





ENGLISH SYNONYMS
EXPLAINED

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IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER

WITH

COPIOUS ILLUSTRATIONS AND EXAMPLES

DRAWN FROM THE BEST WRITERS

BY

GEORGE CRABB, A.M.

AUTHOR OF THE UNIVERSAL TECHNOLOGICAL DICTIONARY

Sed cum idem frequentissimè plura significant, quod *synonymula* vocatur, jam sunt aliis alia honestiora, sublimiora, nitidiora, jucundiora, vocaliora.

QUINTIL. INST. ORAT. *lib. ix.*

LONDON

GEORGE ROUTLEDGE AND SONS, LIMITED

BROADWAY, LUDGATE HILL

1901

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THE

COMMON ILLUSTRATIONS AND EXAMPLES

DOWN FROM THE 12th CENTURY

LONDON:

PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN

10, BEDFORD SQUARE, LONDON, W.C.2

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LONDON

PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED

STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS

1894

PREFACE.

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It may seem surprising that the English, who have employed their talents successfully in every branch of literature, and in none more than in that of philology, should yet have fallen below other nations in the study of their synonyms: it cannot, however, be denied that, whilst the French and Germans have had several considerable works on the subject, we have not a single writer who has treated it in a scientific manner adequate to its importance: not that I wish by this remark to depreciate the labours of those who have preceded me; but simply to assign it as a reason why I have now been induced to come forward with an attempt to fill up what is considered a chasm in English literature.

In the prosecution of my undertaking, I have profited by everything which has been written in any language upon the subject; and although I always pursued my own train of thought, yet whenever I met with anything deserving of notice I adopted it, and referred it to the author in a note. I had not proceeded far before I found it necessary to restrict myself in the choice of my materials; and accordingly laid it down as a rule not to compare any words together which were sufficiently distinguished from each other by striking features in their signification, such as *abandon* and *quit*, which require a comparison with others, though not necessarily with themselves; for the same reason I was obliged to limit myself, as a rule, to one authority for each word, unless where the case seemed to require farther exemplification. But notwithstanding all my care in this respect, I was compelled to curtail much of what I had written, for fear of increasing the volume to an inconvenient size.

Although a work of this description does not afford much scope for system and arrangement, yet I laid down to myself the plan of arranging the words according to the extent or universality of their acceptance, placing those first which had the most general sense and application, and the rest in order. By this plan I found myself greatly aided in analyzing their differences, and I trust that the reader will thereby be equally benefited. In the choice of authorities I have been guided by various considerations; namely, the appropriateness of the examples; the classic purity of the author; the justness of the sentiment; and, last of all, the variety of the writers; but I am persuaded that the reader will not be dissatisfied to find that I have shown a decided preference to such authors as Addison, Johnson, Dryden, Pope, Milton, &c. At the same time it is but just to observe that this selection of authorities has been made by an actual perusal of the authors, without the assistance of Johnson's Dictionary.

For the sentiments scattered through this work I offer no apology, although I am aware that they will not fall in with the views of many who may be competent to decide on its literary merits. I write not to please or displease any description of persons ; but I trust that what I have written according to the dictates of my mind will meet the approbation of those whose good opinion I am most solicitous to obtain. Should any object to the introduction of morality in a work of science, I beg them to consider, that a writer, whose business it was to mark the nice shades of distinction between words closely allied, could not do justice to his subject without entering into all the relations of society, and showing, from the acknowledged sense of many moral and religious terms, what has been the general sense of mankind on many of the most important questions which have agitated the world. My first object certainly has been to assist the philological inquirer in ascertaining the force and comprehension of the English language ; yet I should have thought my work but half completed had I made it a mere register of verbal distinctions. While others seize every opportunity unblushingly to avow and zealously to propagate opinions destructive of good order, it would ill become any individual of contrary sentiments to shrink from stating his convictions, when called upon as he seems to be by an occasion like that which has now offered itself. As to the rest, I throw myself on the indulgence of the public, with the assurance that having used every endeavour to deserve their approbation, I shall not make an appeal to their candour in vain.

ENGLISH SYNONYMS

EXPLAINED.

To Abandon, Desert, Forsake, Relinquish.

THE idea of leaving or separating one's self from an object is common to these terms, which differ in the circumstances or modes of leaving. The two former are more solemn acts than the two latter.

Abandon, from the French *abandonner*, is a conjunction of the words *donner a ban*, to give up to a public ban or outlawry. To *abandon* then is to expose to every misfortune which results from a formal and public denunciation; to set out of the protection of law and government; and to deny the privileges of citizenship.

Desert, in Latin *desertus*, participle of *desero*, that is, *de* privative and *sero* to sow, signifying unsworn, unplanted, cultivated no longer. To *desert* then is to leave off cultivating; and as there is something of idleness and improvidence in ceasing to render the soil productive, ideas of disapprobation accompany the word in all its metaphorical applications. He who leaves off cultivating a farm usually removes from it; hence the idea of removal and blameworthy removal, which usually attaches to the term.

Forsake, in Saxon *forsecan*, is compounded of the primitive *for* and *sake*, *seek* *secan*, signifying to seek no more, to leave off seeking that which has been an object of search.

Relinquish, in Latin *relinquo*, is compounded of *re* or *retro* behind and *linquo* to leave, that is, to leave what we would fain take with us, to leave with reluctance.

To *abandon* is totally to withdraw ourselves from an object; to lay aside all care and concern for it; to leave it altogether to itself: to *desert* is to withdraw ourselves at certain times when our assistance or co-operation is required, or to separate ourselves from that to which we ought to be attached: to *forsake* is to withdraw our regard for and interest in an object, to keep at a distance from it: to *relinquish* is to leave that which has once been an object of our pursuit.

Abandon and *desert* are employed for persons or things; *forsake* for persons or places; *relinquish* for things only.

With regard to persons these terms express

moral culpability in a progressive ratio downwards: *abandon* comprehends the violation of the most sacred ties; *desert*, a breach of honour and fidelity; *forsake*, a rupture of the social bond.

We *abandon* those who are entirely dependent upon us for protection and support; they are left in a helpless state exposed to every danger; a child is *abandoned* by its parent; we *desert* those with whom we have entered into coalition; they are left to their own resources; a soldier *deserts* his comrades; a partisan *deserts* his friends: we *forsake* those with whom we have been in habits of intimacy; they are deprived of the pleasures and comforts of society; a man *forsakes* his companions; a lover *forsakes* his mistress.

We are bound by every law human and divine not to *abandon*; we are called upon by every good principle not to *desert*; we are impelled by every kind feeling not to *forsake*.

Few animals except man will *abandon* their young until they are enabled to provide for themselves. Interest, which is but too often the only principle that brings men together, will lead them to *desert* each other in the time of difficulty. We are enjoined in the gospel not to *forsake* the poor and needy.

When *abandoned* by our dearest relatives, *deserted* by our friends, and *forsaken* by the world, we have always a resource in our Maker.

He who *abandons* his offspring, or corrupts them by his example, perpetrates a greater evil than a murderer.—HAWKESWORTH.

After the death of Stella, Swift's benevolence was contracted, and his severity exasperated; he drove his acquaintance from his table and wondered why he was *deserted*.—JOHNSON.

Forsake me not thus, Adam !—MILTON.

With regard to things (in which sense the word *relinquish* is synonymous) the character of *abandoning* varies with the circumstances, and motives of the action, according to which it is either good, bad, or indifferent; *deserting* is always taken in an unfavourable or bad sense; the act of *forsaking* is indifferent; that of *relinquishing* is prudent or imprudent.

A captain may *abandon* his vessel when he has no means of saving it, except at the risk of his life; but an upright statesman will never *desert* his post when his country is in danger, nor a true soldier *desert* his colours.

Birds will mostly forsake their nests when they discover them to have been visited. Men often inadvertently relinquish the fairest prospects in order to follow some favourite scheme which terminates in their ruin.

No wise man will abandon his house when it is on fire. It is the common consequence of war that the peaceable and well-disposed are compelled to desert their houses and their homes. Animals that are pursued by the sportsman will forsake their haunts, when they find themselves much molested. It is sometimes better to relinquish our claims than to contend for them at the expense of our peace.

Having abandoned their all, they forsook the place which gave them birth, and relinquished the advantages which they might have obtained from their rank and family.

—neglected Nature pine
Abandoned.—COWPER.

He who at the approach of evil betrays his trust, or deserts his post, is branded with cowardice.—HAWKESWORTH.

When learning, abilities, and what is excellent in the world, forsake the church, we may easily foretell its ruin without the gift of prophecy.—SOUTH.

Men are wearied with the toil which they bear, but cannot find in their hearts to relinquish it.—STEELE.

To Abandon, Resign, Renounce, Abdicate.

The idea of giving up is common to these terms, which signification, though analogous to the former, admits, however, of a distinction; as in the one case we separate ourselves from an object, in the other we send or cast it from us.

Abandon, *v.* To abandon, desert.

Resign, from *re* and *signo*, signifies to sign away or back from one's self.

Renounce, in Latin *renuncio*, from *nuncio* to tell or declare, is to declare off from a thing.

Abdicate, from *ab* from, and *dico* to speak, signifies likewise to call or cry off from a thing.

We abandon and resign by giving up to another; we renounce by sending away from ourselves; we abandon a thing by transferring our power over to another; in this manner a debtor abandons his goods to his creditors: we resign a thing by transferring our possession of it to another; in this manner we resign a place to a friend: we renounce a thing by simply ceasing to hold it; in this manner we renounce a claim or a profession. As to renounce signified originally to give up by word of mouth, and to resign to give up by signature, the former is consequently a less formal action than the latter: we may renounce by implication; we resign in direct terms: we renounce the pleasures of the world when we do not seek to enjoy them; we resign a pleasure, a profit, or advantage, of which we expressly give up the enjoyment.

To abdicate is a species of informal resignation. A monarch abdicates his throne who simply declares his will to cease to reign; but a minister resigns his office when he gives up the seals by which he held it.

An humane commander will not abandon a town to the rapine of his soldiers. The motives for resignations are various. Discontent, disgust, and the love of repose, are the

ordinary inducements for men to resign honourable and lucrative employments. Men are not so ready to renounce the pleasures that are within their reach, as to seek for those which are out of their reach. The abdication of a throne is not always an act of magnanimity, it may frequently result from caprice or necessity.

Charles the Fifth abdicated his crown, and his minister resigned his office on the very same day, when both renounced the world with its allurements and its troubles.

The passive Gods beheld the Greeks defile
Their temples, and abandon to the spoil
Their own abodes.—DRYDEN.

It would be a good appendix to "the art of living and and dying," if any one would write "the art of growing old," and teach men to resign their pretensions to the pleasures of youth.—STEELE.

For ministers to be silent in the cause of Christ is to renounce it, and to fly is to desert it.—SOUTH.

Much gratitude is due to the Nine from their favoured poets, and much hath been paid, for even to the present hour they are invoked and worshipped by the sons of verse, whilst all the other deities of Olympus have either abdicated their thrones, or been dismissed from them with contempt.—CUMBERLAND.

We abandon nothing but that over which we have had an entire and lawful control; we abdicate nothing but that which we have held by a certain right; but we may resign or renounce that which may be in our possession only by an act of violence. A usurper cannot abandon his people, because he has no people over whom he can exert a lawful authority; still less can he abdicate a throne, because he has no throne to abdicate, but he may resign supreme power, because power may be unjustly held; or he may renounce his pretensions to a throne, because pretensions may be fallacious or extravagant.

Abandon and resign are likewise used in a reflective sense; the former to express an involuntary or culpable action, the latter that which is voluntary and proper. The soldiers of Hannibal abandoned themselves to effeminacy during their winter quarters at Capua.

It is the part of every good man's religion to resign himself to God's will.—CUMBERLAND.

To Abandon, *v.* To give up, abandon.

Abandoned, *v.* Profligate.

To Abase, Humble, Degrade, Disgrace, Debase.

To Abase expresses the strongest degree of self-humiliation, from the French *abaisser*, to bring down or make low, which is compounded of the intensive syllable *a* or *ad* and *baiss* from *bas* low, in Latin *basis* the base, which is the lowest part of a column. It is at present used principally in the Scripture language, or in a metaphorical style, to imply the laying aside all the high pretensions which distinguish us from our fellow-creatures, the descending to a state comparatively low and mean.

To Humble, in French *humilier*, from the Latin *humilis* humble, and *humus* the ground, naturally marks a prostration to the ground, and figuratively a lowering the thoughts and feelings.

According to the principles of Christianity whoever abaseth himself shall be exalted, and according to the same principles whoever reflects on his own littleness and unworthiness will daily humble himself before his Maker.

To Degrade, in French *degrader*, from the

Latin *gradus* a step, signifies to bring a step lower; figuratively, to lower in the estimation of others. It supposes already a state of elevation either in outward circumstances or in public opinion.

Disgrace is compounded of the privative *dis* and the noun *grace* or favour. To *disgrace* properly implies to put out of favour, which is always attended more or less with circumstances of ignominy, and reflects contempt on the object.

Debase is compounded of the intensive syllable *de* and the adjective *base*, signifying to make very base or low.

The modest man *abases* himself by not insisting on the distinctions to which he may be justly entitled; the penitent man *humbles* himself by confessing his errors the man of rank *degrades* himself by a too familiar deportment with his inferiors; he *disgraces* himself by his meannesses and irregularities, and *debases* his character by his vices.

We can never be *abased* by abasing ourselves, but we may be *humbled* by unseasonable humiliations, or improper concessions; we may be *degraded* by descending from our rank, and *disgraced* by the exposure of our unworthy actions.

The great and good man may be *abased* and *humbled*, but never *degraded* or *disgraced*: his glory follows him in his abasement or humiliation; his greatness protects him from degradation, and his virtue shields him from disgrace.

It is necessary to *abase* those who will exalt themselves; to *humble* those who have lofty opinions of themselves; to *degrade* those who act inconsistently with their rank and station; to *disgrace* those who are *debased* by vice and profligacy.

'Tis immortality, 'tis that alone
Amidst life's pains, abasements, emptiness,
The soul can comfort.—YOUNG.

My soul is justly *humbled* in the dust.—ROWE.

It is very disingenuous to level the best of mankind with the worst, and for the faults of particulars to *degrade* the whole species.—HUGHES.

You'd think no fools *disgraced* the former reign.

Did not some grave examples still remain.—POPE.

The great masters of composition know very well that many an elegant word becomes improper for a poet or an orator when it has been *debated* by common use.—ADDISON.

To Abash, Confound, Confuse.

Abash is an intensive of *abase*, signifying to abase thoroughly in spirit.

Confound and **Confuse** are derived from different parts of the same Latin verb *confundo* and its participle *confusus*. *Confundo* is compounded of *con* and *fundo* to pour together. To *confound* and *confuse* then signify properly to melt together or into one mass what ought to be distinct; and figuratively, as it is here taken, to derange the thoughts in such manner as that they seem melted together.

Abash expresses more than *confound*, and *confound* more than *confuse*.

Shame contributes greatly to *abashment*; what is sudden and unaccountable serves to *confound*; bashfulness and a variety of emotions give rise to *confusion*.

The haughty man is *abashed* when he is humbled in the eyes of others; the wicked man is *confounded* when his villainy is suddenly de-

tected; a modest person may be *confused* in the presence of his superiors.

Abash is always taken in a bad sense; neither the scorn of fools, nor the taunts of the oppressor, will *abash* him who has a conscience void of offence towards God and man. To be *confounded* is not always the consequence of guilt: superstition and ignorance are liable to be *confounded* by extraordinary phenomena; and Providence sometimes thinks fit to *confound* the wisdom of the wisest by signs and wonders, far above the reach of human comprehension. *Confusion* is at the best an infirmity more or less excusable according to the nature of the cause: a steady mind and a clear head are not easily *confused*, but persons of quick sensibility cannot always preserve a perfect collection of thought in trying situations, and those who have any consciousness of guilt, and are not very hardened, will be soon thrown into *confusion* by close interrogatories.

If Peter was so *abashed* when Christ gave him a look after his denial, if there was so much dread in his looks when he was a prisoner: how much greater will it be when he sits as a judge!—SOUTH.

Alas! I am afraid they have awaked,

And 'tis not done: th' attempt and not the deed,

Confounds us!—SHAKESPEARE.

The various evils of disease and poverty, pain and sorrow, are frequently derived from others; but shame and *confusion* are supposed to proceed from ourselves, and to be incurred only by the misconduct which they furnish.—HAWKESWORTH.

To Abate, Lessen, Diminish, Decrease.

Abate from the French *abattre*, signified originally to beat down, in the active sense; to come down, in the neuter sense.

Diminish, or, as it is sometimes written, *minish*, from the Latin *diminuo*, and *minuo* to lessen, and *minus* less, expresses, like the verb *lessen*, the sense of either making less or becoming less.

Decrease is compounded of the privative *de* and *crease*, in Latin *cresco*, to grow, signifying to grow less.

The first three are used transitively or intransitively; the latter only intransitively.

Abate respects the vigour of action: a person's fever is *abated* or *abates*; the violence of the storm *abates*; pain and anger *abate*.

Lessen and *diminish* are both applied to size, quantity, and number, but the former mostly in the proper and familiar sense, the latter in the figurative and higher acceptance; the size of a room or garden is *lessened*; the credit and respectability of a person is *diminished*.

Nothing is so calculated to *abate* the ardour of youth as grief and disappointment; an evil may be *lessened* when it cannot be removed by the application of remedies; nothing *diminishes* the lustre of great deeds more than cruelty.

The passion of an angry man ought to be allowed to *abate* before any appeal is made to his understanding; we may *lessen* the number of our evils by not dwelling upon them.

Objects apparently *diminish* according to the distance from which they are observed.

To *decrease* is to diminish for a continuance; a retreating army will *decrease* rapidly when, exposed to all the privations and hardships attendant on forced marches, it is comp^d to

to fight for its safety: some things *decrease* so gradually that it is some time before they are observed to be *diminished*.

In the abstract sense the word *lessening* is mostly supplied by *diminution*: it will be no *abatement* of sorrow to a generous mind to know that the *diminution* of evil to itself has been produced by the abridgment of good to another.

My wonder *abated*, when upon looking around me, I saw most of them attentive to three Syrens clothed like goddesses, and distinguished by the name of Sloth, Ignorance, and Pleasure.—ADDISON.

Tully was the first who observed that friendship improves happiness and *abates* misery.—ADDISON.

He sought fresh fountains in a foreign soil;

The pleasure *lessened* the attending toil.—ADDISON.

If Parthenissa can now possess her own mind, and think as little of her beauty, as she ought to have done when she had it, there will be no great *diminution* of her charms.—HUGHES.

These leaks shall then *decrease*; the sails once more
Direct our course to some relieving shore.—FALCONER.

To *Abate*, v. To *subside*.

Abbreviation, v. *Contraction*.

To *Abdicate*, v. To *abandon*.

To Abdicate, Desert.

The following celebrated speech of Lord Somers, in 1688, on King James's vacating the throne, may be admitted as a happy elucidation of these two important words; but I am not inclined to think that they come sufficiently close in signification to render any comparison necessary.

"What is appointed me to speak to 's your Lordships' first amendment by which the word *abdicated* in the Commons' vote is changed into the word *deserted*, and I am to acquaint your Lordships what some of the grounds are that induced the Commons to insist on the word *abdicated*, and not to agree to your amendment.

"The first reason your Lordships are pleased to deliver for your changing the word is, that the word *abdicated* your Lordships do not find is a word known to the common law of England, and therefore ought not to be used. The next is that the common application of the word amounts to a voluntary express renunciation, which is not in this case, nor will follow from the premises.

"My Lords, as to the first of these reasons, if it be an objection that the word *abdicated* hath not a known sense in the common law of England, there is the same objection against the word *deserted*; so that your Lordships' first reason hath the same force against your own amendment, as against the term used by the Commons.

"The words are both Latin words, and used in the best authors, and both of a known signification; their meaning is very well understood, though it be true their meaning is not the same. The word *abdicate* doth naturally and properly signify, entirely to renounce, throw off, disown, relinquish any thing or person, so as to have no further to do with it; and that whether it be done by express words or in writing (which is the sense your Lordships put upon it, and which is properly called resignation or cession), or by doing such acts as are inconsistent with the holding and retaining of the thing, which the

Commons take to be the present case, and therefore make choice of the word *abdicate*, as that which they thought did above all others express that meaning. And in this latter sense it is taken by others; and that this is the true signification of the word I shall show your Lordships out of the best authors.

"The first I shall mention is Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis, l. 2, c. 4, § 4. Venit enim hoc non ex jure civili, sed ex jure naturali, quo quisque suum potest *abdicare*, et ex naturali presumptione, quâ voluisse quis creditur quod sufficienter significavit. And then he goes on: Recusari hæreditas, non tantum verbis sed etiam re, potest, et quovis indicio voluntatis.

"Another instance which I shall mention, to show that for *abdication* a thing it is sufficient to do an act which is inconsistent with retaining it, though there be nothing of express renunciation, is out of Calvin's Lexicon Juridicum, where he says, Generum *abdicat* qui sponsam repudiat. Here is an *abdication* without express words, but it is by doing such an act as doth sufficiently signify his purpose.

"The next author I shall quote is Brisonius, De Verborum Significatione, who hath this passage: Homo liber qui seipsum vendit *abdicat* se statui suo. That is, he who sells himself hath thereby done such an act as cannot consist with his former state of freedom, and is thereby said properly *se abdicasse* statui suo.

"Budæus, in his Commentaries De Origine Juris ad Legem Secundam, expounds the words in the same sense *Abdicare* se magistratu est idem quod abire penitus magistratu. He that goes out of his office of magistracy, let it be in what manner he will, has *abdicated* the magistracy.

"And Grotius, in his book De Jure Belli et Pacis, l. 1, c. 4, § 9, seems to expound the word *abdicare* by *manifeste habere pro derelicto*; that is, he who hath *abdicated* anything hath so far relinquished it, that he hath no right of return to it. And that is the sense the Commons put upon the word. It is an entire alienation of the thing *abdicated*, and so stands in opposition to *dicare*. Dicat qui proprium aliquot faciat, *abdicat* qui alienat; so says Praelejus in his Lexicon Juris. It is therefore insisted on as the proper word by the Commons.

"But the word *deserted* (which is the word, used in the amendment made by your Lordships) hath not only a very doubtful signification, but in the common acceptance both of the civil and canon law, doth signify only a bare withdrawing, a temporary quitting of a thing, and neglect only, which leaveth the party at liberty of returning to it again. *Desertum* pro neglecto, says Spigelius in his Lexicon. But the difference between *deserere* and *derelinquere* is expressly laid down by Bartolus on the 8th law of the 58th title of the 11th book of the Code, and his words are these: Nota diligenter ex hac lege, quod aliud est agrum *deserere*, aliud *derelinquere*; qui enim *derelinquit* ipsum ex penitentia non revocare, sed qui *deserit*, intra biennium potest.

"Whereby it appears, my Lords, that is

called *desertion* which is temporary and relievable; that is called *dereliction*, where there is no power or right to return.

"So in the best Latin authors, and in the civil law, *deserere exercitum* is used to signify soldiers leaving their colours: and in the canon law to *desert* a benefice signifies no more than to be a non-resident.

"In both cases the party hath not only a right of returning, but is bound to return again; which, my Lords, as the Commons do not take to be the present case, so they cannot think that your Lordships do, because it is expressly said, in one of your reasons given in defence of the last amendment, that your Lordships have been and are willing to secure the nation against the return of King James, which your Lordships would not in justice do, if you did look upon it to be no more than a negligent withdrawing, which leaveth a liberty to the party to return.

"For which reasons, my Lords, the Commons cannot agree to the first amendment, to insert the word *deserted* instead of *abdicated*; because it doth not in any sort come up to their sense of the thing, so they apprehend it doth not reach your Lordships' meaning as it is expressed in your reasons, whereas they look upon the word *abdicated* to express properly what is to be inferred from that part of the vote to which your Lordships have agreed, viz., 'That King James II. by going about to subvert the constitution, and by breaking the original contract between king and people, and by violating the fundamental laws, and withdrawing himself out of the kingdom, hath thereby renounced to be a king according to the constitution.' By avowing to govern according to a despotic power unknown to the constitution, and inconsistent therewith, he hath renounced to be a king according to the law; such a king as he swore to be at the coronation; such a king to whom the allegiance of an English subject is due; and hath set up another kind of dominion; which is to all intents an *abdication* or abandoning of his legal title as fully as if it had been done by express words.

"And, my Lords, for these reasons the Commons do insist upon the word *abdicated*, and cannot agree to the word *deserted*."

Without all this learned verbosity it will be obvious to every person that the two words are widely distinct from each other: *abdication* being a pure act of discretion for which a man is answerable to himself only; but *desertion* an act which involves more or less a breach of moral obligation.

Abettor, Accessary, Accomplice.

Abettor, or one that abets, gives aid and encouragement by counsel, promises, or rewards. An **Accessary**, or one added and annexed, takes an active, though subordinate part. An **Accomplice**, from the word *accomplish*, implies the principal in any plot, who takes a leading part and brings it to perfection.

Abettors propose, *accessaries* assist, *accomplices* execute.

The *abettor* and *accessary*, or the *abettor* and *accomplice*, may be one and the same person; but not so the *accessary* and *accomplice*.

In every grand scheme there must be *abettors* to set it on foot, *accessaries* to co-operate, and *accomplices* to put it into execution; in the gunpowder plot there were many secret *abettors*, some noblemen who were *accessaries*, and Guy Fawkes the principal *accomplice*.

I speak this with an eye to those cruel treatments which men of all sides are apt to give the characters of those who do not agree with them. How many men of honour are exposed to public obloquy and reproach! Those therefore who are either the instruments or *abettors* in such infernal dealings ought to be looked upon as persons who make use of religion to support their cause, not their cause to promote religion.—ADDISON.

Why are the French obliged to lend us a part of their tongue before we can know they are conquered? They must be made *accessaries* to their own disgrace; as the Britons were formerly so artificially wrought in the curtain of the Roman theatre, that they seemed to draw it up in order to give the spectators an opportunity of seeing their own defeat celebrated on the stage.—ADDISON.

Either he picks a purse, or robs a house, Or is *accomplice* with some knavish gang.—CUMBERLAND.

To Abhor, Detest, Abominate, Loath.

These terms equally denote a sentiment of aversion.

Abhor, in Latin *abhorreo*, compounded of *ab* from and *horreo* to stiffen with horror, signifies to start from with a strong emotion of horror.

Detest, in Latin *detestor*, compounded of *de* from or against and *testor* to bear witness, signifies to condemn with indignation.

Abominate, in Latin *abominatus*, participle of *abomino*, compounded of *ab* from or against, and *omino* to wish ill luck, signifies to hold in religious abhorrence, to detest in the highest possible degree.

Loath, in Saxon *lathen*, may possibly be a variation of *loal*, in the sense of overload, because it expresses the nausea which commonly attends an overloaded stomach. In the moral acceptation it is a strong figure of speech to mark the abhorrence and disgust which the sight of offensive objects produces.

What we *abhor* is repugnant to our moral feelings; what we *detest* contradicts our moral principle; what we *abominate* does equal violence to our religious and moral sentiments; what we *loath* acts upon us physically and mentally.

Inhumanity and cruelty are objects of *abhorrence*; crimes and injustice of *detestation*; impiety and profaneness of *abomination*; enormous offenders, of *loathing*.

The tender mind will *abhor* what is base and atrocious; the rigid moralist will *detest* every violent infringement on the rights of his fellow creatures: the conscientious man will *abominate* every breach of the Divine law; the agonised mind *loaths* the sight of every object which recalls to its recollection the subject of its distress.

The chaste Lucretia *abhorred* the pollution to which she had been exposed, and would have *loathed* the sight of the atrocious perpetrator: Brutus *detested* the oppression and the oppressor.

The lie that flatters I *abhor* the most.—COWPER.

This thirst of kindred blood my sons *detest*.—DRYDEN.

The passion that is excited in the fable of the Sisk Kite is that of the object of which is the despair of him who perceives himself to be dying, and has reason to fear that his very prayer is an *abomination*.—HAWKSWORTH.

No costly lords the sumptuous banquet deal, To make him *loath* his vegetable meal.—GOLDSMITH.

Revolving in his mind the stern command,
He longs to fly, and loathes the charming land.—DRYDEN.

To Abide, Sojourn, Dwell, Reside, Inhabit.

Abide, in Saxon *abitan*, old German *beiten*, comes from the Arabic or Persian *but*, or *bit*, to pass the night, that is, to make a partial stay.

Sojourn, in French *sejourner*, from *sub* and *diurnus* in the day time, signifies to pass the day, that is, a certain portion of one's time, in a place.

Dwell, from the Danish *dwelger* to abide and the Saxon *dwelian*, Dutch *dwoelen* to wander, conveys the idea of a moveable habitation, such as was the practice of living formerly in tents. At present it implies a perpetual stay, which is expressed in common discourse by the word *live*, for passing one's life.

Reside, from the Latin *re* and *sideo* to sit down, conveys the full idea of a settlement.

Inhabit, from the Latin *habito*, a frequentative of *habeo*, signifies to have or occupy for a permanency.

The length of stay implied in these terms is marked by a certain gradation.

Abide denotes the shortest stay; to *sojourn* is of longer continuance; *dwelt* comprehends the idea of perpetuity, but *reside* and *inhabit* are partial and local—we *dwelt* only in one spot, but we may *reside* at or *inhabit* many places.

These words have likewise a reference to the state of society.

Abide and *sojourn* relate more properly to the wandering habits of men in a primitive state of society.

Dwell, as implying a stay under a cover, is universal in its application; for we may *dwell* either in a palace, a house, a cottage, or any shelter.

Live, *reside*, and *inhabit*, are confined to a civilized state of society; the former applying to the abodes of the inferior orders, the latter to those of the higher classes. The word *inhabit* is never used but in connection with the place inhabited.

The Easterns *abode* with each other, *sojourned* in a country, and *dwelt* in tents.

The Angels *abode* with Lot that night; Abram *sojourned* in the land of Canaan; the Israelites *dwelt* in the land of Goshen.

Savages either *dwelt* in the cavities which nature has formed for them, or in some rude structure erected for a temporary purpose; but as men increase in cultivation they build places for themselves which they can *inhabit*: the poor have their cottages in which they can *live*; the wealthy provide themselves with superb buildings in which they *reside*.

From the first to the last of man's *abode* on earth, the discipline must never be relaxed of guarding the heart from the dominion of passion.—BLAIR.

By the Israelites' *sojourning* in Egypt, God made way for their bondage there, and their bondage for a glorious deliverance through those prodigious manifestations of the Divine power.—SOUTH.

Hence from my sight! Thy father cannot bear thee;
Fly with thy infancy to some dark cell,
Where on the confines of eternal night,
Mourning, misfortunes, cares, and anguish *dwelt*.

MASSINGER.

Being obliged to remove my *habitation*, I was led by

my evil genius to a convenient house in the street where the nobility *reside*.—JOHNSON.

By good company, in the place which I have the misfortune to *inhabit*, we understand not always those from whom good can be learned.—JOHNSON.

Ability, Capacity.

Ability, in French *habilité*, Latin *habilitas*, comes from *able*, *habile*, *habilis*, and *habeo* to have, because possession and power are inseparable.

Capacity, in French *capacité*, Latin *capacitas*, from *capax* and *capio* to receive, marks the abstract quality of being able to receive or hold.

Ability is to capacity as the genus to the species. *Ability* comprehends the power of doing in general, without specifying the quality or degree; *capacity* is a particular kind of ability.

Ability may be either physical or mental, *capacity* is mental only.

Ability respects action, *capacity* respects thought. *Ability* always supposes something able to be done; *capacity* is a mental endowment, and always supposes something ready to receive or hold. Hence we say an *able* commander; an *able* statesman; a man of a *capacious* mind; a great *capacity* of thought.

Ability is no wise limited in its extent; it may be small or great: *capacity* of itself always implies a positive and superior degree of power, although it may be modified by epithets to denote different degrees; a boy of *capacity* will have the advantage over his schoolfellows, particularly if he be classed with those of a dull *capacity*.

A person may be able to write a letter, who is not capable of writing a book.

Abilities, when used in the plural only, is confined to the signification of mental endowments, and comprehends the operations of thought in general; *capacity* on the other hand is that peculiar endowment, that enlargement of understanding, that exalts the possessor above the rest of mankind.

Many men have the *abilities* for managing the concerns of others, who would not have the *capacity* for conducting a concern of their own.

We should not judge highly of that man's *abilities* who could only mar the plans of others, but had no *capacity* for conceiving and proposing anything better in their stead.

A vivid imagination, a retentive memory, an exuberant flow of language, are *abilities* which may be successfully employed in attracting popular applause; but that *capacity* which embraces a question in all its bearings, which surveys with a discriminating eye the mixed multitude of objects that demand attention, which is accompanied with coolness in reflecting, readiness in combining, quickness in inventing, firmness in deciding, promptitude in action, and penetration in discerning, that is the *capacity* to direct a state, which is the gift of but few.

Though a man has not the *abilities* to distinguish himself in the most shining parts of a great character, he has certainly the *capacity* of being just, faithful, modest, and temperate.—ADDISON.

I look upon an *able* statesman out of business like a huge whale, that will endeavour to overturn the ship unless he has an empty cask to play with.—STEELE.

The object is too big for our *capacity*, when we would comprehend the circumference of a world.—ADDISON.

Sir Francis Bacon's capacity seemed to have grasped all that was revealed in books before.—HUGHES.

Ability, *v. Dexterity.*

Ability, *v. Faculty.*

Abject, *v. Lave.*

To Abjure, Recant, Retract, Revoke, Recall.

Abjure, in Latin *abjuro*, is compounded of the privative *ab* and *juro* to swear, signifying to swear to the contrary, or give up with an oath.

Recant, in Latin *recanto*, is compounded of the privative *re* and *canto* to sing or declare, signifying to unsay, to contradict by a counter declaration.

Retract, in Latin *retractus*, participle of *retrahere*, is compounded of *re* back, and *trahere* to draw, signifying to draw back what has been let go.

Revoke and Recall have the same original sense as *recant*, with this difference only, that the word *call*, which is expressed also by *vocate*, or in Latin *voco*, implies an action more suited to a multitude than the word *canto* to sing, which may pass in solitude.

We *abjure* a religion, we *recant* a doctrine, we *retract* a promise, we *revoke* a command, we *recall* an expression.

What has been solemnly professed is renounced by *abjuration*; what has been publicly maintained as a settled point of belief is given up by *recanting*; what has been pledged so as to gain credit is contradicted by *retracting*; what has been pronounced by an act of authority is rendered null by *revocation*; what has been mis-spoken through inadvertence or mistake is rectified by *recalling* the words.

Although Archbishop Cranmer *recanted* the principles of the reformation, yet he soon after *recalled* his words, and died boldly for his faith.

Henry IV. of France *abjured* Calvinism, but he did not *retract* the promise which he had made to the Calvinists of his protection. Louis XIV. drove many of his best subjects from France by *revoking* the edict of Nantes.

Interest but too often leads men to *abjure* their faith; the fear of shame or punishment leads them to *recant* their opinions; the want of principle dictates the *retracting* of one's promise; instability is the ordinary cause for *revoking* decrees; a love of precision commonly induces a speaker or writer to *recall* a false expression.

The pontiff saw Britannia's golden fleece,
Once all his own, invest her worthier sons!
Her verdant valleys, and her fertile plains,
Yellow with grain, *abjure* his hateful sway.—SHENSTONE.

A false satire ought to be *recanted* for the sake of him whose reputation may be injured.—JOHNSON.

When any scholar will convince me that these were true and malicious tales against Socrates, I will *retract* all credit in them, and thank him for the conviction.—CUMBERLAND.

Ah! who the flight of ages can *revoke*!
The free born spirit of her sons is broke;
They bow to Ottoman's imperious yoke!—FALCONER.

That society hath before consented, without *revoking* the same after.—BOOKER.

This done, and since 'tis done 'tis past *recall*,
And since 'tis past recall must be forgotten.—DRYDEN.

To Abolish, Abrogate, Repeal, Revoke, Annul, Cancel.

Abolish, in French *abolir*, Latin *aboleo*, is compounded of *ab* and *oleo* to lose the smell,

signifying to lose every trace of former existence.

Abrogate, in French *abroger*, Latin *abrogatus*, participle of *abrogo*, compounded of *ab* and *rogo* to ask, signifying to ask away, or to ask that a thing may be done away; in allusion to the custom of the Romans, among whom no law was valid unless the consent of the people was obtained by asking, and in like manner no law was unmade without asking their consent.

Repeal, in French *rappeler*, from the Latin words *re* and *appello*, signifies literally to call back or unsay what has been said, which is in like manner the original meaning of *revoke*.

Annul, in French *annuler*, comes from *nil*, in Latin *nihil*, signifying to reduce to nothing.

Cancel, in French *cancelier*, comes from the Latin *cancello* to cut cross-wise, signifying to strike out crosswise, that is, to cross out.

Abolish is a more gradual proceeding than *abrogate* or any of the other actions. *Disuse abolishes*; a positive interference is necessary to *abrogate*. The former is employed with regard to customs: the latter with regard to the authorised transactions of mankind.

Laws are *repealed* or *abrogated*; but the former of these terms is mostly in modern use, the latter is applied to the proceedings of the senate. Edicts are *revoked*. Official proceedings, contracts &c., are *annulled*. Deeds, bonds, obligations, debts, &c., are *cancelled*.

The introduction of new customs will cause the *abolition* of the old. None can *repeal* but those who have the power to make laws; the *revocation* of any edict is the individual act of one who has the power to publish; to *annul* may be the act of superior authority, or an agreement between the parties from whom the act emanated; a reciprocal obligation is *annulled* by the mutual consent of those who have imposed it on each other; but if the obligation be an authoritative act, the *annulment* must be so too: to *cancel* is the act of an individual towards another on whom he has a legal demand; an obligation may be *cancelled*, either by a resignation of right on the part of the one to whom it belonged, or a satisfaction of the demand on the part of the obliged person.

A change of taste, aided by political circumstances, has caused the *abolition* of jousts and tournaments and other military sports in Europe. The Roman people sometimes *abrogated* from party spirit what the magistrates enacted for the good of the republic; the same restless temper would lead many to wish for the *repeal* of the most salutary acts of our parliament.

Caprice, which has often dictated the proclamation of a decree in arbitrary governments, has occasioned its *revocation* after a short interval.

It is sometimes prudent to *annul* proceedings which have been decided upon hastily.

A generous man may be willing to *cancel* a debt; but a grateful man preserves the debt in his mind, and will never suffer it to be *cancelled*.

Or wilt thou thyself
Abolish thy creation, and unmake
For him what for thy glory thou hast made!—MILTON.

On the parliament's part it was proposed that all the bishops, deans, and chapters might be immediately taken away and *abolished*.—CLARENDON.

If the Presbyterians should obtain their ends, I could not be sorry to find them mistaken in the point which they have most at heart, by the *repeal* of the test; I mean the benefit of employments.—SWIFT.

Solon *abrogated* all Draco's sanguinary laws except those that affected murder.—CUMBERLAND.

When we *abrogate* a law as being ill made, the whole cause for which it was made still remaining, do we not herein *revoke* our own deed, and upbraid ourselves with folly?—HOOKER.

I will *annul*.

By the high power with which the laws invest me,
Those guilty forms in which you have entrap'd,
Basely entrap'd, to thy detested nuptials,
My queen betroth'd.—THOMSON.

At this hour make friendships which he breaks the next,
And every breach supplies a vile pretext,
Basely to *cancel* all concessions past,
If in a thousand you deny the last.—CUMBERLAND.

Abominable, * Detestable, Execrable.

The primitive idea of these terms, agreeable to their derivation, is that of badness in the highest degree; conveying by themselves the strongest signification, and excluding the necessity for every other modifying epithet.

The *abominable* thing excites aversion; the *detestable* thing, hatred and revulsion; the *execrable* thing, indignation and horror.

These sentiments are expressed against what is *abominable* by strong ejaculations, against what is *detestable* by animadversion and reprobation, and against what is *execrable* by imprecations and anathemas.

In the ordinary acceptation of these terms, they serve to mark a degree of excess in a very bad thing; *abominable* expressing less than *detestable*, and that less than *execrable*. This gradation is sufficiently illustrated in the following example. Dionysius, the tyrant, having been informed that a very aged woman prayed to the gods every day for his preservation, and wondering that any of his subjects should be so interested for his safety, inquired of this woman respecting the motives of her conduct, to which she replied, "In my infancy I lived under an *abominable* prince, whose death I desired; but when he perished, he was succeeded by a *detestable* tyrant worse than himself. I offered up my vows for his death also, which were in like manner answered; but we have since had a worse tyrant than he. This *execrable* monster is yourself, whose life I have prayed for, lest, if it be possible, you should be succeeded by one even *worse* wicked."

The exaggeration conveyed by these expressions has given rise to their abuse in vulgar discourse, where they are often employed indifferently to serve the humour of the speaker.

This *abominable* endeavour to suppress or lessen every thing that is praiseworthy is as frequent among the men as among the women.—STEELE.

Nothing can atone for the want of modesty, without which beauty is ungraceful, and wit *detestable*.—STEELE.

All vote to leave that *execrable* shore,
Polluted with the blood of Polydore.—DRYDEN.

To Abominate, v. To Abhor.

Abortion, v. Failure.

* Vide Abbe Roubaud's Synonymes; "Abominable, detestable, execrable."

Above, Over, Upon, Beyond.

When an object is *above* another, it exceeds it in height; when it is *over* another, it extends along its superior surface; when it is *upon* another, it comes in contact with its superior surface; when it is *beyond* another, it lies at a greater distance. Trees frequently grow *above* a wall, and sometimes the branches hang *over* the wall or rest *upon* it, but they seldom stretch much *beyond* it.

In the figurative sense the first is mostly employed to convey the idea of superiority; the second of authority; the third of immediate influence; and the fourth of extent. Every one should be *above* falsehood, but particularly those who are set *over* others, who may have an influence on their minds *beyond* all calculation.

So when with crackling flames a caldron fries,
The bubbling waters from the bottom rise,
Above the brims they force their fiery way,
Black vapours climb aloft and cloud the day.—DRYDEN.

The geese fly *over* the barn, the bees in arms
Drive headlong from their waxen cells in swarms.
—DRYDEN.

As I did stand my watch *upon* the hill
I look'd toward Birnam, and anon methought
The wood began to move.—SHAKESPEARE.

He that sees a dark and shady grove
Stays not, but looks *beyond* it on the sky.—HERBERT.

The public power of all societies is *above* every soul contained in the same societies.—HOOKER.

The church has *over* her, bishops able to silence the factious, no less by their preaching than their authority.
—SOUTH.

This is thy work, Almighty Providence,
Whose power *beyond* the stretch of human thought
Revolves the orbs of empire.—THOMSON.

To Abridge, Curtail, Contract.

Abridge, in French *abréger*, Latin *abbreviare*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *ab* and *breviare*, from *brevis* short, signifying to make short.

Curtail, in French *courte* short and *tailler* to cut, signifies to diminish in length by cutting.

Contract, in Latin *contractus*, participle of *contraho*, is compounded of *con* and *traho*, signifying to draw close together.

By *abridging*, in the figurative as well as the literal sense, the quality is diminished; by *curtailing*, the magnitude or number is reduced; by *contracting*, a thing is brought within smaller compass.

Privileges are *abridged*, pleasures *curtailed*, and powers *contracted*.

When the rights of the subject are too much *abridged*, the enjoyments of life become *curtailed*, as the powers of acting and thinking, according to the genuine impulse of the mind, are thereby considerably *contracted*.

It is ungenerous to *abridge* the liberty of any one, or *curtail* him of his advantages, while he makes no improper use of them; or otherwise it is advisable, in order to *contract* his means of doing mischief.

This would very much *abridge* the lover's pains in this way of writing a letter, as it would enable him to express the most useful and significant words with a single touch of the needle.—ADDISON.

I remember several ladies who were once very near seven foot high, that at present want some inches of five: how they came to be thus *curtailed* I cannot learn.—ADDISON.

He that rises up early and goes to bed late only to receive addresses is really as much tied and *abridged* in

his freedom as he that waits all that time to present one. —SOUTH.

God has given no man a body as strong as his appetites; but has corrected the boundlessness of his voluptuous desires, by stinting his strength and contracting his capacities. —SOUTH.

To Abridge, *v.* To debar.

Abridgement, Compendium, Epitome, Digest, Summary, Abstract.

The first four terms are applied to a distinct work, the latter two to parts of a work.

An **Abridgement** is the reduction of a work into a smaller compass. A **Compendium** is a general and concise view of any science, as geography or astronomy. An **Epitome** is a similarly general and concise view of historical events. A **Digest** is any materials digested in order. A **Summary** comprehends the heads and subdivisions of a work. An **Abstract** includes a brief but comprehensive view of any particular part.

Abridgements often surpass the originals in value when they are made with judgment. *Compendiums* are fitted for young persons to commit to memory on commencing the study of any science. There is perhaps not a better *epitome* than that of the Universal History by Bossuet, nor a better *digest* than that of the laws made by order of Justinian. Systematic writers give occasional *summaries* of what they have been treating upon. It is frequently necessary to make *abstracts* of judicial proceedings when they are excessively voluminous.

I shall lay before my readers an *abridgement* of some few of their extravagancies, in hopes that they will in time accustom themselves to dream a little more to the purpose. —SPECTATOR.

Indices and dictionaries are the *compendium* of all knowledge. —POPE.

The face is the *epitome* of the whole man, and the eyes are as it were the *epitome* of the face. —HUGHES.

If we had a complete *digest* of Hindu and Mahomedan laws after the model of Justinian's celebrated *Pandects*, we should rarely be at a loss for principles and rules of law applicable to the cases before us. —SIR W. JONES.

As the *Theselda*, upon which Chaucer's *Knight's Tale* is founded, is very rarely to be met with, it may not be unpleasing to the reader to see here a short *summary* of it. —TYRWHITT.

Though Mr. Halhed performed his part with fidelity, yet the Persian interpreter had supplied him only with a loose, injudicious *epitome* of the original Sanscrit: in which *abstract* many essential passages are omitted. —SIR W. JONES.

To Abrogate, *v.* To abolish.

Abrupt, Rugged, Rough.

Abrupt, in Latin *abruptus*, participle of *abrumco* to break off, signifies the state of being broken off.

Rugged in Saxon *krugge*, comes from the Latin *rugosus* full of wrinkles.

Rough is in Saxon *reoh*, high German *rauh*, low German *rug*, Dutch *ruig*, in Latin *rudis* uneven.

These words mark different degrees of unevenness. What is *abrupt* has greater cavities and protuberances than what is *rugged*; what is *rugged* has greater irregularities than what is *rough*. In the natural sense *abrupt* is opposed to what is unbroken, *rugged* to what is even, and *rough* to what is smooth.

A *precipice* is *abrupt*, a path is *rugged*, a plank is *rough*.

The *abruptness* of a body is generally occasioned by a violent concussion and separation of its parts; *ruggedness* arises from natural, but less violent causes; *roughness* is mostly a natural property, although sometimes produced by friction.

In the figurative sense the distinction is equally clear.

Words and manners are *abrupt* when they are sudden and unconnected; the temper is *rugged* which is exposed to frequent ebullitions of angry humour; actions are *rough* when performed with violence and incaution.

An *abrupt* behaviour is the consequence of an agitated mind; a *rugged* disposition is inherent in the character; a *rough* deportment arises from an undisciplined state of feeling.

An habitual steadiness and coolness of reflection is best fitted to prevent or correct any *abruptness* of manners; a cultivation of the Christian temper cannot fail of smoothing down all *ruggedness* of humour; an intercourse with polished society will inevitably refine down all *roughness* of behaviour.

The precipices *abrupt*,
Projecting horror on the blackened flood,
Softens at thy return. —THOMSON'S SUMMER.

The evils of this life appear like rocks and precipices, *rugged* and barren at a distance; but at our nearer approach we find them little fruitful spots. —SPECTATOR.

Not the rough whirlwind, that deforms
Adria's black gulf, and vexes it with storms,
The stubborn virtue of his soul can move. —FRANCIS.

To Abscond, Steal Away, Secrete One's Self.

Abscond, in Latin *abscondo*, is compounded of *abs* and *condo*, signifying to hide from the view, which is the original meaning of the other words; to *abscond* is to remove one's self for the sake of not being discovered by those with whom we are acquainted.

To **Steal Away** is to get away so as to elude observation.

To **Secrete One's Self** is to get into a place of secrecy without being perceived.

Dishonest men *abscond*, thieves *steal away* when they dread detection, and fugitives *secrete themselves*.

Those who *abscond* will have frequent occasion to *steal away*, and still more frequent occasion to *secrete themselves*.

Absent, Abstracted, Diverted, Distracted.

Absent, in French *absent*, Latin *absens*, comes from *ab* from and *sum* to be, signifying away or at a distance from all objects.

Abstracted in French *abstrait*, Latin *abstractus*, participle of *abstrahō*, or *ab* from and *trahō* to draw, signifies drawn or separated from all objects.

Diverted, in French *divertir*, Latin *diverto*, compounded of *dis* or *dis* asunder and *verto* to turn, signifies to turn aside from the object that is present.

Distracted of course implies drawn asunder by different objects.

A want of attention is implied in all these terms, but in different degrees and under different circumstances.

Absent and *abstracted* denote a total exclusion of present objects; *diverted* and *distracted*

a misapplied attention to surrounding objects, an attention to such things as are not the immediate object of concern.

Absent and *abstracted* differ less in sense than in application; the former is an epithet expressive either of a habit or a state, and precedes the noun; the latter expresses a state only, and is never adjoined to the noun; we say, a man is *absent* or an *absent man*; he is *abstracted*, but not an *abstracted man*.

We are *absent* or *abstracted* when not thinking on what passes before us; we are *diverted* when we listen to any other discourse than that which is addressed to us; we are *distracted* when we listen to the discourse of two persons at the same time.

The *absent man* has his mind and person never in the same place: he is *abstracted* from all the surrounding scenes; his senses are locked up from all the objects that seek for admittance; he is often at Rome while walking the streets of London, or solving a problem of Euclid in a social party. The man who is *diverted* seeks to be present at everything; he is struck with everything, and ceases to be attentive to one thing in order to direct his regards to another; he turns from the right to the left, but does not stop to think on any one point. The *distracted man* can be present at nothing, as all objects strike him with equal force; his thoughts are in a state of vacillation and confusion.

A habit of profound study sometimes causes *absence*; it is well for such a mind to be sometimes *diverted*; the ardent contemplation of any one subject occasions frequent *abstractions*; if they are too frequent, or ill-timed, they are reprehensible: the juvenile and versatile mind is most prone to be *diverted*; it follows the bias of the senses which are caught by the outward surface of things; it is impelled by curiosity to look rather than to think: a well-regulated mind is rarely exposed to *distractions*, which result from contrariety of feeling as well as thinking, peculiar to persons of strong susceptibility or dull comprehension.

The *absent man* neither derives pleasure from society, nor imparts any to it; his resources are in himself. The man who is easily *diverted* is easily pleased; but he may run the risk of displeasing others by the *distractions* of his mind. The *distracted man* is a burden to himself and others.

Theophrastus called one who barely rehearsed his speech, with his eyes fixed, an "*absent actor*,"—HUGHES.

A voice, than human more, th' *abstracted ear*
Of fancy strikes, "Be not afraid of us,
Poor kindred man,"—THOMSON.

The mind is refrigerated by interruption; the thoughts are *diverted* from the principal subject; the reader is weary he knows not why,—JOHNSON'S PREFACE TO SHAKESPEARE.

He used to rave for his Marianne, and call upon her in his *distracted fits*.—ADDISON.

To Absolve, Acquit.

Absolve, in Latin *absolvo*, is compounded of *ab* from and *solveo* to loose, signifying to loose from that with which one is bound.

Acquit, in French *acquitter*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *ac* or *ad*, and *quit*, *quitter*, in Latin *quietus* quiet, signifying to make easy by the removal of a charge.

These two words convey an important dis-

inction between the act of the Creator and the creature.

To *absolve* is the free act of an omnipotent and merciful being towards sinners; to *acquit* is the act of an earthly tribunal towards supposed offenders.

By *absolution* we are released from the bondage of sin, and placed in a state of favour with God; by an *acquittal* we are released from the charge of guilt, and re-instated in the good estimation of our fellow creatures.

Absolution is obtained not from our own merits, but the atoning merits of a Redeemer; *acquittal* is an act of justice due to the innocence of the individual.

Absolution is the work of God only; by him alone it can be made known to the penitent offender: *acquittal* is the work of man only; by him alone it is pronounced.

Although but few individuals may have occasion for *acquittal*; yet we all stand in daily and hourly need of *absolution* at the hands of our Creator and Redeemer.

Yet to be secret, make not sin the less;
Tis only hidden from the vulgar view,
Maintains indeed the reverence due to princes,
But not *absolves* the conscience from the crime.—DRYDEN.

The fault of Mr. Savage was rather negligence than ingratitude; but Sir Richard Steele must likewise be *acquitted* of severity; for who is there that can patiently bear contempt from one whom he has relieved and supported?—JOHNSON.

To Absolve, Acquit, Clear.

Absolve, Acquit, v. To absolve.

To *clear* is to make clear.

One is *absolved* from an oath, *acquitted* of a charge, and *cleared* from actual guilt.

No one can *absolve* from an oath but he to whom the oath is made; no one can *acquit* another of a charge but he who has the right of substantiating the charge; yet any one may *clear* himself or another from guilt or the suspicion of guilt, who has adequate proofs of innocence to allege.

The Pope has assumed to himself the right of *absolving* subjects at pleasure from their oath of allegiance to their sovereign; but as an oath is made to God only, it must be his immediate act to cancel the obligation which binds men's consciences.

It is but justice to *acquit* a man of blame, who is enabled to *clear* himself from the appearance of guilt.

Death, that *absolves* my birth, a curse without it!—YOUNG.

Those who are truly learned will *acquit* me in this point, in which I have been so far from offending, that I have been scrupulous perhaps to a fault in quoting the authors of several passages^{which} I might have made my own.—ADDISON.

In vain we attempt to *clear* our conscience by affecting to compensate for fraud or cruelty by acts of strict religious homage towards God.—BLAIR.

To *Absolve, v. To forgive.*

Absolute, Despotie, Arbitrary, Tyrannical.

Absolute, in Latin *absolutus*, participle of *absolveo*, signifies absolved or set at liberty from all restraint as it regards persons; unconditional, unlimited, as it regards things.

Despotie, from *despot* in Greek *δεσποτης* a master or lord, implies being like a lord, uncon-
trolled.

Arbitrary, in French *arbitraire*, from the Latin *arbitrium* will, implies belonging to the will of one independent of that of others.

Tyrannical signifies being like a tyrant.

Absolute power is independent of and superior to all other power: an *absolute* monarch is uncontrolled not only by men but things; he is above all law except what emanates from himself. When this absolute power is assigned to any one according to the constitution of a government, it is *despotic*. *Despotic* power is therefore something less than *absolute* power: a prince is *absolute* of himself; he is *despotic* by the consent of others.

In the early ages of society, monarchs were *absolute*, and among the Eastern nations they still retain the absolute form of government, though much limited by established usage. In the more civilized stages of society the power of *despots* has been considerably restricted by prescribed laws, inasmuch that *despotism* is now classed among the regular forms of government.

Arbitrary and **tyrannical** do not respect the power itself, so much as the exercise of power: the latter is always taken in a bad sense, the former sometimes in an indifferent sense. With *arbitrariness* is associated the idea of caprice and selfishness; for where is the individual whose uncontrolled will may not oftener be capricious than otherwise? With *tyranny* is associated the idea of oppression and injustice. Among the Greeks the word *tyrannos*, a tyrant, implied no more than what we now understand by *despot*, namely, a possessor of unlimited power; but from the natural abuse of such power it has acquired the signification now attached to it, namely, of exercising power to the injury of another.

Absolute power should be granted to no one man or body of men; since there is no security that it will not be exercised *arbitrarily*. In *despotic* governments the *tyrannical* proceedings of the subordinate officers are often more intolerable than those of the Prince.

Unerring power!

Supreme and *absolute* of these thy ways,
You render no account.—LILLO.

An honest private man often grows cruel and abandoned, when converted into an *absolute* prince.—ADDISON.

Whatever the will commands, the whole man must do: the empire of the will over all the faculties being absolutely overruling and *despotic*.—SOUTH.

Such an history as that of Suetonius is to me an unanswerable argument against *despotic* power.—ADDISON.

Our sects a more *tyrannic* power assume.

And would for scorpions change the rod of Rome.—ROSCOMMON.

Absolute, v. Positive.

To Absorb, Swallow up, Ingulf, Engross.

Absorb, in French *absorber*, Latin *absorbeo*, is compounded of *ab* and *sorbeo* to sup up, in distinction from **swallow up**; the former denoting a gradual consumption; the latter a sudden envelopment of the whole object. The excessive heat of the sun *absorbs* all the nutritious fluids of bodies animal and vegetable. The gaming table is a vortex in which the principle of every man is *swallowed up* with his estate.

Ingulf, compounded of *in* and *gulf*, signifies to be inclosed in a great gulf, which is a

strong figurative representation for being swallowed up. As it applies to grand and sublime objects, it is used only in the higher style.

Engross, which is compounded of the French words *en gros* whole, signifies to purchase wholesale, so as to swallow up the profits of others. In the moral application thereof it is very analogous to *absorb*.

The mind is *absorbed* in the contemplation of any subject, when all its powers are so bent upon it as not to admit distraction. The mind is *engrossed* by any subject when the thoughts of it force themselves upon its contemplation to the exclusion of others which should engage the attention.

Absorbed in that immensity I see,

I shrink abased, and yet aspire to thee.—COWPER.

Surely the bare remembrance that a man was formerly rich or great cannot make him at all happier there, where an infinite happiness or an infinite misery shall equally *swallow up* the sense of these poor felicities.—SOUTH.

Ingulf'd, all helps of art we vainly try

To weather leeward shores alas! too high.—FALCONER.

This inconvenience the politician must expect from others, as well as they have felt from him, unless he thinks that he can *engross* this principle to himself, and that others cannot be as false and atheistical as himself.—SOUTH.

To Abstain, Forbear, Refrain.

Abstain in French *abstenir*, Latin *abstinco*, is compounded of *ab* or *abs* from and *teneo* to keep, signifying to keep one's self from a thing.

Forbear is compounded of the preposition *for*, or *from*, and the verb to bear or carry, signifying to carry or take one's self from a thing.

Refrain, in French *refrèner*, Latin *refreno*, is compounded of *re* back and *freno*, from *frænum* a bridle, signifying to keep back as it were by a bridle, to bridle in.

The first of these terms marks the leaving a thing, and the two others the omission of an action. We *abstain* from any object by not making use of it: we *forbear* to do or *refrain* from doing a thing by not taking any part in it.

Abstaining and *forbearing* are outward actions, but *refraining* is connected with the operations of the mind. We may *abstain* from the thing we desire, or *forbear* to do the thing which we wish to do; but we can never *refrain* from any action without in some measure losing our desire to do it.

We *abstain* from whatever concerns our food and clothing; we *forbear* to do what we may have particular motives for doing; *refrain* from what we desire to do, or have been in the habit of doing.

It is a part of the Mahometan faith to *abstain* from the use of wine; but it is a Christian duty to *forbear* doing an injury even in return for an injury; and to *refrain* from all swearing and evil speaking.

Abstinence is a virtue when we *abstain* from that which may be hurtful to ourselves or injurious to another; *forbearance* is essential to preserve peace and good will betwixt man and man. Everyone is too liable to offend, not to have motives for *forbearing* to deal harshly with the offences of his neighbour. If we *refrain* from uttering with the lips the

first dictates of an angry mind, we shall be saved much repentance in future.

Though a man cannot *abstain* from being weak, he may from being vicious.—ADDISON.

By *forbearing* to do what may be innocently done, we may add hourly new vigour and resolution, and secure the power of resistance when pleasure or interest shall lend their charms to guilt.—JOHNSON.

If we conceive a being, created with all his faculties and senses, to open his eyes in a most delightful plain, to view for the first time the serenity of the sky, the splendour of the sun, the verdure of the fields and woods, the glowing colours of the flowers, we can hardly believe it possible that he should *refrain* from bursting into an ecstasy of joy, and pouring out his praises to the Creator of those wonders.—SIR WILLIAM JONES.

Abstemious, v. Abstinent.

Abstinence, Fast.

Abstinence is a general term, applicable to any object from which we abstain; **Fast** is a species of abstinence, namely, an abstaining from food: the general term is likewise used in the particular sense, to imply a partial *abstinence* from particular food; but *fast* signifies an abstinence from food altogether.

Fridays are appointed by the Church as days of *abstinence*; and Good Friday as a day of *fast*.—TAYLOR

I am verily persuaded that if a whole people were to enter into a course of *abstinence*, and eat nothing but water gruel for a fortnight, it would abate the rage and animosity of parties.

Such a *fast* would have the natural tendency to the procuring of those ends for which a *fast* is proclaimed.—ADDISON.

Abstinent, Sober, Abstemious, Temperate.

The first of these terms is generic, the rest specific.

Abstinent (*v. To abstain*) respects everything that acts on the senses, and in a limited sense applies particularly to solid food.

Sober, from the Latin *sobrius*, or *sebrinus*, that is, *sine ebrius*, not drunk, implies an abstinence from excessive drinking.

Abstemious, from the Latin *abstemius*, compounded of *abs* and *temetum* wine, implies the abstaining from wine or strong liquor in general.

Temperate, in Latin *temperatus*, participle of *tempero* to moderate or regulate, implies a well regulated abstinence in all manner of sensual indulgence.

We may be *abstinent* without being *sober*, *sober* without being *abstemious*, and all together without it being *temperate*.

An *abstemious* man does not eat or drink so much as he could enjoy; a *sober* man may drink much without being affected.* An *abstemious* man drinks nothing strong. A *temperate* man enjoys all in a due proportion.

A particular passion may cause us to be *abstinent* either partially or totally: *sobriety* may often depend upon the strength of the constitution, or be prescribed by prudence: necessity may dictate *abstemiousness*, but nothing short of a well disciplined mind will enable us to be *temperate*. Diogenes practised the most rigorous *abstinence*: some men have unjustly obtained a character for *sobriety*, whose habit of body has enabled them to resist the force of strong liquor even when taken to excess: it is not uncommon for persons to practise *abstemiousness* to that

degree, as not to drink anything but water all their lives: Cyrus was as distinguished by his *temperance* as his other virtues; he shared all hardships with his soldiers, and partook of their frugal diet.

Unlimited *abstinence* is rather a vice than a virtue, for we are taught to enjoy the things which Providence has set before us: *sobriety* ought to be highly esteemed among the lower orders, where the *abstinence* from vice is to be regarded as positive virtue: *abstemiousness* is sometimes the only means of preserving health; but habitual *temperance* is the most efficacious means of keeping both body and mind in the most regular state.

To set the mind above the appetites is the end of *abstinence*, which one of the fathers observes to be not a virtue, but the groundwork of virtue.—JOHNSON.

Cratinus carried his love of wine to such an excess, that he got the name of *φλόστρος*, launching out in praise of drinking, and rallying all *sobriety* out of countenance.—GUMBERLAND.

The strongest oaths are straw
To th' fire I' th' blood; be more *abstemious*,
Or else good night your vow.—SHAKESPEARE.

If we consider the life of these ancient sages, a great part of whose philosophy consisted in a *temperate* and *abstemious* course of life, one would think the life of a philosopher and the life of a man were of two different dates.—ADDISON.

To Abstract, Separate, Distinguish.

Abstract, v. Absent.

Separate in Latin *separatus*, participle of *separo*, is compounded of *se* and *paro* to dispose apart, signifying to put things asunder, or at a distance from each other.

Distinguish in French *distinguer*, Latin *distinguo*, is compounded of the separative preposition *dis* and *tingo* to tinge or colour, signifying to give different marks to things, by which they may be known from each other.

Abstract is used in the moral sense only: *separate* mostly in a physical sense: *distinguish* either in a moral or physical sense: we *abstract* what we wish to regard particularly and individually; we *separate* what we wish not to be united; we *distinguish* what we wish not to confound. The mind performs the office of abstraction for itself; *separating* and *distinguishing* are exerted on external objects.* Arrangement, place, time, and circumstances serve to *separate*: the ideas formed of things, the outward marks attached to them, the qualities attributed to them, serve to *distinguish*.

By the operation of *abstraction* the mind creates for itself a multitude of new ideas: in the act of *separation* bodies are removed from each other by distance of place: in the act of *distinguishing* objects are discovered to be similar or dissimilar. Qualities are *abstracted* from the subjects in which they are inherent: countries are *separated* by mountains or seas: their inhabitants are *distinguished* by their dress, language, or manners. The mind is never less *abstracted* from one's friends than when *separated* from them by immense oceans: it requires a keen eye to *distinguish* objects that bear a great resemblance to each other. Volatile persons easily *abstract* their minds from the most solemn scenes to fix them on trifling objects that pass

* Vide Trusler: "Sober, temperate, abstemious."

* Vide Abbé Girard: "Distinguer, separer."

before them : an unusual temper leads some men to *separate* themselves from all their companions ; an absurd ambition leads others to *distinguish* themselves by their eccentricities.

We ought to *abstract* our minds from the observation of an excellence in those we converse with, till we have received some good information of the disposition of their minds.—VERELK.

Fontenelle, in his panegyric on Sir Isaac Newton, closes a long enumeration of that philosopher's virtues and attainments with an observation that he was not *distinguished* from other men by any singularity either natural or affected.

It is an eminent instance of Newton's superiority to the rest of mankind that he was able to *separate* knowledge from those weaknesses by which knowledge is generally disgraced.—JOHNSON.

Abstract, v. Abridgement.

Abstracted, v. Absent.

Absurd, v. Irrational.

Abundant, v. Plentiful.

To Abuse, Misuse.

Abuse, in Latin *abusus*, participle of *abutor*, compounded of *ab* from and *utor* to use, signifies to use away or wear away with using ; in distinction from *Misuse*, which signifies to use amiss.

Every thing is *abused* which receives any sort of injury ; it is *misused*, if not used at all, or turned to a wrong use. Young people are too prone to *abuse* books for want of setting a proper value on their contents ; they do not always avoid *misusing* them in their riper years, when they read for amusement only instead of improvement. Money is *abused* when it is clipped, or its value any way lessened ; it is *misused* when it is spent in excess and debauchery.

I know no evil so great as the *abuse* of the understanding, and yet there is no one vice more common.—STEELE.

God requires not men to wrong or *misuse* their faculties for him, nor to lie to others or themselves for his sake.—LOCKE.

Abuse, Invective.

Abuse (*v. To abuse*) is here taken in the metaphorical application for ill-treatment of persons.

Invective, from the Latin *invecho*, signifies to bear upon or against. Harsh and unseemly censure is the idea common to these terms : but the former is employed more properly against the person, the latter against the thing.

Abuse is addressed to the individual, and mostly by word of mouth ; *invective* is communicated mostly by writing. *Abuse* is dictated by anger, which throws off all constraint and violates all decency ; *invective* is dictated by party spirit, or an intemperate warmth of feeling in matters of opinion. *Abuse* is always resorted to by the vulgar in their private quarrels ; *invective* is the evulution of zeal and ill-nature in public concerns.

The more rude and ignorant the man, the more liable he is to indulge in *abuse* : the more restless and opinionated the partisan, whether in religion or politics, the more ready he is to deal in *invective*. We must expect to meet with *abuse* from the vulgar whom we offend ; and if in high stations, our conduct will draw forth *invective* from busybodies whom spleen has converted into oppositionists.

At an entertainment given by Pisiistratus to some of his intimates, Thrasippus, a man of violent passion and inflamed with wine, took some occasion, not recorded, to break out into the most violent *abuse* and insult.—CUMBERLAND.

This is the true way of examining a libel ; and when men consider that no man living thinks the better of their heroes and patrons for the paucity given them, none can think themselves lessened by their *invective*.—STEELE.

Abusive, v. Reproachful.

Abyss, v. Gulf.

Academy, v. School.

To Accede, Consent, Comply, Acquiesce, Agree.

Accede, in Latin *accedo*, compounded of *ac* or *ad*, and *cedo* to go or come, signifies to come or fall into a thing.

Consent, in French *consentir*, Latin *consentio*, compounded of *con* together and *sentio* to feel, signifies to feel in unison with another.

Comply comes probably from the French *complaire*, Latin *complaceo*, signifying to be pleased in unison with another.

Acquiesce, in French *acquiescer*, Latin *acquiesco*, compounded of *ac* or *ad* and *quiesco*, signifies to be easy about or contented with a thing.

Agree, in French *agréer*, is most probably derived from the Latin *gruo*, in the word *congruo*, signifying to accord or suit.

We *accede* to what others propose to us, by falling in with their ideas : we *consent** to what others wish, by authorising it : we *comply* with what is asked of us, by allowing it, or not hindering it : we *acquiesce* in what is insisted by accepting it, and conforming to it : we *agree* to what is proposed by admitting and embracing it.

We object to those things to which we do not *accede* : we refuse those things to which we do not *consent*, or with which we will not *comply* : we oppose those things in which we will not *acquiesce* : we dispute that to which we will not *agree*.

To *accede* is the unconstrained action of an equal ; it is a matter of discretion : *consent* and *comply* suppose a degree of superiority, at least the power of preventing ; they are acts of good nature or civility : *acquiesce* implies a degree of submission, it is a matter of prudence or necessity : *agree* indicates an aversion to disputes ; it respects the harmony of social intercourse.

Members of any community ought to be willing to *accede* to what is the general will of their associates : parents should never be induced to *consent* to any thing which may prove injurious to their children : people ought not to *comply* indiscriminately with what is requested of them : in all matters of difference it is a happy circumstance when the parties will *acquiesce* in the judgment of an umpire, which is the greatest proof of their willingness to *agree*.

At last persuasion, menaces, and the impending pressure of necessity, conquered her virtue, and she *acquiesced* to the fraud.—CUMBERLAND.

My poverty, but not my will *consents*.—SHAKESPEARE.

Inclination will at length come over to reason, though

* Vide Abbé Girard : " Consentir, acquiescer, adherer tomber d'accord."

we can never force reason to comply with inclination.—ADDISON.

This we ought to acquiesce in, that the Sovereign Being, the great Author of Nature, has in him all possible perfection.—ADDISON.

We agreed to adopt the infant as the orphan son of a distant relation of our own name.—CUMBERLAND.

To Accelerate, *v.* To hasten.

Accent, *v.* Stress.

To Accept, *v.* To Receive.

Acceptable, Grateful, Welcome.

Acceptable signifies worthy to be accepted.

Grateful, from the Latin *gratus* pleasing, signifies altogether pleasing; it is that which recommends itself. The *acceptable* is a relative good; the *grateful* is positive: the former depends upon our external condition, the latter on our feelings and taste: a gift is *acceptable* to a poor man, which would be refused by one less needy than himself; harmonious sounds are always *grateful* to a musical ear.

Welcome signifies come well or in sea on for us.

Acceptable and *welcome* both apply to external circumstances, and are therefore relatively employed; but the former is confined to such things as are offered for our choice, the latter refers to whatever happens according to our wishes: we may not always accept that which is *acceptable*, but we shall never reject that which is *welcome*: it is an insult to offer any thing by way of a gift to another which is not *acceptable*; it is a *grateful* task to be the bearer of *welcome* intelligence to our friends.

I cannot but think the following letter from the Emperor of China to the Pope of Rome, proposing a coalition of the Chinese and Roman Churches, will be *acceptable* to the curious.—STEELE.

The kids with pleasure browse the bushy plain;
The showers are *grateful* to the swelling grain.

DRYDEN.

Whatever is remote from common appearances is always welcome to vulgar as to childish credulity.—JOHNSON.

Acceptance, Acceptation.

Though both derived from the verb *accept*, have this difference, that the former is employed to express the abstract action generally; the latter only in regard to the single object of words. A book, or whatever else is offered to us, may be worthy of our *acceptance* or not. A word acquires its *acceptation* from the manner in which it is generally accepted by the learned.

It is not necessary to refuse benefits from a bad man, when the *acceptance* implies no approbation of his crimes.—JOHNSON.

On the subject of dress I may add by way of caution that the ladies should do well not to forget themselves. I do not mean this in the common *acceptation* of the phrase, which it may be sometimes convenient and proper to do.—MACKENZIE.

Acceptation, *v.* Acceptance.

Access, *v.* Admittance.

Accession, *v.* Increase.

Accessory, *v.* Abettor.

Accident, Chance.

Accident, in French *accident*, Latin *accidens*, participle of *accido* to happen, compounded of *ac* or *ad* and *cado* to fall, signifies the thing falling out.

Chance, in French *chance*, most probably

comes from the Latin *cadens*, and signifies like the former the thing falling out.

Accident is said of things that have been; *chance* of things that are to be. That is an *accident* which is done without intention; that is a *chance* which cannot be brought about by the use of means. It is an *accident* when a house falls: it is a *chance* when and how it may fall.

Accidents cannot be prevented: *chances* cannot be calculated upon. *Accidents* may sometimes be remedied; *chances* can never be controlled: *accidents* give rise to sorrow, they mostly occasion mischief; *chances* give rise to hope; they often produce disappointment; it is wise to dwell upon neither.

That little *accident* of Alexander's taking a fancy to bathe himself caused the interruption of his march; and that interruption gave occasion of that great victory that founded the third monarchy of the world.—SOUTH.

Surely there could not be a greater *chance* than that which brought to light the Powder-Treason.—SOUTH.

Accident, Contingency, Casualty.

Accident, *v.* Accident, chance.

Contingency, in French *contingence*, Latin *contingens*, participle of *contingo*, compounded of *con* and *tango*, to touch one another, signifies the falling out or happening together; or the thing that happens in conjunction with another.

Casualty, in French *casualté*, from the Latin *casualis*, and *cado* to fall or happen, signifies the thing that happens in the course of events.

All these words imply whatever takes place independently of our intentions. *Accidents* express more than *contingencies*; the former comprehend events with their causes and consequences; the latter respect collateral actions, or circumstances appended to events; *casualties* have regard simply to circumstances. *Accidents* are frequently occasioned by carelessness, and *contingencies* by trivial mistakes; but *casualties* are altogether independent of ourselves.

The overturning a carriage is an *accident*; our situation in a carriage, at the time, is a *contingency*, which may occasion us to be more or less hurt; the passing of any one at the time is a *casualty*. We are all exposed to the most calamitous *accidents*; and our happiness or misery depends upon a thousand *contingencies*: the best concerted scheme may be thwarted by *casualties*, which no human foresight can prevent.

This natural impatience to look into futurity, and to know what *accidents* may happen to us hereafter, has given birth to many ridiculous arts and inventions.—ADDISON.

Nothing less than infinite wisdom can have an absolute command over fortune; the highest degree of it which man can possess is by no means equal to fortuitous events, and to such *contingencies* as may rise in the prosecution of our affairs.—ADDISON.

Men are exposed to more *casualties* than women, as battles, sea-voyages, with several dangerous trades and professions.—ADDISON.

Accident, *v.* Event.

Accidental, Incidental, Casual, Contingent.

Accidental, *v.* Accident.

Incidental, from *incident*, in Latin *in-*

cidens and incido or *in* and *cado* to fall upon, sign fles belonging to a thing by chance.

Casual, v. Casualty.

Contingent, v. Contingency.

Accidental is opposed to what is designed or planned, *incidental* to what is premeditated, *casual* to what is constant and regular, *contingent* to what is definite and fixed. A meeting may be *accidental*, an expression *incidental*, a look, expression, &c., *casual*, an expense or circumstance *contingent*. We do not expect what is *accidental*; we do not suspect or guard against what is *incidental*; we do not heed what is *casual*; we are not prepared for what is *contingent*. Many of the most fortunate and important occurrences in our lives are *accidental*; many remarks, seemingly *incidental*, do in reality conceal a settled intent; a *casual* remark in the course of conversation will sometimes make a stronger impression on the minds of children than the most eloquent and impressive discourse or repeated counsel; in the prosecution of any plan we ought to be prepared for the numerous *contingencies* which we may meet with to interfere with our arrangement.

This book fell *accidentally* into the hands of one who had never seen it before.—ADDISON.

Savage lodged as much by *accident* and passed the night sometimes in mean houses, which are set open at night to any *casual* wanderers.—JOHNSON.

The distempers of the mind may be figuratively classed under the several characters of those maladies which are *incidental* to the body.—CUMBERLAND.

We see how a *contingent* event baffles man's knowledge and evades his power.—SOUTH.

Acclamation, v. Applause.

To Accommodate, v. To fit.

Accompaniment, Companion, Concomitant.

Accompaniment is properly a collective term to express what goes in company, and is applied only to things; **Companion**, which also signifies what is in the company, is applied either to persons or to things.

Concomitant, from the intensive syllable *con* and *comæ* a companion, implies what is attached to an object, or goes in its train, and is applied only to things.

When said in relation to things, *accompaniment* implies a necessary connection; *companion* an incidental connection; the former is as a part to a whole, the latter is as one whole to another: the *accompaniment* belongs to the thing accompanied inasmuch as it serves to render it more or less complete; the *companion* belongs to the thing accompanied inasmuch as they correspond: in this manner singing is an *accompaniment* in instrumental music; subordinate ceremonies are the *accompaniments* in any solemn service; but a picture may be the *companion* of another picture from their fitness to stand together.

The *concomitant* is as much of an appendage as the *accompaniment*, but it is applied only to moral objects: thus morality is a *concomitant* to religion.

We may well believe that the ancient heathen bards, who were chiefly Asiatic Greeks, performed religious rites and ceremonies in metre with *accompaniments* of music, to which they were devoted in the extreme.—CUMBERLAND.

As the beauty of the body *accompanies* the health of it, so certainly is decency *concomitant* to virtue.—HUGHES.

Alas, my soul! thou pleasing *companion* of this body, thou fleeing thing that art now deserting it, whither art thou flying?—STEELE.

To Accompany, Attend, Escort.

Accompany, in French *accompagner*, is compounded of *ac* or *ad* and *compagner*, in Latin *compagino* to put or join together, signifying to give one's company and presence to any object, to join one's self to its company.

Attend, in French *attendre*, compounded of *at* or *ad* and *tendo* to tend or incline towards, signifies to direct one's notice or care towards any object.

Escort, in French *escorter*, from the Latin *cohors* a cohort or band of soldiers that attended a magistrate on his going into a province, signifies to accompany by way of safeguard.

We *accompany** those with whom we wish to go; we *attend* those whom we wish to serve; we *escort* those whom we are called upon to protect or guard. We *accompany* our equals, we *attend* our superiors, and *escort* superiors or inferiors. The desire of pleasing or being pleased actuates in the first case; the desire of serving or being served, in the second case; the fear of danger or the desire of security, in the last place.

One is said to have a numerous *company*, a crowd of *attendants*, and a strong *escort*; but otherwise one person only may *accompany* or *attend*, though several are waiting for an *escort*. Friends *accompany* each other in their excursions; princes are *attended* with a considerable retinue whenever they appear in public, and with a strong *escort* when they travel through unfrequented and dangerous roads. Creusa the wife of Æneas *accompanied* her husband on his leaving Troy; Socrates was *attended* by a number of illustrious pupils, whom he instructed by his example and his doctrines; St. Paul was *escorted* as a prisoner by a band of three hundred men.

This account in some measure excited our curiosity, and at the entreaty of the ladies I was prevailed upon to *accompany* them to the playhouse, which was no other than a bath.—GOLDSMITH.

When the Marquis of Warton was appointed Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Addison *attended* him as his secretary.—JOHNSON.

He very prudently called up four or five of the ostlers that belonged to the yard, and engaged them to enlist under his command as an *escort* to the coach.—HAWKSWORTH.

Accompany and *attend* may likewise be said of persons as well as things. In this case the former is applied to what goes with an object so as to form a part of it; the latter to that which follows an object as a dependant upon it. Pride is often *accompanied* with meanness, and *attended* with much inconvenience to the possessor.

The old English plainness and sincerity, that generous integrity of nature and honesty of disposition, which always argues true greatness of mind, and is usually *accompanied* with undaunted courage and resolution, is in a great measure lost among us.—TILLOTSON.

Humility lodged in a worthy mind is always *attended* with a certain homage, which no haughty soul, with all the arts imaginable, can purchase.—HUGHES.

The practice of religion will not only be *attended* with

* Vide Girard: "Accompagner, escorter."

that pleasure which naturally *accompanies* those actions to which we are habituated, but with those supernatural joys that rise from the consciousness of such a pleasure.—ADDISON.

Accomplice, v. Abettor.

Accomplice, v. Confederate.

To Accomplish, Effect, Execute, Achieve.

Accomplish, in French *accomplir*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *ac* or *ad* and *complir*, in Latin *compleo* to complete, signifying to complete to the end.

Effect, in Latin *effectus*, participle of *efficio*, compounded of *ef* and *ex* out of or up, and *facio* to make, signifies to make up until nothing remains to be done.

Execute, in Latin *executus*, participle of *exsequor*, compounded of *ex* and *sequor* to follow, signifies to follow up or carry through to the end.

Achieve, in French *achever*, from *chef* a chief, signifies to perform as a chief.

We accomplish an object, *effect* a purpose, *execute* a project, *achieve* an enterprise. Perseverance is requisite for *accomplishing*, means for *effecting*, abilities for *executing*, and spirit for *achieving*. Some persons are always striving to attain an end without ever *accomplishing* what they propose. It is the part of wisdom to suit the means to the end when we have any scheme to *effect*. Those who are readiest in forming projects are not always the fittest for carrying them into *execution*. That ardour of character which impels to the *achievement* of arduous undertakings belongs but to very few.

We should never give up what we have the least chance of *accomplishing*, if it be worth the labour; nor pursue any plan which affords us no prospect of *effecting* what we wish; nor undertake what we do not feel ourselves competent to *execute*, particularly when there is anything extraordinary to *achieve*. The friends of humanity exerted their utmost endeavours in behalf of the enslaved Africans, and after many years' noble struggle at length *accomplished* their wishes, as far as respects Great Britain, by obtaining a legislative enactment against the slave trade; but they have not yet been able to *effect* the total abolition of this nefarious traffic: the vices of individuals still interfere with the due *execution* of the laws of their country: yet this triumph of humanity, as far as it has been successful, exceeds in greatness the boldest *achievements* of antiquity.

It is the first rule in oratory that a man must appear such as he would persuade others to be; and that can be *accomplished* only by the force of his life.—SWIFT.

Reason considers the motive, the means, and the end; and honours courage only when it is employed to *effect* the purpose of virtue.—HAWKSWORTH.

We are not to indulge our corporeal appetites with pleasures that impair our intellectual vigour, nor gratify our minds with schemes which we know our lives must fail in attempting to *execute*.—JOHNSON.

It is more than probable, that in case our freethinkers could once *achieve* their glorious design of sinking the credit of the Christian Religion, and causing the revenues to be withdrawn which their wiser forefathers had appointed to the support and encouragement of its teachers, in a little time the Shaster would be as intelligible as the Greek Testament.—BERKELEY.

To Accomplish, v. To fulfil.

Accomplished, * Perfect.

These epithets express an assemblage of all the qualities suitable to the subject; and mark the qualification in the highest degree. **Accomplished** refers only to the artificial refinements of the mind; **Perfect** is said of things in general, whether natural or artificial, mental or corporeal.

An acquaintance with modern languages and the ornamental branches of the arts and sciences constitutes a person *accomplished*: the highest possible degree of skill in any art constitutes a man a *perfect* artist. An *accomplished* man needs no moral endowment to entitle him to the name: a *perfect* man, if such an one there could be, must be free from every moral imperfection, and endowed with every virtue. *Accomplished* is applied only to persons; *perfect* is applicable not only to persons but to works, and everything else as occasion requires; it may likewise be employed in a bad sense to magnify any unfavourable quality.

The English nation in the time of Shakspeare was yet struggling to emerge from barbarity; and to be able to read and write was an *accomplishment* still valued for its rarity.—JOHNSON.

A man endowed with great *perfections*, without good breeding, is like one who has his pocket full of gold, but always wants change for his ordinary occasions.—STEELE.

Accomplishment, v. Qualification.

To Accord, v. To Agree.

Accordance, v. Harmony.

Accordant, c. Consonant.

Accordingly, v. Therefore.

To Accost, Salute, Address.

Accost, in French *accoster*, is compounded of *ac* or *ad*, and the Latin *costa* a rib or side, signifying to come by the side of a person.

Salute, in Latin *saluto*, from *salus* health, signifies to bid good speed.

Address, in French *addresser*, is compounded of *ad* and *dresser*, from the Latin *direct*, preterite of *dirigo* to direct or apply, signifying to direct one's discourse to a person.

We *accost* a stranger whom we casually meet by the way; we *salute* our friends on re meeting; we *address* indifferent persons in company. Curiosity or convenience prompt men to *accost*; good-will or intimacy to *salute*; business or social communication to *address*. Rude people *accost* every one whom they meet; familiar people *salute* those with whom they are barely acquainted; impertinent people *address* those with whom they have no business.

We must *accost* by speaking; but we may *salute* by signs as well as words; and *address* by writing as well as by speaking.

When *Aeneas* is sent by Virgil to the shades, he meets Dido the Queen of Carthage, whom his perjury had hurried to the grave; he *accosts* her with tenderness and excuses, but the lady turns away like *Ajax* in mute disdain.—JOHNSON.

I was harassed by the multitude of eager *salutations*, and returned the common civilities with hesitation and impropriety.—JOHNSON.

I still continued to stand in the way, having scarcely strength to walk farther; when another soon *addressed* me in the same manner.—JOHNSON.

* Vide *Albé Girard*: "Accompli, parfait."

Account, Reckoning, Bill.

Account, compounded of *ac* or *ad* and *count*, signifies to count to a person, or for a thing; an account is the thing so counted.

Reckoning, from the verb to *reckon*, signifies the thing reckoned up.

Bill, in Saxon *bill*, in all probability comes from the Swedish *byla*, to build, signifying a written contract for building vessels, which in German is still called a *beilbrief*; hence it has been employed to express various kinds of written documents. These words, which are very similar in signification, may frequently be substituted for one another.

Account is the generic, the others the specific terms: a *reckoning* and *bill* is an *account*, though not always *vice versa*; *account* expresses the details, with the sum of them counted up; *reckoning* implies the register and notation of the things to be reckoned up; *bill* denotes the details, with their particular charges. An *account* should be correct, containing neither more nor less than is proper; a *reckoning* should be explicit, leaving nothing unnoticed as to dates and names; a *bill* should be fair.

We speak of keeping an *account*, of coming to a *reckoning*, of sending in a *bill*. Customers have an *account* with their tradespeople; masters have a *reckoning* with their work-people; tradesmen send in their *bills* at stated periods.

Account, from the extensive use of the term, is applicable to every thing that is noted down; the particulars of which are considered worthy of notice, individually or collectively: merchants keep their *accounts*; an *account* is taken at the Custom House of all that goes in and out of the kingdom; an *account* is taken of all transactions, of the weather, of natural phenomena, and whatever is remarkable. *Reckoning*, as a particular term, is more partial in its use: it is mostly confined to the dealings of men with one another; in which sense it is superseded by the preceding term, and now serves to express only an explanatory enumeration, which may be either verbal or written. *Bill*, as implying something charged or engaged, is used not only in a mercantile, but a legal sense: hence we speak of a *bill* of lading; a *bill* of parcels; a *bill* of exchange; a *bill* of indictment, or a *bill* in Parliament.

At many times I brought in my *accounts*,
Laid them before you; you would throw them off,
And say you found them in my honesty.

SHAKESPEARE.

Merchant with some rudeness demanded a room, and was told that there was a good fire in the next parlour, and that the company were about to leave, being then paying their *reckoning*.—JOHNSON.

Ordinary expense ought to be limited by a man's estate, and ordered to the best, that the *bills* may be less than the estimation abroad.—BACON.

Account, Narrative, Description.

Account, *v.* *Account*, *reckoning*.

Narrative, from *narrare*, is in Latin *narratus*, participle of *narrare* or *gnare*, which signifies to make known.

Description, from *describere*, in Latin *describo* or *de* and *scribo*, signifies to write down.

Account is the most general of these terms; whatever is noted as worthy of remark is an *account*: *narrative* is an account narrated: *Description*, an account described. *Account* has

no reference to the person giving the account; a *narrative* must have a narrator; a *description* must have a describer. An *account* may come from one or several quarters, or no specified quarter; but a *narrative* and *description* bespeak themselves as the production of some individual. An *account* may be the statement of a single fact only; a *narrative* must always consist of several connected incidents; a *description*, of several unconnected particulars respecting some common object. An *account* and a *description* may be communicated either verbally or in writing; a *narrative* is mostly written. An *account* may be given of political events, natural phenomena, and domestic occurrences; as the signing of a treaty, the march of an army, the death and funeral of an individual: a *narrative* is mostly personal, respecting the adventures, the travels, the dangers, and the escapes of some particular person: a *description* does not so much embrace occurrences, as characters, appearances, beauties, defects, and attributes in general. *Accounts* from the armies are anxiously looked for in time of war: whenever a *narrative* is interesting, it is a species of reading eagerly sought after: the *descriptions* which are given of the eruptions of volcanoes are calculated to awaken a strong degree of curiosity. An *account* may be false or true; a *narrative* clear or confused; a *description* lively or dull.

A man of business, in good company, who gives an *account* of his abilities and dispatches, is hardly more insupportable than her they call a notable woman.—STEELE.

Few *narratives* will, either to men or women, appear more incredible than the histories of the Amazons.—JOHNSON.

Most readers, I believe, are more charmed with Milton's *description* of Paradise than of hell.—ADDISON.

Account, *v.* *Sake*.

Accountable, *v.* *Answerable*.

To Accumulate, *v.* *To heap*.

Accurate, Exact, Precise.

Accurate, in French *accurate*, Latin *accuratus*, participle of *accuro*, compounded of the intensive *ac* or *ad* and *curo* to take care of, signifying done with great care.

Exact, in French *exacte*, Latin *exactus*, participle of *exigo* to finish or complete, denotes the quality of completeness, the absence of defect.

Precise, in French *précis*, Latin *præcisus*, participle of *præcido* to cut by rule, signifies the quality of doing by rule.

A man is *accurate* when he avoids faults; *exact*, when he attends to every minutia, and leaves nothing undone; *precise*, when he does it according to a certain measure. These epithets, therefore, bear a comparative relation to each other; *exact* expresses more than *accurate*, and *precise* more than *exact*. An *account* is *accurate* in which there is no misrepresentation; it is *exact* when nothing essential is omitted; it is *precise* when it contains particular details of time, place, and circumstance.

Accuracy is indispensable in all our concerns, be they ever so ordinary; *exactness* is of peculiar importance in matters of taste; and in some cases, where great results flow from trifling causes, the greatest *precision* be-

comes requisite: we may, however, be too *precise* when we dwell on unimportant particulars; but we never can be too *accurate* or *exact*. Hence the epithet *precise* is sometimes taken in the unfavourable sense for affectedly exact. An *accurate* man will save himself much trouble; an *exact* man will gain himself much credit; and a *precise* man will take much pains only to render himself ridiculous. Young people should strive to do everything *accurately*, which they think worth doing at all, and thus they will learn to be *exact*, or *precise*, as occasion may require.

Accuracy, moreover, concerns our mechanical labours, and the operations of our senses and understandings; *exactness* respects our dealings with others; *precision* is applied to our habits and manners in society. We write, we see, we think, we judge *accurately*; we are *exact* in our payments; we are *precise* in our modes of dress. Some men are very *accurate* in their particular line of business, who are not very *exact* in fulfilling their engagements, nor very *precise* in the hours which they keep.

An eminent artist who wrought up his pictures with the greatest *accuracy*, and gave them all those delicate touches which are apt to please the nicest eye, is represented as tuning a theorbo.—ADDISON.

This lady is the most *exact* economist, without appearing busy.—CONGREVE.

An apparent desire of admiration, a reflection upon their own merit, and a *precise* behaviour in their general conduct, are almost inseparable accidents in beauties.—HUGHES.

An aptness to jumble things together, wherein can be found any likeness, hinders the mind from *accurate* conceptions of them.—LOCKE.

Angels and spirits, in their several degrees of elevation above us, may be endowed with more comprehensive faculties; and some of them, perhaps, have perfect and exact views of all finite beings that come under their consideration.—LOCKE.

A definition is the only way whereby the *precise* meaning of moral words can be known.—LOCKE.

Accurate, v. Correct.

Accusation, v. Complaint.

To Accuse, Charge, Impeach, Arraign.

Accuse, in Latin *accuso*, compounded of *ac* or *ad* and *causa* a cause or trial, signifies to bring to trial.

Charge, from the word *cargo* a burden, signifies to lay on a burden.

Impeach, in French *empêcher* to hinder or disturb, compounded of *em* or *in* and *pes* the foot, signifies to set one's foot or one's self against another.

Arraign, compounded of *ar* or *ad* and *rang* or *range*, signifies to range, or set at the bar of a tribunal.

The idea of asserting the guilt of another is common to these terms. *Accuse* in the proper sense is applied particularly to crimes, but it is also applied to every species of offence; *charge* may be applied to crimes, but is used more commonly for breaches of moral conduct: we *accuse* a person of murder; we *charge* him with dishonesty.

Accuse is properly a formal action; *charge* is an informal action: criminals are *accused*, and their *accusation* is proved in a court of judicature to be true or false; any person may be *charged*, and the *charge* may be either substantiated or refuted in the judgment of a third person.

The Countess of Hertford, demanding an audience of the Queen, laid before her the whole series of his mother's cruelty, exposed the improbability of an *accusation*, by which he was charged with an intent to commit a murder that could produce no advantage.—JOHNSON'S LIFE OF SAVAGE.

Nor was this irregularity the only *charge* which Lord Tyrconnel brought against him. Having given him a collection of valuable books stamped with his own arms, he had the mortification to see them in a short time exposed for sale.—JOHNSON'S LIFE OF SAVAGE.

Impeach and *arraign* are both species of *accusing*; the former in application to statesmen and state concerns, the latter in regard to the general conduct or principles; with this difference, that he who *impeaches* only asserts the guilt, but does not determine it; but those who *arraign* also take upon themselves to decide: statesmen are *impeached* for misdemeanours in the administration of government: kings *arraign* governors of provinces and subordinate princes, and in this manner kings are sometimes *arraigned* before mock tribunals: our Saviour was *arraigned* before Pilate; and creatures in the madness of presumption *arraign* their Creator.

Aristogiton, with revengeful cunning, *impeached* several courtiers and intimates of the tyrant.—CUMBERLAND.

O the inexorable horror that will seize upon a poor sinner, when he stands *arraigned* at the bar of divine justice.—SOUTH.

To Accuse, Censure.

Accuse, v. To accuse, charge.

Censure, in French *censure*, in Latin *censura*, is derived from *censo*, a Roman magistrate who took cognizance of the morals and manners of the citizens, as also of the domestic arrangements of the city. It signifies not only the office of censor, but, in an extended sense, the act of blaming or punishing offenders against morality, which formed a prominent feature in his office.

To *accuse* is only to assert the guilt of another; to *censure* is to take that guilt for granted.

We *accuse* only to make known the offence, to provoke inquiry; we *censure* in order to inflict a punishment.

An *accusation* may be false or true; a *censure* mild or severe.

It is extremely wrong to *accuse* another without sufficient grounds; but still worse to *censure* him without the most substantial grounds.

Every one is at liberty to *accuse* another of offences which he knows him for a certainty to have committed; but none can *censure* who are not authorized by their age or station.

Mr. Locke *accuses* those of great negligence who dis course of moral things with the least obscurity in the terms they make use of.—BUDGELL.

If any man measure his words by his heart, and speak as he thinks, and do not express more kindness to every man than men usually have for any man, he can hardly escape the *censure* of the want of breeding.—TILLOTSON.

To Achieve, v. To accomplish.

Achievement, v. Deed.

To Acknowledge, Own, Confess, Avow.

Acknowledge, compounded of *ac* or *ad* and *knowledge*, implies to bring to knowledge, to make known.

Own, is a familiar figure, signifying to take

to one's self, to make one's own: it is a common substitute for *confess*.

Confess, in French *confesser*, Latin *confessus*, participle of *confiteor*, compounded of *con* and *fateor*, signifies to impart to any one.

Avow, in French *avouer*, Latin *advoveo*, signifies to vow, or protest to any one.

Acknowledging is a simple declaration; *confessing* or *owning* is a specific private communication; *avowal* is a public declaration. We *acknowledge* facts; *confess* or *own* faults; *avow* motives, opinions, &c.

We *acknowledge* in consequence of a question; we *confess* in consequence of an accusation; we *own* in consequence of a charge; we *avow* voluntarily. We *acknowledge* having been concerned in a transaction; we *confess* our guilt; we *own* that a thing is wrong; but we are ashamed to *avow* our motives. Candour leads to an *acknowledgment*; repentance produces a *confession*; the desire of forgiveness leads to *owning*; generosity or pride occasions an *avowal*.

An *acknowledgment* of what is not demanded may be either politic or impolitic according to circumstances: a *confession* dictated merely by fear is of avail only in the sight of man; those who are most ready to *own* themselves in an error are not always the first to amend: an *avowal* of the principles which actuate the conduct is often the greatest aggravation of guilt.

I must *acknowledge*, for my own part, that I take greater pleasure in considering the works of the creation in their immensity than in their minuteness.—ADDISON.

And now my dear, cried she to me, I will fairly own that it was I that instructed my girls to encourage our landlord's addresses.—GOLDSMITH.

Spite of herself e'en envy must *confess*,
That I the friendship of the great possess.—FRANCIS.

Whether by their settled and *avowed* scorn of thoughtless talkers, the Persians were able to diffuse to any great extent the virtue of taciturnity, we are hindered by the distance of those times from being able to discover.—JOHNSON.

To Acknowledge, v. To recognize.

To Acquaint, v. To inform.

Acquaintance, Familiarity, Intimacy.

Acquaintance comes from *acquaint*, which is compounded of the intensive syllable *ac* or *ad* and *quaint*, in old French *coint*, Teut. *gekant* known, signifying known to one.

Familiarity comes from *familiar*, in Latin *familiaris* and *familia*, signifying known as one of the family.

Intimacy, from *intimate*, in Latin *intimatus*, participle of *intimo* to love entirely, from *intimus* innermost, signifies known to the innermost recesses of the heart.

These terms mark different degrees of closeness in the social intercourse; *acquaintance* expressing less than *familiarity*; and that less than *intimacy*.

A slight knowledge of any one constitutes an *acquaintance*: to be *familiar* requires an *acquaintance* of some standing; *intimacy* supposes such an *acquaintance* as is supported by friendship.—TRUSLER.

Acquaintance springs from occasional intercourse; *familiarity* is produced by a daily intercourse, which wears off all constraint, and banishes all ceremony; *intimacy* arises not merely from frequent intercourse, but

unreserved communication. An *acquaintance* will be occasionally a guest; but one that is on terms of *familiarity* has easy access to our table; and an *intimate*, likewise, lays claim to a share at least of our confidence. An *acquaintance* with a person affords but little opportunity for knowing his character; *familiarity* puts us in the way of seeing his foibles, rather than his virtues; but *intimacy* enables us to appreciate his worth.

Those who are apt to be *familiar* on a slight *acquaintance*, will never acquire any degree of *intimacy*.—TRUSLER.

A simple *acquaintance* is the most desirable footing on which to stand with all persons however deserving. If it have not the pleasures of *familiarity* or *intimacy*, it can claim the privilege of being exempted from their pains. "Too much *familiarity*," according to the old proverb, "breeds contempt." The unlicensed freedom which commonly attends *familiarity* affords but too ample scope for the indulgence of the selfish and unamiable passions. *Intimacies* begun in love often end in hatred, as ill-chosen friends commonly become the bitterest enemies. A man may have a thousand *acquaintance*, and not one whom he should make his *intimate*.

Acquaintance grew; th' *acquaintance* they improve
To friendship; friendship ripen'd into love.—EUSDEN.

That *familiarity* produces neglect has been long observed.—JOHNSON.

The *intimacy* between the father of Eugenio and Agrestis produced a tender friendship between his sister and Amelia.—HAWKESWORTH.

An *acquaintance* is a being who meets us with a smile and salute, who tells us with the same breath that he is glad and sorry for the most trivial good and ill that befalls us.—HAWKESWORTH.

His *familiarity* wears his entire friends, and could have no interested views in courting his *acquaintance*.—STEELE.

At an entertainment given by Pisistratus to some of his *intimates*, Thrasippus took some occasion, not recorded, to break out into the most violent abuse.—CUMBERLAND.

These terms may be applied to things as well as persons, in which case they bear a similar analogy. An *acquaintance* with a subject is opposed to entire ignorance upon it; *familiarity* with it is the consequence of frequent repetition; and *intimacy* of a steady and thorough research. In our intercourse with the world we become daily *acquainted* with fresh subjects to engage our attention. Some men have by extraordinary diligence acquired a considerable *familiarity* with more than one language and science; but few, if any, can boast of having possessed an *intimate acquaintance* with all the particulars of even one language or science. When we can translate the authors of any foreign language we may claim an *acquaintance* with it; when we can speak, or write it freely, we may be said to be *familiar* with it; but an *intimate acquaintance* comprehends a thorough critical *intimacy* with all the niceties and subtleties of its structure.

With Homer's heroes we have more than historical *acquaintance*: we are made *intimate* with their habits and manners.—CUMBERLAND.

The frequency of envy makes it so *familiar*, that it escapes our notice.—JOHNSON.

To Acquiesce, v. To accede

To Acquire, Obtain, Gain, Win, Earn.

Acquire, in French *acquies*, Latin *acquirō*, is compounded of *ac* or *ad* and *quero* to seek, signifying to seek or get to one's self.

Obtain, in French *obtenir*, Latin *obtinere*, is compounded of *ob* and *teneo* to hold, signifying to lay hold or secure with in one's reach.

Gain and **win** are derived from the same source; namely, the French *gagner*, German *gewinnen*, Saxon *winnen*, from the Latin *vinco*, Greek *καταναίω* or *νικω* to conquer, signifying to get the mastery over, to get into one's possession.

Earn comes from the Saxon *tharnan*, German *ernden*, Frieze-Landish *arnan* to reap, which is connected with the Greek *ἀρναι* to take or get.

The idea of getting is common to these terms, but the circumstances of the action vary. We *acquire* by our own efforts; we *obtain* by the efforts of others as well as ourselves; we *gain* or *win* by striving; we *earn* by labour. Talents and industry are requisite for *acquiring*; what we *acquire* comes gradually to us in consequence of the regular exercise of our abilities; in this manner knowledge, honour, and reputation are *acquired*. Things are *obtained* by all means, honest or dishonest; whatever comes into our possession agreeable to our wishes is *obtained*; favours and requests are always *obtained*.

Fortune assists in both *gaining* and *winning*, but particularly in the latter case: a subsistence, a superiority, a victory or battle, is *gained*; a game or a prize in the lottery is *won*. A good constitution and full employment are all that is necessary for *earning* a livelihood. Fortunes are *acquired* after a course of years; they are *obtained* by inheritance, or *gained* in trade; they are sometimes *won* at the gaming table, but seldom *earned*.

What is *acquired* is solid, and produces lasting benefit: what is *obtained* may often be injurious to one's health, one's interest, or one's morals: what is *gained* or *won* is often only a partial advantage, and transitory in its nature; it is *gained* or *won* only to be lost: what is *earned* serves only to supply the necessity of the moment; it is hardly got and quickly spent. Scholars *acquire* learning, *obtain* rewards, *gain* applause, and *win* prizes, which are often hardly *earned* by the loss of health.

It is Sallust's remark upon Cato, that the less he coveted glory, the more he *acquired* it.—ADDISON.

We are not this desire of fame very strong, the difficulty of *obtaining* it, and the danger of losing it when *obtained*, would be sufficient to deter a man from so vain a pursuit.—ADDISON.

He whose mind is engaged by the *acquisition* or improvement of a fortune, not only escapes the insipidity of indifference and the tediousness of inactivity, but *gains* enjoyments wholly unknown to those who live lazily on the toils of others.—JOHNSON.

Where the danger ends, the hero ceases: when he has *won* an empire, or *gained* his mistress, the rest of his story is not worth relating.—STEELE.

An honest man may freely take his own; The goat was mine, by singing fairly *won*.—DRYDEN.

They who have *earned* their fortune by a laborious and industrious life are naturally tenacious of what they have *painfully acquired*.—BLAIR.

To Acquire, Attain.

Acquire, *v.* To *acquire*, *obtain*.

Attain, in Latin *attineo*, is compounded of *ab* or *ad* and *teneo* to hold, signifying to rest at a thing.

To *acquire* is a progressive and permanent action; to *attain* is a perfect and finishing action; we always go on *acquiring*; but we stop when we have *attained*. What is *acquired* is something got into the possession; what is *attained* is the point arrived at. We *acquire* a language; we *attain* to a certain degree of perfection.

By abilities and perseverance we may *acquire* a considerable fluency in speaking several languages; but we can scarcely expect to *attain* to the perfection of a native in any foreign language. Ordinary powers coupled with diligence will enable a person to *acquire* whatever is useful but we cannot *attain* to superiority without extraordinary talents and determined perseverance. *Acquisitions* are always serviceable; *attainments* always creditable.

A genius is never to be *acquired* by art, but is the gift of nature.—GAY.

Inquiries after happiness, and rules for *attaining* it, are not so necessary and useful to mankind as the arts of consolation, and supporting one's self under affliction.—SHEPHERD.

Acquirement, Acquisition.

Two abstract nouns, from the same verb, denoting the thing acquired.

Acquirement implies the thing acquired for and by ourselves; **acquisition**, that which is acquired for another, or to the advantage of another.

People can expect to make but slender *acquirements* without a considerable share of industry; and in such case they will be no *acquisition* to the community to which they have attached themselves.

Acquirement respects rather the exertions employed; *acquisition* the benefit or gain accruing. To learn a language is an *acquirement*; to gain a class or a degree, an *acquisition*. The *acquirements* of literature far exceed in value the *acquisitions* of fortune.

Men of the greatest application and *acquirements* can look back upon many vacant spaces and neglected parts of time.—HUGHES.

To me, who have taken pains to look at beauty, abstracted from the consideration of its being an object of desire; at power only as it sits upon another without any hopes of partaking any share of it; at wisdom and capacity without any pretension to rival or envy its *acquisitions*; the world is not only a mere scene, but a pleasant one.—STEELE.

Acquisition, *v.* Acquirement.

To *Acquit*, *v.* To *absolve*.

Acrimony, Tartness, Asperity, Harshness.

These epithets are figuratively employed to denote sharpness of feeling corresponding to the quality in natural bodies.

Acrimony, in Latin *acrimonia*, from *acer* sharp, is the characteristic of garlic, mustard, and pepper, that is, a biting sharpness.

Tartness, from *tart*, is not improbably derived from *tartar*, the quality of which it in some degree resembles; it is a high degree of acid peculiar to vinegar.

Asperity, in Latin *asperitas*, from *asper*, and the Greek *ασπρος* fallow, without culture

and without fruit, signifying land that is too hard and rough to be tilled.

Harshness, from *harsh*, in German and Teutonic *herbe*, *herbisch*, Swedish *kerb*, Latin *acerbus*, denotes the sharp rough taste of unripe fruit.

A quick sense produces *acrimony*: it is too frequent among disputants, who embitter each other's feelings. An acute sensibility coupled with quickness of intellect produces *tartness*: it is too frequent among females. *Acrimony* is a transient feeling that discovers itself by the words; *tartness* is an habitual irritability that mingles itself with the tone and looks. An *acrimonious* reply frequently gives rise to much ill-will; a *tart* reply is often treated with indifference, as indicative of the natural temper, rather than of any unfriendly feeling.

Asperity and *harshness* respect one's conduct to inferiors; the latter expresses a strong degree of the former. *Asperity* is opposed to mildness and forbearance; *harshness* to kindness. A reproof is conveyed with *asperity*, when the words and looks convey strong displeasure; a treatment is *harsh* when it wounds the feelings, and does violence to the affections. Mistresses sometimes chide their servants with *asperity*; parents deal *harshly* with their children.

The genius even when he endeavours only to entertain or instruct, yet suffers persecution from innumerable critics, whose *acrimony* is excited merely by the pain of seeing others pleased.—JOHNSON.

Cowley seems to have possessed the power of writing easily beyond any other of our poets, yet his pursuit of remote thoughts led him often into *harshness* of expression.—JOHNSON.

The nakedness and *asperity* of the wintery world always fills the beholder with pensive and profound astonishment.—JOHNSON.

They cannot be too sweet for the king's *tartness*.—SHAKESPEARE.

To Act, do.

Act, in Latin *actus*, from *ago* to direct, signifies the putting in motion.

Do, in German *thun*, comes probably from the Greek *devo* to put, signifying to dispose, put in order, or bring to pass.

We *act* whenever we do any thing; but we may *act* without doing any thing. The first of these words is intransitive, and the second transitive: we do not *act* a thing, but we always *do* a thing. The first approaches nearest to the idea of *move*; it is properly the exertion of power corporeal or mental: the second is closely allied to *effect*; it is the producing an effect by such an exertion. They *act* very unwisely who attempt to do more than their abilities will enable them to complete: whatever we *do*, let us be careful to *act* considerately.

We have made this a maxim, "That a man who is commonly called good-natured is hardly to be thanked for what he *does*, because half that is *acted* about him is *done* rather by his sufferance than approbation."—STEELE.

Action, Act, Deed.

The words *action*, *act*, and *deed*, though derived from the preceding verbs, have an obvious distinction in their meaning.

Action, in French *action*, Latin *actio*, signifies doing.

Act, in French *acte*, Latin *actum*, denotes the thing done: the former implies a process: the latter a result.

We mark the degrees of *action** which indicate energy; we mark the number of *acts* which may serve to designate a habit or character: we speak of a lively, vehement, or impetuous *action*; a man of *action*, in distinction from a mere talker or an idler; whatever rests without influence or movement has lost its *action*; we speak of many *acts* of a particular kind; we call him a fool who commits continued *acts* of folly; and him a riggard who commits nothing but *acts* of meanness.

Action is a continued exertion of power: *act* is a single exertion of power; the physical movement; the simple *acting*. Our *actions* are our works in the strict sense of the word; our *acts* are the operations of our faculties. The character of a man must be judged by his *actions*; the merit of *actions* depends on the motive: that give rise to them: the *act* of speaking is peculiar to man; but the *acts* of walking, running, eating, &c., are common to all animals.

Actions may be considered either singly or collectively; *acts* are regarded only individually and specifically: we speak of all a man's *actions*, but not of all his *acts*; we say a good *action*, a virtuous *action*, a charitable *action*; but an *act*, not an *action* of goodness, an *act* of virtue, an *act* of faith, an *act* of charity, and the like. It is a good *action* to conceal the faults of our neighbours; but a rare *act* of charity among men. Many noble *actions* are done in private, the consciousness of which is the only reward of the doer; the wisest of men may occasionally commit *acts* of folly, which are not imputable to their general character. Nothing can be a greater *act* of imprudence than not to take an occasional review of our past *actions*.

Action † is a term applied to whatever is done in general; *act* to that which is remarkable or that requires to be distinguished. The sentiments of the heart are easier to be discovered by one's *actions*, than by one's words: it is an heroic *act* to forgive our enemy, when we are in a condition to be revenged on him. The good man is cautious in all his *actions* to avoid even the appearance of evil: a great prince is anxious to mark every year by some distinguished *act* of wisdom or virtue.

Act and *deed* are both employed for what is remarkable; but *act* denotes only one single thing done; *deed* implies some complicated performance, something achieved: we display but one quality or power in performing an *act*; we display many, both physical and mental, in performing a *deed*. A prince distinguishes himself by *acts* of mercy; the commander of an army by martial *deeds*. *Acts* of disobedience in youth frequently lead to the perpetration of the foulest *deeds* in more advanced life.

Many of those *actions* which are apt to procure fame are not in their nature conducive to our ultimate happiness.—ADDISON.

I desire that the same rule may be extended to the whole fraternity of heathen gods; it being my design to

* Roubaud; "Acte, action."
† Girard; "Action, acte."

condemn every poem to the flames, in which Jupiter thunders or exercises any act of authority which does not belong to him.—ADDISON.

All with united force combine to drive
The lazy drones from the laborious hive;
With envy stung they view each other's deeds,
With diligence the fragrant work proceeds.—DRYDEN.

Action, Gesture, Gesticulation, Posture, Attitude.

Action, v. To act.

Gesture, in French *geste*, Latin *gestus*, participle of *gero* to carry one's self, signifies the manner of carrying one's body.

Gesticulation, in Latin *gesticulatio* comes from *gesticulator* to make many gestures.

Posture, in French *posture*, Latin *positura* a position, comes from *positus*, participle of *pono*, signifying the manner of placing one's self.

Attitude, in French *attitude*, Italian *attitudine*, is changed from *aptitude*, signifying a propriety as to disposition.

All these terms are applied to the state of the body; the former three indicating a state of motion; the latter two a state of rest. *Action* respects the movements of the body in general; *gesture* is an action indicative of some particular state of mind; *gesticulation* is a species of artificial *gesture*. Raising the arm is an action; bowing is a *gesture*.

Actions may be ungraceful; *gestures* indecent. A suitable *action* sometimes gives great force to the words that are uttered; *gestures* often supply the place of language between people of different nations. *Actions* characterize a man as vulgar or well-bred; *gestures* mark the temper of the mind. There are many *actions* which it is the object of education to prevent from growing into habits; savages express the vehement passions of the mind by vehement *gestures* on every occasion, even in their amusements. An extravagant or unnatural *gesture* is termed a *gesticulation*; a sycophant, who wishes to cringe into favour with the great, deals largely in *gesticulation* to mark his devotion; a buffoon who attempts to imitate the *gestures* of another will use *gesticulation*; and the monkey who apes the *actions* of human beings does so by means of *gesticulations*.

*Posture** is a mode of placing the body more or less differing from the ordinary habits; *attitude* is the manner of keeping the body more or less suitable to the existing circumstances. A *posture*, however convenient, is never assumed without exertion; it is therefore willingly changed: an *attitude*, though not usual, is still according to the nature of things; it is therefore readily preserved. A *posture* is singular; it has something in it which departs from the ordinary carriage of the body, and makes it remarkable: an *attitude* is striking; it is the natural expression of character or impression. A brave man will put himself into a *posture* of defence, without assuming an *attitude* of defiance.

Strange and forced positions of the body are termed *postures*; noble, agreeable, and expressive forms of carriage, are called *attitudes*: mountebanks and clowns put themselves into

ridiculous *postures* in order to excite laughter; actors assume graceful *attitudes* to represent their characters. *Postures* are to the body what grimaces are to the face; *attitudes* are to the body what air is to the figure: he who in attempting to walk assumes the *attitude* of a dancer, puts himself into a ridiculous *posture*; a graceful and elegant *attitude* in dancing becomes an affected and laughable *posture* in another case.

Postures are sometimes usefully employed in stage dancing; *attitudes* are necessarily employed by painters, sculptors, dancing masters, and other artists. *Posture* is said of the whole body; the rest, of particular limbs or parts. *Attitude* and *posture* are figuratively applied to other objects besides the body: arms assume a menacing *attitude*; in a critical *posture* of affairs, extraordinary skill is required on the part of the government.

Cicero concludes his celebrated book 'de Oratore' with some precepts for pronunciation and *action*, without which part he affirms that the best orator in the world can never succeed.—HUGHES.

Our best actors are somewhat at a loss to support themselves with proper *gesture*, as they move from any considerable distance to the front of the stage.—STEEL.

Neither the judges of our laws, nor the representatives of the people, would be much affected by laboured *gesticulation*, or believe any man the more, because he rolled his eyes, or puffed his cheeks.—JOHNSON.

Falsehood in a short time found by experience that her superiority consisted only in the celerity of her course, and the change of her *posture*.—JOHNSON.

When I entered his room, he was sitting in a contemplative *posture*, with his eyes fixed upon the ground; after he had continued in his reverie near a quarter of an hour, he rose up and seemed by his *gestures* to take leave of some invisible guest.—HAWKESWORTH.

Falsehood always endeavoured to copy the mien and *attitudes* of truth.—JOHNSON.

Action, Agency, Operation.

Action, v. To act.

Agency, v. To act.

Operation, in Latin *operatio*, from *opera* labour and *opus* need, signifies the work that is needful.

Action is the effect, *agency* the cause. *Action* is inherent in the subject; *agency* is something exterior; it is, in fact, putting a thing into *action*; in this manner the whole world is in *action* through the *agency* of the Divine Being. *Operation* is action for a specific end and according to a rule; as the *operation* of nature in the article of vegetation.

It is better, therefore, that the earth should move about its own centre, and make those useful vicissitudes of night and day, than expose always the same side to the action of the sun.—BENTLEY.

A few advances there are in the following papers tending to assert the superintendence and *agency* of Providence in the natural world.—WOODWARD.

The tree whose operation brings
Knowledge of good and ill, shun thou to taste.
MILTON.

Active, Diligent, Industrious, Assiduous, Laborious.

Active, from the verb *to act*, implies a propensity to act, to be doing something without regard to the nature of the object.

Diligent, in French *diligent*, Latin *diligens*, participle of *diligere*, to choose or like, implies an attachment to an object, and consequent attention to it.

Industrious, in French *industrieux*,

* Roubaud; "Posture, attitude,"

Latin *industrius*, is probably changed from *endostruus*, that is *endo* or *intro* within, and *struo* to build, make, or do, signifying an inward or thorough inclination to be engaged in some serious work.

Assiduous, in French *assidu*, in Latin *assiduus*, is compounded of *as* or *ad*, and *siduus* from *sedeo* to sit, signifying to sit close to a thing.

Laborious, in French *laborieux*, Latin *laboriosus*, from *labor*, implies belonging to labour, or the inclination to labour.

We are *active* if we are only ready to exert our powers, whether to any end or not. We are *diligent* when we are active for some specific end. We are *industrious* when no time is left unemployed in some serious pursuit. We are *assiduous* if we do not leave a thing until it is finished. We are *laborious* when the bodily or mental powers are regularly employed in some hard labour.

A man may be *active* without being *diligent*, since he may employ himself in what is of no importance; but he can scarcely be *diligent* without being *active*, since *diligence* supposes some degree of activity in one's application to a useful object. A man may be *diligent* without being *industrious*, for he may diligently employ himself about a particular favourite object without employing himself constantly in the same way; and he may be *industrious* without being *diligent*, since *diligence* implies a free exercise of the mental as well as corporeal powers, but *industry* applies principally to manual labour. *Activity* and *diligence* are therefore commonly the property of lively or strong minds, but *industry* may be associated with moderate talents. A man may be *diligent* without being *assiduous*; but he cannot be *assiduous* without being *diligent*, for *assiduity* is a sort of persevering *diligence*. A man may be *industrious*, without being *laborious*, but not *vice versa*: for *laboriousness* is a severer kind of *industry*.

The *active* man is never easy without an employment; the *diligent* man is contented with the employment he has; the *industrious* man goes from one employment to the other; the *assiduous* man seeks to attain the end of his employment; the *laborious* man spares no pains or labour in following his employment.

Activity is of great importance for those who have the management of public concerns: *diligence* in business contributes greatly to success: *industry* is of great value in obtaining a livelihood: without *assiduity* no advances can be made in science or literature; and without *laborious* exertions, considerable attainments are not to be expected in many literary pursuits.

Active minds set on foot inquiries to which the *industrious*, by *assiduous* application, and *diligent* if not *laborious* research, often afford satisfactory answers.

Providence has made the human soul an *active* being.—JOHNSON.

A constant and unflinching obedience is above the reach of terrestrial *diligence*.—JOHNSON.

It has been observed by writers of morality, that in order to quicken human *industry*, Providence has so contrived that our daily food is not to be procured without much pains and labour.—ADDISON.

If ever a cure is performed on a patient, where quacks are concerned, they can claim no greater share in it than

Virgil's Iapis in the curing of Æneas; he tried his skill, was very *assiduous* about the wound, and indeed was the only visible means that relieved the hero; but the poet assures us it was the particular assistance of a deity that speeded the operation.—PEARCE.

If we look into the brute creation, we find all its individuals engaged in a painful and *laborious* way of life to procure a necessary subsistence for themselves.—ADDISON.

Active, Brisk, Agile, Nimble.

Active, *v. Active, diligent.*

Brisk has a common origin with *fresh*, which is in Saxon *fersh*, Dutch *frisch* or *bersk*, Danish *frisk*, *fersk*, &c.

Agile, in Latin *agilis*, comes from the same verb as *active*, signifying a fitness, a readiness to act or move.

Nimble, is probably derived from the Saxon *nemen* to take, implying a fitness or capacity to take any thing by a celerity of movement.

Activity respects one's transactions; *briskness*, one's sports: men are *active* in carrying on business; children are *brisk* in their play. *Agility* refers to the light and easy carriage of the body in springing; *nimbleness* to its quick and gliding movements in running. A rope dancer is *agile*; a female moves *nimbly*.

Activity results from ardour of mind; *briskness* from vivacity of feeling; *agility* is produced by corporeal vigour, and habitual strong exertion; *nimbleness* results from an habitual effort to move lightly.

There is not a more painful action of the mind than invention, yet in dreams it works with that ease and *activity*, that we are not sensible when the faculty is employed.—ADDISON.

I made my next application to a widow, and attacked her so *briskly* that I thought myself within a fortnight of her.—BUDGELL.

When the Prince touched his stirrup, and was going to *speak*, the officer, with an incredible *agility*, threw himself on the earth and kissed his feet.—STEELE.

O friends, I hear the tread of *nimble* feet
Hasting this way.—MILTON.

Active, Busy, Officious.

Active, *v. Active, diligent.*

Busy, in Saxon *gebysgod*, from *biagian*, *beschäftigt*, from *beschäftigen* to occupy, and *schaffen* to make or do, implies a propensity to be occupied.

Officious, in French *officieux*, Latin *officiosus*, from *officium* duty or service, signifies a propensity to perform some service or office.

Active respects the habit or disposition of the mind; *busy* and *officious*, either the disposition of the mind, or the employment of the moment: the former regards every species of employment; the latter only particular kinds of employment. An *active* person is ever ready to be employed; a person is *busy*, when he is actually employed in any object; he is *officious*, when he is employed for others.

Active is always taken in a good, or at least an indifferent sense; it is opposed to lazy: *busy*, as it respects occupation, is mostly in a good sense; it is opposed to being at leisure; as it respects disposition, it is always in a bad sense; *officious* is never taken in a good sense; it implies being *busy* without discretion. To an *active* disposition, nothing is more irksome than inaction; but it is not concerned to inquire into the utility of the action. It is better

for a person to be *busy* than quite unemployed; but a *busy* person will employ himself about the concerns of others, when he has none of his own sufficiently important to engage his attention: an *officious* person is as unfortunate as he is troublesome; when he strives to serve he has the misfortune to annoy.

The pursuits of the *active* part of mankind are either in the paths of religion and virtue, or, on the other hand, in the roads to wealth, honour, or pleasures.—ADDISON.

We see multitudes *busy* in the pursuit of riches at the expense of wisdom and virtue.—JOHNSON.

The air-pump, the barometer, the quadrant, and the like inventions, were thrown out to those *busy* spirits (politicians), as tubs and barrels are to a whale, that he may let the ship sail on without disturbance.—ADDISON.

I was forced to quit my first lodgings by reason of an *officious* landlady, that would be asking me every morning how I had slept.—ADDISON.

Actor, Agent.

These terms vary according to the different senses of the verb from which they are drawn.

Actor is used for one who acts a part, or who represents the actions and characters of others, whether real or feigned. **Agent** is said of those who simply act for or in the stead of another.

Actors require the power of imitating actions; *agents* the power of performing them. *Actors* serve for the diversion of others; *agents* are employed for the benefit of others.

Of all the patriarchal histories, that of Joseph and his brethren is the most remarkable, for the characters of the *actors*, and the instructive nature of the events.—BLAIR.

I expect that no pagan *agent* shall be introduced into the poem, or any fact related which a man cannot give credit to with a good conscience.—ADDISON.

Actor, Player.

The **Actor** and **Player** both perform on a stage; but the former is said in relation to the part that is acted, the latter to the profession that is followed. We may be *actors* occasionally without being players professionally, but we may be *players* without deserving the name of *actors*. Those who personate characters for their amusement are *actors* but not *players*; those who do the same for a livelihood are *players* as well as *actors*; hence we speak of a company of *players*, not *actors*. So likewise in the figurative sense, whoever acts a part real or fictitious, that is, on the stage of life, or the stage of a theatre, is an *actor*; but he only is a *player* who performs the fictitious part; hence the former is taken* in a bad or good sense, according to circumstances; but the *player* is always taken in a less favourable sense, from the artificiality which attaches to his profession.

Cicero is known to have been the intimate friend of Roscius the *actor*.—HUGHES.

Our orators (says Cicero) are as it were the *actors* of truth itself; and the *players* the imitators of truth.—HUGHES.

All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely players.
SHAKESPEARE.

Actual, Real, Positive.

Actual, in French *actuel*, Latin *actualis*, from *actio* a deed, signifies belonging to the thing done.

* Vide Girard; "Acteur, comedien."

Real, in French *reel*, Latin *realis*, from *res*, signifies belonging to the thing as it is.

Positive, in French *positif*, Latin *positivus*, from *pono* to place or fix, signifies the state or quality of being fixed, established.

What is *actual* has proof of its existence within itself, and may be exposed to the eye; what is *real* may be satisfactorily proved to exist; and what is *positive* precludes the necessity of a proof. *Actual* is opposed to the supposititious, conceived or reported; *real* to the feigned, imaginary; *positive* to the uncertain, doubtful.

Whatever is the condition of a thing for the time being is the *actual* condition; sorrows are *real* which flow from a substantial cause; proofs are *positive* which leave the mind in no uncertainty. The *actual* state of a nation is not to be ascertained by individual instances of poverty or the reverse; there are but few, if any, *real* objects of compassion among common beggars; many *positive* facts have been related of the deception which they have practised. By an *actual* survey of human life we are alone enabled to form just opinions of mankind; it is but too frequent for men to disguise their *real* sentiments, although it is not always possible to obtain *positive* evidence of their insincerity.

The very notion of any duration being past implies that it was once present; for the idea of being once present is *actually* included in the idea of its being past.—ADDISON.

We may and do converse with God in person *really*, and to all the purposes of giving and receiving though not visibly.—SOUTH.

Dissimulation is taken for a man's *positively* professing himself to be what he is not.—SOUTH.

To Actuate, Impel, Induce.

Actuate, from the Latin *actum* an action, implies to call into action.

Impel, in Latin *impello*, is compounded of *in* towards, and *pello* to drive, signifying to drive towards an object.

Induce, in Latin *induco*, is compounded of *in* and *duco*, signifying to lead into an object.

One is *actuated* by motives, *impelled* by passions, and *induced* by reason or inclination.

Whatever *actuates* is the result of reflection; it is a steady and fixed principle: whatever *impels* is momentary and vehement, and often precludes reflection; whatever *induces* is not vehement, though often momentary.

We seldom repent of the thing to which we are *actuated*; as the principle, whether good or bad, is not liable to change: but we may frequently be *impelled* to measures which cause serious repentance: the thing to which we are *induced* is seldom of sufficient importance to call for repentance.

Revenge *actuates* men to commit the most horrid deeds; anger *impels* them to the most imprudent actions; phlegmatic people are not easily *induced* to take any one measure in preference to another.

It is observed by Cicero, that men of the greatest and the most shining parts are most *actuated* by ambition.—ADDISON.

When youth *impell'd* him, and when love inspir'd,
The listening nymphs his Doris lays admir'd.
SIR WM. JONES.

Induced by such examples, some have taught
That bees have portions of ethereal thought.—DRYDEN.

Acute, Keen, Shrewd.

Acute, in French *acute*, Latin *acutus*, from *acus* a needle, signifies the quality of sharpness and pointedness peculiar to a needle.

Keen, in Saxon *cene*, probably comes from *scian* to cut; signifying the quality of being able to cut.

Shrewd, probably from the Teutonic *beschreyen* to enchant, signifies inspired or endowed with a strong portion of intuitive intellect.

In the natural sense, a fitness to pierce is predominant in the word *acute*; and that of cutting, or a fitness for cutting, in the word *keen*. The same difference is observable in their figurative acceptation.

An *acute* understanding is quick at discovering truth in the midst of falsehood; it fixes itself on a single point with wonderful celerity. A *keen* understanding cuts or removes away the artificial veil under which the truth lies hidden from the view. A *shrewd* understanding is rather quick at discovering new truths, than at distinguishing truth from falsehood.

Acuteness is requisite in speculative and abstruse discussions; *keenness* in penetrating characters and springs of action; *shrewdness* in eliciting remarks and new ideas. The *acute* man detects errors, and the *keen* man falsehoods; the *shrewd* man exposes follies. Arguments may be *acute*, reproaches *keen*, and replies or retorts *shrewd*. A polemic, or a lawyer, must be *acute*, a satirist *keen*, and a wit *shrewd*.

His *acuteness* was most eminently signalized at the masquerade, where he discovered his acquaintance through their disguises with such wonderful facility.—JOHNSON.

The village songs and festivities of Bacchus gave a scope to the wildest extravagancies of mummery and licence, mixed with coarse but *keen* raillery.—CUMBERLAND.

You statesmen are so *shrewd* in forming schemes! JEFFREY.

Acute, *v.* Sharp.

Acuteness, *v.* Penetration.

Adage, *v.* Axiom.

To Adapt, *v.* To fit.

To Add, Join, Unite, Coalesce.

Add, in Latin *addo*, compounded of *ad* and *do*, signifies to put to an object.

Join, in French *joindre*, Latin *jungo*, comes from *jugum* a yoke, and the Greek *gyvo* to yoke, signifying to bring into close contact.

Unite, in Latin *unitus*, participle of *unio*, from *unus* one, implies to make into one.

Coalesce, in Latin *coalesco*, compounded of *co* or *con*, and *alesco* for *cresco*, signifies to grow or form one's self together.

We *add* by affixing a part of one thing to another, so as to make one whole; we *join* by attaching one whole to another, so that they may adhere in part; we *unite* by putting one thing to another, so that all their parts may adhere to each other; things *coalesce* by coming into an entire cohesion of all their parts.

Adding is either a corporeal or spiritual action; *joining* is mostly said of corporeal objects; *uniting* and *coalescing* of spiritual objects. We *add* a wing to a house by a mechanical pro-

cess, or we *add* quantities together by calculation; we *join* two houses together, or two armies, by placing them on the same spot: people are *united* who are bound to each other by similarity of opinion or sentiment; parties *coalesce* when they agree to lay aside their leading distinctions of opinion, so as to cooperate.

Nothing can be *added* without some agent to perform the act of *adding*; but things may be *joined* by casually coming in contact; and things will *unite* of themselves which have an aptitude to concordance; *coalition* is that species of union which arises mostly from external agency. The *addition* of quantities produces vast sums; the *junction* of streams forms great rivers; the *union* of families or states constitutes their principal strength; by the *coalition* of sounds diphthongs are formed. Bodies are enlarged by the *addition* of other bodies; people are sometimes *joined* in matrimony who are not *united* in affection; no two things can *coalesce*, between which there is an essential difference, or the slightest discordance.

Addition is opposed to subtraction; *junction* and *union*, to division; *coalition*, to distinction.

Now, best of kings, since you propose to send
Such bounteous presents to your Trojan friend,
Add yet a greater at our joint request,
One which he values more than all the rest;
Give him the fair Lavinia for his bride.—DRYDEN.

The several great bodies which compose the solar system are kept from *joining* together at the common centre of gravity by the rectilinear motions the Author of nature has impressed on each of them.—BERKELEY.

Two Englishmen meeting at Rome or Constantinople soon run into familiarity. And in China or Japan, Europeans would think their being so a sufficient reason for their *uniting* in particular converse.—BERKELEY.

The Danes had been established during a longer period in England than in France; and though the similarity of their original language to that of the Saxons invited them to a more early *coalition* with the natives, they had found as yet so little example of civilized manners among the English, that they retained all their ancient ferocity.—MUME.

To Addict, Devote, Apply.

Addict, in Latin *addictus*, participle of *addico*, compounded of *ad* and *dico*, signifies to speak or declare in favour of a thing, to exert one's self in its favour.

Devote, in Latin *devotus*, participle of *devo*, signifies to vow or make resolutions for a thing.

Apply, in French *appliquer*, Latin *applico*, is compounded of *ap* or *ad*, and *plico*, signifying to knit or join one's self to a thing.

To *addict* is to indulge one's self in any particular practice; to *devote* is to direct one's powers and means to any particular pursuit; to *apply* is to employ one's time or attention about any object. Men are *addicted* to vices; they *devote* their talents to the acquirement of any art or science; they *apply* their minds to the investigation of a subject.

Children begin early to *addict* themselves to lying when they have any thing to conceal. People who are *devoted* to their appetites are burdensome to themselves, and to all with whom they are connected. Whoever *applies* his mind to the contemplation of nature, and the works of creation, will feel himself impressed with sublime and reverential ideas of the Creator.

We are *addicted* to a thing from an irresistible passion or propensity: we are *devoted* to a thing from a strong but settled attachment to it: we *apply* to a thing from a sense of its utility. We *addict* ourselves to study by yielding to our passion for it: we *devote* ourselves to the service of our king and country by employing all our powers to their benefit: we *apply* to business by giving it all the time and attention that it requires.

Addict is seldom used in a good than in a bad sense; *devote* is mostly employed in a good sense; *apply* in an indifferent sense.

As the pleasures of luxury are very expensive, they put those who are *addicted* to them upon raising fresh supplies of money by all the methods of rapaciousness and corruption.—ADDISON.

Persons who have *devoted* themselves to God are venerable to all who fear him.—BERKELEY.

Tully has observed that a lamb no sooner falls from its mother, but immediately, and of its own accord, it *applies* itself to the teat.—ADDISON.

Addition, v. Increase.

To Address, v. To accost.

To Address, Apply.

Address is compounded of *ad* and *dress*. In Spanish *derecar*, Latin *direri*, preterite of *dirigo* to direct, signifying to direct one's self to an object.

Apply, v. To addict.

An *address* is immediately directed from one party to the other, either personally or by writing; an *application* may be made through the medium of a third person. An *address* may be made for an indifferent purpose or without any express object; but an *application* is always occasioned by some serious circumstance.

We *address* those to whom we speak or write; but we *apply* to those to whom we wish to communicate some object of personal interest. An *address* therefore may be made without an *application*; and an *application* may be made by means of an *address*.

It is a privilege of the British Constitution, that the subject may *address* the monarch, and *apply* for a redress of grievances. We cannot pass through the streets of the metropolis without being continually *addressed* by beggars, who *apply* for the relief of artificial more than of real wants. Men in power are always exposed to be publicly *addressed* by persons who wish to obtrude their opinions upon them, and to have perpetual *applications* from those who solicit favours.

An *address* may be rude or civil, an *application* may be frequent or urgent. It is impertinent to *address* any one with whom we are not acquainted, unless we have any reason for making an *application* to them.

Many are the inconveniences which happen from the improper manner of *address*, in common speech, between persons of the same or different quality.—STEELE.

Thus all the words of lordship, honour and grace, are only repetitions to a man that the King has ordered him to be called so, but no evidences that there is any thing in himself that would give the man, who *applies* to him, those ideas without the creation of his master.—STEELE.

Address, Speech, Harangue, Oration.

Address, v. To address.

Speech, from *speak*, signifies the thing spoken.

Harangue, probably comes from *ara* an altar, where *harangues* used to be delivered.

Oration, from the Latin *oro* to beg or entreat, signifies that which is said by way of entreaty.

All these terms denote a set form of words directed or supposed to be directed to some person; an *address* in this sense is always written, but the rest are really spoken or supposed to be so; a *speech* is in general that which is addressed in a formal manner to one person or more; an *harangue* is a noisy tumultuous *speech* addressed to many; an *oration* is a solemn *speech* for any purpose.

Addresses are frequently sent up to the throne by public bodies. *Speeches* in Parliament, like *harangues* at elections, are often little better than the crude effusions of party spirit. The *orations* of Demosthenes and Cicero, which have been so justly admired, received a polish from the correcting hand of their authors, before they were communicated to the public.

Addresses of thanks are occasionally presented to persons in high stations by those who are anxious to express a sense of their merits. It is customary for the King to deliver *speeches* to both houses of parliament at their opening. In all popular governments there is a set of persons who have a trick of making *harangues* to the populace, in order to render them dissatisfied with those in power. Funeral *orations* are commonly spoken over the grave.

When Louis of France had lost the battle of Fontenoy, the *addresses* to him at that time were full of his fortitude.—HUGHES.

Every circumstance in their *speeches* and actions is with justice and delicacy adapted to the persons who speak and act.—ADDISON ON MILTON.

There is scarcely a city in Great Britain but has one of this tribe who takes it into his protection, and on the market days *harangues* the good people of the place with aphorisms and recipes.—PEARCE ON QUACKS.

How cold and unaffecting the best *oration* in the world would be without the proper ornaments of voice and gesture, there are two remarkable instances in the case of Ligarius and that of Milo.—SWIFT.

Address, v. Dexterity.

Address, v. Direction.

To Adduce, Alledge, Assign,

Advance.

Adduce, in Latin *adduco*, compounded of *ad* and *duco* to lead, signifies to bring forwards, or for a thing.

Alledge, in French *alleguer*, in Latin *allego*, compounded of *al* or *ad* and *lego*, in Greek *lego* to speak, signifies to speak for a thing.

Assign, in French *assigner*, Latin *assigno*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *signo* to sign or mark out, signifies to set apart for a purpose.

Advance comes from the Latin *advénio*, compounded of *ad* and *venio* to come, or cause to come, signifying to bring forward a thing.

An argument is *adduced*; a fact or a charge is *alleged*; a reason is *assigned*; a position or an opinion is *advanced*. What is *adduced* tends to corroborate or invalidate; what is *alleged* tends to criminate or exculpate; what is *assigned* tends to justify; what is *advanced*

tends to explain and illustrate. Whoever discusses disputed points must have arguments to *adduce* in favour of his principles: censures should not be passed where nothing improper can be *alleged*: a conduct is absurd for which no reason can be *assigned*: those who *advance* what they cannot maintain expose their ignorance as much as their folly.

The reasoner *addresses* facts in proof of what he has *advanced*. The accuser *alleges* circumstances in support of his charge. The philosophical investigator *assigns* causes for particular phenomena.

We may controvert what is *adduced* or *advanced*; we may deny what is *alleged*, and question what is *assigned*.

I have said that Celsus *adduces* neither oral nor written authority against Christ's miracles.—CUMBERLAND.

The criminal *alleged* in his defence, that what he had done was to raise mirth, and to avoid ceremony.—ADDISON.

If we consider what providential reasons may be *assigned* for these three particulars, we shall find that the numbers of the Jews, their dispersion and adherence to their religion, have furnished every age, and every nation of the world, with the strongest arguments for the Christian faith.—ADDISON.

I have heard of one that, having *advanced* some erroneous doctrines of philosophy, refused to see the experiments by which they were confuted.—JOHNSON.

Adequate, v. Proportionate.

To Adhere, Attach.

Adhere, from the French *adherer*, Latin *adhereo*, is compounded of *ad* and *hæreo* to stick close to.

Attach, in French *attacher*, is compounded of *at* or *ad* and *tach* or *touch*, both which come from the Latin *tango* to touch, signifying to come so near as to touch.

A thing is *adherent* by the union which nature produces; it is *attached* by arbitrary ties which keep it close to another thing. Glutinous bodies are apt to *adhere* to everything they touch: a smaller building is sometimes *attached* to a larger by a passage, or some other mode of communication.

What *adheres* to a thing is closely joined to its outward surface; but what is *attached* may be fastened to it by the intervention of a third body. There is an universal *adhesion* in all the particles of matter one to another; the sails of a vessel are *attached* to a mast by means of ropes.

In a figurative sense the analogy is kept up in the use of these two words. *Adherence* is a mode of conduct; *attachment* a state of feeling. We *adhere* to opinions which we are determined not to renounce; we are *attached* to opinions for which our feelings are strongly prepossessed. It is the character of obstinacy to *adhere* to a line of conduct after it is proved to be injurious: some persons are not to be *attached* by the ordinary ties of relationship or friendship.

The firm *adherence* of the Jews to their religion is no less remarkable than their numbers and dispersion.—ADDISON.

The play which this pathetic prologue was *attached* to was a comedy, in which Laberius took the character of a slave.—CUMBERLAND.

The conqueror seems to have been fully apprized of the

strength which the new government might derive from a clergy more closely *attached* to himself.—TYRWHITT.

Adhere, v. To stick.

Adherence, v. *Adhesion*.

Adherent, v. *Follower*.

Adhesion, Adherence.

These terms are both derived from the verb *adhere*, one expressing the proper or figurative sense, and the other the moral sense or acceptance.

There is a power of *adhesion* in all glutinous bodies; a disposition for *adherence* in steady minds.

We suffer equal pain from the pertinacious *adhesion* of unwelcome images, as from the evanescence of those which are pleasing and useful.—JOHNSON.

Shakespeare's *adherence* to general nature has exposed him to the censure of critics, who form their judgements upon narrower principles.—JOHNSON.

Adjacent, Adjoining, Contiguous.

Adjacent, in Latin *adjiciens*, participle of *adjicio*, is compounded of *ad* and *jacio* to lie near.

Adjoining, as the words imply, signifies being joined together.

Contiguous, in French *contigu*, Latin *continguis*, comes from *contingo* or *con* and *tango*, signifying to touch close.

What is *adjacent* may be separated altogether by the intervention of some third object; what is *adjoining* must touch in some part; and what is *contiguous* must be fitted to touch entirely on one side. Lands are *adjacent* to a house or a town; fields are *adjoining* to each other; and houses *contiguous* to each other.

They have been beating up for volunteers at York, and the towns *adjacent*: but nobody will list.—GRANVILLE.

As he happens to have no estate *adjoining* equal to his own, his oppressions are often borne without resistance.—JOHNSON.

We arrived at the utmost boundaries of a wood which lay *contiguous* to a plain.—STEELE.

Adjective, v. *Epithet*.

Adjoining, v. *Adjacent*.

To Adjourn, v. To prorogue.

To Adjust, v. To fit.

To Administer, v. To minister.

Administration, v. *Government*.

Admiration, v. *Wonder*.

To Admire, v. To wonder.

Admission, v. *admittance*.

To Admit,* Receive.

Admit, in French *admettre*, Latin *admitto*, compounded of *ad* and *mitto*, signifies to send or suffer to pass into

Receive, in French *recevoir*, Latin *recipio*, compounded of *re* and *capio*, signifies to take back or to one's self.

To *admit* is a general term, the sense of which depends upon what follows; to *receive* has a complete sense in itself: we cannot

* Girard; "Aimetre, recevoir."

speak of *admitting*, without associating with it an idea of the object to which one is *admitted*; but *receive* includes no relative idea of the receiver or the received.

Admitting is an act of relative import; *receiving* is always a positive measure: a person may be *admitted* into a house, who is not prevented from entering; he is *received* only by the actual consent of some individual.

We may be *admitted* in various capacities; we are *received* only as guests, friends, or inmates. Persons are *admitted* to the tables, and into the familiarity or confidence of others; they are hospitably *received* by those who wish to be their entertainers.

We *admit* willingly or reluctantly; we *receive* politely or rudely. Foreign ambassadors are *admitted* to an audience, and *received* at court. It is necessary to be cautious not to *admit* any one into our society, who may not be agreeable and suitable companions; but still more necessary not to *receive* any one into our houses whose character may reflect disgrace on ourselves.

Whoever is *admitted* as a member of any community should consider himself as bound to conform to its regulations: whoever is *received* into the service of another should study to make himself valued and esteemed. A winning address, and agreeable manners, gain a person *admittance* into the genteel circles: the talent for affording amusement procures a person a good *reception* among the mass of mankind.

The Tyrian train, *admitted* to the feast,
Approach, and on the painted couches rest.—DRYDEN.

He star'd and roll'd his haggard eyes around;
Then said, 'Alas! what earth remains, what sea
Is open to receive unhappy me?'—DRYDEN.

Somewhat is sure design'd by fraud or force;
Trust not their presents, nor *admit* the horse.—DRYDEN.

The thin-leav'd arbutue hazel-grafts receives,
And planes huge apples bear, that bore but leaves.—DRYDEN.

To Admit, Allow, Permit, Suffer, Tolerate.

Admit, v. To admit, receive.

Allow, in French *allower*, compounded of the intensive syllable *al* or *ad* and *lower*, in German *loben*, old German *laubzan*, low German *laven*, Swedish *lofva*, Danish *love*, &c. Latin *laus* praise, *laudare* to praise, signifies to give consent to a thing.

Permit, in French *permettre*, Latin *permittere*, is compounded of *per* through or away, and *mitto* to send or let go, signifying to let it go its way.

Suffer, in French *souffrir*, Latin *suffero*, is compounded of *sub* and *fero*, signifying to bear with.

Tolerate, in Latin *toleratus*, participle of *tolero*, from the Greek *traw* to sustain, signifying also to bear or bear with.

The actions denoted by the first three are more or less voluntary; those of the last two are involuntary: *admit* is less voluntary than *allow*; and that than *permit*. We *admit* what we profess not to know, or seek not to prevent; we *allow* what we know, and tacitly consent to; we *permit* what we authorise by a formal consent; we *suffer* and *tolerate* what we

object to, but do not think proper to prevent. We *admit* of things from inadvertence, or the want of inclination to prevent them; we *allow* of things from easiness of temper, or the want of resolution to oppose them; we *permit* things from a desire to oblige, or a dislike to refuse; we *suffer* things for want of ability to remove them; we *tolerate* things from motives of discretion.

What is *admitted*, *allowed*, *suffered*, or *tolerated* has already been done; what is *permitted* is desired to be done. To *admit*, *suffer*, and *tolerate*, are said of what ought to be avoided; *allow* and *permit* of things good, bad, or indifferent. *Suffer* is employed, mostly with regard to private individuals; *tolerate* with respect to the civil power. It is dangerous to *admit* of familiarities from persons in a subordinate station, as they are apt to degenerate into impertinent freedoms, which though not *allowable* cannot be so conveniently resented: in this case we are often led to *permit* what we might otherwise prohibit; it is a great mark of weakness and blindness in parents to *suffer* that in their children which they condemn in others: opinions, however absurd, in matters of religion, must be *tolerated* by the civil authority, rather than violate the liberty of conscience.

A well regulated society will be careful not to *admit* any deviation from good order, which may afterwards become injurious as a practice; it frequently happens that what has been *allowed* from indiscretion is afterwards claimed as a right: no earthly power can *permit* that which is prohibited by the divine law: when abuses are *suffered* to creep in, and to take deep root in any established institution, it is difficult to bring about a reform without endangering the existence of the whole; when abuses therefore are not very grievous, it is wiser to *tolerate* them than run the risk of producing a greater evil.

Both Houses declared that they could *admit* of no treaty with the king, till he took down his standard and recalled his proclamations, in which the Parliament supposed themselves to be declared traitors.—HUME.

Plutarch says very finely, that a man should not *allow* himself to hate even his enemies.—ADDISON.

Permit our ships a shelter on your shores,
Refitted from your woods with planks and oars;
That if our prince be safe, we may renew
Our destin'd course, and Italy pursue.—DRYDEN.

No man can be said to enjoy health, who is only not sick, without he feel within himself a lightsome and invigorating principle, which will not *suffer* him to remain idle.—SPECTATOR.

No man ought to be *tolerated* in an habitual humour, whim, or particularity of behaviour, by any who do not wait upon him for bread.—STEELE.

To Admit, Allow, Grant.

Admit, v. to admit, receive.

Allow, v. To admit, allow.

We *admit* the truth of a position; *allow* the propriety of a remark; *grant* what is desired. Some men will not readily *admit* the possibility of overcoming bad habits: it is ungenerous not to *allow* that some credit is due to those who effect any reformation in themselves: it is necessary, before any argument can be commenced, that something should be taken for *granted* on both sides.

Though the fallibility of man's reason, and the narrowness of his knowledge, are very liberally confessed, yet the conduct of those who so willingly *admit* the weakness of human nature seems to discover that this acknowledgment is not sincere.—JOHNSON.

The zealots in atheism are perpetually teasing their friends to come over to them, although they *allow* that neither of them shall get anything by the bargain.—ADDISON.

I take it at the same time for *granted* that the immortality of the soul is sufficiently established by other arguments.—STEELE.

Admittance, Access.

Admittance marks the act or liberty of admitting (*v. To admit, receive*).

Access from *accedo* to approach or come up to, marks the act or liberty of approaching.

We get *admittance* into a place or a society; we have *access* to a person.

Admittance may be open or excluded; *access* may be free or difficult.

We have *admittance* when we enter; we have *access* to him whom we address.

There can be no *access* where there is no *admittance*; but there may be *admittance* without *access*.

Servants or officers may grant us *admittance* into the palaces of princes; but the latter only can allow us *access* to their persons.

As my pleasures are almost wholly confined to those of the sight, I take it for a peculiar happiness that I have always had an easy and familiar *admittance* to the fair sex.—STEELE.

Do not be surprised, most holy father, at seeing, instead of a cockcomb to laugh at, your old friend who has taken this way of *access* to admonish you of your own folly.—STEELE.

Admittance, Admission.

These words differ according to the different acceptations of the primitive from which they are both derived: the former being taken in the proper sense or familiar style, and the latter in the figurative sense or in the grave style.

The **Admittance** to public places of entertainment is on particular occasions difficult. The **Admission** of irregularities, however trifling in the commencement, is mostly attended with serious consequences.

Assurance never failed to get *admittance* into the houses of the great.—MOORE.

The gospel has then only a free *admission* into the assent of the understanding, when it brings a passport from a rightly disposed will.—SOUTH.

To Admonish, Advise.

Admonish, in Latin *admoneo*, is compounded of the intensive *ad* and *moneo* to advise, signifying to put seriously in mind.

Advise is compounded of the Latin *ad* and *visus*, participle of *video*, to see, signifying to make to see or to shew.

Admonish mostly regards the past; *advise* respects the future. We *admonish* a person on the errors he has committed, by representing to him the extent and consequences of his offence; we *advise* a person as to his future conduct, by giving him rules and instructions. Those who are most liable to transgress require to be *admonished*; those who are most inexperienced require to be *advised*. *Admonition*

serves to put people on their guard against evil; *advice* to direct them in the choice of good.

The present writing is only to *admonish* the world that they shall not find me an idle but a busy spectator.—STEELE.

My worthy friend, the clergyman, told us, that he wondered any order of persons should think themselves too considerable to be *advised*.—ADDISON.

Admonition, Warning, Caution.

Admonition, *v. To admonish*.

Warning, in Saxon *warnein*, German *warnen* probably from *wahren*, to perceive, signifies making to see.

Caution, from *caveo* to beware, signifies the making beware.

A guarding against evil is common to these terms; but *admonition* expresses more than *warning*, and that more than *caution*.

An *admonition* respects the moral conduct; it comprehends reasoning and remonstrance; *warning* and *caution* respect the personal interest or safety; the former comprehends a strong forcible representation of the evil to be dreaded; the latter a simple appraisal of a future contingency. *Admonition* may therefore frequently comprehend *warning*; and *warning* may comprehend *caution*, though not *vice versa*. We *admonish* a person against the commission of any offence; we *warn* him against danger; we *caution* him against any misfortune.

Admonitions and *warnings* are given by those who are superior in age and station, *cautions* by any who are previously in possession of information. Parents give *admonitions*; ministers of the gospel give *warnings*; indifferent persons give *cautions*. It is necessary to *admonish* those who have once offended to abstain from a similar offence; it is necessary to *warn* those of the consequences of sin who seem determined to persevere in a wicked course; it is necessary to *caution* those against any false step who are going in a strange path.

Admonitions are given by persons only; *warnings* and *cautions* are given by things. The young are *admonished* by the old; the death of friends or relatives serve as a *warning* to the survivors; the unfortunate accidents of the careless serve as a *caution* to others to avoid the like error. *Admonitions* should be given with mildness and gravity; *warnings* with impressive force and warmth; *cautions* with clearness and precision. The young require frequent *admonitions*; the ignorant and self-deluded solemn *warnings*; the inexperienced timely *cautions*.

Admonitions ought to be listened to with sorrowful attention; *warnings* should make a deep and lasting impression; *cautions* should be borne in mind; but *admonitions* are too often rejected, *warnings* despised, and *cautions* slighted.

At the same time that I am talking of the cruelty of urging people's faults with severity, I cannot but bewail some which men are guilty of for want of *admonition*.—STEELE.

Not e'en Philander had bespoke his shroud,
Nor had he cause—a *warning* was denied.—YOUNG.

You *caution'd* me against their charms,
But never gave me equal arms;
Your lessons found the weakest part,
Aim'd at the head, but reach'd the heart.—SWIFT.

To Adore, Worship.

Adore, in French *adorer*, Latin *adoro*, that is *ad* and *oro* to pray to.

Worship, in Saxon *weorthscype*, is contracted from *worthship*, implying either the object that is worth, or the worth itself; whence it has been employed to designate the action of doing suitable homage to the object which has worth, and, by a just distinction, of paying homage to our Maker by religious rites.

Adoration is the service of the heart towards a Superior Being, in which we acknowledge our dependence and obedience, by petition and thanksgiving: *worship* consists in the outward form of showing reverence to some supposed superior being. *Adoration* can with propriety be paid only to the one true God; but *worship* is offered by heathens to stocks and stones.

We may *adore* our Maker at all times and in all places, whenever the heart is lifted up towards Him; but we *worship* Him only at stated times, and according to certain rules. Outward signs are but secondary in the act of *adoration*; and in divine *worship* there is often nothing existing but the outward form. We seldom *adore* without *worshipping*; but we too frequently *worship* without *adoring*.

Menander says, that "God, the Lord and Father of all things, is alone worthy of our humble *adoration*, being at once the maker and giver of all blessings."—CUMBERLAND.

By reason man a Godhead can discern,
But how he should be *worship'd* cannot learn.—DRYDEN.

To Adore, Reverence, Venerate, Revere.

Adore, *v.* To *adore*, *worship*.

Reverence, in Latin *reverentia* reverence or awe, implies to show reverence, from *revere* to stand in awe of.

Venerate, in Latin *veneratus*, participle of *veneror*, probably from *venere* beauty, signifying to hold in very high esteem for its superior qualities.

Revere is another form of the same verb.

Adoration has been before considered only in relation to our Maker; it is here employed in an improper and extended application to express in the strongest possible manner the devotion of the mind towards sensible objects.

Reverence is equally engendered by the contemplation of superiority, whether of the Supreme Being, as our Creator, or of any earthly being, as our parent. It differs, however, from *adoration*, in as much as it has a mixture of fear arising from the consciousness of weakness and dependence, or of obligation for favours received.

To *revere* and *venerate* are applied only to human beings, and that not so much from the relation we stand in to them, as from their characters and endowments; on which account these two latter terms are applicable to inanimate as well as animate objects.

Adoration in this case, as in the former, requires no external form of expression; it is not properly to be expressed but by the devotion of the individual to the service of him whom he *adores*: *reverencing* our Maker is al-

together an inward feeling; but *reverencing* our parents includes in it an outward expression of our sentiments by our deportment towards them: *revere* and *venerate* are confined to the breast of the individual, but they may sometimes display themselves in suitable acts of homage.

Good princes are frequently *adored* by their subjects: it is a part of the Christian character to *revere* our spiritual pastors and masters, as well as all temporal authorities: we ought to *venerate* all truly good men while living, and to *revere* their memories when they are dead.

"There is no end of his greatness." The most exalted creature he has made is only capable of *adoring* it; none but himself can comprehend it.—ADDISON.

The war protracted, and the siege delay'd,
Were due to Hector's and this hero's aid,
Both brave alike and equal in command;
Æneas, not inferior in the field.

In *plous reverence* to the gods excell'd.—DRYDEN.

It seems to me remarkable that death increases our *veneration* for the good, and extenuates our hatred of the bad.—JOHNSON.

And had not men the hoary head *rever'd*,
And boys paid *reverence* when a man appear'd,
Both must have died, though richer skins they wore,
And saw more heaps of acorns in their store.—CREECH.

To Adorn, Decorate, Embellish.

Adorn, in Latin *adorno*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *ad* and *orno*, in Greek *upaio* to make beautiful, signifying to dispose for the purpose of ornament.

Decorate, in Latin *decoratus*, participle of *decoro*, from *decorus* becoming, signifies to make becoming.

Embellish, in French *embellir*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *em* or *in* and *bellor* or *bel*, in Latin *bellus* handsome, signifying to make handsome.

We *adorn* by giving the best external appearance to a thing; we *decorate* by annexing something to improve its appearance; we *embellish* by giving a finishing stroke to a thing that is well executed. Females *adorn* their persons by the choice and disposal of their dress: a head dress is *decorated* with flowers, or a room with paintings; fine writing is *embellished* by suitable flourishes.

Adorn and *embellish* are figuratively employed; *decorate* only in the proper sense. The mind is *adorned* by particular virtues which are implanted in it: a narrative is *embellished* by the introduction of some striking incidents.

As vines the trees, as grapes the vines *adorn*.—DRYDEN.

A few years afterwards (1751) by the death of his father, Lord Lyttleton inherited a baronet's title, with a large estate, which though perhaps he did not augment, he was careful to *adorn* by a house of great elegance, and by much attention to the *decoration* of his park.—JOHNSON.

I shall here present my reader with a letter from a projector, concerning a new office which he thinks may very much contribute to the *embellishment* of the city.—ADDISON.

Adroit, *v.* *Clever*.

To Adulate, Flatter, Compliment.

Adulate, in Latin *adulatus*, participle of *adulor*, is changed from *adoleo* to offer incense.

Flatter, in French *flatter*, comes from the Latin *flatus*, wind or air, signifying to say what is airy and unsubstantial.

Compliment comes from *comply*, and the Latin *complaceo* to please greatly.

We *adulate* by discovering in our actions an entire subserviency; we *flatter* simply by words expressive of an unusual admiration; we *compliment* by fair language or respectful civilities. An *adulatory* address is couched in terms of feigned devotion to the object; a *flattering* address is filled with the fictitious perfections of the object; a *complimentary* address is suited to the station of the individual and the occasion which gives rise to it. Courtiers are guilty of *adulation*; lovers are addicted to *flattery*; people of fashion indulge themselves in a profusion of *compliments*.

Adulation can never be practised without falsehood; its means are hypocrisy and lying, its end private interest; *flattery* always exceeds the truth; it is extravagant praise dictated by an overweening partiality, or, what is more frequent, by a disingenuous temper. *Compliments* are not incompatible with sincerity, unless they are dictated from a mere compliance to the prescribed rules of politeness or the momentary desire of pleasing. *Adulation* may be fulsome, *flattery* gross, *compliments* unmeaning. *Adulation* inspires a person with an immoderate conceit of his own importance; *flattery* makes him in love with himself; *compliments* make him in good humour with himself.

The servile and excessive *adulation* of the senate soon convinced Tiberius that the Roman spirit had suffered a total change under Augustus.—CUMBERLAND.

You may be sure a woman loves a man when she uses his expressions, tells his stories, or imitates his manner. This gives a secret delight: for imitation is a kind of artless *flattery*, and mightily favours the principle of self-love.—SPECTATOR.

I have known a hero *complimented* upon the decent majesty and state he assumed after victory.—POPE.

To Advance, v. To adduce.

To Advance, Proceed.

Advance, in French *avancer*, from the Latin *advēnio*, signifies to come near or toward.

Proceed, in Latin *procedo*, signifies to go forward.

To *advance* is to go towards some point; to *proceed* is to go onward in a certain course. The same distinction is preserved between them in their figurative acceptation. A person *advances* in the world, who succeeds in his transactions and raises himself in society; he *proceeds* in his business, when he carries it on as he has done before.

We *advance* by *proceeding*, and we *proceed* in order to *advance*. Some people pass their lives in the same situation without *advancing*; some are always doing without *proceeding*. Those who make considerable progress in learning stand the fairest chance of being *advanced* to dignity and honour.

It is wonderful to observe by what a gradual progress the world of life *advances* through a prodigious variety of species, before a creature is formed that is complete in all its senses.—ADDISON.

If the scale of being rises by such a regular progress so high as man, we may by a parity of reason suppose that it still *proceeds* gradually through those beings which are of a superior nature to him.—ADDISON.

To Advance, v. To encourage.

Advance, v. Progress.

Advancement, v. Progress.

Advantage, Benefit, Utility, Service.

Advantage, in French *avantage*, probably comes from the Latin *advēntum*, participle of *advēnio*, compounded of *ad* and *venio* to come to, signifying to come to any one according to his desire, or agreeable to his purpose.

Benefit in French *bienfait*, Latin *benefactum*, compounded of *bene* well, and *factum* done, signifies done or made to one's wishes.

Utility, in French *utilité*, Latin *utilitas*, and *utilis* useful, from *utor* to use, signifies the quality of being able to be used.

Service, in French *service*, Latin *servitum*, from *servio* to serve, signifies the quality of serving one's purpose.

Advantage respects external or extrinsic circumstances of profit, honour, and convenience; *benefit* respects the consequences of actions and events; *utility* and *service* respect the good which can be drawn from the use of any object. *Utility* implies the intrinsic good quality which renders a thing fit for use; *service* the actual state of a thing which may fit it for immediate use; a thing has its *utility* and is made of *service*.

A large house has its *advantages*: suitable exercise is attended with *benefit*: sun-dials have their *utility* in ascertaining the hour precisely by the sun; and may be made *serviceable* at times in lieu of watches. Things are sold to *advantage*; persons ride or walk for the *benefit* of their health; they purchase articles for their *utility*, and retain them when they are found *serviceable*.

A good education has always its *advantages*, although every one cannot derive the same *benefit* from the cultivation of his talents, as all have not the happy art of employing their acquirements to the right objects: riches are of no *utility* unless rightly employed; and edge tools are of no *service* which are not properly sharpened. It is of great *advantage* to young people to form good connexions on their entrance into life: it is no less *beneficial* to their morals to be under the guidance of the aged and experienced, from whom they may draw many *useful* directions for their future conduct, and many *serviceable* hints by way of admonition.

It is the great *advantage* of a trading nation, that there are very few in it so dull and heavy, who may not be placed in stations of life, which may give them an opportunity of making their fortunes.—ADDISON.

For the *benefit* of the gentle reader, I will show what to turn over unread, and what to peruse.—STEELE.

If the gibbet does not produce virtue, it is yet of such incontestable *utility* that I believe these gentlemen would be very unwilling that it should be removed, who are notwithstanding so zealous to steel every breast against damnation.—HAWKESWORTH.

His wisdom and knowledge are *serviceable* to all who think fit to make use of them.—STEELE.

Advantage, v. Good.

Advantage, Profit.

Advantage, v. Advantage, benefit.

Profit, in French *profite*, Latin *profectus*, participle of *proficio*, compounded of *pro* and *facio*, signifies that which makes for one's good.

The idea common to these terms is of some good received by a person. *Advantage* is

general; it respects every thing which can contribute to the wishes, wants, and comforts of life: *profit* in its proper sense is specific; it regards only pecuniary advantage. Situations have their *advantages*; trade has its *profits*.

Whatever we estimate as an *advantage* is so to the individual; but *profits* are something real: the former is a relative term, it depends on the sentiments of the person: what is an *advantage* to one may be a *disadvantage* to another; the latter is an absolute term: *profit* is alike to all under all circumstances.

For he in all his am'rous battles
N' *advantage* finds like goods and chattels.—BUTLER.

He does the office of a counsellor, a judge, an executor, and a friend, to all his acquaintance, without the *profits* which attend such offices.—STEELE.

Adventure, v. Event.

Adventurous, v. Enterprising.

Adventurous, v. Foolhardy.

Adversary, v. Enemy.

Adverse, Contrary, Opposite.

Adverse, in French *adverse*, Latin *adversus*, participle of *adverto*, compounded of *ad* and *verto*, signifies turning towards or against.

Contrary, in French *contraire*, Latin *contrarius*, comes from *contra* against.

Opposite, in Latin *oppositus*, participle of *oppono*, is compounded of *ob* and *pono*, signifying placed in the way.

Adverse respects the feelings and interests of persons; *contrary* regards their plans and purposes; *opposite* relates to the situation and nature of things. Fortune is *adverse*; an event turns out *contrary* to what was expected; sentiments are *opposite* to each other. An *adverse* wind comes across our wishes; a *contrary* wind lies in an opposite direction; *contrary* winds are mostly *adverse* to some one who is crossing the ocean; *adverse* winds need not always be directly *contrary*.

Circumstances are sometimes so *adverse* as to baffle the best concerted plans. Facts often prove directly *contrary* to the representations given of them. People with *opposite* characters cannot be expected to act together with pleasure to either party. *Adverse* events interrupt the peace of mind; *contrary* accounts invalidate the testimony of the narration; *opposite* principles interrupt the harmony of society.

The periodical winds which were then set in were distinctly *adverse* to the course which Pizarro proposed to steer.—ROBERTSON.

As I should be loth to offer none but instances of the abuse of prosperity, I am happy in recollecting one very singular example of the *contrary* sort.—CUMBERLAND.

And as Egæon, when with heav'n he strove,
Stood *opposite* in arms to mighty Jove.—DRYDEN.

Adverse, Inimical, Hostile, Repugnant.

Adverse, v. Adverse.

Inimical, from the Latin *inimicus* an enemy, signifies belonging to an enemy.

Hostile, in Latin *hostilis*, from *hostis* an enemy, signifies the same.

Repugnant, in Latin *repugnans*, from *repugno*, or *re* and *pugno* to fight against, signifies warring with,

Adverse may be applied to either persons or things; *inimical* and *hostile* to persons or things personal; *repugnant* to things only: a person is *adverse* or a thing is *adverse* to an object; a person, or what is personal, is either *inimical* or *hostile* to an object; one thing is *repugnant* to another. We are *adverse* to a proposition; or circumstances are *adverse* to our advancement. Partizans are *inimical* to the proceedings of government, and *hostile* to the possessors of power. Slavery is *repugnant* to the mild temper of Christianity.

Adverse expresses simple dissent or opposition; *inimical* either an acrimonious spirit or a tendency to injure; *hostile* a determined resistance; *repugnant* a direct relation of variance. Those who are *adverse* to any undertaking will not be likely to use the endeavours which are essential to ensure its success. Those who dissent from the establishment are *inimical* to its forms, its discipline, or its doctrine: many of them are so *hostile* to it as to aim at its subversion. The restraints which it imposes on the wandering and licentious imagination is *repugnant* to the temper of their minds.

Sickness is *adverse* to the improvement of youth. The dissensions in the Christian world are *inimical* to the interests of religion, and tend to produce many *hostile* measures. Democracy is *inimical* to good order, the fomentor of *hostile* parties, and *repugnant* to every sound principle of civil society.

Only two soldiers were killed on the side of Cortes, and two officers with fifteen privates of the *adverse* faction.—ROBERTSON.

God hath shown himself to be favourable to virtue, and *inimical* to vice and guilt.—BL. GR.

Then with a purple veil involve your eyes,
Lest *hostile* faces blast the sacrifice.—DRYDEN.

The exorbitant jurisdiction of the (Scottish) ecclesiastical courts were founded on maxims *repugnant* to justice.—ROBERTSON.

Adverse, Averse.

Adverse (v. *Adverse*), signifying turned against or over against, denotes simply opposition of situation. **Averse**, from *a* and *versus*, signifying turned from or away from, denotes an active removal or separation from. *Adverse* is therefore as applicable to inanimate as to animate objects, *averse* only to animate objects. When applied to conscious agents *adverse* refers to matters of opinion and sentiment, *averse* to those affecting. We are *adverse* to that which we think wrong; we are *averse* to that which opposes our inclinations, our habits, or our interests. Sectarians profess to be *adverse* to the doctrines and discipline of the establishment, but the greater part of them are still more *averse* to the wholesome restraints which it imposes on the imagination.

Before you were a tyrant I was your friend, and am now no otherwise your enemy than every Athenian must be who is *adverse* to your usurpation.—CUMBERLAND.

Men relinquish ancient habits slowly, and with reluctance. They are *averse* to new experiments, and venture upon them with timidity.—ROBERTSON.

Adversity, Distress.

Adversity, v. adverse.

Distress, from the Latin *distringo*, com-

pounded of *dis* twice, and *stringo* to bind, signifies that which binds very tight, or brings into a great strait.

Adversity respects external circumstances; *distress* regards either external circumstances or inward feelings. *Adversity* is opposed to prosperity; *distress* to ease.

Adversity is a general condition, *distress* a particular state. *Distress* is properly the highest degree of *adversity*. When a man's affairs go altogether *adverse* to his wishes and hopes, when accidents deprive him of his possessions or blast his prospects, he is said to be in *adversity*; but when in addition to this he is reduced to a state of want, deprived of friends and all prospect of relief, his situation is that of real *distress*.

Adversity is trying, *distress* is overwhelming. Every man is liable to *adversity*, although few are reduced to *distress* but by their own fault.

The other extreme which these considerations should arm the heart of a man against, is utter dependency of mind in a time of pressing *adversity*.—SOUTH.

Most men, who are at length delivered from any great *distress*, indeed, find that they are so by ways they never thought of.—SOUTH.

To Advertise, Publish.

Advertise, from the Latin *adverto*, compounded of *ad* and *verto* to turn to, signifies to turn the attention to a thing.

Publish, in Latin *publico*, that is, *facere publicum*, signifies to make public.

Advertise denotes the means, and *publish* the end. To *advertise* is to direct the public attention to any event, by means of a printed circular; *publish* is to make known either by oral or a printed communication.

We *publish* by *advertising*, but we do not always *advertise* when we *publish*. Mercantile and civil transactions are conducted by means of *advertisements*. Extraordinary circumstances are speedily *published* in a neighbourhood by circulating from mouth to mouth.

Every man that *advertises* his own excellence should write with some consciousness of a character which dares to call the attention of the public.—JOHNSON.

The criticisms which I have hitherto *published*, have been made with an intention rather to discover beauties and excellences in the writers of my own time, than to *publish* any of their faults and imperfections.—ADDISON.

Advice, Counsel, Instruction.

Advice, *v. To admonish.*

Counsel, in French *conseil*, Latin *consilium*, comes from *consilio*, compounded of *con* and *salio* to leap together, signifying to run or act in accordance; and in an extended sense implies deliberation, or the thing deliberated upon, determined, and prescribed.

Instruction, in French *instruction*, Latin *instruere*, comes from *in* and *struo* to dispose or regulate, signifying the thing laid down.

The end of all the actions implied by these words is the communication of knowledge, and all of them include the accessory idea of superiority, either of age, station, knowledge or talent. *Advice* flows from superior professional knowledge, or an acquaintance with things in general; *counsel* regards superior wisdom, or a superior acquaintance with moral principles and practice; *instruction* respects

superior local knowledge in particular transactions. A medical man gives *advice* to his patient; a father gives *counsel* to his children; a counsellor gives *advice* to his client in points of law; he receives *instructions* from him in matters of fact.

Advice should be prudent and cautious; *counsel* sage and deliberative; *instructions* clear and positive. *Advice* is given on all the concerns of life, important, or otherwise; *counsel* is employed for grave and weighty matters; *instruction* is used on official occasions. Men of business are best able to give *advice* in mercantile transactions. In all measures that involve our future happiness, it is prudent to take the *counsel* of those who are more experienced than ourselves. An ambassador must not act without *instructions* from his Court.

A wise king will not act without the *advice* of his ministers. A considerate youth will not take any serious step without the *counsel* of his better informed friends. All diplomatic persons are guided by particular *instructions* in carrying on negotiations.

Advice and *counsel* are often given unasked and undesired, but *instructions* are always required for the regulation of a person's conduct in an official capacity.

In what manner can one give *advice* to a youth in the pursuit and possession of pleasure?—STEELE.

Young persons are commonly inclined to slight the remarks and *counsels* of their elders.—JOHNSON.

Some convey their *instructions* to us in the best chosen words.—ADDISON.

Advice, *v. Information.*

To Advise, *v. To admonish.*

Advocate, *v. Defender.*

Æra, *v. Time.*

Affable, Courteous.

Affable, in French *affable*, Latin *affabilis*, from *af* or *ad*, and *fari* to speak, signifies a readiness to speak to any one.

Courteous, in French *courtois*, from the word court, signifies after the refined manner of a court.

We are *affable* by a mild and easy address towards all, without distinction of rank, who have occasion to speak to us; we are *courteous* by a refined and engaging air to our equals or superiors who address themselves to us. The *affable* man invites to inquiry, and is ready to gratify curiosity: the *courteous* man encourages to a communication of our wants, and discovers in his manners a willingness to relieve them. *Affability* results from good nature, and *courteousness* from fine feeling. It is necessary to be *affable* without familiarity, and *courteous* without officiousness.

After a short pause, Augustus appeared, looking around him with an *affable* countenance.

Whereat the Elin knight with speeches gent

Him first saluted, who, well as he might,

Him fair salutes again, as seemeth *courteous* knight.

WEST.

Affair, Business, Concern.

Affair, in French *affaire*, is compounded of *af* or *ad* and *faire*, in Latin *facio* to make or do, signifying the thing that makes, does or takes place for a person.

Business, from *busy* (v. *Active*), signifies the thing that makes or interests a person, or with which he is busy or occupied.

Concern, in French *concerner*, Latin *concerno*, compounded of *con* and *cerno* to look, signifies the thing looked at, thought of, or taken part in.

An *affair* is what happens; a *business* is what is done; a *concern* is what is felt. An *affair* is general; it respects one, many, or all: every *business* and *concern* is an *affair*, though not *vice-versâ*. *Business* and *concern* are personal; *business* is that which engages the attention; *concern* is that which interests the feelings, prospects, and condition, advantageously or otherwise. An *affair* is interesting; a *business* is serious; a *concern* momentous. The usurpation of power is an *affair* which interests a nation; the adjusting a difference is a *business* most suited to the ministers of religion; to make our peace with our Maker is the *concern* of every individual.

Affairs are administered; *business* is transacted; *concerns* are managed. The *affairs* of the world are administered by a Divine Providence. Those who are in the practice of the law require peculiar talents to fit them for transacting the complicated *business*, which perpetually offers itself. Some men are so involved in the *affairs* of this world as to forget the *concerns* of the next, which ought to be nearest and dearest to them.

I remember in Tully's epistle, in the recommendation of a man to an *affair* which had no manner of relation to money, it is said, you may trust him, for he is a frugal man.—STEELE.

We may indeed say that our part does not suit us, and that we could perform another better; but this, says Epictetus, is not our *business*.—ADDISON.

The sense of other men ought to prevail over us in things of less consideration; but not in *concerns* where truth and honour are engaged.—STEELE.

To Affect, Concern.

Affect, in French *affecter*, Latin *affectum*, participle of *afficio*, compounded of *ad* and *facio*, to do or act; signifies to act upon.

Concern, v. *Affair*.

Things *affect* us which produce any change in our outward circumstances; they *concern* us if only connected with our circumstances in any shape.

Whatever *affects* must *concern*; but all that *concerns* does not *affect*. The price of corn *affects* the interest of the seller; and therefore it *concerns* him to keep it up, without regard to the public good or injury.

Things *affect* either persons or things; but they *concern* persons only. Rain *affects* the hay or corn; and these matters *concern* every one more or less.

Affect and *concern* have an analogous meaning likewise, when taken for the influence on the mind. We are *affected* by things when our *affections* only are awakened by them: we are *concerned* when our understanding and wishes are engaged.

We may be *affected* either with joy or sorrow: we are *concerned* only in a painful manner. People of tender sensibility are easily *affected*: irritable people are *concerned* about trifles. It is natural for every one to be *affected* at the recital of misfortunes; but there are people

of so cold and selfish a character as not to be *concerned* about any thing which does not immediately *affect* their own persons or property.

We see that every different species of sensible creatures has its different notions of beauty, and that each of them is *affected* with the beauties of its own kind.—ADDISON.

Without *concern* he hears, but hears from far,
Of tumults, and descents, and distant war.—DRYDEN.

To Affect, Assume.

Affect, in this sense, derives its origin immediately from the Latin *affecto* to desire after eagerly, signifying to aim at or aspire after.

Assume, in Latin *assumo*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *sumo* to take, signifies to take to one's self.

To *affect* is to use forced efforts to appear to have; to *assume* is to appropriate to one's self.

One *affects* to have fine feelings, and *assumes* great importance.

Affectation springs from the desire of appearing better than we really are; *assumption* from the thinking ourselves better than we really are. We *affect* the virtues which we have not; we *assume* the character which does not belong to us.

An *affected* person is always thinking of others; an *assuming* person thinks only of himself. The *affected* man strives to gain applause by appearing to be what he is not; the *assuming* man demands respect upon the ground of what he supposes himself to be. Hypocrisy is often the companion of *affectation*; self-conceit always that of *assumption*.

To *affect* is always taken in a bad sense; but to *assume* may be sometimes an indifferent action at least, if not justifiable. Men always *affect* that which is admired by others, in order to gain their applause; but they sometimes *assume* a name or an authority, which is no more than their just right.

In conversation the medium is neither to *affect* silence or eloquence.—STERNE.

Laughs not the heart when giants big with pride

Assume the pompous port, the martial part?

CHURCHILL.

To Affect,* Pretend To.

Affect, v. To *affect*, *concern*.

Pretend, in Latin *pretendo*, that is *pro* and *tendo*, signifies to hold or stretch one thing before another by way of a blind.

These terms are synonymous only in the bad sense of setting forth to others what is not real: we *affect* by putting on a false air; we *pretend* by making a false declaration. Art is employed in *affecting*; assurance and self-complacency in *pretending*. A person *affects* not to hear what it is convenient for him not to answer; he *pretends* to have forgotten what it is convenient for him not to recollect. One *affects* the manners of a gentleman, and *pretends* to gentility of birth. One *affects* the character and habits of a scholar; one *pretends* to learning.

To *affect* the qualities which we have not

* Vide Trusler; "To affect, pretend to."

spoils those which we have; to *pretend* to attainments which we have not made, obliges us to have recourse to falsehoods in order to escape detection.

Self quite put off *affects* with too much art
To put on Woodward in each mangled part.

CHURCHILL.

There is something so natively great and good in a person that is truly devout, that an awkward man may as well *pretend* to be genteel as an hypocrite to be pious.—STEELE.

Affecting, v. Moving.

Affection, Love.

Affection, from the verb *affect* (v. *To affect*), denotes the state of being kindly *affected* towards a person.

Love, in low German *leeve*, high German *liebe*, from the English *lieve*, low German *leef*, high German *lieb* dear or pleasing, the Latin *libet* it is pleasing, and by metathesis, from the Greek *φίλος* dear, signifies the state of holding a person dear.

These words express two sentiments of the heart which do honour to human nature; they are the bonds by which mankind are knit to each other. Both imply good will: but *affection* is a tender sentiment that dwells with pleasure on the object; *love* is a tender sentiment accompanied with longing for the object; we cannot have *love* without *affection*, but we may have *affection* without *love*.

Love is the natural sentiment between near relations; *affection* subsists between those who are less intimately connected, being the consequence either of relationship, friendship, or long intercourse; it is the sweetener of human society, which carries with it a thousand charms, in all the varied modes of kindness which it gives birth to; it is not so active as *love*, but it diffuses itself wider, and embraces a larger number of objects.

Love is powerful in its effects, awakening vivid sentiments of pleasure or pain; it is a passion exclusive, restless, and capricious. *Affection* is a chastened feeling under the control of the understanding; it promises no more pleasure than it gives, and has but few alloys. Marriage may begin with *love*; but it ought to terminate in *affection*.

But thou, whose years are more to mine allied,
No fate my vow'd *affection* shall divide
From thee, heroic youth!—DRYDEN.

The poets, the moralists, the painters, in all their descriptions, allegories, and pictures, have represented *love* as a soft torment, a bitter sweet, a pleasing pain, or an agreeable distress.—ADDISON.

Affection, v. Attachment.

Affectionate, Kind, Fond.

Affectionate, from *affection* (v. *Affection*), denotes the quality of having *affection*.

Kind, from the word *kind* kindred or family, denotes the quality or feeling engendered by the family tie.

Fond, from the Saxon *fandian* to gape, and the German *finden* to find or seek, denotes a vehement attachment to a thing.

Affectionate and *fond* characterise feelings; *kind* is an epithet applied to outward actions, as well as inward feelings; a disposition is *affectionate* or *fond*; a behaviour is *kind*.

Affection is a settled state of the mind;

kindness a temporary state of feeling, mostly discoverable by some outward sign: both are commendable and honourable, as to the nature of the feelings themselves, the objects of the feelings, and the manner in which they display themselves; the understanding always approves the *kindness* which *affection* dictates, or that which springs from a tender heart. *Fondness* is a less respectable feeling; it is sometimes the excess of *affection*, or an extravagant mode of expressing it, or an attachment to an inferior object.

A person is *affectionate*, who has the object of his regard strongly in his mind, who participates in his pleasures and pains, and is pleased with his society. A person is *kind*, who expresses a tender sentiment, or does any service in a pleasant manner. A person is *fond*, who caresses an object, or makes it a source of pleasure to himself.

Relatives should be *affectionate* to each other: we should be *kind* to all who stand in need of our *kindness*: children are *fond* of whatever affords them pleasure, or of whoever gives them indulgences.

Our salutations were very hearty on both sides, consisting of many *kind* shakes of the hand, and *affectionate* looks which we cast upon one another.—ADDISON.

Riches expose a man to pride and luxury, a foolish elation of heart, and too great *fondness* for the present world.—ADDISON.

Affinity, v. Alliance.

Affinity, v. Kindred.

To Affirm, Asseverate, Assure, Vouch, Aver, Protest.

Affirm, in French *affirmer*, Latin *affirmo*, compounded of *af* or *ad* and *firma* to strengthen, signifies to give strength to what has been said.

Asseverate, in Latin *asseveratus*, participle of *assevero*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *severus*, signifies to make strong and positive.

Assure, in French *assurer*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *as* or *ad* and *sure*, signifying to make sure.

Vouch is probably changed from *vow*.

Aver, in French *averer*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *av* or *ad* and *verus* true, signifying to bear testimony to the truth.

Protest, in French *protester*, Latin *protesto*, is compounded of *pro* and *testor* to call to witness as to what we think about a thing.

All these terms indicate an expression of a person's conviction.

In one sense, to *affirm* is to declare that a thing is in opposition to denying or declaring that it is not; in the sense here chosen it signifies to declare a thing as a fact on our credit. To *asseverate* is to declare it with confidence. To *vouch* is to rest the truth of another's declaration on our own responsibility. To *aver* is to express the truth of a declaration unequivocally. To *protest* is to declare a thing solemnly, and with strong marks of sincerity.

Affirmations are made of the past and present; a person *affirms* what he has seen and what he sees. *Asseverations* are strong *affirmations*, made in cases of doubt to remove every impression disadvantageous to one's sincerity. *Assurances* are made of the past, present, and future; they mark the conviction of the

speaker as to what has been, or is, and his intentions as to what shall be; they are appeals to the estimation which another has in one's word. *Vouching* is an act for another; it is the supporting of another's assurance by our own. *Averring* is employed in matters of fact; we *aver* as to the accuracy of details; we *aver* on positive knowledge that sets aside all question. *Protestations* are stronger than either *asseverations* or *assurances*; they are accompanied with every act, look, or gesture, that can tend to impress conviction on another.

Affirmations are employed in giving evidence, whether accompanied with an oath or not: liars deal much in *asseverations* and *protestations*. People *asseverate* in order to produce a conviction of their veracity; they *protest* in order to obtain a belief of their innocence; they *aver* where they expect to be believed. *Assurances* are altogether personal; they are always made to satisfy some one of what they wish to know and believe. We ought to be sparing of our *assurances* of regard for another, as we ought to be suspicious of such assurances when made to ourselves. Whenever we *affirm* anything on the authority of another, we ought to be particularly cautious not to *vouch* for its veracity if it be not unquestionable.

An infidel and fear?

Fear what? a dream? a fable?—How thy dread,

Unwilling evidence, and therefore strong,

Affords my cause an undesign'd support!

How disbelief *affirms* what it denies!—YOUNG.

I judge in this case as Charles the Second victualled his navy, with the bread which one of his dogs chose of several pieces thrown before him, rather than trust to the *asseverations* of the victualers.—STEELE.

My learned friend *assured* me that the earth had lately received a shock from a comet that crossed its vertex.—STEELE.

All the great writers of the Augustan age, for whom singly we have so great an esteem, stand up together as *vouchers* for one another's reputation.—ADDISON.

Among ladies, he positively *averred* that nonsense was the most prevailing part of eloquence, and had so little complaisance as to say, "a woman is never taken by her reason, but always by her passion."—STEELE.

To Affirm, Assert.

Affirm, *v.* To *affirm*, *asseverate*.

Assert, in Latin *assertus*, participle of *asserere*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *sero* to connect, signifies to connect words into a proposition.

To *affirm* is said of facts; to *assert*, of opinions: we *affirm* what we know; we *assert* what we believe.

Whoever *affirms* what he does not know to be true is guilty of falsehood; whoever *asserts* what he cannot prove to be true is guilty of folly.

We contradict an *affirmation*: we confute an *assertion*.

That this man, wise and virtuous as he was, passed always unentangled through the snares of life, it would be prejudice and temerity to *affirm*.—JOHNSON'S LIFE OF COLLINS.

It is *asserted* by a tragic poet, that "est miser nemo nisi comparatus,"—"no man is miserable, but as he is compared with others happier than himself." This position is not strictly and philosophically true.—JOHNSON.

To Affix, Subjoin, Attach, Annex.

Affix, in Latin *affixus*, participle of *affigere*, compounded of *af* or *ad* and *figo* to fix, signifies to fix to a thing.

Subjoin is compounded of *sub* and *join*, signifying to join to the lower or farther extremity of a body.

Attach, *v.* To *adhere*.

Annex, in Latin *annexus*, participle of *annectere*, compounded of *an* or *ad* and *necto* to knit, signifies to knit or tie to a thing.

To *affix* is to put any thing as an essential to any whole; to *subjoin* is to put any thing as a subordinate part to a whole; in the former case the part to which it is put is not specified; in the latter the syllable *sub* specifies the extremity as the part: to *attach* is to make one thing *adhere* to another as an accompaniment; to *annex* is to bring things into a general connexion with each other.

A title is *affixed* to a book; a few lines are *subjoined* to a letter by way of postscript; we *attach* blame to a person; a certain territory is *annexed* to a kingdom.

Letters are *affixed* to words in order to modify their sense: it is necessary to *subjoin* remarks to what require illustration: we are apt from prejudice or particular circumstances to *attach* disrepute to certain professions, which are not only useful but important: papers are *annexed* by way of appendix to some important transaction.

It is improper to *affix* opprobrious epithets to any community of persons on account of their religious tenets. Men are not always scrupulous about the means of *attaching* others to their interest, when their ambitious views are to be forwarded. Every station in life, above that of extreme indigence, has certain privileges *annexed* to it, but none greater than those which are enjoyed by the middling classes.

He that has settled in his mind determined ideas, with names *affixed* to them, will be able to discern their differences one from another.—LOCKE.

In justice to the opinion which I would wish to impress of the amiable character of Pistratus, I *subjoin* to this paper some explanation of the word tyrant.—CUMBERLAND.

As our nature is at present constituted, *attached* by so many strong connections to the world of sense, and enjoying a communication so feeble and distant with the world of spirits, we need fear no danger from cultivating intercourse with the latter as much as possible.—BLAIR.

The evils inseparably *annexed* to the present condition are numerous and afflictive.—JOHNSON.

To Afflict, Distress, Trouble.

Afflict, in Latin *afflictus*, participle of *affligere*, compounded of *af* or *ad* and *figo*, in Greek *θλιβω* to press hard, signifies to beat upon any one.

Distress, *v.* *Adversity*.

Trouble signifies to cause a tumult, from the Latin *turba*, Greek *τurbη* or *θουρβος*, a tumult.

When these terms relate to outward circumstances, the first expresses more than the second, and the second more than the third.

People are *afflicted* with grievous maladies. The mariner is *distressed* for want of water in the midst of the wide ocean; or an embarrassed tradesman is *distressed* for money to

maintain his credit. The mechanic is troubled for want of proper tools, or the head of a family for want of good domestics.

When they respect the inward feelings, *afflict* conveys the idea of deep sorrow; *distress* that of sorrow mixed with anxiety; *trouble* that of pain in a smaller degree.

The death of a parent *afflicts*; the misfortunes of our family and friends *distress*; crosses in trade and domestic inconveniences *trouble*.

In the season of *affliction* prayer affords the best consolation and surest supports. The assistance and sympathy of friends serve to relieve *distress*. We may often help ourselves out of our *troubles*, and remove the evil by patience and perseverance.

Afflictions may be turned to benefits if they lead a man to turn inwardly into himself, and examine the state of his heart and conscience in the sight of his Maker. The *distresses* of human life often serve only to enhance the value of our pleasures when we regain them. Among the *troubles* with which we are daily assailed many of them are too trifling for us to be *troubled* by them.

We last night received a piece of ill news at our club which very sensibly *afflicted* every one of us. I question not but my readers themselves will be *troubled* at the hearing of it. To keep them no longer in suspense, Sir Roger de Coverly is dead.—ADDISON.

While the mind contemplates *distress*, it is acted upon and never acts, and by indulging in this contemplation it becomes more and more unfit for action.—CRAIG.

Affliction, Grief, Sorrow.

Affliction, v. To afflict.

Grief from *grave*, in German *grämen*, Swedish *gramga*, &c.

Sorrow, in German *sorge*, &c., signifies care, as well as sorrow.

All these words mark a state of suffering which differs either in the degree or the cause, or in both.

Affliction is much stronger than *grief*; it lies deeper in the soul, and arises from a more powerful cause; the loss of what is most dear, the continued sickness of our friends, or a reverse of fortune, will all cause *affliction*: the misfortunes of others, the failure of our favourite schemes, the troubles of our country, will occasion us *grief*.

Sorrow is less than *grief*; it arises from the untoward circumstances which perpetually arise in life. A disappointment, the loss of a game, our own mistake, or the negligences of others, cause *sorrow*.

Affliction lies too deep to be vehement; it discovers itself by no striking marks in the exterior; it is lasting, and does not cease when the external causes cease to act; *grief* may be violent, and discover itself by loud and indecorous signs; it is transitory, and ceases even before the cause which gave birth to it: *sorrow* discovers itself by a simple expression; it is still more transient than *grief*, not existing beyond the moment in which it is produced.

A person of a tender mind is *afflicted* at the remembrance of his sins; he is *grieved* at the consciousness of his fallibility and proneness to error; he is *sorry* for the faults which he has committed,

Affliction is allayed: *grief* subsides: *sorrow* is soothed.

It is almost wonderful to consider how men are able to raise *affliction* to themselves out of every thing.—ADDISON.

The melancholy silence that follows hereupon, and continues until he has recovered himself enough to reveal his mind to his friend, raises in the spectators a *grief* that is inexpressible.—ADDISON.

The most agreeable objects recall the *sorrow* for her with whom he used to enjoy them.—ADDISON.

Affluence, v. Riches.

To Afford, Yield, Produce.

—*Afford* is probably changed from *affered*, and comes from the Latin *affero*, compounded of *af* or *ad* and *fero*, signifying to bring to a person.

Yield, in Saxon *geldan*, German *gelten* to pay, restore, or give the value, is probably connected with the Hebrew *ilad* to breed, or bring forth.

Produce, in Latin *produco*, compounded of *pro* forth and *duco* to bring, signifies to bring out or into existence.

With *afford* is associated the idea of communicating a part, or property of some substance, to a person; meat *affords* nourishment to those who make use of it; the sun *affords* light and heat to all living creatures.

To *yield* is the natural operation of any substance to give up or impart the parts or properties inherent in it; it is the natural surrender which an object makes of itself: trees *yield* fruit; the seed *yields* grain; some sorts of grain do not *yield* much in particular soils.

Produce conveys the idea of one thing causing another to exist, or to spring out of it; it is a species of creation, the formation of a new substance: the earth *produces* a variety of fruits; confined air will *produce* an explosion.

Afford and *produce* have a moral application; but not *yield*: nothing *affords* so great a scope for ridicule as the follies of fashion; nothing *produces* so much mischief as the vice of drunkenness. The history of man does not *afford* an instance of any popular commotion that has ever *produced* such atrocities and atrocious characters as the French revolution.

Religion is the only thing that can *afford* true consolation and peace of mind in the season of affliction, and the hour of death. The recollection of past incidents, particularly those which have passed in our infancy, *produces* the most pleasurable sensations in the mind.

The generous man in the ordinary acceptance, without respect of the demands of his family, will soon find upon the foot of his account that he has sacrificed to fools, knaves, flatterers, or the deservedly unhappy, all the opportunities of *affording* any future assistance where it ought to be.—STEELE.

Their vines a shadow to their race shall *yield*,
And the same hand that sowed shall reap the field. POPE.

Their sharpen'd ends in earth their footing place,
And the dry poles *produce* a living race.—DRYDEN.

To Afford, Spare.

Afford, v. To afford, yield.

Spare, in German *sparen*, Latin *parco*,

Hebrew *perak* to preserve, signifies here to lay apart for any particular use.

The idea of deducting from one's property with convenience is common to these terms; but *afford* respects solely expenses which are no more than commensurate with our income; *spare* is said of things in general, which we may part with without any sensible diminution of our comfort.

There are few so destitute that they cannot *afford* something for the relief of others, who are more destitute. He who has two things of a kind may easily *spare* one.

Accept whate'er *Aeneas* can *afford*,
Untouch'd thy arms, untaken be thy sword.—DRYDEN.

How many men, in the common concerns of life, lend sums of money which they are not able to spare.—ADDISON.

To *Afford*, *v.* To give.

Affray, *v.* Quarrel.

Affront, Insult, Outrage.

Affront, in French *affronte*, from the Latin *ad* and *frons*, the forehead, signifies flying in the face of a person.

Insult, in French *insulte*, comes from the Latin *insulto* to dance or leap upon. The former of these actions marks defiance, the latter scorn and triumph.

Outrage is compounded of *out* or *utter* and *rage* or *violence*, signifying an act of extreme violence.

An *affront* is a mark of reproach shown in the presence of others; it piques and mortifies; an *insult* is an attack made with insolence; it irritates and provokes; an *outrage* combines all that is offensive; it wounds and injures. An intentional breach of politeness is an *affront*: if coupled with any external indication of hostility it is an *insult*: if it break forth into personal violence it is an *outrage*.

Captious people construe every innocent freedom into an affront. When people are in a state of animosity, they seek opportunities of offering each other *insults*. Intoxication or violent passion impel men to the commission of *outrages*.

The person thus conducted, who was Hannibal, seemed much disturbed, and could not forbear complaining to the board of the *affronts* he had met with among the Roman historians.—ADDISON.

It may very reasonably be expected that the old draw upon themselves the greatest part of those *insults* which they so much lament, and that age is rarely despised but when it is contemptible.—JOHNSON.

This is the round of a passionate man's life; he contracts debts when he is furious, which his virtue, if he has virtue, obliges him to discharge at the return of reason. He spends his time in *outrage* and reparation.—JOHNSON.

Affront, *v.* Offence.

Afraid, Fearful, Timorous, Timid.

Afraid is changed from *afear'd*, signifying in a state of fear.

Fearful, as the words of which it is compounded imply, signifies full of fear.

Timorous and **Timid** come from the Latin *timidus* fearful, *timor* fear, and *timere* to fear.

The first denotes a temporary state, the three last a habit of the mind.

Afraid may be used either in a physical or moral application, either as it relates to ourselves only or to others; *fearful* and *timorous* are only applied physically and personally; *timid* is mostly used in a moral sense.

It is the character of the *fearful* or *timorous* person to be *afraid* of what he imagines would hurt himself; it is not necessary for the prospect of danger to exist in order to awaken fear in such a disposition. It is the characteristic of the *timid* person to be *afraid* of offending or meeting with something painful from others; such a disposition is prevented from following the dictates of its own mind.

Between *fearful* and *timorous* there is little distinction, either in sense or application, except that we say *fearful* of a thing, not *timorous* of a thing.

To be always *afraid* of losing life is, indeed, scarcely to enjoy a life that can deserve the care of preservation.—JOHNSON.

By I know not what impatience of railery, he is wonderfully *fearful* of being thought too great a believer.—STEELE.

Then birds in airy space might safely move,
And *tim'rous* hares on heath securely rove.
—DRYDEN.

He who brings with him into a clamorous multitude the *timidity* of reclusive speculation, will suffer himself to be driven by a burst of laughter from the fortresses of demonstration.—JOHNSON.

After, Behind.

After respects order; **Behind** respects position. One runs *after* a person, or stands *behind* his chair.

After is used either figuratively or literally; *behind* is used only literally.

Men hunt *after* amusements; misfortunes come *after* one another: a garden lies *behind* a house; a thing is concealed *behind* a bush.

Good *after* ill, and *after* pain delight.
Alternate, like the scenes of day and night.—DRYDEN.
He first, and close *behind* him followed she,
For such was Proserpine's severe decree.—DRYDEN.

Age, *v.* Generation.

Age, *v.* Time, period.

Aged, *v.* Elderly.

Agency, *v.* Action, agency.

Agent, *v.* Actor.

Agent, *v.* Minister.

Agent, *v.* Factor.

To Aggravate, Irritate, Provoke. Exasperate, Tantalize.

Aggravate, in Latin *aggravatus*, participle of *aggravo*, compounded of the intensive syllable *ag* or *ad* and *gravo* to make heavy, signifies to make very heavy.

Irritate, in Latin *irritatus*, participle of *irrito*, which is a frequentative from *ira*, signifies to excite anger.

Provoke, in French *provoquer*, Latin *provoco*, compounded of *pro* forth, and *voco* to call, signifies to challenge or defy.

Exasperate, Latin *exasperatus*, participle of *exaspero*, is compounded of the intensive

syllable *ex* and *asper* rough, signifying to make things exceedingly rough.

Tantalize, in French *tantaliser*, Greek *τὰνταλίζω*, comes from *Tantalus*, a king of Phrygia, who having offended the gods, was destined by way of punishment to stand up to his chin in water with a tree of fair fruit hanging over his head, both of which, as he attempted to allay his hunger and thirst, fled from his touch.

All these words, except the first, refer to the feelings of the mind, and in familiar discourse that also bears the same signification; but otherwise respects the outward circumstances.

The crime of robbery is *aggravated* by any circumstances of cruelty whatever comes across the feelings *irritates*; whatever awakens anger *provokes*; whatever heightens this anger extraordinarily *exasperates*; whatever raises hopes in order to frustrate them *tantalizes*.

An appearance of unconcern for the offence and its consequences *aggravates* the guilt of the offender: a grating harsh sound *irritates* if long continued and often repeated: angry words *provoke*, particularly when spoken with an air of defiance; when to this be added bitter taunts and multiplied provocations, they *exasperate*; the weather by its frequent changes *tantalizes* those who depend upon it for amusement.

Wicked people *aggravate* their transgression by violence: susceptible and nervous people are most easily *irritated*: proud people are quickly *provoked*; hot and fiery people are soonest *exasperated*; those who wish for much, and wish for it eagerly, are oftentimes *tantalized*.

As if nature had not sown evils enough in life, we are continually adding grief to grief, and *aggravating* the common calamity by our cruel treatment of one another. —ADDISON.

He *irritated* many of his friends in London so much by his letters, that they withdrew their contributions. —JOHNSON'S LIFE OF SAVAGE.

The animal versions of critics are commonly such as may easily *provoke* the sedatest writer to some quickness of resentment. —JOHNSON.

Opposition retards, censure *exasperates*, or neglect depresses. —JOHNSON.

Can we think that religion was designed only for a contradiction to nature; and with the greatest and most irrational tyranny in the world to *tantalize*! —SOUTH.

To Aggravate, v. To heighten.

Aggressor, Assailant.

Aggressor, in Latin *aggressor*, participle of *aggrederi*, compounded of *ag* or *ad*, and *grederi* to step, signifies to step up to, fall upon, or attack.

Assailant, from *assail*, in French *assailir*, compounded of *as* or *ad*, and *aulio* to leap upon, signifies to leap upon or attack any one vehemently.

The characteristic idea of *aggressor* is that of one person going up to another in a hostile manner, and by a natural extension of the sense commencing an attack; the characteristic idea of *assailant* is that of one committing an act of violence.

An *aggressor* offers to do some injury either by word or deed; an *assailant* actually commits some violence: the former commences a dis-

pute, the latter carries it on with a vehement and direct attack.

An *aggressor* is blameable for giving rise to quarrels: an *assailant* is culpable for the mischief he does.

Were there no *aggressors* there would be no disputes; were there no *assailants* these disputes would not be serious.

An *aggressor* may be an *assailant*, or an *assailant* may be an *aggressor*, but they are as frequently distinct.

Where one is the *aggressor* and in pursuance of his first attack kills the other, the law supposes the action, however sudden, to be malicious. —JOHNSON'S LIFE OF SAVAGE.

What ear so fortified and barr'd
Against the tuneful force of vocal charms,
But would with transport to such sweet *assailants*
Surrender its attention? —MASON.

Agile, v. Active, brisk.

To Agitate, v. To shake, agitate.

Agitation, Emotion, Trepidation, Tremor.

Agitation, in Latin *agitatio*, from *agito*, signifies the state of being *agitated*.

Emotion, in Latin *emotio*, from *emotus*, participle of *emoveo*, compounded of *e*, out of, and *moveo*, to move, signifies the state of being moved out of rest or put in motion.

Trepidation, in Latin *trepidatio*, from *trepido*, to tremble, compounded of *tremo* and *pede*, to tremble with the feet, signifies the condition of trembling in all one's limbs from head to foot.

Tremor, from the Latin *tremor*, signifies originally the same state of trembling.

Agitation refers either to body or mind, *emotion* to the mind only, *trepidation* and *tremor* to the body only.

Agitation of mind is a vehement struggle between contending feelings; *emotion* is the awakening but one feeling; which in the latter case is not so vehement as in the former.

Distressing circumstances produce *agitation*: affecting and interesting circumstances produce *emotions*.

Agitations have but one character, namely, that of violence: *emotions* vary with the object that awakens them: they are *emotions* either of pain or pleasure, of tenderness or anger; they are either gentle or strong, faint or vivid.

With regard to the body, an *agitation* is more than a *trepidation*, and the latter more than a *tremor*: the two former attract the notice of the bystander; the latter is scarcely visible.

Agitations of the mind sometimes give rise to distorted and extravagant *agitations* of the body; *emotions* of terror or horror will throw the body into a *trepidation*: those of fear will cause a *tremor* to run through the whole frame.

The seventh book affects the imagination like the ocean in a calm, and fills the mind of the reader without producing in it anything like tumult or *agitation*. —ADDISON ON MILTON.

The description of Adam and Eve as they first appeared to Satan, is exquisitely drawn, and sufficient to make the fallen angel gaze upon them with all those *emotions* of envy in which he is represented. —ADDISON ON MILTON.

His first action of note was in the battle of Lepanto, where the success of that great day, in such *trepidation* of the state, made every man meritorious.—WOTTON.

He fell into such a universal *tremor* of all his joints that when going his legs trembled under him.—HERVEY.

Agony, v. Distress.

Agony, v. Pain.

Agreeable, Pleasant, Pleasing.

The first two of these epithets approach so near in sense and application, that they can with propriety be used indifferently, the one for the other; yet there is an occasional difference which may be clearly defined.

The **Agreeable** is that which agrees with or suits the character, temper, and feelings of a person; the **Pleasant** that which pleases; the **Pleasing** that which is adapted to please.

Agreeable expresses a feeling less vivid than *pleasant*; people of the soberest and gravest character may talk of passing *agreeable* hours, or enjoying *agreeable* society, if those hours were passed *agreeably* to their turn of mind, or that society which suited their taste; but the young and the gay will prefer *pleasant* society, where vivacity and mirth prevail, suitable to the tone of their spirits.

A man is *agreeable* who by a soft and easy address contributes to the amusement of others; a man is *pleasant* who to this softness adds affability and communicativeness.

Pleasing marks a sentiment less vivid and distinctive than either. A *pleasing* voice has something in it which we like; an *agreeable* voice strikes with positive pleasure upon the ear.

A *pleasing* countenance denotes tranquillity and contentment; it satisfies us when we view it: a *pleasant* countenance bespeaks happiness; it gratifies the beholder, and invites him to look upon it.

To divert me, I took up a volume of Shakspeare, where I chanced to cast my eye upon a part in the tragedy of Richard the Third, which filled my mind with an *agreeable* horror.—STEELE.

Pleasant the sun
When first on this delightful land he spreads
His orient beams.—MILTON.

Nor this alone t'indulge a vain delight,
And make a *pleasing* prospect for the sight.
DRYDEN.

Agreeable, v. Conformable.

To Agree, Accord, Suit.

Agree is compounded of a *or ad*, and *gree* *or gruo*, which root is found in the verb *congruo*, signifying to fit to a thing.

Accord, in French *accord*, from the Latin *chorda* the string of a harp, signifies the same as to be in tune or join in tune.

Suit, from the Latin *secutus*, participle of *sequor* to follow, signifies to be in a line, in the order a thing ought to be.

An *agreement* between two things requires an entire sameness; an *accordance* supposes a considerable resemblance; a *suitableness* implies an aptitude to coalesce.

Opinions *agree*, feelings *accord*, and tempers *suit*.

Two statements *agree* which are in all re-

spects alike: that *accords* with our feelings which produces pleasurable sensations: that *suits* our taste which we wish to adopt, or in adopting gives us pleasure.

Where there is no *agreement* in the essentials of any two accounts, their authenticity may be greatly questioned: if a representation of any thing *accords* with what has been stated from other quarters, it serves to corroborate it: it is advisable that the ages and stations as well as tempers of the parties should be *suitable*, who look forward for happiness in a matrimonial connexion.

Where there is no *agreement* of opinion, there can be no assimilation of habit; where there is no *accordance* of sound, there can be no harmony; where there is no *suitability* of temper, there can be no co-operation.

When opinions do not *agree*, men must *agree* to differ: the precepts of our Saviour *accord* with the tenderest as well as the noblest feelings of our nature: when the humours and dispositions of people do not *suit*, they do wisely not to have any intercourse with each other.

The laurel and the myrtle sweets *agree*.—DRYDEN.

Metre aids, and is adapted to, the memory; it *accords* to music, and is the vehicle of enthusiasm.—CUMBERLAND.

Rullo followed, in the partition of his states, the customs of the feudal law, which was then universally established in the southern countries of Europe, and which *suit*ed the peculiar circumstances of the age.—HUME.

To Agree, v. To accede.

To Agree, Coincide, Concur.

In the former section *agree* is compared with terms that are employed only for things; in the present case it is compared with words as they are applied to persons only.

Agree implies a general sameness.

Coincide, from the Latin *con* together and *incido* to fall, implies a meeting in a certain point.

Concur, from *con* together and *curro* to run, implies a running in the same course, an acting together on the same principles.

Agree denotes a state of rest; *coincide* and *concur* a state of motion, either towards or with another.

Agreement is either the voluntary or involuntary act of persons in general; *coincidence* is the voluntary but casual act of individuals, the act of one falling into the opinion of another; *concurrence* is the intentional positive act of individuals; it is the act of one authorizing the opinions and measures of another.

Men of like education and temperament *agree* upon most subjects: people cannot expect others to *coincide* with them, when they advance extravagant positions: the wiser part of mankind are backward in *concurring* in any schemes which are not warranted by experience.

Since all *agree*, who both with judgment read,
Tis the same sun, and does himself succeed.—TATE.

There is not perhaps any couple whose dispositions and relish of life are so perfectly similar as that their wills constantly *coincide*.—HAWKESWORTH.

The plan being thus concerted, and my cousin's *concurrence* obtained, it was immediately put in execution.
—HAWKESWORTH.

Agreement, Contract, Covenant, Compact, Bargain.

Agreement signifies what is agreed to (vide *To agree*).

Contract, in French *contracte*, from the Latin *contractus*, participle of *contraho* to bring close together or bind, signifies the thing thus contracted or bound.

Covenant, in French *covenante*, Latin *conventus*, participle of *convenio* to meet together at a point, signifies the point at which several meet, that is, the thing agreed upon by many.

Compact, in Latin *compactus*, participle of *compingo* to bind close, signifies the thing to which people bind themselves close.

Bargain, from the Welsh *bargan* to contract or deal for, signifies the act of dealing, or the thing dealt for.

An *agreement* is general, and applies to transactions of every description, but particularly such as are made between single individuals; in cases where the other terms are not so applicable; a *contract* is a binding agreement between individuals; a simple agreement may be verbal, but a *contract* must be written and legally executed: *covenant* and *compact* are agreements among communities; a *covenant* is commonly a national and public transaction; a *compact* respects individuals as members of a community, or communities with each other: a *bargain*, in its proper sense, is an agreement solely in matters of trade; but applies figuratively in the same sense to other objects.

The simple consent of parties constitutes an *agreement*; a seal and signature are requisite for a *contract*; a solemn engagement on the one hand, and faith in that engagement on the other hand, enter into the nature of a *covenant*; a tacit sense of mutual obligation in all the parties gives virtue to a *compact*; an assent to stipulated terms of sale may form a *bargain*.

Friends make an *agreement* to meet at a certain time; two tradesmen enter into a *contract* to carry on a joint trade; the people of England made a *covenant* with King Charles I. entitled the solemn covenant: in the society of Freemasons, every individual is bound to secrecy by a solemn *compact*: the trading part of the community are continually striking *bargains*.

Frog had given his word that he would meet the above-mentioned company at the Salutation. To talk of this *agreement*.—ARBUTHNOT'S HISTORY OF JOHN BULL.

It is impossible to see the long scrolls in which every contract is included, with all their appendages of seal and attestations, without wondering at the depravity of those beings, who must be restrained from violation of promise by such formal and public evidences.—JOHNSON.

These flashes of blue lightning gave the sign
Of covenants broke; three peals of thunder join.
DRYDEN.

In the beginnings and first establishment of speech, there was an implicit *compact* amongst men, founded upon common use and consent, that such and such words or voices, actions or gestures, should be means or signs whereby they would express or convey their thoughts one to another.—SOUTH.

We see men frequently dexterous and sharp enough in making a *bargain*, who, if you reason with them about matters of religion, appear perfectly stupid.—LOCKE.

Agriculturist, v. Farmer.

To Aid, v. To help.

Aim, Object, End.

Aim is in all probability a variation of *home*, in old German *haim*. It is the *home* which the marksman wishes to reach; it is the thing aimed at; the particular point to which one's efforts are directed; which is had always in view, and which every thing is made to bend to the attainment of.

Object, from the Latin *objectus*, participle of *ob* and *jacio* to lie in the way, is more vague; it signifies the thing that lies before us; we pursue it by taking the necessary means to obtain it; it becomes the fruit of our labour.

End in the improper sense of *end* is still more general, signifying the thing that ends one's wishes and endeavours; it is the result not only of action, but of combined action; it is the consummation of a scheme; we must take the proper measures to arrive at it.

It is the *aim* of every good Christian to live in peace; it is a mark of dulness or folly to act without an *object*: every scheme is likely to fail, in which the means are not adequate to the *end*.

We have an *aim*; we propose to ourselves an *object*; we look to the *end*. An *aim* is attainable, an *object* worthy, an *end* important.

Cunning has only private, selfish *aims*, and sticks at nothing which may make them succeed.—ADDISON.

We should sufficiently weigh the *objects* of our hope, whether they be such as we may reasonably expect from them what we propose in their fruition.—ADDISON.

Liberty and truth are not in themselves desirable, but only as they relate to a farther *end*.—BERKELEY.

To Aim, Point, Level.

Aim, signifying to take aim (*v. Aim*), is to direct one's view towards a point.

Point, from the noun *point*, signifies to direct the point to any thing.

Level, from the adjective *level*, signifies to put one thing on a level with another.

Aim expresses more than the other two words, inasmuch as it denotes a direction towards some minute point in an object, and the others imply direction towards the whole objects themselves. We *aim* at a bird; we *point* a cannon against a wall; we *level* a cannon at a wall. *Pointing* is of course used with most propriety in reference to instruments that have points; it is likewise a less decisive action than either *aiming* or *levelling*. A stick or a finger may be *pointed* at a person, merely out of derision; but a blow is *levelled* or *aimed* with an express intent of committing an act of violence.

The same analogy is kept up in their figurative application.

The shafts of ridicule are but too often *aimed* with little effect against the follies of fashion: remarks which seem merely to *point* at others, without being expressly addressed to them, have always a bad tendency: it has hitherto been the fate of infidels to *level* their battery of sneers, declamation, and sophistry against the Christian religion only to strengthen the conviction of its sublime truths in the minds of mankind at large.

Their heads from *aiming* blows they bear afar,
With clashing gauntlets then provoke the war.
DRYDEN.

The story silly points at you.—CUMBERLAND.
He calls on Bacchus, and propounds the prize;
The groom his fellow groom at butts defies.
And bends his bow, and levels with his eyes.
DRYDEN.

To Aim, Aspire.

Aim (*v. Aim*) includes efforts as well as views, in obtaining an object.

Aspire, from *as* or *ad* to or after and *spiro* to breathe, comprehends views, wishes, and hopes to obtain an object.

We *aim* at a certain proposed point, by endeavouring to gain it; we *aspire* after that, which we think ourselves entitled to, and flatter ourselves with gaining.

Many men *aim* at riches and honour: it is the lot of but few to *aspire* to a throne.

We *aim* at what is attainable by ordinary efforts; we *aspire* after what is great and unusual.

An emulous youth *aims* at acquiring the esteem of his teachers; he *aspire*s to excel all his competitors in literary attainments.

Whether zeal or moderation be the point we *aim* at, let us keep fire out of the one, and frost out of the other.—ADDISON.

The study of those who in the time of Shakspeare *aspired* to plebeian learning was laid upon adventures, giants, dragons, and enchantments.—JOHNSON.

To Aim, *v.* To endeavour.

Aim, *v.* Tendency.

Air, Manner.

Air, in Latin *aer*, Greek *app*, comes from the Hebrew *aoz*, because it is the vehicle of light; hence in the figurative sense, in which it is here taken, it denotes an appearance.

Manner, in French *manière*, comes probably from *mener* to lead or direct, signifying the direction of one's movements.

An *air* is inherent in the whole person; a *manner* is confined to the action or the movement of a single limb. A man has the *air* of a common person; it discovers itself in all his *manners*. An *air* has something superficial in its nature; it strikes at the first glance: *manner* has something more solid in it; it develops itself on closer observation. Some people have an *air* about them which displeases; but their *manners* afterwards win upon those who have a farther intercourse with them. Nothing is more common than to suffer ourselves to be prejudiced by a person's *air*, either in his favour or otherwise: the *manners* of a man will often contribute to his advancement in life, more than his real merits.

An *air* is indicative of a state of mind; it may result either from a natural or habitual mode of thinking: a *manner* is indicative of the education; it is produced by external circumstances. An *air* is noble or simple, it marks an elevation or simplicity of character; a *manner* is rude, rustic, or awkward, for want of culture, good society, and good example. We assume an *air*, and affect a *manner*. An assumed *air* of importance exposes the littleness of the assumer, which might otherwise pass unnoticed: the same *manners* which are becoming when natural, render a

person ridiculous when they are affected. A prepossessing *air* and engaging *manners* have more influence on the heart than the solid qualities of the mind.

The *air* she gave herself was that of a romping girl.—STEELE.

The boy is well fashioned, and will easily fall into a graceful *manner*.—STEELE.

Air, Mien, Look.

Air, *v.* Air.

Mien, in German *miene*, comes, as Adelung supposes, from *mähen* to move or draw, because the lines of the face which constitute the mien in the German sense are drawn together.

Look signifies properly a mode of looking or appearing.

The exterior of a person is comprehended in the sense of all these words.

Air depends not only on the countenance, but the stature, carriage, and action: *mien* respects the whole outward appearance, not excepting the dress: *look* depends altogether on the face and its changes. *Air* marks any particular state of the mind: *mien* denotes any state of the outward circumstances: *look* any individual movement of the mind. We may judge by a person's *air*, that he has a confident and fearless mind: we may judge by his sorrowful *mien*, that he has substantial cause for sorrow; and by sorrowful *looks*, that he has some partial or temporary cause for sorrow.

We talk of doing any thing with a particular *air*; of having a *mien*; of giving a *look*. An innocent man will answer his accusers with an *air* of composure; a person's whole *mien* sometimes bespeaks his wretched condition; a *look* is sometimes given to one who acts in concert by way of intimation.

The truth of it is, the *air* is generally nothing else but the inward disposition of the mind made visible.—ADDISON.

How sleek their *looks*, how goodly is their *mien*.
When big they strut behind a double chin.—DRYDEN.

What chief is this that visits us from far,
Whose gallant *mien* bespeaks him train'd to war.
STEELE,

How in the *looks* does conscious guilt appear.—ADDISON.

Air, *v.* Appearance.

Alacrity, *v.* Alertness.

Alarm, Terror, Fright, Consternation.

Alarm, in French *alarmes*, is compounded of *al* or *ad* and *armes* arms, signifying a cry to arms, a signal of danger, a call to defence.

Terror, in Latin *terror*, comes from *terreo* to produce fear.

Fright, from the German *furcht* fear, signifies a state of fear.

Consternation, in Latin *consternatus*, from *consterno* to lay low or prostrate, expresses the mixed emotion of terror and amazement which confounds.

Alarm springs from any sudden signal that announces the approach of danger. **Terror** springs from any event or phenomenon that may serve as a prognostic of some catastrophe. It supposes a less distinct view of danger than

alarm, and affords room to the imagination, which commonly magnifies objects. *Alarm* therefore makes us run to our defence, and *terror* disarms us.

Fright is a less vivid emotion than either, as it arises from the simple appearance of danger. It is more personal than either *alarm* or *terror*; for we may be *alarmed* or *terrified* for others, but we are mostly *frightened* for ourselves. *Constitution* is stronger than either *terror* and *afright*: it springs from the view of some very serious evil.

Alarm affects the feelings, *terror* the understanding, and *fright* the senses; *consternation* seizes the whole mind, and benumbs the faculties.

Cries *alarm*; horrid spectacles *terrify*; a tumult *frightens*: a sudden calamity fills with *consternation*.

One is filled with *alarm*, seized with *terror*, overwhelmed with *fright* or *consternation*.

We are *alarmed* for what we apprehend; we are *terrified* by what we imagine; we are *frightened* by what we see; *consternation* may be produced by what we learn.

None so renown'd
With breathing brass to kindle fierce alarms.—DRYDEN.

I was once in a mixt assembly, that was full of noise and mirth, when on a sudden an old woman unluckily observed, there were thirteen of us in company. The remark struck a panic *terror* into several of us.—ADDISON.

I have known a soldier that has entered a breach, *afrighted* at his own shadow.—ADDISON.

The son of Pelias ceased; the chiefs around
In silence wrapt, in *consternation* drown'd.—POPE.

Alertness, Alacrity.

Alertness, from *ales* a wing, designates corporeal activity or readiness for action; *Alacrity*, from *acer* sharp, brisk, designates mental activity.

We proceed with *alertness*, when the body is in its full vigour; we proceed with *alacrity* when the mind is in full pursuit of an object.

The wings that waft our riches out of sight
Grow on the gamster's elbows; and the alert
And nimble motion of those restless joints
That never tire, soon fans them all away.—COWPER.

In dreams it is wonderful to observe with what sprightliness and *alacrity* the soul exerts herself.—ADDISON.

Alien, v. *Stranger*.

To Alienate, v. *Stranger*.

Alike, v. *Equal*.

All, Whole.

All and *Whole* are derived from the same source, that is, in German *al* and *heil* whole or sound, Dutch *al*, *hel*, or *heel*, Saxon *al*, *wal*, Danish *al*, *ald*, Greek *olos*, Hebrew *chol* or *hol*.

All respects a number of individuals; *whole* respects a single body with its components: we have not *all*, if we have not the *whole* number; we have not the *whole*, if we have not *all* the parts of which it is composed. It is not within the limits of human capacity to take more than a partial survey of *all* the interesting objects which the *whole* globe contains.

When applied to spiritual objects in a general sense, *all* is preferred to *whole*; but

when the object is specific, *whole* is preferable: thus we say, *all* hope was lost; but, our *whole* hope rested in this.

It will be asked how the drama moves if it is not credited. It is credited with *all* the credit due to a drama.—JOHNSON.

The *whole* story of the transactions between Edward, Harold and the Duke of Normandy is told so differently by ancient writers, that there are few important passages of the English history liable to so great uncertainty.—HUME.

All, Every, Each.

All is collective; *Every* single or individual; *Each* distributive.

All and *every* are universal in their signification; *each* is restrictive: the former are used in speaking of great numbers; the latter is applicable to small numbers. *All* men are not born with the same talent, either in degree or kind; but *every* man has a talent peculiar to himself; a parent divides his property among his children, and gives to *each* his due share.

Harold by his marriage broke *all* measures with the Duke of Normandy.—HUME.

Every man's performances, to be rightly estimated, must be compared to the state of the age in which he lived.—JOHNSON.

Taken singly and individually, it might be difficult to conceive how *each* event wrought for good. They must be viewed in their consequences and effects.—BLAIR.

To Allay, Sooth, Appease, Assuage.

To Allay is compounded of *al* or *ad*, and *lay* to lay to or by, signifying to lay a thing to rest, to abate it.

Sooth probably comes from *sweet*, which is in Swedish *söt*, Low German, &c. *söt*, and is doubtless connected with the Hebrew *sot* to allure, invite, compose.

Appease, in French *appaier*, is compounded of *ap* or *ad* and *paix* peace, signifying to quiet.

Assuage is compounded of *as* or *ad* and *suage*, from the Latin *suavi* perfect of *suadeo* to persuade, signifying to treat with gentleness; or to render easy.

All these terms indicate a lessening of something painful. In a physical sense a pain is *allayed* by an immediate application; it is *soothed* by affording ease and comfort in other respects, and by diverting the mind from the pain. Extreme heat or thirst is *allayed*; extreme hunger is *appeased*.

In a moral sense one *allays* what is fervid and vehement; one *soothes* what is distressed; one *appeases* what is tumultuous and boisterous; one *assuages* grief or afflictions. Nothing is so calculated to *allay* the fervour of a dis-temper'd imagination as prayer and religious meditation: religion has everything in it which can *sooth* a wounded conscience by presenting it with the hope of pardon, that can *appease* the angry passions by giving us a sense of our own sinfulness and need of God's pardon, and that can *assuage* the bitterest griefs by affording us the brightest prospects of future bliss.

Without expecting the return of hunger, they eat for an appetite, and prepare dishes not to *allay*, but to excite it.—ADDISON.

Nature has given all the little arts of soothing and blaudishing to the female.—ADDISON.

Charon is no sooner appeased, and the triple-headed dog laid asleep, but *Æneas* makes his entrance into the dominions of Pluto.—ADDISON.

If I can any way assuage private inflammations, or allay public ferments, I shall apply myself to it with the utmost endeavours.—ADDISON.

To Alledge, *v.* To adduce.

Allegorical, *v.* Figurative.

Allegory, *v.* Parable.

To Alleviate, Relieve.

Alleviate, in Latin *alleviatus*, participle of *allevio*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *al* or *ad* and *levo* to lighten, signifying to lighten by making less.

Relieve, from the Latin *relevo*, is *re* and *levo* to lift up, signifying to take away or remove.

A pain is *alleviated* by making it less burdensome; a necessity is *relieved* by supplying what is wanted. *Alleviate* respects our internal feelings only; *relieve* our external circumstances. That *alleviates* which affords ease and comfort; that *relieves* which removes the pain. It is no *alleviation* of sorrow to a feeling mind, to reflect that others undergo the same suffering; a change of position is a considerable *relief* to an invalid, wearied with confinement.

Condolence and sympathy tend greatly to *alleviate* the sufferings of our fellow creatures; it is an essential part of the Christian's duty to *relieve* the wants of his indigent neighbour.

Half the misery of human life might be extinguished, would men *alleviate* the general curse they lie under, by mutual offices of compassion, benevolence, and humanity.—ADDISON.

Now sinking underneath a load of grief,
From death alone she seeks her last relief.—DRYDEN.

Alliance, League, Confederacy.

Alliance, in French *alliance*, from the Latin *aligo* to knit or tie together, signifies the moral state of being tied.

League, in French *ligue*, comes from the same verb *ligo* to bind.

Confederacy or confederation, in Latin *confederatio*, from *con* and *fœdus* an agreement, or *fides* faith, signifies a joining together under a certain pledge.

* Relationship, friendship, the advantages of a good understanding, the prospect of aid in case of necessity, are the ordinary motives for forming *alliances*. A *league* is a union of plan, and a junction of force, for the purpose of effectuating some common enterprize, or obtaining some common object. A *confederacy* is a union of interest and support on particular occasions, for the purpose of obtaining a redress of supposed wrong, or of defending right against usurpation and oppression.

Treaties of *alliance* are formed between sovereigns; it is a union of friendship and convenience concluded upon precise terms, and maintained by honour or good faith. *Leagues* are mostly formed between parties or small communities, as they are occasioned by cir-

cumstances of an imperative nature; they are in this manner rendered binding on each party. *Confederacies* are formed between individuals or communities; they continue while the impelling cause that set them in motion remains; and every individual is bound more by a common feeling of safety than by any express contract.

History mentions frequent *alliances* which have been formed between the courts of England and Portugal. The cantons of Switzerland were bound to each other by a famous *league* which was denominated the Helvetic *league*, which took its rise in a *confederacy* formed against the Austrian government by William Tell and his companions.

Confederacy is always taken in a civil or political sense: *alliance* and *league* are sometimes employed in a moral sense: the former being applied to marriage, the latter to plots or factions. *Alliance* is taken only in a good acceptance; *league* and *confederacy* frequently in relation to that which is bad. *Alliances* are formed for the mutual advantage of the parties concerned; but *leagues* may have plunder for their object, and *confederacies* may be treasonable.

Who but a fool would wars with Juno choose,
And such alliance and such gifts refuse.—DRYDEN.

Rather in leagues of endless peace unite,
And celebrate the hymeneal rite.—ADDISON.

The history of mankind informs us that a single power is very seldom broken by a *confederacy*.—JOHNSON.

Though domestic misery must follow an *alliance* with a gamster, matches of this sort are made every day.—CUMBERLAND.

Tiger with tiger, bear with bear, you'll find
In leagues offensive and defensive join'd.—TATE.

When Babel was confounded, and the great
Confederacy of projectors wild and vain
Was split into diversity of tongues,
Then, as a shepherd separates his flock,
These to the upland, to the valley those,
God drove asunder.—COWPER.

Alliance, Affinity.

Alliance, *v.* *Alliance, league.*

Affinity, in Latin *affinitas*, from *af* or *ad* and *finis* a border, signifies a contiguity of borders.

Alliance is artificial; *affinity* is natural: an *alliance* is formed either by persons or by circumstances; an *affinity* exists of itself; an *alliance* subsists between persons only in the proper sense, and between things figuratively; an *affinity* exists between things as well as persons: the *alliance* between families is matrimonial; the *affinity* arises from consanguinity.

O horror! horror! after this *alliance*
Let tigers match with hinds, and wolves with sheep,
And every creature couple with its foe.—DRYDEN.

It cannot be doubted but that signs were invented originally to express the several occupations of their owners; and to bear some *affinity*, in their external designations, with the wares to be disposed of.—BATHURST.

Religion (in England) has maintained a proper *alliance* with the state.—BLAIR.

To Allot, Assign, Apportion, Distribute.

Allot is compounded of the Latin *al* or *ad* and the word *lot*, which owes its origin to the Saxon and other northern languages. It signifies literally to set apart as a particular lot.

* Vide Girard and Roubaud; "Alliance, Ligue, confederation."

Assign, in French *assigner*, Latin *assigno*, is compounded of *as* or *ad* and *signo* to sign, or mark to, or for, signifying to mark out for any one.

Apportion is compounded of *ap* or *ad* and *portion*, signifying to *portion* out for a purpose.

Distribute, in Latin *distributus*, participle of *dis* and *tribuo*, signifies to bestow or portion out to several.

To *allot* is to dispose on the ground of utility for the sake of good order; to *assign* is to communicate according to the merit of the object; to *apportion* is to regulate according to the due proportion; to *distribute* is to give in several distinct portions.

A portion of one's property is *allotted* to charitable purposes, or a portion of one's time to religious meditation; a prize is *assigned* to the most meritorious or an honourable post to those whose abilities entitle them to distinction; a person's business is *apportioned* to the time and abilities he has for performing it; his alms are *distributed* among those who are most indigent.

When any complicated undertaking is to be performed by a number of individuals, it is necessary to *allot* to each his distinct task. It is the part of a wise prince to *assign* the highest offices to the most worthy, and to *apportion* to every one of his ministers an employment suited to his peculiar character and qualifications: the business of the state thus *distributed* will proceed with regularity and exactitude.

Every one that has been long dead, has a due proportion of praise *allotted* him, in which, whilst he lived, his friends were too profuse, and his enemies too sparing.—ADDISON.

I find by several hints in ancient authors, that when the Romans were in the height of power and luxury they *assigned* out of their vast dominions an island called Anticyra, as an habitation for madmen.—STEELE.

Of the happiness and misery of our present condition, part is *distributed* by nature, and part is in a great measure *apportioned* by ourselves.—JOHNSON.

From thence the cup of mortal man he fills,
Blessings to these, to those *distributes* ills.—POPE.

To Allot, Appoint, Destine.

Allot, *v.* To *allot*, assign.

Appoint, in French *appointer*, Latin *appono*, that is, *ap* or *ad* and *pono* to place, signifies to put by.

Destine, Latin *destino*, of *de* and *stino* *sto* or *sisto*, signifies to place apart.

Allot is used only for things, *appoint* and *destine* for persons or things. A space of ground is *allotted* for cultivation; a person is *appointed* as steward or governor; a youth is *destined* for a particular profession. *Allotments* are mostly made in the time past or present; *appointments* respect either the present or the future; *destinations* always respect some distant purposes and include preparatory measures. A conscientious man *allots* a portion of his annual income to the relief of the poor: when public meetings are held it is necessary to *appoint* a particular day for the purpose: our plans in life are defeated by a thousand contingencies—the man who builds a house is not certain he will live to use it for the purpose for which it was *destined*.

It is unworthy a reasonable being to spend any of the little time *allotted* us without some tendency, direct or oblique, to the end of our existence.—JOHNSON.

Having notified to my good friend, Sir Roger, that I should set out for London the next day, his horses were ready at the *appointed* hour.—STEELE.

Look round and survey the various beauties of the globe, which Heaven has *destined* for man, and consider whether a world thus exquisitely framed could be meant for the *abode* of misery and pain.—JOHNSON.

To Allow, Grant, Bestow.

Allow, *v.* To *admit*, *allow*.

Grant is probably changed from *guarantee*, in French *garantir*, signifying to assure any thing to a person by one's word or deed.

Bestow is compounded of *be* and *stow*, which in English, as well as in the northern languages, signifies to place; hence to *bestow* signifies to dispose according to one's wishes and convenience.

That is *allowed* which may be expected, if not directly required; that is *granted* which is desired, if not directly asked for; that is *bestowed* which is wanted as a matter of necessity.

What is *allowed* is a gift stipulated as to time and quantity, which as to continuance depends upon the will of the giver; what is *granted* is perfectly gratuitous on the part of the giver; it is a pure favour, and lays the receiver under an obligation; what is *bestowed* is occasional, altogether depending on the circumstances and disposition of both giver and receiver.

Many of the poor are *allowed* a small sum weekly from the parish. It is as improper to *grant* a person more than he asks, as it is to ask a person for more than he can *grant*. Alms are very ill *bestowed* which only serve to encourage beggary and idleness.

A *grant* comprehends in it something more important than an *allowance*, and passes between persons in a higher station; what is *bestowed* is of less value than either. A father *allows* his son a yearly sum for his casual expenses, or a master *allows* his servant a maintenance: kings *grant* pensions to their officers; governments *grant* subsidies to one another: relief is *bestowed* on the indigent.

In a figurative application, merit is *allowed*, an indulgence or privilege is *granted*, applause is *bestowed*.

A candid man *allows* merit even in his rivals. In former times the kings of England *granted* certain privileges to some towns, which they retain to this day. Those who are hasty in applauding frequently *bestow* their commendations on very undeserving objects.

Martial's description of a species of lawyers is full of humour: "Men that hire out their words and anger, that are more or less passionate as they are paid for it, and *allow* their client a quantity of wrath proportionable to the fee which they receive from him."—ADDISON.

If you in pity *grant* this one request
My death shall glut the hatred of his breast.
DRYDEN.

So much the more thy diligence *bestow*,
In depth of winter to defend the snow.—DRYDEN.

To Allow, *v.* To *admit*, *allow*.

To Allow, *v.* To *admit*, *permit*.

To Allow, *v.* To *consent*,

Allowance, Stipend, Salary, Wages, Hire, Pay.

All these terms denote a stated sum paid according to certain stipulations.

Allowance, from *allow* (v. *To admit, allow*), signifies the thing *allowed*.

Stipend, in Latin *stipendium*, from *stips* a piece of money, signifies money *paid*.

Salary, in French *salaire*, Latin *salarium*, comes from *sal* salt, which was originally the principal *pay* for soldiers.

Wages, in French *gage*, Latin *vadium*, from the Hebrew *igang* labour, signifies that which is *paid* for labour.

Hire expresses the sum for which one is *hired*, and **Pay** the sum that is to be *paid*.

An *allowance* is gratuitous; it ceases at the pleasure of the donor; all the rest are the requital for some supposed service; they cease with the engagement made between the parties. A *stipend* is more fixed and permanent than a *salary*; and that than *wages*, *hire*, or *pay*: a *stipend* depends upon the fulfilling of an engagement, rather than on the will of an individual; a *salary* is a matter of contract between the giver and receiver, and may be increased or diminished at will.

An *allowance* may be given in any form, or at any stated times; a *stipend* and *salary* are paid yearly, or at even portions of a year; *wages*, *hire*, and *pay* are estimated by days, weeks, or months, as well as years.

An *allowance* may be made by, with, and to persons of all ranks; a *stipend* and *salary* are assignable only to persons of respectability; *wages* are given to labourers, *hire* to servants, *pay* to soldiers or such as are employed under government.

Sir Richard Steele was officiously informed that Mr. Savage had ridiculed him; by which he was so much exasperated that he withdrew the *allowance* which he had paid him.—JOHNSON.

Is not the care of souls a load sufficient?

Are not your holy *stipends* paid for this?—DRYDEN.

Several persons, out of a salary of five hundred pounds, have always lived at the rate of two thousand.—SWIFT.

The peasant and the mechanic, when they have received the *wages* of the day, and procured their strong beer and supper, have scarce a wish unsatisfied.—HAWKESWORTH.

I have five hundred crowns,
The thrifty *hire* I sav'd under your father.

SHAKESPEARE.

Come on, brave soldiers, doubt not of the day;

And that once gotten, doubt not of large *pay*.

SHAKESPEARE.

To Allude, Refer, Hint, Suggest.

Allude, in Latin *alludo*, is compounded of *al* or *ad* and *ludo* to sport, that is, to say anything in a cursory manner.

Refer, in Latin *refero*, signifies to bring back, that is, to bring back a person's recollection to any subject by mentioning it.

Hint may very probably be changed from *hind* or *behind*, in German *hinten*, signifying to convey from behind, or in an obscure manner.

Suggest, in Latin *suggestus*, participle of *suggero*, is compounded of *sub* and *gero* to bring under or near, and signifies to bring forward in an indirect or casual manner.

To *allude* is not so direct as to *refer*, but it

is more clear and positive than either *hint* or *suggest*.

We *allude* to a circumstance by introducing something collaterally allied to it; we *refer* to an event by expressly introducing it into one's discourse; we *hint* at a person's intentions by darkly insinuating what may possibly happen; we *suggest* an idea by some poetical expressions relative to it.

There are frequent *allusions* in the Bible to the customs and manners of the East. It is necessary to *refer* to certain passages of a work when we do not expressly copy them. It is mostly better to *hint* at what cannot be entirely explained. Many improvements have owed their origin to some ideas casually *suggested* in the course of conversation.

Allude and *refer* are always said with regard to things that have positively happened, and mostly such as are indifferent; *hint* and *suggest* have mostly a personal relation to things that are precarious. The whole drift of a discourse is sometimes unintelligible for want of knowing what is *alluded* to, although many persons and incidents are *referred* to with their proper names and dates. It is the part of the slanderer to *hint* at things discreditable to another, when he does not dare to speak openly; and to *suggest* doubts of his veracity which he cannot positively charge.

I need not inform my reader that the author of Hudibras *alludes* to this strange quality in that cold climate, when speaking of abstracted notions clothed in a visible shape, he adds that apt simile,

"Like words congeal'd in northern air."—ADDISON.

Every remarkable event, every distinguished personage under the law, is interpreted in the New Testament, as bearing some reference to Christ's death.—BLAIR.

It is *hinted* that Augustus had in mind to restore the commonwealth.—CUMBERLAND.

This image of misery, in the punishment of Tantalus, was perhaps originally *suggested* to some poet by the conduct of his patron.—JOHNSON.

To Allude to, v. To glance at.

To Allure, Tempt, Seduce, Entice, Decoy.

Allure is compounded of the intensive syllable *al* or *ad* and *lure*, in French *leurre*, in German *luder*, a lure or tempting bait, signifying to hold a bait in order to catch animals, and figuratively to present something to please the senses.

Tempt, in French *tenter*, Latin *tento* to try, comes from *tentus*, participle of *tendo* to stretch, signifying by efforts to impel to action.

Seduce, in French *seduire*, Latin *seduco*, is compounded of *se* apart, and *duco* to lead, signifying to lead any one aside.

Entice is probably, *per metathesin*, changed from *incite*.

Decoy is compounded of the Latin *de* and *coy*, in Dutch *koy*, German, &c., *koi*, a cage or enclosed place for birds, signifying to draw into any place for the purpose of getting them into one's power.

We are *allured* by the appearances of things; we are *tempted* by the words of persons as well as the appearances of things; we are *enticed* by persuasion; we are *seduced* or *decoyed* by the influence and false arts of others,

To *allure* and *tempt* are used either in a good or bad sense; *entice* sometimes in an indifferent, but mostly in a bad sense; *seduce* and *decoy* are always in a bad sense. The weather may *allure* us out of doors; the love of pleasures may *allure* us into indulgences that afterwards cause repentance. We are sometimes *tempted* upon very fair grounds to undertake what turns out unfortunately in the end: our passions are our bitterest enemies; the devil uses them as instruments to *tempt* us to sin. When the wicked *entice* us to do evil, we should turn a deaf ear to their flattering representations: those who know what is right, and are determined to practise it, will not suffer themselves to be *enticed* into any irregularities. Young men are frequently *seduced* by the company they keep. Children are *decoyed* away by the evil-minded, who wish to get them into their possession.

The country has its *allurements* for the contemplative mind: the metropolis is full of *temptations*. Those who have any evil project to execute will omit no *enticement* in order to *seduce* the young and inexperienced from their duty. The practice of *decoying* children or ignorant people into places of confinement was formerly more frequent than at present.

Allure does not imply such a powerful influence as *tempt*: what *allures* draws by gentle means; it lies in the nature of the thing that affects: what *tempts* acts by direct and continued efforts; it presents motives to the mind in order to produce decision; it tries the power of resistance. *Entice* supposes such a decisive influence on the mind, as produces a determination to act; in which respect it differs from the two former terms. *Allure* and *tempt* produce actions on the mind, not necessarily followed by any result; for we may be *allured* or *tempted* to do a thing, without necessarily doing the thing; but we cannot be *enticed* unless we are led to take some step. *Seduce*, and *decoy*, have reference to the outward action, as well as the inward movements of the mind which give rise to them: they indicate a drawing aside of the person as well as the mind; it is a misleading by false representation. Prospects are *alluring*, offers are *tempting*, words are *enticing*, charms are *seductive*.

June 26, 1284, the rats and mice by which Hamelen was infested were *allured*, it is said, by a piper to a contiguous river, in which they were all drowned.—ADDISON.

In our time the poor are strongly *tempted* to assume the appearance of wealth.—JOHNSON.

There is no kind of idleness by which we are so easily *seduced* as that which dignifies itself by the appearance of business.—JOHNSON.

There was a particular grove which was called "the labyrinth of coquettes," where many were *enticed* to the chase, but few returned with purchase.—ADDISON.

I have heard of barbarians, who, when tempests drive ships upon their coast, *decoy* them to the rocks that they may plunder their lading.—JOHNSON.

To *Allure*, v. To attract.

Allurements, v. Attractions.

Ally, Confederate.

Although derived from the preceding terms (*v. Alliance, confederacy*), these words are used only in part of their acceptations.

An *Ally* is *one* who forms an *alliance* in the political sense: a *Confederate* is one who forms *confederacies* in general, but more particularly when such *confederacies* are unauthorised.

The Portuguese and English are *allies*. William Tell had some few particular friends who were his *confederates*; but we should use the word with more propriety in its worst sense, for an associate in a rebellious faction, as in speaking of Cromwell and his *confederates* who were concerned in the death of the king.

We could hinder the accession of Holland to France, either as subjects with great immunities for the encouragement of trade, or as an inferior and dependent *ally* under their protection.—TEMPLE.

Having learned by experience that they must expect a vigorous resistance from this warlike prince, they entered into an *alliance* with the Britons of Cornwall, and landing two years after in that country made an inroad with their *confederates* into the county of Devon.—HUME.

Almanack, v. Calendar.

Alone, Solitary, Lonely.

Alone, compounded of *all* and *one*, signifies altogether one, or single; that is, by one's self.

Solitary, in French *solitaire*, Latin *solitarius*, from *solus* alone, signifies the quality of being alone.

Lonely, signifies 'n the manner of *alone*.

Alone marks the state of a person; *solitary* the quality of a person or thing; *lonely* the quality of a thing only. A person walks *alone*, or takes a *solitary* walk in a *lonely* place.

Whoever likes to be much *alone* is of a *solitary* turn: wherever we can be most and oftenest *alone*, that is a *solitary* or *lonely* place.

Here we stand *alone*.

As in our form distinct, pre-eminent.—YOUNG.

I would wish no man to deceive himself with opinions which he has not thoroughly reflected upon in his *solitary* hours.—CUMBERLAND.

Within an ancient forest's ample verge

There stands a *lonely*, but a healthful dwelling,

Built for convenience, and the use of life.—ROWE.

Also, Likewise, Too.

Also, compounded of *all* and *so*, signifies literally *all* in the same manner.

Likewise, compounded of *like* and *wise*, or manner, signifies in like manner.

Too, a variation of the numeral *two*, signifies what may be added or joined to another thing from its similarity.

These adverbial expressions obviously convey the same idea of including or classing certain objects together upon a supposed ground of affinity. *Also* is a more general term, and has a more comprehensive meaning, as it implies a sameness in the whole; *likewise* is more specific and limited in its acceptation; *too* is still more limited than either, and refers only to a single object.

"He *also* was among the number" may convey the idea of totality both as respects the person and the event: "he writes *likewise* a very fine hand" conveys the idea of similar perfection in his writing as in other qualifications: "he said *so too*" signifies he said so in

addition to the others; he said it *likewise* would imply that he said the same thing, or in the same manner.

Let us only think for a little of that reproach of modern times, that gulf of time and fortune, the passion for gaming, which is so often the refuge of the idle sons of pleasure, and often *also* the last resource of the ruined.—BLAIR.

Long life is of all others the most general, and seemingly the most innocent object of desire. With respect to this, *too*, we so frequently err, that it would have been a blessing to many to have had their wish denied.—BLAIR.

All the duties of a daughter, a sister, a wife, and a mother, may be well performed, though a lady should not be the finest woman at an opera. They are *likewise* consistent with a moderate share of wit, a plain dress, and a modest air.—STEELE.

To Alter, v. To change, alter.

Altercation, v. Difference, dispute, altercation, quarrel.

Alternate, v. Successive.

Always, At all times, Ever.

Always, compounded of *all* and *ways*, is the same as, under all circumstances, through all the ways of life, that is, uninterruptedly.

At all Times, means, without distinction of time.

Ever, implies, for a perpetuity, without end.

A man must be *always* virtuous, that is, whether in adversity or prosperity; and *at all times* virtuous, that is, in his going in and coming out, his rising up and his lying down, by day and by night; he will then be *ever* happy, that is, in this life, and the life to come.

Human life never stands still for any long time. It is by no means a fixed and steady object, like the mountain or the rock, which you *always* find in the same situation.—BLAIR.

Among all the expressions of good nature, I shall single out that which goes under the general name of charity, as it consists in relieving the indigent; that being a trial of this kind which offers itself to us almost *at all times*, and in every place.—ADDISON.

Have you forgotten all the blessings you have continued to enjoy, *ever* since the day that you came forth a helpless infant into the world?—BLAIR.

To Amass, v. To heap.

To Amaze, v. To admire.

Ambassador, Envoy, Plenipotentiary, Deputy.

Ambassador is supposed to come from the low Latin *ambasciator* a waiter, although this does not accord with the high station which they have always held.

Envoy, from the French *envoyer* to send, signifies one sent.

Plenipotentiary, from the Latin *plenus* and *potens*, signifies one invested with full powers.

Deputy, signifies one deputed.

Ambassadors, envoys, and plenipotentiaries, speak and act in the name of their sovereigns, with this difference, that the first is invested with the highest authority, acting in all cases as the representative; the second appears only as a simple authorised minister acting for another, but not actually representing him; the third is a species of *envoy* used by courts only on the occasion of concluding peace or making

treaties: *deputies* are not deputed by sovereigns, although they may be *deputed* to sovereigns; they have no power to act or speak, but in the name of some subordinate community, or particular body. The functions of the first three belong to the minister, those of the latter to the agent.

An *ambassador* is a resident in a country during a state of peace; he must maintain the dignity of his court by a suitable degree of splendour; an *envoy* may be a resident, but he is more commonly employed on particular occasions; address in negotiating forms an essential in his character; a *plenipotentiary* is not so much connected with the court immediately, as with persons in the same capacity with himself; he requires to have integrity, coolness, penetration, loyalty, and patriotism. A *deputy* has little or no responsibility; and still less intercourse with those to whom he is *deputed*; he needs no more talent than is sufficient to maintain the respectability of his own character, and that of the body to which he belongs.

Prior continued to act without a title till the Duke of Sirewsbury returned next year to England, and then he assumed the style and dignity of an *ambassador*.—JOHNSON.

We hear from Rome, by letters dated the 20th of April, that the Count de Melhos, *envoy* from the King of Portugal, had made his public entry into that city with much state and magnificence.—STEELE.

The conferences began at Utrecht on the 1st of January, 1711-12, and the English *plenipotentiaries* arrived on the fifteenth.—JOHNSON.

They add that the *deputies* of the Swiss cantons were returned from Soleure, where they were assembled at the instance of the French *ambassador*.—STEELE.

Ambiguous, Equivocal.

Ambiguous, in Latin *ambiguus*, from *ambigo*, compounded of *ambo* and *ago*, signifies acting both ways.

Equivocal, in French *equivoque*, Latin *equivocus*, composed of *aequus* and *vox*, signifies a word to be applied equally to two or more objects.

An *ambiguity* arises from a too general form of expression, which leaves the sense of the author indeterminate; an *equivocation* lies in the power of particular terms used, which admit of a double interpretation: the *ambiguity* leaves us in entire incertitude as to what is meant; the *equivocation* misleads us in the use of a term in the sense which we do not suspect.

The *ambiguity* may be unintentional, arising from the nature both of the words and the things; or it may be employed to withhold information respecting our views; the *equivocation* is always intentional, and may be employed for purposes of fraud. The histories of heathen nations are full of confusion and *ambiguity*: the heathen oracles are mostly veiled by some *equivocation*; of this we have a remarkable instance in the oracle of the Persian mule, by which Croesus was misled.

An honest man will never employ an *equivocal* expression; a confused man may often utter *ambiguous* ones without any design.—BLAIR.

We make use of an *equivocation* to deceive; of an *ambiguity* to keep in the dark.—TRUSLER.

Th' ambiguous God, who rul'd her lab'ring breast,
In these mysterious words his mind express'd,
Some truths reveal'd, in terms involv'd the rest.

DRYDEN.

The Parliament of England is without comparison the most voluminous author in the world, and there is such a happy ambiguity in its works, that its students have as much to say on the wrong side of every question as upon the right.—CUMBERLAND.

Give a man all that is in the power of the world to bestow, but leave him at the same time under some secret oppression or heaviness of heart; you bestow indeed the materials of enjoyment, but you deprive him of the ability to extract it. Hence prosperity is so often an equivocal word, denoting merely affluence of possession, but unjustly applied to the possessor.—BLAIR.

Shakspeare is not long soft and pathetic, without some idle conceit or contemptible equivocation.—JOHNSON.

Amenable, v. Answerable.

To Amend, Correct, Reform, Rectify, Emend, Improve, Mend, Better.

Amend, in Latin *emendo*, from *menda* the fault of a transcriber, signifies to remove this fault.

Correct, in Latin *correctus*, participle of *corrigo*, compounded of *con* and *rego*, signifies to set in order, to set to rights.

Reform, compounded of *re* and *form*, signifies to form afresh, or put into a new form.

Rectify, in Latin *rectifico*, compounded of *rectus* and *facio*, signifies to make or put right.

Emend is the immediate derivative of the Latin *emendo*.

Improve comes from the Latin *in* and *probo* to prove or try, signifying to make good, or better than it was, by trials or after experiments.

Mend is a contraction of *emend*.

Better is properly to make better.

To *amend*, *correct*, *rectify*, and *emend*, imply the lessening of evil; to *improve*, *reform*, and *better*, the increase of good. We *amend* our moral conduct, *correct* errors, *reform* our life, *rectify* mistakes, *emend* the readings of an author, *improve* our mind, *mend* or *better* our condition. What is *amended* is mostly that which is wrong in ourselves; what is *reformed* or *corrected* is that which is faulty in ourselves or in others; what is *rectified* is mostly wrong in that which has been done; that which is *improved* may relate either to an individual, or to indifferent objects.

To *mend* and *better* are common terms, employed only on familiar occasions, corresponding to the terms *amend* and *improve*. Whatever is wrong must be *amended*; whatever is faulty must be *corrected*; whatever is altogether insufficient for the purpose must be *reformed*; whatever error escapes by an oversight must be *rectified*; whatever is obscure or incorrect must be *amended*. What has been torn may be *mended*, and what admits of change may be *improved*, or *bettered*. When a person's conduct is in any way culpable, it ought to be *amended*; when his habits and principles are vicious, his character ought to be *reformed*; when he has any particular faulty habit, it ought to be *corrected*; when he commits mistakes he should not object to have them *rectified*: the emendations of critics frequently involve an author in still greater obscurity: whoever wishes to advance himself in life must endeavour to *improve* his time and talents.

The first step to *amendment* is a consciousness of error in ourselves; busy politicians are ever ready to propose a *reform* in the constitution of their country, but they forget the

reformation which is requisite in themselves: the *correction* of the temper is of the first moment, in order to live in harmony with others: in order to avoid the necessity of *rectifying* what has been done amiss, we must strive to do every thing with care: critics *emend* the productions of the pen, and ingenious artists *improve* the inventions of art.

The interest which the corrupt part of mankind have in hardening themselves against every motive to *amendment*, has disposed them to give to contradictions, when they can be produced against the cause of virtue, that weight which they will not allow them in any other case.—JOHNSON.

Presumption will be easily *corrected*; but timidity is a disease of the mind more obstinate and fatal.—JOHNSON.

Indolence is one of the vices from which those whom it once infects are seldom *reformed*.—JOHNSON.

That sorrow which dictates no caution, that fear which does not quicken our escape, that austerity which fails to *rectify* our affections, are vain and unavailing.—JOHNSON

Some have read the manuscript, and *rectified* its inaccuracies.—JOHNSON.

That useful part of learning, which consists in *emendations*, knowledge of different readings, and the like, is what in all ages persons extremely wise and learned have had in great veneration.—ADDISON.

While a man, infatuated with the promises of greatness, wastes his hours and days in attendance and solicitation, the honest opportunities of *improving* his condition pass by without his notice.—ADDISON.

The wise for cure on exercise depend,

God never made his work for man to *mend*.—DRYDEN.

I then *bettered* my condition a little, and lived a whole summer in the shape of a bee.—ADDISON.

Amends, v. Compensation.

Amends, v. Restoration.

Amiable, Lovely, Beloved.

Amiable, in Latin *amabilis*, from *amo* and *habilis*, signifies fit to be loved.

Lovely, compounded of *love* and *ly* or *like*, signifies like that which we love.

Beloved signifies having or receiving love.

The first two express the fitness of an object to awaken the sentiment of love; the latter expresses the state of being in actual possession of that love. The *amiable* designates that sentiment in its most spiritual form, as it is awakened by purely spiritual objects; the *lovely* applies to the sentiment as it is awakened by sensible objects. We are *amiable* according to the qualities of the heart; we are *lovely* according to the external figure and manners; we are *beloved* according to the circumstances that bring us into connexion with others: hence it is that things as well as persons may be *lovely* or *beloved*, but persons only are *amiable*.

An *amiable* disposition without a *lovely* person will render a person *beloved*. It is distressing to see any one who is *lovely* in person *unamiable* in character.

Tully has a very beautiful gradation of thoughts to show how *amiable* virtue is. "We love a virtuous man," says he, "who lives in the remotest parts of the earth, although we are altogether out of the reach of his virtue and can receive from it no manner of benefit."—ADDISON.

Sweet Auburn, loveliest village of the plain.

GOLDSMITH.

Sorrow would be a rarity most *belov'd*

If all could so become it.—SHAKSPEARE.

Amicable, Friendly.

Amicable, from *amicus* a friend, signifies able or fit for a friend.

Friendly signifies *like a friend*. The word *amicus* likewise comes from *amo* to love, and *friend*, in the Northern languages, from *fregan* to love.

Amicable and *friendly* therefore both denote the tender sentiment of good-will which all men ought to bear one to another; but *amicable* rather implies a negative sentiment, a freedom from discordance: and *friendly* a positive feeling of regard, the absence of indifference. We make an *amicable* accommodation, and a *friendly* visit. It is a happy thing when people who have been at variance can *amicably* adjust all their disputes. Nothing adds more to the charms of society than a *friendly* correspondence.

Amicable is always said of persons who have been in connexion with each other; *friendly* may be applied to those who are perfect strangers. Neighbours must always endeavour to live *amicably* with each other. Travellers should always endeavour to keep up a *friendly* intercourse with the inhabitants, wherever they come.

The abstract terms of the preceding qualities admit of no variation but in the signification of *friendship*, which marks an individual feeling only. To live *amicably*, or in *amity* with all men, is a point of Christian duty; but we cannot live in *friendship* with all men; since *friendship* must be confined to a few.

What first presents itself to be recommended is a disposition averse to offence, and desirous of cultivating harmony, and *amicable* intercourse in society.—BLAIR.

Who slake his thirst: who spread the *friendly* board
To give the famish'd Belsharius food?—PHILLIPS.

Beasts of each kind their fellow spare;
Bear lives in *amity* with bear.—JOHNSON.

Every man might, in the multitudes that swarm about him, and some kindred mind with which he could unite in confidence and *friendship*.—JOHNSON.

Amorous, Loving, Fond.

Amorous, from *amor* and the ending *ous*, which designates abundance, signifies full of love.

Loving signifies the act of *loving*, that is, continually *loving*.

Fond, from the Saxon *fundan*, and the German *finden*, which signify either to seek or find. Hence *fond* signifies longing for, or eagerly attached to.

These epithets are all used to mark the excess or distortion of a tender sentiment. *Amorous* is taken in a criminal sense, *loving* and *fond* in a contemptuous sense: an indiscriminate and dishonourable attachment to the fair sex characterizes the *amorous* man; an overweening and childish attachment to any object marks the *loving* and *fond* person.

Loving is less dishonourable than *fond*: men may be *loving*; children and brutes may be *fond*. Those who have not a well regulated affection for each other will be *loving* by fits and starts; children and animals who have no control over their appetites will be apt to be *fond* of those who indulge them. An *amorous* temper should be suppressed; a *loving* temper

should be regulated: a *fond* temper should be checked.

I shall range all old *amorous* dotards under the denomination of grinners.—STEELE.

This place may seem for shepherds' leisure made,
So lovingly these clime unite their shade.—PHILLIPS.

My impatience for your return, my anxiety for your welfare, and my *fondness* for my dear Ulysses, were the only distempers that preyed upon my life.—ADDISON.

Ample, Spacious, Capacious.

Ample, in French *ample*, Latin *amplus*, probably comes from the Greek *avamples* full.

Spacious, in French *spacieux*, Latin *spacuosus*, comes from *spatium* a space, implying the quality of having space.

Capacious, in Latin *capax*, from *capio* to hold, signifies the quality of being able to hold.

These epithets convey the analogous ideas of extent in quantity, and extent in space. *Ample* is figuratively employed for whatever is extended in quantity; *spacious* is literally used for whatever is extended in space; *capacious* is literally and figuratively employed to express extension in both quantity and space. Stores are *ample*, room is *ample*, an allowance is *ample*: a room, a house, or a garden is *spacious*: a vessel or hollow of any kind is *capacious*: the soul, the mind, and the heart are *capacious*.

Ample is opposed to scanty, *spacious* to narrow, *capacious* to small. What is *ample* suffices and satisfies; it imposes no constraint: what is *spacious* is free and open, it does not confine: what is *capacious* readily receives and contains; it is *spacious*, liberal, and generous. Although sciences, arts, philosophy, and languages, afford to the mass of mankind *ample* scope for the exercise of their mental powers without recurring to mysterious or fanciful researches, yet this world is hardly *spacious* enough for the range of the intellectual faculties: the *capacious* minds of some are no less capable of containing than they are disposed for receiving whatever spiritual food is offered them.

The pure consciousness of worthy actions, abstracted from the views of popular applause, is to a generous mind an *ample* reward.—HUGHES.

These mighty monarchies, that had o'erspread
The *spacious* earth, and stretch'd their conqu'ring arms
From pole to pole, by ensnaring charms
Were quite consumed.—MAY

Down sunk, a hollow bottom broad and deep,
Capacious bed of waters.—MILTON.

Ample, v. Plentiful.

To Amuse, Divert, Entertain.

To **Amuse** is to occupy the mind lightly, from the Latin *musa* a song, signifying to allure the attention by any thing as light and airy as a song.

Divert, in French *divertir*. Latin *diverto*, is compounded of *di* and *verto* to turn a-side, signifying to turn the mind aside from an object.

Entertain, in French *entretenir*, compounded of *entre*, *inter*, and *tenir*, *teneo* to keep, signifies to keep the mind fixed on a thing.

We *amuse* or *entertain* by engaging the attention on some present occupation; we *divert* by drawing the attention from a present ob-

ject; all this proceeds by the means of that pleasure which the object produces, which in the first case is less vivid than in the second, and in the second case is less durable than in the third. Whatever *amuses* serves to kill time, to lull the faculties, and banish reflection; it may be solitary, sedentary, and lifeless: whatever *diverts* causes mirth, and provokes laughter; it will be active, lively, and tumultuous: whatever *entertains* acts on the senses, and awakens the understanding; it must be rational, and is mostly social. The bare act of walking and changing place may *amuse*; the tricks of animals *divert*; conversation *entertains*. We sit down to a card table to be *amused*; we go to a comedy or pantomime to be *diverted*; we go to a tragedy to be *entertained*. Children are *amused* with looking at pictures: ignorant people are *diverted* with shows; intelligent people are *entertained* with reading.

The duller and most vacant minds may be *amused*; the most volatile are *diverted*; the most reflective are *entertained*: the emperor Domitian *amused* himself with killing flies the emperor Nero *diverted* himself with appearing before his subjects in the characters of gladiator and charioteer; Socrates *entertained* himself by discoursing on the day of his execution with his friends on the immortality of the soul.

I yesterday passed a whole afternoon in the churchyard, the cloisters, and the church, *amusing* myself with the tomb-stones and inscriptions that I met with in those several regions of the dead.—ADDISON.

His *diversion* on this occasion was to see the cross bows' mistaken signs, and wrong connivances that passed amidst so many broken and refracted rays of sight.—ADDISON.

Will, Honeycomb was very *entertaining*, the other night at the play, to a gentleman who sat on his right hand, while I was at his left. The gentleman believed Will, was talking to himself.—ADDISON.

To Amuse, Beguile.

Amuse, v. To amuse, divert.

Beguile is compounded of *be* and *guile*, signifying to overreach with *guile*.

As *amuse* denotes the occupation of the mind, so *beguile* expresses an effect or consequence of amusement.

When *amuse* and *beguile* express any species of deception, the former indicates what is effected by persons, and the latter that which is effected by things. The first is a fraud upon the understanding; the second is a fraud upon the memory and consciousness. We are *amused* by a false story; our misfortunes are *beguiled* by the charms of fine music or fine scenery. To suffer one's self to be *amused* is an act of weakness; to be *beguiled* is a relief and a privilege. Credulous people are easily *amused* by any idle tale, and thus prevented from penetrating the designs of the artful; weary travellers *beguile* the tedium of the journey by lively conversation.

In later ages pious frauds were made use of to *amuse* mankind.—ADDISON.

With seeming innocence the crowd *beguiled*.

But made the desperate passes when he *said*.

DRYDEN.

Amusement, Entertainment, Diversion, Sport, Recreation, Pastime.

Amusement signifies here that which serves to *amuse* (*v. To amuse, divert*).

Entertainment, that which serves to *entertain* (*v. To amuse*).

Diversion, that which serves to *divert* (*v. To amuse, divert*).

Sport, that which serves to give *sport*.

Recreation, that which serves to *recreate* from *recreatus*, participle of *recreo* or *recreo* to create or make alive again.

Pastime, that which serves to *pass time*.

The first four of these terms are either applied to objects which specifically serve the purposes of pleasure, or to such objects as may accidentally serve this purpose; the last two terms are employed only in the latter sense.

The distinction between the first three terms are very similar in this as in the preceding case. *Amusement* is a general term, which comprehends little more than the common idea of pleasure, whether small or great; *entertainment* is a species of *amusement*, which is always more or less of an intellectual nature; *diversions* and *sports* are a species of *amusements* more adapted to the young and the active, particularly the latter; the theatre or the concert is an *entertainment*: fairs and public exhibitions are *diversions*: games of racing or cricket, hunting, shooting, and the like, are *sports*.

Recreation and *pastime* are terms of relative import; the former is of use for those who labour; the latter for those who are idle. A *recreation* must partake more or less of the nature of an *amusement*, but it is an occupation which owes its pleasure to the relaxation of the mind from severe exertion: in this manner gardening may be a *recreation* to one who studies; company is a *recreation* to a man of business: the *pastime* is the *amusement* of the leisure hour; it may be alternately a *diversion*, a *sport*, or a simple *amusement*, as circumstances require.

As Atlas groan'd

The world beneath, we groan beneath an hour;

We cry for mercy to the next amusement.

The next amusement mortgages our fields.—YOUNG.

The stage might be made a perpetual source of the most noble and useful *entertainments* were it under proper regulations.—ADDISON.

When I was some years younger than I am at present, I used to employ myself in a more laborious *diversion*, which I learned from a Latin treatise of exercises that is written with great erudition; it is there called the *σχιμαχία*, or the fighting with a man's own shadow.—ADDISON.

With great respect to country *sports*, I may say this gentleman could pass his time agreeably, if there were not a fox or a hare in his country.—STEELE.

Pleasure and *recreation* of one kind or other are absolutely necessary to relieve our minds and bodies from too constant attention and labour; where therefore public *diversions* are tolerated, it behoves persons of distinction, with their power and example, to preside over them.—STEELE.

Your microscope brings to sight shoals of living creatures in a spoonful of vinegar; but we, who can distinguish them in their different magnitudes, see among them several huge Leviathans that terrify the little fry of animals about them, and take their *pastime* as in an ocean.—ADDISON.

Anathema, *v. Curse.*

Ancestors, *v. Forefathers.*

Ancient, *v. Former.*

Ancient, *v. Old.*

Anciently, *v. Formerly.*

Ancient times, *v. Formerly.*

Anecdote, Story.

Anecdote, *v. Anecdotes.*

Story, like history comes from the Greek *ιστορειν* to relate.

An anecdote has but little incident, and no plot; a story may have many incidents, and an important catastrophe annexed to it: there are many anecdotes related of Dr. Johnson, some of which are of a trifling nature, and others characteristic: stories are generally told to young people of ghosts and visions, which are calculated to act on their fears.

An anecdote is pleasing and pretty; a story is frightful or melancholy: an anecdote always consists of some matter of fact; a story is founded on that which is real. Anecdotes are related of some distinguished persons; displaying their characters or the circumstances of their lives: stories from life, however striking and wonderful, will seldom impress so powerfully as those which are drawn from the world of spirits: anecdotes serve to amuse men, stories to amuse children.

How admirably Rabin, the most popular among the French critics, was qualified to sit in judgment upon Homer and Thucydides, Demosthenes and Plato, may be gathered from an anecdote preserved by Menage, who affirms upon his own knowledge that Le Fevre and Saumur furnished this assuming critic with the Greek passages which he had to cite, Rabin himself being totally ignorant of that language.—WARTON.

This story I once intended to omit, as it appears with no great evidence; nor have I met with any confirmation but in a letter of Farquhar, and he only relates that the funeral of Dryden was tumultuary and confused.—JOHNSON.

Anecdotes, Memoirs, Chronicles, Annals.

Anecdote, from the Greek *anekdotos*, signifies what is communicated in a private way.

Memoirs, in French *memoires*, from the word *memory*, signifies what serves to help the memory.

Chronicle, in French *chronicle*, from the Greek *χρονος* time, signifies an account of the times.

Annals, from the French *Annales*, from the Latin *annus*, signifies a detail of what passes in the year.

All these terms mark aspects of narrative more or less connected, that may serve as materials for a regular history.

Anecdotes consist of personal or detached circumstances of a public or private nature, involving one subject or more. *Anecdotes* may be either moral or political, literary or biographical: they may serve as characteristics of any individual, or of any particular nation or age.

Memoirs may include anecdotes, as far as they are connected with the leading subject

on which they treat; *memoirs* are rather connected than complete; they are a partial narrative respecting an individual, and comprehending matter of a public or private nature; they serve as *memorials* of what ought not to be forgotten, and lay the foundation either for a history or a life.

Chronicle and *annals* are altogether of a public nature; and approach the nearest to regular and genuine history. *Chronicles* register the events as they pass; *annals* digest them into order, as they occur in the course of successive years. *Chronicles* are minute as to the exact point of time; *annals* only preserve a general order within the period of a year.

Chronicles detail the events of small as well as large communities, as of particular districts and cities; *annals* detail only the events of nations. *Chronicles* include domestic incidents, or such things as concern individuals: the word *annals*, in its proper sense, relates only to such things as affect the great body of the public, but it is frequently employed in an improper sense. *Chronicles* may be confined to simple matter of fact; *annals* may enter into the causes and consequences of events.

Anecdotes require point and vivacity, as they seem rather to amuse than instruct: the grave historian will always use them with caution; *memoirs* require authenticity: *chronicles* require accuracy; *annals* require clearness of narration, method in the disposition, impartiality in the representation, with almost every requisite that constitutes the true historian.

Anecdotes and *memoirs* are of more modern use: *chronicles* and *annals* were frequent in former ages; they were the first historic monuments which were stamped with the impression of the simple, frank, and rude manners of early times. The *chronicles* of our present times are principally to be found in newspapers and magazines; the *annals* in annual registers or retrospects.

I allude to those papers in which I treat of the literature of the Greeks, carrying down my history in a chain of *anecdotes* from the earliest poets to the death of Menander.—CUMBERLAND.

Cesar gives us nothing but *memoirs* of his own times.—CULLEN.

His eye was so piercing that, as ancient *chronicles* report, he could blunt the weapons of his enemies only by looking at them.—JOHNSON.

Could you with patience hear, or I relate,
O nymph! the tedious *annals* of our fate,
Through such a train of woes if I should run,
The day would sooner than the tale be done.

DRYDEN.

Anger, Resentment, Wrath, Ire, Indignation.

Anger, comes from the Latin *angor* vexation, *ango* to vex, compounded of *an* or ad against, and *ago* to act.

Resentment, in French *ressentiment* from *ressentir*, is compounded of *re* and *sentir*, signifying to feel again, over and over, or for a continuance.

Wrath and **Ire** are derived from the same

* Vide Roubaud; "Histoire, fastes, chroniques, annales, mémoires, &c."

source, namely, *wrath*, in Saxon *wrath* and *ire*, in Latin *ira* anger, Greek *epis* contention, all which springs from the Hebrew, *herah*, or *cherah* heat or anger.

Indignation, in French *indignation*, in Latin *indignatio*, from *indignor* to think or feel unworthy, marks the strong feeling which base conduct awakens in the mind.

An impatient agitation against any one who acts contrary to our inclinations or opinions is the characteristic of all these terms. *Resentment* is less vivid than *anger*, and *anger* than *wrath*, *ire* or *indignation*. *Anger* is a sudden sentiment of displeasure; *resentment* is a continued *anger*; *wrath* is a heightened sentiment of *anger*, which is poetically expressed by the word *ire*.

Anger may be either a selfish or a disinterested passion; it may be provoked by injuries done to ourselves, or injustice done to others: in this latter sense of strong displeasure God is *angry* with sinners, and good men may to a certain degree be *angry* with those under their control, who act improperly. *Resentment* is a brooding sentiment altogether arising from a sense of personal injury; it is associated with a dislike of the offender, as much as the offence, and is diminished only by the infliction of pain in return; in its rise, progress, and effects, it is alike opposed to the Christian spirit. *Wrath* and *ire* are the sentiment of a superior towards an inferior, and when provoked by personal injuries discovers itself by heightiness and a vindictive temper: as a sentiment of displeasure *wrath* is unjustifiable between man and man; but the *wrath* of God may be provoked by the persevering impudence of sinners: the *ire* of a heathen god, according to the gross views of Pagans, was but the *wrath* of man associated with greater power; it was altogether unconnected with moral displeasure. *Indignation* is a sentiment awakened by the unworthy and atrocious conduct of others; as it is exempt from personality, it is not irreconcilable with the temper of a Christian: a warmth of constitution sometimes gives rise to sallies of *anger*; but depravity of heart breeds *resentment*; unheeding pride is a great source of *wrath*; but *indignation* flows from a high sense of honour and virtue.

Moralists have defined *anger* to be a desire of revenge for some injury offered.—STEELE.

The temperately revengeful have leisure to weigh the merits of the cause, and thereby either to smother their secret *resentments*, or to seek adequate reparations for the damages they have sustained.—STEELE.

Achilles' *wrath*, to Greece the direful spring
Of woes unnumber'd, Heavenly Goddess sing.—POPE.

The prophet spoke: when with a gloomy frown
The monarch started from his shining throne;
Black *choler* fill'd his breast that boil'd with *ire*,
And from his eye-balls flash'd the living fire.—POPE.

It is surely not to be observed without *indignation*, that men may be found of minds mean enough to be satisfied with this treatment; wretches who are proud to obtain the privileges of madmen.—JOHNSON.

Anger, Choler, Rage, Fury.

Anger, *v. Anger*, *resentment*.

Choler, in French *colere*, Latin *cholera*, Greek *χολeros*, comes from *χολη* bile, because the overflowing of the bile is both the cause and consequence of *choler*.

Rage, in French *rage*, Latin *rabies* madness, and *rabio* to rave like a madman, comes from the Hebrew *ragaz* to tremble or shake with a violent madness.

Fury, in French *furie*, Latin *furor*, comes probably from *fero* to carry away, because one is carried or hurried by the emotions of *fury*.

These words have a progressive force in their signification. *Choler* expresses something more sudden and virulent than *anger*; *rage* is a vehement ebullition of *anger*; and *fury* is an excess of *rage*. *Anger* may be so stifled as not to discover itself by any outward symptoms; *choler* is discoverable by the paleness of the visage; *rage* breaks forth into extravagant expressions and violent distortions; *fury* takes away the use of the understanding.

Anger is an infirmity incident to human nature; it ought, however, to be suppressed on all occasions: *choler* is a malady too physical to be always corrected by reflection; *rage* and *fury* are distempers of the soul which nothing but religion and the grace of God can cure.

The maxim which Pericles of Corinth, one of the seven sages of Greece, left as a memorial of his knowledge and benevolence, was *χολον κρατει*, be master of thy *anger*.—JOHNSON.

Must I give way to your rash *choler*?
Shall I be frightened when a madman stares?
SHAKESPEARE.

Oppose not *rage*, while *rage* is in its force,
But give it way awhile and let it waste.
SHAKESPEARE.

Of this kind is the *fury* to which many men give away among their servants and dependants.—JOHNSON.

Anger, *v. Displeasure*, *anger*.

Angle, *v. Corner*.

Angry, Passionate, Hasty.

Angry signifies either having *anger*, or prone to *anger*.

Passionate signifies prone to *passion*.

Hasty signifies prone to excess of *lust* from intemperate feeling.

Angry denotes a particular state or emotion of the mind; *passionate* and *hasty* express habits of the mind. An *angry* man is in a state of *anger*; a *passionate* or *hasty* man is habitually prone to be *passionate* or *hasty*. The *angry* has less that is vehement and impetuous in it than the *passionate*; the *hasty* has something less vehement, but more sudden and abrupt in it than either.

The *angry* man is not always easily provoked, nor ready to retaliate; but he often retains his *anger* until the cause is removed: the *passionate* man is quickly roused, eager to repay the offence, and speedily appeased by the infliction of pain of which he afterwards probably repents: the *hasty* man is very soon offended, but not ready to offend in return; his *angry* sentiment spends itself in *angry* words.

It is told by Prior, in a panegyric on the Duke of Dorset, that his servants used to put themselves in his way when he was *angry*, because he was sure to recompense them for any indignities which he made them suffer.—JOHNSON.

There is in the world a certain class of mortals known, and contentedly known by the name of *passionate* men, who imagine themselves entitled by that distinction to be provoked on every slight occasion.—JOHNSON.

The king, who saw their squadrons yet unmoved,
With hasty ardor thus the chiefs reprovd.—POPE.

Anguish, *v. Distress, anxiety.*

Anguish, *v. Pain*

Animadversion, Criticism, Stricture.

Animadversion, in Latin *animadversio*, from *animadvertere*, that is, *vertere animum ad*, signifies to turn the mind to a thing.

Criticism, in French *critique*, Latin *criticus*, Greek *κριτικός*, from *κρίνω* to judge, signifies by distinction a judgment in literary matters.

Stricture, in Latin *strictura* a glance at any thing, comes from *stringo* to touch upon lightly or in few words.

Animadversion includes censure and reproof; *criticism* implies scrutiny and judgment, whether for or against; and *stricture* comprehends a partial investigation mingled with censure. We *animadvert* on a person's opinions by contradicting or correcting them; we *criticise* a person's works by minutely and rationally exposing their imperfections and beauties; we pass *strictures* on public measures by decanting on them cursorily, and censuring them partially.

Animadversions are too personal to be impartial; consequently they are seldom just; they are mostly resorted to by those who want to build up one system on the ruins of another: *criticism* is one of the most important and honourable departments of literature; a *critic* ought justly to weigh the merits and demerits of authors, but of the two his office is rather to blame than to praise; much less injury will accrue to the cause of literature from the severity than from the laxity of *criticism*: *strictures* are mostly the vehicles of party spleen; like most ephemeral productions, they are too superficial to be entitled to serious notice.

These things fall under a province you have partly pursued already, and therefore demand your *animadversion* for the regulating so noble an entertainment as that of the stage.—STEELE.

Just *criticism* demands not only that every beauty or blemish be minutely pointed out in its different degree and kind, but also that the reason and foundation of excellences and faults be accurately ascertained.—WARTON.

To the end of most of the plays I have added short *strictures*, containing a general censure of faults or praise of excellence.—JOHNSON.

To Animadvert, *v. To censure.*

Animal, Brute, Beast.

Animal, in French *animal*, Latin *animal*, from *anima* life, signifies the thing having life.

Brute is in French *brute*, Latin *brutus* dull, Greek *βαρύντης*, Chaldee *barout*, foolishness.

Beast, in French *bête*, Latin *bestia* changed from *bestirma* Greek *βοσκημα* a beast of burden, and *βοσκει* to feed, signifies properly the thing that feeds.

Animal is the generic, *brute* and *beast* are the specific terms. The *animal* is the thing that lives and moves. If *animal* be considered as thinking, willing, reflecting, and acting, it is confined in its signification to the human species; if it be regarded as limited in all the functions which mark intelligence and will, if

it be divested of speech and reason, it belongs to the *brute*; if *animal* be considered, moreover, as to its appetites, independent of reason, of its destination, and consequent dependance on its mental powers; it descends to the *beast*.

Man and *brute* are opposed. To man an immortal soul is assigned; but we are not authorised by Scripture to extend this dignity to the *brutes*. The *brutes* that perish is the ordinary mode of distinguishing that part of the *animal* creation from the superior order of terrestrial beings who are destined to exist in a future world. Men cannot be exposed to a greater degradation than to be divested of their particular characteristics, and classed under the general name of *animal*, unless we except that which assigns to them the epithet of *brute* or *beast*, which, as designating peculiar atrocity of conduct, does not always carry with it a reproach equal to the infamy; the perversion of the rational faculty is at all times more shocking and disgraceful than the absence of it by nature.

Some would be apt to say, he is a conjurer; for he has found that a republic is not made up of every body of *animals*, but is composed of men only and not of horses.—STEELE.

As nature has framed the several species of beings as it were in a chain, so man seems to be placed as the middle link between angels and *brutes*.—ADDISON.

Whom e'en the savage *beasts* had spar'd, they kill'd,
And strew'd his mangled limbs about the field.—DRYDEN.

To Animate, Inspire, Enliven, Cheer, Exhilarate.

Animate, in Latin *animatus*, from *animus* the mind, and *anima* the soul or vital principle, signifies in the proper sense to give life, and in the moral sense to give spirit.

Inspire, in French *inspirer*, Latin *inspiro*, compounded of *in* and *spiro*, signifies to breathe life or spirit into any one.

Enliven, from *en* or *in* and *liven*, has the same sense.

Cheer, in French *chère*, Flemish *cièrè* the countenance, Greek *χαρά* joy, signifies the giving joy or spirit.

Exhilarate, in Latin *exhilaratus*, participle of *exhilaro*, from *hilaris*, Greek *ἡλαος* joyful, Hebrew *oïlen* to exult or *hap* for joy, signifies to make glad.

Animate and *inspire* imply the communication of the vital or mental spark; *enliven*, *cheer*, and *exhilarate*, signify actions on the mind or body. To be *animated* in its physical sense is simply to receive the first spark of animal life in however small a degree; for there are *animated* beings in the world possessing the vital power in an infinite variety of degrees and forms; to be *animated* in the moral sense is to receive the smallest portion of the sentient or thinking faculty; which is equally varied in thinking beings; *animation* therefore never conveys the idea of receiving any strong degree of either physical or moral feeling. To *inspire*, on the contrary, expresses the communication of a strong moral sentiment or passion; hence to *animate* with courage is a less forcible expression than to *inspire* with courage; we likewise speak of *inspiring* with emulation or a thirst for knowledge; not of *animating* with emulation or a

thirst for knowledge. To *enliven* respects the mind; *cheer* relates to the heart; *exhilarate* regards the spirits, both animal and mental; they all denote an action on the frame by the communication of pleasurable emotions; the mind is *enlivened* by contemplating the scenes of nature; the imagination is *enlivened* by reading poetry; the benevolent heart is *cheered* by witnessing the happiness of others; the spirits are *exhilarated* by the convivialities of social life: conversation *enlivens* society; the conversation of a kind and considerate friend *cheers* the drooping spirits in the moments of trouble: unexpected good news is apt to *exhilarate* the spirits.

Through subterranean cells
Where searching sunbeams scarce can find a way,
Earth animated heaves.—THOMSON.

Each gentle breast with kindly warmth she moves,
Inspires new flames, revives extinguished loves.

DRYDEN ON MAY.

To grace each subject with *enlivening* wit.—ADDISON.
Every eye bestows the *cheering* look of approbation
upon the humble man.—CUMBERLAND.

Nor rural sights alone, but rural sounds
Exhilarate the spirit.—COWPER.

To Animate, v. To encourage.

Animation, Life, Vivacity, Spirit.

Animation and Life do not differ either in sense or application, but the latter is more in familiar use. They express either the particular or general state of the mind.

Vivacity and Spirit express only the habitual nature and state of the feelings.

A person of no *animation* is divested of the distinguishing characteristic of his nature, which is mind: a person of no *vivacity* is a dull companion; a person of no *spirit* is unfit to associate with others.

A person with *animation* takes an interest in every thing: a *vivacious* man catches at every thing that is pleasant and interesting: a *spirited* man enters into plans, makes great exertions, and disregards difficulties.

A speaker may address his audience with more or less *animation* according to the disposition in which he finds it: a man of a *vivacious* temper diffuses his *vivacity* into all his words and actions: a man of *spirit* suits his measures to the exigency of his circumstances.

The British have a lively *animated* aspect.—STEELE.

The very dead creation from thy touch
Assumes a mimic life.

THOMSON ON THE POWER OF THE SUN.

His *vivacity* is seen in doing all the offices of life, with readiness of *spirit*, and propriety in the manner of doing them.—STEELE.

Animosity, v. Enmity.

Annals, v. Anecdotes.

To Annex, v. To affix.

Annotations, v. Notes.

To Announce, Proclaim, Publish.

Announce, in Latin *annuncio*, is compounded of *an* or *ad* and *nuncio* to tell to any one.

Proclaim, in Latin *proclamo*, is com-

pounded of *pro* and *clamo* to cry before, or cry aloud.

Publish, in Latin *publico*, from *publicus* and *populus*, signifies to make *public* or known to the people at large.

The characteristic sense of these words is the making of a thing known to several individuals: a thing is *announced* to an individual or small community; it is *proclaimed* to a neighbourhood, and published to the world. We *announce* an event that is expected and just at hand: we *proclaim* an event that requires to be known by all the parties interested; we *publish* what is supposed likely to interest all who know it.

Announcements are made verbally, or by some well known signal; *proclamations* are made verbally, and accompanied by some appointed signal; *publications* are ordinarily made through the press, or by oral communication from one individual to another. The arrival of a distinguished person is *announced* by the ringing of the bells; the *proclamation* of peace by a herald is accompanied with certain ceremonies calculated to excite notice; the *publication* of news is the office of the journalist.

We might with as much reason doubt whether the sun was intended to enlighten the earth, as whether he who has framed the human mind intended to *announce* righteousness to mankind as a law.—BLAIR.

But witness, heralds! and *proclaim* my vow,
Witness to gods above, and men below.—POPE.

It very often happens that none are more industrious in *publishing* the blemishes of an extraordinary reputation, than such as lie open to the same censures in their own character.—ADDISON.

To Annoy, v. Inconvenience.

To Annul, v. To abolish.

Answer, Reply, Rejoinder, Response.

Answer, in Saxon *andswaren* and *varan*, Goth. *avari* and *vord*, German *antwort*, compounded of *ant* or *anti* against, and *vort* a word, signifies a word used against or in return for another.

Reply comes from the French *repliquer*, Latin *replico* to unfold, signifying to unfold or enlarge upon by way of explanation.

Rejoin is compounded of *re* and *join*, signifying to join or add in return.

Response, in Latin *responsus*, participle of *respondeo*, compounded of *re* and *spondeo*, signifies to declare or give a sanction to in return.

Under all these terms is included the idea of using words in return for other words. An *answer* is given to a question; a *reply* is made to an assertion; a *rejoinder* is made to a *reply*; a *response* is made in accordance with the words of another.

We *answer* either for the purpose of affirmation, information, or contradiction; we always *reply*, or *rejoin*, in order to explain or confute: *responses* are made by way of assent or confirmation. It is unpolite not to *answer* when we are addressed: arguments are maintained by the alternate *replies* and *rejoinders* of two parties; but such arguments seldom tend to the pleasure and improvement of society: the *responses* in the liturgy are peculiarly calculated to keep alive the attention of those who take part in the devotion.

An *answer* may be either spoken or written : *reply* and *rejoinder* are used in personal discourse only : a *response* may be said or sung.

The blackbird whistles from the thorny brake,
The mellow bulfinch *answers* from the grove.
THOMSON.

He again took some time to consider, and civilly replied "I do." "If you do agree with me," rejoined I, "in acknowledging the complaint, tell me if you will concur in promoting the cure."—CUMBERLAND.

Lacedæmon, always disposed to controul the growing consequence of her neighbours, and sensible of the bad policy of her late measures, had opened her eyes to the folly of expelling Hippia as the forged *responses* of the Pythia.—CUMBERLAND.

Answerable, Responsible, Accountable, Amenable.

Answerable, from *answer*, signifies ready or able to *answer* for.

Responsible, from *respondeo* to *answer*, has a similar meaning in its original sense.

Accountable, from *account*, signifies able or ready to give an *account*.

Amenable, from the French *amener* to lead, signifies liable to be led.

We are *answerable* for a demand : *responsible* for a trust ; *accountable* for our proceedings ; and *amenable* to the laws. When a man's credit is firmly established he will have occasions to be *answerable* for those in less flourishing circumstances : every one becomes *responsible*, more or less, in proportion to the confidence which is reposed in his judgment and integrity : we are all *accountable* beings, either to one another, or at least to the great Judge of all ; when a man sincerely wishes to do right, he will have no objection to be *amenable* to the laws of his country.

An honest man will not make himself *answerable* for any thing which it is above his ability to fulfil : a prudent man will avoid a too heavy *responsibility* ; an upright man never refuses to be *accountable* to any who are invested with proper authority ; a conscientious man makes himself *amenable* to the wise regulations of society.

That he might render the execution of justice strict and regular, Alfred divided all England into counties, these counties he subdivided into hundreds, and the hundreds into tithings. Every householder was *answerable* for the behaviour of his family and his slaves, and even of his guests if they lived above three days in his house.—HUME.

As a person's *responsibility* bears respect to his reason, so do human punishments bear respect to his *responsibility* ; infants and boys are chastised by the hand of the parent or the master ; rational adults are *amenable* to the laws.—CUMBERLAND.

We know that we are the subjects of a Supreme Righteous Governor, to whom we are *accountable* for our conduct.—BLAIR.

Antagonist, v. Enemy.

Antecedent, Preceding, Foregoing, Previous, Anterior, Prior, Former.

Antecedent, in Latin *antecedens*, that is *ante* and *cedens* going before.

Preceding, in Latin *precedens*, going before.

Foregoing, literally going before.

Previous, in Latin *prævi*, that is *præ* and *via* making a way before.

Anterior the comparative of the Latin *ante* before.

Prior, in Latin *prior*, comparative of *primus* first.

Former in English the comparative of first.

Antecedent, *preceding*, *foregoing*, *previous*, are employed for what goes or happens before ; *anterior*, *prior*, *former*, for what is, or exists before.

* *Antecedent* marks priority of order, place, and position, with this peculiar circumstance, that it denotes the relation of influence, dependence, and connexion established between two objects : thus, in logic the premises are called the *antecedent*, and the conclusion the consequent ; in theology or politics, the *antecedent* is any decree or resolution which influences another decree or action ; in mathematics, it is that term from which any induction can be drawn to another ; in grammar, the *antecedent* is that which requires a particular regimen from its subsequent.

Antecedent and *preceding* both denote priority of time, or the order of events ; but the former in a more vague and indeterminate manner than the latter. A *preceding* event is that which happens immediately before the one of which we are speaking ; whereas *antecedent* may have events or circumstances intervening. An *antecedent* proposition may be separated from its consequent by other propositions ; but a *preceding* proposition is closely followed by another. In this sense *antecedent* is opposed to *posterior* ; *preceding* to *succeeding*.

The seventeen centuries since the birth of Christ are *antecedent* to the eighteenth, or the one we live in ; but it is the seventeenth only which we call the *preceding* one.—TRUSLER.

Preceding respects simply the succession of times and things ; but *previous* denotes the succession of actions and events, with the collateral idea of their connexion with and influence upon each other : we speak of the *preceding* day, or the *preceding* chapter, merely as the day or chapter that goes before ; but when we speak of a *previous* engagement or a *previous* inquiry, it supposes an engagement or inquiry preparatory to something that is to follow, *previous* is opposed to subsequent ; *foregoing* is employed to mark the order of things narrated or stated ; as when we speak of the *foregoing* statement, the *foregoing* objections, or the *foregoing* calculation, &c. : *foregoing* is opposed to following.

Anterior, *prior*, and *former*, have all a relative sense, and are used for things that are more before than others : *anterior* is a technical term to denote forwardness of position, as in anatomy ; the *anterior* or fore part of the skull, in contradistinction to the hind part ; so likewise the *anterior* or fore front of a building, in opposition to the back front : *prior* is used in the sense of *previous* when speaking of comparatively two or more things, when it implies anticipation ; a *prior* claim invalidates the one that is set up ; a *prior* engagement prevents the forming of any other that is proposed : *former* is employed either with regard to times, as *former* times, in

* Vide Boubaud ; "Antérieur, antécédent, précédent."

contradistinction to later periods, or with regard to propositions, when the *former* or first thing mentioned is opposed to the latter or last mentioned.

Little attention was paid to literature by the Romans in the early and more martial ages. I read of no collections of books *antecedent* to those made by Æmilius Paulus, and Lucullus.—CUMBERLAND.

Letters from Rome dated the thirteenth instant, say, that on the *preceding* Sunday, his Holiness was carried in an open chair from St. Peter's to St. Mary's.—STEELE.

A boding silence reigns
Dead through the dull expanse, save the dull sound
That from the mountain, *previous* to the storm,
Rolls o'er the muttering earth.—THOMSON.

Consistently with the *foregoing* principles we may judge original and native poetry to be the language of the violent passions, expressed in exact measure.—SIR W. JONES.

Some accounts make Thamyris the eighth epic poet, prior to Homer, an authority to which no credit seems due.—CUMBERLAND.

Former follies pass away and are forgotten. Those which are present strike observation and sharpen censure.—BLAIR.

Anterior, v. Antecedent.

To Anticipate, v. To prevent, anticipate.

Antipathy, v. Aversion.

Antiquated, v. Old.

Antique, v. Old.

Anxiety, v. Distress, anxiety.

Anxiety, v. Care, solitude.

Any, v. Some.

Apartments, v. Lodgings.

Apathy, v. Indifference.

To Ape, v. To imitate, mimic.

Aperture, v. Opening.

Aphorism, v. Axiom.

To Apologize, Defend, Justify, Exculpate, Excuse, Plead.

Apologize, from the French *apologie*, Greek *απολογία*, and *απολογεομαι*, compounded of *apo* from or away, and *lego* to speak, signifies to do away by speaking.

Defend, in French *defendre*, Latin *defensus*, participle of *defendo*, is compounded of *de* and *fendo*, signifying to keep or ward off.

Justify, in French *justifier*, Latin *justifico*, is compounded of *justus*, and *facio*, signifying to do justice, or to put right.

Exculpate, in Latin *exculpatus*, participle of *exculpo*, compounded of *ex* and *culpa*, signifies to get out of a fault.

Excuse, in French *excuser*, Latin *excuso*, compounded of *ex* and *causa*, signifies to get out of any cause or affair.

Plead, in French *plaider*, may either come from *placitum* or *placendum*, or be contracted from *appellatum*.

There is always some *imperfection sup-

* According to the vulgar acceptation of the term, this imperfection is always presumed to be real in the thing for which we *apologize*: but the Bishop of Llandaff did not use the term in this sense when he wrote his "*Apology* for the Bible;" by which, bearing in mind the original meaning of the word, he wished to imply an attempt to do away the alleged imperfections of the Bible, or to do away the objections made to it. Whether the learned Prelate might not have used a less classical, but more intelligible expression for such a work is a question which happily for mankind it is not necessary now to decide.

posed or real which gives rise to an *apology*; with regard to persons it presupposes a consciousness of impropriety, if not of guilt; we *apologize* for an error by acknowledging ourselves guilty of it: a *defence* presupposes a consciousness of innocence more or less; we *defend* ourselves against a charge by proving its fallacy: a *justification* is founded on the conviction not only of entire innocence, but of strict propriety; we *justify* our conduct against any imputation by proving that it was blameless: *exculpation* rests on the conviction of innocence with regard to the fact; we *exculpate* ourselves from all blame by proving that we took no part in the transaction: *excuse* and *plea* are not grounded on any idea of innocence; they are rather appeals for favour resting on some collateral circumstance which serves to extenuate: a *plea* is frequently an idle or unfounded *excuse*, frivolous attempt to lessen displeasure; we *excuse* ourselves for a neglect by alleging indisposition; we *plead* for forgiveness by solicitation and entreaty.

An *apology* mostly respects the conduct of individuals with regard to each other as equals. It is a voluntary act springing out of a regard to decorum, or the good opinion of others. To avoid misunderstandings it is necessary to *apologize* for any omission that wears the appearance of neglect. A *defence* respects matters of higher importance; the violation of laws or public morals; judicial questions decided in a court, or matters of opinion which are offered to the decision of the public: no one *defends* himself, but he whose conduct or opinions are called in question. A *justification* is applicable to all moral cases in common life, whether of a serious nature or otherwise: it is the act of individuals towards each other according to their different stations: no one can demand a *justification* from another without a sufficient authority, and no one will attempt to *justify* himself to another whose authority he does not acknowledge: men *justify* themselves either on principles of honour, or from the less creditable motive of concealing their imperfections from the observation and censure of others. An *exculpation* is the act of an inferior, it respects the violations of duty towards the superior; it is dictated by necessity, and seldom the offspring of any higher motive than the desire to screen one's self from punishment: *exculpation* regards offences only of commission; *excuse* is employed for those of omission as well as commission: we *excuse* ourselves oftener for what we have not done, than for what we have done: it is the act of persons in all stations, and arises from various motives dishonourable or otherwise: a person may often have substantial reasons to *excuse* himself from doing a thing, or for not having done it; an *excuse* may likewise sometimes be the refuge of idleness and selfishness. To *plead* is properly a judicial act, and extended in its sense to the ordinary concerns of life; it is mostly employed for the benefit of others, rather than ourselves.

Excuse and *plea*, which are mostly employed in an unfavourable sense, are to *apology*, *defence*, and *exculpation*, as the means to an end: an *apology* is lame when, instead of an honest confession of an unintentional error, an idle

attempt is made at *justification*: a *defence* is poor when it does not contain sufficient to invalidate the charge: a *justification* is nugatory when it applies to conduct altogether wrong: an *excuse* or a *plea* is frivolous or idle, which turns upon some falsehood, misrepresentation, or irrelevant point.

There are some men who are contented to be the *apologists* for the vices of others. No man should hold precepts secretly which he is not prepared to *defend* openly. It is a habit with some people contracted in early life of *justifying* themselves on every occasion, from a reluctance which they feel to acknowledge themselves in an error. When several are involved in a general charge each seeks to *exculpate* himself. A *plea* of incapacity is often set up to *excuse* remissness, which is in fact but the refuge of idleness and indolence: it is the boast of Englishmen that, in their courts of judicature, the poor man's *plea* will be heard with as much attention as that of his rich neighbour.

But for this practice (detraction), however, vile, some have dared to *apologize* by contending that the report by which they injured an absent character was true.—HAWKESWORTH.

Attacked by great injuries, the man of mild and gentle spirit will feel what human nature feels, and will *defend* and resent as his duty allows him.—BLAIR.

Whatever private views and passions *plead*,
No cause can *justify* so black a deed.—THOMSON.

A good child will not seek to *exculpate* herself at the expense of the most revered characters.—RICHARDSON.

The strength of the passions will never be accepted as an *excuse* for complying with them.—SPECTATOR.

Poverty on this occasion *pleads* her cause very notably, and represents to her old landlord that should she be driven out of the country, all their trades, arts, and sciences would be driven out with her.—ADDISON.

Apothegm, v. Axiom.

To Appal, v. To dismay.

Apparel, Attire, Array.

Apparel, in French *apparel*, like the word *apparatus*, comes from the Latin *apparatus* or *adparatus*, signifying the thing fitted or adapted for another.

Attire, compounded of *at* or *ad* and *tire*, in French *tirer*, Latin *trahere* to draw, signifies the thing drawn or put on.

Array is compounded of *ar* or *ad* and *ray* or *row*, signifying the state of being in a row, or being in order.

These terms are all applicable to dress or exterior decoration. **Apparel** is the dress of every one; **attire** is the dress of the great; **array** is the dress of particular persons on particular occasions: it is the first object of every man to provide himself with *apparel* suitable to his station; but the desire of shining forth in gaudy *attire* is the property of little minds; on festivals and solemn occasions, it may be proper for those who are to be conspicuous to set themselves out with a comely *array*.

Apparel and **attire** respect the quality and fashion of the thing; but **array** has regard to the disposition of the things with their neatness and decorum: *apparel* may be costly or mean; *attire* may be gay or shabby; but *array* will never be otherwise than neat or comely.

It is much, that this depraved custom of painting the face should so long escape the penal laws, both of the

church and state, which have been very severe against luxury in *apparel*.—BACON.

A robe of tissue, stiff with golden wire,
An upper vest, once Helen's rich *attire*.—DRYDEN.

She seem'd a virgin of the Spartan blood,
With such *array* Harpalyce bestrode
Her Thracian courser.—DRYDEN.

Apparent, Visible, Clear, Plain, Obvious, Evident, Manifest.

Apparent, in Latin *apparens*, participle of *appareo* to appear, signifies the quality of appearing:

Visible, in Latin *visibilis*, from *visus* participle of *video*, to see, signifies capable of being seen.

Clear, in French *clair*, German, Swedish, &c., *klar*, Latin *clarus*, Greek *γλαυρος*, comes from *γλαύσσω* to shine.

Plain, in Latin *planus* even, signifies what is so smooth and unencumbered that it can be seen.

Obvious, in Latin *obvius*, compounded of *ob* and *via*, signifies the quality of lying in one's way, or before one's eyes.

Evident, in French *evident*, Latin *evidens*, from *video*, Greek *εἶδω*, Hebrew *ido*, to know, signifies as good as certain or known.

Manifest, in French *manifeste*, Latin *manifestus*, compounded of *manus* the hand and *festus*, participle of *fendo* to fall in, signifies the quality of being so near that it can be laid hold of by the hand.

These words agree in expressing various degrees in the capability of seeing; but *visible* is the only one used purely in a physical sense; *apparent*, *clear*, *plain*, and *obvious*, are used physically and morally; *evident* and *manifest* solely in a moral acceptation. That which is simply an object of sight is *visible*; that of which we see only the surface is *apparent*; the stars themselves are *visible* to us; but their size is *apparent*: the rest of these terms denote not only what is to be seen, but what is easily to be seen: they are all applied as epithets to objects of mental discernment.

What is *apparent* appears but imperfectly to view; it is opposed to that which is real: what is *clear* is to be seen in all its bearings; it is opposed to that which is obscure: what is *plain* is seen by a plain understanding; it requires no deep reflection nor severe study; it is opposed to what is intricate: what is *obvious* presents itself readily to the mind of every one; it is seen at the first glance and is opposed to that which is abstruse: what is *evident* is seen forcibly, and leaves no hesitation on the mind; it is opposed to that which is dubious: *manifest* is a greater degree of the *evident*; it strikes on the understanding and forces conviction; it is opposed to that which is dark.

A contradiction may be *apparent*; on closer observation it may be found not to be one: a case is *clear*; it is decided on immediately: a truth is *plain*; it is involved in no perplexity; it is not multifarious in its bearings: a falsehood is *plain*; it admits of no question: a reason is *obvious*; it flows out of the nature of the case: a proof is *evident*; it requires no discussion, there is nothing in it that clashes or contradicts; the guilt or innocence of a

person is *evident* when every thing serves to strengthen the conclusion : a contradiction or absurdity is *manifest*, which is felt by all as soon as it is perceived.

The business men are chiefly conversant in does not only give a certain cast or turn to their minds, but is very *apparent* in their outward behaviour.—BUDGELL.

The *visible* and present are for brutes :

A slender portion, and a narrow bound.—YOUNG.

It is *plain* that our skill in literature is owing to the knowledge of Greek and Latin, which that they are still preserved among us, can be ascribed only to a religious regard.—BERKELEY.

It is *obvious* to remark that we follow nothing heartily unless carried to it by inclination.—GROVE.

It is *evident* that fame, considered merely as the immortality of a name, is not less likely to be the reward of bad actions than of good.—JOHNSON.

Among the many inconsistencies which folly produces in the human mind, there has often been observed a *manifest* and striking contrariety between the life of an author and his writings.—JOHNSON.

Apparition, v. Vision.

To Appear, v. To look, appear.

To Appear, v. To seem.

Appearance, Air, Aspect.

Appearance signifies the thing that *appears*.

Air, v. Air, manner.

Aspect, in Latin *aspectus* from *apsicio* to look upon, signifies the thing that is looked upon or seen.

Appearance is the generic, the rest specific terms. The whole external form, figure, or colours, whatever is visible to the eye, is its *appearance* : *air* is a particular *appearance* of any object as far as it is indicative of its quality or condition : an *air* of wretchedness or poverty : *aspect* is the partial *appearance* of a body as it presents one of its sides to view ; a gloomy or cheerful *aspect*.

It is not safe to judge of any person or thing altogether by *appearances* : the *appearance* and reality are often at variance ; the *appearance* of the sun is that of a moving body, but astronomers have satisfactorily proved that it is no motion round the earth : there are particular towns, habitations, or rooms which have always an *air* of comfort, or the contrary : this is a sort of *appearance* the most to be relied on : politicians of a certain stamp are always busy in judging for the future from the *aspect* of affairs ; but their predictions, like those of astrologers who judge from the *aspect* of the heavens, turn out to the discredit of the prophet.

The hero answers with the respect due to the beautiful *appearance* she made.—STEELE.

Some who had the most assuming *air* went directly of themselves to error without expecting a conductor.—FARNELL.

Her motions were steady and composed, and her *aspect* serious but cheerful ; her name was Patience.—ADDISON.

Appearance, v. Show, outside.

Appease, Calm, Pacify, Quiet, Still.

Appease, v. To allay.

Calm, in French *calmer*, from *almus* bright, signifies to make bright.

Pacify, in Latin *pacifico*, compounded of

pax and *facio*, signifies to make peace or peaceable.

Quiet, in French *quiet*, Latin *quietus*, from *quies* rest, signifies to put to rest.

Still, signifies to make still.

To *appease* is to remove great agitation ; to *calm* is to bring into a tranquil state.

* The wind is *appeased* ; the sea is *calmed*. With regard to persons it is necessary to *appease* those who are in transports of passion, and to *calm* those who are in trouble, anxiety or apprehension.

Appease respects matters of force or violence, *calm* those of inquietude and distress : one is *appeased* by a submissive behaviour, and *calmed* by the removal of danger. *Pacify* corresponds to *appease*, and *quiet* to *calm* : in sense they are the same, but in application they differ ; *appease* and *calm* are used only in reference to objects of importance ; *pacify* and *quiet* to those of a more familiar nature : the uneasy humours of a child are *pacified*, or its groundless fears are *quieted*.

Still is a loftier expression than any of the former terms ; serving mostly for the grave or poetic style : it is an onomatopœia for restraining or putting to silence that which is noisy and boisterous.

A lofty city by my hand is rais'd,
Pygmalion punish'd, and my lord *appeased*.
DRYDEN.

All powerful harmony, that can assuage
And *calm* the sorrows of the frenzied wretch.
MARSH.

My breath can *still* the winds,
Uncloud the sun, charm down the swelling sea,
And stop the floods of heaven.—BEAUMONT.

Appellation, v. Name, appellation.

To Applaud, v. To praise.

Applause, Acclamation.

Applause, from the Latin *applaudo*, signifies literally to clap or stamp the feet to a thing.

Acclamation, from *acclamo*, signifies a crying out to a thing.

These terms express a public demonstration ; the former by means of a noise with the hands or feet ; the latter by means of shouts and cries : the former being employed as a testimony of approbation ; the latter as a sanction, or an indication of respect. An actor looks for *applause* ; a speaker looks for *acclamation*.

What a man does calls forth *applause*, but the person himself is mostly received with *acclamations*. At the hustings popular speeches meet with *applause*, and favourite members are greeted with loud *acclamations*.

Amidst the loud *applauses* of the shore
Gyas outstripp'd the rest and sprung before.
DRYDEN.

When this illustrious person (the Duke of Marlbro') touched on the shore, he was received by the *acclamations* of the people.—STEELE.

Application, v. Attention.

To Apply, v. To addit.

To Apply, v. To address

* Vide Abbe Girard ; " Appaiser, calmer."
F

To Appoint, *v.* To constitute.

To Appoint, *v.* To allot.

To Appoint, Order, Prescribe,
Ordain.

Appoint, *v.* To allot.

Order in French *ordre*, Latin *ordino* to arrange, dispose, *ordo* order, Greek *opxos* a row of trees, which is the symbol of order.

Prescribe, in Latin *prescribo*, compounded of *pre* before, and *scribo* to write signifies to draw a line for a person.

Ordain is a variation of order.

To appoint is either the act of an equal or superior: we appoint a meeting with any one at a given time and place; a King appoints his ministers. To order is the act of one invested with a partial authority: a customer orders a commodity from his tradesman: a master gives his orders to his servant. To prescribe is the act of one who is superior by virtue of his knowledge: a physician prescribes to his patient. To ordain is an act emanating from the highest authority: kings and councils ordain: but their ordinances must be conformable to what is ordained by the Divine Being.

Appointments are made for the convenience of individuals or communities; but they may be altered or annulled at the pleasure of the contracting parties. Orders are dictated by the superior only, but they presuppose a discretionary obligation on the part of the individual to whom they are given. Prescriptions are binding on none but such as voluntarily admit their authority: but ordinances leave no choice to those on whom they are imposed to accept or reject them: the ordinances of man are not less binding than those of God, so long as they do not expressly contradict the divine law.

Appointments are kept, orders executed or obeyed, prescriptions followed, ordinances submitted to. It is a point of politeness or honour if not of direct moral obligation, to keep the appointments which we have made. Interest will lead men to execute the orders which they receive in the course of business: duty obliges them to obey the orders of their superiors. It is a nice matter to prescribe to another without hurting his pride; this principle leads men often to regard the counsels of their best friends as prescriptions: with children it is an unquestionable duty to follow the prescriptions of those whose age, station, or experience authorize them to prescribe. God has ordained all things for our good; it rests with ourselves to submit to his ordinances and be happy.

Majestic months

Set out with him to their appointed race.—DRYDEN.

The whole course of things is so ordered, that we neither by an irregular and precipitate education become men too soon; nor by a fond and trifling indulgence be suffered to continue children for ever.—BLAIR.

Sir Francis Bacon, in his Essay upon Health, has not thought it improper to prescribe to his reader a poem or a prospect, where he particularly dissuades him from knotty and subtle disquisitions.—ADDISON.

It was perhaps ordained by Providence to hinder us from tyrannizing over one another, that no individual should be of such importance as to cause by his retirement or death any chasm in the world.—JOHNSON.

To Apportion, *v.* To allot.

To Appraise, or Appreciate,
Estimate, Esteem.

Appraise, Appreciate, from *apprecio* and *appreciatus*, participle of *apprecio*, compound of *ap* or *ad* and *pretium* a price, signifies to set a price or value on a thing.

Estimate comes from *estimatus*, participle of *estimo* to value.

To Esteem is a variation of estimate.

Appraise and appreciate are used in precisely the same sense for setting a value on any thing according to relative circumstances; but the one is used in the proper, and the other in the figurative sense: a sworn appraiser appraises goods according to the condition of the articles, and their saleable property; the characters of men are appreciated by others when their good and bad qualities are justly put in a balance. To estimate a thing is to get the sum of its value by calculation; to esteem anything is to judge its actual and intrinsic value.

Estimate is used either in a proper or a figurative acceptance; esteem only in a moral sense: the expense of an undertaking, losses by fire, gains by trade, are estimated at a certain sum; the estimate may be too high or too low: the moral worth of men is often estimated above or below the reality according to the particular bias of the estimator; but there are individuals of such an unquestionable worth that they need only be known in order to be esteemed.

To the finishing of his course, let every one direct his eye; and let him now appreciate life according to the value it will be found to have when summed up at the close.—BLAIR.

The extent of the trade of the Greeks, how highly soever it may have been estimated in ancient times, was in proportion to the low condition of their marine.—ROBERTSON.

If a lawyer were to be esteemed only as he uses his parts in contending for justice, and were immediately despicable when he appeared in a cause which he could not but know was an unjust one, how honourable would his character be.—STEELE.

To Appreciate, *v.* To appraise.

To Apprehend, Fear, Dread.

Apprehend, in French *appréhender*, Latin *apprehendo*, compounded of *ap* and *prehendo* to lay hold of; in a moral sense it signifies to seize with the understanding.

Fear comes in all probability through the medium of the Latin *pavor* and *veror*, from the Greek *φρασσω* to feel a shuddering.

Dread, in Latin *territor*, comes from the Greek *ταρασσω* to trouble, signifying to fear with exceeding trouble.

These words rise progressively in their import; they mark a sentiment of pain at the prospect of evil; but the sentiment of apprehension is simply that of uneasiness; that of fear is anxiety; that of dread is wretchedness.

We apprehend an unpleasant occurrence; we fear a misfortune; we dread a calamity. What is possible is apprehended; what is probable is feared; the symptom or prognostic of an evil is dreaded as if the evil itself were present. Apprehend respects things only; fear and dread relate to persons as well as things: we fear the person who has the power of inflicting pain or

disgrace ; we *dread* him who has no less the will than the power.

Fear is a salutary sentiment in society, it binds men together in their several relations and dependencies, and affords the fullest scope for the exercise of the benevolent feelings ; it is the sentiment of a child towards its parent or instructor ; of a creature to its Creator ; it is the companion of love and respect towards men, of adoration in erring and sinful mortals towards their Maker. *Dread* is altogether an irksome sentiment ; with regard to our fellow creatures, it arises out of the abuse of power : we *dread* the tyrant who delights in punishing and tormenting ; his image haunts the breast of the unhappy subject, his shadow awakens terror as the approach of some direful misfortune : with regard to our Maker it springs from a consciousness of guilt, and the prospect of a severe and adequate punishment ; the wrath of God may justly be *dreaded*.

Our natural sense of right and wrong produces an apprehension of merited punishment, when we have committed a crime.—BLAIR.

That which is *feared* may sometimes be avoided ; but that which is regretted to-day may be regretted again to-morrow.—JOHNSON.

All men think all men mortal but themselves. Themselves, when some alarming shock of fate Strikes through their wounded hearts the sudden *dread*. YOUNG.

To Apprehend, *v.* To conceive, apprehend.

To Apprise, *v.* To be aware.

To Apprise, *v.* To inform.

To Approach, Approximate.

Approach, in French *approcher*, compounded of *ap* or *ad* and *proche* or *prope*, signifies to come near.

Approximate, compounded of *ap* and *proximus* to come nearest or next, signifies either to draw near or bring near.

To *approach* is intransitive only ; a person *approaches* an object. To *approximate* is both transitive and intransitive ; a person *approximates* two objects.

Lambs push at those that *approach* them with their horns before the first budding of a horn appears.—ADDISON.

Shakspeare *approximates* the remote and far. JOHNSON.

To *approach* denotes simply the moving of an object towards another, but to *approximate* denotes the gradual moving of two objects towards each other : that which *approaches* may come into immediate conjunction ; but bodies may *approximate* for some time before they form a junction, or may never form a junction.

An equivocation *approaches* to a lie. Minds *approximate* by long intercourse.

Comets, in their *approaches* towards the earth, are imagined to cause diseases, famines, and other such like judgments of God.—DERHAM.

The *approximations* and recesses of some of the little stars I speak of, suit not with the observations of some very ancient astronomers.—DERHAM.

To Appropriate, Usurp, Arrogate, Assume, Ascribe.

Appropriate, in French *approprier*, compounded of *ap* or *ad* and *propriatus*, participle of *proprio* an old verb, from *proprius* proper or own, signifies to make one's own.

Usurp, in French *usurper*, Latin *usurpo* from *usus* use, is a frequentative of *utor*, signifying to make use of as if it were one's own.

Arrogate, in Latin *arrogatus*, participle of *arrogare*, signifies to ask or claim to for one's self.

Assume, in French *assumer*, Latin *assumo*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *sumo* to take, signifies to take to one's self.

Ascribe, in Latin *ascribo*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *scribo* to write, signifies here to write down to one's own account.

The idea of taking something to one's self by an act of one's own, is common to all these terms.

Appropriate respects natural objects : we *appropriate* the money, goods, or lands of another to ourselves when we enjoy the fruit of them. *Usurp* respects power and authority : one *usurps* a government, when one exercises the functions of a ruler without a legitimate sanction. *Appropriation* is a matter of convenience ; it springs from a selfish concern for ourselves, and a total unconcern for others : *usurpation* is a matter of self indulgence ; it springs from an inordinate ambition that is gratified only at the expense of others. *Appropriation* seldom requires an effort : a person *appropriates* that which casually falls into his hands. *Usurpation* mostly takes place in a disorganised state of society ; when the strongest prevail, the most artful and the most vicious individual invests himself with the supreme authority. *Appropriation* is generally an act of injustice : *usurpation* is always an act of violence.

Arrogate, *assume* and *ascribe*, denote the taking to one's self, but do not, like *appropriate* and *usurp*, imply taking from another. *Arrogate* is a more violent action than *assume*, and *assume* than *ascribe*. *Arrogate* and *assume* are employed either in the proper or figurative sense, *ascribe* only in the figurative sense. We *arrogate* distinctions, honours and titles ; we *assume* names, rights, privileges.

In the moral sense we *arrogate* pre-eminence, *assume* importance, *ascribe* merit. To *arrogate* is a species of moral *usurpation* ; it is always accompanied with haughtiness and contempt for others : that is *arrogated* to one's self to which one has not the smallest title : an *arrogant* temper is one of the most odious features in the human character ; it is a compound of folly and insolence. To *assume* is a species of moral *appropriation* ; its objects are of a less serious nature than those of *arrogating* ; and it does less violence to moral propriety : we may *assume* in trifles, we *arrogate* only in important matters. To *ascribe* is oftener an act of vanity than of injustice ; many men are entitled to the merit which they *ascribe* to themselves ; but by this very act they lessen the merit of their best actions.

Arrogating as an action, or *arrogance* as a disposition, is always taken in a bad sense : the former is always dictated by the most preposterous pride ; the latter is associated with every unworthy quality.

Thal. . . . **Approbation, v. Assent.**

Assumption as an action varies in its character according to circumstances; it may be either good, bad, or indifferent: it is justifiable in certain exigencies to *assume* a command where there is no one else able to direct; it is often a matter of indifference what name a person *assumes* who does so only in conformity to the will of another; but it is always bad to *assume* a name as a mask to impose upon others.

As a disposition *assumption* is always bad, but still not to the same degree as *arrogance*. An *arrogant* man renders himself intolerable to society; an *assuming* man makes himself offensive: *arrogance* is the characteristic of men; *assumption* is peculiar to youths: an *arrogant* man can be humbled only by silent contempt; an *assuming* youth must be checked by the voice of authority.

A conscientious man will *appropriate* nothing to himself which he cannot unquestionably claim as his own. *Usurpers*, who violate the laws both of God and man, are as much to be pitied as dreaded: they generally pay the price of their crimes in a miserable life, and a still more miserable death. Nothing exposes a man to greater ridicule than *arrogating* to himself titles and distinctions which do not belong to him. Although a man may sometimes innocently *assume* to himself the right of judging for others, yet he can never, with any degree of justice, *assume* the right of oppressing them. Self-complacence leads many to *ascribe* great merit to themselves for things which are generally regarded as trifling.

A voice was heard from the clouds declaring the intention of this visit, which was to restore and *appropriate* to every one what was his due.—ADDISON.

If any passion has so much *assured* our understanding as not to suffer us to enjoy advantages with the moderation prescribed by reason, it is not too late to apply this remedy: when we find ourselves sinking under sorrow, we may then usefully revolve the uncertainty of our condition, and the folly of lamenting that from which, if it had stayed a little longer, we should ourselves have been taken away.—JOHNSON.

It very seldom happens that a man is slow enough in *assuming* the character of a husband, or a woman quick enough in condescending to that of a wife.—STEELE.

After having thus *ascribed* due honour to birth and parentage, I must however take notice of those who *arrogate* to themselves more honours than are due to them on this account.—ADDISON.

Sometimes we *ascribe* to ourselves the merit of good qualities, which, if justly considered, should cover us with shame.—CRAIG.

Appropriate, v. Peculiar.

To Approximate, v. To approach.

Apt, v. Fit.

Apt, v. Ready.

Arbiter, v. Judge.

Arbitrary, v. Absolute.

Arbitrator, v. Judge.

Architect, Builder.

Architect, from architecture, in Latin *architectus*, from *architectura*, Greek *αρχιτεκτονικη*, compounded of *αρχος* the chief, and *τεχνη* art or contrivance, signifies the chief of contrivers.

Builder, from the verb to *build*, denotes the person concerned in buildings, who causes the structure of houses, either by his money or his personal service.

An *architect* is an artist, employed only to form the plans for large buildings; a *builder* is a simple tradesman, or even workman, who *builds* common dwelling houses.

Rome will bear witness that the English artists are as superior in talents as they are in numbers to those of all nations besides. I reserve the mention of her *architects* as a separate class.—CUMBERLAND.

With his ready money, the *builder*, mason, and carpenter, are enabled to make their market of gentlemen in his neighbourhood who inconsiderately employ them.—STEELE.

Archive, v. Record.

Ardent, v. Hot.

Ardor, v. Fervor.

Arduous, Difficult.

Arduous, in Latin *arduous* lofty, from *ardeo* to burn or be on fire, because like the flame of any thing it tends upwards.

Difficult, in French *difficile*, in Latin *difficilis*, compounded of the privitive *dis* and *facilis*, easy or ductile, from *facio*, signifies not to be done without labour.

Arduous denotes a high degree of *difficulty*. What is *difficult* requires the efforts of ordinary powers to surmount; but what is *arduous* is set above the reach of common intellect, and demands the utmost stretch of power both physical and mental. A child may have a *difficult* exercise which he cannot perform without labour and attention: the man who strives to remove the *difficulties* of learners undertakes an *arduous* task. It is *difficult* to conquer our own passions: it is *arduous* to control the unruly and contending wills of others.

The translation of Homer was an *arduous* undertaking, and the translator entered upon it with a candid confession that he was utterly incapable of doing justice to Homer.—CUMBERLAND.

Whatever melting metals can conspire.

Or breathing bellows, or the forming fire,

Is freely yours; your anxious fears remove.

And think no task is *difficult* to love.—DRYDEN.

To Argue, Dispute, Debate.

Argue, in Latin *arguo*, from Greek *αργος* clear, manifest, signifies to make clear, that is by adducing reasons or proofs.

Dispute, in French *disputer*, Latin *disputo*, compounded of *dis* and *puto*, signifies to think differently; in an extended sense, to assert a different opinion.

Debate, in French *debattre*, compounded of the intensive syllable *de* and *battere* to beat or fight, signifies to contend for and against.

To *argue* is to defend one's self; *dispute* to oppose another; to *debate* to dispute in a formal manner. To *argue* on a subject is to explain the reasons or proofs in support of an assertion; to *argue* with a person is to defend a position against him: to *dispute* a thing is to advance objections against a position; to *dispute* with a person is to start objections against his positions, to attempt to refute them: a *debate* is a disputation held by many. To *argue* does not necessarily suppose a conviction on the part of the *arguer* that what he defends is true; nor a real difference of opinion in his opponent; for some men have

such an itching propensity for an argument that they will attempt to prove what nobody denies : to dispute always supposes an opposition to some person, but not a sincere opposition to the thing ; for we may dispute that which we do not deny, for the sake of holding a dispute with one who is of different sentiments : to debate presupposes a multitude of clashing or opposing opinions. Men of many words argue for the sake of talking : men of ready tongues dispute for the sake of victory : in parliament men often debate for the sake of opposing the ruling party, or from any other motive than the love of truth.

Argumentation is a dangerous propensity, and renders a man an unpleasant companion in society ; no one should set such a value on his opinions as to obtrude the defence of them on those who are uninterested in the question : disputation, as a scholastic exercise, is well fitted to exert the reasoning powers and awaken a spirit of inquiry : debating in parliament is by some converted into a trade : he who talks the loudest, and makes the most vehement opposition, expects the greatest applause.

Of good and evil much they argued then.—MILTON.

Thus Rodmond, train'd by this unhallow'd crew,
The sacred social passions never knew :
Unskill'd to argue, in dispute yet loud,
Bold without caution, without honours prond.
FALCONER.

The murmur ceased : then from his lofty throne
The king invok'd the gods, and thus began ;
I wish, ye Latins, what ye now debate
Had been resolv'd before it was too late.—DRYDEN.

To Argue, Evince, Prove.

Argue, *v. to Argue, dispute.*

Evince, in Latin *evinco*, is compounded of *vinco* to prove or make out, and *e* forth, signifies to bring to light, to make to appear clear.

Prove, in French *prouver*, in Latin *probo*, from *probus* good, signifies to make good, or make to appear good.

These terms in general convey the idea of evidence, but with gradations : argue denotes the smallest, and prove the highest degree. To argue is to serve as an indication amounting to probability ; to evince denotes an indication so clear as to remove doubt ; to prove marks an evidence so positive as to produce conviction.

It argues a want of candor in any man to conceal circumstances in his statement which are any ways calculated to effect the subject in question : the tenor of a person's conversation may evince the refinement of his mind and the purity of his taste : when we see men sacrificing their peace of mind and even their integrity of character to ambition, it proves to us how important it is even in early life to check this natural and in some measure laudable, but still insinuating and dangerous passion.

It is not the being singular, but being singular for something that argues either extraordinary endowments of nature or benevolent intentions to mankind, which draws the admiration and esteem of the world.—BERKELEY.

The nature of the soul itself, and particularly its immateriality, has I think been evinced almost to a demonstration.—ADDISON.

What object, what event the moon beneath,
But argues or endears an after-scene ?
To reason proves, or weds it to desire!—YOUNG.

Argument, Reason, Proof.

Argument, from *argue* (*v. To argue*), signifies either the thing that argues, or that which is brought forward in arguing.

Reason, in French *raison*, Latin *ratio*, from *ratus*, participle of *reor* to think, signifies the thing thought or believed in support of some other thing.

Proof, from *to prove* (*v. To argue*), signifies the thing that proves.

An argument serves for defence ; a reason for justification ; a proof for conviction. Arguments are adduced in support of an hypothesis or proposition ; reasons are assigned in matters of belief and practice ; proofs are collected to ascertain a fact.

Arguments are either strong or weak ; reasons solid or futile ; proofs clear and positive, or vague and indefinite. We confute an argument, overpower a reason, and invalidate a proof. Whoever wishes to defend Christianity will be in no want of arguments : the believer need never be at a loss to give a reason for the hope that is in him ; but throughout the whole of Divine Revelation there is no circumstance that is substantiated with such irrefragable proofs as the resurrection of our Saviour.

When the arguments press equally on both sides in matters that are indifferent to us, the safest method is to give up ourselves to neither.—ADDISON.

The reasons, with his friend's experience join'd,
Encourag'd much, but more disturb'd his mind.
DRYDEN.

Are there (still more amazing !) who resist
The rising thought, who smother in its birth
The glorious truth, who struggle to be brutes ?
Who fight the proofs of immortality !—YOUNG.

To Arise, or Rise, Mount, Ascend, Climb, Scale.

Arise, in Saxon *arisan*, Gothic *reisen*, &c., is possibly connected with the Latin *orior* to rise, Greek *anipō* to lift up *opos* a mountain, and the Hebrew *har* mountain, with many others.

Ascend, in Latin *ascendo*, compounded of *ad* and *scando*, signifies to climb up towards a point.

Climb, in German *klimmen*, which is probably connected with *klimmar* a hook, signifying to rise by a hook.

Scale, in French *escalader*, Italian *scalare*, Latin *scala* a ladder, signifies to rise by a ladder.

The idea of going upwards is common to all these terms ; arise is used only in the sense of simply getting up, but rise is employed to express a continued motion upward : a person arises from his seat or his bed ; a bird rises in the air ; the silver of the barometer rises : the first three of these terms convey a gradation in their sense ; to arise or rise denotes a motion to a less elevated height than to mount, and to mount that which is less elevated than ascend : a person rises from his seat, mounts a hill, and ascends a mountain.

Arise and rise are intransitive only ; the rest are likewise transitive : we rise from a point, we mount and ascend to a point, or we mount against something : an air balloon rises when it first leaves the ground ; it mounts

higher and higher until it is out of sight ; but if it *ascends* too high it endangers the life of the aerial adventurer.

Climb and *scale* express a species of *rising* : to *climb* is to *rise* step by step, by clinging to a certain body ; to *scale* is to rise by an esca- lade, or species of ladder, employed in *mount- ing* the walls of fortified towns : trees and mountains are *climbed* ; walls are *scaled*.

Th' inspected entrails could no fates foretell,
Nor, laid on altars, did pure flames *arise*.—DRYDEN.

To contradict them, see all nature *rise* !
What object, what event the moon beneath,
But argues or endears an after-scene ?—YOUNG.

At length the fatal fabric mounds the walls,
Big with destruction.—DRYDEN.

We view a *rising* land like distant clouds ;
The mountain tops confirm the pleasing sight,
And curling smoke *ascending* from their height.
DRYDEN.

While you (alas that I should find it so)
To shun my sight, your native soil forego,
And *climb* the frozen Alps, and tread the eternal snow.
DRYDEN.

But brave Messapus, Neptune's warlike son,
Broke down the palisades, the trenches won,
And loud for ladders calls, to *scale* the town.—DRYDEN.

To Arise, Proceed, Issue, Spring, Flow, Emanate.

Arise (*v. To arise*).

Proceed, in Latin *procedo*, that is *pro* and *cedo* to go, signifies to go forth.

Issue, in French *issue*, comes from the Latin *isse* or *visse*, infinitive of *eo* to go, and the Hebrew *itza* to go out.

Spring, in German *springen* comes from *rinnen* to run like water, and is connected with the Greek *βρῆναι* to pour out.

Flow, in Saxon *fléowan*, low German *flögan*, high German *fließen*, Latin *fluo*, &c., all from the Greek *βῆω* or *βλῆω*, which is an onomatopœia expressing the murmur of waters.

Emanate, in Latin *emanatus*, participle of *emano*, compounded of *mano* to flow, from the Hebrew *mim* and Chaldee *min* waters, expressing the motion of waters.

The idea of one object coming out of another is expressed by all these terms, but they differ in the circumstances of the action. What comes up out of a body and rises into existence is said to *arise*, as the mist which *arises* out of the sea : what comes forth as it were gradually into observation is said to *proceed* ; thus the light *proceeds* from a certain quarter of the heavens, or from a certain part of a house : what comes out from a small aperture is said to *issue* ; thus perspiration *issues* through the pores of the skin ; water *issues* sometimes from the sides of rocks : what comes out in a sudden or quick manner, or comes from some remote source, is said to *spring* ; thus blood *springs* from an artery which is pricked ; water *springs* up out of the earth : what comes out in quantities or in a stream is said to *flow* : thus blood *flows* from a wound : to *emanate* is a species of *flowing* by a natural operation, when bodies send forth, or seem to send forth, particles of their own composition from themselves ; thus light *emanates* from the sun.

This distinction in the signification of these

terms is kept up in their moral acceptation, where the idea of one thing originating from another is common to them all ; but in this case *arise* is a general term, which simply implies the coming into existence ; but *proceed* conveys also the idea of a progressive movement into existence. Every object therefore may be said to *arise* out of whatever produces it ; but it *proceeds* from it only when it is gradually produced : evils are continually *arising* in human society for which there is no specific remedy : in complicated disorders it is not always possible to say precisely from what the complaint of the patient *proceeds*. *Issue* is seldom used but in application to sensible objects ; yet we may say, in conformity to the original meaning, that words *issue* from the mouth : the idea of the distant source or origin is kept up in the moral application of the term *spring*, when we say that actions *spring* from a generous or corrupt principle : the idea of a quantity and a stream is preserved in the moral use of the terms *flow* and *emanate* ; but the former may be said of that which is not inherent in the body ; the latter respects that only which forms a component part of the body : God is the *spring* whence all our blessings *flow* : all authority *emanates* from God, who is the supreme source of all things : theologians, when speaking of God, say that the Son *emanates* from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son, and that grace *flows* upon us incessantly from the inexhaustible treasures of Divine mercy.

From roots hard hazels, and from scions *rise*
Tall ash, and taller oak that mates the skies.—DRYDEN.

The greatest misfortunes men fall into *arise* from themselves.—STEELE.

Teach me the various labours of the moon,
And whence *proceed* the eclipses of the sun.—DRYDEN.

But whence *proceed* these hopes, or whence this dread,
If nothing really can affect the dead ?—JENYNS.

As when some huntsman with a flying spear
From the blind thicket wounds a stately deer,
Down his cleft side while fresh the blood distils,
He bounds aloft and scuds from hills to hills,
Till, life's warm vapour *issuing* through the wound,
Wild mountain wolves the fainting beast surround.
POPE.

As light and heat *flow* from the sun as their centre, so bliss and joy *flow* from the Deity.—BLAIR.

Providence is the great sanctuary to the afflicted who maintain their integrity ; and often there has *issued* from this sanctuary the most seasonable relief.—BLAIR.

All from utility this law approve,
As every private bliss must *spring* from social love.
JENYNS.

As in the next world so in this, the only solid blessings are owing to the goodness of the mind, not the extent of the capacity ; friendship here is an *emanation* from the same source as beatitude there.—POPE.

Arms, Weapons.

Arms from the Latin *arma*, is now properly used for instruments of offence, and never otherwise except by a poetic license of *arms* for armour ; but *weapons* from the German *waffen*, may be used either for an instrument of offence or defence. We say fire *arms*, but not fire *weapons* ; and *weapons* offensive or defensive, not *arms* offensive or defensive. *Arms* likewise, agreeably to its origin, is employed for whatever is intentionally made as an instrument of offence ; *weapon*, according to its extended and indefinite application, is em

ployed for whatever may be accidentally used for this purpose: guns and swords are always arms; stones, and brickbats, and pitchforks, may be occasionally weapons.

Louder, and yet more loud, I hear th' alarms
Of human cries distinct and clashing arms.—DRYDEN.

The cry of Talbot serves me for a sword;
For I have loaded me with many spoils,
Using no other weapon than his name.
SHAKESPEARE.

Army, Host.

An **Army** is an organized body of armed men; a **Host**, from *hostis* an enemy, is properly a body of hostile men.

An *army* is a limited body; a *host* may be unlimited, and is therefore generally considered a very large body.

The word *army* applies only to that which has been formed by the rules of art for purposes of war: *host* has been extended in its application not only to bodies, whether of men or angels, that were assembled for purposes of offence, but also in the figurative sense to whatever rises up to assail.

No more applause would on ambition wait,
And laying waste the world be counted great:
But one good natured act more praises gain,
Than armies overthrow and thousands slain.
JENYNS.

He it was whose guile,
Stir'd up with envy and revenge, deceiv'd
The mother of mankind, what time his pride
Had cast him out of heav'n with all his host
Of rebel angels.—MILTON.

Yet true it is, survey we life around,
Whole hosts of ill on every side are found.—JENYNS.

To Arraign, *v.* To accuse.

To Arrange, *v.* To dispose.

To Arrange, *v.* To class.

To Arrive, *v.* To come.

Arrogance, Presumption.

Arrogance, in French *arrogance*, Latin *arrogantia*, signifies the disposition to arrogate (*v.* To appropriate).

Presumption, from *presume*, Latin *presumo*, compounded of *præ* before, and *sumo* to take or put, signifies the disposition to put one's self forward.

Arrogance is the act of the great; *presumption* that of the little; the *arrogant* man takes upon himself to be above others; the *presumptuous* man strives to be on a level with those who are above him. *Arrogance* is commonly coupled with haughtiness; *presumption* with meanness; men *arrogantly* demand as a right the homage which has perhaps before been voluntarily granted; the creature *presumptuously* arraigns the conduct of the Creator, and murmurs against the dispensations of his providence.

I must confess I was very much surprised to see so great a body of editors, critics, commentators, and grammarians, meet with so very ill a reception. They had formed themselves into a body, and with a great deal of *arrogance* demanded the first station in the column of knowledge; but the goddess, instead of complying with their request, clapped them into liveries.—ADDISON.

In the vanity and *presumption* of youth, it is common to allege the consciousness of innocence as a reason for the contempt of censure.—HAWKESWORTH.

To Arrogate, *v.* To appropriate.

Art, Cunning, Deceit.

Art, in Latin *ars*, probably comes from the Greek *apo* to fit or dispose, Hebrew *haveset* to contrive, in which action the mental exercise of art principally consists.

Cunning is in Saxon *cuning*, German *kennend* knowing, in which sense the English word was formerly used.

Deceit, in Latin *deceptum*, participle of *decipio* or *de* and *capio*, signifies to take by surprise or unawares.

Art implies a disposition of the mind, to use circumvention or artificial means to attain an end: *cunning* marks the disposition to practise disguise in the prosecution of a plan: *deceit* leads to the practice of dissimulation and gross falsehood, for the sake of gratifying a desire. *Art* is the property of a lively mind; *cunning* of a thoughtful and knowing mind; *deceit* of an ignorant, low, and weak mind.

Art is practised often in self-defence; as a practice therefore it is even sometimes justifiable, although not as a disposition: *cunning* has always self in view; the *cunning* man seeks his gratification without regard to others; *deceit* is often practised to the express injury of another: the *deceitful* man adopts base means for base ends. Animals practise *art* when opposed to their superiors in strength; but they are not *artful*, as they have not that versatility of power which they can habitually exercise to their own advantage like human beings: animals may be *cunning* in as much as they can by contrivance and concealment seek to obtain the object of their desire, but no animal is *deceitful* except man: the wickedest and stupidest of men have the power and the will of *deceiving* and practising falsehood upon others, which is unknown to the brutes.

It has been a sort of maxim that the greatest *art* is to conceal art; but I know not how, among some people we meet with, their greatest *cunning* is to appear *cunning*.—STEELE.

Cunning can in no circumstance imaginable be a quality worthy a man, except in his own defence, and merely to conceal himself from such as are so, and in such cases it is wisdom.—STEELE.

Though the living man can wear a mask and carry on *deceit*, the dying Christian cannot counterfeit.—CUMBERLAND.

Art, *v.* Business, trade.

Artful, Artificial, Fictitious.

Artful, compounded of *art* and *ful*, marks the quality of being full of art (*v.* Art).

Artificial, in Latin *artificialis*, from *ars* and *facio* to do, signifies done with art.

Fictitious, in Latin *fictitious*, from *finco* to feign, signifies the quality of being feigned.

Artful respects what is done with art or design; *artificial* what is done by the exercise of workmanship; *fictitious* what is made out of the mind. *Artful* and *artificial* are used either for natural or moral objects; *fictitious* always for those that are moral: *artful* is opposed to what is *artless*, *artificial* to what is natural, *fictitious* to what is real: the ringlets of a lady's hair are disposed in an *artful* manner; the hair itself may be *artificial*: a tale is *artful* which is told in a way to gain credit; manners are *artificial* which do not

seem to suit the person adopting them : a story is *fictitious* which has no foundation whatever in truth, and is the invention of the narrator.

Children sometimes tell their stories so *artfully* as to impose on the most penetrating and experienced. Those who have no character of their own are induced to take an *artificial* character in order to put themselves on a level with their associates. Beggars deal in *fictitious* tales of distress in order to excite compassion.

I was much surprised to see the ants' nest which I had destroyed, very *artfully* repaired.—ADDISON.

If we compare two nations in an equal state of civilization, we may remark that where the greater freedom obtains, there the greater variety of *artificial* wants will obtain also.—CUMBERLAND.

Among the numerous stratagems by which pride endeavours to recommend folly to regard, there is scarcely one that meets with less success than affectation, or a perpetual disguise of the real character by *fictitious* appearance.—JOHNSON.

Article, Condition, Term.

Article, in French *article*, Latin *articulus* a joint or a part of a member.

Condition, in French *condition*, Latin *conditio*, from *condo* to build or form, signifies properly the thing framed.

Term, in French *terme*, Latin *terminus* a boundary, signifies the point to which one is fixed.

These words agree in their application to matters of compact, or understanding between man and man. *Article* and *condition* are used in both numbers ; *terms* only in the plural in this sense : the former may be used for any point individually ; the latter for all the points collectively : *article* is employed for all matters which are drawn out in specific *articles* or *points* ; as the *articles* of an indenture, of a capitulation, or an agreement. *Condition* respects any point that is admitted as a ground of obligation or engagement : it is used for the general transactions of men, in which they reciprocally bind themselves to return certain equivalents. The word *terms* is employed in regard to mercantile transactions ; as the *terms* of any bargain, the *terms* of any agreement, the *terms* on which any thing is bought or sold.

Articles are mostly voluntary ; they are admitted by mutual agreement : *conditions* are frequently compulsory, sometimes hard : they are submitted to from policy or necessity : *terms* are dictated by interest or equity ; they are fair, or unfair, according to the temper of the parties ; they are submitted or agreed to. *Articles* are drawn up between parties who have to co-operate ; men undertake particular offices on *condition* of receiving a stipulated remuneration : they enter into dealings with each other on definite and precise *terms*. Clergymen subscribe to the *articles* of the Established Church before they are admitted to perform its sacred functions ; in so doing they are presumed to be free agents ; but they are not free to swerve from these *articles* while they remain in the Church, and receive its emoluments. In all auctions there are certain *conditions* with which all must comply who wish to receive the benefits of the sale : in the time of war it is the business of the victor to prescribe *terms* to the vanquished ; with the

latter it is a matter of prudence whether they shall be accepted or rejected.

In the mean time they have ordered the preliminary treaty to be published, with observations on each *article*, in order to quiet the minds of the people.—STEELE.

The Trojan by his word is bound to take
The same conditions which himself did make.
DRYDEN.

Those mountains all'd with firs, that lower land,
If you consent, the Trojans shall command ;
Call'd into part of what is ours, and there,
On terms agreed, the common country share.
DRYDEN.

To Articulate, v. To utter.

Artifice, Trick, Finesse, Stratagem.

Artifice, in French *artifice*, Latin *artifex* an artificer, and *artem facio* to execute an art, signifies the performance of an art.

Trick, in French *tricher*, German *triegen* to deceive.

Finesse, a word directly imported from France with all the meaning attached to it, which is characteristic of the nation itself, means properly fineness ; the word *fin* fine, signifying in French, as well as in the northern languages from which it is taken, subtlety or mental acumen.

Stratagem, in French *stratagème*, from the Greek *στρατηγικα* and *στρατηγικω* to lead an army, signifies by distinction to head them in carrying on any scheme.

All these terms denote the exercise of an art calculated to mislead others. *Artifice* is the generic term ; the rest specific : the former has likewise a particular use and acceptation distinct from the others : it expresses a ready display of art for the purpose of extricating one's self from a difficulty, or securing to one's self an advantage. *Trick* includes in it more of design to gain something for one's self, or to act secretly to the inconvenience of others : * it is rather a cheat on the senses than the understanding. *Finesse* is a species of *artifice* in which art and cunning are combined in the management of a cause : it is a mixture of invention, falsehood, and concealment. *Stratagem* is a display of art in plotting and contriving, a disguised mode of obtaining an end.

Females who are not guarded by fixed principles of virtue and uprightness are apt to practise *artifices* upon their husbands. Men without honour, or an honourable means of living, are apt to practise various *tricks* to impose upon others to their own advantage : every trade therefore is said to have its *tricks* ; and professions are not entirely clear from this stigma, which has been brought upon them by unworthy members. Diplomatic persons have most frequent recourse to *finesse*, in which no people are more skilful practitioners than those who have coined the word. Military operations are sometimes considerably forwarded by well-concerted and well-timed *stratagems* to surprise the enemy.

An *artifice* may be perfectly innocent when it serves to afford a friend an unexpected pleasure. A *trick* is childish which only serves to deceive or amuse children. *Stratagems* are allowable not in war only ; the writer

* Trueler : "Cunning, finesse, device, artifice, trick, stratagem."

of a novel or a play may sometimes adopt a successful *stratagem* to cause the reader a surprise. *Finesse* is never justifiable; it carries with it too much of concealment and dissimulateness to be practised but for selfish and unworthy purposes.

Among the several *artifices* which are put in practice by the poets, to fill the minds of an audience with terror, the first place is due to thunder and lightning.—ADDISON.

Where men practise falsehood and show *tricks* with one another, there will be perpetual suspicions, evil surmises, doubts, and jealousies.—SOUTH.

On others practise thy Ligurian arts,
Thy *stratagems* and *tricks* of little hearts
Are lost on me.—DRYDEN.

Another can't forgive the paltry arts
By which he makes his way to shallow hearts,
Mere pieces of *finesse*, traps for applause.
CHURCHILL.

One of the most successful *stratagems*, whereby Mahomet became formidable, was the assurance that impostor gave his votaries, that whoever was slain in battle should be immediately conveyed to that luxurious paradise his wanton fancy had invented.—STEELE.

Artifice, *v. Artist.*

Artificer, *v. Artist.*

Artificial, *v. Artful.*

Artisan, *v. Artist.*

Artist, Artisan, Artificer, Mechanic.

Artist is a practiser of the fine arts.

Artisan is a practiser of the vulgar arts.

Artificer, from *ars* and *facio*, is one who does or makes according to art.

Mechanic is an *artisan* in the *mechanic* arts.

The *artist* ranks higher than the *artisan*: the former requires intellectual refinement in the exercise of his art; the latter requires nothing but to know the general rules of his art. The musician, painter, and sculptor are *artists*; the carpenter, the sign painter, and the blacksmith are *artisans*. The *artificer* is an intermediate term betwixt the *artist* and the *artisan*: manufacturers are *artificers*; and South, in his sermons, calls the author of the universe the great *Artificer*. The *mechanic* is that species of *artisan* who works at arts purely *mechanical*, in distinction from those which contribute to the completion and embellishment of any objects; on this ground a shoemaker is a *mechanic*, but a common painter is a simple *artisan*.

If ever this country saw an age of *artists*, it is the present; her painters, sculptors, and engravers, are now the only schools properly so called.—CUMBERLAND.

The merchant, tradesman, and *artisan* will have their profit upon all the multiplied wants, comforts, and indulgences of civilized life.—CUMBERLAND.

Man must be in a certain degree the *artificer* of his own happiness; the tools and materials may be put into his hands by the bounty of providence, but the workmanship must be his own.—CUMBERLAND.

The concurring assent of the world in preferring gentlemen to *mechanics* seems founded in that preference which the rational part of our nature is entitled to above the animal.—BARTELETT.

To Ascend, *v. To arise, rise, mount, climb, scale.*

Ascendency, *v. Influence.*

To Ascribe, Attribute, Impute.

Ascribe, *v. To appropriate.*

Attribute, in Latin *attributus*, participle of *attribuo*, compounded of *ad* and *tribuo*, signifies to bestow upon, or attach to a thing what belongs to it.

Impute, compounded of *im* or *in* and *pute*, Latin *puto* to think, signifies to think or judge what is in a thing.

To *ascribe* is to assign any thing to a person as his property, his possession, or the fruit of his labour; to *attribute* is to assign things to others as their causes; to *impute* is to assign qualities to persons. Milton *ascribes* the first use of artillery to the rebel angels; the loss of a vessel is *attributed* to the violence of the storm; the conduct of the captain is *imputed* to his want of firmness. The letters of Junius have been falsely *ascribed* to many persons in succession, as the author to this day remains concealed, and out of the reach of even probable conjecture; the oracles of the heathens are *ascribed* by some theologians to the devil; the death of Alexander the Great is *attributed* to his intemperance; generosity has been *imputed* to him from his conduct on certain occasions, but particularly in his treatment of the Persian princesses, the relatives of Darius.

Ascribe is mostly used in a favourable or indifferent sense; *impute* is either favourable or unfavourable. In the doxology of the church ritual, all honour, might, majesty, dominion, and power are *ascribed* to the three persons in the Holy Trinity: the actions of men are often so equivocal that it is difficult to decide whether praise or blame ought to be *imputed* to them.

Holiness is *ascribed* to the pope; majesty to kings; serenity or mildness to princes; excellence or perfection to ambassadors; grace to archbishops; honour to peers.—ADDISON.

Perhaps it may appear upon examination that the most polite ages are the least virtuous. This may be *attributed* to the folly of admitting wit and learning as merit in themselves, without considering the application of them.—STEELE.

We who are adepts in astrology can *impute* it to several causes in the planets, that this quarter of our great city is the region of such as either never had, or have lost, the use of reason.—STEELE.

To Ascribe, *v. To appropriate.*

To Ask, Beg, Request.

Ask is in Saxon *ascian*, low German *esken*, *eschen*, German *heischen*, Danish *adske*, Swedish *aeska*; these in general signify to wish for, and come from the Greek *aiōō* to think worthy.

Beg is contracted from the word *beggar*, and the German *begehren* to desire vehemently.

Request, in Latin *requisitus*, participle of *requiro*, is compounded of *re* and *quæro* to seek or look after with indications of desire to possess.

The expression of a wish to some one to have something is the common idea comprehended in these terms. As this is the simple signification of *ask*, it is the generic term; the other two are specific: we *ask* in *begging* and *requesting*, but not *vice versa*.

Asking is peculiar to no rank or station; in consequence of our mutual dependance on

each other, it is requisite for every man to *ask* something of another: the master *asks* of the servant, the servant *asks* of the master; the parent *asks* of the child, the child *asks* of the parent. *Begging* marks a degree of dependence which is peculiar to inferiors in station: we *ask* for matters of indifference; we *beg* that which we think is of importance: a child *asks* a favour of his parent; a poor man *begs* the assistance of one who is able to afford it: that is *asked* for which is easily granted; that is *begged* which is with difficulty obtained. To *ask* therefore requires no effort; but to *beg* is to *ask* with importunity; those who by merely *asking* find themselves unable to obtain what they wish will have recourse to *begging*.

As *ask* sometimes implies a demand, and *beg* a vehemence of desire, or strong degree of necessity; politeness has adopted another phrase which conveys neither the imperiousness of the one nor the urgency of the other; this is the word *request*. *Asking* carries with it an air of superiority; *begging* that of submission; *requesting* has the air of independence and equality. *Asking* borders too nearly on an infringement of personal liberty; *begging* imposes a constraint by making an appeal to the feelings; *requests* leave the liberty of granting or refusing unencumbered. It is the character of impertinent people to *ask* without considering the circumstances and situation of the person *asked*; they seem ready to take without permission that which is *asked*, if it be not granted: selfish and greedy people *beg* with importunity, and in a tone that admits of no refusal: men of good breeding tender their *requests* with moderation and discretion; they *request* nothing but what they are certain can be conveniently complied with.

Ask is altogether exploded from polite life, although *beg* is not. We may *beg* a person's acceptance of any thing; we may *beg* him to favour or honour us with his company; but we can never talk of *asking* a person's acceptance, or *asking* him to do us an honour. *Beg* in such cases indicates a condescension which is sometimes not unbecoming, but on ordinary occasions *request* is with more propriety substituted in its place.

Let him pursue the promis'd Latian shore,
A short delay is all I *ask* him now,
A pause of grief, an interval from woe.—DRYDEN.

But we must *beg* our bread in climes unknown,
Beneath the scorching or the frozen zone.—DRYDEN.
But do not you my last request deny,
With you perfidious man your interest try.—DRYDEN.

To Ask, or Ask For, Claim, Demand.

Ask, v. To ask, beg.

Claim, in French *clamer*. Latin *clamo* to cry after, signifies to express an imperious wish for.

Demand, in French *demandeur*, Latin *demandare*, compounded of *de* and *mando* to order, signifies to call for imperatively.

Ask, in the sense of *beg*, is confined to the expression of wishes on the part of the *asker*, without involving any obligation on the part of the person *asked*; all granted in this case is voluntary, or complied with as a favour: but *ask for*, in the sense here taken is involun-

tary, and springs from the forms and distinctions of society. *Ask* is here, as before, generic or specific; *claim* and *demand* are specific; in its specific sense it conveys a less peremptory sense than either *claim* or *demand*. To *ask* for denotes simply the expressed wish to have what is considered as due; to *claim* is to assert a right, or to make it known; to *demand* is to insist on having without the liberty of a refusal.

Asking respects obligation in general, great or small; *claim* respects obligations of importance. *Asking* for supposes a right, not questionable; *claim* supposes a right hitherto unacknowledged; *demand* supposes either a disputed right, or the absence of all right, and the simple determination to have: a tradesman *asks* for what is owed to him as circumstances may require; a person *claims* the property he has lost; people are sometimes pleased to make *demands*, the legality of which cannot be proved. What is lent must be *asked* for when it is wanted; whatever has been lost and is found must be recovered by a *claim*; whatever a selfish person wants, he strives to obtain by a *demand*, whether just or unjust.

Virtue, with them, is only to abstain
From all that nature *asks*, and covet pain.—JENYNS.

My country *claims* me all, *claims* ev'ry passion.
MARTYN.

Even mountains, vales,
And forests, seem impatient to *demand*
The promis'd sweetness.—THOMSON.

To Ask, Inquire, Question, Interrogate.

Ask, v. To ask, beg.

Inquire, Latin *inquiro*, compounded of *in* and *quero* signifies to search after.

Question, in French *questionner*, signifies to put a question, from the Latin *questio* and *quero* to seek or search, to look into.

Interrogate, Latin *interrogatus*, participle of *interrogo*, compounded of *inter* and *rogo*, signifies to *ask* alternately, or an asking between different persons.

We perform all these actions in order to get information: but we *ask* for general purposes of convenience; we *inquire* from motives of curiosity; we *question* and *interrogate* from motives of discretion. To *ask* respects simply one thing: to *inquire* respects one or many subjects; to *question* and *interrogate* is to *ask* repeatedly, and in the latter case more authoritatively than in the former.

Indifferent people *ask* of each other whatever they wish to know: learners *inquire* the reasons of things which are new to them; masters *question* their servants, or parents their children, when they wish to ascertain the real state of any case; magistrates *interrogate* criminals when they are brought before them. It is very uncivil not to answer whatever is *asked* even by the meanest person; it is proper to satisfy every *inquiry*, so as to remove doubt: *questions* are sometimes so impertinent that they cannot with propriety be answered: *interrogations* from unauthorized persons are little better than insults.

Upon my *asking* her who it was, she told me it was a very grave elderly gentleman, but that she did not know his name.—ADDISON.

Not only what is great, strange, or beautiful, but any thing that is disagreeable when looked upon, pleases us in an apt description. Here we must *inquire* after a new principle of pleasure, which is nothing else but the action of the mind, which compares the ideas that arise from words with the ideas that arise from objects themselves.—ADDISON.

In order to pass away the evening, which now began to grow tedious, we fell into that laudable and primitive diversion of *questions* and *commands*.—ADDISON.

Thomson was introduced to the Prince of Wales, and being gaily *interrogated* about the state of his affairs, said, that, they were "in a more poetical posture than formerly."—JOHNSON.

Aspect, *v.* *Appearance*.

Asperity, *v.* *Acrimony*.

To Asperse, Detract, Defame, Slander, Calumniate.

Asperse, in Latin *aspersus*, participle of *aspergo* to sprinkle, signifies in a moral sense to stain with spots.

Detract, in Latin *detractus*, participle of *detraho*, compounded of *de* and *traho*, signifies to draw from.

Defame, in Latin *defamo*, compounded of the privative *de* and *famo* or *fama* fame, signifies to deprive of reputation.

Slander is doubtless connected with the words *slur*, *sully*, and *soil*, signifying to stain with some spot.

Calumniate, from the Latin *calumnia*, and the Hebrew *calameh* infamy, signifies to load with infamy.

All these terms denote an effort made to injure the character by some representation.

Asperse and *detract* mark an indirect representation; *defame*, *slander*, and *calumniate*, a positive assertion.

To *asperse* is to fix a moral stain on a character; to *detract* is to lessen its merits and excellences. *Aspersions* always imply something bad, real or supposed; *detractions* are always founded on some supposed good in the object that is *detracted*: to *defame* is openly to advance some serious charge against the character: to *slander* is to expose the faults of another in his absence: to *calumniate* is to communicate secretly, or otherwise, circumstances to the injury of another.

Aspersions and *detractions* are never positive falsehoods, as they never amount to more than insinuations: *defamation* is the public communication of facts, whether true or false: *slander* involves the discussion of moral qualities, and is consequently the declaration of an opinion as well as the communication of a fact: *calumny*, on the other hand, is a positive communication of circumstances known by the narrator at the time to be false. *Aspersions* are the effect of malice and meanness; they are the resource of the basest persons, insidiously to wound the characters of those whom they dare not openly attack: the most virtuous are exposed to the malignity of the *asperser*. *Detraction* is the effect of envy: when a man is not disposed or able to follow the example of another, he strives to *detract* from the merit of his actions by questioning the purity of his motives: distinguished persons are the most exposed to the will of *detractors*. *Defamation* is the consequence of personal resentment, or a busy interference with

other men's affairs; it is an unjustifiable exposure of their errors or vices, which is often visited with the due vengeance of the law upon the offender. *Slander* arises either from a mischievous temper, or a gossiping humour; it is the resource of ignorant and vacant minds, who are in want of some serious occupation: the *slanderer* deals unmercifully with his neighbour, and speaks without regard to truth or falsehood. *Calumny* is the worst of actions, resulting from the worst of motives; to injure the reputation of another by the sacrifice of truth is an accumulation of guilt which is hardly exceeded by any one in the whole catalogue of vices. *Slanderers* and *calumniators* are so near akin that they are but too often found in the same person; it is to be expected that when the *slanderer* has exhausted all his surmises and censure upon his neighbour, he will not hesitate to *calumniate* him rather than remain silent.

If I speak slightly of my neighbour, and insinuate any thing against the purity of his principles, or the rectitude of his conduct, I *asperse* him: if he be a charitable man, and I ascribe his charities to a selfish motive, or otherwise take away from the merit of his conduct, I am guilty of *detraction*: if I publish any thing openly that injures his reputation, I am a *defamer*: if I communicate to others the reports that are in circulation to his disadvantage, I am a *slanderer*: if I fabricate any thing myself and spread it abroad, I am a *calumniate*.

It is certain, and observed by the wisest writers that there are women who are not nicely chaste, and men not severely honest, in all families; therefore let those who may be apt to raise *aspersions* upon ours, please to give us an impartial account of their own, and we shall be satisfied.—STEELE.

What made their enmity the more entertaining to all the rest of their sex was, that in their *detraction* from each other, neither could fall upon terms which did not hit herself as much as her adversary.—STEELE.

What shall we say of the pleasure a man takes in a *defamatory* libel. Is it not a heinous sin in the sight of God?—ADDISON.

Slander, that worst of poisons, ever finds
An easy entrance to ignoble minds.—HERVEY.

The way to silence *calumny*, says Bias, is to be always exercised in such things as are praiseworthy.—ADDISON.

To Aspire, *v.* *To aim, aspire*.

To Assail, *v.* *To attack*.

Assailant, *v.* *Aggressor*.

To Assassinate, *v.* *To kill*.

To Assault, *v.* *To attack, assault*.

To Assault, *v.* *To attack, assault*.

Assemblage, *v.* *Assembly*.

To Assemble, Muster, Collect.

Assemble, in French *assemble*, Latin *ad-simulare*, or *assimulare*, from *similis* like and *simul* together, signifies to make alike or bring together.

Muster, in German *mustern* to set out for inspection, in Latin *monstror* to show or display.

Collect, in Latin *collectus*, participle of *colligo*, compounded of *col* or *con* and *lego* to bind, signifies to bring together, or into one point.

Assemble is said of persons only; *muster* and *collect* of persons or things. To *assemble* is to bring together by a call or invitation; to *muster* is to bring together by an act of authority, into one point of view, at one time, and from one quarter; to *collect* is to bring together at different times, and from different quarters: the Parliament is *assembled*; soldiers are *mustered* every day in order to ascertain their numbers; an army is *collected* in preparation for war; a king *assembles* his council in order to consult with them on public measures; a general *musters* his forces before he undertakes an expedition, and *collects* more troops if he finds himself too weak.

Collect is used for everything which can be brought together in numbers *muster* is used figuratively for bringing together, for an immediate purpose, whatever is in one's possession: books, coins, curiosities, and the like, are *collected*; a person's resources, his strength, courage, resolution, &c., are *mustered*: some persons have a pleasure in *collecting* all the pieces of antiquity which fall in their way; on a trying occasion it is necessary to *muster* all the fortitude of which we are master.

Assemble all in choir, and with their notes,
Salute and welcome up the rising sun.—OTWAY.

Oh! thou hast set my busy brain at work!
And now she *musters* up a train of images.—ROWE.

Each leader now his scatter'd force conjoins
In close array, and forms the deep'ning lines;
Not with more ease, the skilful shepherd swain
Collects his flock, from thousands on the plain.

POPE.

To Assemble, Convene, Convoke.

Assemble, *v.* To assemble, muster.

Convene, in Latin *convenio*, signifies to come or bring together.

Convoke, in Latin *convoco*, signifies to call together.

The idea of collecting many persons into one place, for a specific purpose, is common to all these terms. *Assemble* conveys this sense without any addition; *convene* and *convoke* include likewise some collateral idea: people are *assembled*, therefore, whenever they are *convened* or *convoked*, but not *vice versâ*. *Assembling* is mostly by the wish of one; *convening* by that of several: a crowd is *assembled* by an individual in the streets; a meeting is *convened* at the desire of a certain number of persons: people are *assembled* either on public or private business; they are always *convened* on a public occasion. A king *assembles* his parliament; a particular individual *assembles* his friends: the inhabitants of a district are *convened*.

There is nothing imperative on the part of those that *assemble* or *convene*, and nothing binding on those *assembled* or *convened*: one *assembles* or *convenes* by invitation or request; one attends to the notice or not at pleasure. *Convoke*, on the other hand, is an act of authority; it is the call of one who has the authority to give the call; it is heeded by those who feel themselves bound to attend. *Assembling* and *convening* are always for domestic or civil purposes; *convoking* is always employed in spiritual matters: a dying man *assembles* his friends round his death-bed; a meeting is *convened* in

order to present an address; the dignitaries in the church are *convoked* by the supreme authority.

He ceas'd: the *assembled* warriors all assent,
All but Atrides.—CUMBERLAND.

They form one social shade, as if *conven'd*
By magic summons of the Orphean lyre.—COWPER.

Where on the mingling boughs they sit embower'd
All the hot noon, till cooler hours arrive.

Faint underneath, the household fowls *convene*.
THOMSON.

Here cease thy fury, and the chiefs and kings,
Convoke to council, weigh the sum of things.—POPE.

Assembly, Assemblage, Group, Collection.

Assembly, **Assemblage**, are collective terms derived from the verb *assemble*.

Group comes from the Italian *gruppo*, which among painters signifies an assemblage of figures in one place.

Collection expresses the act of *collecting*, or the body *collected* (*v.* to *assemble*, *muster*).

Assembly respects persons only; *assemblage*, things only; *group* and *collection*, persons or things: an *assembly* is any number either brought together, or come together of themselves; an *assemblage* is any number of things standing together; a *group* is come together by accident, or put together by design; a *collection* is mostly put or brought together by design.

A general alarm will cause an *assembly* to disperse: an agreeable *assemblage* of rural objects, whether in nature or in representation, constitutes a landscape: a painting will sometimes consist only of a *group* of figures, but if they be well chosen, it will sometimes produce a wonderful effect: a *collection* of evil-minded persons ought to be immediately dispersed by the authority of the magistrate. In a large *assembly* you may sometimes observe a singular *assemblage* of characters, countenances, and figures. when people come together in great numbers on any occasion, they will often form themselves into distinct *groups*: the *collection* of scarce books and curious editions has become a passion, which is justly ridiculed under the title of Bibliomania.

Love and marriage are the natural effects of these anniversary *assemblies*.—BUDGELL.

O Hertford! fitted or to shine in courts
With unaffected grace, or walk the plain
With innocence and meditation join'd
In soft *assemblage*, listen to my song.

THOMSON.

A lifeless *group* the blasted cattle lie.—THOMSON.

There is a manuscript at Oxford containing the lives of an hundred and thirty five of the finest Persian poets, most of whom left very ample *collections* of their poems behind them.—SIR WM. JONES.

Assembly, Company, Meeting, Congregation, Parliament, Diet, Congress, Convention, Synod, Convocation, Council.

An **Assembly** (*v.* To *assemble*, *muster*) is simply the *assembling* together of any number of persons: this idea is common to all the rest of these terms, which differ in the object, mode and other collateral circumstances of the action.

Company, a body linked together (*v. To accompany*), is an *assembly* for purposes of amusement.

Meeting, a body met together, is an *assembly* for general purposes of business.

Congregation, a body flocked or gathered together, from the Latin *grex* a flock, is an *assembly* brought together from congeniality of sentiment, and community of purpose.

Parliament, in French *parlement*, from *parler* to speak, signifies an *assembly* for speaking or debating on important matters.

Diet, from the Greek *diæta* to govern, is an *assembly* for governing or regulating affairs of State.

Congress, from the Latin *congređior* to march in a body, is an *assembly* coming together in a formal manner from distant parts for special purposes.

Convention, from the Latin *convenio* to come together, is an *assembly* coming together in an informal and promiscuous manner from a neighbouring quarter.

Synod, in Greek *συνδος*, compounded of *syn*, and *odos*, signifies literally going the same road, and has been employed to signify an *assembly* for consultation on matters of religion.

Convocation, is an *assembly* convoked for an especial purpose.

Council is an *assembly* for consultation either on civil or ecclesiastical affairs.

An *assembly* is, in its restricted sense, public, and under certain regulations: a *company* is private, and confined to friends and acquaintances: a *meeting* is either public or private: a *congregation* is always public. *Meetings* are held by all who have any common concern to arrange: *congregations* consist of those who follow the same form of doctrine and discipline: all these different kinds of *assemblies* are formed by individuals in their private capacity; the other terms designate *assemblies* that come together for national purposes, with the exception of the word *convention*, which may be either domestic or political.

A *parliament* and *diet* are popular *assemblies* under a monarchical form of government; *congress* and *convention* are *assemblies* under a republican government: of the first description are the *parliaments* of England and France, the *diets* of Germany and Poland, which consisted of subjects *assembled* by the monarch, to deliberate on the affairs of the nation. Of the latter description are the *congress* of the United Provinces of Holland, and that of the United States of America, and the national *convention* of France: but there is this difference observable between a *congress* and a *convention*, that the former consists of deputies or delegates from higher authorities, that is, from independent governments already established; but a *convention* is a self-constituted *assembly*, which has no power but what it assumes to itself.

A *synod* and *convocation* are in religious matters what a *diet* and *convention* are in civil matters: the former exists only under an episcopal form of government; the latter may exist under any form of church discipline, even where the authority lies in the whole body of the ministry.

A *council* is more important than all other species of *assembly*; it consists of persons in-

vested with the highest authority, who, in their consultations, do not so much transact ordinary concerns, as arrange the forms and fashions of things. Religious *councils* used to determine matters of faith and discipline; political *councils* frame laws and determine the fate of empires.

Lucan was so exasperated with the repulse, that he muttered something to himself, and was heard to say, "that since he could not have a seat among them himself, he would bring in one who alone had more merit than their whole *assembly*;" upon which he went to the door and brought in Cato of Utica.—ADDISON.

As I am insignificant to the *company* in public places, and as it is visible I do not come thither as most do to show myself, I gratify the vanity of all who pretend to make an appearance!—STEELE.

It is very natural for a man who is not turned for fruitful *meetings* of men, or *assemblies* of the fair sex, to delight in that sort of conversation which we meet with in coffee-houses.—STEELE.

Their tribes adjusted, clean'd their vig'rous wings,
And many a circle, many a short essay,
Wheel'd round and round; in *congregation* full
The figur'd fight ascends.—THOMSON.

As all innocent means are to be used for the propagation of truth, I would not deter those who are employed in preaching to common *congregations* from any practice which they may find persuasive.—JOHNSON.

The word *parliament* was first applied to general *assemblies* of the states under Louis VII. in France, about the middle of the twelfth century.—BLACKSTONE.

What further provoked their indignation was that instead of twenty-five pistoles formerly allowed to each member for their charge in coming to the *diet*, he had presented them with six only.—STEELE.

Prior had not, however, much reason to complain: for he came to London, and obtained such notice, that (in 1691) he was sent to the *congress* at the Hague, as secretary to the embassy.—JOHNSON.

The office of conservators of the peace was newly erected in Scotland; and these, instigated by the clergy, were resolved, since they could not obtain the king's consent, to summon in his name, but by their own authority, a *convention* of states.—HUME.

A *synod* of the celestials was convened, in which it was resolved that patronage should descend to the assistance of the sciences.—JOHNSON.

The *convocation* is the miniature of a *parliament*, wherein the archbishop presides with regal state.—BLACKSTONE.

Inspir'd by Juno, Thetis' godlike son
Conven'd to *council* all the Grecian train.—POPE.

Assent, Consent, Approbation, Concurrence.

Assent, in Latin *assentio*, is compounded of *as* or *ad* and *sentio* to think, signifying to bring one's mind or judgment to a thing.

Consent, *v. To accede*.

Approbation, in Latin *approbatio*, is compounded of *ad* and *probo* to prove, signifying to make a thing out good.

Concurrence, *v. To agree*.

Assent respects the judgment; *consent* respects the will. We *assent* to what we think true; we *consent* to the wish of another by agreeing to it and allowing it. Some men give their hasty *assent* to propositions which they do not fully understand; and their hasty *consent* to measures which are very injudicious. It is the part of the true believer not merely to *assent* to the Christian doctrines, but to make them the rule of his life: those who *consent* to a bad action are partakers in the guilt of it.

Approbation is a species of *assent*; *concurrence* of *consent*. To *approve* is not merely to *assent* to a thing that is right, but to feel it positively, to have the will and judgment in

accordance: *concurrence* is the *consent* of many. *Approbation* respects the practical conduct of men in their intercourse with each other; *assent* is given to speculative truths, abstract propositions, or direct assertions. It is a happy thing when our actions meet with the approbation of others; but is of little importance if we have not at the same time an *approving* conscience: we may often *assent* to the premises of a question or proposition without admitting the deductions drawn from them.

Concurrence respects matters of general concern, as *consent* respects those of individual interest. No bill in the house of parliament can pass for a second reading without the *concurrence* of a majority; no parent should be induced by persuasion to give his *consent* to what his judgment disapproves. *Assent* is opposed to contradiction or denial; *consent* to refusal; *approbation* to dislike or blame; *concurrence* to opposition: but we may sometimes seem to give our *assent* to what we do not expressly contradict, or seem to *approve* what we do not blame; and we are supposed to *consent* to a request when we do not positively refuse it. We may *approve* or disapprove of a thing without giving an intimation either of our *approbation* or the contrary: but *concurrence* cannot be altogether a negative action; it must be signified by some sign, although that need not necessarily be a word.

The *assent* of some people to the most important truths is so tame, that it might with no great difficulty be converted into a contradiction; he who is anxious to obtain universal *approbation*, or even to escape censure, will find his fate depicted in the story of the old man and his ass: according to the old proverb, "Silence gives *consent*." It is not uncommon for ministerial men to give their *concurrence* in parliament to the measures of administration by a silent vote, while those of the opposite party spout forth their opposition to catch the applause of the multitude.

Precept gains only the cold *approbation* of reason, and compels an *assent* which judgement frequently yields with reluctance, even when delay is impossible.—HAWKESWORTH.

Whatever be the reason, it appears by the common consent of mankind that the want of virtue does not incur equal contempt with the want of parts.—HAWKESWORTH.

There is as much difference between the *approbation* of the judgement and the actual volitions of the will with relation to the same object, as there is between a man's viewing a desirable thing with his eye and his reaching after it with his hand.—SOUTH.

Sir Matthew Hale mentions one case wherein the Lords may alter a money bill (that is, from a greater to a less time)—here he says the bill need not be sent back to the Commons for their *concurrence*.—BLACKSTONE.

To Assert, Maintain, Vindicate.

To Assert, v. *To affirm, assert.*

Maintain, in French *maintenir*, from the Latin *manus* and *teneo*, signifies to hold by the hand, that is, closely and firmly.

Vindicate, in Latin *vindicatus*, participle of *vindico*, compounded of *vim* and *dico*, signifies to pronounce a violent or positive sentence.

To assert is to declare a thing as our own; *to maintain* is to abide by what we have so declared; *to vindicate* is to stand up for that which concerns ourselves or others. We *assert*

any thing to be true; we *maintain* it by adducing proofs, facts, or arguments; we *vindicate* our own conduct or that of another when it is called in question. We *assert* boldly or impudently; we *maintain* steadily or obstinately; we *vindicate* resolutely or insolently. A right or claim is *asserted*, which is avowed to belong to any one; it is *maintained* when attempts are made to prove its justice, or regain its possession; the cause of the *asserter* or *maintainer* is *vindicated* by another. Innocence is *asserted* by a positive declaration; it is *maintained* by repeated assertions and the support of testimony; it is *vindicated* through the interference of another.

The most guilty persons do not hesitate to *assert* their innocence with the hope of inspiring credit; and some will persist in *maintaining* it, even after their guilt has been pronounced; but the really innocent man will never want a friend to *vindicate* him when his honour or his reputation is at stake. *Assertions* which are made hastily and inconsiderately are seldom long *maintained* without exposing a person to ridicule; those who attempt to *vindicate* a bad cause expose themselves to as much reproach as if the cause were their own.

When the great soul buoys up to this high point,
Leaving gross nature's sediments below,
Then, and then only, Adam's offspring quits
The sage and hero of the fields and woods,
Asserts his rank, and rises into man.—YOUNG.

Sophocles also, in a fragment of one of his tragedies *asserts* the unity of the Supreme Being.—CUMBERLAND.

I am willing to believe that Dryden wanted rather skill to discover the right, than virtue to *maintain* it.—JOHNSON.

'Tis just that I should *vindicate* alone
The broken truce, or for the breach atone.—DRYDEN.

To Assert, v. *To affirm, assert.*

Assessment, v. *Tax.*

To Asseverate, v. *To affirm.*

Assiduous, v. *Active, diligent.*

Assiduous, v. *Sedulous.*

To Assign, v. *To adduce.*

To Assign, v. *To allot, assign.*

To Assist, v. *To help.*

Assistant, v. *Coadjutor.*

Associate, Companion.

Associate, in Latin *associatus*, participle of *associo*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *socio* to ally, signifies one united with a person.

Companion, from company, signifies one that bears company (*v.* *To accompany*).

Associates are habitually together; *companions* are only occasionally in company.

As our habits are formed from our *associates* we ought to be particular in our choice of them: as our *companions* contribute much to our enjoyments, we ought to choose such as are suitable to ourselves.

Many men may be admitted as *companions*, who would not altogether be fit as *associates*.

We see many struggling single about the world, unhappy for want of an *associate*, and pining with the necessity of confining their sentiments to their own bosoms.—JOHNSON.

There is a degree of want by which the freedom of agency is almost destroyed, and long association with fortuitous *companions* will at last relax the strictness of truth, and state the fervor of sincerity.—JOHNSON.

An *associate* may take part with us in some business, and share with us in the labour: a *companion* takes part with us in some concern and shares with us in the pleasure or the pain.

Addison contributed more than a fourth part of the last volume of the Spectator, and the other contributors are by no means unworthy of appearing as his *associates*.—JOHNSON.

Thus while the cordage stretch'd ashore may guide
Our brave companions thro' the swelling tide:
This floating lumber shall sustain them o'er
The rocky shelves, in safety to the shore.—FALCONER.

Association, Society, Company, Partnership.

All these terms denote a union of several persons into one body.

Association (*v. To associate*) is general, the rest specific. Whenever we habitually or frequently meet together for some common object it is an *association*. *Associations* are therefore political, religious, commercial, and literary.

A **Society** is an *association* for some specific purpose, moral or religious, civil or political.

A **Company** is an *association* of many for the purpose of trade.

A **Partnership** is an *association* of a few for the same object.

Whenever *association* is used in distinction from the others, it denotes that which is partial in its object and temporary in its duration. It is founded on unity of sentiment as well as unity of object; but it is mostly unorganized, and kept together only by the spirit which gives rise to it. It is not, however the less dangerous on this account; and when politics are the subject, it commodiously breathes a spirit hostile to the established order of things; as the last thirty years have evinced to us by woful experience.

A *society* requires nothing but unity of object, which is permanent in its nature; it is well organized, and commonly set on foot to promote the cause of humanity, literature, or religion. No country can boast such numerous and excellent *societies*, whether of a charitable, a religious, or a literary description as England.

Companies are brought together for the purposes of interest, and are dissolved when that object ceases to exist: their duration depends on the contingencies of profit and loss. The South-sea company, which was founded on an idle speculation, was formed for the ruin of many, and dispersed almost as soon as it was formed. The East India company on the other hand, which is one of the grandest that ever was raised, promises as much permanency as is commonly allotted to human transactions.

Partnerships are altogether of an individual and private nature. As they are without organization and system, they are more precarious than any other *association*. Their duration depends not only on the chances of trade, but the compatibility of individuals to co-operate in a close point of union. They are often begun rashly and end ruinously.

For my own part, I could wish that all honest men would enter into an *association* for the support of one another against the endeavours of those whom they ought

to look upon as their common enemies, whatever side they may belong to.—ADDISON.

What I humbly propose to the public is, that there may be a *society* erected in London, to consist of the most skilful persons of both sexes, for the inspection of modes and fashions.—BUDGELE.

The nation is a *company* of players.—ADDISON.

Gay was the general favourite of the whole *association* of wits; but they regarded him as a play-fellow rather than a *partner*, and treated him with more fondness than respect.—JOHNSON.

Society is a *partnership* in all science; a *partnership* in every virtue and in all perfection.—BURKE.

Association, Combination.

Association, *v. Associate*.

Combination, from the Latin *combindo*, or *con* and *binus*, signifies tying two into one.

An *association* is something less binding than a *combination*; *associations* are formed for purposes of convenience; *combinations* are formed to serve either the interests or passions of men. The word *association* is therefore always taken in a good or an indifferent sense; *combination* in an indifferent or bad sense. An *association* is public; it embraces all classes of men: a *combination* is often private, and includes only a particular description of persons. *Associations* are formed for some general purpose; *combinations* are frequently formed for particular purposes, which respect the interest of the few, to the injury of many. *Associations* are formed by good citizens; *combinations* by discontented mechanics, or low persons in general.

When used for things *association* is a natural action; *combination* an arbitrary action. Things *associate* of themselves, but *combinations* are formed either by design or accident. Nothing will *associate* but what harmonises; things the most opposite in their nature are *combined* together. We *associate* persons with places, or events with names; discordant properties are *combined* in the same body. With the name of one's birth-place are *associated* pleasurable recollections: virtue and vice are so *combined* in the same character as to form a contrast. The *association* of ideas is a remarkable phenomenon of the human mind, but it can never be admitted as solving any difficulty respecting the structure and composition of the soul; the *combination* of letters forms syllables, and that of syllables forms words.

In my yesterday's paper I proposed that the honest men of all parties should enter into a kind of *association* for the defence of one another.—ADDISON.

There is no doubt but all the safety, happiness, and convenience that men enjoy in this life, is from the *combination* of particular persons into societies or corporations.—SOUTH.

The cry of the people in cities and towns, though unfortunately (from a fear of their multitude and *combination*) the most regarded, ought in fact to be the least regarded, on the subject of monopoly.—BURKE.

Meekness and courtesy will always recommend the first address, but soon pall and nauseate unless they are *associated* with more sprightly qualities.—JOHNSON.

Before the time of Dryden, those happy *combinations* of words which distinguish poetry from prose had been rarely attempted.—JOHNSON.

To Assuage, *v. To allay*.

To Assume, *v. To affect, assume*.

To Assume, *v. To appropriate*.

Assurance, Confidence.

Assurance implies either the act of making another sure (vide *To affirm*), or of being sure one's self.

Confidence implies simply the act of the mind in *confiding*, which is equivalent to a feeling.

Assurance, as an action, is to *confidence* as the means to the end. We give a person an *assurance* in order to inspire him with *confidence*.

Assurance and *confidence*, as a sentiment in ourselves, may respect either that which is external of us, or that which belongs to ourselves; in the first case they are both taken in an indifferent sense: but the feeling of *assurance* is much stronger than that of *confidence*, and applies to objects that interest the feelings; whereas *confidence* applies only to such objects as exercise the understanding: thus we have an *assurance* of a life to come: an *assurance* of a blessed immortality: we have a *confidence* in a person's integrity. As respects ourselves exclusively, *assurance* is employed to designate either an occasional feeling, or a habit of the mind; *confidence* an occasional feeling mostly: *assurance*, therefore in this sense, may be used indifferently, but in general it has a bad acceptation; but *confidence* has an indifferent or a good sense.

Assurance is a self-possession of the mind, arising from the conviction that all in ourselves is right; *confidence* is that self-possession only in particular cases, and grounded on the reliance we have in our abilities or our character.

The man of *assurance* never loses himself under any circumstances, however trying; he is calm and easy when another is abashed and confounded: the man who has *confidence* will generally have it in cases that warrant him to trust to himself.

A liar utters his falsehoods with an air of *assurance*, in order the more effectually to gain belief: conscious innocence enables a person to speak with *confidence* when interrogated.

Assurance shows itself in the behaviour, *confidence* in the conduct. Young people are apt to assert every thing with a tone of *assurance*; no man should undertake any thing without a *confidence* in himself.

I appeal to posterity, says *Æschylus*; to posterity I consecrated my works, in the *assurance* that they will meet that reward from time which the partiality of my contemporaries refuses to bestow.—CUMBERLAND.

All the arguments upon which a man, who is telling the private affairs of another, may ground his *confidence* of security, he must, upon reflection, know to be uncertain, because he finds them without effect upon himself.—JOHNSON.

I never sit silent in company when secret history is talking, but I am reproached for want of *assurance*.—JOHNSON.

The hope of fame is necessarily connected with such considerations as must abate the ardor of *confidence*, and repress the vigor of pursuit.—JOHNSON.

Modesty, the daughter of knowledge, and *Assurance* the offspring of ignorance, met accidentally upon the road; and as both had a long way to go, and had experienced from former hardships that they were alike unqualified to pursue their journey alone, they agreed, for their mutual advantage, to travel together.—MOORE.

I must observe that there is a vicious modesty which justly deserves to be ridiculed, and which those very persons often discover, who value themselves most upon a well-bred *confidence*. This happens when a man

is ashamed to act up to his reason, and would not, upon any consideration, be surprised in the practice of those duties for the performance of which he was sent into the world.—ADDISON.

Assurance, Impudence.

Assurance, *v.* *Assurance*, *confidence*.

Impudence literally implies shamelessness. They are so closely allied to each other, that *assurance* is distinguished from *impudence* more in the manner than the spirit; for *impudence* has a grossness attached to it which does not belong to *assurance*.

Vulgar people are *impudent* because they have *assurance* to break through all the forms of society; but those who are more cultivated will have their *assurance* controlled by its decencies and refinements.

The man of *assurance*, though at first it only denoted a person of a free and open carriage, is now very usually applied to a profligate wretch, who can break through all the rules of decency and morality without a blush. I shall endeavour, therefore, in this essay, to restore these words to their true meaning, to prevent the idea of modesty from being confounded with that of sheepishness, and to hinder *impudence* from passing for *assurance*.—BUDGELL.

To Assure, *v.* *To affirm*.

To Astonish, *v.* *To admire*.

Astonishment, *v.* *Wonder*.

Astrology, *v.* *Astronomy*.

Astronomy, Astrology.

Astronomy is compounded of the Greek *αστρον* and *νομος* and signifies the laws of the stars, or a knowledge of their laws.

Astrology, from *αστρον* and *λογος*, signifies a reasoning on the stars.

The * astronomer studies the course and movement of the stars; the astrologer reasons on their influence.

The former observes the state of the heavens, marks the order of time, the eclipses and the revolutions which arise out of the established laws of motion in the immense universe: the latter predicts events, draws horoscopes, and announces all the vicissitudes of rain and snow, heat and cold, &c. The astronomer calculates and seldom errs, as his calculations are built on fixed rules and actual observations; the astrologer deals in conjectures, and his imagination often deceives him. The astronomer explains what he knows, and merits the esteem of the learned; the astrologer hazards what he thinks, and seeks to please.

A thirst for knowledge leads to the study of *astronomy*: an inquietude about the future has given rise to *astrology*. Many important results for the arts of navigation, agriculture, and of civil society in general, have been drawn from astronomical researches: many serious and mischievous effects have been produced on the minds of the ignorant, from their faith in the dreams of the astrologer.

Asylum, Refuge, Shelter, Retreat.

Asylum, in Latin *asylum*, in Greek *ασυλον* compounded of *α* privative and *συλη* plunder, signifies a place exempt from plunder.

* Abbé Girard; "Astronomie astrologique."

Refuge, in Latin *refugium*, from *refugio* to fly away, signifies the place one may fly away to.

Shelter comes from *shell*, in high German *schalen*, Saxon *secala*, &c. from the Hebrew *cala* to hide, signifying a cover or hiding place.

Retreat, in French *retraite*, Latin *retractus*, from *retraho*, or *re* and *traho* to draw back, signifies the place that is situated behind or in the back ground.

Asylum, *refuge*, and *shelter*, all denote a place of safety; but the former is fixed, the two latter are occasional: the *retreat* is a place of tranquillity rather than of safety. An *asylum* is chosen by him who has no home, a *refuge* by him who is apprehensive of danger: the French emigrants found a *refuge* in England, but very few will make it an *asylum*. The inclemencies of the weather make us seek a *shelter*. The fatigues and toils of life make us seek a *retreat*.

It is the part of a Christian to afford an *asylum* to the helpless orphan and widow. The terrified passenger takes *refuge* in the first house he comes to, when assailed by an evil-disposed mob. The vessel shattered in a storm takes *shelter* in the nearest haven. The man of business, wearied by the anxieties and cares of the world, disengages himself from the whole, and seeks a *retreat* suited to his circumstances.

The adventurer knows he has not far to go before he will meet with some fortress that has been raised by sophistry for the *asylum* of error.—HAWKESWORTH.

Superstition, now retiring from Rome, may yet find *refuge* in the mountains of Tibet.—CUMBERLAND.

In rueful gaze
The cattle stand, and on the scowling heavens
Cast a deploring eye, by man forsook;
Who to the crowded cottage hies him fast,
Or seeks the *shelter* of the downward cave.

THOMSON.

For this, this only favor let me sue
If pity can to conquer'd foes be due;
Refuse it not, but let my body have
The last *retreat* of human kind, a grave.—DRYDEN.

At All Times, *v. Always*.

At Last, *v. Lastly*.

At Length, *v. Lastly*.

To Atone For, Expiate.

Atone, or at one, signifies to be at peace or good friends.

Expiate, in Latin *expiatus*, participle of *expio*, compounded of *ex* and *pio*, signifies to put out or make clear by an act of piety.

Both these terms express a satisfaction for an offence; but *atone* is general, *expiate* is particular. We may *atone* for a fault by any species of suffering; we *expiate* a crime only by suffering a legal punishment. A female often sufficiently *atones* for her violation of chastity by the misery she entails on herself; there are too many unfortunate wretches in England who *expiate* their crimes on a gallows.

Neither *atonement* nor *expiation* always necessarily require punishment or even suffering from the offender. The nature of the *atonement* depends on the will of the individual who is offended; *expiations* are frequently made by means of performing certain religious

rites or acts of piety. Offences between man and man are sometimes *atoned* for by an acknowledgment of error; but offences towards God require an *expiatory* sacrifice, which our Saviour has been pleased to make of himself, that we, through Him, might become partakers of eternal life. *Expiation*, therefore, in the religious sense, is to *atonement* as the means to the end: *atonement* is often obtained by an *expiation*, but there may be *expiations* where there is no *atonement*.

Atonement replaces in a state of favour; *expiation* produces only a real or supposed exemption from sin and its consequences. Among the Jews and heathens there was *expiation*, but no *atonement*; under the Christian dispensation there is *atonement* as well as *expiation*.

O let the blood, already spilt, *atone*
For the past crimes of curs'd Laomedon.—DRYDEN.

I would earnestly desire the story-teller to consider, that no wit or mirth at the end of a story can *atone* for the half hour that has been lost before they come at it.—STEELE.

How sacred ought kings' lives be held,
When but the death of one
Demands an empire's blood for *expiation*.—LEE.

To Attach, *v. To affix*.

To Attach, *v. To adhere*.

Attachment, Affection, Inclination.

Attachment (*v. To adhere*) respects persons and things: **Affection** (*v. Affection*) regards persons only: **Inclination** has respect to things mostly.

Attachment, as it regards persons, is not so powerful or solid as *affection*.

Children are *attached* to those who will minister to their gratifications; they have an *affection* for their nearest and dearest relatives.

Attachment is sometimes a tender sentiment between the persons of different sexes; *affection* is an affair of the heart without distinction of sex.

The passing *attachments* of young people are seldom entitled to serious notice; although sometimes they may ripen by long intercourse into a laudable and steady *affection*. Nothing is so delightful as to see *affection* among brothers and sisters.

Attachment, as it respects things, is more powerful than *inclination*; the latter is a rising sentiment, the forerunner of *attachment*, which is positive and fixed.

We strive to obtain that to which we are *attached*; but an *inclination* seldom leads to any effort for possession.

Little minds are always betraying their *attachment* to trifles. It is the character of *inclination* not to show an *inclination* to any thing.

Attachments are formed; *inclinations* arise of themselves.

Interest, similarity of character, or habit, give rise to *attachment*; a natural warmth of temper gives birth to various *inclinations*.

Suppress the first *inclination* to gaming, lest it grows into an *attachment*.

Though devoted to the study of philosophy, and a great master in the early science of the times, Solon mixed with cheerfulness in society, and did not hold back from those tender ties and *attachments* which connect a man to the world.—CUMBERLAND.

When I was sent to school, the gaiety of my look, and the liveliness of my loquacity, soon gained me admission to hearts not yet fortified against *affection* by artifice or interest.—JOHNSON.

I am glad that he whom I must have loved from duty, whatever he had been, is such a one as I can love from inclination.—STEELE.

To Attack, Assail, Assault, Encounter.

Attack, in French *attaquer*, changed from *attacher*, in Latin *attacum*, participle of *attingo*, signifies to bring into close contact.

Assail, Assault, in French *assailir*, Latin *assilio*, *assallum*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *salio*, signifies to leap upon.

Encounter, in French *rencontre*, compounded of *en* or *in* and *contre*, in Latin *contra* against, signifies to run or come against.

Attack is the generic, the rest are specific terms. To *attack* is to make an approach in order to do some violence to the person; to *assail* or *assault* is to make a sudden and vehement *attack*; to *encounter* is to meet the *attack* of another. One *attacks* by simply offering violence without necessarily producing an effect; one *assails* by means of missile weapons; one *assaults* by direct personal violence; one *encounters* by opposing violence to violence.

Men and animals *attack* or *encounter*; men only, in the literal sense, *assail* or *assault*. Animals *attack* each other with the weapons nature has bestowed upon them: those who provoke a multitude may expect to have their houses or windows *assailed* with stones, and their persons *assaulted*: it is ridiculous to attempt to *encounter* those who are superior in strength and prowess.

They are all used figuratively. Men *attack* with reproaches or censures; they *assail* with abuse; they are *assaulted* by temptations; they *encounter* opposition and difficulties. A fever *attacks*; horrid shrieks *assail* the ear; dangers are *encountered*. The reputations of men in public life are often wantonly *attacked*: they are *assailed* in every direction by the murmurs and complaints of the discontented; they often *encounter* the obstacles which party spirit throws in the way, without reaping any solid advantage to themselves.

The women might possibly have carried this Gothic building higher, had not a famous monk, Thomas Conecte by name, *attacked* it with great zeal and resolution.—ADDISON.

Not truly penitent, but chief to try
Her husband, how far urg'd his patience bears,
His virtue or weakness which way to *assail*.—MILTON.

It is sufficient that you are able to *encounter* the temptations which now *assail* you: when God sends trials he may send strength.—TAYLOR.

Attack, Assault, Encounter, Onset, Charge.

Attack, Assault, Encounter (*v. To attack*), denote the act of *attacking*, *assaulting*, *encountering*.

Onset signifies a setting on or to, a commencing.

Charge (*v. To accuse*) signifies pressing upon.

An *attack* and *assault* may be made upon an

unresisting object: *encounter*, *onset*, and *charge* require at least two opposing parties. An *attack* may be slight or indirect; an *assault* must always be direct and mostly vigorous. An *attack* upon a town need not be attended with any injury to the walls or inhabitants; but an *assault* is commonly conducted so as to affect its capture. *Attacks* are made by robbers upon the person or property of another; *assaults* upon the person only.

An *encounter* generally respects an informal casual meeting between single individuals: *onset* and *charge* a regular *attack* between contending armies; *onset* is employed for the commencement of the battle; *charge* for an *attack* from a particular quarter. When knight-errantry was in vogue, *encounters* were perpetually taking place between the knights and their antagonists, who often existed only in the imagination of the combatants: *encounters* were, however, sometimes fierce and bloody, when neither party would yield to the other while he had the power of resistance. The French are said to make impetuous *onsets*, but not to withstand a continued *attack* with the same perseverance and steadiness as the English. A furious and well-directed *charge* from the cavalry will sometimes decide the fortune of the day.

There is one species of diversion which has not been generally condemned, though it is produced by an *attack* upon those who have not voluntarily entered the lists; who find themselves buffeted in the dark, and have neither means of defence, nor possibility of advantage.—HAWKSWORTH.

We do not find the meekness of a lamb in a creature so armed for battle and *assault* as the lion.—ADDISON.

And such a frown
Each cast at-th' other, as when two black clouds,
With heav'n's artillery fraught, come rattling on
Hovering a space, till winds the signal blow,
To join their dark *encounter* in mid air.—MILTON.

Onsets in love seem best like those in war,
Fierce, resolute, and done with all the force.—TATE.
O my Antonio! I am all on fire;
My soul is up in arms, ready to *charge*.
And bear amidst the foe with conqu'ring troops.
CONGREVE.

To *Attack*, *v. To impugn*.

To *Attain*, *v. To acquire*, *attain*.

Attempt, Trial, Endeavour, Essay, Effort.

Attempt, in French *attenter*, Latin *attento*, from *at* or *ad* and *tento*, signifies to try at a thing.

Trial, from *try*, in French *tenter*, Hebrew *tur* to stretch, signifies to stretch the power.

Endeavour, compounded of *en* and the French *devoir* to owe, signifies to try according to one's duty.

Essay, in French *essayer*, comes probably from the German *ersuchen*, compounded of *er* and *suchen* to seek, written in old German *suahhen*, and is doubtless connected with *sehen* to see or look after, signifying to aspire after, to look up to.

Effort, in French *effort*, from the Latin *effert*, present tense of *effero*, compounded of *e* or *ex* and *fero*, signifies a bringing out or calling forth the strength.

To *attempt* is to set about a thing with a view of affecting it; to *try* is to set about a

thing with a view of seeing the result. An *attempt* respects the action with its object; a *trial* is the exercise of power. We always act when we *attempt*; we use the senses and the understanding when we *try*. We *attempt* by *trying*, but we may *try* without *attempting*: when a thief *attempts* to break into a house he first *tries* the locks and fastenings to see where he can most easily gain admittance.

Men *attempt* to remove evils; they *try* experiments. *Attempts* are perpetually made by quacks, whether in medicine, politics, or religion, to recommend some scheme of their own to the notice of the public; which are often nothing more than *trials* of skill to see who can most effectually impose on the credulity of mankind. Spirited people make *attempts*; persevering people make *trials*; players *attempt* to perform different parts; and *try* to gain applause.

An *endeavour* is a continued *attempt*. *Attempts* may be fruitless; *trials* may be vain; *endeavours*, though unavailing, may be well meant. Many *attempts* are made which exceed the abilities of the *attempter*; *trials* are made in matters of speculation, the results of which are uncertain; *endeavours* are made in the moral concerns of life. People *attempt* to write books; they *try* various methods; and *endeavour* to obtain a livelihood.

Essay is used altogether in a figurative sense for an *attempt* or *endeavour*; it is an intellectual exertion. A modest writer apologizes for his feeble *essay* to contribute to the general stock of knowledge and cultivation: hence short treatises which serve as *attempts* to illustrate any point in morals are termed *essays*, among which are the finest productions in our language from the pen of Addison, Steele, and their successors. An *effort* is to an *attempt* as a means to an end; it is the very act of calling forth those powers which are employed in an *attempt*. In *attempting* to make an escape, a person is sometimes obliged to make desperate efforts.

Attempts at imitation expose the imitator to ridicule when not executed with peculiar exactness. *Trials* of strength are often foolhardy; in some cases attended with mischievous consequences to the *trier*. Honest *endeavours* to please are to be distinguished from idle *attempts* to catch applause. The first *essays* of youth ought to meet with indulgence, in order to afford encouragement to rising talents. Great *attempts*, which require extraordinary efforts either of body or mind, always meet with an adequate share of public applause.

A natural and unconstrained behaviour has something in it so agreeable that it is no wonder to see people *endeavouring* after it. But at the same time it is so very hard to hit, when it is not born with us, that people often make themselves ridiculous in *attempting* it.—ADDISON.

To bring it to the *trial*, will you dare
Our pipes, our skill, our voices to compare?

DRYDEN.

Whether or no (said Socrates on the day of his execution) God will approve of my actions I know not; but this I am sure of, that I have at all times made it my *endeavour* to please him.—ADDISON.

I afterwards made several *essays* towards speaking.—ADDISON.

The man of sagacity bestirs himself to distress his enemy by methods probable and reducible to reason; so the same reason will fortify his enemy to elude these his

regular efforts; but your fool projects with such notable inconsistency, that no course of thought can evade his machinations.—STEELE.

Attempt, Undertaking, Enterprise.

Attempt (v. To attempt) signifies the thing attempted.

Undertaking, from *undertake*, or take in hand, signifies the thing taken in hand.

Enterprise, from the French *entrepris*, participle of *entreprendre* to undertake, has the same original sense.

The idea of something set about to be completed is common to all these terms. An *attempt* is less complicated than an *undertaking*; and that less arduous than an *enterprise*. *Attempts* are the common exertions of power for obtaining an object: an *undertaking* involves in it many parts and particulars which require thought and judgment; an *enterprise* has more that is hazardous and dangerous in it; it requires resolution. *Attempts* are frequently made on the lives and property of individuals; *undertakings* are formed for private purposes; *enterprises* are commenced for some great national object.

Nothing can be effected without making the *attempt*; *attempts* are therefore often idle and unsuccessful, when they are made by persons of little discretion, who are eager to do something without knowing how to direct their powers: *undertakings* are of a more serious nature, and involve a man's serious interests; if begun without adequate means of bringing them to a conclusion, they too frequently bring ruin by their failure on those who are concerned in them: *enterprises* require personal sacrifices rather than those of interest; he who does not combine great resolution and perseverance with considerable bodily powers will be ill-fitted to take part in grand *enterprises*.

The present age has been fruitful in *attempts* to bring premature genius into notice: literary *undertakings* have of late degenerated too much into mere commercial speculations: a state of war gives birth to naval and military *enterprises*: a state of peace is most favourable to those of a scientific nature.

Why wilt thou rush to certain death and rage,
In rash attempts beyond thy tender age?—DRYDEN.

When I hear a man complain of his being unfortunate in all his *undertakings*, I shrewdly suspect him for a very weak man in his affairs.—ADDISON.

There would be few *enterprises* of great labour or hazard *undertaken*, if we had not the power of magnifying the advantages which we persuade ourselves to expect from them.—JOHNSON.

To Attend, v. To accompany.

To Attend To, Mind, Regard, Heed, Notice.

Attend, in French *attendre*, Latin *attendo*, compounded of *at* or *ad* and *tendo* to stretch, signifies to stretch or bend the mind to a thing.

Mind, from the noun *mind*, signifies to have in the mind.

Regard, in French *regarder*, compounded of *re* and *garder*, comes from the German *wahren* to see or look at, signifying to look upon again or with attention.

Heed, in German *hüthen*, in all probability comes from *vito*, and the Latin *video* to see or pay attention to.

Notice, from the Latin *notitia* knowledge, signifies to get the knowledge of or have in one's mind.

The idea of fixing the mind on an object is common to all these terms. As this is the characteristic of *attention*, *attend* is the generic; the rest are specific terms. We *attend* in *mind-ing*, *regarding*, *heeding*, and *noticing*, and also in many cases in which these words are not employed. To *mind* is to *attend* to a thing, so that it may not be forgotten. To *regard* is to look on a thing as of importance; to *heed* is to *attend* to a thing from a principle of caution; to *notice* is to think on that which strikes the senses.

We *attend* to a speaker when we hear and understand his words. We *mind* what is said when we bear it in mind; we *regard* what is said by dwelling and reflecting on it; *heed* is given to whatever awakens a sense of danger; *notice* is taken of what passes outwardly. Children should always *attend* when spoken to, and *mind* what is said to them; they should *regard* the counsels of their parents, so as to make them the rule of their conduct, and *heed* their warnings so as to avoid the evil; they should *notice* what passes before them so as to apply it to some useful purpose. It is a part of politeness to *attend* to every minute circumstance which affects the comfort and convenience of those with whom we associate: men who are actuated by any passion seldom pay any *regard* to the dictates of conscience; nor *heed* the unfavourable impressions which their conduct makes on others; for in fact they seldom think what is said of them to be worth their *notice*.

Conversation will naturally furnish us with hints which we did not *attend* to, and make us enjoy other men's parts and reflexions as well as our own.—ADDISON.

Cease to request me, let us *mind* our way.
Another song requires another day.—DRYDEN.

The voice of reason is more to be *regarded* than the bent of any present inclination.—ADDISON.

Ah! why was ruin so attractive made,
Or, why fond man so easily betray'd?
Why *heed* we not, while mad we haste along,
The gentle voice of peace or pleasure's song?

COLLINS.

I believe that the knowledge of Dryden was gleaned from accidental intelligence and various conversation, by vigilance that permitted nothing to pass without notice.—JOHNSON.

To Attend, Wait On.

Attend (*v. To attend to*) is here employed in the improper sense for the devotion of the person to an object. To **Wait** on is the same as to wait for or expect the wishes of another.

Attendance is an act of obligation; *waiting on*, that of choice. A physician *attends* his patient; a member *attends* in parliament: one gentleman *waits on* another. We *attend* a person at the time and place appointed; we *wait on* those with whom we wish to speak. Those who dance *attendance* on the great must expect every mortification; it is wiser therefore only to *wait on* those by whom we can be received upon terms of equality.

Attend and *wait on* are likewise used for being about the person of anyone: to *attend* is

to bear company or be in readiness to serve; to *wait on* is actually to perform some service. A nurse *attends* a patient in order to afford him assistance as occasion requires; the servant *waits on* him to perform the menial duties. *Attendants* about the great are always near the person; but men and women in *waiting* are always at call. People of rank and fashion have a crowd of *attendants*; those of the middle classes have only those who *wait on* them.

At length her lord descends upon the plain.

In pomp, *attended* with a numerous train.—DRYDEN.

One of Pope's constant demands was of coffee in the night; and to the woman that *waited* on him in his chamber he was very burdensome; but he was careful to recompense her want of sleep.—JOHNSON.

To Attend, Hearken, Listen.

Attend, *v. To attend to*.

Hearken, in German *horchen*, is an intensive of *hören* to hear.

Listen probably comes from the German *lusten* to lust after, because *listening* springs from an eager desire to hear.

Attend is a mental action; *hearken* both corporeal and mental; *listen* simply corporeal. To *attend* is to have the mind engaged on what we hear; to *hearken* and *listen* are to strive to hear. People *attend* when they are addressed; they *hearken* to what is said by others; they *listen* to what passes between others.

It is always proper to *attend*, and mostly of importance to *hearken*, but frequently improper to *listen*. The mind that is occupied with another object cannot *attend*: we are not disposed to *hearken* when the thing does not appear interesting: curiosity often impels to *listening* to what does not concern the listener.

Listen is sometimes used figuratively for *hearing*, so as to *attend*: it is necessary at all times to *listen* to the dictates of reason. It is of great importance for a learner to *attend* to the rules that are laid down: it is essential for young people in general to *hearken* to the counsels of their elders; and to *listen* to the admonitions of conscience.

Hush'd winds the topmast branches scarcely bend,
As if thy tuneless song they did *attend*.—DRYDEN.

What a deluge of lust, and fraud and violence would in a little time overflow the whole nation, if these wise advocates for morality (the freethinkers) were universally *hearkened to*.—BERKELEY.

While Chaos hush'd stands *listening* to the noise,
And wonders at confusion not his own.—DENNIS.

Attention, Application, Study.

These terms indicate a direction of the thoughts to an object, but differing in the degree of steadiness and force.

Attention (*v. To attend to*) marks the simple bending of the mind.

Application (*v. To address*) marks an envelopment or engagement of the powers; a bringing them into a state of close contact.

Study, from the Latin *studeo* to desire eagerly, marks a degree of application that arises from a strong desire of attaining the object.

Attention is the first requisite for making a progress in the acquirement of knowledge; it

may be given in various degrees, and it rewards according to the proportion in which it is given; a divided *attention* is however more hurtful than otherwise; it retards the progress of the learner while it injures his mind by improper exercise. *Application* is requisite for the attainment of perfection in any pursuit; it cannot be partial or variable, like *attention*; it must be the constant exercise of power or the regular and uniform use of means for the attainment of an end: youth is the period for *application*, when the powers of body and mind are in full vigour; no degree of it in after life will supply its deficiency in younger years. *Study* is that species of *application* which is most purely intellectual in its nature; it is the exercise of the mind for itself and in itself, its native effort to arrive at maturity; it embraces both *attention* and *application*. The student *attends* to all he hears and sees; *applies* what he has learnt to the acquirement of what he wishes to learn, and digests the whole by the exercise of reflexion: as nothing is thoroughly understood or properly reduced to practice without *study*, the professional man must choose this road in order to reach the summit of excellence.

Those whom sorrow incapacitates to enjoy the pleasures of contemplation, may properly *apply* to such diversions, provided they are innocent, as lay strong hold on the *attention*.—JOHNSON.

I could heartily wish there was the same *application* and endeavours to cultivate and improve our church music as have been lately bestowed upon that of the stage.—ADDISON.

Other things may be seized with might, or purchased with money, but knowledge is to be gained only with *study*.—JOHNSON.

Attention, v. Heed.

Attentive, Careful.

Attentive, marks a readiness to attend (*v. To attend to*).

Careful signifies full of care (*v. Care, solicitude*).

These epithets denote a fixedness of mind: we are *attentive* in order to understand and improve: we are *careful* to avoid mistakes. An *attentive* scholar profits by what is told him in learning his task: a *careful* scholar performs his exercises correctly.

Attention respects matters of judgment; *care* relates to mechanical action: we listen *attentively*: we read or write *carefully*. A servant must be *attentive* to the orders that are given him, and *careful* not to injure his master's property. A translator must be *attentive*; a transcriber *careful*. A tradesman ought to be *attentive* to the wishes of his customers, and *careful* in keeping his accounts.

The use of the passions is to stir up the soul, to awaken the understanding, and to make the whole man more vigorous and *attentive* in the prosecution of his designs.—ADDISON.

We should be as *careful* of our words as our actions, and as far from speaking as doing ill.—STEELE.

Attire, v. Apparel.

Attitude, v. Action, gesture,

To Attract, Allure, Invite, Engage.

Attract, in Latin *attractum*, participle of *attraho*, compounded of *at* or *ad* and *traho*, signifies to draw towards.

Allure, *v. To allure*.

Invite, in French *inviter*, Latin *invito*, compounded of *in* privative and *vito* to avoid, signifies the contrary of avoiding, that is, to seek or ask.

Engage, compounded of *en* or *in* and the French *gager* a pledge, signifies to bind as by a pledge.

That is *attractive* which draws the thoughts towards itself; that is *alluring* which awakens desire; that is *inviting* which offers persuasion; that is *engaging* which takes possession of the mind. The *attention* is *attracted*; the senses are *allured*; the understanding is *invited*; the whole mind is *engaged*. A particular sound *attracts* the ear; the prospect of gratification *allures*: we are *invited* by the advantages which offer; we are *engaged* by those which already accrue.

The person of a female is *attractive*; female beauty involuntarily draws all eyes towards itself: it awakens admiration: the pleasures of society are *alluring*; they create in the receiver an eager desire for still farther enjoyment; but when too eagerly pursued they vanish in the pursuit, and leave the mind a prey to listless uneasiness: fine weather is *inviting*; it seems to persuade the reluctant to partake of its refreshments: the manners of a person are *engaging*; they not only occupy the attention, but they lay hold of the affections.

At this time of universal migration, when almost every one considerable enough to *attract* regard has retired into the country, I have often been tempted to inquire what happiness is to be gained by this stated secession.—JOHNSON.

Seneca has attempted not only to pacify us in misfortune, but almost to *allure* us to it by representing it as necessary to the pleasures of the mind. He *invites* his pupil to calamity as the Syrens *allured* the passengers to their coasts, by promising that he shall return with increase of knowledge.—JOHNSON.

The present, whatever it be, seldom *engages* our attention so much as what is to come.—BLAIR.

Attractions, Allurements. Charms.

Attraction (*v. To attract*) signifies the thing that attracts.

Allurement (*v. To allure*) signifies the thing that *allures*.

Charm, from the Latin *carmen* a verse, signifies whatever acts by an irresistible influence, like poetry.

* Besides the synonymous idea which distinguishes these words, they are remarkable for the common property of being used only in the plural when denoting the thing that *attracts*, *allures*, and *charms*, as applied to female endowments, or the influence of person on the heart: it seems that in *attractions* there is something natural; in *allurements* something artificial; in *charms* something moral and intellectual.

Attractions lead or draw; *allurements* win or entice; *charms* seduce or captivate. The

* Vide Abbé Girard and Roubaud; "Attrait. amas. charmes."

human heart is always exposed to the power of female *attractions* : it is guarded with difficulty against the *allurements* of a coquette ; it is incapable of resisting the united *charms* of body and mind.

Females are indebted for their *attractions* and *charms* to a happy conformation of features and figure ; but they sometimes borrow their *allurements* from their toilet. *Attractions* consist of those ordinary graces which nature bestows on women with more or less liberality ; they are the common property of the sex : *allurements*, of those cultivated graces formed by the aid of a faithful looking-glass and the skilful hand of one anxious to please : *charms*, of those singular graces of nature which are granted as a rare and precious gift ; they are the peculiar property of the individual possessor.

Defects unexpectedly discovered tend to the diminution of *attractions* : *allurements* vanish when their artifice is discovered ; *charms* lose their effect when time or habit have rendered them too familiar, so transitory is the influence of mere person. *Attractions* assail the heart and awaken the tender passion ; *allurements* serve to complete the conquest, which will however be but of short duration if there be not more solid though less brilliant *charms* to substitute affection in the place of passion.

When applied, as these terms may be, to other objects beside the personal endowments of the female sex, *attractions* and *charms* express whatever is very amiable in themselves ; *allurements* on the contrary whatever is hateful and congenial to the baser propensities of human nature. A courtesan who was never possessed of *charms*, and has lost all personal *attractions*, may by the *allurements* of dress and manners, aided by a thousand meretricious arts, still retain the wretched power of doing incalculable mischief.

An *attraction* springs from something remarkable and striking ; it lies in the exterior aspect, and awakens an interest towards itself : a *charm* acts by a secret, all-powerful, and irresistible impulse on the soul ; it springs from an accordance of the object with the affections of the heart ; it takes hold of the imagination, and awakens an enthusiasm peculiar to itself : an *allurement* acts on the senses ; it flatters the passions ; it enslaves the imagination. A musical society has *attractions* for one who is musically inclined ; for music has *charms* to soothe the troubled soul : fashionable society has too many *allurements* for youth, which are not easily withstood.

The music, the eloquence of the preacher, or the crowds of hearers, are *attractions* for the occasional attendants at a place of worship : the society of cultivated persons, whose character and manners have been tempered by the benign influence of Christianity, possess peculiar *charms* for those who have a congeniality of disposition ; the present lax and undisciplined age is however but ill-fitted for the formation of such society, or the susceptibility of such charms ; people are now more prone to yield to the *allurements* of pleasure and licentious gratification in their social intercourse. A military life has powerful *attractions* for adventurous minds ; glory has irresistible *charms* for the ambitious ; the al-

lurements of wealth predominate in the minds of the great bulk of mankind.

This cestus was a fine party-coloured girdle, which, as Homer tells us, had all the *attractions* of the sex wrought into it.—ADDISON.

How justly do I fall a sacrifice to sloth and luxury in the place where I first yielded to those *allurements* which seduced me to deviate from temperance and innocence.—JOHNSON.

Juno made a visit to Venus, the deity who presides over love, and begged of her as a particular favour that she would lend for a while those *charms* with which she subdued the hearts of gods and men.—ADDISON.

To Attribute, v. To ascribe.

Attribute, v. Quality.

Avail, Use, Service.

Avail, compounded of a or *ad*, and the French *valoir*, Latin *valere*, to be strong, that is, to be strong for a purpose.

Use, in Latin *usus*, participle of *utor* to use, signifies the capacity to be used.

Service, in French *service*, Latin *servitium*, from *servio*, signifies the property or act of serving.

These terms are, properly speaking, epithets applied to things to characterise their fitness for being employed to advantage. Words are of no *avail* when they do not influence the person addressed ; endeavours are of no *use* which do not effect the thing proposed ; people are of no *service* who do not contribute their portion of assistance. When entreaties are found to be of no *avail*, females sometimes try the force of tears : prudence forbids us to destroy anything that can be turned to a *use* : economy enjoins that we should not throw aside a thing so long as it is fit for *service*.

The intercession of a friend may be *available* to avert the resentment of one who is offended : *useful* lessons of experience may be drawn from all the events of life : whatever is of the best quality will be found most *serviceable*.

What does it *avail*, though Seneca had taught as good morality as Christ himself from the mount.—CUMBERLAND.

A man with great talents, but void of discretion, is like Polyphemus in the fable, strong and blind, endued with an irresistible force, which for want of sight is of no use to him.—ADDISON.

The Greeks in the heroic age seem to have been unacquainted with the use of iron, the most *serviceable* of all the metals.—ROBERTSON.

To Avail, v. To signify.

Avaricious, Miserly, Parsimonious, Niggardly.

Avaricious, from the Latin *avere* to desire, signifies in general longing for, but by distinction longing for money.

Miserly signifies like a *miser* or *miserable man*, for none are so miserable as the lovers of money.

Parsimonious, from the Latin *parco* to spare or save, signifies literally saving.

Niggardly is a frequentative of *nigh* or *close*, signifies very nigh.

The *avaricious* man and the *miser* are one and the same character, with this exception, that the *miser* carries his passion for money to a still greater excess. An *avaricious* man shows

his love of money in his ordinary dealings; but the *miser* lives upon it, and suffers every deprivation rather than part with it. An *avaricious* man may sometimes be indulgent to himself, and generous to others; the *miser* is dead to everything but the treasure which he has amassed.

Parasimonious and *niggardly* are the subordinate characteristics of *avarice*. The *avaricious* man indulges his passion for money by *parsimony*, that is, by saving out of himself, or by *niggardly* ways in his dealings with others. He who spends a farthing on himself, where others with the same means spend a shilling, does it from *parsimony*; he who looks to every farthing in the bargains he makes, gets the name of a *niggard*. *Avarice* sometimes clokes itself under the name of prudence: it is, as Goldsmith says, often the only virtue which is left a man at the age of seventy-two. The *miser* is his own greatest enemy, and no man's friend; his ill-gotten wealth is generally a curse to him by whom it is inherited. A man is sometimes rendered *parasimonious* by circumstances; he who first saves from necessity but too often ends with saving from inclination. The *niggard* is an object of contempt, and sometimes hatred; every one fears to lose by a man who strives to gain from all.

Though the apprehensions of the aged may justify a cautious frugality, they can by no means excuse a sordid avarice.—BLAIR.

As some lone *miser* visiting his store,
Bends at his treasure, counts, recounts it o'er;
Hoards after hoards his rising raptures fill,
Yet still he sighs, for hoards are wanting still;
Thus to my breast alternate passions rise,
Pleas'd with each bliss that Heav'n to man supplies.
Yet oft a sigh prevails and sorrows fall,
To see the hoard of human bliss so small.

GOLDSMITH.

Armstrong died in September, 1779, and to the surprise of his friends left a considerable sum of money, saved by great *parsimony* out of a very moderate income.—JOHNSON.

I have heard Dodsley, by whom Akenside's "*Pleasures of the Imagination*" was published, relate, that when the copy was offered him, he carried the work to Pope, who, having looked into it, advised him not to make a *niggardly* offer, for this was no every day writer.—JOHNSON.

Avaricious, v. Covetous.

Audacity, Effrontery, Hardihood or Hardiness, Boldness.

Audacity, from *audacious*, in French *audacieux*, Latin *audax*, from *audere* to dare, signifies literally the quality of daring.

Effrontery, compounded of *ef*, *en*, or *in*, and *frons*, a face, signifies the standing face to face.

Hardihood or *Hardiness*, from *hardy* or *hard*, signifies a capacity to endure or stand the brunt of difficulties, opposition, or shame.

Boldness, from *bold*, in Saxon *bald*, is in all probability changed from *bald*, that is, uncovered, open-fronted, without disguise, which are the characteristics of *boldness*.

The idea of disregarding what others regard is common to all these terms. *Audacity* expresses more than *effrontery*: the first has something of vehemence or defiance in it; the latter that of cool unconcern; *hardihood* expresses less than *boldness*; the first has more of *extermination*, and the second more

of spirit and enterprise. *Audacity* and *effrontery* are always taken in a bad sense; *hardihood* in an indifferent, if not a bad sense; *boldness* in a good, bad, or indifferent sense.

* *Audacity* marks haughtiness and temerity; *effrontery* the want of all modesty, a total shamelessness; *hardihood* indicates a firm resolution to meet consequences; *boldness* a spirit and courage to commence action. An *audacious* man speaks with a lofty tone, without respect and without reflection; his haughty demeanour makes him forget what is due to his superiors. *Effrontery* discovers itself by an insolent air; a total unconcern for the opinions of those present, and a disregard of all the forms of civil society. A *hardy* man speaks with a resolute tone, which seems to brave the utmost evil that can result from what he says. A *bold* man speaks without reserve, undaunted by the quality, rank, or haughtiness of those whom he addresses.

It requires *audacity* to assert false claims, or vindicate a lawless conduct in the presence of accusers and judges; it requires *effrontery* to ask a favour of the man whom one has basely injured, or to assume a placid unconcerned air in the presence of those by whom one has been convicted of flagrant atrocities; it requires *hardihood* to assert as a positive fact what is dubious or suspected to be false; it requires *boldness* to maintain the truth in spite of every danger with which one is threatened.

Audacity makes a man to be hated; but it is not always such a base metal in the estimation of the world as it ought to be; it frequently passes current for *boldness* when it is practised with success. *Effrontery* makes a man despised; it is of too mean and vulgar a stamp to meet with general sanction: it is odious to all but those by whom it is practised, as it seems to run counter to every principle and feeling of common honesty. *Hardihood* is a die on which a man stakes his character for veracity; it serves the purpose of disputants, and frequently brings a man through difficulties which, with more deliberation and caution, might have proved his ruin. *Boldness* makes a man universally respected though not always beloved: a *bold* man is a particular favourite with the fair sex, with whom timidity passes for folly, and *boldness* of course for great talent.

Audacity is the characteristic of rebels; *effrontery* that of villains; *hardihood* is serviceable to gentlemen of the bar; *boldness* is indispensable in every great undertaking.

As knowledge without justice ought to be called cunning rather than wisdom, so a mind prepared to meet danger, if excited by its own eagerness and not the public good, deserves the name of *audacity* rather than of fortitude.—STEELE.

I could never forbear to wish that while vice is every day multiplying seducements, and stalking forth with more hardened *effrontery*, virtue would not withdraw the influence of her presence.—JOHNSON.

I do not find any one so *hardy* at present as to deny that there are very great advantages in the enjoyment of a plentiful fortune.—BUDGELL.

A *bold* tongue and a feeble arm are the qualifications of Drauces in Virgil.—ADDISON.

Bold in the council board,
But cautious in the field, he shunn'd the sword.
DRYDEN.

• Vide Girard; "Hardiesse, audace, effronterie."

To Avenge, Revenge, Vindicate.

Avenge, Revenge, and Vindicate, all spring from the same source, namely, the Latin *vindico*, the Greek *ἐνδικα*, compounded of *ἐν* in and *δικη* justice, signifying to pronounce justice or put justice in force.

The idea common to these terms is that of taking up some one's cause.

To *avenge* is to punish in behalf of another; to *revenge* is to punish for one's self; to *vindicate* is to defend another.

The wrongs of a person are *avenged* or *revenge*d; his rights are *vindicated*.

The act of *avenging*, though attended with the infliction of pain, is oftentimes an act of humanity, and always an act of justice; none are the sufferers but such as merit it for their oppression; whilst those are benefited who are dependant for support: this is the act of God himself, who always *avenges* the oppressed who look up to him for support; and it ought to be the act of all his creatures, who are invested with the power of punishing offenders and protecting the helpless. *Revenge* is the basest of all actions, and the spirit of *revenge* the most diametrically opposed to the Christian principles of forgiving injuries, and returning good for evil; it is gratified only with inflicting pain without any prospect of advantage. *Vindication* is an act of generosity and humanity; it is the production of good without the infliction of pain: the claims of the widow and orphan call for *vindication* from those who have the time, talent, or ability, to take their cause into their own hands: England can boast of many noble *vindicators* of the rights of humanity, not excepting those which concern the brute creation.

The day shall come, that great avenging day,
When Troy's proud glories in the dust shall lay.

POPE.

By a continued series of loose, though apparently trivial gratifications, the heart is often as thoroughly corrupted, as by the commission of any one of those enormous crimes which spring from great ambition, or great *revenge*.—BLAIR.

Injured or oppress'd by the world, the good man looks up to a judge who will *vindicate* his cause.—BLAIR.

To Avenge, *v.* To asseverate.

Averse, *v.* Adverse.

Averse, Unwilling, Backward,
Loath, Reluctant.

Averse, in Latin *aversus*, participle of *averto*, compounded of *verto* to turn, and *a* from, signifies the state of having the mind turned from a thing.

Unwilling literally signifies not willing.

Backward signifies having the will in a backward direction.

Loath, from to *loath*, denotes the quality of loathing.

Reluctant, from the Latin *re* and *lucto* to struggle, signifies struggling with the will against a thing.

Averse is positive, it marks an actual sentiment of dislike; *unwilling* is negative, it marks the absence of the will; *backward* is a sentiment betwixt the two, it marks a leaning of the will against a thing; *loath* and re-

luctant mark strong feelings of *aversion*. *Aversion* is an habitual sentiment; *unwillingness* and *backwardness* are mostly occasional; *loath* and *reluctant* always occasional.

Aversion must be conquered; *unwillingness* must be removed; *backwardness* must be counteracted, or urged forward; *loathing* and *reluctance* must be overpowered. One who is *averse* to study will never have recourse to books; but a child may be *unwilling* or *backward* to attend to his lessons from partial motives, which the authority of the parent or master may correct; he who is *loath* to receive instruction will always remain ignorant; he who is *reluctant* in doing his duty will always do it as a task.

A miser is *averse* to nothing so much as to parting with his money: he is even *unwilling* to provide himself with necessities, but he is not *backward* in disposing of his money when he has the prospect of getting more; friends are *loath* to part who have had many years' enjoyment in each other's society; we are *reluctant* in giving unpleasant advice. Lazy people are *averse* to labour: those who are not paid are *unwilling* to work; and those who are paid less than others are *backward* in giving their services: every one is *loath* to give up a favourite pursuit, and when compelled to it by circumstances they do it with *reluctance*.

Of all the race of animals, alone,
The bees have common cities of their own;
But (what's more strange) their modest appetites,
Averse from Venus, fly the nuptial rites.—DRYDEN.

I part with thee,
Part with their lives, *unwilling*, *loath*, and fearful,
And trembling at futurity.—ROWE.

All men, even the most depraved, are subject more or less to compunctions of conscience; but *backward* at the same time to resign the gains of dishonesty, or the pleasures of vice.—BLAIR.

E'en thus two friends condemn'd
Embrace, and kiss, and take ten thousand leaves,
Loather a hundred times to part than die.

SHAKESPEARE.

From better habitations spurru'd,
Reluctant dost thou rove,
Or grieve for friendship unreturn'd,
Or unregarded love?—GOLDSMITH.

Aversion, Antipathy, Dislike,
Hatred, Repugnance.

Aversion denotes the quality of being *averse* (*v.* *Averse*).

Antipathy, in French *antipathie*, Latin *antipathia*, Greek *αντιπαθεια*, compounded of *αντ*: against, and *παθεια* feeling, signifies a feeling against.

Dislike, compounded of the privative *dis* and *like*, signifies not to like or be attached to.

Hatred, in German *hass*, is supposed by Adelung to be connected with *heiss* hot, signifying heat of temper.

Repugnance, in French *repugnance*, Latin *repugnantia* and *repugno*, compounded of *re* and *pugno*, signifies the resistance of the feelings to an object.

Aversion is in its most general sense the generic term to these and many other similar expressions, in which case it is opposed to attachment: the former denoting an alienation of the mind from an object; the latter a

knitting or binding of the mind to objects: it has, however, more commonly a partial acceptance, in which it is justly comparable with the above words. *Aversion* and *antipathy* apply more properly to things; *dislike* and *hatred* to persons; *repugnance* to actions, that is, such actions as one is called upon to perform.

Aversion and *antipathy* seem to be less dependent on the will, and to have their origin in the temperament or natural taste, particularly the latter, which springs from causes that are not always visible; it lies in the physical organization. *Antipathy* is in fact a natural *aversion* opposed to sympathy: *dislike* and *hatred* are on the contrary voluntary, and seem to have their root in the angry passions of the heart; the former is less deep-rooted than the latter, and is commonly awakened by slighter causes. *Repugnance* is not an habitual and lasting sentiment, like the rest; it is a transitory but strong *dislike* to what one is obliged to do.

A unfitness in the temper to harmonize with an object produces *aversion*: a contrariety in the nature of particular persons and things occasions *antipathies*, although some pretend that there are no such mysterious incongruities in nature, and that all *antipathies* are but *aversions* early engendered by the influence of fear and the workings of imagination; but under this supposition we are still at a loss to account for those singular effects of fear and imagination in some persons which do not discover themselves in others: a difference in the character, habits, and manners, produces *dislike*: injuries, quarrels, or more commonly the influence of malignant passions, occasion *hatred*: a contrariety to one's moral sense, or one's humours, awakens *repugnance*.

People of a quiet temper have an *aversion* to disputing or argumentation; those of a gloomy temper have an *aversion* to society; *antipathies* mostly discover themselves in early life, and as soon as the object comes within the view of the person affected: men of different sentiments in religion or politics, if not of amiable temper, are apt to contract *dislikes* to each other by frequent irritation in discourse: when men of malignant tempers come in collision, nothing but a deadly *hatred* can ensue from their repeated and complicated aggressions towards each other: any one who is under the influence of a misplaced pride is apt to feel a *repugnance* to acknowledge himself in an error.

Aversions produce an anxious desire for the removal of the object *disliked*: *antipathies* produce the most violent physical revulsion of the frame, and vehement recoiling from the object; persons have not unfrequently been known to faint away at the sight of insects for whom this *antipathy* has been conceived: *dislikes* too often betray themselves by distant and uncourteous behaviour: *hatred* assumes every form which is black and horrid: *repugnance* does not make its appearance until called forth by the necessity of the occasion.

Aversions will never be so strong in a well regulated mind, that they cannot be overcome when their cause is removed, or they are found to be ill-grounded; sometimes they lie in a vicious temperament formed by nature or

habit, in which case they will not easily be destroyed; a slothful man will find a difficulty in overcoming his *aversion* to labour, or an idle man his *aversion* to steady application. *Antipathies* may be indulged or resisted: people of irritable temperaments, particularly females, are liable to them in the most violent degree; but those who are fully persuaded of their fallacy may do much by the force of conviction to diminish their violence. *Dislikes* are often groundless, or have their origin in trifles, owing to the influence of caprice or humour: people of sense will be ashamed of them, and the true Christian will stifle them in their birth, lest they grow into the formidable passion of *hatred*, which strikes at the root of all peace; which is a mental poison that infuses its venom into all the sinuosities of the heart, and pollutes the sources of human affection. *Repugnance* ought always to be resisted whenever it prevents us from doing what either reason, honour, or duty require.

Aversions are applicable to animals as well as men: dogs have a particular *aversion* to beggars, most probably from their suspicious appearance; in certain cases likewise we may speak of their *antipathies*, as in the instance of the dog and the cat: according to the schoolmen there existed also *antipathies* between certain plants and vegetables; but these are not borne out by facts sufficiently strong to warrant a belief of their existence. *Dislike* and *hatred* are sometimes applied to things, but in a sense less exceptionable than in the former case: *dislike* does not express so much as *aversion*, and *aversion* not so much as *hatred*: we ought to have a *hatred* for vice and sin, an *aversion* to gossiping and idle talking, and a *dislike* to the frivolities of fashionable life.

I cannot forbear mentioning a tribe of egotists, for whom I have always had a mortal *aversion*: I mean the authors of memoirs who are never mentioned in any works but their own.—ADDISON.

There is one species of terror which those who are unwilling to suffer the reproach of cowardice have wisely dignified with the name of *antipathy*. A man has indeed no dread of harm from an insect or a worm, but his *antipathy* turns him pale whenever they approach him.—JOHNSON.

Every man whom business or curiosity has thrown at large into the world, will recollect many instances of fondness and *dislike*, which have forced themselves upon him without the intervention of his judgment.—JOHNSON.

One punishment that attends the lying and deceitful person is the *hatred* of all those whom he either has, or would have deceived. I do not say that a Christian can lawfully hate any one, and yet I affirm that some may very worthily deserve to be hated.—SOUTH.

In this dilemma Aristophanes conquered his *repugnance*, and determined upon presenting himself on the stage for the first time in his life.—CUMBERLAND.

Augmentation, v. Increase.

To Augur, Presage, Forebode,
Betoken, Portend.

Augur, in French *augurer*, Latin *augurium*, comes from *avis* a bird, as an *augury*, was originally, and at all times, principally drawn from the song, the flight, or other actions of birds.

Presage, in French *présage*, from the

Latin *pro* and *sagio* to be instinctively wise, signifies to be thus wise about what is to come.

Forebode is compounded of *fore* and the Saxon *bodan* to declare, signifying to pronounce on futurity.

Betoken signifies to serve as a token.

Portend, in Latin *portendo*, compounded of *por* for *pro* and *tendo*, signifies to set or show forth.

Augur signifies either to serve or make use of as an *augury*; to *forebode*, and *presage* is to form a conclusion in one's own mind; to *betoken* or *portend* is to serve as a sign. Persons or things *augur*; persons only *forebode* or *presage*; things only *betoken* or *portend*. *Auguring* is a calculation of some future event, in which the imagination seems to be as much concerned as the understanding; *presaging* is rather a conclusion or deduction of what may be from what is; it lies in the understanding more than in the imagination; *foreboding* lies altogether in the imagination. Things are said to *betoken*, which present natural signs; those are said to *portend*, which present extraordinary or supernatural signs.

It *augurs* ill for the prosperity of a country or a state when its wealth has increased so as to take away the ordinary stimulus to industry, and to introduce an inordinate love of pleasure. We *presage* the future greatness of a man from the indications which he gives of possessing an elevated character. A distempered mind is apt to *forebode* every ill from the most trivial circumstances. We see with pleasure those actions in a child which *betoken* an ingenuous temper: a mariner sees with pain the darkness of the sky which *portends* a storm: the moralist *augurs* no good to the morals of a nation from the lax discipline which prevails in the education of youth; he *presages* the loss of independence to the minds of men in whom proper principles of subordination have not been early engendered. Men sometimes *forebode* the misfortunes which happen to them, but they oftener *forebode* evils which never come.

There is always an *augury* to be taken of what a peace is likely to be, from the preliminary steps that are made to bring it about.—BURKE.

An opinion has been long conceived, that quickness of invention, accuracy of judgment, or extent of knowledge, appearing before the usual time, *presage* a short life.—JOHNSON.

What conscience *forebodes*, revelation verifies, assuring us that a day is appointed when God will render to every man according to his works.—BLAIR.

Skill'd in the wing'd inhabitants of the air,
What auspices their notes and flights declare!
O! say—for all religious rites *portend*
A happy voyage and a prosperous end.—DRYDEN.

All more than common menaces an end;
A blaze *betokens* brevity of life,
As if bright embers should emit a flame.—YOUNG.

August, v. Magisterial.

Avidity, Greediness, Eagerness,

Are epithets expressive of a strong desire.

Avidity, in Latin *aviditas*, from *aveo* to desire, expresses very strong desire.

Greediness, from the German *gierig*, and *begehren* to desire, signifies the same,

Eagerness, from *eager*, and the Latin *acer* sharp, signifies acuteness of feeling.

Avidity is in mental desires what *greediness* is in animal appetites: *eagerness* is not so vehement, but more impatient than *avidity* or *greediness*. *Avidity* and *greediness* respect simply the desire of possessing; *eagerness* the general desire of attaining an object. An opportunity is seized with *avidity*: the miser grasps at money with *greediness*: or the glutton devours with *greediness*: a person runs with *eagerness* in order to get to the place of destination: a soldier fights with *eagerness* in order to conquer: a lover looks with *eager* impatience for a letter from the object of his affection.

Avidity is employed in an adverbial form to qualify an action; we seize with *avidity*; *greediness* marks the abstract quality or habit of the mind; *greediness* is the characteristic of low and brutal minds: *eagerness* denotes the transitory state of feeling; a person discovers his *eagerness* in his looks.

I have heard that Addison's *avidity* did not satisfy itself with the air of renown, but that with great eagerness he laid hold on his proportion of the profits.—JOHNSON.

Bid the sea listen, when the greedy merchant
To gorge his ravenous jaws, hurls all his wealth,
And sands himself upon the splitting deck
For the last plunge.—LEE.

Avocation, v. Business, occupation.

To Avoid, Eschew, Shun, Elude.

Avoid, in French *eviter*, Latin *evito*, compounded of *e* and *vito*, probably from *viduus* void, signifies to make one's self void or free from a thing.

Eschew and **Shun** both come from the German *scheuen*, Swedish *sky*, &c., when it signifies to fly.

Elude, in French *eluder*, Latin *eludo*, compounded of *e* and *ludo*, signifies to get one's self out of a thing by a trick.

Avoid is both generic and specific; we *avoid* in *eschewing* or *shunning*, or we *avoid* without *eschewing* or *shunning*. Various contrivances are requisite for *avoiding*; *eschewing* and *shunning* consist only of going out of the way, of not coming in contact; *eluding*, as its derivation denotes, has more of artifice in it than any of the former. We *avoid* a troublesome visitor under real or feigned pretences of ill-health, prior engagement, and the like; we *eschew* evil company by not going into any but what we know to be good: we *shun* the sight of an offensive object by turning into another road; we *elude* a punishment by getting out of the way of those who have the power of inflicting it.

Prudence enables us to *avoid* many of the evils to which we are daily exposed: nothing but a fixed principle of religion can enable a man to *eschew* the temptations to evil which lie in his path: fear will lead us to *shun* a madman, whom it is not in our power to bind: a want of all principle leads a man to *elude* his creditors whom he wishes to defraud.

The best means of *avoiding* quarrels is to *avoid* giving offence. The surest preservative of our innocence is to *eschew* evil company, and the surest preservative of our health is to *shun*

every intemperate practice. Those who have no evil design in view will have no occasion to elude the vigilance of the law.

We speak of *avoiding* a danger, and *shunning* a danger: but to *avoid*, it is in general not to fall into it; to *shun* it is with care to keep out of the way of it.

Having thoroughly considered the nature of this passion, I have made it my study how to *avoid* the envy that may accrue to me from these my speculations.—STEELE.

Thus Brute this realm into his rule subdued
And reigned long in great felicity,
Lov'd of his friends, and of his foes eschewed.
SPENSER.

Of many things, some few I shall explain;
Teach thee to shun the dangers of the main,
And how at length the promis'd shore to gain
DRYDEN.

The wary Trojan, bending from the blow,
Etudes the death, and disappoints his foe.—POPE.

To Avow, v. To acknowledge.

Auspicious, Propitious.

Auspicious, from *auspice*, in Latin *auspicium* and *auspex*, compounded of *avis* and *spicio* to behold, signifies favourable according to the inspection of birds.

Propitious, in Latin *propitius*, probably from *prope* near, because the heathens always solicited their deities to be near or present to give their aid in favour of their designs; hence *propitious* is figuratively applied in the sense of favourable.

Auspicious is said only of things; *propitious* is said only of persons or things personified. Those things are *auspicious* which are casual, or only indicative of good; persons are *propitious* to the wishes of another who listen to their requests and contribute to their satisfaction. A journey is undertaken under *auspicious* circumstances, where every thing incidental, as weather, society, and the like, bid fair to afford pleasure; it is undertaken under *propitious* circumstances when every thing favours the attainment of the object for which it was begun. Whoever has any request to make ought to seize the *auspicious* moment when the person of whom it is asked is in a pleasant frame of mind; a poet in his invocation requests the muse to be *propitious* to him, or the lover conjures his beloved to be *propitious* to his vows.

Still follow where *auspicious* fates invite,
Careless the happy, and the wretched slight.
Sooner shall jarring elements unite,
Than truth with gain, than interest with right.
LEWIS.

Who loves a garden loves a greenhouse too;
Unconscious of a less *propitious* clime,
There blooms exotic beauty.—COWPER.

Austere, Rigid, Severe, Rigorous, Stern.

Austere, in Latin *austerus* sour or rough, from the Greek *auw* to dry, signifies rough or harsh, from drought.

Rigid and **Rigorous**, from *rigeo*, Greek *pryew*, Hebrew *reg* to be stiff, signifies stiffness or unbendingness.

Severe, in Latin *severus*, comes from *sævus* cruel.

Stern, in Saxon *sterne*, German *streng* strong, has the sense of strictness.

Austere applies to ourselves as well as to others; *rigid* applies to ourselves only; *severe*, *rigorous*, *stern*, apply to others only. We are *austere* in our manner of living; *rigid* in our mode of thinking; *austere*, *severe*, *rigorous*, and *stern*, in our mode of dealing with others. Effeminacy is opposed to *austerity*, pliability to *rigidity*.

The *austere* man mortifies himself; the *rigid* man binds himself to a rule: the *austerities* formerly practised among the Roman Catholics were in many instances the consequence of *rigid* piety: the manners of a man are *austere* when he refuses to take part in any social enjoyments; his probity is *rigid*, that is, inaccessible to the allurements of gain, or the urgency of necessity: an *austere* life consists not only in the privation of every pleasure, but in the infliction of every pain; *rigid* justice is unbiassed, no less by the fear of loss than by the desire of gain: the present age affords no examples of *austerity*, but too many of its opposite extreme, effeminacy; and the *rigidity* of former times, in modes of thinking, has been succeeded by a culpable laxity.

Austere, when taken with relation to others, is said of the behaviour; *severe* of the conduct: a parent is *austere* in his looks, his manner, and his words to his child; he is *severe* in the restraints he imposes, and the punishments he inflicts: an *austere* master speaks but to command, and commands so as to be obeyed; a *severe* master punishes every fault, and punishes in an undue measure: an *austere* temper is never softened; the countenance of such an one never relaxes into a smile, nor is he pleased to witness smiles: a *severe* temper is ready to catch at the imperfections of others, and to wound the offender: a judge should be a *rigid* administrator of justice between man and man, and *severe* in the punishment of offences as occasion requires; but never *austere* towards those who appear before him; *austerity* of manner would ill become him who sits as a protector of either the innocent or the injured.

Rigor is a species of great *severity*, namely, in the infliction of punishment; towards enormous offenders, or on particular occasions where an example is requisite, *rigor* may be adopted, but otherwise it marks a cruel temper. A man is *austere* in his manners, *severe* in his remarks, and *rigorous* in his discipline.

Austerity, *rigidity*, and *severity*, may be habitual; *rigor* and *sternness* are occasional. *Sternness* is a species of severity, more in manner than in direct action; a commander may issue his commands *sternly*, or a despot may issue his *stern* decrees.

Austerity is the proper antidote to indulgence; the diseases of the mind as well as body are cured by contraries.—JOHNSON.

In things which are not immediately subject to religious or moral consideration, it is dangerous to be too long, or too *rigidly* in the right.—JOHNSON.

If you are hard or contracted in your judgments, *severe* in your censures, and oppressive in your dealings: then conclude with certainty that what you had termed piety was but an empty name.—BLAIR.

It is not by *rigorous* discipline and unrelaxing *austerity* that the aged can maintain an ascendant over youthful minds.—BLAIR.

A man severe he was, and stern to view,
I knew him well, and every truant knew;
Yet he was kind, or if severe in aught,
The love he bore to learning was in fault.

GOLDSMITH.

It is stern criticism to say that Mr. Pope's is not a translation of Homer.—CUMBERLAND.

Author, v. Writer.

Authoritative, v. Commanding.

Authority, v. Influence.

Authority, v. Power, strength.

To Authorize, v. To Commission.

To Await, Wait for, Look for, Expect.

Await and Wait, in German *warten*, comes from *wahren* to see or look after.

Expect, in Latin *expecto* or *expecto*, compounded of *ex* and *specto*, signifies to look out after.

All these terms have a reference to futurity, and our actions with regard to it.

Await, wait for, and *look for*, mark a calculation of consequences and a preparation for them; and *expect* simply a calculation: we often *expect* without *awaiting*, *waiting*, or *looking for*, but never the reverse.

Await is said of serious things; *wait* and *look for* are terms in familiar use; *expect* is employed either seriously or otherwise. A person *expects* to die, or *awaits* the hour of his dissolution; he *expects* a letter, *waits* for its coming, and *looks for* it when the post is arrived.

Await indicates the disposition of the mind; *wait for*, the regulation of the outward conduct as well as that of the mind; *look for* is a species of *waiting* drawn from the physical action of the eye, and may be figuratively applied to the mind's eye, in which latter sense it is the same as *expect*. It is our duty, as well as our interest, to *await* the severest trials without a murmur: prudence requires us to *wait* patiently for a suitable opportunity, rather than be premature in our attempts to obtain any object: when children are too much indulged and caressed they are apt to *look for* a repetition of caresses at inconvenient seasons: it is in vain to *look for* or *expect* happiness from the conjugal state, which is not founded on a cordial and mutual regard.

This said, he sat, and expectation held
His looks suspense, *awaiting* who appeared
To second or oppose, or undertake
The perilous attempt.—MILTON.

Not less resolv'd, Antenor's valiant heir
Confronts Achilles, and *awaits* the war.—POPE.

Wait till thy being shall be unfolded.—BLAIR.

If you *look for* a friend, in whose temper there is not to be found the least inequality, you *look for* a pleasing phantom.—BLAIR.

We are not to *expect*, from our intercourse with others, all that satisfaction which we fondly wish.—BLAIR.

To Awaken, Excite, Provoke, Rouse, Stir up.

To Awaken is to make *awake* or alive.

Excite, in Latin *excito*, compounded of the

intensive syllables *ex* and *cito*, in Hebrew *sul* to move, signifies to move out of a state of rest.

Provoke, v. *To aggravate.*

To Rouse is to cause to rise.

Stir, in German *stören* to move, signifies to make to move upwards.

To *excite* and *provoke* convey the idea of producing something; *rouse* and *stir up* that of only calling into action that which previously exists; to *awaken* is used in either sense.

To *awaken* is a gentler action than to *excite*, and this is gentler than to *provoke*. We *awaken* by a simple effort; we *excite* by repeated efforts or forcible means; we *provoke* by words, looks, or actions. The tender feelings are *awakened*; affections or the passions in general are *excited*; the angry passions are commonly *provoked*. Objects of distress *awaken* a sentiment of pity; competition among scholars *excites* a spirit of emulation; taunting words *provoke* anger.

Awaken is applied only to the individual and what passes within him; *excite* is applicable to the outward circumstances of one or many; *provoke* is applicable to the conduct or temper of one or many. The attention is *awakened* by interesting sounds that strike upon the ear; the conscience is *awakened* by the voice of the preacher, or by passing events: a commotion, a tumult, or a rebellion, is *excited* among the people by the active efforts of individuals; laughter or contempt is *provoked* by preposterous conduct.

To *awaken* is in the moral, as in the physical sense, to call into consciousness from a state of unconsciousness; to *rouse* is forcibly to bring into action that which is in a state of inaction; and *stir up* is to bring into a state of agitation or commotion. We are *awakened* from an ordinary state by ordinary means; we are *roused* from an extraordinary state by extraordinary means; we are *stirred up* from an ordinary to an extraordinary state. The mind of a child is *awakened* by the action on its senses as soon as it is born; there are some persons who are not *roused* from the stupor in which they were by anything but the most awful events; and there are others whose passions, particularly of anger, are *stirred up* by trifling circumstances.

The conscience is sometimes *awakened* for a time, but the sinner is not *roused* to a sense of his danger, or to any exertions for his own safety, until an intemperate zeal is *stirred up* in him by means of enthusiastic preaching, in which case the vulgar proverb is verified, that the remedy is as bad as the disease. Death is a scene calculated to *awaken* some feeling in the most obdurate breast: the tears and sighs of the afflicted *excite* a sentiment of commiseration; the most equitable administration of justice may *excite* murmurs among the discontented: a harsh and unreasonable reproof will *provoke* a reply: oppression and tyranny mostly *rouse* the sufferers to a sense of their injuries; nothing is so calculated to *stir up* the rebellious spirits of men as the harangues of political demagogues.

The soul has its curiosity more than ordinarily *awakened* when it turns its thoughts upon the conduct of such who have behaved themselves with an equal, a resigned, a cheerful, a generous, or heroic temper in the extremity of death.—STEELE.

In our Saviour was no form of comeliness that men

should desire, no artifice or trick to catch applause, or to excite surprise.—CUMBERLAND.

See, mercy ! see with pure and loaded hands
Before thy shrine my country's genius stands.
When he whom *l'en* our joys *protekte*,
The fiend of nature join'd his yoke,
And rush'd in wrath to make our isles his prey ;
Thy form from out thy sweet abode,
O'ertook him on the blasted road.—COLLINS.

Go study virtue, rugged ancient worth ;
Rouse up that flame our great forefathers felt.
SHIRLEY.

The turbulent and dangerous are for embroiling councils,
stirring up seditions, and subverting constitutions, out
of a mere restlessness of temper.—STEELE.

Aware, On One's Guard, Apprized, Conscious.

Aware, compounded of *a* or *on* and *ware*, signifies to be on the look out, from the Saxon *waerd*, German, *etc.*, *wahren*, Greek *opao* to see.

Guard, in French *garder*, is connected with *ward*, in Saxon *waerd*, German, *etc.*, *gewahrt*, participle of *wahren* to see, as above.

Apprized, in French *appris*, from *apprendre* to apprehend, learn, or understand.

Conscious, in Latin *conscius*, of *con* and *scio* to know, signifies knowing within one's self.

The idea of having the expectation or knowledge of a thing is common to all these terms. We are *aware* of a thing when we calculate upon it ; we are *on our guard* against it when we are prepared for it ; we are *apprized* of that of which we have had an intimation, and are *conscious* of that in which we have ourselves been concerned.

To be *aware*, and *on one's guard*, respect the future : to be *apprized*, either the past or present ; to be *conscious*, only the past. Experience enables a man to be *aware* of consequences ; prudence and caution dictate to him the necessity of being *on his guard* against evils. Whoever is fully *aware* of the precarious tenure by which he holds all his goods in this world, will be *on his guard* to prevent any calamities, as far as depends upon the use of means in his control.

We are *apprized* of events, or what passes outwardly, through the medium of external circumstances ; we are *conscious* only through the medium of ourselves, of what passes within. We are *apprized* of what has happened from indications that attract our notice ; we are *conscious* of our guilt from the recollection of what we have done. A commander who is not *aware* of all the contingencies that influence the fate of a battle, who is not *on his guard* against the stratagems of the enemy, who is not fully *apprized* of their intentions, and *conscious* of his own strength to frustrate them, has no grounds to expect a victory ; the chances of defeat are greatly against him.

The first steps in the breach of a man's integrity are more important than men are *aware* of.—STEELE.

What establishment of religion more friendly to public happiness could be desired or framed (than our own). How zealous ought we to be for its preservation : how much on our guard against every danger which threatens to trouble it.—BLAIR.

In play the chance of loss and gain ought always to be equal, at least each party should be *apprized* of the force employed against him.—STEELE.

I know nothing so hard for a generous mind to get

over as calumny and reproach, and cannot find any method of quieting the soul under them, besides this single one, of our being *conscious* to ourselves that we do not deserve them.—ADDISON.

Awe, Reverence, Dread.

Awe, probably from the German *achten*, conveys the idea of regarding.

Reverence, in French *reverence*, Latin *reverentia*, comes from *revereor* to fear strongly.

Dread, in Saxon *dread*, comes from the Latin *territo* to frighten, and Greek *tapasaw* to trouble.

Awe and *reverence* both denote a strong sentiment of respect, mingled with some emotions of fear ; but the former marks the much stronger sentiment of the two ; *dread* is an unmingled sentiment of fear for one's personal security. *Awe* may be awakened by the help of the senses and understanding ; *reverence* by that of the understanding only ; and *dread* principally by that of the imagination.

Sublime, sacred, and solemn objects awaken *awe* : they cause the beholder to stop and consider whether he is worthy to approach them any nearer ; they rivet his mind and body to a spot, and make him cautious, lest by his presence he should contaminate that which is hallowed : exalted and noble objects produce *reverence* : they lead to every outward mark of obeisance and humiliation which it is possible for him to express : terrific objects excite *dread* : they cause a shuddering of the animal frame, and a revulsion of the mind which is attended with nothing but pain.

When the creature places himself in the presence of the Creator : when he contemplates the immeasurable distance which separates himself, a frail and finite mortal, from his infinitely perfect Maker ; he approaches with *awe* : even the sanctuary where he is accustomed thus to bow before the Almighty acquires the power of awakening the same emotions in his mind. Age, wisdom, and virtue, when combined in one person, are never approached without *reverence* ; the possessor has a dignity in himself that checks the haughtiness of the arrogant, that silences the petulance of pride and self-conceit, that stills the noise and giddy mirth of the young, and communicates to all around a sobriety of mien and aspect. A grievous offender is seldom without *dread* : his guilty conscience pictures every thing as the instrument of vengeance, and every person as denouncing his merited sentence.

The solemn stillness of the tomb will inspire *awe*, even in the breast of him who has no *dread* of death. Children should be early taught to have a certain degree of *reverence* for the Bible as a book, in distinction from all other books.

It were endless to enumerate all the passages, both in the sacred and profane writers, which establish the general sentiment of mankind concerning the inseparable union of a sacred and reverential *awe* with our ideas of the Divinity.—BURKE.

If the voice of universal nature, the experience of all ages, the light of reason, and the immediate evidence of my senses, cannot awake me to a dependence upon my God, a *reverence* for his religion, and an humble opinion of myself, what a lost creature am I.—CUMBERLAND.

To Phœbus next my trembling steps be led,
Full of religious doubts and awful *dread*.—DRYDEN.

Awkward, Clumsy.

Awkward, in Saxon *æwerd*, compounded of *æ* or *a* adversative and *ward*, from the Teutonic *wāren* to see or look, that is, looking the opposite way, or being in an opposite direction, as *toward* signifies looking the same way, or being in the same direction.

Clumsy, from the same source as *clump* and *bump*, in German *lumpisch*, denotes the quality of heaviness and unseemliness.

These epithets denote what is contrary to rule and order, in form or manner. *Awkward* respects outward deportment; *clumsy* the shape and make of the object: a person has an *awkward* gait, is *clumsy* in his whole person.

Awkwardness is the consequence of bad education; *clumsiness* is mostly a natural defect. Young recruits are *awkward* in marching, and *clumsy* in their manual labour.

They may be both employed figuratively in the same sense, and sometimes in relation to the same objects: when speaking of *awkward* contrivances, or *clumsy* contrivances, the latter expresses the idea more strongly than the former.

Montaigne had many *awkward* imitators, who, under the notion of writing with the fire and freedom of this lively old Gascon, had fallen into confused rhapsodies and uninteresting egotisms.—WARTON.

All the operations of the Greeks in sailing were *clumsy* and unskilful.—ROBERTSON.

Awkward, Cross, Untoward, Crooked, Froward, Perverse.

Awkward, v. Awkward.

Cross, from the noun *cross*, implies the quality of being like a *cross*.

Untoward, signifies the reverse of *toward* (v. *Awkward*).

Crooked signifies the quality of resembling a *crook*.

Froward, that is, from *ward*, signifies running a contrary direction.

Perverse, Latin *perversus*, participle of *per-vert*, compounded of *per* and *verto*, signifies turned aside.

Awkward, *cross*, *untoward*, and *crooked*, are used as epithets in relation to the events of life or the disposition of the mind; *froward* and *perverse* respect only the disposition of the mind. *Awkward* circumstances are apt to embarrass; *cross* circumstances to pain; *crooked* and *untoward* circumstances to defeat. What is *crooked* springs from a *perverted* judgment; what is *untoward* is independent of human control. In our intercourse with the world there are always little *awkward* incidents arising, which a person's good sense and good nature will enable him to pass over without disturbing the harmony of society. It is the lot of every one in his passage through life to meet with *cross* accidents that are calculated to ruffle the temper; but he proves himself to be the wisest whose serenity is not so easily disturbed. A *crooked* policy obstructs the prosperity of individuals, as well as of states. Many men are destined to meet with severe trials in the frustration of their dearest hopes, by numberless *untoward* events which call for the exercise of patience; in this

case the Christian can prove to himself and others the infinite value of his faith and doctrine.

When used with regard to the disposition of the mind, *awkward* expresses less than *froward*, and *froward* less than *perverse*. *Awkwardness* is an habitual frailty of temper; it includes certain weaknesses and particularities, pertinaciously adhered to: *crossness* is a partial irritation resulting from the state of the humours, physical and mental. *Frowardness* and *perversity* lie in the will: a *froward* temper is capricious; it wills or wills not to please itself without regard to others. *Perversity* lies deeper; taking root in the heart, it assumes the shape of malignity: a *perverse* temper is really wicked; it likes or dislikes by the rule of contradiction to another's will. *Untowardness* lies in the principles; it runs counter to the wishes and counsels of another.

An *awkward* temper is connected with self-sufficiency; it shelters itself under the sanction of what is apparently reasonable; it requires management and indulgence in dealing with it. *Crossness* and *frowardness* are peculiar to children; indiscriminate indulgence of the rising will engenders those diseases of the mind, which if fostered too long in the breast become incorrigible by any thing but a powerful sense of religion. *Perversity* is, however, but too commonly the result of a vicious habit, which embitters the happiness of all who have the misfortune of coming in collision with it. *Untowardness* is also another fruit of these evil tempers. A *froward* child becomes an *untoward* youth, who turns a deaf ear to all the admonitions of an afflicted parent.

It is an *awkward* thing for a man to print in defence of his own work against a chimaera: you know not who or what you fight against.—POPE.

Some are indeed stopped in their career by a sudden shock of calamity, or diverted to a different direction by the cross impulse of some violent passion.—JOHNSON.

Christ had to deal with a most *untoward* and stubborn generation.—BLAIR.

There are who can, by potent magic spells,
Bend to their *crooked* purpose nature's laws.—MILTON.

To fret and repine at every disappointment of our wishes is to discover the temper of *froward* children.—BLAIR.

Interference of interest, or *perversity* of disposition, may occasionally lead individuals to oppose, even to hate, the upright and the good.—BLAIR.

Awry, v. Bent.

Axiom, Maxim, Aphorism, Apophthegm, Saying, Adage, Proverb, Bye-Word, Saw.

Axiom, in French *axiome*, Latin *axioma*, comes from the Greek *αξίω* to think worthy, signifying the thing valued.

Maxim, in French *maxime*, in Latin *maximus* the greatest, signifies that which is most important.

Aphorism, from the Greek *αφορισμός* a short sent nce, and *αφορίζω* to distinguish, signifies that which is set apart.

Apophthegm, in Greek *αποφθεγμα* from *αποφθεγγμαι* to speak pointedly, signifies a pointed saying.

Saying signifies literally what is said, that is, said habitually.

Adage, in Latin *adagium*, probably compounded of *ad* and *ago*, signifies that which is fit to be acted upon.

Proverb, in French *proverbe*, Latin *proverbium*, compounded of *pro* and *verbum* signifies that expression which stands for something particular.

Bye-Word signifies a word by the bye, or by the way, in the course of conversation.

Saw is but a variation of say, put for saying.

A given sentiment conveyed in a specific sentence, or form of expression, is the common idea included in the signification of these terms. The *axiom* is a truth of the first value; a self-evident proposition which is the basis of other truths. A *maxim* is the truth of the first moral importance for all practical purposes. An *aphorism* is a truth set apart for its pointedness and excellence. *Apophthegm* is, in respect to the ancients, what *saying* is in regard to the moderns: it is a pointed sentiment pronounced by an individual, and adopted by others. *Adage* and *proverb* are vulgar sayings, the former among the ancients, the latter among the moderns. The *bye-word* is a casual saying, originating in some local circumstance. The *saw*, which is a barbarous corruption of *saying*, is the *saying* formerly current among the ignorant.

Axioms are in science what *maxims* are in morals; self-evidence is an essential characteristic in both; the *axiom* presents itself in so simple and undeniable a form to the understanding as to exclude doubt, and the necessity for reasoning. The *maxim*, though not so definite in its expression as the *axiom*, is at the same time equally parallel to the mind of man, and of such general application, that it is acknowledged by all moral agents who are susceptible of moral truth; it comes home to the common sense of all mankind.* "Things that are equal to one and the same thing are equal to each other,"—"Two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time," are *axioms* in mathematics and metaphysics. "Virtue is the true source of happiness,"—"The happiness of man is the end of civil government," are *axioms* in ethics and politics. "To err is human, to forgive divine,"—"When our vices leave us, we flatter ourselves that we leave them," are among the number of *maxims*. Betwixt *axioms* and *maxims* there is this obvious difference to be observed; that the former are unchangeable both in matter and manner, and admit of little or no increase in number; but the latter may vary with the circumstances of human life, and admit of considerable extension.

An *Aphorism* is a speculative principle, either in science or morals, which is presented in a few words to the understanding; it is the substance of a doctrine, and many *aphorisms* may contain the abstract of a science. Of this description are the *aphorisms* of Hippocrates, and those of Lavater in physiognomy.

Sayings and *apophthegms* differ from the

preceding, in as much as they always carry the mind back to the person speaking; there is always one who says when there is a *saying* or an *apophthegm*, and both acquire a value as much from the person who utters them as from the thing that is uttered: when Leonidas was asked why brave men prefer honour to life, his answer became an *apophthegm*; namely, that they hold life by fortune, and honour by virtue: of this description are the *apophthegms* comprised by Plutarch, the *sayings* of Franklin's Old Richard, or those of Dr. Johnson: they are happy effusions of the mind which men are fond of treasuring. The *adage* and *proverb* are habitual, as well as general *sayings*, not repeated as the *sayings* of one, but of all; not adopted for the sake of the person, but for the sake of the thing; and they have been used in all ages for the purpose of conveying the sense of mankind on ordinary subjects.

The *adage* of former times is the *proverb* of the present times; if there be any difference between them, it lies in this, that the former are the fruit of knowledge and long experience, the latter of vulgar observations; the *adage* is therefore more refined than the *proverb*. Adversity is our best teacher, according to the Greek *adage*, "What hurts us instructs us."—"Old birds are not to be caught with chaff" is a vulgar *proverb*.

Bye-words rarely contain any important sentiment; they mostly consist of familiar similes, nick-names, and the like, as the Cambridge *bye-word* of "Hobson's choice," signifying that or none: the name of Nazarene was a *bye-word* among the Jews, for a Christian. A *saw* is vulgar in form and vulgar in matter; it is the partial *saying* of particular neighbourhoods, originating in ignorance and superstition: of this description are the *sayings* which attribute particular properties to animals or to plants, termed old women's *sayings*.

Those authors are to be read at schools, that supply most *axioms* of prudence, most principles of moral truth.—JOHNSON.

It was my grandfather's *maxim*, that a young man seldom makes much money, who is out of his time before two and twenty.—JOHNSON.

As this one *aphorism*, *Jesus Christ is the son of God*, is virtually and eminently the whole Gospel; so to confess or deny it is virtually to embrace or reject the whole round and series of Gospel truths.—SOUTH.

It is remarkable that so near his time so much should be known of what Pope has written, and so little of what he has said. One *apophthegm* only stands upon record. When an objection raised against his inscription for Shakspeare was defended by the authority of Patrick, he replied, 'hat he would allow the publisher of a dictionary to know the meaning of a single word, but not of two words together.—JOHNSON.

The little and short *sayings* of wise and excellent men are of great value, like the dust of gold, or the least sparks of diamonds.—TILLOTSON.

It is in praise and commendation of men, as it is in gettings and gains; the *proverb* is true that light gains make heavy purses; for light gains come thick, whereas great come now and then.—BACON.

Quoth Hudibras, thou offer'st much,
But art not able to keep touch,
Mira de lente, as 'tis i' the *adage*,
Id est, to make a leek a cabbage.—BUTLER.

I knew a pretty young girl in a country village, who, overfond of her own praise, became a property to a poor rogue in the parish, who was ignorant of all things but

* Vide Roubaud: "Axiome, maxime, apophthegme, aphorisme."

lawning.—Thus Isaac extols her out of a quartern of *cut and dry* every day she lives, and though the young woman is really handsome, she and her beauty are become a *bye-word*, and all the country round, she is called nothing but Isaac's best *Virginian*.—ARBUTHNOT.

If we meet this dreadful and portentous energy with poor common-place proceedings, with trivial *maxims*, paltry old *saws*, with doubts, fears, and suspicions; down we go to the bottom of the abyss, and nothing, short of omnipotence can save us.—BURKE.

B.

To Babble, Chatter, Chat, Prattle, Prate.

Babble, in French *babiller*, probably receives its origin from the tower of *Babel*, when the confusion of tongues took place, and men talked unintelligibly to each other.

Chatter, **Chat**, is in French *caquet*, low German *atern*, high German *schnattern*, Latin *blatero*, Hebrew *bala*.

Prattle, **Prate**, in low German *praten*, is probably connected with the Greek *φραζω* to speak.

All these terms mark a superfluous or improper use of speech; *babble* and *chatter* are onomatopoeias drawn from the noise or action of speaking; *babbling* denotes rapidity of speech, which renders it unintelligible; hence the term is applied to all who make use of many words to no purpose: *chatter* is an imitation of the noise of speech properly applied to magpies, or parrots, and figuratively to a corresponding vicious mode of speech in human beings. The vice of *babbling* is most commonly attached to men, that of *chattering* to women: the *babblers* talk much to impress others with his self-importance; the *chatterer* is actuated by self-conceit, and a desire to display her volubility: the former cares not whether he is understood; the latter cares not if she be but heard.

Chatting is harmless, if not respectable: the winter's fire-side invites neighbours to assemble and *chat* away many an hour which might otherwise hang heavy on hand, or be spent less inoffensively: *chatting* is the practice of adults; *prattling* and *prating* that of children, the one innocently, the other impertinently: the *prattling* of babes has an interest for every feeling mind, but for parents it is one of their highest enjoyments; *prating*, on the contrary, is the consequence of ignorance and childish assumption; a *prattler* has all the unaffected gaiety of an uncontaminated mind; a *prater* is forward, obtrusive, and ridiculous.

To stand up and *babble* to a crowd in an ale-house, till silence is commanded by the stroke of a hammer, is as low an ambition as can taint the human mind.—HAWKES-WORTH.

Some birds there are who, prone to noise,
Are hir'd to silence wisdom's voice;
And skill'd to chatter out the hour,
Rise by their emptiness to power.—MOORE.

Sometimes I dress, with women sit,
And chat away the gloomy fit.—GREEN.

Now blows the surly north, and chills throughout
The stiff'ning regions: while by stronger charms
Than Circe e'er, or fell Medea brew'd,
Each brook that wont to prattle to its banks
Lies all bestill'd.—ARMSTRONG.

My prudent counsels prop the state,
Magpies were never known to prate.—MOORE.

Back, Backward, Behind,

Back and **Backward** are used only as adverbs: **Behind** either as an adverb or a preposition. To go *back* or *backward*, to go *behind* or *behind* the wall.

Back denotes the situation of being, and the direction of going; *backward* simply the manner of going: a person stands *back* who does not wish to be in the way; he goes *backward*, when he does not wish to turn his *back* to an object.

Back marks simply the situation of a place, *behind* the situation of one object with regard to another: a person stands *back*, who stands in the *back* part of any place; he stands *behind*, who has any one in the front of him: the *back* is opposed to the front, *behind* to before.

So rag'd Tydides, boundless in his ire,
Drove armies *back*, and made all Troy retire.—POPE.

Whence many wearied e'er they had o'erpast
The middle stream (for they in vain have tried)
Again return'd astounded and aghast,
No one regardful look would ever *backward* cast.
GILBERT WEST.

Forth flew this hated fiend, the child of Rome,
Driv'n to the verge of Albion, lingered there:
Then, with her James receding, cast *behind*
One *angry* frown, and sought more servile climes.
SHENSTONE ON CRUELTY.

Backward, *v. Back*.

Backward, *v. Averse*.

Bad, Wicked, Evil.

Bad, in Saxon *bad*, *baed*, in German *bös*, probably connected with the Latin *pejus* worse and the Hebrew *bosch*.

Wicked is probably changed from *witched* or *bewitched*, that is, possessed with an evil spirit.

Bad respects moral and physical qualities in general; *wicked* only moral qualities.

Evil, in German *übel*, from the Hebrew *chebel* pain, signifies that which is the prime cause of pain; *evil* therefore, in its full extent comprehends both *badness* and *wickedness*.

Whatever offends the taste and sentiments of a rational being is *bad*: food is *bad* when it disagrees with the constitution; the air is *bad* which has any thing in it disagreeable to the senses or hurtful to the body; books are *bad* which only inflame the imagination or the passions. Whatever is *wicked* offends the moral principles of a rational agent: any violation of the law is *wicked*, as law is the support of human society; an act of injustice or cruelty is *wicked*, as it opposes the will of God and the feelings of humanity. *Evil* is either moral or natural, and may be applied

to every object that is contrary to good; but the term is employed only for that which is in the highest degree *bad* or *wicked*.

When used in relation to persons, both refer to the morals, but *bad* is more general than *wicked*; a *bad* man is one who is generally wanting in the performance of his duty; a *wicked* man is one who is chargeable with actual violations of the law, human or Divine; such an one has an *evil* mind. A *bad* character is the consequence of immoral conduct; but no man has the character of being *wicked* who has not been guilty of some known and flagrant vices: the inclinations of the best are *evil* at certain times.

Whatever we may pretend, as to our belief, it is the strain of our actions that must show whether our principles have been good or *bad*.—BLAIR.

For when th' impetuous and *wicked* die,
Loaded with crimes and infamy;
If any sense at that sad time remains,
They feel amazing terror, mighty pains.—POMFRET.

And what your bounded view, which only saw
A little part, deem'd *evil*, is no more;
The storms of wintry time will quickly pass,
And one unbounded spring encircle all.

THOMSON.

Badge, *v. Mark*.

Badly, *Ill*.

Badly, in the manner of *bad* (*v. Bad*).

Ill, in Swedish *ill*, Icelandic *illur*, Danish *ill*, &c. is supposed by Adelung, and with some degree of justice, not to be a contraction of evil, but to spring from the Greek *ovlos* destructive, and *ovlos* to destroy,

These terms are both employed to modify the actions or qualities of things, but *badly* is always annexed to the action, and *ill* to the quality: as to do any thing *badly*, the thing is *badly* done; an *ill*-judged scheme, an *ill*-contrived measure, an *ill*-disposed person.

To Baffle, Defeat, Disconcert, Confound.

Baffle, in French *baffler*, from *buffle* an ox, signifies to lead by the nose as an ox, that is, to amuse or disappoint.

Defeat, in French *defait*, participle of *defaire*, is compounded of the privative *de* and *faire* to do, signifying to undo.

Disconcert, is compounded of the privative *dis* and *concert*, signifying to throw out of concert or harmony, to put into disorder.

Confound, in French *confondre*, is compounded of *con* and *fondre* to melt or mix together in general disorder.

When applied to the derangement of the mind or rational faculties, *baffle* and *defeat* respect the powers of argument, *disconcert* and *confound* the thoughts and feelings: *baffle* expresses less than *defeat*; *disconcert* less than *confound*: a person is *baffled* in argument who is for the time (dis)composed and silenced by the superior address of his opponent; he is *defeated* in argument if his opponent has altogether the advantage of him in strength of reasoning and justness of sentiment: a person is *disconcerted* who loses his presence of mind for a moment, or has his feelings any way

discomposed; he is *confounded* when the powers of thought and consciousness become torpid or vanish.

A superior command of language or a particular degree of effrontery will frequently enable one person to *baffle* another who is advocating the cause of truth: ignorance of the subject, or a want of ability, may occasion a man to be *defeated* by his adversary, even when he is supporting a good cause: assurance is requisite to prevent any one from being *disconcerted* who is suddenly detected in any disgraceful proceeding: hardened effrontery sometimes keeps the daring villain from being *confounded* by any events, however awful.

When applied to the derangement of plans, *baffle* expresses less than *defeat*; *defeat* less than *confound*; and *disconcert* less than all. Obstinacy, perseverance, skill, or art *baffles*; force or violence *defeats*; awkward circumstances *disconcert*; the visitation of God *confounds*. When wicked men strive to obtain their ends, it is a happy thing if their adversaries have sufficient skill and address to *baffle* all their arts, and sufficient power to *defeat* all their projects; but sometimes when our best endeavours fail in our own behalf, the devices of men are *confounded* by the interposition of heaven.

It frequently happens even in the common transactions of life that the best schemes are *disconcerted*, by the trivial casualties of wind and weather. The obstinacy of a disorder may *baffle* the skill of the physician; the imprudence of the patient may *defeat* the object of his prescriptions: the unexpected arrival of a superior may *disconcert* the unauthorised plan of those who are subordinate: the miraculous destruction of his army *confounded* the project of the King of Assyria.

Now shepherds! To your helpless charge be kind
Baffle the raging year, and fill their pens
With food at will.—THOMSON.

He that could withstand conscience is frightened at infamy, and shame prevails when reason is *defeated*.—JOHNSON.

She looked in the glass while she was speaking to me, and without any confusion adjusted her tucker: she seemed rather pleased than *disconcerted* at being regarded with earnestness.—HAWKESWORTH.

I could not help inquiring of the clerks if they knew this lady, and was greatly *confounded* when they told me with an air of secrecy that she was my cousin's mistress.—HAWKESWORTH.

Balance, *v. Poise*.

Ball, *v. Globe*.

Band, Company, Crew, Gang.

Band, in French *bande*, in German, &c. *band*, from *binden* to bind, signifies the thing bound.

Company, *v. To accompany*.

Crew, from the French *cru*, participle of *croître*, and the Latin *creasco* to grow or gather, signifies the thing grown or formed into a mass.

Gang, in Saxon, German, &c., *gang* a walk, from *gehen* to go, signifies a body going the same way.

All these terms denote a small association for a particular object: a *band* is an associa-

tion where men are bound together by some strong obligation, whether taken in a good or bad sense, as a *band* of soldiers, a *band* of robbers. A *company* marks an association for convenience without any particular obligation, as a *company* of travellers, a *company* of strolling players. *Crew* marks an association collected together by some external power, or by coincidence of plan and motive; in the former case it is used for a ship's *crew*; in the latter and bad sense of the word it is employed for any number of evil-minded persons met together from different quarters, and co-operating for some bad purpose.

Gang is always used in a bad sense for an association of thieves, murderers, and depredaters in general; for such an association is rather a casual meeting from the similarity of pursuits, than an organized body under any leader; it is more in common use than *band*: the robbers in Germany used to form themselves into *bands* that set the government of the country at defiance: housebreakers and pickpockets commonly associate now in *gangs*.

Behold a ghastly *band*,
Each a torch in his hand!
These are Grecian ghosts that in battle were slain,
And unbury'd remain,
Inglorious in the plain.—DRYDEN.

Chaucer supposes in his prologue to his tales that a *company* of pilgrims going to Canterbury assemble at an Inn in Southwark, and agree that for their common amusement on the road each of them shall tell at least one tale in going to Canterbury, and another in coming back from thence.—TYRWHITT.

The clowns, a hoist'rons, rude, ungovern'd *crew*,
With furious haste to the loud summons flew.
—DRYDEN.

Others again who form a *gang*,
Yet take due measures not to hang;
In magazines their forces join,
By legal methods to purloin.—MALLETT.

Band, v. Chain.

Bane, Pest, Ruin.

Bane, in its proper sense, is the name of a poisonous plant.

Pest, in French *peste*, Latin *pestis* a plague, from *pastum* participle of *pasco* to feed upon or consume.

Ruin, in French *ruine*, Latin *ruina*, from *ruo* to rush, signifies the falling into a ruin, or the cause of ruin.

These terms borrow their figurative signification from three of the greatest evils in the world; namely, poison, plague, and destruction. *Bane* is said of things only; *pest* of persons only: whatever produces a deadly corruption is the *bane*; whoever is as obnoxious as the plague is a *pest*: luxury is the *bane* of civil society; gaming is the *bane* of all youth; sycophants are the *pests* of society.

Bane when compared with *ruin* does not convey so strong a meaning; the former in its positive sense is that which tends to mischief; *ruin* is that which actually causes ruin: a love of pleasure is the *bane* of all young men whose fortune depends on the exercise of their talents; drinking is the *ruin* of all who indulge themselves in it to excess.

Pierc'd thro' the dauntless heart then tumbles slain,
And from his fatal course finds his *bane*.—POPE.

First dire Chimera's conquest was enjoin'd,
This *pest* he slaughter'd (for he rend the skies)
And trust'd heav'n's informing prodigies.—POPE.

Be this, O mother! your religious care,
I go to rouse soft Paris to the war.
Oh! would kind earth the hateful wretch embrace,
That *pest* of Troy, that *ruin* of our race
Deep to the dark abyss might he descend,
Troy yet should flourish, and my sorrows end.—POPE.

To Banish, Exile, Expel.

Banish, in French *bannir*, German *bannen*, signified to put out of a community by a ban or civil interdict, which was formerly either ecclesiastical or civil.

Exile, in French *exiler*, from the Latin *exilium* banishment, and *exul* an exile, compounded of *extra* and *solum* the soil, signifies to put away from one's native soil or country.

Expel, in Latin *expello*, compounded of *ex* and *pello* to drive, signifies to drive out.

The idea of exclusion, or of a coercive removal from a place, is common to these terms: *banishment* includes the removal from any place, or the prohibition of access to any place, where one has been, or whither one is in the habit of going; *exile* signifies the removal from one's home: to *exile*, therefore, is to *banish*, but to *banish*, is not always to *exile*: * the Tarquins were *banished* from Rome; Coriolanus was *exiled*.

Banishment follows from a decree of justice; *exile* either by the necessity of circumstances or an order of authority *banishment* is a disgraceful punishment inflicted by tribunals upon delinquents; *exile* is a disgrace incurred without dishonour: *exile* removes us from our country: *banishment* drives us from it ignominiously: it is the custom in Russia to *banish* offenders to Siberia; Ovid was *exiled* by an order of Augustus.

Banishment is an action, a compulsory exercise of power over another, which must be submitted to; *exile* is a state into which we may go voluntarily: many Romans chose to go into *exile* rather than await the judgment of the people, by whom they might have been *banished*. *Banishment* and *expulsion* both mark a disgraceful and coercive exclusion, but *banishment* is authoritative; it is a public act of government: *expulsion* is simply coercive; it is the act of a private individual, or a small community. *Banishment* always supposes a removal to a distant spot, to another land; *expulsion* never reaches beyond a particular house or society: *expulsion* from the university, or any public school, is the necessary consequence of discovering a refractory temper, or a propensity to insubordination.

Banishment and *expulsion* are likewise used in a figurative sense, although *exile* is not: in this sense, *banishment* marks a distant and entire removal; *expulsion* a violent removal: we *banish* that which it is not prudent to retain; we *expel* that which is noxious. Hopes are *banished* from the mind when every prospect of success has disappeared; fears are *banished* when they are altogether groundless; envy, hatred, and every evil passion, should be *expelled* from the mind as disturbers of its peace: harmony and good humour are best promoted by *banishing* from conversation all subjects of difference in religion and politics;

Footnote: "Exiler, bannir."

good morals require that every unseemly word should be expelled.

*O banishment ! Eternal banishment !
Ne'er to return ! Must we ne'er meet again !
My heart will break.*—OTWAY.

Arms, and the man I sing, who forc'd by fate,
And haughty Juno's unrelenting hate,
Expell'd and exil'd, left the Trojan shore.—DRYDEN.

The expulsion and escape of Hippas at length set
Athens free.—CUMBERLAND.

If sweet content is banish'd from my soul,
Life grows a burden and a weight of woe.—GENTLEMAN.

In all the tottering imbecility of a new government
and with a parliament totally unmanageable, his Majesty
(King William III.) persevered. He persevered to *expel*
the fears of his people by his fortitude ; to steady their
fickleness by his constancy.—BURKE.

Bankruptcy, v. Insolveny.

Banquet, v. Feast.

To Banter, v. To deride.

Barbarous, v. Cruel.

Bare, Naked, Uncovered.

Bare, in Saxon *bare*, German *bar*, Hebrew
parah to lay bare, and *bar* pure.

Naked, in Saxon *naced*, German *nacket*
or *nakt*, low German *naakt*, Swedish *nakot*,
Danish *nogen*, &c. comes from the Latin *nudus*,
compounded of *ne* not and *dutus* or *indutus*
clothed, and the Greek *gυμνo* to clothe.

Bare marks the condition of being without
some necessary appendage ; *naked* simply the
absence of an external covering ; *bare* is there-
fore often substituted for *naked*, although not
vice versa : we speak of *bare-headed*, *barefoot*, to
expose the *bare* arm ; but a figure is *naked*, or
the body is *naked*.

When applied to other objects, *bare* conveys
the idea of want in general ; *naked* simply the
want of something exterior : when we speak
of sitting upon the *bare* ground, of laying any
place *bare*, of *bare* walls, a *bare* house, the idea
of want in essentials is strongly conveyed ;
but *naked* walls, *naked* fields, a *naked* appear-
ance, all denote something wanting to the
eye : *bare* in this sense is frequently followed
by the object that is wanted ; *naked* is mostly
employed as an adjunct : a tree is *bare* of
leaves ; this constitutes it a *naked* tree.

They preserve the same analogy in their
figurative application : a *bare* sufficiency is
that which scarcely suffices ; the *naked* truth
is that which has nothing about it to intercept
the view of it from the mind.

Naked and *uncovered* bear a strong resem-
blance to each other ; to be *naked* is in fact to
have the body *uncovered*, but many things are
uncovered which are not *naked* : nothing is
said to be *naked* but what in the nature of
things, or according to the usages of men,
ought to be covered ; everything is *uncovered*
from which the covering is removed. Accord-
ing to our natural sentiments of decency, or
our acquired sentiments of propriety, we ex-
pect to see the *naked* body covered with cloth-
ing, the *naked* tree covered with leaves ; the
naked walls covered with paper or paint ; and
the *naked* country covered with verdure or
habitations ; on the other hand, plants are left

uncovered to receive the benefit of the sun or
rain ; furniture or articles of use or neces-sity
are left *uncovered* to suit the convenience of the
user : or a person may be *uncovered*, in the
sense of *bare-headed*, on certain occasions.

The story of *Aeneas*, on which Virgil founded his poem,
was very *bare* of circumstances.—ADDISON.

Why turn'st thou from me ? I'm alone already ;
Methinks I stand upon a *naked* beach,
Sighing to winds, and to the seas complaining.
OTWAY.

In the eye of that Supreme Being to whom our whole
internal frame is *uncovered*, dispositions hold the place of
actions.—BLAIR.

Bare, Scanty, Destitute.

Bare, v. Bare, naked.

Scanty, from to *scant*, signifies the quality
of *scanting* : *scant* is most probably changed
from the Latin *scindo* to clip or cut.

Destitute, in Latin *destitutus*, participle
of *destitu*, compounded of *de* privative and
statuo to appoint or provide for, signifies un-
provided for or wanting.

All these terms denote the absence or de-
privation of some necessary. *Bare* and *scanty*
have a relative sense : *bare* respects what serves
for ourselves ; *scanty* that which is provided
by others. A subsistence is *bare* ; a supply is
scanty. An imprudent person will estimate as
a *bare* competence what would supply an econ-
omist with superfluities. A hungry person
will consider as a *scanty* allowance what would
more than suffice for a moderate eater.

Bare is said of those things which belong to
our corporeal sustenance ; *destitute* is said of
one's outward circumstances in general. A
person is *bare* of clothes or money ; he is *destitu-
te* of friends, of resources, or of comforts.

Christ and the Apostles did most earnestly inculcate
the belief of his Godhead, and attracted men upon the
bare acknowledgment of this.—SOUTH.

So *scanty* is our present allowance of happiness, that in
many situations life could scarcely be supported, if hope
were not allowed to relieve the present hour, by pleasures
borrowed from the future.—JOHNSON.

Destitute of that faithful guide, the compass, the
ancients had no other method of regulating their course
than by observing the sun and stars.—ROBERTSON.

Bare, Mere.

Bare, v. Bare, naked.

Mere, in Latin *merus* mere, properly *solus*
alone, from the Greek *μερo* to divide, signifies
separated from others.

Bare is used in a positive sense : *mere*, nega-
tively. The *bare* recital of some events brings
tears. The *mere* circumstance of receiving
favours ought not to bind any person to the
opinions of another.

The *bare* idea of being in the company of a
murderer is apt to awaken horror in the mind.
The *mere* attendance at a place of worship is
the smallest part of a Christian's duty.

He who goes no farther than *bare* justice stops at the
beginning of virtue.—BLAIR.

I would advise every man, who would not appear in the
world a *mere* scholar or philosopher, to make himself
master of the social virtue of complaisance.—ADDISON.

Barefaced v. Glaring.

Bargain, v. Agreement.

To Bargain, v. To buy.

To Barter, v. To change.

To Barter, v. To exchange.

Base, Vile, Mean.

Base, in French *bas* low, from the Latin *basis* the foundation or lowest part.

Vile, in French *vil*, Latin *vilis*, Greek *φάυλος*, worthless, of no account.

Mean and **Middle** both come from the Latin *medius*, which signifies moderate, not elevated, of little value.

Base is a stronger term than **vile**, and **vile** than **mean**. **Base** marks a high degree of moral turpitude: **vile** and **mean** denote in different degrees the want of all value or esteem. What is **base** excites our abhorrence, what is **vile** provokes disgust, what is **mean** awakens contempt. **Base** is opposed to magnanimous; **vile** to noble; **mean** to generous. Ingratitude is **base**. It does violence to the best affections of our nature: flattery is **vile**; it violates truth in the grossest manner for the lowest purposes of gain; compliances are **mean** which are derogatory to the rank or dignity of the individual.

The **base** character violates the strongest moral obligations; the **vile** character blends low and despicable arts with his vices; the **mean** character acts inconsistently with his honour or respectability. Depravity of mind dictates **base** conduct; lowness of sentiment or disposition leads to **vileness**; a selfish temper engenders **meanness**. The schoolmaster of Falerii was guilty of the **basest** treachery in surrendering his helpless charge to the enemy; the Roman general, therefore, with true nobleness of mind treated him as a **vile** malefactor; sycophants are in the habit of practising every **mean** artifice to obtain favour.

The more elevated a person's rank, the greater is his **baseness** who abuses his influence to the injury of those who repose confidence in him. The lower the rank of the individual, and the more atrocious his conduct, the **viler** is his character. The more respectable the station of the person, and the more extended his wealth, the greater is his **meanness** when he descends to practices fitted only for his inferiors.

Scorns the **base** earth and crowd below,
And with a soaring wing still mounts on high.—CREECH.

That all the petty kings him envy'd,
And worshipp'd be like him and deify'd,
Of courtly sycophants and catfists vile.
GILBERT WEST.

There is hardly a spirit upon earth so **mean** and contracted as to centre all regards on its own interest exclusive of the rest of mankind.—BERKELEY.

Basis, v. Foundation.

Bashful, v. Modest.

Battle, Combat, Engagement.

Battle, in French *bataille*, comes from the Latin *batuo*, Hebrew *abat* to beat, signifying a beating.

Combat signifies literally a **battle** one with the other.

Engagement signifies the act of being engaged or occupied in a contest.

* **Battle** is a general action requiring some preparation: **combat** is only particular, and sometimes unexpected. Thus the action which took place between the Carthaginians and the Romans, or Cæsar and Pompey, were **battles**; but the action in which the Horatii and the Curiatii, decided the fate of Rome, as also many of the actions in which Hercules was engaged, were **combats**. The **battle** of Almanza, was a decisive action between Philip of France and Charles of Austria, in their contest for the throne of Spain; in the **combat** between Menelaus and Paris, Homer very artfully describes the reasonable interference of Venus to save her favourite from destruction.

The word **combat** has more relation to the act of fighting than that of **battle**, which is used with more propriety simply to denominate the action. In the **battle** between the Romans and Pyrrhus, King of Epirus, the **combat** was obstinate and bloody; the Romans seven times repulsed the enemy, and were as often repulsed in their turn. In this latter sense **engagement** and **combat** are analogous, but the former has a specific relation to the agents and parties engaged, which is not implied in the latter term. We speak of a person being present in an **engagement**; wounded in an **engagement**; or having fought desperately in an **engagement**: on the other hand we say, to **engage** in a **combat**; to challenge to single **combat**: **combats** are sometimes begun by the accidental meeting of avowed opponents; in such **engagements** nothing is thought of but the gratification of revenge.

Battles are fought between armies only; they are gained or lost: **combats** are entered into between individuals, whether of the brute or human species, in which they seek to destroy or excel: **engagements** are confined to no particular member, only to such as are **engaged**: a general **engagement** is said of an army when the whole body is **engaged**: partial **engagements** respect only such as are fought by small parties or companies of an army. History is mostly occupied with the details of **battles**; in the history of the Greeks and Romans, we have likewise an account of the **combats** between men or wild beasts, which formed their principal amusement. It is reported of the German women, that whenever their husbands went to **battle** they used to go into the thickest of the **combat** to carry them provisions, or dress their wounds; and that sometimes they would take part in the **engagement**.

A **battle** bloody fought,
Where darkness and surprise made conquest cheap.
DRYDEN.

This brave man, with long resistance,
Held the **combat** doubtful.—ROWE.

The relation of events becomes a moral lecture, when the **combat** of honour is rewarded with virtue.—HAWKSWORTH.

The Emperor of Morocco commanded his principal officers, that if he died during the **engagement**, they should conceal his death from the army.—ADDISON.

• Girard: "Bataille. combat."

To Be, Exist, Subsist.

Be, with its inflections, is to be traced through the northern and Oriental languages to the Hebrew *hovah*.

Exist, in French *exister*, Latin *existo*, compounded of *e* or *ex* and *sisto*, signifies to place or stand by itself or of itself. From this derivation of the latter verb arises the distinction in the use of the two words. The former is applicable either to the accidents of things, or to the substances or things themselves; the latter only to substances or things that stand or exist of themselves.

* We say of qualities, of forms, of actions, of arrangement, of movement, and of every different relation, whether real, ideal, or qualificative, that they *are*; we say of matter, of spirit, of body, and of all substances, that they *exist*. Man *is* man, and will *be* man under all circumstances and changes of life: he *exists* under every known climate and variety of heat or cold in the atmosphere.

Being and *existence* as nouns have this farther distinction, that the former is employed not only to designate the abstract action of *being*, but is metaphorically employed for the sensible object that *is*; the latter is confined altogether to the abstract sense. Hence we speak of human *beings*, *beings* animate or inanimate; the Supreme *Being*; but the *existence* of a God; *existence* of innumerable worlds; the *existence* of evil. *Being* may in some cases be indifferently employed for *existence*, particularly in the grave style; when speaking of animate objects, as the *being* of a God; our frail *being*; and when qualified in a compound form is preferable, as our *well-being*.

Subsist is properly a species of *existing*; from the Latin prepositive *sub*, signifying for a time, it denotes temporary or partial *existence*. Every thing *exists* by the creative and preservative power of the Almighty; that which *subsists* depends for its *existence* upon the chances and changes of this mortal life. To *exist* therefore designates simply the event of *being* or *existing*; to *subsist* conveys the accessory ideas of the mode and duration of *existing*. Man *exists* while the vital or spiritual part of him remains; he *subsists* by what he obtains to support life. Friendships *exist* in the world, notwithstanding the prevalence of selfishness; but it cannot *subsist* for any length of time between individuals in whom this base temper prevails.

He does not understand either vice or virtue, who will not allow that life without the rules of morality is a wayward uneasy *being*.—STEELE.

When the soul is freed from all corporeal alliance, then it truly *exists*.—HUGHES after XENOPHON.

Forlorn of thee,
Whither shall I betake me? where *subsist*!—MILTON.

To Be, Become, Grow.

Be, *v.* To be, exist.

Become signifies to *come to be*, that is, to be in course of time.

Grow is in all probability changed from the Latin *crevi*, perfect of *cresco* to increase or grow.

Vide Abbé Girard; "Être, exister, subsister."

Be is positive; *become* is relative; a person is what he is without regard to what he *was*; he *becomes* that which he *was* not before. We judge of a man by what he *is*, but we cannot judge of him by what he will *become*: this year he *is* immoral and irreligious, but by the force of reflection on himself he may *become* the contrary in another year.

To *become* includes no idea of the mode or circumstance of its *becoming*; to *grow* is to *become* by a gradual process: a man may *become* a good man from a vicious one, in consequence of a sudden action on his mind; but he *grows* in wisdom and virtue by means of an increase in knowledge and experience.

To be or not to be? that is the question.—SHAKESPEARE.

About this time Savage's purse, who had always treated him as her own son, died; and it was natural for him to take care of those effects which by her death were, as he imagined, *become* his own.—OHNSON.

Authors, like coins, *grow* dear, as they *grow* old.—POPE.

To be Acquainted With, *v.* To know.

Beam, *v.* Gleam.

Beam, *v.* Ray.

To Bear, Yield.

Bear, in Saxon *baran*, old German *beran*, Latin *pario*, and Hebrew *bara* to create.

Yield, *v.* To afford.

Bear conveys the idea of creating within itself; *yield* that of giving from itself. Animals *bear* their young; inanimate objects *yield* their produce. An apple-tree *bears* apples; the earth *yields* fruits.

Bear marks properly the natural power of bringing forth something of its own kind; *yield* is said of the result or quantum brought forth: shrubs *bear* leaves, flowers, or berries, according to their natural properties; flowers *yield* seeds plentifully or otherwise as they are favoured by circumstances.

No keel shall cut the waves for foreign ware,
For every soil shall ev'ry product *bear*.—DRYDEN.

Nor Bactria, nor the richer Indian fields,
Nor all the gummy stores Arabia *yields*,
Nor any foreign earth of greater name,
Can with sweet Italy contend in fame.—DRYDEN.

To Bear, Carry, Convey, Transport.

Bear, from the sense of generating (*v.* To bear, *yield*), has derived that of retaining.

Carry, in French *porter*, probably from the Latin *currus*, Greek *καρὸς* or *τρεχὸς* to run, or *kurva*, in Hebrew *kerah* to meet, signifies to move a thing from one place to another.

Convey, in Latin *conveho*, is probably compounded of *con* and *veho* to carry with one.

Transport, in French *transporter*, Latin *transporto*, compounded of *trans* over, and *porto* to carry, signifies to *carry* to a distance.

To *bear* is simply to take the weight of any substance upon one's self; to *carry* is to remove that weight from the spot where it was; we always *bear* in *carrying*, but we do not always *carry* when we *bear*. Both may be applied to things as well as persons: whatever receives the weight of any thing *bears* it; whatever is caused to move with any thing

carries it. That which cannot be easily borne must be burdensome to *carry*: in extremely hot weather it is sometimes irksome to *bear* the weight even of one's clothing; Virgil praises the pious Æneas for having *carried* his father on his shoulders in order to save him from the sacking of Troy. Weak people or weak things are not fit to *bear* heavy burdens: lazy people prefer to be *carried* rather than to *carry* any thing.

Since *bear* is confined to personal service it may be used in the sense of *carry*, when the latter implies the removal of any thing by means of any other body. The *bearer* of any letter or parcel is he who *carries* it in his hand; the *carrier* of parcels is he who employs a conveyance. Hence the word *bear* is often very appropriately substituted for *carry*, as Virgil praises Æneas for *bearing* his father on his shoulders. *Convey* and *transport* are species of *carrying*.

Carry in its particular sense is employed either for personal exertions or actions performed by the help of other means; *convey* and *transport* are employed for such actions as are performed not by immediate personal intervention or exertion: a porter *carries* goods on his knot; goods are *conveyed* in a waggon or a cart; they are *transported* in a vessel.

Convey expresses simply the mode of removing; *transport* annexes to this the idea of the place and the distance. Merchants get the goods *conveyed* into their warehouses which they have had *transported* from distant countries. Pedestrians take no more with them than what they can conveniently *carry*: could armies do the same, one of the greatest obstacles to the indulgence of human ambition would be removed: for many an incursion into a peaceful country is defeated for the want of means to *convey* provisions sufficient for such numbers; and when mountains or deserts are to be traversed, another great difficulty presents itself in the *transportation* of artillery.

It is customary at funerals for some to *bear* the pall and others to *carry* wands or staves; the body itself is *conveyed* in a hearse, unless it has to cross the ocean, in which case it is *transported* in a vessel.

In hollow wood they floating armies *bear*.—DRYDEN.

A whale, besides those seas and oceans in the several vessels of his body which are filled with innumerable shoals of little animals, *carries* about him a whole world of inhabitants.—ADDISON.

Love cannot, like the wind, itself *convey*
To fill two sails, though both are spread one way.
HOWARD.

It is to navigation that men are indebted for the power of *transporting* the superfluous stock of one part of the earth to supply the wants of another.—ROBERTSON.

To Bear, *v.* To suffer.

To Bear Down, *v.* To overbear.

Beast, *v.* Animal.

To Beat, Strike, Hit.

Beat, in French *battre*, Latin *batuo*, comes from the Hebrew *habat* to beat.

Strike, in Saxon *strican*, Danish *stricker*, &c. from *strictum*, participle of *stringo* to bind.

Hit, in Latin *ictus*, participle of *ico*, comes from the Hebrew *necut* to strike.

To *beat* is to redouble blows; to *strike* is to give one single blow; but the bare touching in consequence of an effort constitutes *hitting*. We never *beat* but with design, nor *hit* without an aim, but we may *strike* by accident. It is the part of the strong to *beat*; of the most vehement to *strike*; of the most sure-sighted to *hit*.

Notwithstanding the declamations of philosophers as they please to style themselves, the practice of *beating* cannot altogether be discarded from the military or scholastic discipline. The master who *strikes* his pupil hastily is oftener impelled by the force of passion than of conviction. *Hitting* is the object and delight of the marksman; it is the utmost exertion of his skill to *hit* the exact point at which he aims.

Young Sylvia *beats* her breast, and cries aloud
For succour from the clownish neighbourhood.
DRYDEN.

Send thy arrows forth,
Strike, strike these tyrants and avenge my tears.
CUMBERLAND.

No man is thought to become vicious by sacrificing the life of an animal to the pleasure of *hitting* a mark. It is however certain that by this act more happiness is destroyed than produced.—HAWKSWORTH.

To Beat, Defeat, Overpower, Rout, Overthrow.

Beat is here figuratively employed in the sense of the former section.

Defeat, from the French *defaire*, implies to undo; and *Overpower* to have the power over any one.

To *Rout* from the French *mettre en déroute* is to turn from one's route, and *Overthrow* to throw over or upside down.

Beat respects personal contests between individuals or parties: *defeat*, *rout*, *overpower*, and *overthrow*, are employed mostly for contests between numbers. A general is *beaten* in important engagements; he is *defeated* and may be *routed* in partial attacks; he is *overpowered* by numbers, and *overthrown* in set engagements. The English pride themselves on *beating* their enemies by land as well as by sea, whenever they come to fair engagements, but the English are sometimes *defeated* when they make too desperate attempts, and sometimes they are in danger of being *overpowered*: they are very seldom *routed* or *overthrown*.

To *beat* is an indefinite term expressive of no particular degree: the being *beaten* may be attended with greater or less damage. To be *defeated* is a specific disadvantage, it is a failure in a particular object of more or less importance. To be *overpowered* is a positive loss; it is a loss of the power of acting which may be of longer or shorter duration: to be *routed* is a temporary disadvantage; a *rout* alters the route or course of proceeding, but does not disable: to be *overthrown* is the greatest of all mischiefs, and is applicable only to great armies and great concerns: an *overthrow* commonly decides a contest.

Beat is a term which reflects more or less dishonour on the general or the army, or on both: *defeat* is an indifferent term; the best

generals may sometimes be *defeated* by circumstances which are above human control; *overpowering* is coupled with no particular honour to the winner, nor disgrace to the loser; superior power is oftener the result of good fortune than of skill. The bravest and finest troops may be *overpowered* in cases which exceed human power: a *route* is always disgraceful, particularly to the army; it always arises from want of firmness: an *overthrow* is fatal rather than dishonourable; it excites pity rather than contempt.

Turnus. I know you think me not your friend,
Nor will I much with your belief contend;
I beg your greatness not to give the law
In other realms, but *beaten* to withdraw.—DRYDEN.

Satan frequently confesses the omnipotence of the Supreme Being, that being the perfection he was forced to allow him, and the only consideration which could support his pride under the shame of his defeat.—ADDISON.

The veterans who defended the walls were soon *overpowered* by numbers.—ROBERTSON.

The *route* (at the battle of Pavia) now became universal, and resistance ceased in almost every part but where the king was in person.—ROBERTSON.

Milton's subject is rebellion against the Supreme Being; raised by the highest order of created beings; the *overthrow* of their host is the punishment of their crime.—JOHNSON.

*Beatification, Canonization.

These are two acts emanating from the pontifical authority, by which the Pope declares a person, whose life has been exemplary and accompanied with miracles, as entitled to enjoy eternal happiness after his death, and determines in consequence the sort of worship which should be paid to him.

In the act of *Beatification* the Pope pronounces only as a private person, and uses his own authority only in granting to certain persons, or to a religious order, the privilege of paying a particular worship to a *beatified* object.

In the act of *Canonization*, the Pope speaks as a judge after a judicial examination on the state, and decides the sort of worship which ought to be paid by the whole church.

Beatitude, *v.* Happiness.

Beau, *v.* Gallant.

Beautiful, Fine, Handsome, Pretty.

Beautiful, or full of *beauty*, in French *beau*, comes from *beau*, *belle*, in Latin *bellus* fair, and *bonus* or *bonus* good.

Fine in French *fin*, German *fein*, &c., not improbably comes from the Greek *φαῖνος* bright, splendid, and *φαῖνω* to appear, because what is *fine* is by distinction clear.

Handsome, from the word *hand*, denotes a species of *beauty* in the body, as *handy* denotes its agility and skill.

Pretty, in Saxon *præte* adorned, German *prächtigt*, Swedish *praktigt* splendid, which is connected with our words, parade and pride.

Of these epithets, which denote what is pleasing to the eye, *beautiful* conveys the strongest meaning; it marks the possession

of that in its fullest extent, of which the other terms denote the possession in part only. *Fineness*, *handsomeness*, and *prettiness*, are to *beauty* as parts to a whole. When taken in relation to persons, a woman is *beautiful* who in feature and complexion possesses a grand assemblage of graces; a woman is *fine*, who with a striking figure unites shape and symmetry; a woman is *handsome*, who has good features, and *pretty* if with symmetry of feature be united delicacy.

The *beautiful* is determined by fixed rules; it admits of no excess or defect; it comprehends regularity, proportion, and a due distribution of colour, and every particular which can engage the attention: the *fine* must be coupled with grandeur, majesty, and strength of figure; it is incompatible with that which is small; a little woman can never be *fine*: the *handsome* is a general assemblage of what is agreeable; it is marked by no particular characteristic, but the absence of all deformity: *prettiness* is always coupled with simplicity, it is incompatible with that which is large: a tall woman with masculine features cannot be *pretty*.

Beauty will always have its charms; they are, however, but attractions for the eye; they please and awaken ardent sentiments for a while; but the possessor must have something else to give her claims to lasting regard: this is, however, seldom the case: Providence has dealt out his gifts with a more even hand. Neither the *beautiful*, nor the *fine* woman has in general those durable attractions which belong either to the *handsome* or the *pretty*, who with a less inimitable tint of complexion, a less unerring proportion in the limbs, a less precise symmetry of feature, are frequently possessed of a sweetness of countenance, a vivacity in the eye, and a grace in the manner, that wins the beholder and inspires affection.

Beauty is peculiarly a female perfection, in the male sex it is rather a defect: a *beautiful* man will not be respected, because he cannot be respectable; the possession of *beauty* deprives him of his manly characteristics, boldness and energy of mind, strength and robustness of limb: but though a man may not be *beautiful* or *pretty*, he may be *fine* or *handsome*.

When relating to other objects, *beautiful*, *fine*, *pretty*, have a strong analogy. With respect to the objects of nature, the *beautiful* is displayed in the works of creation, and wherever it appears it is marked by elegance, variety, harmony, proportion; but above all, that softness which is peculiar to female *beauty*: the *fine*, on the contrary, is associated with the grand, and the *pretty* with the simple. The sky presents either a *beautiful* aspect, or a *fine* aspect; but not a *pretty* aspect. A rural scene is *beautiful* when it unites richness and diversity of natural objects with superior cultivation: it is *fine* when it presents the bolder and more impressive features of nature, consisting of rocks and mountains; it is *pretty* when divested of all that is extraordinary, it presents a smiling view of nature in the gay attire of shrubs, and many coloured flowers, and verdant meadows, and luxuriant fields.

Beautiful sentiments have much in them to interest the affections, as well as the understanding; they make a vivid impression: *fine*

* Girard; "Beatification, canonization."

sentiments mark an elevated mind and a loftiness of conception; they occupy the understanding, and afford scope for reflection; they make a strong impression: *pretty* ideas are but pleasing associations or combinations that only amuse for the time being, without producing any lasting impression. We may speak of a *beautiful* poem, although not a *beautiful* tragedy; but a *fine* tragedy, and a *pretty* comedy. Imagery may be *beautiful* and *fine*, but seldom *pretty*.

The celestial bodies revolving with so much regularity in their orbits, and displaying so much brilliancy of light, are *beautiful* objects. The display of an army drawn up in battle array; the neatness of the men; the order, complexity, and variety of their movements, and the precision in their discipline, afford a *fine* spectacle. An assemblage of children imitating in their amusements the system and regularity of more serious employments, and preserving at the same time the playfulness of childhood, is a *pretty* sight.

Beautiful, *fine*, and *pretty*, are indifferently applied to works of nature and art; *handsome* to works of art only, as a *beautiful* picture, a *fine* drawing, and a *pretty* cap, *handsome* furniture; but in such cases *handsome* has mostly a reference to the make or construction of a thing: but *beautiful*, *fine*, and *pretty*, simply denote the impression which the appearance of things makes on the observer. Hence it is that *handsome* is applied to moral actions, which reflect credit on the agent; and hence the proverb of "*handsome is that handsome does*."

There is nothing that makes its way more directly to the soul than *beauty*, which immediately diffuses a secret satisfaction and complacency through the imagination.—ADDISON.

It is observed among birds that nature has lavished all her ornaments upon the male, who very often appears in a most *beautiful* head dress.—ADDISON.

When in ordinary discourse, we say a man has a *fine* head, a long head, or a good head, we express ourselves metaphorically, and speak in relation to his understanding; whereas, when we say of a woman, she has a *fine*, a long, or a good head, we speak only in relation to her comode.—ADDISON.

A *handsome* fellow immediately alarms jealous husbands, and every thing that looks young or gay turns their thoughts upon their wives.—ADDISON.

A letter dated Sept. acquaints me that the writer, being resolved to try his fortune, had fasted all that day, and, that he might be sure of dreaming upon something at night, procured a *handsome* slice of bride cake.—SPECTATOR.

"Indeed, my dear," says she, "you make me mad sometimes, so you do, with the silly way you have of treating me like a *pretty* idiot."—STEELE.

An innocent creature, who would start at the name of strumpet, may think it *pretty* to be called a mistress.—SPECTATOR.

To Become, *v.* To be, become.

Becoming, Decent, Fit, Suitable.

Becoming, from *become*, compounded of *be* and *come*, signifies coming in its place.

Decent, in French *decent*, in Latin *decens*, participle of *deceo*, from the Greek *δοκεο*, and the Chaldee *deca* to beseech, signifies the quality of beseeching and besitting.

Fit, in French *fait*, Latin *factum*, participle of *facio* to do, signifies done as it ought to be. Suitable, from *to suit*, signifies able to suit; and *suit*, in French *suite*, Latin *secutus*, comes from *sequor* to follow, signifying to follow as it ought.

What is *becoming* respects the manner of being in society, such as it ought, as to person, time, and place. Decency regards the manner of displaying one's self, so as to be approved and respected. *Fitness* and *suitableness* relate to the disposition, arrangement, and order of either being or doing, according to persons, things, or circumstances.

The *becoming* consists of an exterior that is pleasing to the view: *decency* involves moral propriety; it is regulated by the fixed rules of good breeding: *fitness* is regulated by local circumstances, and *suitableness* by the established customs and usages of society. The dress of a woman is *becoming* that renders her person more agreeable to the eye; it is *decent* if it in no wise offend modesty; it is *fit* if it be what the occasion requires; it is *suitable* if it be according to the rank and character of the wearer. What is *becoming* varies for every individual; the age, the complexion, the stature, and the habits of the person must be consulted in order to obtain the appearance which is *becoming*: what *becomes* a young female, or one of fair complexion, may not *become* one who is farther advanced in life, or who has dark features: *decency* is one and the same for all; all civilized nations have drawn the exact line between the *decent* and the *indecent*, although fashion may sometimes draw females aside from this line: *fitness* varies with the seasons, or the circumstances of persons; what is *fit* for the winter is *unfit* for the summer, or what is *fit* for dry weather is *unfit* for the wet; what it *fit* for town is not *fit* for the country; what is *fit* for a healthy person is not *fit* for one that is infirm: *suitableness* accommodates itself to the external circumstances and conditions of persons; the house, the furniture, the equipage of a prince, must be *suitable* to his rank; the retinue of an ambassador must be *suitable* to the character which he has to maintain, and to the wealth, dignity, and importance of the nation, whose monarch he represents.

Gravity *becomes* a judge, or a clergyman, at all times: an unassuming tone is *becoming* in a child when he addresses his superiors. *Decency* requires a more than ordinary gravity when we are in the house of mourning or prayer; it is *indecent* for a child on the commission of a fault to affect a careless unconcern in the presence of those whom he has offended. There is a *fitness* or *unfitness* in persons for each other's society: education *fits* a person for the society of the noble, the wealthy, the polite, and the learned. There is a *suitableness* in people's tempers for each other; such a *suitability* is particularly requisite for those who are destined to live together: selfish people, with opposite tastes and habits, can never be *suitable* companions.

Nothing ought to be held laudable or *becoming*, but what nature itself should prompt us to think so.—STEELE.

A Gothic bishop, perhaps, thought it proper to repeat such a form in such particular shoes or slippers; another

fancied it would be very *decent* if such a part of public devotions were performed with a mitre on his head.—ADDISON.

To the wiser judgment of God it must be left to determine what is *fit* to be bestowed, and what to be withheld.—BLAIR.

Raphael, amidst his tenderness and friendship for man, shews such a dignity and condescension in all his speech and behaviour, as are *suitable* to a superior nature.—ADDISON.

Becoming, Comely, Graceful.

Becoming, *v. Becoming, decent.*

Comely, or *comely*, signifies coming or appearing as one would have it.

Graceful, signifies full of *grace*.

These epithets are employed to mark in general what is agreeable to the eye. *Becoming* denotes less than *comely*, and this less than *graceful*: nothing can be *comely* or *graceful* which is *unbecoming*: although many things are *becoming* which are neither *comely* or *graceful*.

Becoming respects the decorations of the person, and the exterior deportment; *comely* respects natural embellishments: *graceful* natural or artificial accomplishments: manner is *becoming*; figure is *comely*, air, figure, or attitude, is *graceful*.

Becoming is relative; it depends on taste and opinion on accordance with the prevailing sentiments or particular circumstances of society: *comely* and *graceful* are absolute; they are qualities felt and acknowledged by all.

What is *becoming* is confined to no rank; the highest and the lowest have, alike, the opportunity of doing or being that which *becomes* their station: what is *comely* is seldom associated with great refinement and culture; what is *graceful* is rarely to be discovered apart from high rank, noble birth, or elevation of character.

The care of doing nothing *unbecoming* has accompanied the greatest minds to their last moments. Thus Cæsar gathered his robe about him that he might not fall in a manner *unbecoming* of himself.—SPECTATOR.

The *comeliness* of person, and the decency of behaviour, add infinite weight to what is pronounced by any one.—SPECTATOR.

To make the acknowledgment of a fault in the highest manner *graceful*, it is lucky when the circumstances of the offender place him above any ill-consequences from the resentment of the person offended.—STEELE.

To Be Conscious, *v. To feel.*

To Be Deficient, *v. To fail.*

To Bedew, *v. To sprinkle.*

To Beg, Desire.

Beg, *v. To ask, beg.*

Desire, in French *desirer*, Latin *desidero*, comes from *desido* to fix the mind on an object.

To *beg*, marks the wish; to *desire*, the will and determination.

Beg is the act of an inferior, or one in a subordinate condition; *desire* is the act of a superior: we *beg* a thing as a favour; we *desire* it as a right: children *beg* their parents

to grant them an indulgence; parents *desire* their children to attend to their business.

She'll hang upon his lips, and *beg* him tell
The story of my passion o'er again.—SOUTHERN.

Once when he was without lodging, meat, or clothes, one of his friends left a message, that he *desired* to see him about nine in the morning. Savage knew that it was his intention to assist him; but was very much disgusted that he should presume to prescribe the hour of his attendance, and I believe refused to see him.—JOHNSON.

To Beg, Beseech, Solicit, Entreat, Supplicate, Implore, Crave.

Beg, *v. To ask, beg.*

Beseech, compounded of *be* and *seech*, or *seek* is an intensive verb, signifying to seek strongly.

Solicit, in French *soliciter*, Latin *solicito*, is probably compounded of *solum* or *totum*, and *cito* to cite, summon, appeal to, signifying to rouse altogether.

Entreat, compounded of *en* or *in* and *trat*, in French *traiter*, Latin *tracto* to manage, signifies to act upon.

Supplicate, in Latin *supplicatus*, participle of *supplico*, compounded of *sup* or *sub* and *plico* to fold, signifies to bend the body down in token of submission or distress, in order to awaken notice.

Implore, in French *implorer*, Latin *imploro*, compounded of *im* or *in* and *ploro* to weep or lament, signifies to act upon by weeping.

Crave, in Saxon *cravian*, signifies to long for earnestly.

All these terms denote a species of asking (*v. To ask, beg*), varied as to the person, the object and the manner; the first four do not mark such a state of dependence in the agent as the last three: to *beg* denotes a state of want; to *beseech*, *entreat*, and *solicit*, a state of urgent necessity; *supplicate* and *implore* a state of abject distress; *crave*, the lowest state of physical want: one *begs* with importunity; *beseeches* with earnestness; *entreats* by the force of reasoning and strong representation: one *solicits* by virtue of one's interest; *supplicates* by an humble address; *implores* by every mark of dejection and humiliation.

Begging is the act of the poor when they need assistance: *beseeching* and *entreating* are resorted to by friends and equals, when they want to influence or persuade, but *beseeching* is more urgent: *entreating* more argumentative: *solicitations* are employed to obtain favours, which have more respect to the circumstances than the rank of the solicitor: *supplicating* and *imploping* are resorted to by sufferers for the relief of their misery, and are addressed to those who have the power of averting or increasing the calamity: *craving* is the consequence of longing; it marks an earnestness of supplication: an abject state of suffering dependence.

Those who are too idle to work commonly have recourse to *begging*: a kind parent will sometimes rather *beseech* an undutiful child to lay aside his wicked courses, than plunge him deeper into guilt by an ill-timed exercise of authority: when we are *entreated* to do an act of civility, it is a mark of unkindness to be

heedless to the wishes of our friends: gentlemen in office are perpetually exposed to the solicitations of their friends, to procure for themselves, or their connexions, places of trust and emolument: a slave supplicates his master for pardon, when he has offended, and implores his mercy to mitigate, if not to remit the punishment: a poor wretch, suffering with hunger, craves a morsel of bread.

What more advance can mortals make in sin,
So near perfection, who with blood begin?
Deaf to the calf that lies beneath the knife;
Looks up, and from the butcher begs her life?
DRYDEN.

Modesty never rages, never murmurs, never pouts, when it is ill-treated; it pines, it desecures, it languishes.—STEELE.

As money collected by subscription is necessarily received in small sums, Savage was never able to send his poems to the press, but for many years continued his solicitation, and squandered whatever he obtained.—JOHNSON.

For whom the merchant spread his silken stores,
Can she entreat for bread, and want the needful raiment?
—ROWE'S JANE SHORE.

Savage wrote to Lord Tyrconnel, not in a style of supplication and respect; but of reproach, menace, and contempt.—JOHNSON.

Is't then so hard, Monimia, to forgive
A fault, where humble love, like mine, implores thee?
OTWAY.

For my past crimes, my forfeit life receive.
No pity for my sufferings here I crave,
And only hope forgiveness in the grave.
ROWE'S JANE SHORE.

To Beg, *v.* To ask.

To Begin, Commence, Enter upon.

Begin, in German *beginnen*, is compounded of *be* and *ginnen*, probably a frequentative of *gehen* to go, signifying to go first to a thing.

Commence, in French *commencer*, is not improbably derived from the Latin *commendo*, signifying to betake one's self to a thing.

Enter, in Latin *intro* within, signifies with the preposition **Upon**, to go into a thing.

Begin and *commence* are so strictly allied in signification, that it is not easy to discover the difference in their application; although a minute difference does exist. To *begin* respects the order of time; to *commence*, the exertion of setting about a thing: whoever *begins* a dispute is termed the aggressor; no one should *commence* a dispute unless he can calculate the consequences, and as this is impracticable, it is better never to *commence* disputes, particularly such as are to be decided by law. *Begin* is opposed to end; *commence* to complete: a person *begins* a thing with a view of ending it; he *commences* a thing with a view of completing it.

To *begin* is either transitive or intransitive; to *commence* is mostly transitive: a speaker *begins* by apologising; he *commences* his speech with an apology: happiness frequently ends where prosperity *begins*; whoever *commences* any undertaking, without estimating his own power, must not expect to succeed.

To *begin* is used either for things or persons; to *commence* for persons only: all things have their *beginning*; in order to effect anything, we must make a *commencement*: a word *begins* with a particular letter, or a line *begins* with a

particular word; a person *commences* his career. Lastly, *begin* is more colloquial than *commence*: thus we say, to *begin* the work; to *commence* the operation: to *begin* one's play; to *commence* the pursuit; to *begin* to write; to *commence* the letter.

To *commence* and *enter upon* are as closely allied in sense as the former words; they differ principally in application: to *commence* seems rather to denote the making an experiment; to *enter upon*, that of first doing what has not been tried before: we *commence* an undertaking; we *enter upon* an employment: speculating people are very ready to *commence* schemes; considerate people are always averse to *entering upon* any office, until they feel themselves fully adequate to discharge its duties.

When *beginning* to act your part, what can be of greater moment than to regulate your plan of conduct with the most serious attention?—BLAINE.

By the destination of his Creator, and the necessities of his nature, man *commences* at once an active, not merely a contemplative being.—BLAINE.

If any man has a mind to *enter upon* such a voluntary abstinence, it might not be improper to give him the caution of Pythagoras, in particular: *Abstine a fabis*, that is, say the interpreters, "meddle not with elections."—ADDISON.

Beginning, *v.* Origin.

To Beguile, *v.* To amuse.

Behaviour, Conduct, Carriage, Deportment, Demeanour.

Behaviour comes from *behave*, compounded of *be* and *have*, signifying to have one's self, or have self-possession.

Conduct, in Latin *conductus*, participle of *conduco*, compounded of *con* or *cum* and *duco* to lead along, signifies leading one's self along.

Carriage, the abstract of *carry* (*v.* To bear, carry), signifies the act of carrying one's body, or one's self.

Deportment, from the Latin *deporto* to carry; and **Dem:anour**, from the French *demener* to lead, have the same original sense as the preceding.

Behaviour respects corporeal or mental actions; *conduct*, mental actions; *carriage*, *deportment*, and *demeanour*, are different species of behaviour. *Behaviour* respects all actions exposed to the notice of others; *conduct* the general line of a person's moral proceedings: we speak of a person's *behaviour* at table, or in company, in a ball room, in the street, or in public; of his *conduct* in the management of his private concerns, in the direction of his family, or in his different relations with his fellow creatures. *Behaviour* applies to the minor morals of society; *conduct* to those of the first moment: in our intercourse with others we may adopt a civil or polite, a rude or boisterous, *behaviour*; in our serious transactions we may adopt a peaceable, discreet, or prudent, a rash, dangerous, or mischievous *conduct*. Our *behaviour* is good or bad; our *conduct* is wise or foolish: by our *behaviour* we may render ourselves agreeable, or otherwise; by our *conduct* we may command esteem, or provoke contempt: the *behaviour* of young people in society is of particular importance;

it should, above all things, be marked with propriety in the presence of superiors and elders: the youth who does not learn betimes a seemly behaviour in company, will scarcely know how to conduct himself judiciously on any future occasion.

Carriage respects simply the manner of carrying the body; *deportment* includes both the action and the carriage of the body in performing the action; *demeanour* respects only the moral character or tendency of the action; *deportment* is said only of those exterior actions that have an immediate reference to others; *demeanour* of the general behaviour as it relates to the circumstances and situation of the individual; the *carriage* is that part of behaviour, which is of the first importance to attend to in young persons. A *carriage* should neither be haughty nor servile; to be graceful it ought to have a due mixture of dignity and condescension: the *deportment* of a man should be suited to his station; a humble *deportment* is becoming in inferiors; a stately and forbidding *deportment* is very unbecoming in superiors: the *demeanour* of a man should be suited to his situation; the suitable *demeanour* of a judge on the bench, or of a clergyman in the pulpit, or when performing his clerical functions, adds much to the dignity and solemnity of the office itself.

The *carriage* marks the birth and education: an awkward *carriage* stamps a man as vulgar; a graceful *carriage* evinces refinement and culture. The *deportment* marks the existing temper of the mind: whoever is really impressed with the solemnity and importance of public worship will evince his impressions by a gravity of *deportment*; females should guard against a light *deportment*, as highly prejudicial to their reputation: the *demeanour* marks the habitual temper of the mind, or in fact, the real character: we are often led to judge favourably of an individual from the first glance, whose *demeanour* on close examination does not leave such favourable impressions.

The circumstance of life is not that which gives us place, but our behaviour in that circumstance is what should be our solid distinction.—STEELE.

Wisdom is no less necessary in religious and moral than in civil conduct.—BLAIR.

He that will look back upon all the acquaintances he has had in his whole life will find he has seen more men capable of the greatest employments and performances, than such as could in the general bent of their *carriage* act otherwise than according to their own complexion and humour.—STEELE.

The mild *demeanour*, the modest *deportment*, are valued not only as they denote internal purity and innocence, but as forming in themselves the most amiable and engaging part of the female character.—MACKENZIE.

I have been told the same even of Mahometans, with relation to the propriety of their *demeanour* in the conventions of their erroneous worship.—STEELE.

Behind, *v.* After.

Behind, *v.* Back.

To Behold, *v.* To look, see.

Beholder, *v.* Looker on.

Belief, Credit, Trust, Faith.

Belief, from *believe*, in Saxon *gelyfan*, *geleawan*, in German *glauben*, comes, in all possi-

bility, from *lief*, in German, *belieben* to please, and the Latin *libet* it pleaseth, signifying the pleasure or assent of the mind.

Credit, in French *credit*, Latin *creditus*, participle of *credo*, compounded of *cor* the heart, and *do* to give, signifies also giving the heart.

Trust is connected with the old word *traw*, in Saxon *treowian*, German *trauen*, old German *thrawahn*, *thruwen*, &c. to hold true, and probably from the Greek *thappeiv* to have confidence, signifying to depend upon as true.

Faith, in Latin *fides*, from *fido* to confide, signifies also dependance upon as true.

Belief is the generic term, the others specific; we *believe* when we *credit* and *trust*, but not always *vice-versa*. *Belief* rests on no particular person or thing; but *credit* and *trust* rest on the authority of one or more individuals. Every thing is the subject of *belief* which produces one's assent: the events of human life are *credited* upon the authority of the narrator: the words, promises, or the integrity of individuals are *trusted*: the power of persons and the virtue of things are objects of *faith*.

Belief and *credit* are particular actions, or sentiments: *trust* and *faith* are permanent dispositions of the mind. Things are entitled to our *belief*; persons are entitled to our *credit*: but people repose a *trust* in others; or have a *faith* in others.

Our *belief* or *unbelief* is not always regulated by our reasoning faculties or the truth of things: we often *believe*, from prejudice and ignorance, things to be true which are very false. With the bulk of mankind, assurance goes further than any thing else in obtaining *credit*; gross falsehoods, pronounced with confidence, will be *credited* sooner than plain truths told in an unvarnished style. There are no disappointments more severe than those which we feel on finding that we have *trusted* to men of base principles. Ignorant people have commonly a more implicit *faith* in any nostrum recommended to them by persons of their own class, than in the prescriptions of professional men regularly educated.

Oh! I've heard him talk
Like the first-born child of love, when every word
Spoke in his eyes, and 'eapt to be believ'd,
And all to ruin me.—SOUTHERN

Oh! I will credit my Scamandra's tears!
Nor think them drops of chance like other women's.
LEE.

Capricious man! To good or ill inconstant.
Too much to fear or trust is equal weakness.
JOHNSON.

For faith repos'd on seas and on the flat'ring sky,
Thy naked corpse is doom'd on shores unknown to lie.
DRYDEN.

Belief, *trust*, and *faith*, have a religious application which *credit* has not. *Belief* is simply an act of the understanding: *trust* and *faith* are active moving principles of the mind in which the heart is concerned. *Belief* does not extend beyond an assent of the mind to any given proposition; *trust* and *faith* are lively sentiments which impel to action. *Belief* is to *trust* and *faith* as cause to effect: there may be *belief* without either *trust* or *faith*; but there can be no *trust* or *faith* without *belief*: we *believe* that there is a God, who is the creator and preserver of all his creatures; we

therefore *trust* in him for his protection of ourselves: we believe that Jesus Christ died for the sins of men; we have therefore *faith* in his redeeming grace to save us from our sins.

Belief is common to all religions: *trust* is peculiar to the *believers* in Divine revelation: *faith* is employed by distinction for the Christian *faith*. *Belief* is purely speculative; and *trust* and *faith* are operative: the former operates on the mind; the latter on the outward conduct. *Trust* in God serves to dispel all anxious concern about the future. "*Faith*," says the Apostle, "is dead without works." Theorists substitute *belief* for *faith*; enthusiasts mistake passion for *faith*. True *faith* must be grounded on a right *belief*, and accompanied with a right practice.

The Epicureans contented themselves with the denial of a Providence, asserting at the same time the existence of gods in general; because they would not shock the common *belief* of mankind.—ADDISON.

What can be a stronger motive to a firm *trust* and reliance on the mercies of our Maker, than the giving us his Son to suffer for us.—ADDISON.

The *faith* or persuasion of a Divine revelation is a divine faith, not only with respect to the object of it, but likewise in respect of the author of it, which is the Divine Spirit.—TILLOTSON.

To Believe, *v.* To think.

Beloved, *v.* Amiable.

Below, *v.* Under.

To Bemoan, *v.* To bewail.

Bend, Bent.

Both abstract nouns from the verb to *bend*: the one to express its proper, and the other its moral application: a stick has a *Bend*; the mind has a *Bent*.

A *bend* in any thing that should be straight is a defect; a *bent* of the inclination that is not sanctioned by religion is detrimental to a person's moral character and peace of mind. For a vicious *bend* in a natural body there are various remedies; but nothing will cure a corrupt *bent* except religion.

His coward lips did from their colour fly,
And that same eye whose *bend* does awe the world,
Did lose its lustre.—SHAKESPEARE.

The soul does not always care to be in the same *bent*. The faculties relieve one another by turns, and receive an additional pleasure from the novelty of those objects about which they are conversant.—ADDISON.

To Bend, *v.* To learn.

To Bend, *v.* To turn.

Beneath, *v.* Under.

Benefaction, Donation.

Benefaction, from the Latin *benefacio*, signifies the thing well done, or done for the good of others.

Donation, from *dono* to give or present, signifies the sum presented.

Both these terms denote an act of charity, but the former comprehends more than the latter: a *benefaction* comprehends acts of personal service in general towards the indigent:

donation respects simply the act of giving and the thing given. *Benefactions* are for private use; *donations* are for public service. A *benefactor* to the poor does not confine himself to the distribution of money; he enters into all their necessities, consults their individual cases, and suits his *benefactions* to their exigencies; his influence, his counsel, his purse, and his property, are employed for their good: his *donations* form the smallest part of the good which he does.

The light and influence that the heavens bestow upon this lower world, though the lower world cannot equal their *benefaction*, yet with a kind of grateful return, it reflects those rays that it cannot recompense.—SOUTH.

Titles and lands given to God are never, and plates, vestments, and other sacred utensils, are seldom consecrated; yet certain it is that after the *donation* of them to the church, it is as really a sacrifice to steal them as it is to pull down a church.—SOUTH.

Benefice, *v.* Living.

Beneficence, *v.* Benevolence.

Beneficent, Bountiful, or Bounteous, Munificent, Generous, Liberal.

Beneficent, from *benefacio* (*v.* *Benefaction*).

Bountiful signifies full of *bounty* or goodness, from the French *bonté*, Latin *bonitas*.

Munificent, in Latin *munificus*, from *munus* and *facio*, signifies the quality of making presents.

Generous, in French *généreux*, Latin *generosus*, of high blood, noble extraction, and consequently of a noble character.

Liberal, in French *libéral*, Latin *liberalis* from *liber* free, signifies the quality of being like a free man in distinction from a bondman, and by a natural association being of a free disposition, ready to communicate.

Beneficent respects every thing done for the good of others: *bounty*, *munificence*, and *generosity*, are species of *beneficence*: *liberality* is a qualification of all. The first two denote modes of action; the latter three either modes of action or modes of sentiment. The sincere well-wisher to his fellow-creatures is *beneficent* according to his means; he is *bountiful* in providing for the comfort and happiness of others; he is *munificent* in dispensing favours; he is *generous* in imparting his property; he is *liberal* in all he does.

Beneficence and *bounty* are characteristics of the Deity as well as of his creatures: *munificence*, *generosity*, and *liberality* are mere human qualities. *Beneficence* and *bounty* are the peculiar characteristics of the Deity: with him the will and the act of doing good are commensurate only with the power: he was *beneficent* to us as our Creator, and continues his *beneficence* to us by his daily preservation and protection; to some, however, he has been more *bountiful* than to others, by providing them with an unequal share of the good things of this life.

The *beneficence* of man is regulated by the *bounty* of Providence: to whom much is given, from him will much be required. Instructed by his word, and illumined by that spark of benevolence which was infused into their souls with the breath of life, good men

are ready to believe that they are but stewards of all God's gifts, holden for the use of such as are less *bountifully* provided. They will desire, as far as their powers extend, to imitate this feature of the Deity by bettering with their *beneficent* counsel and assistance the condition of all who require it, and by gladdening the hearts of many with their *bountiful* provisions.

Princes are *municipal*, friends are *generous*, patrons *liberal*. *Municipal* is measured by the quality and quantity of the thing bestowed; *generosity* by the extent of the sacrifice made; *liberality* by the warmth of the spirit displayed. A monarch displays his *municipal* in the presents which he sends by his ambassadors to another monarch. A *generous* man will waive his claims, however powerful they may be, when the accommodation or relief of another is in question. A *liberal* spirit does not stop to inquire the reason for giving, but gives when the occasion offers.

Municipal may spring either from ostentation or a becoming sense of dignity; *generosity* may spring either from a generous temper, or an easy unconcern about property; *liberality* of conduct is dictated by nothing but a warm heart and an expanded mind. *Municipal* is confined simply to giving, but we may be *generous* in assisting, and *liberal* in rewarding.

The most *beneficent* of all beings is he who hath an absolute fullness of perfection in himself, who gave existence to the universe, and so cannot be supposed to want that which he communicated.—GROVE.

Hail! Universal Lord, be *bounteous* still
To give us only good.—MILTON.

I esteem a habit of benignity greatly preferable to *municipal*.—STEELE after CICERO.

We may with great confidence and equal truth affirm, that since there was such a thing as mankind in the world, there never was any heart truly great and *generous*, that was not also tender and compassionate.—SOUTH.

The citizen, above all other men, has opportunities of arriving at the highest fruit of wealth, to be *liberal* without the least expense of a man's own fortune.—STEELE.

Benefit, Favour, Kindness, Civility.

Benefit signifies here that which benefits (*v. Advantage, benefit*).

Favour, in French *faveur*, Latin *favor* and *faveo* to bear good will, signifies the act flowing from good will.

Kindness signifies an action that is kind (*v. Affectionate*).

Civility signifies that which is *civil* (*v. civil*).

The idea of an action gratuitously performed for the advantage of another is common to these terms.

Benefits and *favours* are granted by superiors; *kindnesses* and *civilities* pass between equals.

Benefits serve to relieve actual wants: the power of conferring and the necessity of receiving them, constitute the relative difference in station between the giver and the receiver: *favours* tend to promote the interest or convenience: the power of giving and the advantage of receiving are dependant on local circumstances, more than on difference of station. *Kindnesses* and *civilities* serve to afford mutual accommodation by a reciprocity of kind offices

on the many and various occasions which offer in human life: they are not so important as either *benefits* or *favours*, but they carry a charm with them which is not possessed by the former. *Kindnesses* are more endearing than *civilities*, and pass mostly between those who are known to each other: *civilities* may pass between strangers.

Dependence affords an opportunity for conferring *benefits*; partiality gives rise to *favours*: *kindnesses* are the result of personal regard; *civilities*, of general benevolence. A master confers his *benefits* on such of his domestics as are entitled to encouragement for their fidelity. Men in power distribute their *favours* so as to increase their influence. Friends, in their intercourse with each other, are perpetually called upon to perform *kindnesses* for each other. There is no man so mean that he may not have it in his power to show *civilities* to those who are above him.

Benefits tend to draw those closer to each other who by station of life are set at the greatest distance from each other: affection is engendered in him who *benefits*; and devoted attachment in him who is *benefited*: *favours* increase obligation beyond its due limit; if they are not asked and granted with discretion, they may produce servility on the one hand, and haughtiness on the other. *Kindnesses* are the offspring and parent of affection; they convert our multiplied wants into so many enjoyments: *civilities* are the sweets which we gather in the way as we pass along the journey of life.

I think I have a right to conclude that there is such a thing as *generosity* in the world. Though if I were under a mistake in this, I should say as Cicero in relation to the immortality of the soul, I willingly err; for the contrary notion naturally teaches people to be ungrateful by possessing them with a persuasion concerning their benefactors, that they have no regard to them in the *benefits* they bestow.—GROVE.

A *favour* well bestowed is almost as great an honour as him who confers it, as to him who receives it. What, indeed, makes for the superior reputation of the patron in this case is, that he is always surrounded with specious pretences of unworthy candidates.—STEELE.

Ingratitude is too base to return a *kindness*, and too proud to regard it.—SOUTH.

A common *civility* to an impertinent fellow often draws upon one a great many unforeseen troubles.—STEELE.

Benefit, Service, Good Office.

Benefit, *v. Benefit, favour*.

Service, *v. Advantage, benefit*.

Office, in French *office*, Latin *officium* duty, from *officio*, or *ob* and *facio*, signifies the thing done on another's account.

These terms, like the former (*v. Benefit, favour*), agree in denoting some action performed for the good of another, but they differ in the principle on which the action is performed.

A *benefit* is perfectly gratuitous, it produces an obligation: a *service* is not altogether gratuitous; it is that at least which may be expected, though it cannot be demanded: a *good office* is between the two; it is in part gratuitous, and in part such as one may reasonably expect.

Benefits flow from superiors, and *services* from

inferiors or equals; but *good offices* are performed by equals only.

Princes confer *benefits* on their subjects; subjects perform *services* for their princes; neighbours do *good offices* for each other.

Benefits are sometimes the reward of *services*; *good offices* produce a return from the receiver.

Benefits consist of such things as serve to relieve the difficulties, or advance the interests, of the receiver: *services* consist in those acts which tend to lessen the trouble, or increase the ease and convenience, of the person served: *good offices* consist in the employ of one's credit, influence, and mediation for the advantage of another; it is a species of voluntary service.

Humanity leads to *benefits*; the zeal of devotion or friendship renders *services*; general good-will dictates *good offices*.

It is a great *benefit* to assist an embarrassed tradesman, out of his difficulty it is a great *service* for a soldier to save the life of his commander, or for a friend to open the eyes of another to see his danger: it is a *good office* for anyone to interpose his mediation to settle disputes, and heal divisions.

It is possible to be loaded with *benefits* so as to affect one's independence of character. *Services* are sometimes a source of dissatisfaction and disappointment when they do not meet with the remuneration or return which they are supposed to deserve. *Good offices* tend to nothing but the increase of good will. Those who perform them are too independent to expect a return, and those who receive them are too sensible of their value not to seek an opportunity for making a return.

I have often pleased myself with considering the two kinds of *benefits* which accrue to the public from these my speculations, and which, were I to speak after the manner of logicians, I should distinguish into the material and formal.—ADDISON.

Cicero, whose learning and *services* to his country are so well known, was inflamed by a passion for glory to an extravagant degree.—HUGHES.

There are several persons who have many pleasures and entertainments in their possession which they do not enjoy. It is therefore a kind and *good office* to acquaint them with their own happiness.—STEELE.

Benefit, v. Advantage.

Benefit, v. Good benefit.

Benevolence, Beneficence.

Benevolence is literally well willing. **Beneficence** is literally well doing. The former consists of intention, the latter of action: the former is the cause, the latter the result. **Benevolence** may exist without **beneficence**: but **beneficence** always supposes **benevolence**: a man is not said to be **beneficent** who does good from sinister views. The **benevolent** man enjoys but half his happiness if he cannot be **beneficent**; yet there will still remain to him an ample store of enjoyment in the contemplation of others' happiness: that man who is gratified only with that happiness of which he himself is the instrument of producing, is not entitled to the name of **benevolent**.

As **benevolence** is an affair of the heart, and **beneficence** of the outward conduct, the former

is confined to no station, no rank, no degree of education or power: the poor may be **benevolent** as well as the rich, the unlearned as the learned, the weak as well as the strong: the latter on the contrary is controlled by outward circumstances, and is therefore principally confined to the rich, the powerful, the wise, and the learned.

The pity which arises on sight of persons in distress, and the satisfaction of mind which is the consequence of having removed them into a happier state, are instead of a thousand arguments to prove such a thing as a disinterested **benevolence**.—GROVE.

He that banishes gratitude from among men, by so doing stops up the stream of **benevolence**; for though, in common kindness, a truly generous man doth not aim at a return, yet he looks to the qualities of the person obliged.—GROVE.

Benevolence, Benignity, Humanity, Kindness, Tenderness.

Benevolence, v. Benevolence.

Benignity, in Latin *benignitas*, from *bene* and *gigno*, signifies the quality or disposition for producing good.

Humanity, in French *humanité*, Latin *humanitas* from *humanus* and *homo*, signifies the quality of belonging to a man, or having what is common to man.

Kindness from *kind* (v. *Affectionate*).

Tenderness, from *tender*, is in Latin *tener*, Greek *τεχνον*.

Benevolence and **benignity** lie in the will; **humanity** lies in the heart, **kindness** and **tenderness** in the affections: **benevolence** indicates a general good-will to all mankind; **benignity** a particular good-will flowing out of certain relations; **humanity** is a general tone of feeling; **kindness** and **tenderness** are particular modes of feeling.

Benevolence consists in the wish or intention to do good; it is confined to no station or object: the **benevolent** man may be rich or poor, and his **benevolence** will be exerted wherever there is an opportunity of doing good; **benignity** is always associated with power, and accompanied with condescension.

Benevolence in its fullest sense is the sum of moral excellence, and comprehends every other virtue; when taken in this acceptance, **benignity**, **humanity**, **kindness** and **tenderness**, are but modes of **benevolence**.

Benevolence and **benignity** tend to the communicating of happiness; **humanity** is concerned in the removal of evil. **Benevolence** is common to the Creator and his creatures; it differs only in degree; the former has the knowledge and power as well as the will to do good; man often has the will to do good without having the power to carry it into effect. **Benignity** is ascribed to the stars, to heaven, or to princes; ignorant and superstitious people are apt to ascribe their good fortune to the **benign** influence of the stars rather than to the gracious dispensations of Providence. **Humanity** belongs to man only: it is his peculiar characteristic, and ought at all times to be his boast; when he throws off this his distinguishing badge, he loses everything valuable in him; it is a virtue that is indispensable in his present suffering condition: **humanity** is as universal in its application as **benevolence**; wherever there is distress, **humanity** flies to its relief. **Kindness** and **tenderness** are partial

modes of affection, confined to those who know or are related to each other: we are kind to friends and acquaintances, *tender* towards those who are near and dear: *kindness* is a mode of affection most fitted for social beings; it is what every one can show, and every one is pleased to receive: *tenderness* is a state of feeling that is occasionally acceptable; the young and the weak demand *tenderness* from those who stand in the closest connexion with them, but this feeling may be carried to an excess so as to injure the object on which it is fixed.

There are no circumstances or situation in life which preclude the exercise of *benevolence*: next to the pleasure of making others happy, the *benevolent* men rejoice in seeing them so: the *benign* influence of a *benevolent* monarch extends to the remotest corner of his dominions: *benignity* is a becoming attribute for a prince, when it does not lead him to sanction vice by its impunity; it is highly to be applauded in him as far as it renders him forgiving of minor offences, gracious to all who are deserving of his favours, and ready to afford gratification to all whom it is in his power to serve: the multiplied misfortunes to which all men are exposed afford ample scope for the exercise of *humanity*, which, in consequence of the unequal distribution of wealth, power, and talent, is peculiar to no situation of life: even the profession of arms does not exclude *humanity* from the breasts of its followers; and when we observe men's habits of thinking in various situations, we may remark that the soldier with arms by his side, is commonly more *humane* than the partisan without arms. *Kindness* is always an amiable feeling, and in a grateful mind always begets *kindness*; but it is sometimes ill bestowed upon selfish people who requite it by making fresh exactions: *tenderness* is frequently little better than an amiable weakness, when directed to a wrong end, and fixed on an improper object; the false *tenderness* of parents has often been the ruin of children.

I have heard say, that Pope Clement XI. never passes through the people, who always kneel in crowds and ask his benediction, but the tears are seen to flow from his eyes. This must proceed from an imagination that he is the father of all these people, and that he is touched with so extensive a *benevolence*, that it breaks out into a passion of tears.—STEELE.

A constant *benignity* in commerce with the rest of the world, which ought to run through all a man's actions, has effects more useful to those whom you oblige, and is less ostentatious in yourself.—STEELE.

The greatest wits I have conversed with are men eminent for their *humanity*.—ADDISON.

Benevolence, would the followers of Epicurus say, is all founded in weakness; and whatever be pretended, the *kindness* that passeth between men and men is by every man directed to himself. This it must be confessed is of a piece with that hopeful philosophy which, having patched man up out of the four elements, attributes his being to chance.—GROVE.

Dependence is a perpetual call upon *humanity* and a greater incitement to *tenderness* and pity than any other motive whatsoever.—ADDISON.

Benignity, v. Benevolence.

Bent, Curved, Crooked, Awry.

Bent, from *bend*, in Saxon *bendan*, is a variation of *wind*, in the sea phraseology *wend*, in German *winden*, &c., from the Hebrew *onad* to wind or turn.

Curved is in Latin *curvus*, in Greek *kopros*, ἑλικος *kopros*.

Crooked, v. *Awkward*.

Awry is a variation of *writhed*, v. *To turn*.

Bent is here the generic term, all the rest are but modes of the *bent*: what is *bent* is opposed to that which is straight; things may therefore be *bent* to any degree, but when *curved* they are *bent* only to a small degree; when *crooked* they are *bent* to a great degree: a stick is *bent* any way; it is *curved* by being *bent* one specific way; it is *crooked* by being *bent* different ways.

Things may be *bent* by accident or design; they are *curved* by design, or according to some rule; they are *crooked* by accident or in violation of some rule: a stick is *bent* by the force of the hand; a line is *curved* so as to make a mathematical figure; it is *crooked* so as to lose all figure: *awry* marks a species of *crookedness*, but *crooked* is applied as an epithet, and *awry* is employed to characterise the action; hence we speak of a *crooked* thing, and of sitting or standing *awry*.

And when too closely press'd, she quits the ground,
From her *bent* bow she sends a backward wound.

DRYDEN.

Another thing observable in and from the spots is that they describe various paths or lines over the sun, sometimes straight, sometimes *curved* towards one pole of the sun.—DERHAM.

It is the ennobling office of the understanding to correct the fallacious and mistaken reports of the senses, and to assure us that the staff in the water is straight, though our eye would tell us it is *crooked*.—SOUTH.

Preventing fate directs the lance *awry*.

Which glancing only mark'd Achates' thigh.

DRYDEN.

Bent, Bias, Inclination, Prepossession.

Bent, v. *Bend*, *bent*.

Bias, in French *biais*, signifies a weight fixed on one side of a bowl in order to turn its course that way towards which the *bias* leans, from the Greek *βία* force.

Inclination, in French *inclination*, Latin *inclinatio*, from *inclino*, Greek *κλίνω*, signifies a leaning towards.

Prepossession, compounded of *pre* and *possession*, signifies the taking *possession* of the mind previously, or beforehand.

All these terms denote a preponderating influence on the mind. *Bent* is applied to the will, affection, and power in general; *bias* solely to the judgment; *inclination* and *prepossession* to the state of the feelings. The *bent* includes the general state of the mind, and the object on which it fixes a regard: *bias*, the particular influential power which sways the judging faculty: the one is absolutely considered with regard to itself; the other relatively to its results and the object it acts upon.

Bent is sometimes with regard to *bias*, as cause is to effect; we may frequently trace in the particular *bent* of a person's likes and dislikes the principal *bias* which determines his opinions. *Inclination* is a faint kind of *bent*; *prepossession* is a weak species of *bias*: an *inclination* is a state of something, namely, a

state of the feelings : *prepossession* is an actual something, namely, the thing that *prepossesses*.

We may discover the *bent* of a person's mind in his gay or serious moments ; in his occupations, and in his pleasures ; in some persons it is so strong, that scarcely an action passes which is not more or less influenced by it, and even the exterior of a man will be under its control : in all disputed matters the support of a party will operate more or less to *bias* the minds of men for or against particular men, or particular measures : when we are attached to the party that espouses the cause of religion and good order, this *bias* is in some measure commendable and salutary : a mind without *inclination* would be a blank, and where *inclination* is, there is the ground-work for *prepossession*. Strong minds will be strongly *bent*, and labour under a strong *bias* ; but there is no mind so weak and powerless as not to have its *inclinations*, and none so perfect as to be without its *prepossessions* : the mind that has virtuous *inclinations* will be *prepossessed* in favour of every thing that leans to virtue's side : it were well for mankind were this the only *prepossession* ; but in the present mixture of truth and error, it is necessary to guard against *prepossessions* as dangerous anticipations of the judgment ; if their object be not perfectly pure, or their force be not qualified by the restrictive powers of the judgment, much evil springs from their abuse.

Servile *inclinations*, and gross love,
The guilty *bent* of vicious appetite.—HAVARD.

The choice of man's will is indeed uncertain, because in many things free ; but yet there are certain habits and principles in the soul that have some kind of sway upon it, apt to *bias* it more one way than another.—SOUTH.

'Tis not indulging private *inclination*,
The selfish passions, that sustains the world,
And lends its ruler grace.—THOMSON.

I take it for a rule, that in marriage the chief business is to acquire a *prepossession* in favour of each other.—STEELE.

Bent, *v. Bend*.

Bent, *v. Turn*.

Benumb, *v. Numb*.

Bequeath, *v. Devise*.

To Bereave, Deprive, Strip.

Bereave, in Saxon *bereafan*, German *berauben*, &c., is compounded of *be* and *raube* or *rob*, Saxon *raefan*. German *rauben*, low German *roffen*, &c., Latin *rapina* and *rapio* to catch or seize, signifying to take away contrary to one's wishes.

Deprive, compounded of *de* and *prive*, French *priver*, Latin *privo*, from *privus* private, signifies to make that one's own which was another's.

Strip is in German *streifen*, low German *streipen*, *stroepen*, Swedish *ströfva*, probably changed from the Latin *surripio* to snatch by stealth.

To *bereave* expresses more than *deprive*, but less than *strip*, which in this sense is figurative, and denotes a total bereavement : one is *bereaved* of children. *deprived* of pleasures,

and *stripped* of property : we are *bereaved* of that on which we set most value ; the act of *bereaving* does violence to our inclination : we are *deprived* of the ordinary comforts and conveniences of life ; they cease to be ours : we are *stripped* of the things which we most want ; we are thereby rendered as it were naked. *Deprivations* are preparatory to *bereavements* : if we cannot bear the one patiently, we may expect to sink under the other ; common prudence should teach us to look with unconcern on our *deprivations* : Christian faith should enable us to consider every *bereavement* as a step to perfection ; that when *stripped* of all worldly goods we may be invested with those more exalted and lasting honours which await the faithful disciple of Christ.

We are *bereaved* of our dearest hopes and enjoyments by the dispensations of Providence : casualties *deprive* us of many little advantages or gratifications which fall in our way : men are active in *stripping* each other of their just rights and privileges.

O first-created Being, and thou great Word,
Let there be light, and light was over all !
Why am I thus *bereav'd* thy prime decree ?

MILTON.

Too daring hard ! whose unsuccessful pride
Th' immortal muses in their art defied ;
Th' avenging muses of the light of day
Depriv'd his eyes, and snatch'd his voice away.

POPE.

From the uncertainty of life, moralists have endeavoured to sink the estimation of its pleasures, and if they could not *strip* the seductions of vice of their present enjoyment, at least to load them with the fear of their end.—MACKENZIE.

To be Responsible, *v. To guarantee*.

To be Security, *v. To guarantee*.

To be Sensible, *v. To fear*.

To Beseech, *v. To beg*.

Besides, Moreover.

Besides, that is, by the *side*, next to, marks simply the connexion which subsists between what goes before and what follows.

Moreover, that is, more than all else, marks the addition of something particular to what has already been said.

Thus in enumerating the good qualities of an individual, we may say, "he is *besides* of a peaceable disposition." On concluding any subject of question we may introduce a farther clause by a *moreover* : " *Moreover* we must not forget the claims of those who will suffer by such a change."

Now, the best way in the world for a man to seem to be anything, is really to be what he would seem to be. *Besides*, that it is many times as troublesome to make good the pretence of a good quality as to have it.—TILLOTSON.

It being granted that God governs the world, it will follow also that he does it by means suitable to the natures of the things that he governs ; and *moreover* man being by nature a free, moral agent, and so capable of deviating from his duty, as well as performing it, it is necessary that he should be governed by laws.—SOUTH.

Besides, Except.

Besides (*v. Moreover*), which is here taken as a preposition, expresses the idea of addition. *Except* expresses that of exclusion.

There were many there *besides* ourselves ; no one *except* ourselves will be admitted.

Besides impiety, discontent carries along with it as its inseparable concomitants, several other sinful passions. —BLAIR.

Neither jealousy nor envy can dwell with the Supreme Being. He is a rival to none, he is an enemy to none, *except* to such as, by rebellion against his laws seek enmity with him. —BLAIR.

To Bestow, *v.* To allow, grant.

To Bestow, *v.* To confer.

To Bestow, *v.* To give.

Betimes, *v.* Soon.

To Betoken, *v.* To augur.

To Belter, *v.* To amend.

To Bewail, Bemoan, Lament.

Bewail is compounded of *be* and *wail*, which is probably connected with the word *woe*, signifying to express sorrow.

Bemoan, compounded of *be* and *moan*, signifies to indicate grief with moans.

Lament, in French *lamentier*, Latin *lamentor* or *lamentum*, probably from the Greek *κλαυμα* and *κλαίω* to cry out with grief.

All these terms mark an expression of pain by some external sign. *Bewail* is not so strong as *bemoan*, but stronger than *lament* ; *bewail* and *bemoan* are expressions of unrestrained grief or anguish : a wretched mother *bewails* the loss of her child ; a person in deep distress *bemoans* his hard fate : *lamentation* may arise from simple sorrow or even imaginary grievances : a sensualist *laments* the disappointment of some expected gratification.

Bewail and *bemoan* are always indecorous if not sinful expressions of grief, which are inconsistent with the profession of a Christian ; they are common among the uncultivated, who have not a proper principle to restrain the intemperance of their feelings. There is nothing temporal which is so dear to any one that he ought to *bewail* its loss : nor any condition of things so distressing or desperate as to make a man *bemoan* his lot. *Lamentations* are sometimes allowable : the miseries of others, or our own infirmities and sins, may justly be *lamented*.

To Bewitch, *v.* To charm.

Beyond, *v.* Above.

Bias, Prepossession, Prejudice.

Bias, *v.* Bent, bias.

Prepossession, *v.* Bent, bias.

Prejudice, in French *prejudice*, Latin *prejudicium*, compounded of *pre* before, and *judicium* judgment, signifies a judgment before hand, that is, before examination.

Bias marks the state of the mind ; *prepossession* applies either to the general or particular state of the feelings ; *prejudice* is employed only for opinions. Children may receive an early *bias* that influences their future character and destiny ; *prepossessions* spring from casualties ; they do not exist in young minds :

prejudices are the fruits of a contracted education. Physical infirmities often give a strong *bias* to serious pursuits : *prepossessions* created by outward appearances are not always fallacious ; it is at present the fashion to brand every thing with the name of *prejudice*, which does not coincide with the lax notions of the age. A *bias* may be overpowered, a *prepossession* overcome, and a *prejudice* corrected or removed.

We may be *biased* for or against ; we are always *prepossessed* in favour, and mostly *prejudiced* against.

It should be the principal labour of moral writers to remove the *bias* which inclines the mind rather to prefer natural than moral endowments. —HAWKESWORTH.

A man in power, who can without the ordinary *prepossession* which stop the way to the true knowledge and service of mankind, overlook the little distinctions of fortune, raise obscure merit, and discountenance successful indolence, has, in the minds of knowing men, the figure of an angel rather than a man. —STEELE.

It is the work of a philosopher to be every day subduing his passions, and laying aside his *prejudices*. I endeavour at least to look upon men and their actions only as an impartial spectator. —SPECTATOR.

Bias, *v.* Bent.

To Bid, *v.* To call.

To Bid, *v.* To offer.

To Bid Adieu, *v.* To leave, take leave.

To Bid Farewell, *v.* To leave, take leave.

Bill, *v.* Account.

Billow, *v.* Wave.

To Bind, Tie.

Bind, in Saxon *binden*, German, &c., *binden*, comes from Latin *vincio*, Greek *σφιγγω*, and is connected with the word *wind*.

Tie, in Saxon *tian*, is very probably connected with the low German *tehen*, high German *ziehen* to draw, the English *tug* or *tow*, and the Latin *duco* to draw.

The species of fastening denoted by these two words differ both in manner and degree. *Binding* is performed by circumvolution round a body ; *tying*, by involution within itself. Some bodies are *bound* without being *tied* ; others are *tied* without being *bound* : a wounded leg is *bound* but not *tied* ; a string is *tied* but not *bound* ; a ribband may sometimes be *bound* round the head, and *tied* under the chin. *Binding* therefore serves to keep several things in a compact form together ; *tying* may serve to prevent one single body separating from another ; a criminal is *bound* hand and foot ; he is *tied* to a stake.

Binding and *tying* likewise differ in degree ; *binding* serves to produce adhesion in all the parts of a body ; *tying* only to produce contact in a single part : thus when the hair is *bound*, it is almost inclosed in an envelope : when it is *tied* with a string, the ends are left to hang loose.

A similar distinction is preserved in the figurative use of the terms. A *bond* of union is applicable to a large body with many component parts ; a *tie* of affection marks an adhesion between individual minds.

Now are our brows *bound* with victorious wreaths,
Our stern alarms are chang'd to merry meetings.
SHAKESPEARE.

A fluttering dove upon the top they tie,
The living mark at which their arrows fly.—DRYDEN.

As nature's ties decay ;
As duty, love, and honour fail to sway ;
Fictitious bonds, the bonds of wealth and law,
Still gather strength, and force unwilling awe.
GOLDSMITH.

To Bind, Oblige, Engage.

Bind, *v.* To bind, tie.

Oblige, in French *obliger*, Latin *obligo*, compounded of *ob* and *ligo*, signifies to tie up.

Engage, in French *engager*, compounded of *en* or *in* and *gager* a pledge, signifies to bind by means of a pledge.

Bind is more forcible and coercive than *oblige*; *oblige* than *engage*. We are bound by an oath, *obliged* by circumstances, and *engaged* by promises.

Conscience binds, prudence or necessity *oblige*, honour and principle *engage*. A parent is bound no less by the law of his conscience, than by those of the community to which he belongs, to provide for his helpless offspring. Politeness *obliges* men of the world to preserve a friendly exterior towards those for whom they have no regard. When we are *engaged* in the service of our king and country, we cannot shrink from our duty without exposing ourselves to the infamy of all the world.

We bind a man by a fear of what may befall him; we *oblige* him by some immediately urgent motive; we *engage* him by alluring offers, and the prospect of gain. A debtor is bound to pay by virtue of a written instrument in law; he is *obliged* to pay in consequence of the importunate demands of the creditor; he is *engaged* to pay in consequence of a promise given. A bond is the strictest deed in law: an obligation binds under pain of a pecuniary loss; an engagement is mostly verbal, and rests entirely on the rectitude of the parties.

Who can be bound by any solemn vow,
To do a murderous deed?—SHAKESPEARE.

No man is commanded or *obliged* to obey beyond his power.—SOUTH.

While the Israelites were appearing in God's house,
God himself *engages* to keep and defend theirs.—SOUTH.

Bishopric, Diocese.

Bishopric, compounded of *bishop* and *rick* or *reich* empire, signifies the empire or government of a bishop.

Diocese, in Greek *διοκρσις*, compounded of *δια* and *οικω*, signifies an administration throughout.

Both these words describe the extent of an episcopal jurisdiction; the first with relation to the person who officiates, the second with relation to the charge. There may, therefore, be a *bishopric*, either where there are many dioceses or no diocese; but according to the import of the term, there is properly no diocese where there is no *bishopric*. When the jurisdiction is merely titular, as in countries where the catholic religion is not recognized, it is a *bishopric*, but not a diocese. On the other hand, the *bishopric* of Rome or that of an archbishop

comprehends all the dioceses of the subordinate bishops. Hence it arises that when we speak of the ecclesiastical distribution of a country, we term the divisions *bishoprics*; but when we speak of the actual office, we term it a diocese. England is divided into a certain number of *bishoprics*, not dioceses. Every bishop visits his diocese, not his *bishopric*, at stated intervals.

To Blame, Reprove, Reproach, Upbraid, Censure, Condemn.

Blame, in French *blamer*, probably from the Greek *βεβαιμααι*, perfect of the verb *βλαπτω* to hurt, signifying to deal harshly with.

Reprove, comes from the Latin *reprobo*, which signifies the contrary of *probo* to approve.

Reproach, in French *reprocher*, compounded of *re* and *proche*, proximus near signifies to bring near or cast back upon a person.

Upbraid, compounded of *up* or *upon* and *braid*, or *breed*, signifies to hatch against one.

Censure, *v.* To accuse, censure.

Condemn, in French *condamner*, Latin *condemno*, compounded of *con* and *damno*, from *damnum* a loss or penalty, signifies to sentence to some penalty.

The expression of one's disapprobation of a person, or of that which he has done, is the common idea in the signification of these terms; but to blame expresses less than to reprove. We simply charge with a fault in *blaming*; but in *reproving* severity is mixed with the charge. *Reproach* expresses more than either; it is to blame acrimoniously. We need not hesitate to blame as occasion may require; but it is proper to be cautious how we deal out *reproof* where the necessity of the case does not fully warrant it, and it is highly culpable to *reproach* without the most substantial reason.

To blame and reprove are the acts of a superior; to *reproach*, *upbraid*, that of an equal: to *censure* and *condemn* leave the relative condition of the agent and the sufferer undefined. Masters blame or reprove their servants; parents, their children; friends and acquaintances *reproach* and *upbraid* each other; persons of all conditions may *censure* or be *censured*, *condemn* or be *condemned*, according to circumstances.

Blame and *reproof* are dealt out on every ordinary occasion; *reproach* and *upbraid* respect personal matters, and always that which affects the moral character; *censure* and *condemnation* are provoked by faults and misconduct of different descriptions. Every fault, however trivial, may expose a person to blame, particularly if he perform any office for the vulgar, who are never contented. Intentional errors, however small, seem necessarily to call for *reproof*, and yet it is a mark of an imperious temper to substitute *reproof* in the place of admonition, when the latter might possibly answer the purpose. There is nothing which provokes a *reproach* sooner than ingratitude, although the offender is not entitled to so much notice from the injured person. Mutual *upbraidings* commonly follow between those who have mutually contributed to their misfortunes. The defective execution of a work

is calculated to draw down *censure* upon its author, particularly if he betray a want of modesty. The mistakes of a general, or a minister of state, will provoke *condemnation*, particularly if his integrity be called in question.

Blame, *reproof*, and *upbraiding*, are always addressed directly to the individual in person; *reproach*, *censure*, and *condemnation*, are sometimes conveyed through an indirect channel, or not addressed at all to the party who is the object of them. When a master *blames* his servant, or a parent *reproves* his child, or one friend *upbraids* another, he directs his discourse to him to express his disapprobation. A man will always be *reproached* by his neighbours for the vices he commits, however he may fancy himself screened from their observation. Writers *censure* each other in their publications: the conduct of individuals is sometimes *condemned* by the public at large.

Blame, *reproach*, *upbraid*, and *condemn*, may be applied to ourselves; *reproof* and *censure* are applied to others: we *blame* ourselves for acts of imprudence; our consciences *reproach* us for our weaknesses, and *upbraid* or *condemn* us for our sins.

Chafe not thyself about the rabble's censure;

They blame or praise, but as one leads the other.

PROWDE.

In all terms of *reproof*, when the sentence appears to arise from personal hatred or passion, it is not then made the cause of mankind, but a misunderstanding between two persons.—STEELE.

The prince replies: "Ah cease, divinely fair,
Nor add reproaches to the wounds I bear."—POPE.

Though ten times worse themselves, you'll frequent view
Those who with keenest rage will *censure* you.—PITT.

Thus they in mutual accusation spent

The fruitless hours, but neither self-condemning.

MILTON.

Have we not known thee slave! Of all the host,
The man who acts the least *upbraids* the most.

POPE.

To Blame, *v.* To find fault with.

Blameless, Irreproachable, Unblemished, Unspotted, or Spotless.

Blameless signifies literally void of *blame* (*v.* To Blame).

Irreproachable, that is, not able to be reproached (*v.* To blame).

Unblemished, that is, without *blemish* (*v.* Blemish.)

Unspotted, that is, without *spot* (*v.* Blemish).

Blameless is less than *irreproachable*; what is *blameless* is simply free from *blame*, but that which is *irreproachable* cannot be *blamed*, or have any *reproach* attached to it. It is good to say of a man that he leads a *blameless* life, but it is a high encomium to say that he leads an *irreproachable* life: the former is but the negative praise of one who is known only for his harmlessness; the latter is the positive commendation of a man who is well known for his integrity in the different relations of society.

Unblemished and *unspotted* are applicable to many objects, besides that of personal conduct; and when applied to this, their original meaning sufficiently points out their use in

distinction from the two former. We may say of a man that he has an *irreproachable* or an *unblemished* reputation, and *unspotted* or *spotless* purity of life.

The sire of Gods, and all th' ethereal train,
On the warm limits of the farthest main,
Now mix with mortals, nor disdain to grace
The feasts of Ethiopia's *blameless* race.—POPE.

Take particular care that your amusements be of an *irreproachable* kind.—BLAIR.

But now those white *unblemish'd* manners, whence
The fabled poets took their golden age,
Are found no more amid these iron times.—THOMSON.

But the good man, whose soul is pure,
Unspotted, regular, and free
From all the ugly stains of lust and villany,
Of mercy and of pardon sure,
Looks through the darkness of the gloomy night,
And sees the dawning of a glorious day.—POMPREY.

Hail, rev'rend priest! To Phœbus' awful dome
A suppliant I from great Atides come.
Unransom'd here, receive the *spotless* fair,
Accept the hetæcomb the Greeks prepare.—POPE.

Blast, *v.* Breeze.

To Blaze, *v.* To flame.

Blemish, Stain, Spot, Speck, Flaw.

Blemish comes from the French *blémir* to grow pale.

Stain, in French *teindre*, old French *deslendre*, Latin *tingo* to die.

Spot, not improbably connected with the word *spit*, Latin *sputum*, and the Hebrew *spad* to adhere as something extraneous.

Speck, in Saxon *specce*, Hebrew *sapach* to unite, or to adhere as a tetter on the skin.

Flaw, in Saxon *floh*, *fleece*, German *fleck*, low German *flak* or *plakke* a spot or a fragment, a piece, most probably from the Latin *plaga*, Greek *πληγή* a strip of land, or a stripe, a wound in the body.

In the proper sense *blemish* is the generic, the rest specific; a *stain*, a *spot*, *speck*, and *flaw*, are *blemishes*, but there are likewise many *blemishes*, which are neither *stains*, *spots*, *specks*, nor *flaws*.

Whatever takes off from the seemliness of appearance is *blemish*. In works of art the slightest dimness of colour, or want of proportion, is a *blemish*. A *stain* and *spot* sufficiently characterize themselves, as that which is superfluous and out of its place. A *speck* is a small *spot*; and a *flaw*, which is confined to hard substances, mostly consists of a faulty indenture on the outer surface. A *blemish* tarnishes; a *stain* spoils; a *spot*, *speck*, or *flaw*, disfigures. A *blemish* is rectified, a *stain* wiped out, a *spot* or *speck* removed.

Blemish, *stain*, and *spot*, are employed figuratively. Even an imputation of what is improper in our moral conduct is a *blemish* in our reputation: the failings of a good man are so many *spots* in the bright hemisphere of his virtue: there are some vices which affix a *stain* on the character of nations, as well as of the individuals who are guilty of them. A *blemish* or a *spot* may be removed by a course of good conduct, but a *stain* is mostly indelible: it is as great a privilege to have an *unblemished* reputation, or a *spotless* character, as it is a misfortune to have the *stain* of bad actions affixed to our name.

It is impossible for authors to discover beauties in one another's works: they have eyes only for spots and blemishes.—ADDISON.

By length of time,
The scurf is worn away of each committed crime;
No speck is left of their habitual stains,
But the pure ether of the soul remains.—DRYDEN.

There are many who applaud themselves for the singularity of their judgment, which has searched deeper than others, and found a *flaw* in what the generality of mankind have admired.—ADDISON.

Blemish, Defect, Fault.

Blemish, *v. Blemish, stain.*

Defect, in Latin *defectus*, participle of *deficio* to fall short, signifies the thing falling short.

Fault, from *fail*, in French *faute*, from *faillir*, in German *gefehlt*, participle of *fehlen*, probably comes from the Latin *falsus* false, *falso* to deceive or be wanting, and the Hebrew *repal* to fall or decay, signifying what is wanting to truth or propriety.

Blemish respects the exterior of an object: *defect* consists in the want of some specific propriety in an object; *fault* conveys the idea not only of something wrong, but also of its relation to the author. There is a *blemish* in fine china; a *defect* in the springs of a clock; and a *fault* in the contrivance. An accident may cause a *blemish* in a fine painting; the course of nature may occasion a *defect* in a person's speech; but the carelessness of the workman is evinced by the *faults* in the workmanship. A *blemish* may be easier remedied than a *defect* is corrected, or a *fault* repaired.

There is another particular which may be reckoned among the *blemishes*, or rather the false beauties, of our English tragedy; I mean those particular speeches which are commonly known by the name of rants.—ADDISON.

It has been often remarked, though not without wonder, that a man is more jealous of his natural, than of his moral qualities: perhaps it will no longer appear strange, if it be considered that natural *defects* are of necessity, and moral of choice.—HAWKESWORTH.

The resentment which the discovery a *fault* or folly produces must bear a certain proportion to our pride.—JOHNSON.

To blend, *v. To mix.*

Blessedness, *v. Happiness.*

Blind, *v. Cloak.*

Bliss, *v. Happiness.*

Bloody, *v. Sanguinary.*

Bloodthirsty, *v. Sanguinary.*

To Blot Out, Expunge, Rase or Erase, Efface, Cancel, Obliterate.

Blot is in all probability a variation of *spot*, signifying to cover over with a *blot*.

Expunge in Latin *expungo*, compounded of *ex* and *pungo* to prick, signifies to put out by pricking with the pen.

Erase, in Latin *erasus*, participle of *erado*, that is, *e* and *rado* to scratch out.

Efface, in French *effacer*, compounded of the Latin *e* and *facio* to make, signifies literally to make or put out.

Cancel, in French *canceller*, Latin *cancello*,

from *cancelli* lattice-work, signifies to strike out with cross lines.

Obliterate, in Latin *obliteratus*, participle of *oblitero*, compounded of *ob* and *litera*, signifies to cover over letters.

All these terms obviously refer to characters that are impressed on bodies; the first three apply in the proper sense only to that which is written with the hand, and bespeak the manner in which the action is performed. Letters are *blotted out*, so that they cannot be seen again; they are *expunged*, so as to signify that they cannot stand for anything; they are *erased*, so that the space may be re-occupied with writing. The last three are extended in their application to other characters formed on other substances: *efface* is general, and does not designate either the manner or the object: inscriptions on stone may be *effaced*, which are rubbed off so as not to be visible: *cancel* is principally confined to written or printed characters; they are *cancelled* by striking through them with the pen; in this manner, leaves or pages of a book are *cancelled* which are no longer to be reckoned: *obliterate* is said of all characters, but without defining the mode in which they are put out; letters are *obliterated*, which are in any way made illegible.

Efface applies to images, or the representations of things; in this manner the likeness of a person may be *effaced* from the statue: *cancel* respects the subject which is written or printed, *obliterate* respects the single letters which constitute words.

Efface is the consequence of some direct action on the thing which is *effaced*; in this manner writing may be *effaced* from a wall by the action of the elements: *cancel* is the act of a person, and always the fruit of design: *obliterate* is the fruit of accident and circumstances in general; time itself may *obliterate* characters on a wall or on paper.

The metaphorical use of these terms is easily deducible from the preceding explanation: what is figuratively described as written in a book may be said to be *blotted*; thus our sins are *blotted out* of the book by the atoning blood of Christ: when the contents of a book are in part rejected, they are aptly described as being *expunged*; in this manner, the free-thinking sects *expunge* everything from the Bible which does not suit their purpose, or they *expunge* from their creed what does not humour their passions. When the memory is represented as having characters impressed, they are said to be *erased*, when they are, as it were, directly taken out and occupied by others; in this manner, the recollection of what a child has learned is easily *erased* by play; and with equal propriety sorrows may be said to *efface* the recollection of a person's image from the mind. From the idea of striking out or *cancelling* a debt in an account book, a debt of gratitude, or an obligation, is said to be *cancelled*. As the lineaments of the face corresponded to written characters, we may say that all traces of his former greatness are *obliterated*.

If virtue is of this amiable nature, what can we think of those who can look upon it with an eye of hatred and ill-will, and can suffer themselves from their aversion for a party to *blot out* all the merit of the person who is engaged in it.—ADDISON.

I believe that any person who was of age to take a part in public concerns forty years ago (if the intermediate space were expunged from his memory) would hardly credit his senses when he should hear that an army of two hundred thousand men was kept up in this island.—BURKE.

Mr. Waller used to say he would *raise* any line out of his poem which did not imply some motive to virtue.—WALSH.

Yet the best blood by learning is refin'd,
And virtue arms the solid mind;
Whilst vice will stain the noblest race,
And the paternal stamp efface.—OLDISWORTH.

Yet these are they the world pronounces wise;
The world, which *cancels* nature's right and wrong,
And casts new wisdom.—YOUNG.

The transferring of the scene from Sicily to the Court of King Arthur, must have had a very pleasing effect, before the fabulous majesty of that court was quite obliterated.—TYRWHITT.

Blow, Stroke.

Blow probably derives the meaning in which it is here taken from the action of the wind, which it resembles when it is violent.

Stroke, from the word *strike*, denotes the act of striking.

Blow is used abstractedly to denote the effect of violence; *stroke* is employed relatively to the person producing that effect. A *blow* may be received by the carelessness of the receiver, or by a pure accident; but *strokes* are dealt out according to the design of the giver. Children are always in the way of getting *blows* in the course of their play; and of receiving *strokes* by way of chastisement.

A *blow* may be given with the hand, or with any flat substance; a *stroke* is rather a long drawn *blow* given with a long instrument, like a stick. *Blows* may be given with the flat part of a sword, and *strokes* with a stick.

Blow is seldom used but in the proper sense; *stroke* sometimes figuratively, as a *stroke* of death, or a *stroke* of fortune.

The advance of the human mind towards any object of laudable pursuit may be compared to the progress of a ship driven by a *blow*.—JOHNSON.

Penetrated to the heart with the recollection of his behaviour, and the unmerited pardon he had met with, Thrasypus was proceeding to execute vengeance on himself, by rushing on his sword, when Pisistratus again interposed, and seizing his hand, stopped the *stroke*.—CUMBERLAND.

This declaration was a *stroke* which Evander had neither skill to elude, nor force to resist.—HAWKESWORTH.

Blunder, *v. Error, mistake.*

To boast, *v. To glory.*

Boatman, *v. Waterman.*

Bodily, *v. Corporeal.*

Body, Corpse, Carcase.

Body is here taken in the improper sense for a dead *body*.

Corpse, from the Latin *corpus* a body, has also been turned from its derivation, to signify a dead body.

Carcase, in French *carcasse*, is compounded of *caro* and *cassa vita*, signifying flesh without life.

Body is applicable to either men or brutes,

corpse to men only, and *carcase* to brutes only, unless when taken in a contemptuous sense. When speaking of any particular person who is deceased, we should use the simple term *body*; the *body* was suffered to lie too long unburied: when designating its condition as lifeless, the term *corpse* is preferable; he was taken up as a *corpse*: when designating the *body* as a lifeless lump separated from the soul, it may be characterized (though contemptuously) as a *carcase*; the fowls devour the *carcase*.

A groan, as of a troubled ghost, renew'd
My fright, and then these dreadful words ensued:
Why dost thou thus my buried body rend,
O! spare the *corpse* of thy unhappy friend.

DRYDEN.

On the bleak shore now lies th' abandon'd king,
A headless *carcase*, and a nameless thing.—DRYDEN.

Boisterous, *v. Violent.*

Bold, Fearless, Intrepid, Undaunted.

Bold, *v. Audacity.*

Fearless signifies without fear (*v. To apprehend*).

Intrepid, compounded of *in* privative, and *trepidus* trembling, marks the total absence of fear.

Undaunted, of *un* privative, and *daunted*, from the Latin *domitatus*, participle of *domitare* to impress with fear, signifies unimpressed or unmoved at the prospect of danger.

Boldness is positive; **fearlessness** is negative; we may therefore be **fearless** without being **bold**, or **fearless** through **boldness**: **fearlessness** is a temporary state: we may be **fearless** of danger at this, or at that time; **fearless** of loss, and the like: **boldness** is a characteristic; it is associated with constant **fearlessness**. **Intrepidity** and **undauntedness** denote a still higher degree of **fearlessness** than **boldness**: **boldness** is confident, it forgets the consequences; **intrepidity** is collected, it sees the danger, and faces it with composure; **undauntedness** is associated with unconquerable firmness and resolution; it is awed by nothing: the **bold** man proceeds on his enterprise with spirit and vivacity; the **intrepid** man calmly advances to the scene of death and destruction; the **undaunted** man keeps his countenance in the season of trial, in the midst of the most terrifying and overwhelming circumstances.

These good qualities may, without great care, degenerate into certain vices to which they are closely allied.

Of the three, **boldness** is the most questionable in its nature, unless justified by the absolute urgency of the case: in maintaining the cause of truth against the persecution of influence and power, it is an essential quality, but it may easily degenerate into insolent defiance and contempt of superiors; it may lead to the provoking of resentment and courting of persecution. **Intrepidity** may become rashness if the contempt of danger lead to an unnecessary exposure of the life and person. **Undauntedness**, in the presence of a brutal tyrant, may serve to baffle all his malignant purposes of revenge; but the same spirit may be employed by the hardened villain to preserve himself from detection.

Such unheard of prodigies hang o'er us,
As make the boldest tremble.—YOUNG.

The careful hen
Calls all her chirping family around,
Fed and defended by the fearless cock.—THOMSON.

A man who talks with intrepidity of the monsters of
the wilderness, while they are out of sight, will readily
confess his antipathy to a mole, a weasel, or a frog. Thus
he goes on without any reproach from his own reflections.
—JOHNSON.

His party, press'd with numbers, soon grew faint,
And would have left their charge an easy prey;
Whilst he alone, undaunted at the odds,
Though hopeless to escape, fought well and bravely.
ROWE.

Bold, v. Daring.

Bold, v. Strenuous.

Boldness, v. Audacity.

Bombastic, v. Turgid.

Bondage, v. Servitude.

Booty, Spoil, Prey.

These words mark a species of capture.

Booty, in French *butin*, Danish *bytte*, Dutch
but, Teutonic *beute*, probably comes from the
Teutonic *bat* a useful thing, denoting the thing
taken for its use.

Spoil, in French *depoùille*, Latin *spolium*,
Greek *σκυλον*, signifying the things stripped
off from the dead, from *σπυλω*, Hebrew *salat*
to spoil.

Prey, in French *proie*, Latin *præda*, is not
improbably changed from *prendo*, *prendo*, or
prehendo to lay hold of, signifying the thing
seized.

The first two are used as military terms or
in attacks on an enemy, the latter in cases of
particular violence. The soldier gets his *booty*;
the combatant his *spoils*; the carnivorous
animal his *prey*. *Booty* respects what is of per-
sonal service to the captor; *spoils* whatever
serves to designate his triumph; *prey* includes
whatever gratifies the appetite and is to be
consumed. When a town is taken, soldiers
are too busy in the work of destruction and
mischief to carry away much *booty*; in every
battle the arms and personal property of the
slain enemy are the lawful *spoils* of the victor;
the hawk pounces on his *prey*, and carries him
up to his nest.

Greediness stimulates to take *booty*; am-
bition produces an eagerness for *spoils*; a fer-
ocious appetite impels to a search for *prey*.
Among the ancients the prisoners of war who
were made slaves constituted a part of their
booty; and even in later periods such a cap-
ture was good *booty*, when ransom was paid
for those who could liberate themselves.
Among some savages the head or limb of an
enemy constituted part of their *spoils*. Among
cannibals the prisoners of war are the *prey* of
the conquerors.

Booty and *prey* are often used in an extended
and figurative sense. Plunderers obtain a rich
booty; the diligent bee returns loaded with its
booty.* It is necessary that animals should
become a *prey* to man, in order that man may
not become a *prey* to them; everything in na-
ture becomes a *prey* to another thing, which

in its turn falls a *prey* to something else. All
is change but order. Man is a *prey* to the dis-
eases of his body or his mind, and after death
to the worms.

When they (the French National Assembly) had finally
determined on a state resource from church *booty*, they
came on the 14th of April, 1790, to a solemn resolution on
the subject.—BURKE.

'Twas in the dead of night, when sleep repairs
Our bodies worn with toils, our minds with cares,
When Hector's ghost before my sight appears:
A bloody shroud he seem'd, and bath'd in tears,
Unlike that Hector who return'd from toils
Of war, triumphant in Æacian spoils.—DRYDEN.

The wolf, who from the nightly fold
Forth drags the bleating *prey*, ne'er drank her milk,
Nor wore her warming fleece.—THOMSON.

Border, Edge, Rim or Brim, Brink, Margin, Verge.

Border, in French *bord* or *bordure*, Teutonic
bord, is probably connected with *bret*, and the
English *board*, from *brytan*, in Greek *πρυταν* to
saw or split.

Edge, in Saxon *ege*, low German *egge*, high
German *ecke* a point, Latin *acies*, Greek *ακη*
sharpness, signifies a sharp point.

Rim, in Saxon *rima*, high German *rahmen*
a frame, *riemen* a thong, Greek *ρυμα* a tract,
from *pvo* to draw, signifies a line drawn round.

Brim, Brink, are but variations of *rim*.

Margin, in French *margin*, Latin *margo*,
probably comes from *mare* the sea, as it is
most connected with water.

Verge, from the Latin *virga*, signifies a rod,
but is here used in the improper sense for the
extremity of an object.

Of these terms *border* is the least definite
point, *edge* the most so; *rim* and *brink* are
species of *edge*; *margin* and *verge* are species
of *border*. A *border* is a stripe, an *edge* is a line.

The *border* lies at a certain distance from the
edge; the *edge* is the exterior termination of
the surface of any substance. Whatever is
wide enough to admit of any space round its
circumference may have a *border*; whatever
comes to a narrow extended surface has an
edge. Many things may have both a *border* and
an *edge*; of this description are caps, gowns,
carpets, and the like; others have a *border* but
no *edge*, as lands; and others have an *edge* but
no *border*, as a knife or a table.

A *rim* is the *edge* of any vessel; the *brim* is
the exterior *edge* of a cup; a *brink* is the *edge*
of any precipice or deep place; a *margin* is the
border of a book or a piece of water; a *verge* is
the extreme *border* of a place.

So the pure limpid stream, when foul with stains
Of rushing torrents and descending rains,
Works itself clear, and as it runs refines,
Till by degrees the crystal mirror shines,
Reflects each flower that on its *border* grows.

ADDISON.

Methought the shilling that lay upon the table reared
itself upon its *edge*, and turning its face towards me
opened its mouth.—ADDISON.

But Merion's spear o'ertook him as he flew,
Deep in the belly's *rim* an entrance found
Where sharp the pang, and mortal is the wound.

POPE.

As I approach the precipice's *brink*,
So steep, so terrible, appears the depth.—LANSDOWNE.

By the sea's *margin* on the watery strand
Thy monument, Themistocles, shall stand.
CUMBERLAND

* Vide Roubaud; "Proie, butin."

To the earth's utmost verge I will pursue him;
No place, though e'er so holy, shall protect him.
ROWE.

Border, Boundary, Frontier, Confine, Precinct.

Border, *v.* *Border*, *edge*.

Boundary, from *to bound* (*v.* *To bound*), expresses what *bounds*, *binds*, or *confines*.

Frontier, French *frontière*, from the Latin *frons* a forehead, signifies the forefront, or the commencement of the country.

Confine, in Latin *confinis*, compounded of *con* and *cum* and *finis* an end, signifies an end next to an end.

Precinct, in Latin *præcinctum*, participle of *præcingo*, that is *præ* and *cingo* to enclose, signifies any enclosed place.

All these terms are applied to land, except the latter, which may apply to space in general. *Border* marks the extremities of one country in relation to another, as the *borders* of Scotland; *boundary* respects the prescribed limits of any place, as the *boundaries* of a village; *frontiers* denote the commencement of a country, as the *frontiers* of Germany or France; and *confines* those parts adjoining, or lying contiguous to any given place or district.

Borders and *frontiers* are said of a country only; *boundary* and *confines* of any smaller political division. The inhabitants who lived on the *borders* of England and Scotland were formerly called *borderers*, and distinguished themselves by their perpetual froils and mutual animosities, which now happily exist nowhere but in the pages of the historian: the *boundaries* of kingdoms, countries, and provinces, are distinguished on general maps; those of towns and villages on particular maps: it is common on the *frontiers* of continental kingdoms to require a pass from every one who wishes to enter the country: we may speak of the *confines* between Germany and Holland, but with more propriety of the *confines* between the different states of Germany, as also in former times of the *confines* between the Sabines, the Æqui, Volsci, and other small communities which existed in Italy previous to the establishment of the Roman empire.

Menalcas, whom the larks with many a lay
Had call'd from slumber at the dawn of day;
By chance was roving through a bordering dale
And heard the swains their youthful woes bewail.
SIR WM. JONES.

The Carthaginians discovered the fortunate islands now known by the name of the Canaries, the utmost boundary of ancient navigation.—ROBERTSON.

High on a rock fair Thyroessa stands,
Our utmost frontier on the Fylian lands.—POPE.

You are old,
Nature in you stands in the very verge
Of her confines.—SHAKESPEARE.

And now,
Through all restraint broke loose, he wings his way,
Not far off heav'n in the precincts of light.—MILTON.

To Bore, *v.* *To penetrate*.

To Bound, Limit, Confine, Circumscribe, Restrict.

Bound comes from the verb *bind*, signifying that which *binds* fast, or close to an object.

Limit, from the Latin *limes* a landmark, signifies to draw a line which is to be the exterior line or limit.

Confine signifies to bring within confines (*v.* *Border*).

Circumscribe, in Latin *circumscribo*, is compounded of *circum* and *scribo* to write round, that is, to describe a line round.

Restrict, in Latin *restringo*, participle of *restringo*, compounded of *re* and *stringo*, signifies to keep fast back.

The first four of these terms are employed in the proper sense of parting off certain spaces.

Bound applies to the natural or political divisions of the earth: countries are *bounded* by mountains and seas; kingdoms are often *bounded* by each other; Spain is *bounded* on one side by Portugal, on the other side by the Mediterranean, and on a third side by the Pyrenees. *Limit* applies to any artificial boundary: as landmarks in fields serve to show the *limits* of one man's ground from another; so may walls, palings, hedges, or any other visible sign, be converted into a *limit*, to distinguish one spot from another, and in this manner a field is said to be *limited*, because it has *limits* assigned to it. To *confine* is to bring the *limits* close together; to part off one space absolutely from another: in this manner we *confine* a garden by means of walls. To *circumscribe* is literally to surround: in this manner a circle may *circumscribe* a square: there is this difference however between *confine* and *circumscribe*, that the former may not only show the *limits*, but may also prevent egress and ingress; whereas the latter, which is only a line, is but a simple mark that *limits*.

From the proper acceptation of these terms we may easily perceive the ground on which their improper acceptation rests: to *bound* is an action suited to the nature of things, or to some given rule: in this manner our views are *bounded* by the objects which intercept our sight: we *bound* our desires according to principles of propriety. To *limit*, *confine*, and *circumscribe*, all convey the idea of control which is more or less exercised. To *limit*, whether it be said of persons *limiting* things, or persons being *limited* by things, is an affair of discretion or necessity; we *limit* our expenses because we are *limited* by circumstances. *Confine* conveys the same idea to a still stronger degree: what is *confined* is not only brought within a *limit* but is kept to that *limit* which it cannot pass; in this manner a person *confines* himself to a diet which he finds absolutely necessary for his health, or he is *confined* in the size of his house, in the choice of his situation, or in other circumstances equally uncontrollable; hence the term *confined* expresses also the idea of the *limits* being made narrow as well as impassable or unchangeable. To *circumscribe* is figuratively to draw a line round; in this manner we are *circumscribed* in our pecuniary circumstances when our sphere of action is brought within a line by the want of riches. In as much as all these terms convey the idea of being acted upon involuntarily, they become allied to the term *restrict*, which simply expresses the exercise of control on the will: we use *restriction* when we *limit* and *confine*, but we may

restrict without *limiting* or *confining*: to *limit* and *confine* are the acts of things upon persons, or persons upon persons; but *restrict* is only the act of persons upon persons; we are *limited* or *confined* only to a certain degree, but we may be *restricted* to an indefinite degree: the *limiting* and *confining* depend often on ourselves; the *restriction* depends upon the will of others: a person *limits* himself to so many hours' work in a day; an author *confines* himself to a particular branch of a subject: a person is *restricted* by his physician to a certain portion of food in the day: to be *confined* to a certain spot is irksome to one who has always had his liberty; but to be *restricted* in all his actions would be intolerable.

Our greatest happiness consists in *bounding* our desires to our condition: it is prudent to *limit* our exertions, when we find them prejudicial to our health: it is necessary to *confine* our attention to one object at a time: it is unfortunate to be *circumscribed* in our means of doing good: it is painful to be *restricted* in the enjoyment of innocent pleasure.

Bounded is opposed to *unbounded*, *limited* to *extended*, *confined* to *expanded*, *circumscribed* to *ample*, *restricted* to *free*, or specifically *unrestricted*.

The operations of the mind are not, like those of the hands, *limited* to one individual object, but at once extended to a whole species.—BARTELET.

Mechanical motions or operations are *confined* to a narrow circle of low and little things.—BARTELET.

My passion is too strong
In reason's narrow bounds to be confin'd.
WANDESFORD.

It is much to be lamented that among all denominations of Christians, the uncharitable spirit has prevailed of unwarrantably *circumscribing* the terms of Divine grace within a narrow circle of their own drawing.—BLAIR.

It is not necessary to teach men to thirst after power; but it is very expedient that by moral instructions they should be taught, and by their civil institutions they should be compelled to put many *restrictions* upon the immoderate exercise of it.—BLACKSTONE.

Boundary, v. Border.

Boundary, v. Bounds.

Boundary, v. Term.

Boundless, Unbounded, Unlimited, Infinite.

Boundless, or without *bounds*, is applied to infinite objects which admit of no *bounds* to be made or conceived by us.

Unbounded, or not *bounded*, is applied to that which might be *bounded*.

Unlimited, or not *limited*, applies to that which might be *limited*.

Infinite, or not *finite*, applies to that which in its nature admits of no *bounds*.

The ocean is a *boundless* object so long as no *bounds* to it have been discovered; desires are often *unbounded* which ought always to be *bounded*; and power is sometimes *unlimited* which is always better *limited*; nothing is *infinite* but that Being from whom all *finite* beings proceed.

And see the country far diffus'd around
One *boundless* blush, one white empurpled shower
Of mingled blossoms.—THOMSON.

The soul requires enjoyments more sublime.
By space *unbounded*, undestroy'd by time.—JENYNS.
Gray's curiosity was *unlimited*, and his judgment cultivated.—JOHNSON.

In the wide fields of nature the sight wanders up and down without *confinement*, and is fed with an *infinite* variety of images.—ADDISON.

Bounds, Boundary.

Bounds and Boundary, from the verb *bound* (v. *To bound*), signify the line which sets a *bound*, or marks the extent to which any spot of ground reaches.

Bounds is employed to designate the whole space including the outer line that *confines*: *boundary* comprehends only this outer line. *Bounds* are made for a local purpose; *boundary* for a political purpose: the master of a school prescribes the *bounds* beyond which the scholar is not to go; the parishes throughout England have their *boundaries*, which are distinguished by marks; fields have likewise their *boundaries*, which are commonly marked out by a hedge or a ditch.

Bounds are temporary and changeable; *boundaries* permanent and fixed: whoever has the authority of prescribing *bounds* for others, may in like manner contract or extend them at pleasure; the *boundaries* of places are seldom altered, but in consequence of great political changes.

In the figurative sense *bound* or *bounds* is even more frequently used than *boundary*: we speak of setting *bounds* or keeping within *bounds*: but to know a *boundary*: it is necessary occasionally to set *bounds* to the inordinate appetites of the best disposed children, who cannot be expected to know the exact *boundary* for indulgence.

So when the swelling Nile contemns her *bounds*,
And with extended waste the vallies drowns,
At length her ebbing streams resign the field,
And to the pregnant soil a tenfold harvest yield.
CIBBER.

Alexander did not in his progress towards the East advance beyond the banks of the rivers that fall into the Indus, which is now the Western *boundary* of the vast continent of India.—ROBERTSON.

There are *bounds* within which our concern for worldly success must be confined.—BLAIR.

It is the proper ambition of heroes in literature to enlarge the *boundaries* of knowledge by discovering and conquering new regions of the intellectual world.—JOHNSON.

Bounteous, v. Beneficent.

Bountiful, v. Beneficent.

Brace, v. Couple.

Brave, Gallant.

Brave, though the medium of the northern languages, comes from the Greek *βραβειον* the reward of victory, denoting the ardour which a prospect of such rewards inspires.

Gallant, in French *galant*, comes from the Greek *γαλλω* to adorn, signifying distinguished either by splendid dress or splendid qualities.

These epithets, whether applied to the person or the action, are alike honourable; but the latter is a much stronger expression than the

former. *Gallantry* is extraordinary *bravery*, or *bravery* on extraordinary occasions: the *brave* man goes willingly where he is commanded; the *gallant* man leads on with vigour to the attack. *Bravery* is common to vast numbers and whole nations; *gallantry* is peculiar to individuals or particular bodies: the *brave* man *bravely* defends the post assigned him; the *gallant* man volunteers his services in cases of peculiar danger: and man may feel ashamed in not being considered *brave*. he feels a pride in being looking upon as *gallant*. To call a hero *brave* adds little or nothing to his character; but to entitle him *gallant* adds a lustre to the glory he has acquired.

We cannot speak of a British tar without thinking of *bravery*; of his exploits without thinking of *gallantry*.

The *brave* unfortunate are our best acquaintance.
FRANCIS.

Death is the worst; a fate which all must try,
And for our country 'tis a bliss to die.
The *gallant* man, though slain in fight he be,
Yet leaves his nation safe, his children free.—POPE.

To Brave, Defy, Dare, Challenge.

Brave, from the epithet *brave* (v. *Brave*), signifies to act the *brave*.

Defy, in French *défier*, probably changed from *defaire* to undo, to make nothing, or set at nought.

Dare, in Saxon *dearran*, *dyrran*, *Franconian*, &c., *odurran*, *thorren*, Greek *θάρρειν*, signifies to be bold, or have the confidence to do.

Challenge is probably changed from the Greek *καλέω* to call.

We *brave* things; we *dare* and *challenge* persons; we *defy* persons or their actions; the sailor *braves* the tempestuous ocean, and very often *braves* death itself in its most terrific form; he *dares* the enemy whom he meets to the engagement; he *defies* all his boastings and vain threats.

Brave is sometimes used in a bad sense; *defy* and *dare* commonly so. There is much idle contempt and affected indifference in *braving*; much insolent resistance to authority in *defying*; much provocation and affront in *daring*: a bad man *braves* the scorn and reproach of all the world; he *defies* the threats of his superiors to punish him; he *dares* them to exert their power over him.

Brave and *defy* are dispositions of mind which display themselves in the conduct: *dare* and *challenge* are modes of action: we *brave* a storm by meeting its violence, and hearing it down with superior force: we *defy* the malice of our enemies by pursuing that line of conduct which is most calculated to increase its bitterness. To *brave* conveys the idea of a direct and personal application of force to force; *defying* is carried on by a more indirect and circuitous mode of procedure: men *brave* the dangers which threaten them with evil; they *defy* the angry will which opposes them.

To *dare* and *challenge* are both direct and personal; but the former consists either of actions, words, or looks; the latter of words only. We *dare* a number of persons indefinitely; we *challenge* an individual, and very frequently by name,

Daring arises from our contempt of others; *challenging* arises from a high opinion of ourselves: the former is mostly accompanied with unbecoming expressions of disrespect as well as aggravation; the latter is mostly divested of all angry personality. Metius the Tuscan *dared* Titus Manlius Torquatus, the son of the Roman consul, to engage with him in contradiction to his father's commands: Paris was persuaded to *challenge* Menelaus in order to terminate the Grecian war.

We *dare* only to acts of violence: we *challenge* to any kind of contest in which the skill or the power of the parties are to be tried. It is folly to *dare* one of superior strength if we are not prepared to meet with the just reward of our impertinence: whoever has a confidence in the justice of his cause, needs not fear to *challenge* his opponent to a trial of their respective merits.

Joining in proper union the amiable and the estimable qualities, in one part of our character we shall resemble the flower that smiles in spring; in another the firmly-rooted tree, that *braves* the winter storm.—BLAIR.

The soul, secur'd in her existence, smiles
At the drawn dagger, and *defies* its point.—ADDISON.

Troy sunk in flames I saw (nor could prevent),
And lium from its old foundations rent—
Rent like a mountain ash, which *dard* the winds,
And stood the sturdy strokes of lab'ring winds
DRYDEN.

The Platos and Ciceros among the ancients; the Bacones, Boyles, and Lockes, among our own countrymen, are all instances of what I have been saying, namely, that the greatest persons in all ages have conformed to the established religion of their country; not to mention any of the divines, however celebrated, since our adversaries *challenge* all those as men who have too much interest in this case to be impartial evidence.—BUDGELL.

Bravery, Courage, Valour.

Bravery denotes the abstract quality of *brave* (v. *Brave*).

Courage, in French *courage*, comes from *cœur*, in Latin *cor* the heart, which is the seat of *courage*.

Valour, in French *valeur*, Latin *valor*, from *valere* to be strong, signifies by distinction strength of mind.

Bravery lies in the blood; *courage* lies in the mind: the latter depends on the reason; the former on the physical temperament: the first is a species of instinct; the second is a virtue: a man is *brave* in proportion as he is without thought; he has *courage* in proportion as he reasons or reflects.

Bravery seems to be something involuntary, a mechanical movement that does not depend on one's self; *courage* requires conviction, and gathers strength by delay; it is a noble and lofty sentiment: the force of example, the charms of music, the fury and tumult of battle, the desperation of the conflict, will make cowards *brave*; the *courageous* man wants no other incentives than what his own mind suggests.

Bravery is of utility only in the hour of attack or contest; *courage* is of service at all times and under all circumstances: *bravery* is of avail in overcoming the obstacle of the moment; *courage* seeks to avert the distant evil that may possibly arrive. *Bravery* is a thing of the moment that is or is not, as circumstances may favour; it varies with the

time and season: *courage* exists at all times and on all occasions. The *brave* man who fearlessly rushes to the mouth of the cannon may tremble at his own shadow as he passes through a churchyard, or turn pale at the sight of blood: the *courageous* man smiles at imaginary dangers, and prepares to meet those that are real.

It is as possible for a man to have *courage* without *bravery*, as to have *bravery* without *courage*: Cicero betrayed his want of *bravery* when he sought to shelter himself against the attacks of Cataline; he displayed his *courage* when he laid open the treasonable purposes of this conspirator to the whole senate, and charged him to his face with the crimes of which he knew him to be guilty.

Valour is a higher quality than either *bravery* or *courage*, and seems to partake of the grand characteristics of both; it combines the fire of *bravery* with the determination and firmness of *courage*: *bravery* is most fitted for the soldier and all who receive orders; *courage* is most adapted for the general and all who give commands; *valour* for the leader and framer of enterprises, and all who carry great projects into execution: *bravery* requires to be guided; *courage* is equally fitted to command or obey; *valour* directs and executes. *Bravery* has most relation to danger; *courage* and *valour* include in them a particular reference to action: the *brave* man exposes himself; the *courageous* man advances to the scene of action which is before him; the *valiant* man seeks for occasions to act.

Courage may be exercised in ordinary cases; *valour* displays itself most effectually in the achievement of heroic exploits. A consciousness of duty, a love of one's country, a zeal for the cause in which one is engaged, an over-ruling sense of religion, the dictates of a pure conscience, always inspire *courage*: an ardent thirst for glory, and an insatiable ambition, render men *valiant*.

The *brave* man, when he is wounded, is proud of being so, and boasts of his wounds; the *courageous* man collects the strength which his wounds have left him, to pursue the object which he has in view; the *valiant* man thinks less of the life he is about to lose, than of the glory which has escaped him. The *brave* man, in the hour of victory, exults and triumphs; he discovers his joy in boisterous war shouts. The *courageous* man forgets his success in order to profit by its advantages. The *valiant* man is stimulated by success to seek after new trophies. *Bravery* sinks after a defeat: *courage* may be damped for a moment, but is never destroyed; it is ever ready to seize the first opportunity which offers to regain the lost advantage: *valour*, when defeated on any occasion, seeks another in which more glory is to be acquired.

The three hundred Spartans who defended the Straits of Thermopylæ were *brave*. Socrates drinking the hemlock, Regulus returning to Carthage, Titus tearing himself from the arms of the weeping Ber-nice, Alfred the Great going into the camp of the Danes, were *courageous*. Hercules destroying monsters, Perseus delivering Andromeda, Achilles running to the ramparts of Troy, and the knights of more modern date who have gone in quest

of extraordinary adventures, are all entitled to the peculiar appellation of *valiant*.

This *brave* man, with long resistance,
Held the combat doubtful.—ROWE.

Oh! When I see him arming for his honour,
His country, and his gods, that martial fire
That mounts his *courage*, kindles even me!
DRYDEN.

True *valour*, friends, on virtue founded strong,
Meets all events alike.—MALLET.

Breach, Break, Gap, Chasm.

Breach and Break are both derived from the same verb *break* (v. To *break*), to denote what arises from being broken, in the figurative sense of the verb itself.

Gap, from the English *gape*, signifies the thing that *gapes* or stands open.

Chasm, in Greek *χασμα* from *χαίρω*, and the Hebrew *gahah* to be open, signifies the thing that has opened itself.

The idea of an opening is common to these terms, but they differ in the nature of the opening. A *breach* and a *gap* are the consequence of a violent removal, which destroys the connexion; a *break* and a *chasm* may arise from the absence of that which would form a connexion. A *breach* in a wall is made by means of cannon; *gaps* in fences are commonly the effect of some violent effort to pass through; a *break* is made in a page of printing by leaving off in the middle of a line: a *chasm* is left in writing when any words in the sentence are omitted.

A *breach* and a *chasm* always imply a larger opening than a *break* or *gap*. A *gap* may be made in a knife; a *breach* is always made in the walls of a building or fortification: the clouds sometimes separate so as to leave small *breaks*; the ground is sometimes so convulsed by earthquakes as to leave frightful *chasms*.

Breach and *chasm* are used morally; *break* and *gap* seldom otherwise than in application to natural objects. Trifling circumstances too often occasion wide *breaches* in families. The death of relatives often produces a sad *chasm* in the enjoyments of individuals.

A mighty *breach* is made; the rooms conceal'd
Appear, and all the palace is reveal'd.—DRYDEN.

Considering, probably, how much Homer had been figured by the arbitrary compilers of his works, Virgil, by his will, obliged Tucca and Varius to add nothing, nor so much as fill up the *breaks* he had left in his poem.—WALSH.

Or if the order of the world below
Will not the *gap* of one whole day allow,
Give me that minute when she made her vow.
DRYDEN.

The whole *chasm* in nature, from a plant to a man, is filled up with diverse kinds of creatures.—ADDISON.

When *breach* of faith join'd hearts does disengage,
The calmest temper turns to wildest rage.—LEE.

To Break, Rack, Rend, Tear.

Break, in Saxon *brecan*, Danish and Low German *breken*, High German *brechen*, Latin *frango*, Greek *σπιννυμι*, *σπινχω*, Chaldean *perak* to separate.

Rack, comes from the same source as *break*; it is properly the root of this word,

and an onomatopoeia, conveying a sound correspondent with what is made by *breaking*; *rak* in Swedish, and *racco* in Icelandic, signifies a *breaking* of the ice.

Rend, is in Saxon *hrendan*, *hreddan*, low German *ritan*, high German *reissen* to split, Greek *ρησσω*, Hebrew *rangnah* to break in pieces.

Tear, in Saxon *taeran*, Low German *tiren*, high German *zerren*, is an intensive verb from *ziehen* to pull, Greek *τρωω τειρω*, to bruise, Hebrew *tor* to split, divide, or cleave.

The forcible division of any substance is the common characteristic of these terms.

Break is the generic term, the rest specific: every thing *racked*, *rent*, or *torn*, is broken, but not *vice versâ*. *Break* has however a specific meaning, in which it is comparable with the others. *Breaking* requires less violence than either of the others: brittle things may be *broken* with the slightest touch, but nothing can be *racked* without intentional violence of an extraordinary kind. Glass is quickly *broken*; a table is *racked*. Hard substances only are *broken* or *racked*; but every thing of a soft texture and composition may be *rent* or *torn*.

Breaking is performed by means of a blow; *racking* by that of a violent concussion; but *rending* and *tearing* are the consequences of a pull. Anything of wood or stone is *broken*; any thing of a complicated structure, with hinges and joints, is *racked*; cloth is *rent*, paper is *torn*. *Rend* is sometimes used for what is done by design; a *tear* is always faulty. Cloth is sometimes *rent* rather than cut when it is wanted to be divided; but when it is *torn* it is injured.

But out affection!

All bond and privilege of nature break.—SHAKESPEARE.

Long has this secret struggl'd in my breast;

Long has it rack'd and rent my tortured bosom.

SMITH.

The people rend the skies with loud applause,

And heaven can hear no other name but yours.

DRYDEN.

She sigh'd, she sobb'd, and furlous with despair,

She rent her garments, and she tore her hair.

DRYDEN.

Who would not bleed with transport for his country.

Tear every tender passion from his heart?—THOMSON.

To Break, Bruise, Squeeze, Pound, Crush.

Break, *v.* To break, rack.

Bruise, in French *briser*, Saxon *brysed*, not improbably from the same source as press.

Squeeze, in Saxon *cwysin*, low German *quiesen*, *quiesen*, Swedish *quesa*, Latin *quatio* to shake, or produce a concussion.

Pound, in Saxon *punian*, is not improbably derived by a change of letters from the Latin *tundo* to bruise.

Crush, in French *ecraser* is most probably only a variation of the word *squeeze*, like *crash* or *squash*.

Break always implies the separation of the component parts of a body; *bruise* denotes simply the destroying the continuity of the parts. Hard brittle substances, as glass, are *broken*; soft pulpy substances, as flesh or fruits, are *bruised*.

The operation of *bruising* is performed either by a violent blow or by pressure; that of *squeezing* by compression only. Metals, particularly lead and silver, may be *bruised*; fruits may be either *bruised* or *squeezed*. In this latter sense *bruise* applies to the harder substances, or indicates a violent compression; *squeeze* is used for soft substances or a gentle compression. The kernels of nuts are *bruised*; oranges or apples are *squeezed*. To pound is properly to *bruise* in a mortar so as to produce a separation of parts; to *crush* is the most violent and destructive of all operations which amounts to the total dispersion of all the parts of a body.

What is *broken* may be made whole again; what is *bruised* or *squeezed* may be restored to its former tone and consistency; what is *pounded* is only reduced to smaller parts for convenience; but what is *crushed* is destroyed. When the wheel of a carriage passes over any body that yields to its weight it *crushes* it to powder: thus in the figurative sense it marks a total annihilation: if a conspiracy be not *crushed* in the bud, it will prove fatal to the power which has suffered it to grow.

Dash my devoted bark! ye surges break it.

'Tis for my ruin that the tempest rises!—ROWE.

Yet lab'ring well his little spot of ground,
Some scatt'ring pot-herbs here and there he found;
Which cultrated with his daily care.

And, bruis'd with vervain, were his daily fare.

DRYDEN.

He therefore first among the swains was found,

To reap the produce of his labour'd ground,

And squeeze the combs with golden liquor crown'd.

DRYDEN.

And where the rafters on the columns meet,

We push them headlong with our arms and feet:

Down goes the top at once; the Greeks beneath

Are piece-meal torn, or pounded into dust.

DRYDEN.

Such were the sufferings of our Lord, so great and so grievous as none of us are in any degree able to undergo. That weight under which he crouched, would *crush* us.—TILLOTSON.

To crush rebellion every way is just.—DARCY.

To Break, Burst, Crack, Split.

Break, *v.* To break, rack.

Burst, in Saxon *deorstan*, *bersten*, *byrsten*, low German *baisten*, *basten*, high German *bersten*, old German *bresten*, Swedish *brysta*, is but a variation of *break*.

Crack, is in Saxon *cearcian*, French *cracquer*, high German *kracken*, low German *kraken*, Danish *krakke*, Greek *κρεκειν*, which are in all probability but variations of *break*, &c.

Split, in Dutch *split*, Danish *splitten*, low German *spieten*, high German *spalten*, old German *spiltten*, Swedish *splita*, which are all connected with the German *platzen* to burst, from the Greek *σπαισσομαι* to tear or split, and the Hebrew *pelah* to separate, *palet* or *palety* to cut in pieces.

Break denotes a forcible separation of the constituent parts of a body. *Burst* and *crack* are onomatopoeias or imitations of the sound which are made in *bursting* and *cracking*. *Splitting* is a species of *cracking* that takes place in some bodies in a similar manner without being accompanied with the noise.

Breaking is generally the consequence of

some external violence : every thing that is exposed to violence may without distinction be *broken*. *Bursting* arises mostly from an extreme tension : hollow bodies when over-filled, *burst*. *Cracking* is caused by the application of excessive heat, or the defective texture of the substance : glass *cracks* ; the earth *cracks* ; leather *cracks*. *Splitting* may arise from a combination of external and internal causes : wood in particular is liable to *split*. A thing may be *broken* in any shape, form, and degree : *bursting* leaves a wide gap ; *cracking* and *splitting* leave a long aperture ; the latter of which is commonly wider than that of the former.

Ambitious thence the manly river *breaks*.
And gathering many a flood, and copious fed
With all the mellowed treasures of the sky,
Winds in progressive majesty along.—THOMSON.

Off traitors ! Off ! or my distracted soul
Will *burst* indignant from this jail of nature.
THOMSON.

And let the weighty roller run the round,
To smoothe the surface of th' unequal ground ;
Lest *crack'd* with summer heats the flooring flies,
Or sinks, and through the crannies weeds arise.
DRYDEN.

Is't meet that he
Should leave the helm, and like a fearful lad,
With tearful eyes, add water to the sea ?
While in his mean, the ship *splits* on the rock,
Which industry and courage might have saved.
SHAKESPEARE.

Break, v. Breach.

Breaker, v. Wave.

To Breed, Engender.

Breed, in Saxon *bredan*, Teutonic *breetan*, is probably connected with *braten* to roast, being an operation principally performed by fire or heat.

Engender, compounded of *en* and *gender*, from *genitus* participle of *gigno*, signifies to lay or communicate the seeds for production.

These terms are figuratively employed for the act of procreation.

To *breed* is to bring into existence by a slow operation ; to *engender* is to be the author or prime cause of existence. So in the metaphorical sense, frequent quarrels are apt to *breed* hatred and animosity : the levelling and inconsistent conduct of the higher classes in the present age serves to *engender* a spirit of insubordination and assumption in the inferior order.

Whatever *breeds* acts gradually ; whatever *engenders* produces immediately as cause and effect. Uncleanliness *breeds* diseases of the body ; want of occupation *breeds* those of the mind : playing at chance games *engenders* a love of money.

The strong desire of fame *breeds* several vicious habits in the mind.—ADDISON.

Eve's dream is full of those high conceits *engendering* pride, which, we are told, the Devil endeavoured to instil into her.—ADDISON.

Breed, v. Race.

Breeding, v. Education.

Breeze, Gale, Blast, Gust, Storm, Tempest, Hurricane.

All these words express the action of the wind, in different degrees and under different circumstances.

Breeze, in Italian *brezza*, is in all probability an onomatopoeia for that kind of wind peculiar to southern climates.

Gale is probably connected with *call* and *yell*, denoting a sonorous wind.

Blast, in German *geblasen*, participle of *blasen*, signifies properly the act of blowing, but by distinction it is employed for any strong effort of blowing.

Gust, is immediately of Icelandic origin, and expresses the phenomena which are characteristic of the Northern climates ; but in all probability it is a variation of *gush*, signifying a violent stream of wind.

Storm, in German *sturm*, from *stören* to put in commotion, like *gust*, describes the phenomenon of Northern climates.

Tempest, in Latin *tempesta*, or *tempus* a time or season, describes that season or sort of weather which is most remarkable, but at the same time most frequent, in Southern climates.

Hurricane has been introduced by the Spaniards into European languages from the Caribbee Islands ; where it describes that species of *tempestuous* wind most frequent in tropical climates.

A *breeze* is gentle ; a *gale* is brisk, but steady : we have *breezes* in a calm summer's day ; the mariner has favourable *gales* which keep the sails on the stretch. A *blast* is impetuous : the exhalations of a trumpet, the breath of bellows, the sweep of a violent wind, are *blasts*. A *gust* is sudden and vehement : *gusts* of wind are sometimes so violent as to sweep every thing before them while they last.

Storm, *tempest*, and *hurricane*, include other particulars besides wind.

A *storm* throws the whole atmosphere into commotion ; it is a war of the elements, in which wind, rain, hail, and the like, conspire to disturb the heavens. *Tempest* is a species of *storm* which has also thunder and lightning to add to the confusion. *Hurricane* is a species of *storm* which exceeds all the rest in violence and duration.

Gust, *storm*, and *tempest*, which are applied figuratively, preserve their distinction in this sense. The passions are exposed to *gusts* and *storms*, to sudden bursts, or violent and continued agitations ; the soul is exposed to *tempests* when agitated with violent and contending emotions.

Gradual sinks the breeze
Into a perfect calm.—THOMSON.

What happy gale
Blows you to Padua here from old Verona ?
SHAKESPEARE.

As when fierce Northern *blasts* from th' Alps descend,
From his firm roots with struggling *gusts* to rend
An aged sturdy oak, the rustling sound
Grows loud.—DENHAM.

Through *storms* and *tempests* so the sailor drives,
Whilst every element in combat strives ;
Loud roars the thunder, fierce the lightning flies,
Winds wildly rage, and billows tear the skies.
SHIRLEY.

So where our wide Numidian wastes extend,
Sudden th' impetuous hurricanes descend,
Wheel through the air, in curling eddies play,
Tear up the sands, and sweep whole plains away.
ADDISON.

Stay these sudden gusts of passion
That hurry you away.—ROWE.

I burn, I burn! The storm that's in my mind
Kindles my heart, like fires provoked by wind.
LANSDOWN.

All deaths, all tortures, in one pang combin'd,
Are gentle, to the tempest of my mind.—THOMSON.

Brief, v. Short.

Bright, v. Clear.

Brightness, Lustre, Splendor, Brilliancy.

Brightness, from the English *bright*, Saxon *breorht*, probably comes, like the German *pracht* splendour, from the Hebrew *berak* to shine or glitter.

Lustre, in French *lustre*, Latin *lustrum*, a purgation, or cleansing, that is, to make clean or pure.

Splendor, in French *splendeur*, Latin *splendor*, from *splendeo* to shine, comes either from the Greek *σπλῆδος* embers, or *σπνθῆρ* a spark.

Brilliancy, from *brilliant*, and *briller* to shine, comes from the German *brille* spectacles, and the Latin of the middle ages *beryllus* a crystal.

Brightness is the generic, the rest are specific terms: there cannot be *lustre*, *splendor*, and *brilliancy*, without *brightness*; but there may be *brightness* where these do not exist. These terms rise in sense; *lustre* rises on *brightness*, *splendor* on *lustre*, and *brilliancy* on *splendor*.

Brightness and *lustre* are applied properly to natural lights; *splendor* and *brilliancy* have been more commonly applied to that which is artificial: there is always more or less *brightness* in the sun or moon; there is an occasional *lustre* in all the heavenly bodies when they shine in their unclouded *brightness*; there is *splendor* in the eruptions of flame from a volcano or an immense conflagration; there is *brilliancy* in a collection of diamonds. There may be both *splendor* and *brilliancy* in an illumination: the *splendor* arises from the mass and richness of light; the *brilliancy* from the variety and *brightness* of the lights and colours. *Brightness* may be obscured, *lustre* may be tarnished, *splendor* and *brilliancy* diminished.

The analogy is closely preserved in the figurative application. *Brightness* attaches to the moral character of men in ordinary cases, *lustre* attaches to extraordinary instances of virtue and greatness, *splendor* and *brilliancy* attach to the achievements of men.

Our Saviour is strikingly represented to us as the *brightness* of his Father's glory, and the express image of his person. The humanity of the English in the hour of conquest adds a *lustre* to their victories which are either *splendid* or *brilliant*, according to the number and nature of the circumstances which render them remarkable.

Earthly honours are both short-lived in their continuance, and while they last, tarnished with spots and stains. On some quarter or other their *brightness* is obscured. But the honour which proceeds from God and virtue is

unmixed and pure. It is a *lustre* which is derived from heaven.—BLAIR.

Thomson's diction is in the highest degree florid and luxuriant, such as may be said to be to his images and thoughts "both their *lustre* and their shade," such as invest them with *splendor* through which they are not easily discernible.—JOHNSON.

There is an appearance of *brilliancy* in the pleasures of high life which naturally dazzles the young.—CRAIG.

Brilliancy, v. Radiance.

To Bring, Fetch, Carry.

Bring, in Saxon *bringan*, Teutonic, &c., *bringen*, old German *brinnan*, *pringan*, *bibringen*, is most probably contracted from *beringen*, which from the simple *ringen* or *regen* to move, signifies to put in motion, or remove.

Fetch, in Saxon *fecian*, is not improbably connected with the word *search*, in French *chercher*, German *suchen*, Greek *ζητεω*, Hebrew *zangnack* to send for or go after.

Carry, v. To bear, carry.

To *bring* is simply to take with one's self from the place where one is; to *fetch* is to go first to a place and then *bring* it; to *fetch* therefore is a species of *bringing*: whatever is near at hand is *brought*: whatever is at a distance must be *fetch'd*: the porter at an inn *brings* a parcel, a servant who is sent for it *fetches* it.

Bring always respects motion towards the place in which the speaker resides; *fetch*, a motion both to and from; *carry*, always a motion directly from the place or at a distance from the place. A servant *brings* the parcel home which his master has sent him to *fetch*; he *carries* a parcel from home. A *carrier* *carries* parcels to and from a place, but he does not *bring* parcels to and from any place.

Bring is an action performed at the option of the agent; *fetch* and *carry* are mostly done at the command of another. Hence the old proverb, "He who will *fetch* will *carry*," to mark the character of the gossip and tale-bearer, who reports what he hears from two persons in order to please both parties.

What appeared to me wonderful was that none of the ants came home without *bringing* something.—ADDISON.

I have said before that those ants which I did so particularly consider, *fetch'd* their corn out of a garret.—ADDISON.

How great is the hardship of a poor ant, when she *carries* a grain of corn to the second story, climbing up & wall with her head downwards.—ADDISON.

Brink, v. Border.

Brisk, v. Active.

Brittle, v. Fragile.

Broad, v. Large.

Broil, v. Quarrel.

To Bruise, v. To break, bruise.

Brutal, v. Cruel.

Brute, v. Animal.

Bud, v. Sprout.

Buffoon, v. Fool, idiot.

To Build, Erect, Construct.

Build, in Saxon *bytliau*, French *batir*, German *bauen*, Gothic *boa*, *bua*, *byggja*, to erect house-, from the Hebrew *ba'ath* a habitation.

Erect, in French *eriger*, Latin *erectus*, participle of *erigo*, compounded of *e* and *rego*, from the Greek *opeya* to stretch or extend.

Construct, in Latin *constructus*, participle of *construo*, compounded of *con* together and *struo* to put, in Greek *spanvau*, *sopew* to *strew*, in Hebrew *okrah* to dispose or put in order, signifies to form together into a mass.

The word *build* by distinction expresses the purpose of the action; *erect* indicates the mode of the action *construct* indicates contrivance in the action. What is *built* is employed for the purpose of receiving, retaining, or confining; what is *erected* is placed in an elevated situation; what is *constructed* is put together with ingenuity.

All that is *built* may be said to be *erected* or *constructed*; but all that is *erected* or *constructed* is not said to be *built*; likewise what is *erected* is mostly *constructed*, though not *vice versa*. We *build* from necessity; we *erect* for ornament; we *construct* for utility and convenience. Houses are *built*, monuments *erected*, machines are *constructed*.

Montesquieu wittily observes, that by *building* professed madhouses, men tacitly insinuate that all who are out of their senses are to be found only in those places.—WARTON.

It is as rational to live in caves till our own hands have erected a palace, as to reject all knowledge of architecture which our understandings will not supply.—JOHNSON.

From the raft or canoe, which first served to carry a savage over the river, to the *construction* of a vessel capable of conveying a numerous crew with safety to a distant coast, the progress in improvement is immense.—ROBERTSON.

Build, *v. To found*.

Bulk, *v. Size*.

Bulky, Massive.

Bulky denotes having *bulk*, which is connected with our words, belly, body, bilge, bulge, &c., and the German *balg*.

Massive, in French *massif* from *mass*, signifies having a mass or being like a mass, which through the German *masse*, Latin *massa*, Greek *μασα* dough, comes from *μασσω* to knead, signifying made into a solid substance.

Whatever is *bulky* has a prominence of figure; what is *massive* has compactness of matter. The *bulky* therefore, though larger in size, is not so weighty as the *massive*.

Hollow bodies commonly have a *bulk*; none but solid bodies can be *massive*.

A vessel is *bulky* in its form; lead, silver, and gold, *massive*.

In Milton's time it was suspected that the whole creation languished, that neither trees nor animals had the height or *bulk* of their predecessors.—JOHNSON.

His pond'rous shield,
Ethereal temper, *massy*, large, and round,
Behind him cast.—MILTON.

Burden, *v. Encumbrance*.

Burden, *v. Freight*.

Burden, *v. Weight*.

Burdensome, *v. Heavy*.

Burial, Interment, Sepulture.

Burial from *bury*, in Saxon *birian*, *birigan*, German *bergen*, signifies in the original sense to conceal.

Interment from *inter*, compounded of *in* and *terra*, signifies the putting into the ground.

Sepulture, in French *sepulture*, Latin *sepultura*, from *sepultus*, participle of *sepelio* to *bury*, comes from *sepes* a hedge, signifying an enclosure, and probably likewise from the Hebrew *sabat* to put to rest, or in a state of privacy.

Under *burial* is comprehended simply the purpose of the action; under *interment* and *sepulture*, the manner as well as the motive of the action. We *bury* in order to conceal; *interment* and *sepulture* are accompanied with religious ceremonies.

* *Bury* is confined to no object or place; we *bury* whatever we deposit in the earth, and wherever we please; but *interment* and *sepulture* respect only the bodies of the deceased when deposited in a sacred place.

Burial requires that the object be concealed under ground; *interment* may be used for depositing in vaults.

Self-murderers are *buried* in the highways; Christians in general are *buried* in the churchyard; but the kings of England were formerly *interred* in Westminster Abbey.

Burial is a term in familiar use; *interment* serves frequently as a more elegant expression; *sepulture* is an abstract term confined to particular cases, as in speaking of the rights and privileges of *sepulture*.

Interment and *sepulture* never depart from their religious import; *bury* is used figuratively for other objects and purposes. A man is said to *bury* himself alive who shuts himself out from the world; he is said to *bury* the talent of which he makes no use, or to *bury* in oblivion what he does not wish to call to mind.

Let my pale corse the rights of *burial* know,
And give me entrance in the realms below.—POPE.

But good Æneas ordered on the shore
A stately tomb, whose top a trumpet bore;
Thus was his friend *inter'd*, and deathless fame,
Still to the lofty cape consigns his name.—DRYDEN.

Ah! leave me not for Grecian dogs to tear;
The common rites of *sepulture* bestow:
To soothe a father's and a mother's woe;
Let their large gifts procure an urn at least,
And Hector's ashes in his country rest.—POPE.

Burlesque, *v. Wit*.

Burning, *v. Hot*.

Burst, *v. Break*.

Business, Occupation, Employment, Engagement, Avocation.

Business signifies what makes *busy* (*v. Active, busy*).

* Vide Trusler: "To bury, *inter*."

Occupation from *occupy*, in French *occuper*, Latin *occupo*, that is, *ob* and *capio*, signifies that which serves or takes possession of a person or thing to the exclusion of other things.

Employment from *employ*, in French *employer*, Latin *implico*, Greek *ἐμπλέω*, signifies that which engages or fixes a person.

Engagement, *v.* To attract.

Avocation, in Latin *avocatio*, from *a* and *voco*, signifies the thing that calls off from another thing.

Business occupies all a person's thoughts as well as his time and powers; *occupation* and *employment* occupy only his time and strength: the first is mostly regular, it is the object of our choice; the second is casual, it depends on the will of another. *Engagement* is a partial *employment*, *avocation* a particular *engagement*: an *engagement* prevents us from doing any thing else; an *avocation* calls off or prevents us from doing what we wish.

Every tradesman has a *business*, on the diligent prosecution of which depends his success in life; every mechanic has his daily *occupation*, by which he maintains his family; every labourer has an *employment* which is fixed for him.

Business and *occupation* always suppose a serious object. *Business* is something more urgent and important than *occupation*: a man of independent fortune has no occasion to pursue *business*, but as a rational agent he will not be contented to be without an *occupation*.

Employment, *engagement*, and *avocation*, leave the object undefined. An *employment* may be a mere diversion of the thoughts, and a wasting of the hours in some idle pursuit; a child may have its *employment*, which may be its play in distinction from its *business*: an *engagement* may have no higher object than that of pleasure; the idler people have often the most *engagements*; the gratification of curiosity, and the love of social pleasure, supply them with an abundance of *engagements*. *Avocations* have seldom a direct trifling object, although it may sometimes be of a subordinate nature, and generally irrelevant: numerous *avocations* are not desirable; every man should have a regular pursuit, the *business* of his life, to which the principal part of his time should be devoted: *avocations* therefore of a serious nature are apt to divide the time and attention to a hurtful degree.

A person who is *busy* has much to attend to, and attends to it closely: a person who is *occupied* has a full share of *business* without any pressure; he is opposed to one who is idle: a person who is *employed* has the present moment filled up; he is not in a state of inaction: the person who is *engaged* is not at liberty to be otherwise *employed*; his time is not his own; he is opposed to one at leisure.

The materials are no sooner wrought into paper, but they are distributed among the presses where they again set innumerable artists at work, and furnish *business* to another mystery.—ADDISON.

How little must the ordinary occupations of men seem to one who is engaged in so noble a pursuit as the assimilation of himself to the Deity.—BERKELEY.

I would recommend to every one of my readers the keeping a journal of their lives for one week, and setting

down punctually their whole series of employments during that space of time.—ADDISON.

Mr. Baretti being a single man, and entirely clear from all *engagements*, takes the advantage of his independence.—JOHNSON.

Sorrow ought not to be suffered to increase by indulgence, but must give way after a stated time to social duties and the common avocations of life.—JOHNSON.

Business, Trade, Profession, Art.

Business, *v.* *Business*, *occupation*.

Trade signifies that which employs the time by way of *trade*.

Profession signifies that which one professes to do.

Art signifies that which is followed in the way of the arts.

These words are synonymous in the sense of a calling, for the purpose of a livelihood: *business* is general, *trade* and *profession* are particular; all *trade* is *business*, but all *business* is not *trade*.

Buying and selling of merchandize is inseparable from *trade*; but the exercise of one's knowledge and experience, for purposes of gain, constitutes a *business*; when learning or particular skill is required, it is a *profession*; and when there is a peculiar exercise of *art*, it is an *art* every shop-keeper and retail dealer carries on a *trade*; brokers, manufacturers, bankers, and others, carry on *business*; clergymen, medical, or military men, follow a *profession*; musicians and painters follow an *art*.

Those who are determined by choice to any particular kind of *business* are indeed more happy than those who are determined by necessity.—ADDISON.

Some persons, indeed, by the privilege of their birth and quality, are above a common *trade* and *profession*, but they are not hereby exempted from all *business*, and allowed to live unprofitably to others.—TILLOTSON.

No one of the sons of Adam ought to think himself exempt from labour or industry; those to whom birth or fortune may seem to make such an application unnecessary, ought to find out some calling or *profession*, that they may not lie as a burthen upon the species.—ADDISON.

The painter understands his *art*.—SWIFT.

Business, Office, Duty.

Business, *v.* *Business*, *occupation*.

Office, *v.* *Benefit*, *service*.

Duty signifies what is due or owing one, from the Latin *debitum*, participle of *debeo* to owe.

Business is what one prescribes to one's self; *office* is prescribed by another; *duty* is prescribed or enjoined by a fixed rule of propriety: mercantile concerns are the *business* which a man takes upon himself; the management of parish concerns is an *office* imposed upon him often, much against his inclination; the maintenance of his family is a *duty* which his conscience enjoins upon him to perform.

Business and *duty* are public or private; *office* is mostly of a public nature: a minister of state, by virtue of his *office*, has always public *business* to perform; but men in general have only private *business* to transact: a minister of religion has public *duties* to perform in his ministerial capacity; every other man has

personal or relative duties, which he is called upon to discharge according to his station.

It is certain, from Suetonius, that the Romans thought the education of their children a *business* properly belonging to the parents themselves.—BUDGELL.

But now the feather'd youth their former bounds
Ardent disdain, and weighing off their wings,
Demand the free possession of the sky.
This one glad *office* more, and then dissolves
Parental love at once, now heedless grown.
THOMSON.

Discretion is the perfection of reason, and a guide to us in all the duties of life.—ADDISON.

Business, v. Affair.

Bustle, Tumult, Uproar.

Bustle is probably a frequentative of *busy*.

Tumult, in French *tumulte*, Latin *tumultus*, or *tumor multus*, much swelling or perturbation.

Uproar, compounded of *up* and *roar*, marks the act of setting up a roar or clamour, or the state of its being so set up.

Bustle has most of hurry in it; *tumult* most of disorder and confusion; *uproar* most of noise: the hurried movements of one, or many, cause a *bustle*; disorderly struggles of many constitute a *tumult*; the loud elevation of many opposing voices produces an *uproar*. *Bustle* is frequently not the effect of design, but the natural consequence of many persons coming together; *tumult* commonly arises from a general effervescence in the minds of a multitude; *uproar* is the consequence either of general anger or mirth. A crowded street will always be in a *bustle*: contested elections are always accompanied with a great *tumult*: drinking parties make a considerable *uproar*, in the iniquity of their intemperate mirth.

They who live in the *bustle* of the world are not, perhaps, the most accurate observers of the progressive change of manners in that society in which they pass their time.—ADERCROMBY.

Outlaws of nature! yet the great must use 'em
Sometimes as necessary tools of *tumult*.—DRYDEN.

Amidst the *uproar* of other bad passions, conscience acts as a restraining power.—BLAIR.

Busy, v. Active.

Butchery, v. Carnage.

Butt, v. Mark.

To Buy, Purchase, Bargain, Cheapen.

Buy, in Saxon *byegean*, is in all probability connected with *bargain*.

Purchase, in French *poursuivre*, like the word pursue, *poursuivre*, comes from the Latin *persequor*, signifying to obtain by a particular effort.

Bargain, in Welsh *bargen*, is most probably connected with the German *borgen* to borrow, and *burge* a surety.

Cheapen is in Saxon *ceapan*, German *kaufen*, Dutch *koopen* to buy.

Buy and *purchase* have a strong resemblance to each other, both in sense and application; but the latter is a term of more refinement than the former: *buy* may always be substituted for *purchase* without impropriety; but *purchase* would be sometimes ridiculous in the familiar application of *buy*: the necessities of life are *bought*; luxuries are *purchased*.

The characteristic idea of *buying* is that of expending money according to a certain rule, and for a particular purpose; that of *purchase* is the procuring the thing: the propensity of *buying* whatever comes in one's way is very injurious to the circumstances of some people; what it is not convenient to procure for ourselves we may commission another to *purchase* for us.

Buying implies simply the exchange of one's money for a commodity; *bargaining* and *cheapening* have likewise respect to the price: to *bargain* is to make a specific agreement as to the price; to *cheapen* is not only to lower the price asked, but to deal in such things as are *cheap*: trade is supported by *buyers*; *bargainers* and *cheapeners* are not acceptable customers: mean people are prone to *bargaining*; poor people are oblige to *cheapen*.

It gives me very great scandal to observe, wherever I go, how much skill, in *buying* all manner of things, there is necessary to defend yourself from being cheated.—STEELE.

Pirates may make *cheap* pennyworths of their pillage,
And *purchase* friends.—SHAKESPEARE.

So York must sit, and fret, and bite his tongue,

While his own lands are *bargain'd* for, and sold.
SHAKESPEARE.

You may see many a smart rhetorician turning his hat in his hands, moulding it into several different cocks, examining sometimes the lining, and sometimes the button, during the whole course of his harangue. A deaf man would think he was *cheapening* a beaver, when perhaps he is talking of the fate of the British nation.—ADDISON.

By-Word, v. Axiom.

C.

Cabal, v. Combination.

To Cajole, v. To Coax.

Calamity, Disaster, Misfortune, Mischance, Mishap.

Calamity, in French *calamité*, Latin *calamitas*, from *calamus* a stalk; because hail or whatever injured the stalks of corn was termed a *calamity*.

Disaster, in French *désastre*, is compounded of the privative *des* or *dis* and *astre*, in Latin *astrum* a star, signifying what comes from the adverse influence of the stars.

Misfortune, Mischance, and Mishap, naturally express what comes amiss.

The idea of a painful event is common to all these terms, but they differ in the degree of importance.

A *calamity* is a great disaster or *misfortune*;

a *misfortune* a great *mischance* or *misshap*: whatever is attended with destruction is a *calamity*; whatever occasions mischief to the person, defeats or interrupts plans, is a *disaster*: whatever is accompanied with a loss of property, or the deprivation of health, is a *misfortune*: whatever diminishes the beauty or utility of objects is a *mischance* or *misshap*: the devastation of a country by hurricanes or earthquakes, or the desolation of its inhabitants by famine or plague, are great *calamities*: the overturning of a carriage, or the fracture of a limb, are *disasters*: losses in trade are *misfortunes*, the spoiling of a book is, to a greater or less extent, a *mischance* or *misshap*.

A *calamity* seldom arises from the direct agency of man; the elements, or the natural course of things, are mostly concerned in producing this source of misery to men; the rest may be ascribed to chance, as distinguished from design: *disasters* mostly arise from some specific known cause, either the carelessness of persons, or the unfitness of things for their use; as they generally serve to derange some preconceived scheme or undertaking, they seem as if they were produced by some secret influence: *misfortune* is frequently assignable to no specific cause, it is the bad fortune of an individual; a link in the chain of his destiny; an evil independent of himself, as distinguished from a fault: *mischance* and *misshap* are *misfortunes* of comparatively so trivial a nature, that it would not be worth while to inquire into their cause, or to dwell upon their consequences. A *calamity* is dreadful; a *disaster* melancholy; a *misfortune* grievous or heavy; a *mischance* or *misshap* slight or trivial.

A *calamity* is either public or private, but more frequently the former: a *disaster* is rather particular than private; it affects things rather than persons; journeys, expeditions, and military movements are commonly attended with *disasters*: *misfortunes* are altogether personal; they immediately affect the interests of the individual: *mischances* and *misshaps* are altogether domestic. We speak of a *calamitous* period, a *disastrous* expedition, an *unfortunate* person, little *mischances* or *misshaps*.

They observed that several blessings had degenerated into *calamities*, and that several *calamities* had improved into blessings, according as they fell into the possession of wise or foolish men.—ADDISON.

There in his noisy mansion, skill'd to rule,
The village master taught his little school:
A man severe, he was, and stern to view,
I knew him well, and every truant knew,
Well had the boding tremblers learn'd to trace
The day's *disasters* in his morning face.

GOLDSMITH.

She daily exercises her benevolence by pitying every *misfortune* that happens to every family within her circle of notice.—JOHNSON.

Permit thy daughter, Gracious Jove, to tell,
How this *mischance* the Cyprian Queen befell.—POPE.

For pity's sake tells undeserv'd *misshaps*,
And their applause to gain, recounts his claps.
CHURCHILL.

To Calculate, Compute, Reckon, Count.

Calculate, in Latin *calculus* participle of *calculo*, comes from *calculus*, Greek *καλῖς* a

pebble; because the Greeks gave their votes, and the Romans made out their accounts, by little stones; hence it denotes the action itself of *reckoning*.

Compute, in French *computer*, Latin *computo*, compounded of *com* and *puto*, signifies to put together in one's mind.

Reckon, in Saxon *reccan*, Dutch *rekenen*, German *rechnen*, is not improbably derived from *row*, in Dutch *reck*, because stringing of things in a row was formerly, as it is now sometimes, the ordinary mode of *reckoning*.

Count, in French *compter*, is but a contraction of *computer*.

These words indicate the means by which we arrive at a certain result, in regard to quantity.

To calculate is the generic term, the rest are specific: * *computation* and *reckoning* are branches of *calculation*, or an application of those operations to the objects of which a result is sought: to *calculate* comprehends arithmetical operations in general, or particular applications of the science of numbers, in order to obtain a certain point of knowledge: to *compute* is to combine certain given numbers in order to learn the grand result: to *reckon* is to enumerate and set down things in the detail: to *count* is to add up the individual items contained in many different parts, in order to determine the quantity.

Calculation particularly respects the operation itself: *compute* and *count* respect the gross sums; *reckon* refers to the details. To *calculate* denotes any numerical operation in general, but in its limited sense; it is the abstract science of figures used by mathematicians and philosophers; *computation* is a numerical estimate, a simple species of *calculation* used by historians, chronologists, and financial speculators, in drawing great results from complex sources: *reckon* and *count* are still simpler species of *calculation*, applicable to the ordinary business of life, and employed by tradesmen, mechanics, and people in general; *reckoning* and *counting* were the first efforts made by men in acquiring a knowledge of number, quantity, or degree.

The astronomer *calculates* the return of the stars; the geometrician makes algebraic *calculations*. The Banians, Indian merchants, make prodigious *calculations* in an instant on their thumb nails, doubtless after the manner of algebra, by signs, which the *calculator* employs as he pleases. The chronologist *computes* the times of particular events, by comparing them with those of other known events. Many persons have attempted from the prophecies to make a *computation* as to the probable time of the millennium: financiers *compute* the produce of a tax according to the measure and circumstances of its imposition. At every new consulate the Romans used to drive a nail into the wall of the capitol, by which they *reckoned* the length of time that their state had been erected: tradesmen *reckon* their profits and losses. Children begin by *counting* on their fingers, one, two, three.

An almanack is made by *calculation*, *computation*, and *reckoning*. The rising and setting

* Vide Roubaud: "Calculus, supposer, computer."

of the heavenly bodies are *calculated*; from giving astronomical tables is *computed* the moment on which any celestial phenomenon may return; and by *reckoning* are determined the days on which holidays, or other periodical events, fall.

Buffon, in his moral arithmetic, has *calculated* tables as guides to direct our judgments in different situations, where we have only vague probability, on which to draw our conclusions. By this we have only to *compute* what the fairest gain must cost us; how much we must lose in advance from the most favourable lottery; how much our hopes impose upon us, our cupidity cheats us, and our habits injure us.

Calculate and *reckon* are employed in a figurative sense; *compute* and *count* in an extended application of the same sense.

Calculate, *reckon*, and *count*, respect mostly the future; *compute*, the past.

Calculate is rather a conjectural deduction from what is, as to what may be; *computation* is a rational estimate of what has been, from what is; *reckoning* is a conclusive conviction, a complacent assurance that a thing will happen; *counting* indicates an expectation. We *calculate* on a gain; *compute* any loss sustained, or the amount of any mischief done; we *reckon* on a promised pleasure; we *count* the hour and minutes until the time of enjoyment arrives.

A spirit of *calculation* arises from the cupidity engendered by trade; it narrows the mind to the mere prospect of accumulation and self-interest. *Computations* are inaccurate that are not founded upon exact numerical calculations. Inconsiderate people are apt to *reckon* on things that are very uncertain, and then lay up to themselves a store of disappointments. Children who are uneasy at school *count* the hours, minutes, and moments for their return home. Those who have experienced the instability of human affairs will never *calculate* on an hour's enjoyment beyond the moment of existence. It is difficult to *compute* the loss which an army sustains upon being defeated, especially if it be obliged to make a long retreat. Those who know the human heart will never *reckon* on the assistance of professed friends in the hour of adversity. A mind that is ill at ease seeks a resource and amusement in *counting* the moments as they fly; but this is often an unhappy delusion that only adds to the bitterness of sorrow.

* In this bank of fame, by an exact *calculation*, and the rules of political arithmetic, I have allotted ten hundred thousand shares; five hundred thousand of which is the due of the general; two hundred thousand I assign to the general officers; and two hundred thousand more to all the commissioned officers, from the colonels to ensigns; the remaining hundred thousand must be distributed among the non-commissioned officers and private men; according to which *computation*, I find Serjeant Hall is to have one share and a fraction of two fifths.—STEELE.

The time we live ought not to be *computed* by the number of years, but by the use that has been made of it.—ADDISON.

Men *reckon* themselves possessed of what their genius inclines them to, and so bend all their ambition to excel in what is out of their reach.—SPECTATOR.

Applause and admiration are by no means to be *counted* among the necessities of life.—JOHNSON.

Calendar, Almanack, Ephemeris.

Calendar comes from *calenda*, the Roman name for the first days of every month.

Almanack, that is *al* and *mana*, signifies properly the reckoning or thing reckoned, from the Arabic *mana* and Hebrew *manach* to reckon.

Ephemeris, in Greek *εφεμερις* from *επι* and *ημερα* the day, implies that which happens by the day.

These terms denote a date-book, but the *calendar* is a book which registers events under every month: the *almanack* is a book which registers times, or the divisions of the year: and an *ephemeris* is a book which registers the planetary movements every day. An *almanack* may be a *calendar*, and an *ephemeris* may be both an *almanack* and a *calendar*; but every *almanack* is not a *calendar*, nor every *calendar* an *almanack*. The Gardener's *calendar* is not an *almanack*, and the sheet *almanacks* are seldom *calendars*; likewise the nautical *ephemeris* may serve as an *almanack*, although not as a *calendar*.

He was sitting upon the ground upon a little straw in the furthest corner of his dungeon, which was alternately his chair and bed; a little *calendar* of small sticks were laid at the head, notched all over with the dismal nights and days he had passed there.—STERNE.

When the reformers were purging the *calendar* of legions of visionary saints they took due care to defend the niches of real martyrs from profanation. They preserved the holy festivals which had been consecrated for many ages to the great luminaries of the church, and at once paid proper observance to the memory of the good, and fell in with the proper humour of the vulgar, which loves to rejoice and mourn at the discretion of the *almanack*.—WALPOLE.

That two or three suns or moons appear in any man's life or reign, it is not worth the wonder; but that the same should fall out at a remarkable time or point of some decisive action; that those two should make but one lute in the book of fate, and stand together in the great *ephemerides* of God, beside the philosophical assignment of the cause, it may admit a Christian apprehension in the signality.—BROWN'S VULGAR ERRORS.

To Call, Bid, Summon, Invite.

Call, in its abstract and original sense, signifies simply to give an expression of the voice, in which it agrees with the German *schall*, Swedish *skalla* a sound, Greek *καλεω* to call, Hebrew *kol* the voice.

Bid, in Saxon *beodan* or *bidden* to offer, old German *buden*, low German *bedan*, German *brethen*, &c., Latin *vito* or *invito*, which comes from *in* and *viam* the way, signifies to *call* into the way or measure of another.

Summon, in French *sommer*, changed from *summoner*, Latin *submoneo*, signifies to give special notice.

The idea of signifying one's wish to another to do any thing is included in all these terms.

To *call* is not confined to any particular sound; we may *call* by simply raising the voice: to *invite* is not even confined to sounds: we may *invite* by looks, or signs, or even by writing: to *bid* and *summons* require the express use of words. The actions of *calling* and *inviting* are common to animals as well as men: sheep *call* their young when they bleat, and oxen their companions when they low; cats and other females among the brutes *invite*

their young to come out from their bed when it is proper for them to begin to walk : to *bid* and *summon* are altogether confined to human beings.

Call and *bid* are direct addresses : to *invite* and *summon* may pass through the medium of a second person. I *call* or *bid* the person whom I wish to come, but I send him a *summons* or *invitation*.

Calling of itself expresses no more than the simple desire ; but according to circumstances it may be made to express a command or entreaty. When equals *call* each other it amounts simply to a wish, when the dam *calls* her young it amounts to supplicating entreaty ; but when a father *calls* his son it is equivalent to a command. To *bid* expresses either a command or an entreaty : when superiors *bid* it is a positive command ; when equals *bid* it is an act of civility. To *summon* is always imperative ; to *invite* always in the spirit of kindness and courtesy. Persons in all stations of life have occasion to *call* each other ; but it is an action most befitting the superior : to *bid* and *invite* are alike the actions of superiors and equals : to *summon* is the act of a superior only.

Calling is always for the purpose of drawing the object to one's person. *Bidding*, as a command, may be employed for what we wish to be done ; but *bidding* in the sense of an *invitation* is employed for drawing the object to our place of residence. *Inviting* is employed for either purpose. *Summoning* is an act of authority by which a person is obliged to make his appearance at a given place.

In a deep vale, or near some ruin'd wall,
He would the ghosts of slaughter'd soldiers call.
DRYDEN.

The star that *bids* the shepherd fold,
Now the top of heaven doth hold.—MILTON.

This minute may be mine, the next another's ;
But still all mortals ought to wait the *summons*.
SMITH.

Still follow where auspicious fates *invite*,
Caress the happy, and the wretched slight.—LEWIS.

To *Call*, *v.* To *cry*.

To *Call*, *v.* To *name*.

Callous, *v.* *Hard*.

Calm, Composed, Collected.

Calm, *v.* To *appease*.

Composed, from the verb *compose*, marks the state of being *composed* ; and *Collected*, from *collect*, the state of being *collected*.

These terms agree in expressing a state ; but *calm* respects the state of the feelings, *composed* the state of the thoughts and feelings, and *collected* the state of the thoughts more particularly.

Calmness is peculiarly requisite in seasons of distress, and amidst scenes of horror : *composure*, in moments of trial, disorder, and tumult : *collectedness*, in moments of danger. *Calmness* is the companion of fortitude ; no one whose spirits are easily disturbed can have strength to bear misfortune : *composure* is an attendant upon clearness of understanding ; no one can express himself with per-

spicuity whose thoughts are any way *disarranged* : *collectedness* is requisite for a determined promptitude of action ; no one can be expected to act promptly who cannot think fixedly.

It would argue a want of all feeling to be *calm* on some occasions, when the best affections of our nature are put to a severe trial. *Composedness* of mind associated with the detection of guilt, evinces a hardened conscience, and an insensibility to shame. *Collectedness* of mind has contributed in no small degree to the preservation of some persons' lives, in moments of the most imminent peril.

'Tis godlike magnanimity to keep,
When most provok'd, our reason *calm* and clear.
THOMSON.

A moping lover would grow a pleasant fellow by that time he had rid thrice about the island (Anticyra) : and a hare-brained rake, after a short stay in the country, go home again a *composed*, grave, worthy gentleman.—STEELE.

Collected in his strength, and like a rock,
Poised on his base, Mezentius stood the shock.
DRYDEN.

Calm, Placid, Serene.

Calm, *v.* To *appease*.

Placid, in Latin *placidus*, from *placeo* to please, signifies the state of being pleased, or free from uneasiness.

Serene, Latin *serenus*, comes most probably from the Greek *εὐρηνη* peace, signifying a state of peace.

Calm and *serene* are applied to the elements ; *placid* only to the mind. *Calmness* respects only the state of the winds, *serenity* that of the air and heavens : the weather is *calm* when it is free from agitation : it is *serene* when free from noise and vapour. *Calm* respects the total absence of all perturbation ; *placid* the ease and contentment of the mind ; *serene* clearness and composure of the mind.

As in the natural world a particular agitation of the wind is succeeded by a *calm*, so in the mind of man, when an unusual effervescence has been produced, it commonly subsides into a *calm* : *placidity* and *serenity* have more that is even and regular in them ; they are positively what they are. *Calm* is a temporary state of the feelings ; *placid* and *serene* are habits of the mind. We speak of a *calm* state ; but a *placid* and *serene* temper. *Placidity* is more of a natural gift ; *serenity* is acquired : people with not very ardent desires or warmth of feeling will evince *placidity* ; they are pleased with all that passes inwardly or outwardly : nothing contributes so much to *serenity* of mind as a pervading sense of God's good providence, which checks all impatience, softens down every asperity of humour, and gives a steady current to the feelings.

Preach patience to the sea, when jarring winds
Throw up the swelling billows to the sky !
And if your reasons mitigate her fury,
My soul will be as *calm*.—SMITH.

Placid and soothing is the remembrance of a life passed with quiet, innocence, and elegance.—STEELE.

Every one ought to fence against the temper of his climate or constitution, and frequently to indulge in himself those considerations which may give him a *serenity* of mind.—ADDISON.

To Calm, *v. To appease.*

Calm, *v. Peace.*

To Calumniate, *v. To asperse.*

Can, May.

Can, in the Northern languages können, &c., is derived most probably from *kennen* to know, from the natural intimacy which subsists between knowledge and power.

May is in German mögen, to may or wish, Greek μάω to desire, from the connexion between wishing and complying with a wish.

Can denotes possibility, may liberty and probability: he who has sound limbs can walk, but he may not walk in places which are prohibited.

For who can match Achilles? he who can
Must yet be more than hero, more than man.—POPE.

Thou canst not call him from the Stygian shore,
But thou, alas! mayst live to suffer more.—POPE.

To Cancel, *v. To abolish.*

To Cancel, *v. To blot out.*

Candid, Open, Sincere.

Candid, in French *candidé*, Latin *candidus*, from *candeo* to shine, signifies to be pure, as truth itself.

Open, is in Saxon *open*, French *ouvert*, German *offen*, from the preposition *up*, German *auf*, Dutch *op*, &c., because erectness is a characteristic of it and openness.

Sincere, French *sincère*, Latin *sincerus*, probably from the Greek *συν* and *κρυ* the heat, that is, with the heart, signifying dictated by or going with the heart.

Candor arises from a conscious purity of intention: openness from a warmth of feeling and love of communication: sincerity from a love of truth.

Candor obliges us to acknowledge whatever may make against ourselves; it is disinterested: openness impels us to utter whatever passes in the mind; it is unguarded: sincerity prevents us from speaking what we do not think; it is positive. A candid man will have no reserve when openness is necessary; an open man cannot maintain a reserve at any time; a sincere man will maintain a reserve only as far as it is consistent with truth.

Candor wins much upon those who come in connexion with it: it removes misunderstandings and obviates differences; the want of it occasions suspicion and discontent. Openness gains as many enemies as friends; it requires to be well regulated not to be offensive; there is no mind so pure and disciplined that all the thoughts and feelings which it gives birth to, may or ought to be made public. Sincerity is an indispensable virtue; the want of it is always mischievous, frequently fatal.

Self conviction is the path to virtue.
An honourable candor thus adorns
Ingenious minds.—C. JOHNSON.

His words are bonds, his oaths are oracles,
His love sincere, his thoughts immaculate.

SHAKESPEARE.

The fondest and firmest friendships are dissolved by such openness and sincerity as interrupt our enjoyment of our own approbation.—JOHNSON.

Candid, *v. Frank.*

Canonization, *v. Beatification.*

Capacious, *v. Ample.*

Capaciousness, *v. Capacity.*

Capacity, *v. Ability.*

Capacity, Capaciousness.

Capacity, *v. Ability.*

Capaciousness, *v. Ample.*

Capacity is the abstract of *capax*, receiving or apt to hold; it is therefore applied to the contents of hollow bodies: capaciousness is the abstract of *capacious*, and is therefore applied to the plane surface comprehended within a given space. Hence we speak of the capacity of a vessel: and the capaciousness of a room.

Capacity is an indefinite term simply designating fitness to hold or receive; but capaciousness denotes something specifically large. Measuring the capacity of vessels belongs to the science of mensuration: the capaciousness of rooms is to be observed by the eye. They are marked by the same distinction in their moral application: men are born with various capacities, some are remarkable for the capaciousness of their minds.

Caprice, *v. Humour.*

Capricious, *v. Fanciful.*

Captious, Cross, Peevish, Petulant, Fretful.

Captious, in Latin *captiosus*, from *capio*, signifies taking or treating in an offensive manner.

Cross, after the noun *cross*, marks the temper which resembles a cross.

Peevish, probably changed from *beish*, signifies easily provoked, and ready to sting like a bee.

Fretful, from the word *fret*, signifies full of fretting. *fret*, which is in Saxon *fretan*, comes from the Latin *fricatus*, participle of *frico* to wear away with rubbing.

Petulant, in Latin *petulans*, from *peto* to seek, signifies seeking or catching up.

All these terms indicate an unamiable working and expression of temper. Captious marks a readiness to be offended: cross indicates a readiness to offend: peevish expresses a strong degree of crossness: fretful a complaining impatience: petulant a quick or sudden impatience. Capiousness is the consequence of misplaced pride, crossness of ill-humour: peevishness and fretfulness of a painful irritability; petulance is either the result of a naturally hasty temper or of a sudden irritability; adults are most prone to be captious; they have frequently a self-importance which is in perpetual danger of being offended; an un-

disciplined temper, whether in young or old will manifest itself on certain occasions by cross looks and words towards those with whom they come in connexion : spoiled children are most apt to be *peevish* ; they are seldom thwarted in any of their unreasonable desires, without venting their ill-humour by an irritating and offending action : sickly children are most liable to *fretfulness* ; their unpleasant feelings vent themselves in a mixture of crying complaints and *crossness* : the young and ignorant are most apt to be *petulant* when contradicted.

Captiousness and jealousy are easily offended ; and to him who studiously looks for an affront, every mode of behaviour will supply it.—JOHNSON.

I was so good-humour'd, so cheerful and gay,
My heart was as light as a feather all day,
But now I so cross and so peevish am grown,
So strangely uneasy as never was known.—BYRON.

Peevish displeasure, and suspicions of mankind, are apt to persecute those who withdraw themselves altogether from the haunts of men.—BLAIR.

By indulging this *fretful* temper, you both aggravate the uneasiness of age, and you alienate those on whose affections much of your comfort depends.—BLAIR.

To Captivate, *v.* To charm.

To Captivate, *v.* To enslave.

Captivity, *v.* Confinement.

Capture, Seizure, Prize.

Capture, in French *capture*, Latin *captura*, from *captus*, participle of *capio* to take, signifies either the act of taking, or the thing taken, but mostly the former.

Seizure, from *seize*, in French *saisir*, signifies only the act of seizing.

Prize, in French *prise*, from *pris*, participle of *prendre* to take, signifies only the thing taken.

Capture and *seizure* differ in the mode ; a *capture* is made by force of arms ; a *seizure* by direct and personal violence. The *capture* of a town or an island requires an army ; the *seizure* of property is effected by the exertions of an individual. A *seizure* always requires some force which a *capture* does not. A *capture* may be made on an unresisting object ; it is merely the taking into possession : a *seizure* supposes much eagerness for possession on the one hand, and reluctance to yield on the other. Merchant vessels are *captured* which are not in a state to make resistance ; contraband goods are *seized* by the police officers.

A *capture* has always something legitimate in it ; it is a public measure flowing from authority : a *seizure* is a private measure, frequently as unlawful and unjust as it is violent ; it depends on the will of the individual. A *capture* is general, it respects the act of taking : a *prize* is particular, it regards the object taken, and its value to the *captor* : many *captures* are made by sea which never become *prizes*.

The late Mr. Robert Wood, in his essay on the original genius and writings of Homer, inclines to think the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were finished about half a century after the capture of Troy.—CUMBERLAND.

Many of the dangers imputed of old to exorbitant wealth are now at an end. The rich are neither waylaid

by robbers, nor watched by informers ; there is nothing to be dreaded from proscriptions or *seizures*.—JOHNSON.

Sensible of their own force, and allured by the prospect of so rich a *prize*, the northern barbarians, in the reign of Arcadius and Honorius, assailed at once all the frontiers of the Roman empire.—HUME.

Carcass, *v.* Body.

Care, Solitude, Anxiety.

Care, in Latin *cura*, comes probably from the Greek *xupos* power, because whoever has power has a weight of *care*.

Solitude, in French *solitude*, Latin *sollicitudo* from *solicito* to disquiet, compounded of *solum* and *cito* to put altogether in commotion, signifies a complete state of restless commotion.

Anxiety, in French *anxiété*, Latin *anxieta*, from *anxius* and *ango*, Greek *οἶστος*, Hebrew *hanak* to hang, suffocate, torment, signifies a state of extreme suffering.

These terms express mental pain in different degrees ; *care* less than *solicitude*, and this less than *anxiety*. *Care* consists of thought and feeling ; *solicitude* and *anxiety* of feeling only. *Care* respects the past, present, and future ; *solicitude* and *anxiety* regard the present and future. *Care* is directed towards the present and absent, near or at a distance : *solicitude* and *anxiety* are employed about that which is absent and at a certain distance.

We are *careful* about the means ; *solicitous* and *anxious* about the end ; we are *solicitous* to obtain a good, we are *anxious* to avoid an evil. The *cares* of a parent exceed every other in their weight. He has an unceasing *solicitude* for the welfare of his children, and experiences many an *anxious* thought lest all his *care* should be lost upon them.

Care, though in some respects an infirmity of our nature, is a consequence of our limited knowledge which we cannot altogether remove ; as it respects the present, it is a bounden duty ; but when it extends to futurity, it must be kept within the limits of pious resignation. *Solicitude* and *anxiety*, as habits of the mind, are irreconcilable with the faith of a Christian, which teaches him to take no thought for the morrow.

But his face
Deep scars of thunder had encreas'd, and *care*
Sat on his faded cheek.—MILTON.

Can your *solicitude* alter the course, or unravel the intricacy of human events ?—BLAIR.

The story of a man who grew grey in the space of one night's *anxiety* is very famous.—SPECTATOR.

Care, Concern, Regard.

Care, *v.* Care, *solicitude*.

Concern, *v.* Affair.

Regard, in French *regarder*, is compounded of *re* and *garder*, to look at again or attentively.

Care and *concern* consist both of thought and feeling, but the latter has less of thought than feeling ; *regard* consists of thought only. We *care* for a thing which is the object of our exertions ; we *concern* ourselves about a thing

when it engages our attention; we have regard for a thing on which we set some value and bestow some reflection.

Care is altogether an active principle; the careful man leaves no means untried in the pursuit of his object; *care* actuates him to personal endeavours; it is opposed to negligence. *Concern* is not so active in its nature; the person who is concerned will be contented to see exertions made by others; it is opposed to indifference. *Regard* is only a sentiment of the mind; it may lead to action, but of itself extends no farther than reflection.

The business of life is the subject of *care*: religion is the grand object of concern: the esteem of others is an object of regard.

No one ought to expect to be exempt from *care*; the provision of a family, and the education of children, are objects for which we ought to take some *care*, or at least have some concern, inasmuch as we have a regard for our own welfare, and the well-being of society.

His trust was equal with the Deity to be deem'd,
Equal in strength, and rather than be less
Car'd not to be at all.—MILTON.

Our country's welfare is our first concern.—HAYARD.

Slander meets no regard from noble minds;
Still the base believe what the base only utter.—BELLER.

Care, Charge, Management.

Care, v. Care, solicitude.

Charge, in French *charge* a burden, in Armor and Breton *carg*, which is probably connected with cargo and carry. It is figuratively employed in the sense of a burden.

Management, in French *ménagement*, from *ménager* and *mener* to lead, and the Latin *manus* a hand, signifies direction.

Care will include both *charge* and *management*; but in the strict sense, it comprehends personal labour: *charge* involves responsibility: *management* includes regulation and order.

A gardener has the *care* of a garden; a nurse has the *charge* of children; a steward has the *management* of a farm; we must always act in order to take *care*; we must look in order to take *charge*; we must always think in order to *manage*.

Care is employed in menial occupations; *charge* in matters of trust and confidence; *management* in matters of business and experience: the servant has the *care* of the cattle; an instructor has the *charge* of youth; a clerk has the *management* of a business.

Care's a father's right—a pleasing right.
In which he labours with a home-felt joy.—SHIRLEY.

I can never believe that the repugnance with which Tiberius took the *charge* of the government upon him was wholly feigned.—CUMBERLAND.

The woman, to whom her husband left the whole *management* of her lodgings, and who persisted in her purpose, soon found an opportunity to put it into execution.—HAWKESWORTH.

Care, v. Heed.

Careful, Cautious, Provident.

Careful, signifies full of *care* (*v. Care, solicitude*).

Cautious is in Latin *cautus*, participle of *caveo*, which comes from *cavus* hollow, or *cavum* a cave, which was originally a place of security; hence the epithet *cautious* in the sense of seeking security.

Provident, in Latin *providens*, signifies foreseeing or looking to before-hand, from *pro* and *video*.

We are *careful* to avoid mistakes; *cautious* to avoid danger; *provident* to avoid straits and difficulties; *care* is exercised in saving and retaining what we have; *caution* must be used in guarding against the evils that may be; *providence* must be employed in supplying the good, or guarding against the contingent evils of the future.

Care consists in the use of means, in the exercise of the faculties for the attainment of an end; a *careful* person omits nothing; *caution* consists rather in abstaining from action; a *cautious* person will not act where he ought not: *providence* respects the use of things; *care* and *caution* are both required in the management of property; a *provident* person acts for the future, by abstaining for the present.

There's not that work
Of careful nature, or of cunning art,
How strong, how beautiful, or how rich it be,
But falls in time to ruin.—SHAKESPEARE.

Flush'd by the spirit of the genial year,
Be greatly cautious of your sliding hearts.
THOMSON.

Blest above men if he perceives and feels
The blessings he is heir to: He! to whom
His provident forefathers have bequeathed
In this fair district of their native isle
A free inheritance.—CUMBERLAND.

Careful, v. Attentive.

Careless, v. Indolent.

Careless, v. Negligent.

To Caress, Fondle.

Both these terms mark a species of endearment.

Caress, like *cherish*, comes from the French *chérir*, and *chère*, Latin *carus* dear, signifying the expression of a tender sentiment.

Fondle, from *fond*, is a frequentative verb, signifying to become *fond* of, or express one's fondness for.

We *caress* by words or actions; we *fondle* by actions only; *caresses* are not always unsuitable; but *fondling*, which is the extreme of *caressing*, is not less unfit for the one who receives than for the one who gives: animals *caress* each other, as the natural mode of indicating their affection; *fondling*, which is the expression of perverted feeling, is peculiar to human beings, who alone abuse the faculties with which they are endowed.

Cargo, v. Freight.

Carnage, Slaughter, Massacre, Butchery.

Carnage, from the Latin *caro carnis* flesh, implies properly a collection of dead flesh,

that is, the reducing to the state of dead flesh.

Slaughter, from *slay*, is the act of taking away life.

Massacre, in French *massacre*, comes from the Latin *mactare* to kill for sacrifice.

Butchery, from *butcher*, signifies the act of *butchering*: in French *boucherie*, from *bouche* the mouth, signifies the killing for food.

Carnage respects the number of dead bodies made; it may be said either of men or animals, but more commonly of the former; *slaughter* respects the act of taking away life, and the circumstances of the agent; *massacre* and *butchery* respect the circumstances of the objects who are the sufferers of the action; the latter three are said of human beings only.

Carnage is the consequence of any impetuous attack from a powerful enemy; soldiers who get into a besieged town, or a wolf who breaks into a sheepfold, commonly make a dreadful *carnage*; *slaughter* is the consequence of warfare; in battles the *slaughter* will be very considerable where both parties defend themselves pertinaciously: a *massacre* is the consequence of secret and personal resentment between bodies of people; it is always a stain upon the nation by whom it is practised, as it cannot be effected without a violent breach of confidence, and a direct act of treachery; of this description was the *massacre* of the Danes by the original Britons, and the *massacre* of the Huguenots in France: *butchery* is the general accompaniment of a *massacre*; defenceless women and children are commonly *butchered* by the savage furies who are most active in this work of blood.

The *carnage* Juno from the skies survey'd,
And, touch'd with grief, bespoke the blue-eyed maid. POPE.

Yet, yet a little, and destructive *slaughter*
Shall rage around and mar this beautiful prospect. ROWE.

Our groaning country bled at every vein;
When murders, rapes, and *massacres* prevail'd. ROWE.

Let us be sacrificers, but not *butchers*.—SHAKESPEARE.

To Carp, *v. To censure*.

Carriage, Gait, Walk.

Carriage from the verb to carry (*v. To bear, carry*) signifies the act of carrying in general, but here that of carrying the body.

Gait, from *go*, signifies the manner of going.

Walk, signifies the manner of walking.

Carriage is here the most general term; it respects the manner of carrying the body, whether in a state of motion or rest: *gait* is the mode of carrying the limbs and body whenever we move: *walk* is the manner of carrying the body when we move forward to walk.

A person's *carriage* is somewhat natural to him; it is often an indication of character, but admits of great change by education; we may always distinguish a man as high or low, either in mind or station, by his *carriage*: *gait* is artificial; we may contract a certain *gait* by

habit; the *gait* is therefore often taken for a bad habit of going, as when a person has a limping *gait*, or an unsteady *gait*: *walk* is less definite than either, as it is applicable to the ordinary movements of men; there is a good, a bad, or an indifferent *walk*; but it is not a matter of indifference which of these kinds of *walk* we have; it is the great art of the dancing-master to give a good *walk*.

Upon her nearer approach to Hercules, she stepped before the other lady, who came forward with a regular composed carriage.—ADDISON.

Lifeless her *gait*, and slow, with seeming pain,
She dragg'd her loitering limbs along the plain. SHENSTONE.

In length of train descends her sweeping gown,
And by her graceful *walk*, the queen of love is known. DRYDEN.

Carriage, v. Behaviour.

To Carry, v. To bear.

To Carry, v. To bring

Carousal, v. Feast.

Case, Cause.

Case, in Latin *casus*, from *cado* to fall, chance, happen, signifies the thing falling out.

Cause, in French *cause*, Latin *causa*, is probably changed from *case*, and the Latin *casus*.

The *case* is matter of fact; the *cause* is matter of question: a *case* involves circumstances and consequences; a *cause* involves reasons and arguments; a *case* is something to be learned; a *cause* is something to be decided.

A *case* needs only to be stated; a *cause* must be defended; a *cause* may include *cases*, but not *vice versa*: in all *causes* that are to be tried, there are many legal *cases* that must be cited: whoever is interested in the *cause* of humanity will not be heedless of those *cases* of distress which are perpetually presenting themselves.

There is a double praise due to virtue when it is lodged in a body that seems to have been prepared for the reception of vice: in many such *cases* the soul and body do not seem to be fellows.—ADDISON.

I was myself an advocate so long, that I never mind what advocates say, but what they prove, and I can only examine proofs in *causes* brought before me.—SIR WILLIAM JONES.

Case, v. Situation.

Case, v. Frame.

Cash, v. Money.

To Cast, Throw, Hurl.

Cast probably comes from *casus*, participate of *cado* to fall, signifying to make or to let fall.

Throw, in Saxon *throwan*, is most probably a variation of *thrust*, in Latin *trudo*, Chaldee *terad* to thrust repeatedly.

Hurl, like the word *whirl*, comes from the Saxon *hvirvel*, *hineorfan*, German, &c., *wirbel*, Teutonic *wirvel*, Danish *hvirvel*, *hvirvler*, Latin *verto*, *gyro*, which are all derived from the Hebrew *orgal* round, signifying to turn round.

Cast conveys simply the idea of laying aside, or putting from one's self; *throw* and *hurl*

designate more specifically the mode of the action: *cast* is an indifferent action, whether it respects ourselves or others; *throw* always marks a direct motive of dislike or contempt. What is not wanted is *cast* off; clothes which are no longer worn are *cast* off; what is worthless or hurtful is *thrown* away; the dross is separated from the wheat and *thrown* away; bad habits cannot be *thrown* off too soon.

Cast, as it respects others, is divested of all personalities; but nothing is *thrown* at any one without an intention of offending or hurting; a glance is *cast* at a person, or things are *cast* before him; but insinuations are *thrown* out against a person; things are *thrown* at him with the view of striking.

Cast requires no particular effort; it amounts in general to no more than let fall or go; *throw* is frequently accompanied with violence. Money is *cast* into a bag; stones are *thrown* from a great distance: animals *cast* their young at stated periods; the horse *throws* his rider; a lawless man *throws* off constraint.

Hurl is a violent species of *throwing* employed only on extraordinary occasions, expressive of an unusual degree of vehemence in the agent, and an excessive provocation on the part of the sufferer: the *hurler*, the thing *hurled*, and the cause of *hurling*, correspond in magnitude; a mighty potentate is *hurled* from his throne by some power superior to his own; Milton represents the devils as *hurled* from Heaven by the word of the Almighty; the heathen poets have feigned a similar story of the giants who made war against Heaven, and were *hurled* by the thunderbolts of Jupiter down to the earth.

As far as I could *cast* my eyes
Upon the sea, something methought did rise
Like bluish mists.—DRYDEN.

O war, thou son of hell!
Whom angry heavens do make their minister,
Throw in the frozen bosoms of our part,
Hot coals of vengeance!—SHAKESPEARE.

Wreath my head
With flaming meteors, load my arms with thunder,
Which as I nimbly cut my cloudy way,
I'll *hurt* on this ungrateful earth.—TATE.

Cast, Turn, Description.

Cast, from the verb to *cast* (*v. To cast*), signifies that which is *cast*, and here by an extension of the sense, the form in which it is *cast*.

Turn, from the verb to *turn*, signifies also the act of *turning*, or the manner of *turning*.

Description signifies the act of *describing*, or the thing which is to be *described*.

What is *cast* is artificial; what *turns* is natural: the former is the act of some foreign agent; the latter is the act of the subject itself; hence the *cast*, as applicable to persons, respects that which they are made by circumstances; the *turn*, that which they are by themselves: thus there are religious *casts* in India, that is, men *cast* in a certain form of religion, and men of a particular moral *cast*, that is, such as are *cast* in a particular mould as respects their thinking and acting; so in like manner men of a particular *turn*, that is, as respects their inclinations and tastes.

Description is a term less definite than either

of the two former; it respects all that may be said of a person, but particularly that which distinguishes a man from others, either in his mode of thinking or acting, in his habits, in his manners, in his language, or his taste.

The *cast* is that which marks a man to others; the *turn* is that which may be known only to a man's self; the *description* is that by which he is *described* or made known to others.

The *cast* is that which is fixed and unchangeable, the *turn* is that which may be again *turned*; and the *description* is that which varies with the circumstances.

My mind is of such a particular *cast*, that the falling of a shower of rain, or the whistling of the wind at such a time (the night season), is apt to fill my thoughts with something awful and solemn.—ADDISON.

There is a very odd *turn* of thought required for this sort of writing (the fairy way of writing, as Dryden calls it), and it is impossible for a poet to succeed in it, who has not a particular *cast* of fancy.—ADDISON.

Christian statesmen think that those do not believe Christianity who do not care it should be preached to the poor. But as they know that charity is not confined to any *description*, they are not deprived of a due and anxious sensation of pity to the distresses of the miserable great.—BURKE.

Casual, *v. Accidental.*

Casual, *v. Occasional.*

Casualty, *v. Accident.*

Catalogue, *v. List.*

To Catch, *v. To lay.*

To Cavil, *v. To censure.*

Cavity, *v. Opening.*

Cause, *v. Case.*

Cause, Reason, Motive.

Cause (*v. Case*) is supposed to signify originally the same as *case*; it means however now, by distinction, the *case* or thing happening before another as its *cause*.

Reason, in French *raison*, Latin *ratio*, from *ratus*, participle of *reor* to think, signifies the thing thought, estimated, or valued in the mind.

Motive, in French *motif*, from the Latin *motus*, participle of *moveo* to move, signifies the thing that brings into action.

Cause respects the order and connexion of things; *reason* the movements and operations of the mind; *motives* the movements of the mind and body. *Cause* is properly the generic term; *reason* and *motive* are specific; every *reason* or *motive* is a *cause*, but every *cause* is not a *reason* or *motive*.

Cause is said of all inanimate objects; *reason* and *motive* of rational agents; whatever happens in the world, happens from some *cause* mediate or immediate; the primary or first *cause* of all is God: whatever opinions men hold they ought to be able to assign a substantial *reason* for them, and for whatever they do they ought to have a sufficient *motive*.

As the *cause* gives birth to the effect, so does the *reason* give birth to the conclusion, and the *motive* gives birth to the action. Between

cause and effect there is a necessary connexion : whatever in the natural world is capable of giving birth to another thing is an adequate cause ; but in the moral world there is not a necessary connexion between reasons and their results, or motives and their actions ; the state of the agent's mind is not always such as to be acted upon according to the nature of things ; every adequate reason will not be followed by its natural conclusion, for every man will not believe who has reasons to believe, nor yield to the reasons that would lead to a right belief ; and every motive will not be accompanied with its corresponding action, for every man will not act who has a motive for acting, nor act in the manner in which his motives ought to dictate : the causes of our diseases often lie as hidden as the reasons of our opinions, and the motives for our actions.

Cut off the causes and the effects will cease.
And all the moving madness fall to peace.

DRYDEN.

Good reasons must of force give way to better.
SHAKESPEARE.

Every principle that is a motive to good actions ought to be encouraged.—ADDISON.

To Cause, Occasion, Create.

To Cause, from the substantive *cause* (v. *Cause*), naturally signifies to be the cause of.

Occasion, from the noun *occasion*, signifies to be the occasion of.

Create, in Latin *creatus*, participle of *creo*, comes from the Greek *κρω* to command, and *κρησσω* to perform.

What is caused seems to follow naturally ; what is occasioned follows incidentally ; what is created receives its existence arbitrarily. A wound causes pain, accidents occasion delay ; busy-bodies create mischief.

The misfortunes of the children cause great affliction to the parents : business occasions a person's late attendance at a place ; disputes and misunderstandings create animosity and ill will. The cause of a person's misfortunes may often be traced to his own misconduct : the improper behaviour of one person may occasion another to ask for an explanation : jealousies are created in the minds of relatives by an unnecessary reserve and distance.

Scarcely an ill to human life belongs,
But what our follies cause, or mutual wrongs.

JENYNS.

Often have the terrors of conscience occasioned inward paroxysms, or violent agitations of the mind.—BLAIR.

As long as the powers or abilities which are ascribed to others are exerted in a sphere of action remote from ours, and not brought into competition with talents of the same kind to which we have pretensions, they create no jealousy.—BLAIR.

Caution, v. Admonition.

Cautious, v. Careful.

Cautious, Wary, Circumspect.

Cautious, v. Careful.

Wary, from the same as *aware* (v. *To be aware of*), signifies ready to look out.

Circumspect, in Latin *circumspectus*, participle of *circumspicio* to look about, signifies ready to look on all sides.

These epithets denote a peculiar care to avoid evil ; but *cautious* expresses less than the other two, it is necessary to be *cautious* at all times ; to be *wary* in cases of peculiar danger ; to be *circumspect* in matters of peculiar delicacy and difficulty.

Caution is the effect of fear ; *wariness* of danger ; *circumspection* of experience and reflection. The *cautious* man reckons on contingencies, he guards against the evil that may be, by pausing before he acts ; the *wary* man looks for the danger which he suspects to be impending, and seeks to avoid it ; the *circumspect* man weighs and deliberates ; he looks around and calculates on possibilities and probabilities ; he seeks to attain his end by the safest means. A tradesman must be *cautious* in his dealings with all men ; he must be *wary* in his intercourse with designing men ; he must be *circumspect* when transacting business of particular importance and intricacy. The traveller must be *cautious* when going a road not familiar to him ; he must be *wary* when passing over slippery and dangerous places ; he must be *circumspect* when going through obscure, uncertain, and winding passages.

A person ought to be *cautious* not to give offence ; he ought to be *wary* not to entangle himself in ruinous litigations ; he ought to be *circumspect* not to engage in what is above his abilities to complete. It is necessary to be *cautious* not to disclose our sentiments too freely before strangers ; to be *wary* in one's speech before busy-bodies and calumniators ; to be *circumspect* whenever we speak on public matters, respecting either politics or religion.

The strong report of Arthur's death has worse
Effect on them, than on the common sort ;
The vulgar only shake their cautious heads,
Or whisper in the ear wisely suspicious.—CIBBER.

Let not that wary caution, which is the fruit of experience, degenerate into craft.—BLAIR.

No pious man can be so *circum* in the care of his conscience, as the covetous man is in that of his pocket.—STEELE.

To Cease, Leave off, Discontinue.

Cease, in French *cesser*, Latin *cesso*, from *cessi*, perfect of *cedo* to yield, signifies to give up, or put an end to.

Leave is in Saxon *helifan* to remain, in Swedish *lifwa*, low German *leven*, Latin *linguo*, *liqui*, Greek *λειπω* to leave.

Discontinue, with the privative *dis*, expresses the opposite of *continue*.

To cease is neuter ; to *leave off* and *discontinue* are active : we *cease* from doing a thing ; we *leave off* or *discontinue* a thing. *Cease* is used either for particular actions or general habits ; *leave off* more usually and properly for particular actions ; *discontinue* for general habits. A restless spoiled child never *ceases* crying until it has obtained what it wants ; it is a mark of impatience not to *cease* lamenting when one is in pain. A labourer *leaves off* his work at any given hour. A delicate person *discontinues* his visits when they are found not to be agreeable.

It should be our first endeavour to cease to do evil. It is never good to leave off working while there is any thing to do, and time to do it in. The discontinuing a good practice without adequate grounds evinces great instability of character.

A successful author is equally in danger of the diminution of his fame, whether he continues or ceases to write.
—JOHNSON

As harsh and irregular sound is not harmony; so neither is banging a cushion, oratory; therefore, in my humble opinion, a certain divine of the first order would do well to leave this off.—SWIFT.

I would cheerfully have borne the whole expence of it, if my private establishment of native readers and writers, which I cannot with convenience *discontinue* at present, did not require more than half of the monthly expence, which the completion of a Dikeet would in my opinion demand.—SIR WILLIAM JONES.

To Cede, *v.* To give up.

To Celebrate, Commemorate.

Celebrate, in Latin *celebratus*, participle of *celebro*, from *celebris*, signifies to make celebrated.

Commemorate, in Latin *commemoratus*, participle of *commemoro*, compounded of *com* or *cum* and *memoro* to keep in mind, signifies to keep in the memory of a number. *Commemorate* is a species of *celebrating*; we always *commemorate* when we *celebrate*, but not vice versa.

Every thing is *celebrated* which is distinguished by any marks of attention, without regard to the time of the event, whether present or past; but nothing is *commemorated* but what has been past. A marriage or a birth-day is *celebrated*; the anniversary of any national event is *commemorated*.

Celebrating is not limited to any species of events or circumstances; whatever interests any number of persons is *celebrated*: *commemorating* is confined to whatever is thought of sufficient importance to be borne in mind, whether of a public or private nature. The election of a favourite member is *celebrated* by those who have contributed to his success: a remarkable preservation, whether national or individual, sometimes demands some signal act of *commemoration*.

Celebrating is a festive as well as social act; it may be sometimes serious, but it is mostly mingled with more or less of gaiety and mirth: *commemorating* is a solemn act; it may be sometimes festive and social, but it is always mingled with what is serious, and may be altogether solitary; it is suited to the occasion, and calculated to revive in the mind suitable impressions of what is past. The birth-day of our sovereign is always *celebrated* by his people, with such marks of honour and congratulation, as are due from subjects to a prince: the providential escape of our nation from destruction by the gunpowder-plot is annually *commemorated* by a public act of devotion, as also by popular demonstrations of joy.

The Jews *celebrate* their feast of the pass-over: as Christians, we *commemorate* the sufferings and death of our Saviour, by partaking of the Lord's Supper.

It faded at the crowing of the cock;
Some say, that ever 'gainst that season comes,
Wherein our Saviour's birth is *celebrated*,
The bird of dawning singeth all night long.
SHAKESPEARE.

The Lacedæmonians would have the *commemoration* of their actions be transmitted by the purest and most untainted memorialists.—STEELE.

Celebrated, *v.* Famous.

Celerity, *v.* Quickness.

Celestial, Heavenly.

Celestial and **Heavenly** derive their difference in signification from their different origin; they both literally imply belonging to heaven; but the former, from the Latin *celum*, signifies belonging to the heaven of heathens; the latter, which has its origin among believers in the true God, has acquired a superior sense, in regard to heaven as the habitation of the Almighty. This distinction is pretty faithfully observed in their application: *celestial* is applied mostly in the natural sense of the heavens; *heavenly* is employed more commonly in a spiritual sense. Hence we speak of the *celestial* globe as distinguished from the terrestrial, of the *celestial* bodies, of Olympus as the *celestial* abode of Jupiter, of the *celestial* deities: but, on the other hand, of the *heavenly* habitation, of *heavenly* joys or bliss, of *heavenly* spirits and the like. There are doubtless many cases in which *celestial* may be used for *heavenly* in the moral sense, but there are cases in which *heavenly* cannot so properly be substituted for *celestial*.

Twice warn'd by the *celestial* messenger,
The pious prince arose, with hasty fear.—DRYDEN.

But now he seiz'd Briseis' heav'nly charms,
And of my valour's prize defrauds my arms.—POPE.

Unhappy son! (fair Thetis thus replies,
While tears *celestial* trickle from her eyes).—POPE.

Thus having said, the hero bound his brows
With leafy branches, then perform'd his vows;
Adorning first the genius of the place,
Then Earth, the mother of the *heavenly* race.
DRYDEN.

To Censure, Animadvert, Criticise.

Censure, *v.* To accuse.

Animadvert, *v.* Animadversion.

Criticise, *v.* Animadversion.

To *censure* expresses less than to *animadvert* or *criticise*: one may always *censure* when one *animadvert*s or *criticises*.

To *censure* and *animadvert* are both personal; the one direct, the other indirect; *criticism* is directed to things, and not to persons only.

Censuring consists in finding some fault real or supposed; it refers mostly to the conduct of individuals. *Animadvert* consists in suggesting some error or impropriety; it refers mostly to matters of opinion and dispute; *criticism* consists in minutely examining the intrinsic characteristics and appreciating the merits of each individually or the whole collectively; it refers to matters of science and learning.

To *censure* requires no more than simple assertion; its justice or propriety often rests on

the authority of the individual; *animadversions* require to be accompanied with reasons; those who *animadvert* on the proceedings or opinions of others must state some grounds for their objections.

Criticism is altogether argumentative and illustrative; it takes nothing for granted, it analyses and decomposes, it compares and combines, it asserts and supports the assertions. The office of the *censurer* is the easiest and least honourable of the three; it may be assumed by ignorance and impertinence, it may be performed for the purpose of indulging an angry or imperious temper. The task of *animadverting* is delicate; it may be resorted to for the indulgence of an overweening self-conceit. The office of a *critic* is both arduous and honourable; it cannot be filled by any one incompetent for the charge without exposing his arrogance and folly to merited contempt.

Many an author has been dejected at the *censure* of one whom he has looked upon as an idiot.—ADDISON.

I wish, Sir, you would do us the favour to *animadvert* frequently upon the false taste the town is in, with relation to the plays as well as operas.—STEELE.

It is ridiculous for any man to *criticize* on the works of another, who has not distinguished himself by his own performances.—ADDISON.

To Censure, Carp, Cavil.

Censure, v. To accuse.

Carp, in Latin *carpo*, signifies to pluck.

Cavil, in French *caviller*, Latin *cavillor*, from *cavilla* a taunt, and *cavus* hollow, signifies to be unsound or unsubstantial in speech.

To *censure* respects positive errors; to *carp* and *cavil* have regard to what is trivial or imaginary: the former is employed for errors in persons; the latter for supposed defects in things. *Censures* are frequently necessary from those who have the authority to use them; a good father will *censure* his children when their conduct is *censurable*. *Carping* and *cavilling* are resorted to only to indulge ill-nature or self-conceit: whoever owes another a grudge will be most disposed to *carp* at all he does in order to lessen him in the esteem of others: those who contend more for victory than truth will be apt to *cavil* when they are at a loss for fair argument: partly politicians *carp* at the measures of administration; infidels *cavil* at the evidences of Christianity, because they are determined to disbelieve.

From a consciousness of his own integrity, a man assumes force enough to despise the little *censures* of ignorance and malice.—BUDGELL.

It is always thus with pedants; they will ever *carp*—*ing*, if a gentleman or man of honour puts pen to paper.—STEELE.

Envy and *cavil* are the natural fruits of laziness and ignorance, which was probably the reason that in the heathen mythology Moros is said to be the son of Nox and Somnus, of darkness and sleep.—ADDISON.

To Censure, v. To accuse

To Censure, v. To blame.

Ceremonious, v. Formal.

Ceremony, v. Form,

Certain, Sure, Secure.

Certain, in French *certain*, Latin *certus*, comes from *certo* to perceive, because what we see or perceive is supposed to be put beyond doubt.

Sure and **Secure** are variations of the same word, in French *sur*, German *sicher*, low German *seker*, &c., Latin *securus*, this is compounded of *se* (*sine*) apart, and *cura* signifying without care, requiring no care.

Certain respects matters of fact or belief; *sure* and *secure* the quality or condition of things. A fact is *certain*, a person's step is *sure*, a house is *secure*. *Certain* is opposed to dubious, *sure* to wavering, *secure* to dangerous. A person is *certain* who has no doubt remaining in his mind; he is *sure* when his conviction is steady and unchangeable; he is *secure* when the prospect of danger is removed.

When applied to things, *certain* is opposed to what is varying and irregular; *sure* to what is unerring; *secure* is used only in its natural sense. It is a defect in the English language, that there are at present no *certain* rules for its orthography or pronunciation; the learner, therefore, is at a loss for a *sure* guide. Amidst opposing statements it is difficult to *ascertain* the real state of the case. No one can *ensure* his life for a moment, or *secure* his property from the contingencies to which all sublunary things are exposed.

It is very *certain* that a man of sound reason cannot forbear closing with religion upon an impartial examination of it.—ADDISON.

When these everlasting doors are thrown open, we may be *sure* that the pleasures and beauties of this place will infinitely transcend our present hopes and expectations, and that the glorious appearance of the throne of God will rise infinitely beyond whatever we are able to conceive of it.—ADDISON.

Weigh well the various terms of human fate,
And seek by mercy to *secure* your state.—DRYDEN.

Cessation, Stop, Rest, Intermission.

Cessation, from the verb to *cease*, marks the condition of leaving off.

Stop, from to *stop*, marks that of being stopped or prevented from going on.

Rest, from to *rest*, marks the state of being quiet: and **Intermission**, from *intermit*, marks that of *ceasing* occasionally.

To *cease* respects the course of things; whatever does not go on has *ceased*; things *cease* of themselves: *stop* respects some external action or influence; nothing *stops* but what is supposed to be *stopped* or hindered by another: *rest* is a species of *cessation* that regards labour or exertion; whatever does not move or exert itself is a *rest*: *intermission* is a species of *cessation* only for a time or at certain intervals.

That which *ceases* or *stops* is supposed to be at an end; *rest* or *intermission* supposes a renewal. A *cessation* of hostilities is at all times desirable: to put a *stop* to evil practices is sometimes the most difficult and dangerous of all undertakings: *rest* after fatigue is indispensable, for labour without *intermission* exhausts the frame. The rain *ceases*, a person or a ball *stops* running, the labourer *rests* from his toil, a fever is *intermittent*. There is nothing

in the world which does not *cease* to exist at one period or another: death *stops* every one sooner or later in his career: whoever is vexed with the cares of getting riches will find no *rest* for his mind or body; he will labour without *intermission* oftentimes only to heap troubles on himself.

Who then would court the pomp of guilty power,
When the mind sickens at the weary show,
And flies to temporary death for ease?
When half our life's cessation of our being.—STEELE.

In all those motions and operations which are incessantly going on throughout nature, there is no *stop* nor interruption.—BLAIR.

The refreshing *rest* and peaceful night are the portion of him only who lies down weary with honest labour.—JOHNSON.

Whether the time of *intermission* is spent in company or in solitude, in necessary business or involuntary levities, the understanding is equally abstracted from the object of inquiry.—JOHNSON.

Chace, *v.* Forest.

Chace, *v.* Hunt.

To Chafe, *v.* To rub.

Chagrin, *v.* Vexation.

Chain, Fetter, Band, Shackle.

Chain, in French *chaine*, Latin *catena*, probably contracted from *captena* and *capio*, signifies that which takes or holds.

Fetter, in German *fessel*, comes from *fassen* to lay hold of.

Band, from *bind*, signifies that which *binds*.

Shackle, in Saxon *scacul*, signifies that which makes a creature shake or move irregularly by confining the legs.

All these terms designate the instrument by which animals or men are confined. *Chain* is general and indefinite; all the rest are *chains*: but there are many *chains* which do not come under the other names; a *chain* is indefinite as to its make; it is made generally of iron rings, but of different sizes and shapes: *fetters* are larger, they consist of many stout *chains*: *bands* are in general any thing which confines the body or the limbs; they may be either *chains* or even cords: *shackle* is that species of *chain* which goes on the legs to confine them; malefactors of the worst order have *fetters* on different parts of their bodies, and *shackles* on their legs.

These terms may all be used figuratively. The substantive *chain* is applied to whatever hangs together like a *chain*, as a *chain* of events; but the verb to *chain* signifies to confine as with a *chain*; thus the mind is *chained* to rules, according to the opinions of the free-thinkers, when men adhere strictly to rule and order; and to represent the slavery of conforming to the establishment, they tell us we are *fettered* by systems. *Band* in the figurative sense is applied, particularly in poetry, to every thing which is supposed to serve the purpose of a *band*; thus love is said to have its silken *bands*. *Shackle*, whether as a substantive or a verb, retains the idea of controlling the movements of the person, not in his body only, but also in his mind and in his moral conduct; thus a man who commences life with a borrowed capital is *shackled* in his commercial

concerns by the interest he has to pay, and the obligations he has to discharge.

Almighty wisdom never acts in vain.
Nor shall the soul, on which it has bestow'd
Such powers, e'er perish like an earthly clod;
But purg'd at length from foul corruption's stain,
Freed from her prison, and unbound her chain,
She shall her native strength and native skies regain.
JENYNS.

Legislatures have no rules to *bind* them but the great principles of justice and equity. These they are *bound* to obey and follow; and rather to enlarge and enlighten law by the liberality of legislative reason than to *fetter* their higher capacity by the narrow constructions of subordinate artificial justice.—BURKE.

Break his *bands* of sleep asunder,
And rouse him like a rattling peal of thunder.
DRYDEN.

It is the freedom of the spirit that gives worth and life to the performance. But a servant commonly is less free in mind than in condition; his very will seems to be in *bonds* and *shackles*.—SOUTH.

To Challenge, *v.* To brave.

Champion, *v.* Combatant.

Chance, Fortune, Fate.

Chance, (*v.* Accident) is here considered as the cause of what falls out.

Fortune, in French *fortune*, Latin *fortuna*, from *fors* chance, in Hebrew *gar*.

Fate, in Latin *fatum*, from *fatum* participle of *for* to speak or decree, signifies that which is decreed, or the power of decreeing.

These terms have served at all times as cloaks for human ignorance, and before mankind were favoured by the light of Divine Revelation, they had an imaginary importance which has now happily vanished.

Believers in Divine Providence no longer conceive the events of the world as left to themselves, or as under the control of any unintelligent or unconscious agent, but ascribe the whole to an overruling mind, which, though invisible to the bodily eye, is clearly to be traced by the intellectual eye, wherever we turn ourselves. In conformity, however, to the preconceived notions attached to these words, we now employ them in regard to the agency of secondary causes. But how far a Christian may use them without disparagement to the majesty of the Divine Being it is not so much my business to inquire, as to define their ordinary acceptation.

In this ordinary sense *chance* is the generic *fortune* and *fate* are specific terms: *chance* applies to all things personal or otherwise; *fortune* and *fate* are mostly said of that which is personal.

Chance neither forms, orders or designs: neither knowledge or intention is attributed to it; its events are uncertain and variable: *fortune* forms plans and designs, but without choice; we attribute to it an intention without discernment; it is said to be blind; *fate* forms plans and chains of causes; intention, knowledge, and power are attributed to it; its views are fixed, its results decisive. A person goes as *chance* directs him when he has no express object to determine his choice one way or other; his *fortune* favours him, if without any expectation he gets the thing he wishes; his *fate* wills it, if he reaches the desired point contrary to what he intended.

Men's success in their undertakings depends often on *chance* than on their ability; we are ever ready to ascribe to ourselves what we owe to our good *fortune*; it is the fate of some men to fail in every thing they undertake.

When speaking of trivial matters, this language is unquestionably innocent, and any objection to their use must spring from an over scrupulous conscience.

If I suffer my horse to direct me in the road I take to London, I may fairly attribute it to *chance* if I take the right instead of the left; and if in consequence I meet with an agreeable companion by the way I shall not hesitate to call it my good *fortune*; and if in spite of any previous intention to the contrary, I should be led to take the same road repeatedly, and as often to meet with an agreeable companion, I shall immediately say that it is my *fate* to meet with an agreeable companion whenever I go to London.

Some there are who utterly proscribe the name of *chance* as a word of impious and profane signification; and indeed if it be taken by us in that sense in which it was used by the heathens, so as to make anything casual in respect of God himself, their exception ought to be admitted. But to say a thing is a *chance* or casually as it relates to second causes is not profaneness, but a great truth.—SOUTH.

Chance aids their daring with unhop'd success,
DEYDEN.

We should learn that none but intellectual possessions are what we can properly all our own. All things from without are but borrowed. What *fortune* gives us is not ours, and whatever she gives she can take away.—SKELE.

Since *fate* divides then, since I must lose thee,
For pity's sake, for love's, h! I suffer me,
Thus languishing, thus dying, to approach thee;
And sigh my last adieu upon thy bosom.—TRAPP.

Chance, Probability.

Chance, v. Accident, chance.

Probability, in French *probabilite*, Latin *probabilitas*, from *probabilis* and *probo* to prove, signifies the quality of being able to be proved or made good.

These terms are both employed in forming an estimate of future events; but the *chance* is either for or against, the *probability* is always for a thing. *Chance* is but a degree of *probability*; there may in this latter case be a *chance* where there is no *probability*. A *chance* affords a possibility; many *chances* are requisite to constitute a *probability*.

What has been once may, under similar circumstances, be again; for that there is a *chance*; what has fallen to one man may fall to another; so far he has a *chance* in his favour; but in all the *chances* of life there will be no *probability* of success, where a man does not unite industry with integrity. *Chance* cannot be calculated upon; it is apt to produce disappointment: *probability* justifies hope; it is sanctioned by experience.

Thus equal deaths are dealt with equal *chance*,
By turns they quit their ground, by turns advance.
DEYDEN.

'There never appear,' says Swift, 'more than five or six men of genius in an age, but if they were united the world could not stand before them.' It is happy therefore for mankind that of this union there is no *probability*.—JOHNSON.

Chance, Hazard.

Chance, v. Accident, chance.

Hazard comes from the oriental *zar* and *tzar*, signifying any thing bearing an impression, particularly the dice used in *chance* games, which is called by the Italians *zara*, and by the Spaniards *azar*.

Both these terms are employed to mark the course of future events, which is not discernible by the human eye. With the *Deity* there is neither *chance* nor *hazard*; his plans are the result of omniscience: but the designs and actions of men are all dependant on *chance* or *hazard*.

Chance may be favourable or unfavourable, more commonly the former; *hazard* is always unfavourable; it is properly a species of *chance*. There is a *chance* either of gaining or losing: there is a *hazard* of losing.

In most speculations the *chance* of succeeding scarcely outweighs the *hazard* of losing.

Again ill *chances* men are ever merry,
But heaviness foreruns the good event.—SHAKESPEARE.

Though wit and learning are certain and habitual perfections of the mind, yet the declaration of them, which alone brings the repute, is subject to a thousand *hazards*.—SOUTH.

Chance, v. Accident.

To Chance, v. To happen.

To Change, Alter, Vary.

Change, in French *changer*, is probably derived from the middle Latin *cambio* to exchange, signifying to take one thing for another.

Alter, from the Latin *alter* another, signifies to make a thing otherwise.

Vary, in Latin *vario* to make various, comes in all probability from *varus* a spot or speckle, which destroys uniformity of appearance in any surface.

We *change* a thing by putting another in its place; we *alter* a thing by making it different from what it was before; we *vary* it by altering it in different manners and at different times. We *change* our clothes whenever we put on others: the tailor *alters* clothes which are found not to fit; and he *varies* the fashion of making them whenever he makes new. A man *changes* his habits, *alters* his conduct, and *varies* his manner of speaking and thinking, according to circumstances.

A thing is *changed* without *altering* its kind; it is *altered* without destroying its identity; and it is *varied* without destroying the similarity. We *change* our habitation, but it still remains a habitation; we *alter* our house, but it still remains the same house; we *vary* the manner of painting and decoration, but it may strongly resemble the manner in which it has been before executed.

The general remedy of those who are uneasy without knowing the cause is *change* of place.—JOHNSON.

All things are but *alter'd*, nothing dies:
And here and there th' unbodied spirit flies;
By time, or force, or sickness, disposess'd,
And lodges, where it lights, in man or beast.
DEYDEN.

In every work of the imagination, the disposition of parts, the insertion of incidents, and use of decorations, may be varied a thousand ways with equal propriety.—JOHNSON.

To Change, Exchange, Barter, Substitute.

Change, v. To change, alter.

Exchange is compounded of *e* or *ex* and *change*, signifying to change in the place of another.

Barter is supposed to come from the French *barater*, a sea term for indemnification, and also for circumvention; hence it has derived the meaning of a mercenary exchange.

Substitute, in French *substitut*, Latin *substitutus*, from *sub* and *statuo*, signifies to place one thing in the room of another.

The idea of putting one thing in the place of another is common to all these terms, which varies in the manner and the object. *Change* is the generic, the rest are specific terms: whatever is *exchanged*, *bartered*, or *substituted* is changed; but not *vice versé*. *Change* is applied in general to things of the same kind, or of different kinds *exchange* to articles of property or possession; *barter* to all articles of merchandise; *substitute* to all matters of service and office.

Things rather than persons are the proper objects for *changing* and *exchanging*, although whatever one has a control over may be *changed* or *exchanged*; a king may *change* his ministers; governments *exchange* prisoners of war. Things only are the proper objects for *barter*; but, to the shame of humanity, there are to be found people who will *barter* their countrymen, and even their relatives, for a paltry trinket.

Substituting may either have persons or things for an object; one man may be *substituted* for another, or one word *substituted* for another.

The act of *changing* or *substituting* requires but one person for an agent; that of *exchanging* and *bartering* requires two: a person *changes* his things or *substitutes* one for another; but one person *exchanges* or *barters* with another.

Change is used likewise intransitively, the others always transitively; things *change* of themselves, but persons always *exchange*, *barter*, or *substitute* things. *Changing* is not advisable, it is seldom advantageous; there is a greater chance of *changing* for the worse than for the better: it is set on foot by caprice oftener than by prudence and necessity. *Exchanging* is convenient; it is founded not so much on the intrinsic value of things, as their relative utility to the parties concerned; its end is mutual accommodation. *Bartering* is profitable; it proceeds upon a principle of mercantile calculation; the productiveness, and not the worth of the thing is considered; its main object is gain. *Substituting* is a matter of necessity; it springs from the necessity of supplying a deficiency by some equivalent; it serves for the accommodation of the party whose place is filled up.

In the figurative application these terms bear the same analogy to each other. A person

changes his opinions; but a proneness to such *changes* evinces a want of firmness in the character. The good king at his death *exchanges* a temporal for an eternal crown. The mercenary trader *barters* his conscience for paltry pelf. Men of dogmatical tempers *substitute* assertion for proof, and abuse for argument.

Those who beyond sea go will sadly find
They *change* their climate only, not their mind.
CREECH.

Our English merchant converts the tin of his own country into gold, and *exchanges* its wool for rubies.—ADDISON.

If the great end of being can be lost,
And thus perverted to the worst of crimes;
Let us shake off deprav'd humanity,
Exchange conditions with the savage brute,
And for his blameless instinct *barter* reason.
HAYARD.

Let never insulted beauty admit a second time into her presence the wretch who has once attempted to ridicule religion, and to *substitute* other aids to human frailty.—HAWKSWORTH.

Change, Variation, Vicissitude.

Change, v. To change, alter.

Variation, v. To change, alter

Vicissitude, in French *vicissitude*, Latin *vicissitudo*, from *vicissim* by turns, signifies changing alternately.

Change is both to *vicissitude* and *variation* as the genus to the species. Every *variation* or *vicissitude* is a *change*, but every *change* is not a *variation* or *vicissitude*.

Change consists simply in ceasing to be the same: *variation* consists in being different at different times; *vicissitude* in being alternately or reciprocally different and the same. All created things are liable to *change*; old things pass away, all things become new: the humours of men, like the elements, are exposed to perpetual *variations*: human affairs, like the seasons, are subject to frequent *vicissitudes*.

Changes in governments or families are seldom attended with any good effect. *Variations* in the state of the atmosphere are indicated by the barometer or thermometer. *Vicissitudes* of a painful nature are less dangerous than those which elevate men to an unusual state of grandeur. By the former they are brought to a sense of themselves; by the latter they are carried beyond themselves.

How strangely are the opinions of men altered by a *change* in their condition.—BLAIR.

One of the company affirmed to us he had actually inclosed the liquor, found in a coquette's heart, in a small tube made after the manner of a weather-glass, but that instead of acquainting him with the *variations* of the atmosphere, it showed him the qualities of those persons who entered the room where it stood.—ADDISON.

Vicissitude wheels round the motley crowd,
The rich grow poor, the poor become purse proud.

Changeable, Mutable, Variable, Inconstant, Fickle, Versatile.

Changeable, v. To change, alter.

Mutable, from the Latin *muto* to change is the same as *changeable*.

Variable, v. To change.

Inconstant, compounded of the privative *in* and *constant*, in Latin *constans* or *con* and *sto* to stand together or remain the same, signifies an incapacity to remain the same for any long continuance.

Fickle is most probably changed from the Latin *facilis* easy.

Versatile, in Latin *versatilis* from *verto* to turn, signifies easy to be turned.

Changeable is said of persons or things; *mutable* is said of things only: human beings are *changeable*, human affairs are *mutable*. *Changeable* respects the sentiments and opinions of the mind; *variable*, the state of the feelings; *inconstant*, the affections; *fickle*, the inclinations and attachments; *versatile*, the application of the talents. A *changeable* person rejects what he has once embraced in order to take up something new; a *variable* person likes and dislikes alternately the same thing; an *inconstant* person likes nothing long; a *fickle* person likes many things successively, or at the same time; a *versatile* person has a talent for whatever he likes.

Changeableness arises from a want of fixed principles; *variableness* from a predominance of humour; *inconstancy* from a selfish and unfeeling temper; *fickleness* from a lightness of mind; *versatility* from a flexibility of mind. Men are the most *changeable* and *inconstant*: women are the most *variable* and *fickle*: the former offend from an indifference for objects in general, or a diminished attachment for any object in particular, the latter from an excessive warmth of feeling that is easily biassed and ready to seize new objects. People who are *changeable* in their views and plans are particularly unfit for the government of a state; those who are *variable* in their humours are unsuitable as masters; people of an *inconstant* character ought to be shunned as lovers, those of a *fickle* disposition ought not to be chosen as friends.

Changeable, *variable*, *inconstant*, and *fickle*, as applied to persons, are taken in the bad sense; but *versatility* is a natural gift, which may be employed advantageously.

I have no taste
Of popular applause: the noisy praise
Of giddy crowds as *changeable* as winds.—DRYDEN.

With respect to the other alterations which the Saxon language appears to have undergone, we have no need to inquire minutely how far they have proceeded from the natural *mutability* of human speech, especially among an unlearned people.—TYRWHITT.

With God there is no *variableness*, with man there is no stability. Hence he is *changeable* in his design, *fickle* in his friendships, fluctuating in his whole character.—BLAIR.

The dew, the blossoms of the tree,
With charms *inconstant* shine;
Their charms were his, but woe to me,
Their constancy was mine.—GOLDSMITH.

Lord North was a man of admirable parts: of general knowledge, of a *versatile* understanding, fitted for every sort of business, of infinite wit and pleasantry, and of a delightful temper.—BURKE.

Character, Letter.

Character comes from the Greek χαρακτήρ signifying an impression or mark, from χαρασσω to imprint or stamp.

Letter, in French *lettre*, Latin *littera*, is

probably contracted from *legitima*, signifying what is legible.

Character is to *letter* as the genus to the species; every *letter* is a *character*; but every *character* is not a *letter*. *Character* is any printed mark that serves to designate something; a *letter* is species of *character* which is the constituent part of a word. Shorthand and hieroglyphics consist of *characters*, but not of *letters*.

Character is employed figuratively, but *letter* is not. A grateful person has the favours which are conferred upon him written in indelible *characters* upon his heart.

A disdainful, a subtle, and a suspicious temper, is displayed in *characters* that are almost universally understood.—HAWKESWORTH.

Character, Reputation.

From the natural sense of a stamp or mark (*v. Character, letter*), this word is figuratively employed for the moral mark which distinguishes one man from another.

Reputation, from the French *reputer*, Latin *reputo* to think, signifies what is thought of a person.

Character lies in the man; it is the mark of what he is; it shows itself on all occasions: *reputation* depends upon others; it is what they think of him.

A *character* is given particularly: a *reputation* is formed generally. Individuals give a *character* of another from personal knowledge: public opinion constitute the *reputation*. *Character* has always some foundation; it is a positive description of something: *reputation* has more of conjecture in it; its source is hearsay.

It is possible for a man to have a fair *reputation* who has not in reality a good *character*: although men of really good *character* are not likely to have a bad *reputation*.

Let a man think what multitudes of those among whom he dwells are totally ignorant of his name and *character*; how many imagine themselves too much occupied with their own wants and pursuits to pay him the least attention? and where his *reputation* is in any degree spread, how often it has been attacked, and how many rivals are daily rising to abate it.—BLAIR.

To Characterize, *v. To designate.*

Charge, *v. Care.*

Charge, *v. Cost.*

Charge, *v. Office.*

To Charge, *v. To accuse.*

To Charge, *v. To attack.*

Charm, *v. Grace.*

Charm, *v. Pleasure.*

To Charm, Enchant, Fascinate,
Enrapture, Captivate.

Charm, *v. Attractions.*

Enchant is compounded of *en* and *chant*, signifying to act upon as by the power of chanting or music.

Fascinate, in Latin *fascino*, Greek *βαρκαωω*, signified originally among the ancients a species of witchcraft, performed by the eyes or the tongue.

Enrapture, compounded of *en* and *rapture*, signifies to put into a *rapture*: and *rapture*, from the Latin *rapio* to seize or carry away, signifies the state of being carried away; whence to *enrapture* signifies to put into that state.

Captivate, in Latin *captivatus*, participle of *captivo*, from *capio* to take, signifies to take, as it were, prisoner.

The idea of an irresistible influence is common to these terms.

Charm expresses a less powerful effect than *enchant*; a *charm* is simply a magical verse used by magicians and sorcerers: *incantation* or *enchantment* is the use not only of verses but of any mysterious ceremonies, to produce a given effect.

To *charm* and *enchant* in this sense denote an operation by means of words or motions; to *fascinate* denotes an operation by means of the eyes or tongue: a person is *charmed* and *enchanted* voluntarily; he is *fascinated* involuntarily: the superstitious have always had recourse to *charms* or *enchantments*, for the purpose of allaying the passions of love or hatred; the Greeks believed that the malignant influence passed by *fascination* from the eyes or tongues of envious persons, which infected the ambient air, and through that medium penetrated and corrupted the bodies of animals and other things.

Charms and *enchantments* are performed by persons; *fascinations* are performed by animals: the former have always some supposed good in view; the latter have always a mischievous tendency: there are persons who pretend to *charm* away the toothache, or other pains of the body: some serpents are said to have a *fascinating* power in their eyes, by which they can kill the animals on whom they have fixed them.

Fascinate, as well as the others, is taken in the improper sense: *charm*, *enchant*, and *fascinate*, are employed to describe moral as well as natural operations: *enrapture* and *captivate* describe effects on the mind only: to *charm*, *enchant*, *fascinate*, and *enrapture*, designate the effects produced by physical and moral objects; *captivate* designates those produced by physical objects only: we may be *charmed*, or *enchanted*, or *enraptured*, with what we see, hear, and learn; we may be *fascinated* with what we see or learn; we are *captivated* only with what we see: a fine voice, a fine prospect, or a fine sentiment, *charms*, *enchants*, or *enraptures*; a fine person *fascinates*, or the conversation of a person is *fascinating*; beauty with all its accompaniments, *captivates*. When applied to the same objects, *charm*, *enchant*, and *enrapture*, rise in sense: what *charms* produces sweet but not tumultuous emotions; in this sense music in general *charms* a musical ear: what *enchants* rouses the feelings to a high pitch of tumultuous delight; in this manner the musician is *enchanted* with the finest compositions of Handel when performed by the best masters; or a lover of the country is *enchanted* with Swiss scenery: to *enrapture* is to absorb all

the affections of the soul; it is of too violent a nature to be either lasting or frequent: it is a term applicable only to persons of an enthusiastic character.

What *charms*, *enchants*, and *enraptures*, only affords pleasure for the time; what *fascinates* and *captivates* rivets the mind to the object: the former three convey the idea of a voluntary movement of the mind, as in the proper sense; the two latter imply a species of forcible action on the mind, which deprives a person of his free agency; the passions, as well as the affections, are called into play whilst the understanding is passive, which, with regard to *fascinate*, may be to the injury of the subject: a loose woman may have it in her power to *fascinate*, and a modest woman to *captivate*.

So fair a landscape *charm'd* the wond'ring knight,
GILBERT WEST.

Music has *charms* to soothe the savage breast.
CONGREVE.

Trust not too much to that *enchancing* face:
Beauty's a *charm*; but soon the *charm* will pass.
DRYDEN.

One would think there was some kind of *fascination* in the eyes of a large circle of people when darting altogether upon one person.—ADDISON.

He play'd so sweetly, and so sweetly sung,
That on each note th' enraptur'd audience hung.
SIR WM. JONES.

Her form the patriot's robe conceal'd,
With studied blandishments she bow'd,
And drew the *captivated* crowd.—MOORE.

Charming, *v. Delightful*.

Charms, *v. Attractions*.

Chasm, *v. Breach*.

To Chasten, To Chastise.

Chasten, **Chastise**, both come through the French *châtier*, from the Latin *castigo*, which is compounded of *castus* and *ago* to make pure.

Chasten has most regard to the end, *chastise* to the means; the former is an act of the Deity, the latter a human action: God *chastens* his faithful people to cleanse them from their transgressions; parents *chastise* their children to prevent the repetition of faults: afflictions are the means which he adopts for *chastening* those whom he wishes to make more obedient to his will; stripes are the means by which offenders are *chastised*.

By repairing sometimes to the house of mourning, you would *chasten* the looseness of fancy.—BLAIR.

Bad characters are dispersed abroad with profusion; I hope for example's sake, and (as punishments are designed by the civil power) more for the delivering the innocent, than the *chastising* the guilty.—HUGHES.

Chastity, Continence.

Chastity, in French *chastité*, Latin *castitas*, comes from *castus* pure, and the Hebrew *kedish* sacred.

Continence, in French *continence*, Latin *continentia*, from *contineo* and *contineo*, signifies the act of keeping one's self within bounds.

These two terms are equally employed in relation to the pleasures of sense: both are virtues, but sufficiently distinct in their characteristics.

* *Chastity* prescribes rules for the indulgence of these pleasures; *continence* altogether interdicts their use. *Chastity* extends its views to whatever may bear the smallest relation to the object which it proposes to regulate; it controls the thoughts, words, looks, attitudes, food, dress, company, and in short the whole mode of living: *continence* simply confines itself to the privation of the pleasures themselves: it is possible, therefore, to be *chaste* without being *continent*, and *continent* without being *chaste*.

Chastity is suited to all times, ages, and conditions; *continence* belongs only to a state of celibacy: the Christian religion enjoins *chastity*, as a positive duty on all its followers; the Romish religion enjoins *continence* on its clerical members: old age renders men *continent*, although it seldom makes them *chaste*.

It fails me here to write of *chastity*,
That fairest virtue far above the rest.—SPENSER.

When Pythagoras enjoined on his disciples an abstinence from beans, it has been thought by some an injunction only of *continency*.—BROWN'S VULGAR ERRORS.

To Chastise, *v.* To chasten.

To Chat, *v.* To babble.

Chattels, *v.* Goods.

To Chatter, *v.* To babble.

To Cheapen, *v.* To buy.

To Cheat, Defraud, Trick.

Cheat, in Saxon *cetta*, in all probability comes from *captum* and *capio*, as deceit comes from *decapio*.

Defraud, compounded of *de* and *fraud*, signifies to practise *fraud*, or to obtain by fraud.

Trick, in French *tricher*, German *trügen*, signifies simply to deceive, or get the better of any one.

The idea of deception which is common to these terms, varies in degree and circumstance.

One *cheats* by a gross falsehood; one *defrauds* by a settled plan; one *tricks* by a sudden invention: *cheating* is as low in its ends, as it is base in its means; *cheats* are contented to gain by any means; *defrauding* is a serious measure; its consequences are serious, both to the perpetrator and the sufferer. A person *cheats* at play; he *defrauds* those who place confidence in him.

Cheating is not punishable by laws; it involves no other consequence than the loss of character; *frauds* are punished in every form, even with death, when the occasion requires; they strike at the root of all confidence, and affect the public security: *tricking* is a species of dexterous *cheating*; the means and the end are alike trifling. Dishonest people *cheat*; villains *defraud*; cunning people *trick*.

* Beauzée; "Chastité, continence."

If e'er ambition did my fancy cheat
With any wish so mean as to be great;
Continue, Heav'n, still from me to remove
The humble blessings of that life I love.
COWLEY.

Thou, varlet, dost thy master's gains devour,
Thou wilt eat at his ewes, and often twice an hour;
Of grass and fodder thou defrauds't the dams,
And of the mother's dugs the starving lamb.
DRYDEN.

He who has the character of a crafty, *tricking* man is entirely deprived of a principal instrument of business, trust, whence he will find nothing succeed to his wish.
—BACON.

To Check, Curb, Control.

All these terms express a species of restraining.

Check and *Curb* are figurative expressions borrowed from natural objects. *Check* in French *échec*, German *schach*, *chess*, is the name in those languages for the king in the game of chess, whence it signifies as a verb to exert a restrictive power; *curb*, from the thing *curb*, by which horses are kept in, signifies in like manner, a coercive restraining.

Control is probably contracted from *counter-roll*, that is, to turn against an object, to act against it.

To *check* is to throw obstacles in the way to impede the course; to *curb* is to bear down by the direct exercise of force, to prevent from action; to *control* is to direct and turn the course: the actions of men are *checked*; their feelings are *curbed*; their actions or feelings are *controlled*.

External means are employed in *checking* or *controlling*; external or internal means are employed in *curbing*: men *check* and *control* others; they *curb* themselves or others: young people ought always to be *checked* whenever they discover a too forward temper in the presence of their superiors or elders; it is necessary to *curb* those who are of an impetuous temper, and to keep youth under *control*, until they have within themselves the restrictive power of judgment to *curb* their passions, and *control* their inordinate appetites.

Unlimited power cannot with propriety be entrusted to any individual, or limited body of individuals; there ought in every state to be a legitimate means of *checking* any one who shows a disposition to exercise an undue authority; but to invest the people with this office is in fact giving back, into the hands of the community, that which for the wisest purposes was taken from them by the institution of government: it is giving a restraining power to those who themselves are most in want of being restrained; whose un governable passions require to be *curbed* by the iron arm of power, whose unruly wills require all the influence of wisdom and authority to *control*.

Devotion, when it does not lie under the *check* of reason, is apt to degenerate into enthusiasm.—ADDISON.

The point of honour has been dead'n'd of use,
To teach good manners, and to curb abuse;
Admit it true, the consequence is clear.
Our polished manners are a mask we wear.
COWPER.

Whatever private views and passions plead,
No cause can justify so black a deed;
These, when the angry tempest clouds the soul,
May darken reason and her course *control*.
THOMSON.

To Check, Chide, Reprimand, Reprove, Rebuke.

Check, v. *To check, curb.*

Chide is in Saxon *cidan*, probably connected with *cyldan* to scold.

Reprimand is compounded of the privative *repro* for *repro*, backwards, and *mando* to approve, i.e., the contrary of approving.

Reprove, in French *reprouver*, Latin *reprobo*, is compounded of the privative syllable *re* and *probo*, signifying to find the contrary of good, that is, to find bad, to blame.

Rebuke is compounded of *re* and *buke*, in French *bouche* the mouth, signifying to stop the mouth.

The idea of expressing one's disapprobation of a person's conduct is common to all these terms.

A person is checked that he may not continue to do what is offensive; he is *chidden* for what he has done that he may not repeat it: impertinent and forward people require to be *checked*, that they may not become intolerable thoughtless people are *chidden* when they give hurtful proofs of their carelessness.

People are *checked* by actions and looks, as well as words: they are *chidden* by words only; a timid person is easily *checked*: the want even of due encouragement will serve to damp his resolution: the young are perpetually falling into irregularities which require to be *chidden*.

To *chide* marks a stronger degree of displeasure than *reprimand*, and *reprimand* than *reprove* or *rebuke*; a person may *chide* or *reprimand* in anger, he *reproves* and *rebukes* with coolness: great offences call forth for *chidings*; omissions or mistakes occasion or require a *reprimand*; irregularities of conduct give rise to *reproof*: and improprieties of behaviour demand *rebuke*.

Chiding and *reprimanding* are employed for offences against the individual, and in cases where the greatest disparity exists in the station of the parties; a child is *chid* by his parent; a servant is *reprimanded* by his master.

Reproving and *rebuking* have less to do with the relation or station of the parties than with the nature of the offence: wisdom, age, and experience, or a spiritual mission, give authority to *reprove* or *rebuke* those whose conduct has violated any law, human or divine; the prophet Nathan *reproved* king David for his heinous offences against his Maker; our Saviour *rebuked* Peter for his presumptuous mode of speech.

But if a clam'rous vile plebeian rose,
Him with *reproof* he *check'd*, or tau'd with blows.
POPE.

His house was known to all the vagrant train,
He *chid* their wanderings, but reliev'd their pain.
GOLDSMITH.

This sort of language was very severely *reprimanded* by the Censor, who told the criminal "that he spoke in contempt of the court."—ADDISON AND STEELE.

He who endeavours only the happiness of him whom he *reproves*, will always have the satisfaction of either obtaining or deserving kindness.—JOHNSON.

With all the infirmities of his disciples he calmly bore; and his *rebukes* were mild when their provocations were great.—BLAIR.

To Check, Stop.

Check, v. *To check, curb.*

Stop, v. *Cessation.*

To *check* is to cause to move slowly; to *stop* is to cause not to move at all: the growth of a plant is *checked* when it does not grow so fast as usual; its growth is *stopped* when it ceases altogether to grow: the water of a river is *stopped* by a dam; the rapidity of its course is *checked* by the intervention of rocks and sands.

When applied to persons, to *check* is always contrary to the will of the sufferer: but to *stop* is often a matter of indifference, if not directly serviceable: one is *checked* in his career of success by some untoward event; one is *stopped* on a journey by the meeting of a friend.

In a moral application these terms bear a similar analogy; *check* has the import of diminishing; *stop* that of destroying or causing to cease: many evils may be easily *checked*, to which it would not be easy to put an effectual *stop*.

Shall neither the admonitions which you receive from the visible inconstancy of the world, nor the declarations of the Divine displeasure, be sufficient to *check* your thoughtless career?—BLAIR.

Emboss'd in the deep where Holland lies,
Methinks her patient sons before me stand,
Where the broad ocean teems against the land,
And sedulous to *stop* the coming tide,
Lift the tall rampire's artificial pride.—GOLDSMITH.

To Cheer, v. To animate.

To Cheer, Encourage, Comfort.

Cheer, v. *To animate.*

Encourage, compounded of *en* and *courage*, signifies to inspire with courage.

Comfort is compounded of *com* or *cum* and *fortis* strong, signifying to invigorate or strengthen.

To *cheer* regards the spirits; to *encourage* the resolution; the sad require to be *cheered*; the timid to be *encouraged*. Mirthful company is suited to *cheer* those who labour under any depression: the prospect of success *encourages* those who have any object to obtain.

To *cheer* and *comfort* have both regard to the spirits, but the latter differs in degree and manner; to *cheer* expresses more than to *comfort*; the former signifying to produce a lively sentiment, the latter to lessen or remove a painful one: we are *cheered* in the moments of despondency, whether from real or imaginary causes; we are *comforted* in the hour of distress.

Cheering is mostly effected by the discourse of others; *comforting* is effected by the actions as well as the words, of others. Nothing tends more to *cheer* the drooping soul than endearing expressions of tenderness from those we love; the most effectual means of *comforting* the poor and afflicted is by relieving their wants. The voice of the benevolent man is *cheering* to the aching heart; his looks *encourage* the sufferer to disclose his griefs; his hand is open to administer relief and *comfort*.

The creation is a perpetual feast to a good man; every thing he sees *cheers* and delights him.—ADDISON.

Complaisance produces good-nature and mutual benevolence, encourages the tinorous, soothes the turbulent, humanizes the fierce, and distinguishes a society of civilized persons from [a confusion of] savages.—ADDISON.

Sleep seldom visits sorrow.

When it does, it is a comforter.—SHAKESPEARE.

There are writers of great distinction who have made it an argument for providence, that the whole earth is covered with green, rather than with any other colour, as being such a right mixture of light and shade, that comforts and strengthens the eye, instead of weakening or grieving it.—ADDISON.

Cheerful, Merry, Sprightly, Gay.

Cheerful signifies full of *cheer*, or of that which *cheers* (v. *To animate*).

Merry, in Saxon *merig*, is probably connected with the word *mare*, and the Latin *meretrix* a strumpet.

Sprightly, is contracted from *spiritedly*.

Gay, is connected with *joy* and *jocund*, from the Latin *jocus*.

Cheerful marks an unruffled flow of spirits; with *mirth* there is more of tumult and noise; with *spirithiness* there is more buoyancy; *gaiety* comprehends *mirth* and indulgence. A *cheerful* person smiles; a *merry* person laughs; a *spirithless* person dances; a *gay* person takes his pleasure.

The *cheerful* countenance is permanently so; it marks the contentment of the heart, and its freedom from pain; the *merry* face will often look sad; a trifle will turn *mirth* into sorrow: the *spirithiness* of youth is often succeeded by the listlessness of bodily infirmity, or the gloom of despondency: *gaiety* is as transitory as the pleasures upon which it subsists; it is often followed by sullenness and discontent.

Cheerfulness is an habitual state of the mind; *mirth* is an occasional elevation of the spirits; *spirithiness* lies in the temperature and flow of the blood; *gaiety* depends altogether on external circumstances. Religion is the best promoter of *cheerfulness*; it makes its possessor pleased with himself and all around him; company and wine are but too often the only promoters of *mirth*; youth and health will naturally be attended with *spirithiness*; a succession of pleasures, an exemption from care, and the banishment of thought, will keep *gaiety* alive.

Spirithiness and *mirth* are seldom employed but in the proper sense as respects persons: but *cheerful* and *gay* are extended to different objects; as a *cheerful* prospect, a *cheerful* room *gay* attire, a *gay* scene, *gay* colours, &c.

I have always preferred *cheerfulness* to *mirth*; the latter I consider as an act, the former as an habit of the mind. *Mirth* is short and transient; *cheerfulness* fixed and permanent.—ADDISON.

Mankind may be divided into the *merry* and the *serious*, who both of them make a very good figure in the species so long as they keep their respective humours from degenerating into the neighbouring extreme.—ADDISON.

But Venus, anxious for her son's affairs,
New counsels tries, and new designs prepares;
That Cupid should assume the shape and face
Of sweet Ascanius, and the *spirithless* grace.

DRYDEN.

To kinder skies, where gentler manners reign,
I turn: and France displays her bright domain.
Gay, *spirithless* land of *mirth* and social ease,
Pleased with thyself, whom all the world can please.

GOLDSMITH.

Cheerful, v. *Glad*.

To Cherish, v. *To foster*.

To Cherish, v. *To nourish*.

To Chide, v. *To check*.

Chief, Principal, Main.

Chief, in French *chef*, from the Latin *caput* the head, signifies belonging to the uppermost part.

Principal, in French *principal*, Latin *principalis*, comes from *princeps* a chief or prince, signifying belonging to a prince.

Main, from the Latin *magnus*, signifies to a great degree.

Chief respects order and rank; *principal* has regard to importance and respectability; *main* to degree or quantity. We speak of a *chief* clerk; a commander in *chief*; the *chief* person in a city; but the *principal* people in a city; the *principal* circumstances in a narrative, and the *main* object.

The *chief* cities, as mentioned by geographers, are those which are classed in the first rank; the *principal* cities generally include those which are the most considerable for wealth and population; these, however, are not always technically comprehended under the name of *chief* cities: the main end of men's exertions is the acquirement of wealth.

What is man,

If his *chief* good and market of his time
Be but to sleep and feed? A beast, no more!

SHAKESPEARE.

The right which one man has to the actions of another, is generally borrowed, or derived from one or both of these two great originals, production or possession, which two are certainly the *principal* and most undoubted rights that take place in the world.—SOUTH.

To the accidental or adventitious parts of Paradise Lost, some slight exceptions may be made; but the *main* fabric is immovably supported.—JOHNSON.

Chief, Leader, Chieftain, Head.

Chief and *Chieftain* signify him who is *chief* (v. *Chief*).

Leader, from *to lead*, and *Head* from the *head*, sufficiently designate their own signification.

Chief respects precedency in civil masters; *leader* regards the direction of enterprises: *chieftain* is employed for the superior in military rank; and *head* for the superior in general concerns.

Among savages the *chief* of every tribe is a despotic prince within his own district. Factions and parties in a state, like savage tribes, must have their *leaders* to whom they are blindly devoted, and by whom they are instigated to every desperate proceeding. Robbers have their *chieftains* who plan and direct every thing, having an unlimited power over the band. The *heads* of families were, in the primitive ages, the *chiefs*, who in conjunction regulated the affairs of state.

Chiefs have a permanent power, which may descend by inheritance, to branches of the same families: *leaders* and *chieftains* have a deputed power with which they are invested, as the time and occasion require: *heads* have a natural power springing out of the nature of their birth, rank, talents, and situation; it is not hereditary, but successive.

Chiefs ought to have superiority of birth combined with talents for ruling; *leaders* and *chieftains* require a bold and enterprising spirit; *heads* should have talents for directing.

No chief like thee, Menestheus, Greece could yield,
To marshal armies in the dusty field.—POPE.

Their constant emulation in military renown dissolved not that inviolable friendship which the ancient Saxons professed to their *chieftain* and to each other.—HUME.

Savage alleged that he was then dependant upon the Lord Tyrconnel, who was an implicit follower of the ministry; and, being enjoined by him, not without menaces, to write in praise of his leader, he had not sufficient resolution to sacrifice the pleasure of assent to that of integrity.—JOHNSON.

As each is more able to distinguish himself as the *head* of a party, he will less readily be made a follower or associate.—JOHNSON.

Chiefly, v. Especially.

Chieftain, v. Chief.

Childish, Infantine.

Childish is in the manner of a *child*.

Infantine is in the manner of an *infant*.

What *children* do is frequently simple or foolish; what *infants* do is commonly pretty and engaging; therefore *childish* is taken in the bad, and *infantine* in the good sense. *Childish* manners are very offensive in those who have ceased according to their years to be children; the *infantine* actions of some children evince a simplicity of character.

It may frequently be remarked of the studious and speculative, that they are proud of trifles, and that their amusements seem frivolous and *childish*.—JOHNSON.

The lay records the labours and the praise,
And all th' immortal acts of Hercules:
First how the mighty babe, when swath'd in bands,
The serpents strangled with his *infant* hands.
DRYDEN.

Chill, Cold.

Chill and Cold are but variations of the same word, in German *kalt*, &c.

Chill expresses less than *cold*, that is to say, it expresses a degree of *cold*. The weather is often *chilly* in summer; but it is *cold* in winter.

We speak of taking the *chill* off water when the *cold* is in part removed; and of a *chill* running through the frame when the *cold* begins to penetrate the frame that is in a state of warmth.

When men once reach their autumn, fickle joys
Fall off apace, as yellow leaves from trees;
Till left quite naked of their happiness,
In the *chill* blasts of winter they expire.—YOUNG.

Thus ease after torment is pleasure for a time, and we are very agreeably recruited when the body, *chilled* with the weather, is gradually recovering its natural tepidity; but the joy ceases when we have forgot the *cold*.—JOHNSON.

To Choak, v. To suffocate,

Choice, v. Option.

Choler, v. Anger.

To Choose, Prefer.

Choose, in French *choisir*, German *kiesen*, from the French *cher*, Celtic *choe*, dear or good, signifies to hold good.

Prefer, in French *preferer*, Latin *præfero*, compounded of *præ* and *fero* to take before, signifies to take one thing rather than another.

* To *choose* is to *prefer* as the genus to the species: we always *choose* in *preferring*, but we do not always *prefer* in *choosing*. To *choose* is to take one thing from among others; to *prefer* is to take one thing before or rather than another. We sometimes *choose* from the bare necessity of *choosing*, but we never *prefer* without making a positive and voluntary *choice*.

When we *choose* from a specific motive, the acts of *choosing* and *preferring* differ in the nature of the motive. The former is absolute, the latter relative. We *choose* a thing for what it is, or what we esteem it to be of itself; we *prefer* a thing for what it has, or what we suppose it has, superior to another.

Utility or convenience are grounds for *choosing*; comparative merit occasions the *preference*: we *choose* something that is good, and are contented with it until we see something better which we *prefer*.

We calculate and pause in *choosing*. We decide in *preferring*; the judgment determines in making the *choice*; the will determines in giving the *preference*. We *choose* things from an estimate of their merits or their fitness for the purpose proposed; we *prefer* them from their accordance with our tastes, habits, and pursuits. Books are *chosen* by those who wish to read; romances and works of fiction are *preferred* by general readers; learned works by the scholar.

One who wants instruction *chooses* a master, but he will mostly *prefer* a teacher whom he knows to a perfect stranger. Our *choice* is good or bad according to our knowledge; our *preference* is just or unjust, according as it is sanctioned by reason.

Our *choice* may be directed by our own experience or that of others; our *preference* must be guided by our own feelings. We make our *choice*: we give our *preference*: the first is the settled purpose of the mind, it fixes on the object; the latter is the inclining of the will, it yields to the object.

Choosing must be employed in all the important concerns of life, *preferring* is admissible in subordinate matters only. There is but one thing that is right, and that ought to be *chosen*, when it is discovered: there are many indifferent things that may suit our tastes and inclinations; these we are at liberty to *prefer*. But to *prefer* what we ought not to *choose* is to make our reason bend to our will. Our Saviour said of Mary that she *chose* the better part: had she

* The Abbé Girard, under the article *choisir, preferer*, has reversed this rule; but as I conceive, from a confusion of thought, which pervades the whole of his illustration on these words. The Abbé Roubaud has controverted his positions with some degree of accuracy. I have, however, given my own view of the matter in distinction from either.

consulted her feelings she would have preferred the part she had rejected. The path of life should be chosen; but the path to be taken in a walk may be preferred. It is advisable for a youth in the choice of a profession to consult what he prefers, as he has the greatest chance of succeeding when he can combine his pleasure with his duty. A friend should be chosen; a companion may be preferred. A wife should be chosen, but unfortunately lovers are most apt to give a preference in a matter where a good or bad choice may determine one's happiness or misery for life. A wise prince is careful in the choice of his ministers; but a weak prince has mostly favourites whom he prefers.

There is nothing of so great importance to us, as the good qualities of one to whom we join ourselves for life. When the choice is left to friends, the chief point under consideration is an estate, where the parties choose for themselves, their thoughts turn most upon the person.—ADDISON.

When a man has a mind to venture his money in a lottery, every figure of it appears equally alluring; and no manner of reason can be given why a man should prefer one to the other before the lottery is drawn.—ADDISON.

Judgment was wearied with the perplexity of choice where there was no motive for preference.—JOHNSON.

To Choose, Pick, Select.

Choose, *v.* To choose, prefer.

Pick, in German *picken*, or *bicken*, French *bicquer*, Dutch *becken*, Icelandic *picka*, Swedish *piucka*, comes very probably from the old German *bag*, *bich*, to stick, corresponding to the Latin *figo* to fix.

Select, Latin *selectus*, participle of *seligo*, that is *lego* to gather or put, and *se* apart.

Choose is as in the former case the generic; the others are specific terms: *pick* and *select* are expressly different modes of choosing. We always choose when we *pick* and *select*: but we do not always *pick* and *select* when we choose.

To choose may be applied to two or more things; to *pick* and *select* can be used only for several things. We may choose one book out of two, but we *pick* and *select* out of a library or a parcel; *pick* may be said of one or many; *select* only of many.

To choose does not always spring from any particular design or preference; to *pick* and *select* signify to choose with care. What is *picked* and *selected* is always the best of its kind, but the former is commonly something of a physical nature; the latter of a moral or intellectual description. Soldiers are sometimes *picked* to form a particular regiment; pieces are *selected* in prose or verse for general purposes.

My friend, Sir Roger, being a good churchman, has beautified the inside of his church with several texts of his own choosing.—ADDISON.

I know by several experiments, that those little animals (the ants) take great care to provide themselves with wheat when they can find it, and always *pick* out the best.—ADDISON.

The chief advantage which these fictions have over real life is, that their authors are at liberty, though not to invent, yet to select objects.—JOHNSON.

To Choose, Elect.

Choose, *v.* To choose, prefer.

Elect, in Latin *electus*, participle of *eligo*, is compounded of *e* and *lego*, signifying to gather or take out from.

Both these terms are employed in regard to persons appointed to an office; the former in a general, the latter in a particular sense.

Choosing is the act either of one man or of many; election is always that of a number; it is performed by the concurrence of many voices.

A prince chooses his ministers; the constituents elect their members of parliament. A person is chosen to serve the office of sheriff; he is elected by the corporation to be mayor.

Choosing is an act of authority; it binds the person chosen: election is a voluntary act; the elected has the power of refusal. People are obliged to serve in some offices when they are chosen, although they would gladly be exempt. The circumstance of being elected is an honour after which they eagerly aspire; and for the attainment of which they risk their property, and use the most strenuous exertions.

Wise were the kings who never chose a friend,
Till with full cups they had unmask'd his soul,
And seen the bottom of his deepest thoughts.
ROSCOMMON.

Cornwall elects as many members as all Scotland; but is Cornwall better taken care of than Scotland?—BURKE.

Chronicles, *v.* Anecdotes.

Church, *v.* Temple.

Circle, Sphere, Orb, Globe.

Circle, in Latin *circulus*, Greek *κυκλος*, in all probability comes from the Hebrew *choog* a circle.

Sphere, in Latin *sphæra*, Greek *σφαῖρα*, from *σπειρα* a line, signifies that which is contained within a prescribed line.

Orb, in Latin *orbis*, from *orbo* to circumscribe with a circle, signifies the thing that is circumscribed.

Globe in Latin *globus*, in all probability comes from the Hebrew *gal* a rolled heap.

Rotundity of figure is the common idea expressed by these terms; but the circle is that figure which is represented on a plane superficies; the others are figures represented by solids. We draw a circle by means of compasses; the sphere is a round body, conceived to be formed according to the rules of geometry by the circumvolution of a circle round about its diameter; hence the whole frame of the world is denominated a sphere. An orb is any body which describes a circle; hence the heavenly bodies are termed orbs: a globe is any solid body, the surface of which is in every part equidistant from the centre; of this description is the terrestrial globe.

A circle may be applied in the improper sense to any round figure, which is formed or supposed to be formed by circumscribing a space; simple rotundity constituting a circle: in this manner a circle may be formed by real objects, as persons, or by moral objects, as pleasures. To the idea of circle is annexed

that of extent around, in the signification of a *sphere*, as a *sphere* of activity, whether applied in the philosophical sense to natural bodies, or in the moral sense to men. Hollowness, as well as rotundity, belongs to an *orb*; hence we speak of the *orb* of a wheel. Of a *globe*, solidity is the peculiar characteristic; hence any ball, like the ball of the earth, may be represented as a *globe*.

Might I from fortune's bounteous hand receive
Each boon, each blessing in her power to give;
E'en at this mighty price I'd not be bound
To tread the same dull *circle* round and round.
The soul requires enjoyments more sublime,
By space unbounded, undestroyed by time.

JENYNS.

Or if some stripes from Providence we feel,
He strikes with pity, and but wounds to heal,
Kindly, perhaps, sometimes afflicts us here,
To guide our views to a sublimer *sphere*.—JENYNS.

Thousands of suns beyond each other blaze,
Orbs roll o'er orbs, and glow with mutual rays.

JENYNS.

Thus roaming with advent'rous wing the *globe*,
From scene to scene excursive, I behold
In all her workings, beauteous, great or new,
Fair nature.—MALLET.

Circuit, Tour, Round.

Circuit, in French *circuit*, Latin *circuitus*, participle of *circumeo*, signifies either the act of going round, or the extent gone.

Tour is from the French *tour*, a turn, from the verb *tourner*, to turn.

Round marks the track *round*, or the space gone *round*.

A *circuit* is made for a specific end of a serious kind; a *tour* is always made for pleasure; a *round*, like a *circuit*, is employed in matters of business, but of a more familiar and ordinary kind. A judge goes his *circuit* at particular periods of time: gentlemen, in times of peace, consider it as an essential part of their education to make what is termed the *grand tour*; tradesmen have certain *rounds* which they take on certain days.

We speak of making the *circuit* of a place; of taking a *tour* in a given county; or going a particular *round*. A *circuit* is wide or narrow; a *tour* and a *round* is great or little. A *circuit* is prescribed as to extent; a *tour* is optional; a *round* is prescribed or otherwise. *Circuit* is seldom used but in a specific sense; *tour* is seldom employed but in regard to travelling; *round* may be taken figuratively, as when we speak of going on's *round* of pleasure.

Th' unfledg'd commanders and the martial train.
First make the *circuit* of the sandy plain.—DRYDEN.

Goldsmith's *tour* through Europe we are told was made for the most part on foot.—JOHNSON.

'Tis night! the season when the happy take
Repose, and only wretches are awake;
Now discontented ghosts begin their *rounds*,
Haunt ruin'd buildings and unwholesome grounds.

OTWAY.

Savage had projected a perpetual *round* of innocent pleasure in Wales, of which he suspected no interruption from pride, ignorance, or brutality.—JOHNSON.

To Circulate, v. To spread.

To Circumscribe, Inclose.

Circumscribe, from the Latin *circum* about, and *scribo* to write, marks simply the surrounding with a line.

Inclose, from the latin *inclusus*, participle of *incluendo*, compounded of *in* and *claudo* to shut, marks a species of confinement.

The extent of any place is drawn out to the eye by a *circumscription*; its extent is limited to a given point by an *inclosure*. A garden is *circumscribed* by any ditch, line, or posts, that serve as its boundaries; it is *inclosed* by wall or fence. An *inclosure* may serve to *circumscribe*, but that which barely *circumscribes* will seldom serve to *inclose*.

Who can imagine that the existence of a creature is to be *circumscribed* by time, whose thoughts are not?—ADDISON.

Remember on that happy coast to build,
And with a trench *inclose* the fruitful field.—DRYDEN.

To Circumscribe, v. To bound.

Circumspect, v. Cautious.

Circumstance, Situation.

Circumstance, in Latin *circumstantia*, from *circum* and *sto*, signifies what stands about a thing, or belongs to it as its accident.

Situation, in French *situation*, comes from the Latin *situs*, and the Hebrew *sot* to place, signifying what is placed in a certain manner.

Circumstance is to *situation* as a part to a whole; many *circumstances* constitute a *situation*; a *situation* is an aggregate of *circumstances*. A person is said to be in *circumstances* of affluence who has an abundance of every thing essential for his comfort; he is in an easy *situation* when nothing exists to create uneasiness.

Circumstance respects that which externally affects us; *situation* is employed both for the outward *circumstances* and the inward feelings. The success of any undertaking depends greatly on the *circumstances* under which it is begun; the particular *situation* of a person's mind will give a cast to his words or actions. *Circumstances* are critical, a *situation* is dangerous.

As for the ass's behaviour in such nice *circumstances*, whether he would starve sooner than violate his neutrality to the two bundles of hay, I shall not presume to determine.—ADDISON.

We are not at present in a proper *situation* to judge of the councils by which Providence acts.—ADDISON.

Circumstance, Incident, Fact.

Circumstance, v. *Circumstance*, *situation*. **Incident**, in Latin *incidens*, participle of *incido*, or *in* and *cado* to fall, signifies what falls upon or to another thing.

Fact, in Latin *factus*, participle of *facio* to do, signifies the thing done.

Circumstance is a general term; *incident* and *fact* are species of *circumstances*. *Incident* is what happens; *fact* is what is done; *circumstance* is not only what happens and is done, but whatever is or belongs to a thing. To

every thing are annexed *circumstances* either of time, place, age, colour, or other collateral appendages which change its nature. Every thing that moves and operates is exposed to *incidents*, effects are produced, results follow, and changes are brought about; these are *incidents* whatever moves and operates does, and what it produces is done or is the *fact*: when the artificer performs any work of art, it depends not only on his skill, but on the excellence of his tools, the time he employs, the particular frame of his mind, the place where he works, with a variety of other *circumstances*, whether he will succeed in producing any thing masterly. Newspapers abound with the various *incidents* which occur in the animal or the vegetable world, some of which are surprising and singular; they likewise contain a number of *facts* which serve to present a melancholy picture of human depravity.

Circumstance is as often employed with regard to the operations as the properties of things, in which case it is most analogous to *incident* and *fact*. It may then be employed for the whole affair, or any part of it whatever, that can be distinctly considered. *Incidents* and *facts* either are *circumstances*, or have *circumstances* belonging to them. A remarkably abundant crop in any particular part of a field is for the agriculturist a singular *circumstance* or *incident*: this may be rendered more surprising if associated with unusual sterility in other parts of the same field. A robbery may either be a *fact* or a *circumstance*; its atrocity may be aggravated by the murder of the injured parties; the savageness of the perpetrators, and a variety of *circumstances*.

Circumstance comprehends in its signification whatever may be said or thought of any thing; *incident* carries with it the idea of whatever may befall or be said to befall any thing; *fact* includes in it nothing but what really is or is done. A narrative therefore may contain many *circumstances* and *incidents* without any *fact*, when what is related is either fictitious or not positively known to have happened: it is necessary for a novel or play to contain much *incident*, but no *facts*, in order to render it interesting; history should contain nothing but *facts*, as authenticity is its chief merit.

You very often hear people after a story has been told with some entertaining *circumstances*, tell it again with particulars that destroy the jest.—STEELE.

It is to be considered that Providence in its economy regards the whole system of time and things together, so that we cannot discover the beautiful connection between *incidents* which lie widely separate in time.—ADDISON.

In describing the achievements and institutions of the Spaniards in the New World, I have departed in many instances from the accounts of preceding historians, and have often related *facts* which seem to have been unknown to them.—ROBERTSON.

Circumstantial, Particular, Minute.

Circumstantial from *circumstance*, signifies consisting of *circumstances*.

Particular, in French *particulier*, from the word *particula*, signifies consisting of *particlos*.

Minute, in French *minute*, Latin *minutus*, participle of *minuo* to diminish, signifies diminished or reduced to a very small point.

Circumstantial expresses less than *particular*, and that less than *minute*. A *circumstantial* account contains all leading events; a *particular* account includes every event and movement however trivial; a *minute* account omits nothing as to person, time, place, figure, form, and every other trivial *circumstance* connected with the events. A narrative may be *circumstantial*, *particular*, or *minute*; an inquiry, investigation, or description may be *particular* or *minute*, a detail may be *minute*. An event or occurrence may be *particular*, a *circumstance* or *particular* may be *minute*. We may be generally satisfied with a *circumstantial* account of ordinary events; but whatever interests the feelings cannot be detailed with too much *particularity* or *minuteness*.

Thomson's wide expansion of general views and his enumeration of *circumstantial* varieties, would have been obstructed and embarrassed by the frequent intersections of the sense which are the necessary effects of the rhyme.—JOHNSON.

I am extremely troubled at the return of your deafness; you cannot be too *particular* in the accounts of your health to me.—POPE.

When Pope's letters were published and avowed, as they had relation to recent facts, and persons either then living or not yet forgotten, they may be supposed to have found readers, but as the facts were *minute*, and the characters little known, or little regarded, they awakened no popular kindness or resentment.—JOHNSON.

To Cite, Quote.

Cite and *Quote* are both derived from the same Latin verb *cito* to move, and the Hebrew *sat* to stir up, signifying to put into action.

To *cite* is employed for persons or things; to *quote* for things only: authors are *cited*, passages from their works are *quoted*: we *cite* only by authority; we *quote* for general purposes of convenience. Historians ought to *cite* their authority in order to strengthen their evidence and inspire confidence; controversialists must *quote* the objectionable passages in those works which they wish to confute: it is prudent to *cite* no one whose authority is questionable; it is superfluous to *quote* any thing that can be easily perused in the original.

The great work of which Justinian has the credit, consists of texts collected from law books of approved authority; and these texts are digested according to a scientific analysis: the names of the original authors and the titles of their several books being constantly cited.—SIR WM. JONES.

Let us consider what is truly glorious according to the author I have to-day quoted in the front of my paper.—STEELE.

To Cite, Summon.

Cite, v. To cite, quote.

Summon, v. To call.

The idea of calling a person authoritatively to appear, is common to these terms. *Cite* is used in a general sense, *summon* in a particular and technical sense; a person may be *cited* to appear before his superior: he is *summoned* to appear before a court: the station of the in-

dividual gives authority to the act of *citing* : the law itself gives authority to that of *summoning*.

When *cite* is used in a legal sense, it is mostly employed for witnesses, and *summon* for every occasion : a person is *cited* to give evidence, he is *summoned* to answer a charge. *Cite* is seldom used in the legal sense than in that of calling by name, in which general acceptance it is employed with regard to authors, as specified in the preceding article : the legal is the ordinary sense of *summon*, it may however be extended in its application to a military *summons* of a fortified town, or to any call for which there may be occasion ; as when we speak of the *summons* which is given to attend the death-bed of a friend, or figuratively, death is said to *summon* mortals from this world.

E'en social friendship duns his ear
And *cites* him to the public sphere.—SHENSTONE.

The sly enchantress *summon'd* all her train,
Alluring Venus, queen of vagrant love,
The boon companion Bacchus, loud and vain,
And tricking Hermes, God of fraudulent gain. WEST.

Civil, Polite.

Civil, in French *civil*, Latin *civilis* from *civis* a citizen, signifies belonging to or becoming a citizen.

Polite, in French *poli*, Latin *politus*, participle of *polio* to polish.

These two epithets are employed to denote different modes of acting in social intercourse : *polite* expresses more than *civil* : it is possible to be *civil* without being *polite* : *politeness* supposes *civility* and something in addition.

Civility is confined to no rank, age, condition, or country : all have an opportunity with equal propriety of being *civil*, but not so with *politeness*, that requires a certain degree of equality, at least the equality of education : it would be contradictory for masters and servants, rich and poor, learned and unlearned, to be *polite* to each other. *Civility* is a Christian duty ; there are times when all men ought to be *civil* to their neighbours : *politeness* is rather a voluntary devotion of ourselves to others : among the inferior orders *civility* is indispensable : an *uncivil* person in a subordinate station is an obnoxious member of society : among the higher orders *politeness* is often a substitute ; and where the form and spirit are combined, it supersedes the necessity of *civility* : *politeness* is the sweetener of human society : it gives a charm to every thing that is said and done.

Civility is contented with pleasing when the occasion offers : *politeness* seeks the opportunity to please, it prevents the necessity of asking by anticipating the wishes ; it is full of delicate attentions, and is an active benevolence in the minor concerns of life.

Civility is anxious not to offend, but it often gives pain from ignorance or error : *politeness* studies all the circumstances and situations of men ; it enters into their characters, suits itself to their humours, and even yields indulgently to their weaknesses ; its object is no less to avoid giving pain than to study to afford pleasure.

Civility is dictated by the desire of serving,

politeness by that of pleasing : *civility* often confines itself to the bare intention of serving ; *politeness* looks to the action and its consequences : when a peasant is *civil* he often does the reverse of what would be desired of him ; he takes no heed of the wants and necessities of others : *politeness* considers what is due to others and from others ; it does nothing superfluously ; men of good breeding think before they speak, and move before they act. It is necessary to be *civil* without being troublesome, and *polite* without being affected.

Civility requires nothing but goodness of intention ; it may be associated with the coarsest manners, the grossest ignorance, and the total want of all culture : *politeness* requires peculiar properties of the head and the heart, natural and artificial ; much goodness and gentleness of character, an even current of feelings, quickness and refined delicacy of sentiment, a command of temper, a general insight into men and manners, and a thorough acquaintance with the forms of society.

Civility is not incompatible with the harshest expressions of one's feelings ; it allows the utterance of all a man thinks without regard to person, time, or season ; it lays no restraint upon the angry passions : *politeness* enjoins us to say nothing to another which we would not wish to be said to ourselves ; it lays at least a temporary constraint on all the angry passions, and prevents all turbulent commotions.

Civility is always the same ; whatever is once *civil* is always so, and acknowledged as such by all persons : *politeness* varies with the fashions and times ; what is *polite* in one age or in one country may be *unpolite* in another.

If *civility* be not a splendid virtue, it has at least the recommendation of being genuine and harmless, having nothing artificial in it ; it admits of no gloss, and will never deceive ; it is the true expression of good will, the companion of respect in inferiors, of condescension in superiors, of humanity and kindness in equals : *politeness* springs from education, is the offspring of refinement, and consists much in the exterior ; it often rests with the bare imitation of virtue, and is distinguished into true and false ; in the latter case it may be abused for the worst of purposes, and serve as a mask to conceal malignant passions under the appearance of kindness : hence it is possible to be *polite* in form without being *civil*, or any thing else that is good.

He has good-nature,
And I have good manners.
His sons too are *civil* to me, because
I do not pretend to be wiser than they.—OTWAY.

I heard a mermaid on a dolphin's back,
Uttering such dulcet and harmonious sounds,
That the rude sea grew *civil* at her song. SHAKESPEARE.

The true effect of genuine *politeness* seems to be rather easy than pleasure.—JOHNSON.

A *polite* country squire shall make you as many bows in half an hour as would serve a courtier for a week.—ADDISON.

Civil, Obliging, Compliant.

Civil, v. *Civil*, *polite*.

Obliging, from *oblige*, signifies either doing what *oblige*s, or ready to *oblige*.

Complaisant. in French *complaisant*, comes from *complaire* to please, signifying ready to please.

Civil is more general than *obliging*: one is always *civil* when one is *obliging*, but one is not always *obliging* when one is *civil*: *compliance* is more than either, it refines upon both; it is a branch of *politeness* (v. *Civil*, *polite*).

Civil regards the manner as well as the action, *obliging* respects the action, *complaisant* includes all the circumstances of the action: to be *civil* is to please by any word or action: to be *obliging* is to perform some actual service; to be *complaisant* is to do that service in the time and manner that is most suitable and agreeable; *civility* requires no effort; to be *obliging* always cost the agent some trouble; *compliance* requires attention and observation: a person is *civil* in his reply, *obliging* in lending assistance, *complaisant* in his attentions to his friends.

One is habitually *civil*: *obliging* from disposition; *complaisant* from education and disposition: it is necessary to be *civil* without being free, to be *obliging* without being officious, to be *complaisant* without being servile.

Pride is never more offensive than when it condescends to be *civil*.—CUMBERLAND.

The shepherd home
Hies merry-hearted, and by turns relieves
The ruddy milkmaid, & her trimmings pail.
The beauty who, perhaps his witless heart
Sincerely loves, by that best language shown
Of cordial glances, and *obliging* deeds.—THOMSON.

I seem'd so pleased with what every one said, and smiled
with so much *compliance* at all their pretty fancies,
that though I did not put one word into their discourse, I
have the vanity to think they looked upon me as very
agreeable company.—ADDISON.

Civility, v. Benefit.

Civilization, v. Cultivation.

To Claim, v. To ask for.

Claim, v. Pretension.

Claim, v. Right.

Clamorous, v. Loud.

Clamour, v. Noise.

Clandestine, Secret.

Clandestine. in Latin *clandestinus*, comes from *clām* secretly.

Secret, in French *secrete*, Latin *secretus*, participle of *secreo* to separate, signifies remote from observation.

Clandestine expresses more than *secret*.

To do a thing *clandestinely* is to elude observation; to do a thing *secretly* is to do it without the knowledge of any one: what is *clandestine* is unallowed, which is not necessarily the case with what is *secret*.

With the *clandestine* must be a mixture of art; with *secrecy*, caution and management are requisite: a *clandestine* marriage is effected by a studied plan to escape notice; a *secret* marriage is conducted by the forbearance of all communication: conspirators have many *clandestine* proceedings and *secret* meetings; an unfaithful servant *clandestinely* conveys away

his master's property from his premises; a thief *secretly* takes a purse from the pocket of the bystanders.

I went to this *clandestine* lodging, and found to my amazement all the ornaments of a fine gentleman, which he had taken upon credit.—JOHNSON.

Ye boys who pluck the flowers, and spoil the spring,
Beware the *secret* snake that shoots a sting.—DRYDEN.

To Clasp, Hug, Embrace.

To Clasp, from the noun *clasp*, signifies to lay hold of like a clasp.

Hug, in Saxon *hogan*, comes from the German *hagen*, which signifies to enclose with a hedge, and figuratively to cherish or take special care of.

Embrace, in French *embrasser*, is compounded of *en* or *in* and *bras* the arm, signifying to take or lock in one's arms.

All these terms are employed to express the act of enclosing another in one's arms: *clasp* marks this action when it is performed with the warmth of true affection; *hug* is a ludicrous sort of *clasp*, which is the consequence of ignorance and extravagant feeling; *embrace* is simply a mode of ordinary salutation: a parent will *clasp* his long-lost child in his arms on their re-meeting; a peasant in the excess of his raptures would throw his body, as well as his arms, over the object of his joy, and stifle with *hugging* him whom he meant to embrace, in the continental parts of Europe *embracing* between males, as well as females, is universal on meeting after a long absence, or on taking leave for a length of time; *embraces* are sometimes given in England between near relatives, but in no other case.

Some more aspiring catch the neighbouring shrub,
With *clasp*ing tendrils, and invest her branch
COWPER.

Thyself a boy, assume a boy's dissembled face,
That when amidst the fervor of the feast
The Tyrian *hugs* and fondles thee on her breast,
Thou mayst infuse thy venom in her veins.
DRYDEN.

The king at length having kindly reproached Helim for depriving him so long of such a brother *embraced* Balsora with the greatest tenderness.—ADDISON.

Class, Order, Rank, Degree.

Class, in French *classe*, Latin *classis*, very probably from the Greek *κλασσειν*, a faction, division, or class.

Order, in French *ordre*, Latin *ordo*, comes from the Greek *ορξος*, a row, which is a species of order.

Rank is in German *rang*, connected with *row*, &c.

Degree, in French *degré*, comes from the Latin *gradus* a step.

Class is more general than *order*; *degree* is more specific than *rank*.

Class and *order* are said of the body who are distinguished; *rank* and *degree* of the distinction itself: men belong to a certain *class* or *order*: they hold a certain *rank*; they are of a certain *degree*: among the Romans all the citizens were distinctly divided into *classes* according to their property; but in the modern constitutions

tion of society, *classes* are distinguished from each other on general, moral, or civil grounds; there are reputable or disreputable *classes*; the labouring *class*, the *class* of merchants, mechanics, &c.; *order* has a more particular signification; it is founded upon some positive civil privilege or distinction; the general *orders* are divided into higher, lower, or middle, arising from the unequal distribution of wealth and power; the particular *orders* are those of the nobility, of the clergy, of freemasonry, and the like: *rank* distinguishes one individual from another; it is peculiarly applied to the nobility and the gentry: although every man in the community holds a certain *rank* in relation to those who are above or below him: *degree* like *rank* is applicable to the individual, but only in particular cases; literary and scientific *degrees* are conferred upon superior merit in different departments of science; there are likewise *degrees* in the same *rank*, whence we speak of men of high and low *degree*. During the French revolution the most worthless *class*, from all *orders*, obtained the supremacy only to destroy all *rank* and *degree*, and sacrifice such as possessed any wealth, power, *rank*, or *degree*.

We are by our occupations, education, and habits of life, divided almost into different species. Each of these *classes* of the human race has desires, fears, and conversation, vexations and merriment, peculiar to itself.—JOHNSON.

Learning and knowledge are perfections in us not as we are men, but as we are reasonable creatures, in which *order* of beings the female world is upon the same level with the male.—ADDISON.

Young women of humble *rank*, and small pretensions, should be particularly cautious how a vain ambition of being noticed by their superiors betrays them into an attempt at displaying their unprotected persons on a stage.—CUMBERLAND.

Then learn, ye fair! to soften splendor's ray,
Endure the swain, the youth of low *degree*.
SHENSTONE.

To Class, Arrange, Range.

To Class, from the noun *class*, signifies to put in a *class*.

Arrange and Range are both derived from *rank* and *row*, signifying to place in a certain order.

The general qualities and attributes of things are to be considered in *classing*; their fitness to stand by each other must be considered in *arranging*; their capacity for forming a line is the only thing to be attended to in *ranking*.

Classification serves the purposes of science; *arrangement* those of decoration and ornament; *ranking* those of general convenience; men are *classed* into different bodies according to some certain standard of property, power, education, occupation, &c.; furniture is *arranged* in a room, according as it answers either in colour, shade, convenience of situation, &c.; men are *ranked* in order whenever they make a procession: *classification* is concerned with mental objects; *arrangement* with either physical or mental objects; *ranking* altogether with physical objects: knowledge, experience, and judgement, are requisite in *classing*; taste and practice are indispensable in *arranging*; care only is wanted in *ranking*.

When applied to intellectual objects, *arrangement* is the ordinary operation of the mind, requiring only methodical habits: *classification* is a branch of philosophy which is not attainable by art only; it requires a mind peculiarly methodical by nature, that is capable of distinguishing things by their generic and specific differences; not separating things that are alike; nor blending things that are different: books are *classed* in a catalogue according to their contents; they are *arranged* in a shop according to their size or price; they are *ranked* in a counter for convenience: ideas are *classed* by the logician into simple and complex, abstract and concrete: they are *arranged* by the power of reflection in the mind of the thinker; words are *classed* by the grammarian into different parts of speech; they are suitably *arranged* by the writer in different parts of a sentence; a man of business *arranges* his affairs so as to suit the time and season for every thing; a shopkeeper *arranges* his goods so as to have a place for every thing, and to know its place; he *ranges* those things before him, of which he wishes to command a view: a general *arranges* his men for the battle; a drill sergeant *ranges* his men when he makes them exercise.

We are all ranked and *classed* by him who seeth into every heart.—BLAIR.

In vain you attempt to regulate our experience, if into your amusements, or your society, disorder has crept. You have admitted a principle of confusion which will defeat all your plans, and perplex and entangle what you sought to *arrange*.—BLAIR.

A noble writer should be born with this faculty (a strong imagination) so as to be well able to receive lively ideas from outward objects, to retain them long, and to *range* them together in such figures and representations as are most likely to hit the fancy of the reader.—ADDISON.

Clean, Cleanly, Pure.

Clean and Cleanly, is in Saxon *clame*.

Pure, in French *pur*, Latin *purus*.

Clean expresses a freedom from dirt or soil; *cleanly* the disposition or habit of being *clean*.

A person who keeps himself *clean* is *cleanly*; a *cleanly* servant takes care to keep other things *clean*.

Clean is employed in the proper sense only; *pure* mostly in the moral sense: the hands should be *clean*; the heart should be *pure*: it is the first requisite of good writing that it should be *clean*; it is of the first importance for the morals of youth to be kept *pure*.

Age itself is not unamiable while it is preserved *clean* and unsullied.—SPECTATOR.

In the east, where the warmth of the climate makes cleanliness more immediately necessary than in colder countries, it is made one part of their religion. The Jewish law, and the Mahometan, which in some things copies after it, is filled with bathing, purifications, and other rites of the like nature. Though there is the above named convenient reason to be assigned for these ceremonies, the chief intention was to typify inward *purity* of heart.—SPECTATOR.

Cleanly, *v.* Clean.

Clear, *v.* Apparent.

Clear, Lucid, Bright, Vivid.

Clear, *v.* To absolve.

Lucid, in Latin *lucidus*, *lucere* to shine, and *lux* light, signifies having light.

Bright, v. Brightness.

Vivid, Latin *viduus* from *vivo* to live, signifies being in a state of life.

These epithets mark a gradation in their sense; the idea of light is common to them, but *clear* expresses less than *lucid*, *lucid* than *bright*, and *bright* less than *vivid*: a mere freedom from stain or dullness constitutes the *clearness*; the return of light, and consequent removal of darkness, constitutes *lucidity*; *brightness* supposes a certain strength of light; *vividness* a freshness combined with the strength, and even a degree of brilliancy: a sky is *clear* that is divested of clouds; the atmosphere is *lucid* in the day, but not in the night; the sun shines *bright* when it is unobstructed by any thing in the atmosphere; lightning sometimes presents a *vivid* redness, and sometimes a *vivid* paleness: the light of the stars may be *clear*, and sometimes *bright*, but never *vivid*; the light of the sun is rather *bright*, than *clear* or *vivid*; the light of the moon is either *clear*, *bright*, or *vivid*.

These epithets may with equal propriety be applied to colour, as well as to light: a *clear* colour is unmixed with any other; a *bright* colour has something striking and strong in it; a *vivid* colour something lively and fresh in it.

Some choose the *clearest* light,
And boldly challenge the most piercing eye.
ROSCOMMON.

Nor is the stream
Of purest crystal, nor the *lucid* air.
Though one transparent vacancy it seems,
Voil of their unseen people.—THOMSON.

This place, the *brightest* mansion of the sky,
I'll call the palace of the Deity.—DRYDEN.

From the moist meadow to the wither'd hill,
Led by the breeze, the *vivid* verdure runs,
And swells, and deepens to the cherish'd eye.
THOMSON.

In their moral application they preserve a similar distinction: a conscience is said to be *clear* when it is free from every stain or spot; a deranged understanding may have *lucid* intervals; a *bright* intellect throws light on every thing around it; a *vivid* imagination glows with every image that nature presents.

I look upon a sound imagination as the greatest blessing of life, next to a *clear* judgment, and a good conscience.—ADDISON.

I believe were Rousseau alive, and in one of his *lucid* intervals, he would be shocked at the practical frenzy of his scholars.—BURKE.

But in a body which doth freely yield
His parts to reason's rule obedient,
There Alma, like a virgin queen most *bright*,
Doth flourish in all beauty excellent.—SPENSER.

There let the classic page thy fancy lead
Through rural scenes, such as the Mantuan swain
Paints in the matchless harmony of song,
Or catch thyself the landscape, glided swift
Athwart imagination's *vivid* eye.—THOMSON.

Clear, v. Fair.

To Clear, v. To Absolve.

Clearly, Distinctly.

That is seen **Clearly** of which one has a general view; that is seen **Distinctly** which is seen so as to distinguish the several parts.

We see the moon *clearly* whenever it shines; but we cannot see the spots in the moon *distinctly* without the help of glasses.

What we see *distinctly* must be seen *clearly*, but a thing may be seen *clearly* without being seen *distinctly*.

A want of light, or the intervention of other objects, prevents us from seeing *clearly*; distance, or a defect in the sight, prevents us from seeing *distinctly*.

* Old men often see *clearly* but not *distinctly*, they perceive large or luminous objects at a distance, but they cannot distinguish such small objects as the characters of a book without the help of convex glasses; short-sighted persons, on the contrary, see near objects *distinctly*, but they have no *clear* vision of distant ones, unless they are viewed through concave glasses.

The custom of arguing on any side, even against our persuasion, dulls the understanding, and makes it by degrees lose the faculty of discerning *clearly* between truth and falsehood.—LOCKE.

Whether we are able to comprehend all the operations of nature, and the manners of them, it matters not to inquire; but this is certain, that we can comprehend no more of them than we can *distinctly* conceive.—LOCKE.

Clearness, Perspicuity.

Clearness, from *clear* (v. *Clear*, *lucid*), is here used figuratively, to mark the degree of light by which one sees things distinctly.

Perspicuity, in French *perspicuité*, Latin *perspicuitas* from *perspicuus* and *perspicio* to look through, signifies the quality of being able to be seen through.

These epithets denote qualities equally requisite to render a discourse intelligible, but each has its peculiar character. † *Clearness* respects our ideas, and springs from the distinction of the things themselves that are discussed; *perspicuity* respects the mode of expressing the ideas, and springs from the good qualities of style. It requires a *clear* head to be able to see a subject in all its bearings and relations; to distinguish all the niceties and shades of difference between things that bear a strong resemblance, and to separate it from all irrelevant objects that intermingle themselves with it. But whatever may be our *clearness* of conception, it is requisite, if we will communicate our conceptions to others, that we should observe a purity in our mode of diction, that we should be particular in the choice of our terms, careful in the disposition of them, and accurate in the construction of our sentences; that is *perspicuity*, which as it is the first, so, according to Quintilian, it is the most important part of composition.

Clearness of intellect is a natural gift; *perspicuity* is an acquired art: although intimately connected with each other, yet it is possible to have *clearness* without *perspicuity*, and *perspicuity* without *clearness*. People of quick capacities will have *clear* ideas on the subjects that offer themselves to their notice, but for want of education they may often use improper or ambiguous phrases; or by errors of

* Vide Trusler: "Clearly, distinctly."

† Vide Abbé Girard: "Clarté, perspicuité."

construction render their phraseology the reverse of *perspicuous*: on the other hand it is in the power of some to express themselves *perspicuously* on subjects far above their comprehension, from a certain facility which they acquire of catching up suitable modes of expression.

The study of the classics and mathematics are most fitted for the improvement of *clearness*; the study of grammar, and the observance of good models, will serve most effectually for the acquirement of *perspicuity*.

Whenever men think *clearly* and are thoroughly interested, they express themselves with *perspicuity* and force. —ROBERTSON.

No modern orator can dare to enter the list with Demosthenes and Tully. We have discourses, indeed, that may be admitted for their *perspicuity*, purity, and elegance; but can produce none that abound in a sublimity which whirls away the auditor like a mighty torrent. —WARTON.

To Cleave, *v.* To stick.

Clemency, Lenity, Mercy.

Clemency, is in Latin *clementia*, signifying mildness.

Lenity, in Latin *lenitas*, from *lenis* soft, or *lavis* smooth, and the Greek *λεως* mild.

Mercy, in Latin *miseriordia*, compounded of *miseria* and *cordis*, i.e. affliction of the heart, signifying the pain produced by observing the pain of others.

Clemency and *lenity* are employed only towards offenders; *mercy* towards all who are in trouble, whether from their own fault, or any other cause.

Clemency lies in the disposition; *lenity* and *mercy* in the act; the former as respects superiors in general, the latter in regard to those who are invested with civil power: a monarch displays his *clemency* by showing *mercy*; a master shows *lenity* by not inflicting punishment where it is deserved.

Clemency is arbitrary on the part of the dispenser, flowing from his will independent of the object on whom it is bestowed; *lenity* and *mercy* are discretionary, they always have regard to the object and the nature of the offence, or misfortunes; *lenity* therefore often serves the purposes of discipline, and *mercy* those of justice by forgiveness, instead of punishment; but *clemency* defeats its end by forbearing to punish where it is needful.

A mild master who shows *clemency* to a faithless servant by not bringing him to justice, often throws a worthless wretch upon the public to commit more atrocious depredations. A well-timed *lenity* sometimes recalls an offender to himself, and brings him back to good order. Upon this principle, the English constitution has wisely left in the hands of the monarch the discretionary power of showing *mercy* in all cases that do not demand the utmost rigour of the law.

We wretched Trojans, toss'd on ev'ry shore,
From sea to sea, thy *clemency* implore;
Forbid the fires our shipping to deface,
Receive th' unhappy fugitives to grace. —DRYDEN.

The King (Charles II.) with *lenity* of which the world has had perhaps no other example, declined to be the judge or avenger of his own or his father's wrongs. —JOHNSON.

The gods (if gods to goodness are inclin'd,
If acts of *mercy* touch their heav'nly mind),
And more than all the gods, your gen'rous heart,
Conscious of worth, requite its own desert. —DRYDEN.

Clergyman, Parson, Priest, Minister.

Clergyman, altered from *clerk*, *clericus*, signified any one holding a regular office, and by distinction one who held the holy office.

Parson, is either changed from *person*, that is, by distinction the person who spiritually presides over a parish, or contracted from *parochianus*.

Priest, in German, &c. *priester*, comes from the Greek *πρεσβυτερος*, signifying an elder who holds the sacerdotal office.

Minister, in Latin *minister* a servant, from *minor* less or inferior, signifies literally one who performs a subordinate office, and has been extended in its meaning, to signify generally one who officiates or performs an office.

The word *clergyman* applies to such as are regularly bred according to the forms of the national religion, and applies to none else. In this sense we speak of the English, the French, and Scotch *clergy* without distinction. A *parson* is a species of *clergyman*, who ranks the highest in the three orders of inferior *clergy*; that is *parson*, vicar, and curate; the *parson*, being a technical term for the rector, or he who holds the living; in its technical sense it has now acquired a definite use; but in general conversation it is become almost a nickname. The word *clergyman* is always substituted for *parson* in polite society. When *priest* respects the Christian religion it is a species of *clergyman*, that is, one who is ordained to officiate at the altar in distinction from the deacon, who is only an assistant to the *priest*. But the term *priest* has likewise an extended meaning in reference to such as hold the sacerdotal character in any form of religion, as the *priests* of the Jews, or those of Greeks, Romans, Indians, and the like. A *minister* is one who actually or habitually officiates. *Clergymen* are therefore not always strictly *ministers*; nor are all *ministers* *clergymen*. If a *clergyman* delegates his functions altogether he is not a *minister*; nor is he who presides over a dissenting congregation a *clergyman*. In the former case, however, it would be invidious to deprive the *clergyman* of the name of *minister* of the gospel, but in the latter case it is a misuse of the term *clergyman* to apply it to any *minister* who does not officiate according to the form of an established religion.

By a *clergyman* I mean one in holy orders. —STEELE.

To the time of Edward III. it is probable that the French and English languages subsisted together throughout the kingdom; the higher orders, both of the *clergy* and laity, speaking almost universally French; the lower retaining the use of their native tongue. —TYRWHITT.

Call a man a *priest*, or *parson*, and you set him in some men's esteem ten degrees below his own servant. —SOUTH.

With leave and honor enter our abodes,
Ye sacred *ministers* of men and gods. —POPE.

Clever, Skilful, Expert, Dexterous, Adroit.

Clever, in French *legère*, Latin *levis* light.

Skilful, signifies full of *skill*; and *skill* probably comes from the Latin *scio* to know.

Expert, in French *experte*, Latin *expertus*, participle of *experior* to search or try, signifies searched and tried.

Dexterous, in Latin *dexter*, in Greek *δεξις*, comparative of *δεξις*, clever, and *δεξια* the right hand, because that is the most fitted for action, signifies the quality of doing rightly, as with the right hand.

Adroit, in French *adroit*, Latin *adrectus* or *rectus* right or straight.

Clever and *skilful* are qualities of the mind; *expert*, *dexterous*, and *adroit*, refer to modes of physical action. *Cleverness* regards in general the readiness to comprehend; *skill* the maturity of the judgement; *expertness* a facility in the use of things; *dexterity* a mechanical facility in the performance of any work; *adroitness* the suitable movements of the body. A person is *clever* at drawing who shows a taste for it, and executes it well without much instruction: he is *skilful* in drawing if he understands it both in theory and practice; he is *expert* in the use of the bow if he can use it with expedition and effect; he is *dexterous* at any game when he goes through the manoeuvres with celerity and an unerring hand; he is *adroit* if by a quick, sudden, and well-directed movement of his body, he effects the object he has in view.

Cleverness is mental power employed in the ordinary concerns of life: a person is *clever* in business. *Skill* is both a mental and corporeal power, exerted in mechanical operations and practical sciences: a physician, a lawyer, and an artist, is *skilful*; one may have a *skill* in divination, or a *skill* in painting. *Expertness* and *dexterity* require more corporeal than mental power exerted in minor arts and amusements: one is *expert* at throwing the quoit; *dexterous* in the management of horses. *Adroitness* is altogether a corporeal talent, employed only as occasion may require: one is *adroit* at eluding the blows aimed by an adversary.

Cleverness is rather a natural gift; *skill* is *cleverness* improved by practice and extended knowledge; *expertness* is the effect of long practice; *dexterity* arises from habit combined with agility; *adroitness* is a species of *dexterity* arising from a natural agility.

My friend bade me welcome, but struck me quite dumb,
With tidings that Johnson and Burke would not come;
"And I knew it," he cried; "both eternally fail,
The one at the House and the other with Thrail.
But no matter; I'll warrant we'll make up the party,
With two full as *clever* and ten times as hearty."

GOLDSMITH.

There is nothing more graceful than to see the play
stand still for a few moments, and the audience kept in
an agreeable suspense, during the silence of a *skilful*
actor.—ADDISON.

O'er bar and shelf the watery path they sound,
With *dextrous* arm, sagacious of the ground;
Fearless they combat every hostile wind,
Wheeling in many tracks with course inclin'd,
Expert to moor, where terrors line the road.

FALCONER.

He applied himself next to the coquette's heart, *while*
he likewise laid open with great *dexterity*.—ADDISON.

To Climb, v. *To arise*.

To Cling, v. *To stick*.

Cloak, Mask, Blind, Veil.

These are figurative terms, expressive of different modes of intentionally keeping something from the view of others. They are borrowed from those familiar objects which serve similar purposes in common life. **Cloak** and **Mask** express figuratively and properly more than **Blind** or **Veil**. The two former keep the whole object out of sight; the two latter only partially intercept the view. In this figurative sense they are all employed for a bad purpose.

The *cloak*, the *mask*, and the *blind*, serve to deceive others; the *veil* serves to deceive one's self.

The whole or any part of a character may be concealed by a *blind*; a part, though not the whole, may be concealed by a *mask*. A *blind* is not only employed to conceal the character but the conduct or proceedings. We carry a *cloak* and a *mask* about with us; but a *blind* is something external.

The *cloak*, as the external garment, is the most convenient of all coverings for entirely keeping concealed what we do not wish to be seen; a good outward deportment serves as a *cloak* to conceal a bad character. A *mask* only hides the face; a *mask* therefore serves to conceal only as much as words and looks can effect. A *blind* is intended to shut out the light and prevent observation; whatever, therefore, conceals the real truth, and prevents suspicion by a false exterior, is a *blind*. A *veil* prevents a person from seeing as well as being seen; whatever, therefore, obscures the mental sight acts as a *veil* to the mind's eye.

Religion is unfortunately the object which may serve to *cloak* the worst of purposes and the worst of characters: its importance in the eyes of all men, makes it the most effectual passport to their countenance and sanction; and its external observances render it the most convenient mode of presenting a false profession to the eyes of the world: those, therefore, who set an undue value on the ceremonial part of religion, do but encourage this most heinous of all sins, by suffering themselves to be imposed upon by a *cloak* of religious hypocrisy. False friends always wear a *mask*; they cover a malignant heart under the smiles and endearments of friendship. Illicit traders mostly make use of some *blind* to facilitate the carrying on their nefarious practices. Among the various arts resorted to in the metropolis by the needy and profligate, none is so bad as that which is made to be a *blind* for the practice of debauchery. Prejudice and passion are the ordinary *veils* which obscure the judgment, and prevent it from distinguishing the truth.

When this severity of manners is hypocritical, and assumed as a *cloak* to secret indulgence, it is one of the worst prostitutions of religion.—BLAIR.

Thou art no ruffian, who beneath the *mask*
Of social commerce, com'st to rob their wealth.

THOMSON.

Those who are bountiful to crimes will be rigid to merit, and penurious to service. Their penury is even held out as a *blind* and cover to their prodigality.—BURKE.

As soon as that mysterious *veil* which covers futurity was lifted up, all the gaiety of life would disappear; its flattering hopes, its pleasing illusions would vanish, and nothing but vanity and sadness remain.—BLAIR.

To Clog, Load, Encumber.

Clog is probably changed from *clot* or *clod*, signifying to put a heavy lump in the way.

Load, from *to load*, in Saxon *laden*, Dutch, &c. *laden*, signifies to burden with a load.

Encumber, compounded of *en* or *in* and *cumber*, in German *kummer* sorrow, signifies to burden with trouble.

Clog is figuratively employed for whatever impedes the motion or action of a thing, drawn from the familiar object which is used to impede the motion of animals: *load* is used for whatever occasions an excess of weight, or materials. A wheel is *clogged*, or a machine is *clogged*: a fire may be *loaded* with coals, or a picture with colouring. The stomach and memory may be either *clogged* or *loaded*: in the former case by the introduction of improper food; and in the second case by the introduction of an improper quantity. A memory that is *clogged* becomes confused, and confounds one thing with another; that which is *loaded* loses the impression of one object by the introduction of another.

Clog and *encumber* have the common signification of interrupting or troubling by means of something irrelevant. Whatever is *clogged* has scarcely the liberty of moving at all; whatever is *encumbered* moves and acts, but with difficulty. When the roots of plants are *clogged* with mould, or any improper substance, their growth is almost stopped: weeds and noxious plants are *encumbrances* in the ground where flowers should grow: the commands or prohibitions of parents sometimes very fortunately *clog* those whose sanguine tempers would lead them into imprudence: no one can expect to proceed with ease to himself in any transaction, who is *encumbered* with a variety of concerns at the same time.

Whatsoever was observed by the ancient philosophers, either irregular or defective in the workings of the mind, was all charged upon the body as its great *clog*.—SOUTH.

Butler gives Hudibras that pedantic ostentation of knowledge, which has no relation to chivalry, and *loads* him with martial *encumbrances* that can add nothing to his civil dignity.—JOHNSON.

This minority is great and formidable. I do not know whether, if I aimed at the total overthrow of a kingdom, I should wish to be *encumbered* with a large body of partizans.—BURKE.

Cloister, Convent, Monastery.

Cloister, in French ** cloître*, from the word *clos* close, signifies a certain close place in a *convent*, or an enclosure of houses for canons, or in general a religious house.

Convent, from the Latin *conventus* a meeting, and *convenio* to come together, signifies a religious assembly.

* Vide Abbé Roubaud; "Cloître, couvent, monastère."

Monastery, in French *monastère*, signifies an habitation for monks, from the Greek *μοναχός* alone.

The proper idea of *cloister* is that of seclusion; the proper idea of *convent* is that of community; the proper idea of a *monastery* is that of solitude. One is shut up in a *cloister*, put into a *convent*, and retires to a *monastery*.

Whoever wishes to take an absolute leave of the world, shuts himself up in a *cloister*; whoever wishes to attach himself to a community that has renounced all commerce with the world, goes into a *convent*; whoever wishes to shun all human intercourse retires to a *monastery*.

In the *cloister* our liberty is sacrificed: in the *convent* our worldly habits are renounced, and those of a regular religious community being adopted, we submit to the yoke of established orders: in a *monastery* we impose a sort of voluntary exile upon ourselves; we live with the view of living only to God.

In the ancient and true *monasteries*, the members divided their time between contemplation and labour; but as population increased, and towns multiplied, *monasteries* were, properly speaking, succeeded by *convents*.

In ordinary discourse, *cloister* is employed in an absolute and indefinite manner: we speak of the *cloister* to designate a *monastic* state; as entering a *cloister*; burying one's self in a *cloister*; penances and mortifications are practised in a *cloister*.

It is not the same thing when we speak of the *cloister* of the Benedictines and of their *monastery*; or the *cloister* of the Capuchins and their *convent*.

Some solitary *cloister* will I choose,

And there with holy virgins live immur'd.—DRYDEN.

Nor were the new abbots less industrious to stock their *convents* with foreigners.—TYRWHITT.

Besides independent foundations, which were opened for the reception of foreign monks in preference to the natives, a considerable number of religious houses were built and endowed as cells to different *monasteries* abroad.—LIST OF ENGLISH MONASTERIES.

Close, Compact.

Close, is from the French *clos*, and Latin *clausus*, the participle of *claudo* to shut.

Compact, in Latin *compactus*, participle of *compingo* to fix or join in, signifies jointed close together.

Proximity is expressed by both these terms; the former in a general and the latter in a restricted sense. Two bodies may be *close* to each other, but a body is *compact* with regard to itself.

Contact is not essential to constitute *closeness*; but a perfect adhesion of all the parts of a body is essential to produce *compactness*. Lines are *close* to each other that are separated but by a small space; things are rolled together in a *compact* form that are brought within the smallest possible space.

To right and left the martial wings display

Their shining arms, and stand in *close* array;

Though weak their spears, though dwarfish be their

height,

Compact they move, the bulwark of the fight.

SIR WM. JONES,

Close, Near, Nigh.

Close, *v. Close, compact.*Near and Nigh, is in Saxon *near*, *neah*, German, &c., *nahe*.

Close is more definite than *near*: houses stand *close* to each other which are almost joined; men stand *close* when they touch each other: objects are *near* which are within sight; persons are *near* each other when they can converse together. *Near* and *nigh*, which are but variations of each other, in etymology, admit of little or no difference in their use; the former however is the most general. People live *near* each other who are in the same street; they live *close* to each other when their houses are adjoining.

Close is annexed as an adjective; *near* is employed only as an adverb or preposition. We speak of *close* ranks or *close* lines; but not *near* ranks or *near* lines.

Th' unweari'd watch their listening leaders keep,
And couching close, repel invading sleep.—POPE.

O friend! Ulysses' shouts invade my ear:
Distress'd he seems, and no assistance *near*.—POPE.

From the red field their scatter'd bodies bear,
And *nigh* the fleet a funeral structure rear.—POPE.

To Close, Shut.

Close, *v. Close, compact.*Shut, is in Saxon *scuttan*, Dutch *schutten*, Hebrew *satem*.

Closing is to *shutting*, frequently as the means to the end.

To *close* signifies simply to put together; to *shut* signifies to put together so *close* that no opening is left. The eyes are *shut* by *closing* the eyelids; the mouth is *shut* by *closing* the lips. The idea of bringing near or joining is prominent in the signification of *close*; that of fastening or preventing admittance in the word *shut*. By the figure of metonymy, *close* may be often substituted for *shut*; as we may speak of *closing* the eyes or the mouth; *closing* a book or a door in the sense of *shutting*; but they are, notwithstanding, very distinct.

Many things are *closed* which are not to be *shut*, and are *shut* which cannot be *closed*. Nothing can be *closed* but what consists of more than one part; nothing can be *shut* but what has or is supposed to have, a cavity. A wound is *closed*, but cannot be *shut*; a window or a box is *shut*, but not *closed*.

When both are applied to hollow bodies, *close* implies a stopping up of the whole, *shut* an occasional stoppage at the entrance. What is *closed* remains *closed*; what is *shut* may be opened. A hole in a road, or a passage through any place, is *closed*; a gate, a window, or a door, is *shut*.

Soon shall the dire Seraglio's horrid gates
Close like the eternal bars of death upon thee.
JOHNSON.

Behold, fond man!
See here thy pictur'd life: pass some few years
Thy dawning spring, thy summer's ardent strength,
Thy sober autumn fading into age,
And pale, concluding winter comes at last,
And *shuts* the scene.—THOMSON.

To Close, Finish, Conclude.

Close, *v. To close, shut.*Finish, in French *finir*, Latin *finio*, comes from *finis* an end.

Conclude, in Latin *concludo*, is compounded of *con* and *cludo* or *claudio* to shut, signifying to shut up or together.

To *close* is to bring to an end: to *finish* is to make an end: we *close* a thing by ceasing to have any thing more to do with it; we *finish* it by really having no more to do to it. We *close* an account with a person with whom we mean to have no farther transactions; we *finish* the business which we have begun.

It is sometimes necessary to *close* without *finishing*, but we cannot *finish* without *closing*. The want of time will compel a person to *close* his letter before he has *finished* saying all he wishes. It is a laudable desire in every one to wish to *close* his career in life honourably, and to *finish* whatever he undertakes to the satisfaction of himself and others.

To *conclude* is a species of *finishing*, that is to say *finishing* in a certain manner; we always *finish* when we *conclude*, but we do not always *conclude* when we *finish*. A history is *closed* at a certain reign; it is *finished* when brought to the period proposed: it is *concluded* with a recapitulation of the leading events.

Close and *finish* are employed generally, and in the ordinary transactions of life; the former in speaking of times, seasons, periods, &c., the latter with regard to occupations and pursuits; *conclusion* is used particularly on moral and intellectual operations. A reign, an entertainment, an age, a year, may have its *close*; a drawing, an exercise, a piece of work, may be *finished*; a discourse, a story, an affair, a negotiation, may be *concluded*. The *close* of Alfred's reign was more peaceful than the commencement: those who are careful as to what they begin will be careful to *finish* what they have begun: some preachers seldom awaken attention in their hearers until they come to the *conclusion* of their discourse.

Destruction hangs on every word we speak,
On every thought, till the concluding stroke
Determines all, and *closes* our design.—ADDISON.

The great work of which Justinian has the credit, although it comprehends the whole system of jurisprudence, was *finished* we are told in three years.—SIR W. JONES.

To Close, *v. To end.*Clown, *v. Countryman.*To Cloy, *v. To satisfy.*Clumsy, *v. Awkward.*

Coadjutor, Assistant.

Coadjutor, compounded of *co* or *com* and *adjutor* a helper, signifies a fellow labourer.

Assistant signifies properly one that *assists* or takes a part.

A *coadjutor* is more noble than an *assistant*: the latter is mostly in a subordinate station, but the former is an equal; the latter performs mental offices in the minor concerns of life, and a subordinate part at all times;

the former labours conjointly in some concern of common interest and great importance. An *assistant* is engaged for a compensation; a *coadjutor* is a voluntary fellow-labourer. In every public concern where the purposes of charity or religion are to be promoted, *coadjutors* often effect more than the original promoters; in the medical and scholastic professions *assistants* are indispensable to relieve the pressure of business. *Coadjutors* ought to be zealous and unanimous; *assistants* ought to be assiduous and faithful.

Advices from Vienna import that the Archbishop of Salzburg is dead, who is succeeded by Count Harrach, formerly Bishop of Vienna; and for these three last years *coadjutor* to the said Archbishop.—STEELE.

As for you, gentlemen and ladies, my *assistants* and grand juries, I have made choice of you on my right hand, because I know you to be very jealous of your honour; and you on my left, because I know you are very much concerned for the reputation of others.—ADDISON.

To Coalesce, *v.* To add.

Coarse, Rough, Rude.

Coarse, probably from the Gothic *kaurids* heavy, answering to our word *gross*, and the Latin *gravis*.

Rough, in Saxon *hruh*, German, *rau*, *roh*, &c.

Rude, in Latin *rudis*, changed from *raudis*, comes from *paβdos*, a twig, signifying unpeeled.

These epithets are equally applied to what is not polished by art. In the proper sense *coarse* refers to the composition and materials of bodies, as *coarse* bread, *coarse* meat, *coarse* cloth; *rough* respects the surface of bodies, as *rough* wood and *rough* skin; *rude* respects the make or fashion of things, as a *rude* bark, a *rude* utensil.

Coarse is opposed to *fine*, *rough* to *smooth*, *rude* to *polished*.

In the figurative application they are distinguished in a similar manner: *coarse* language is used by persons of naturally *coarse* feeling; *rough* language by those whose tempers are either naturally or occasionally *rough*; *rude* language by those who are ignorant of any better.

The fineness and delicacy of perception which the man of taste acquires, may be more liable to irritation than the *coarser* feelings of minds less cultivated.—CRABE.

This is some fellow,
Who, having been praised for bluntness, doth affect
A saucy roughness.—SHAKESPEARE.

Is it in destroying and pulling down that skill is displayed? the shallowest understanding, the *rustiest* hand, is more than equal to that task.—BURKE.

Coarse, v. *Gross*.

To Coax, Wheedle, Cajole, Fawn.

Coax, probably comes from *coke* a simpleton, signifying to treat as a simpleton.

Wheedle, is a frequentative of *wheel*, signifying to come round a person with smooth art.

Cajole is in French *cajoler*.

To Fawn, from the noun *fawn*, signifies to act or move like a *fawn*.

The idea of using mean arts to turn people to one's selfish purposes is common to all these terms: *coax* has something childish in it; *wheedle* and *cajole* that which is knavish; *fawn* that which is servile.

The act of *coaxing* consists of urgent entreaty and whining supplication; the act of *wheedling* consists of smooth and winning entreaty; *cajoling* consists mostly of trickery and stratagem, disguised under a soft address and insinuating manners; the act of *fawning* consists of supplicant grimace and antics, such as characterise the little animal from which it derives its name: children *coax* their parents in order to obtain their wishes; the greedy and covetous *wheedle* those of an easy temper; knaves *cajole* the simple and unsuspecting; parasites *fawn* upon those who have the power to contribute to their gratifications: *coaxing* is mostly resorted to by inferiors towards those on whom they are dependent; *wheedling* and *cajoling* are low practices confined to the baser sort of men with each other; *fawning*, though not less mean and disgraceful than the above-mentioned vices, is commonly practised only in the higher walks, where men of base character, though not mean education, come in connexion with the great.

The nurse had changed her note, she was nuzzling and *coaxing* the child; "that's a good dear," says she.—L'ESTRANGE.

Regulus gave his son his freedom in order to entitle him to the estate left him by his mother, and when he got into possession of it endeavoured (as the character of the man made it generally believed) to *wheedle* him out of it by the most indecent complaisance.—MELNETH'S LETTERS OF PLINY.

I must grant it a just judgment upon poets, that they whose chief pretence is wit, should be treated as they themselves treat fools, that is, be *cajoled* with praises.—POPE.

Unhappy he
Who scornful of the flatterer's *fawning* art,
Dreads even to pour his gratitude of heart.
ARMSTRONG.

To Coerce, Restrain.

Coerce, in Latin *coerceo*, that is *con* and *arceo*, signifies to drive into conformity.

Restrain is a variation of *restrict* (*v.* *To bind*).

Coercion is a species of *restraint*: we always *restrain* or intend to *restrain* when we *coerce*; but we do not always *coerce* when we *restrain*: *coercion* always comprehends the idea of force, *restrain* that of simply keeping under or back; *coercion* is always an external application; *restraint* either external or internal: a person is *coerced* by others only; he may be *restrained* by himself as well as others.

Coercion acts by a direct application, it opposes force to resistance; *restraint* acts indirectly to the prevention of an act; the law *restrains* all men in their actions more or less; it *coerces* those who attempt to violate it; the unruly will is *coerced*; the improper will is *restrained*: *coercion* is exercised; *restraint* is imposed; punishment, threats, or any actual exercise of authority, *coerces*; fear, shame, or a remonstrance from others, *restrains*: the innovators of the present age are for having all

coercion laid aside in the management of children, in lieu of which a system of reasoning is to be adopted: could they persuade the world to adopt their fanciful scheme, we may next expect to hear that all *restraint* on the inclinations ought to be laid aside as an infringement of personal liberty.

Without coercive power all government is but toothless and precarious, and does not so much command as beg obedience.—SOUTH.

The enmity of some men against goodness is so violent and implacable, that no innocence, no excellence of goodness, how great soever, can *restrain* their malice.—TILLOTSON.

Coeval, Cotemporary.

Coeval, from the Latin *cœvum* an age, signifies of the same age.

Cotemporary, from *tempus*, signifies at the same time.

An age is a specifically long space of time; a time is indefinite; hence the application of the terms to things in the first case and to persons in the second: the dispersion of mankind and the confusion of languages were *coeval* with the building of the tower of Babel; Addison was *cotemporary* with Swift and Pope.

The passion of fear seems *coeval* with our nature.
CUMBERLAND.

If the elder Orpheus was the disciple of Linus, he must have been of too early an age to have been *cotemporary* with Hercules; for Orpheus is placed eleven ages before the siege of Troy.—CUMBERLAND.

Cogent, Forcible, Strong.

Cogent, from the Latin *cogo* to compel; and **Forcible**, from the verb to *force*, have equally the sense of acting by *force*.

Strong is here figuratively employed for that species of strength which is connected with the mind.

Cogency applies to reasons individually considered: *force* and *strength* to modes of reasoning or expression: *cogent* reasons impel to decisive conduct; *strong* conviction is produced by *forcible* reasoning conveyed in *strong* language: changes of any kind are so seldom attended with benefit to society, that a legislator will be cautious not to adopt them without the most *cogent* reasons; the important truths of Christianity cannot be presented from the pulpit too *forcibly* to the minds of men.

Accuracy and *strength* are seldom associated in the same mind; those who accustom themselves to *strong* language are not very scrupulous about the correctness of their assertions.

Upon men intent only upon truth, the art of an orator has little power; a credible testimony, or a *cogent* argument will overcome all the art of modulation and all the violence of contortion.—JOHNSON.

The ingenious author just mentioned, assured me that the Turkish satires of Ruhi Bag-dadi were very *forcible*.—SIR WM. JONES.

Such is the censure of Dennis. There is, as Dryden expresses it, perhaps "too much horse-play in his railery;" but if his jests are coarse his arguments are *strong*.—JOHNSON.

To Coincide, Concur.

Coincide, *v.* To agree, *coincide*.

Concur, *v.* To agree, *concur*.

These words are here considered only in their application to things; in which case *coincide* implies simply meeting at a point; *concur* running towards a point; the former seems to exclude the idea of design, the latter that of chance: two sides of different triangles *coincide* when they are applied to each other so as to fall on the same points; two powers *concur* when they both act so as to produce the same result.

A *coincidence* of circumstances is sometimes so striking and singular that it can hardly be attributed to pure accident; a *concurrence* of circumstances, which seemed all to be formed to combine, is sometimes notwithstanding purely casual.

A *coincidence* of sentiment may easily happen without any communication, since there are many occasions in which all reasonable men will nearly think alike.—JOHNSON.

Eminence of station, greatness of effect, and all the favours of fortune, must *concur* to place excellence in public view.—JOHNSON.

To Coincide, *v.* To agree;

Cold, *v.* *Chill*.

Cold, *v.* *Cool*.

Colleague, Partner.

Colleague, in French *collègue*, Latin *collega*, compounded of *col* or *con* and *legatus* sent, signifies sent or employed upon the same business.

Partner, from the word *part*, signifies one having a *part* or share.

Colleague is more noble than *partner*: men in the highest offices are *colleagues*; tradesmen, mechanics, and subordinate persons, are *partners*: every Roman Consul had a *colleague*; every workman has commonly a *partner*.

Colleague is used only with regard to community of office; *partner* is most generally used with regard to community of interest: whenever two persons are employed to act together on the same business they stand in the relation of *colleagues* to each other; whenever two persons unite their endeavours either in trade or in games they are denominated *partners*: ministers, judges, commissioners, and plenipotentiaries, are *colleagues*: bankers, merchants, chess-players, card-players, and the like, have *partners*.

But from this day's decision, from the choice of his first *colleagues*, shall succeeding times Of Edward judge, and on his fame pronounce.
WEST.

And lo! sad *partner* of the general care,
Weary and faint I drive my goats afar.—WARTON.

To Collect, *v.* To assemble.

To Collect, *v.* To gather.

Collected, *v.* *Calm*.

Colloquy, *v.* *Assembly*.

Colloquy, *v.* *Conversation*.

To Color, Dye, Tinge, Stain.

Color, in Latin *color*, probably from *colo* to adorn.

Dye, in Saxon *deagen*, is a variation of *tinge*.

Tinge is in Latin *tingo*, from the Greek *τερω* to sprinkle.

Stain, like the French *desteindre*, is but a variation of *tinge*.

To *color* is to put *color* on; to *dye* is to dip in any *color*; to *tinge* is to touch lightly with a *color*; to *stain* is to put on a bad *color* or in a bad manner: we *color* a drawing, we *dye* clothes of any *color*, we *tinge* a painting with blue by way of intermixture, we *stain* a painting when we put blue instead of red.

They are taken in a moral acceptation with a similar distinction; we *color* a description by the introduction of strong figures, strong facts, and strong expressions; a person is represented as *dyeing* his hands in blood, who is so engaged in the shedding of blood as that he may change the *color* of his skin; a person's mind is *tinged* with melancholy or enthusiasm; his character is *stained* with crimes.

The childish *coloring* of her cheeks is now as ungraceful as that shape would have been when her face wore its real countenance.—STEELE.

With mutual blood the Ausonian soil is *dye'd*,

While on its borders each their claim decide.

DRYDEN.

Now deeper blushes *ting'd* the glowing sky,
And evening rais'd her silver lamp on high.

SIR WM. JONES.

We had the fortune to see what may be supposed to be the occasion of that opinion which Lucian relates concerning this river (Adonis), that is, that this stream at certain seasons of the year is of a bloody *color*; something like this we actually saw come to pass, for the water was *stained* with redness.—MAUNDRELL.

Color, Hue, Tint.

Color, *v.* To *color*.

Hue, in Saxon *hwe*, probably connected with *eye* or *view*.

Tint, from *tinge*, *v.* To *color*.

Color is here the generic term; *hue* and *tint* are but modes of *color*; the former of which expresses a faint or blended *color*; the latter a shade of *color*. Betwixt the *colors* of black and brown, as of all other leading *colors*, there are various *hues* and *tints*, by the due intermixture of which natural objects are rendered beautiful.

Her *color* chang'd, her face was not the same,
And hollow groans from her deep spirit came.

DRYDEN.

Infinite numbers, delicacies, smell,
With *hues* on *hues*, expression cannot paint
The breadth of nature, and her endless bloom.

THOMSON.

Among them shells of many a *tint* appear,
The breast of Venus and her pearly ear.

SIR WM. JONES.

Colorable, Specious, Ostensible, Plausible, Feasible.

Colorable, from to *color* or *tinge*, expresses the quality of being able to give a fair appearance.

Specious, from the Latin *specio*, to see, signifies the quality of looking as it ought.

Ostensible, from the Latin *ostendo* to show, signifies the quality of being able or fit to be shown or seen.

Plausible, from *plaudo* to clap or make a noise, signifies the quality of sounding as it ought.

Feasible, from the French *faire*, and Latin *facio* to do, signifies literally *doable*; but here it denotes seemingly practicable.

The first three of these are figures of speech drawn from what naturally pleases the eye; *plausible* is drawn from what pleases the ear; *feasible* takes its signification from what meets the judgment or conviction.

What is *colorable* has an aspect or face upon it that lulls suspicion and affords satisfaction; what is *specious* has a fair outside when contrasted with that which it may possibly conceal; what is *ostensible* is that which presents such an appearance as may serve for an indication of something real: what is *plausible* is that which meets the understanding merely through the ear: that which is *feasible* recommends itself from its intrinsic value rather than from any representation given of it.

A pretence is *colorable* when it has the *color* of truth impressed upon it; it is *specious* when its fallacy is easily discernible through the thin guise it wears; a motive is *ostensible* which is the one soonest to be discovered; an excuse is *plausible* when the well-connected narrative of the maker impresses a belief of its justice; an account is *feasible* which contains nothing improbable or singular.

It is necessary, in order to avoid suspicion, to have some *colorable* grounds for one's conduct when it is marked by eccentricity or directed to any bad object: sophists are obliged to deal in *specious* arguments for want of more substantial ones in support of their erroneous opinions: men who have no *ostensible* way of supporting themselves naturally excite the suspicion that they have some illicit source of gain; liars may sometimes be successful in inventing a *plausible* tale, but they must not scruple to support one lie by a hundred more as occasion requires; if what an accused person has to say in justification of himself be no more than *feasible*, it will always subject him to unpleasant imputations.

All his (James I. of Scotland's) acquisitions, however fatal to the body of the nobles, had been gained by attacks upon individuals; and being founded on circumstances peculiar to the persons who suffered, might excite murmurs and apprehensions, but afforded no *colorable* pretext for a general rebellion.—ROBERTSON.

The guardian directs one of his pupils to think with the wise, but speak with the vulgar. This is a precept *specious* enough, but not always practicable.—JOHNSON.

What is truly astonishing, the partisans of those two opposite systems were at once prevalent and at once employed, the one *ostensibly*, the other secretly, during the latter part of the reign of Louis XV.—BURKE.

In this superficial way indeed the mind is capable of more variety of *plausible* talk, but is not enlarged as it should be in its knowledge.—LOCKE.

It is some years since I thought the matter *feasible*, that if I could by an exact time-keeper find in any part of the world what o'clock it is at Dover and at the same time where the ship is, the problem is solved.—ABBOTT.

Column, *v.* **Pillar**.

Combat, *v. Battle.*

Combat, *v. Conflict.*

To Combat, Oppose.

Combat, from the French *combattre* to fight together, is used figuratively in the same sense with regard to matters of opinion.

Oppose, in French *opposer*, Latin *opponere* perfect *oppono* to oppose, compounded of *ob* and *pono* to place one's self in the way, signifies to set one's self against another.

Combat is properly a species of *opposing*; one always *opposes* in *combatting*, though not *vice versa*. To *combat* is used in regard to speculative matters; *oppose* in regard to private and personal concerns. A person's positions are *combated*, his interests or his measures are *opposed*. The Christian *combats* the erroneous doctrines of the infidel with no other weapon than that of argument; the sophist *opposes* Christianity with ridicule and misrepresentation.

The most laudable use to which knowledge can be converted is to *combat* error wherever it presents itself; but there are too many, particularly in the present day, who employ the little pittance of knowledge which they have collected, to no better purpose than to *oppose* every thing that is good, and excite the same spirit of *opposition* in others.

When fierce temptation, seconded within
By traitor appetite, and armed with darts
Tempered in hell, invades the throbbing breast,
To *combat* may be glorious, and success
Perhaps may crown us, but to fly is safe.

COWPER.

Though various foes against the truth combine,
Pride above all *opposes* her design.—COWPER.

Combatant, Champion.

Combatant, from *combat*, marks any one that engages in a *combat*.

Champion, French *champion*, Saxon *cempe*, German *kaempe*, signifies originally a soldier or fighter, from the Latin *campus* a field of battle.

A *combatant* fights for himself and for victory; a *champion* fights either for another, or in another's cause. The word *combatant* has always relation to some actual engagement; *champion* may be employed for one ready to be engaged, or in the habit of being engaged. The *combatants* in the Olympic games used to contend for a prize; the Roman gladiators were *combatants* who fought for their lives: when knight errantry was in fashion there were *champions* of all descriptions, *champions* in behalf of distressed females, *champions* in behalf of the injured and oppressed, or *champions* in behalf of aggrieved princes.

The mere act of fighting constitutes a *combatant*: the act of standing up in another's defence at a personal risk, constitutes the *champion*. Animals have their *combats*, and consequently are *combatants*; but they are seldom *champions*. In the present day there are fewer *combatants* than *champions* among men. We have *champions* for liberty, who are the least honourable and the most questionable members of the community; they mostly con-

tend for a shadow, and court persecution, in order to serve their own purposes of ambition. *Champions* in the cause of Christianity are not less ennobled by the object for which they contend, than by the disinterestedness of their motives in contending; they must expect in an infidel age, like the present, to be exposed to the derision and contempt of their self-sufficient opponents.

Conscious that I do not possess the strength, I shall not assume the importance of a *champion*, and as I am not of dignity enough to be angry, I shall keep my temper and my distance too, skirmishing like those insignificant gentry, who play the part of teasers in the Spanish bull-fights whilst bolder *combatants* engage him at the point of his horns.—CUMBERLAND.

In battle every man should fight as if he was the single *champion*.—JOHNSON.

Combination, *v. Association.*

Combination, Cabal, Plot, Conspiracy.

Combination, *v. Association, combination.*

Cabal, in French *cabale*, comes from the Hebrew *kabala*, signifying a secret science pretended to by the Jewish Rabbi, whence it is applied to any association that has a pretended secret.

Plot, in French *complot*, is derived like the word *complicate*, from the Latin *plico* to entangle, signifying any intricate or dark concern.

Conspiracy, in French *conspiration*, from *con* and *spiro* to breathe together, signifies two having one spirit.

An association for a bad purpose is the idea common to all these terms, and peculiar to *combination*. A *combination* may be either secret or open, but secrecy forms a necessary part in the signification of the other terms; a *cabal* is secret as to its end; a *plot* and *conspiracy* are secret, both as to the means and the end.

Combination is the close adherence of many for their mutual defence in obtaining their demands, or resisting the claims of others. * A *cabal* is the intrigue of a party or faction, formed by cunning practices in order to give a turn to the course of things to its own advantage: the natural and ruling idea in *cabal* is that of assembling a number, and manœuvring secretly with address. A *plot* is a clandestine union of some persons for the purpose of mischief: the ruling idea in a *plot* is that of a complicated enterprise formed in secret, by two or more persons. A *conspiracy* is a general intelligence among persons united to effect some serious change: the ruling and natural idea in this word is that of unanimity and concert in the prosecution of a plan.

A *combination* is seldom of so serious a nature as a *cabal*, or a *plot*, though always objectionable; a *combination* may have many or few. A *cabal* requires a number of persons sufficient to form a party, it gains strength by numbers: a *plot* is generally confined to a few, it diminishes its security by numbers; a *conspiracy* mostly requires many for the fulfilment of its purposes although it is thereby the more exposed to discovery.

* Vide Roubaud; "Cabale, complot, conspiration, conjuration."

Selfishness, insubordination, and laxity of morals, give rise to *combinations*; they are peculiar to mechanics, and the lower orders of society. Restless, jealous, ambitious, and little minds, are ever forming *cabals*; they are peculiar to courtiers; malignity, revenge, and every foul passion, is concerned in forming *plots*: disaffected subjects and bad citizens form *conspiracies*, which are frequently set on foot by disappointed ambition.

The object of a *combination*, although not less formidable than the others, is not always so criminal; it rests on a question of claims which it proposes to decide by force; the end is commonly as unjustifiable as the means: of this description are the *combinations* formed by journeymen against their masters, which are expressly contrary to law. The object of a *cabal* is always petty, and mostly contemptible; its end is to gain favour, credit, and influence; to be the distributor of places, honors, emoluments, reputation, and all such contingencies as are eagerly sought for by the great mass of mankind: at court it makes and un-makes ministers, generals, and officers; in the republic of letters it destroys the reputation of authors, and blasts the success of their works; in public societies it stops the course of equity, and nips merit in the bud; in the world at large it is the never-ending source of vexation, broils, and animosities. A *plot* has always the object of committing some atrocity, whether of a private or public nature, as the murder or plunder of individuals; the traitorous surrender of a town, or the destruction of something very valuable. Astarba in Telemachus is represented as having formed a *plot* for the poisoning of Pygmalion: the annihilation of the English government was the object of that *plot* which received the name of gunpowder treason. The object of a *conspiracy* is oftener to bring about some evil change in public than in private concerns; it is commonly directed against the governor, in order to overturn the government: in a republic, *conspiracies* are justified and hailed as glorious events when sanctioned by success: the *conspiracy* of Brutus against Cæsar is always represented by the favours of a republic as a magnanimous exploit. Where every man can rule, there will always be usurpers and tyrants, and where every man has an equal right to set himself up against his ruler, there will never be wanting *conspiracies* to crush the usurpers; hence usurpations and *conspiracies* succeed each other as properly and naturally in republics as cause and effect; the right of the strongest, the most daring, or the most unprincipled, is the only right which can be acknowledged upon the principles of republicanism: on the contrary, in a monarchy where the person of the sovereign and his authority are alike sacred, every *conspirator* to his country, and every *conspiracy*, does no less violence to the laws of God, than to those of man.

The protector dreading *combinations* between the parliament and the malcontents in the army, resolved to allow no leisure for forming *conspiracies* against him.—BUME.

I see you court the crowd,
When with the shouts of the rebellious rabble,
I see you borne on shoulders to *cabals*.—RYDEN.

Oh! think what anxious moments pass between
The birth of *plots*, and their last fatal periods.

ADDISON.

Conspiracies no sooner should be formed than executed.
—ADDISON.

Combine, *v.* Connect.

To Come, Arrive.

Come is general; arrive is particular.

Persons or things *come*; persons only, or what is personified, *arrive*.

To *come* specifies neither time nor manner: *arrival* is employed with regard to some particular period or circumstances. The coming of our Saviour was predicted by the prophets; the arrival of a messenger is expected at a certain hour. We know that evils must *come*, but we do wisely not to meet them by anticipation; the arrival of a vessel in the haven, after a long and dangerous voyage, is a circumstance of general interest in the neighbourhood where it happens.

Hail, reverend priest! to Phœbus' awful dome,
A suppliant I from great Atrides *come*.—POPE.

Old men love novelties; the last *arriv'd*
Still pleases best, the youngest steals their smiles.
YOUNG.

Comedian, *v.* Actor,

Comely, *v.* Becoming.

Comely, *v.* Graceful.

Comfort, Pleasure.

Comfort, *v.* To cheer, encourage.

Pleasure, from to *pleases*, signifies what *pleases*.

Comfort, that genuine English word, describes what England only affords: we may find *pleasure* in every country; but *comfort* is to be found in our own country only: the grand feature in *comfort* is substantiality; in that of *pleasure* it is warmth. *Pleasure* is quickly succeeded by pain; it is the lot of humanity that to every *pleasure* there should be an alloy: *comfort* is that portion of *pleasure* which seems to lie exempt from this disadvantage; it is the most durable sort of *pleasure*.

Comfort must be sought for at home; *pleasure* is pursued abroad: *comfort* depends upon a thousand nameless trifles which daily arise; it is the relief of a pain, the heightening of a gratification, the supply of a want, or the removal of an inconvenience. *Pleasure* is the companion of luxury and abundance: it dwells in the palaces of the rich and the abodes of the voluptuary: but *comfort* is within the reach of the poor, and is the portion of those who know how to husband their means, and to adopt their enjoyments to their habits and circumstances in life. *Comfort* is less than *pleasure* in the detail; it is more than *pleasure* in the aggregate.

Thy rev'rend virtues justified my cares,
And promised *comfort* to my silver hairs.—POPE.

I will believe there are happy tempers in being, to whom
all the good that arrives to any of their fellow creatures
gives a *pleasure*.—STEELE.

To Comfort, *v. To cheer.*

To Comfort, *v. To console.*

Comical, *v. Laughable.*

Command, Order, Injunction, Precept.

Command is compounded of *com* and *mando*, *manudo*, or *dare in manus* to give into the hand, signifying to give or appoint as a task.

Order, in the extended sense of regularity, implies what is done in the way of *order*, or for the sake of regularity.

Injunction, in French *injunction*, comes from *in* and *jungo*, which signifies literally to join or bring close to; figuratively to impress on the mind.

Precept, in French *precepte*, Latin *præceptum*, participle of *præcipio*, compounded of *præ* and *capio* to put or lay before, signifies the thing proposed to the mind.

A *command* is imperative; it is the strongest exercise of authority; *order* is instructive; it is an expression of the wish: an *injunction* is decisive; it is a greater exercise of authority than *order*, and less than *command*: a *precept* is a moral law; it is binding on the conscience. The three former of these are personal in their application; the latter is general: a *command*, an *order*, and an *injunction*, must be addressed to some particular individual; a *precept* is addressed to all.

Command and *order* flow exclusively from the will of the speaker in the ordinary concerns of life; *injunction* has more regard to the conduct of the person addressed; *precept* is altogether founded on the moral obligations of men to each other. A *command* is just or unjust: an *order* is prudent or imprudent; an *injunction* is mild or severe; a *precept* is general or particular.

Command and *order* are affirmative; *injunction* or *precept* are either affirmative or negative: a *command* and an *order* oblige us to do a thing; an *injunction* and *precept* oblige us to do it, or leave it undone. A sovereign issues his *commands*, which the well-being of society requires to be instantly obeyed: a master gives his *orders*, which it is the duty of the servant to execute: a father lays an *injunction* on his children, which they with filial regard ought to endeavour to follow; the moralist lays down his *precepts*, which every rational creature is called upon to practise.

'Tis Heav'n commands me, and you urge in vain:
Had any mortal voice th' *injunction* laid,
Nor augur, seer, or priest, had been obey'd.—POPE.

A stepdame too I have, a cursed she,
Who rules my henpeck'd sire, and *orders* me.
DRYDEN.

This done, Æneas *orders* for the close,
The strife of archers with contending bows.
DRYDEN.

The duties which religion enjoins as to perform towards God are those which have oftentimes furnished matter to the scoffs of the licentious.—BLAIR.

We say not that these ills from virtue flow;
Did her wise *precepts* rule the world, we know
The golden ages would again begin.—JENYNS.

Commanding, Imperative, Imperious, Authoritative.

Commanding signifies having the force of a *command* (*v. To command*).

Imperative, from *impero*, signifies in the imperative mood.

Imperious, from *impero*, signifies in the way of, or like a *command*.

Authoritative signifies having authority, or in the way of *authority*.

Commanding is either good or bad according to circumstances; a *commanding* voice is necessary for one who has to *command*; but a *commanding* air is offensive when it is affected: *imperative* is applied to things, and used in an indifferent sense: *imperious* is used for persons or things in the bad sense: any direction is *imperative* which comes in the shape of a *command*, and circumstances are likewise *imperative*, which act with the force of a *command*; persons are *imperious* who exercise their power oppressively; in this manner underlings in office are *imperious*; necessity is *imperious* when it leaves us no choice in our conduct. *Authoritative* is mostly applied to persons or things personal in the good sense only; magistrates are called upon to assume an *authoritative* air when they meet with any resistance.

Oh! that my tongue had every grace of speech,
Great and *commanding* as the breath of kings.
ROWE.

Quitting the dry *imperative* style of an act of Parliament he (Lord Somers) makes the Lords and Commons fall to a pious legislative ejaculation.—BURKE.

Fear not, that I shall watch, with servile shame,
Th' *imperious* looks of some proud Grecian dame.
DRYDEN.

Authoritative instructions, mandates issued, which the member (of Parliament) is bound blindly and implicitly to vote and argue for, though contrary to the clearest conviction of his judgment and conscience; these are things utterly unknown to the laws of this land.—BURKE.

To Commemorate, *v. To celebrate.*

To Commence, *v. To begin.*

To Commend, *v. To praise.*

Commendable, *v. Laudable.*

Commensurate, *v. Proportionate.*

Commentaries, *v. Remarks.*

Comments, *v. Remarks.*

Commerce, *v. Trade.*

Commerce, *v. Intercourse.*

Commercial, *v. Mercantile.*

Commiseration, *v. Sympathy.*

To Commission, Authorize, Empower.

Commission, from *commit*, signifies the act of *committing*, or putting into the hands of another.

To *Authorize* signifies to give *authority*; to *Empower*, to put in possession of *power*.

The idea of transferring some business to another is common to these terms; the cir-

circumstances under which this is performed constitute the difference. We *commission* in ordinary cases; we *authorize* and *empower* in extraordinary cases. We *commission* in matters where our own will and convenience are concerned; we *authorize* in matters where our personal authority is requisite; and we *empower* in matters where the authority of the law is required. A *commission* is given by the bare communication of one's wishes; we *authorize* by a positive and formal declaration to that intent; we *empower* by the transfer of some legal document. A person is *commissioned* to make a purchase; he is *authorized* to communicate what has been confided to him; he is *empowered* to receive money.

Commissioning passes mostly between equals; the performance of *commissions* is an act of civility; *authorizing* and *empowering* are as often directed to inferiors, they are frequently acts of justice and necessity. Friends give each other *commissions*; servants and subordinate persons are sometimes *authorized* to act in the name of their employers; magistrates *empower* the officers of justice to apprehend individuals or enter houses. We are *commissioned* by persons only; we are *authorized* sometimes by circumstances; we are *empowered* by law.

Commission'd in alternate watch they stand,
The sun's bright portals and the skies command.
POPE.

A more decisive proof cannot be given of the full conviction of the British nation that the principles of the Revolution did not *authorize* them to elect kings at pleasure, than their continuing to adopt a plan of hereditary Protestant succession in the old line.—BURKE.

Empow'rs d the wrath of Gods and men to tame,
E'en Jove rever'd the venerable dame.—POPE.

To Commit, v. To consign.

To Commit, v. To perpetrate.

Commodious, Convenient.

Commodious, from the Latin *commodus*, or *con* and *modus*, according to the measure and degree required.

Convenient, from the Latin *conveniens*, participle of *con* and *venio* to come together, signifies that which comes together with something else as it ought.

Both these terms convey the idea of what is calculated for the pleasure of a person. *Commodious* regards the physical condition, and *convenience* circumstances or mental feelings. That is *commodious* which suits one's bodily ease; that is *convenient* which suits one's purpose. A house, or a chair, is *commodious*; a time, an opportunity, a season, or the arrival of any person, is *convenient*. A noise *incommodious*; the staying or going of a person may *inconvenience*. A person wishes to sit *commodiously*, and to be *conveniently* situated for witnessing any spectacle.

When a position seems thus with *commodious* consequences, who can without regret confess it to be false!—OHMSON.

Within an ancient forest's ample verge,
There stands a lonely, but a healthful dwelling,
Built for convenience and the use of life.—ROWE.

Commodity, Goods, Merchandize, Ware.

These terms agree in expressing articles of trade under various circumstances.

Commodity, in Latin *commoditas*, signifies in its abstract sense *convenience*, and in an extended application any thing that is *convenient* or fit for use, which being also saleable, the word has been employed for things that are sold.

Goods, which denotes the thing that is good, has derived its use from the same analogy in its sense as in the former case.

Merchandize, in French *merchandise*, Latin *mercatura* or *merx*, Hebrew *macar*, signifies saleable things.

Ware, in Saxon *ware*, German, &c., *ware*, signifies properly any thing manufactured, and, by an extension of the sense, an article for sale.

Commodity is employed only for articles of the first necessity; it is the source of comfort and object of industry: *goods* is applied to every thing belonging to tradesmen, for which there is a stipulated value; they are sold retail, and are the proper objects of trade: *merchandize* applies to what belongs to merchants; it is the object of commerce: *wares* are manufactured, and may be either goods or *merchandize*: a country has its *commodities*; a shopkeeper his *goods*; a merchant his *merchandize*; a manufacturer his *wares*.

The most important *commodities* in a country are what are denominated staple *commodities*, which constitute its main riches; yet, although England has fewer of such *commodities* than almost any other nation, it has been enabled by the industry and energy of its inhabitants, the peculiar excellence of its government, and its happy insular situation, not only to obtain the *commodities* of other countries, but to increase their number, for the convenience of the whole world and its own aggrandizement. It is the interest of every tradesman to provide himself with such goods as he can recommend to his customers; the proper choice of which depends on judgment and experience: the conveyance of *merchandize* into England is always attended with considerable risk, as they must be transported by water; on the continent it is very slow and expensive, as they are generally transported by land: all kinds of *wares* are not the most saleable *commodities*, but earthen *ware* is in universal demand.

Men must have made some considerable progress towards civilization before they acquired the idea of property so as to be acquainted with the most simple of all contracts, that of exchanging by barter one rude *commodity* for another.—ROBERTSON.

It gives me very great scandal to observe, wherever I go, how much skill in buying all manner of goods there is necessary to defend yourself from being cheated.—STEELE.

If we consider this expensive voyage, which is undertaken in search of knowledge, and how few there are who take in any considerable *merchandize*; how hard it is, that the very small number who are distinguished with abilities to know how to vend their *wares*, should suffer being plundered by privateers under the very cannon that should protect them.—ADDISON.

Common, Vulgar, Ordinary, Mean.

Common, in French *commun*, Latin *communis*, from *con* and *munus* the joint office or property of many, has regard to the multitude of objects.

Vulgar, in French *vulgaire*, Latin *vulgaris*, from *vulgus* the people, has regard to the number and quality of the persons.

Ordinary, in French *ordinaire*, Latin *ordinarius*, from *ordo* the order or regular practice, has regard to the repetition or disposition of things.

Mean expresses the same as *medium* or moderate, from which it is derived.

Familiar use renders things *common*, *vulgar*, and *ordinary*; but what is *mean* is so of itself: the *common*, *vulgar*, and *ordinary*, are therefore frequently, though not always, *mean*; and on the contrary what is *mean* is not always *common*, *vulgar*, or *ordinary*; consequently in the primitive sense of these words, the first three are not strictly synonymous with the last: monsters are *common* in Africa; *vulgar* reports are little to be relied on; it is an *ordinary* practice for men to make light of their word.

Common is unlimited in its application; it includes both *vulgar* and *ordinary*; the latter are said in reference to persons only, *common* with regard to persons or things: an opinion is either *common* or *vulgar*; an employment is either *common* or *ordinary*: it was long a *vulgarly* received notion, that the sun turned round the earth; it is the *ordinary* pursuit of astronomers to observe the motions of the heavenly bodies: disputes on religion have rendered many facts *vulgar* or *common*, which were formerly known only to the learned, on that account it is now become an *ordinary* or a *common* practice for men to dispute about religion, and even to frame a new set of doctrines for themselves.

In the figurative sense, in which they convey the idea of low value, they are synonymous with *mean*: what is to be seen, heard, and enjoyed by every body is *common*, and naturally of little value, since the worth of objects frequently depends upon their scarcity and the difficulty of obtaining them. What is peculiar to *common* people is *vulgar*, and consequently worse than *common*; it is supposed to belong to those who are ignorant and depraved in taste as well as in morals: what is done and seen *ordinarily* may be done and seen easily. it requires no abilities or mental acquirements; it has nothing striking in it, it excites no interest: what is *mean* is even below that which is *ordinary*; there is something defective in it.

Common is opposed to rare and refined; *vulgar* to polite and cultivated; *ordinary* to the distinguished; *mean* to the noble: a *common* mind busies itself with *common* objects; *vulgar* habits are easily contracted from a slight intercourse with *vulgar* people; an *ordinary* person is seldom associated with elevation of character; and a *mean* appearance is a certain mark of a degraded condition, if not of a degraded mind.

Men may change their climate, but they cannot their nature. A man that goes out a fool cannot ride or sail himself into *common* sense.—ADDISON.

The poet's thought of directing Satan to the sun, which in the *vulgar* opinion of mankind, is the most conspicuous part of the creation, and the placing in it an angel, is a circumstance very finely contrived.—ADDISON.

A very *ordinary* telescope shows us that a louse is itself a very *lousy* creature.—ADDISON.

Under his forming hands a creature grew,
Manlike, but different sex, so lovely fair,
That what seem'd fair in all the world seem'd now
Mean, or in her summ'd up.—MILTON.

Commonly, Generally, Frequently, Usually.

Commonly, in the form of *common* (*v. Common*).

Generally, from *general*, and the Latin *genus* the kind, respects a whole body in distinction from an individual.

Frequently, from *frequent*, in French *frequent*, Latin *frequens*, from *frago*, in Greek *φραγω* and *φραγνυμι* to go about, signifies properly a crowding.

Usually, from *usual* and *use*, signifies according to *use* or custom.

What is *commonly* done is an action *common* to all; what is *generally* done is the action of the greatest part; what is *frequently* done is either the action of many, or an action many times repeated by the same person; what is *usually* done is done regularly by one or many.

Commonly is opposed to rarely; *generally* and *frequently* to occasionally or seldom; *usually* to casually: men *commonly* judge of others by themselves; those who judge by the mere exterior are *generally* deceived; but notwithstanding every precaution, one is *frequently* exposed to gross frauds; a man of business *usually* repairs to his counting-house every day at a certain hour.

It is *commonly* observed among soldiers and seamen, that though there is much kindness, there is little grief.—JOHNSON.

It is *generally* not so much the desire of men, sunk into depravity, to deceive the world, as themselves.—JOHNSON.

It is too *frequently* the pride of students to despise those amusements and recreations which give to the rest of mankind strength of limbs and cheerfulness of heart.—JOHNSON.

The inefficacy of advice is *usually* the fault of the counsellor.—JOHNSON.

Commonwealth, v. State.**Commotion, Disturbance.**

Commotion, compounded of *com* or *cum* and *motio*, expresses naturally a motion of several together.

Disturbance signifies the state of disturbing or being disturbed (*v. To trouble*).

There is mostly a *commotion* where there is a disturbance; but there is frequently no disturbance where there is a *commotion*: *commotion* respects the physical movement; *disturbance* the mental agitation. *Commotion* is said only of large bodies of men, and is occasioned only by something extraordinary; *disturbance* may be said of a few, or even of a single individual: whatever occasions a bustle, awakens general inquiry, and sets people or things in motion, excites a *commotion*; whatever inter-

rupts the peace and quiet of one or many produces a *disturbance* any wonderful phenomenon, or unusually interesting intelligence, may throw the public into a *commotion*; drunkenness is a common cause of *disturbances* in the streets or in families. *civil commotions* are above all others the most to be dreaded; they are attended with *disturbances* general and partial.

Ocean, unequally press'd, with broken tide
And blind *commotion* heaves.—THOMSON.

Nothing can be more absurd than that perpetual contest for wealth which keeps the world in *commotion*.—JOHNSON.

A species of men to whom a state of order would become a sentence of obscurity, are nourished into a dangerous magnitude by the heat of intestine *disturbances*.—SUKKA.

To Communicate, Impart.

Communicate, in Latin *communicatus*, participle of *communico*, contracted from *communifico*, signifies to make common property with another.

Impart, compounded of *in* and *part*, signifies to give in part to another.

Imparting is a species of *communicating*: one always *communicates* in *imparting*, but not *vice versâ*.

Whatever can be enjoyed in common with others is *communicated*; whatever can be shared by another is *imparted*: what one knows or thinks is *communicated*, or made commonly known; what one feels is *imparted* and participated in: intelligence is *communicated*; secrets or sorrows are *imparted*: those who always *communicate* all they hear, sometimes *communicate* more than they really know; it is the characteristic of friendship to allow her votaries to *impart* their joys and sorrows to each other.

A person may *communicate* what belongs to another, as well as that which is his own; but he *imparts* that only which concerns or belongs to himself: an openness of temper leads some men to *communicate* their intentions as soon as they are formed; loquacity impels others to *communicate* whatever is told them: a generosity of temper leads some men to *impart* their substance for the relief of their fellow creatures; a desire for sympathy leads others to *impart* their sentiments. There is a great pleasure in *communicating* good intelligence, and in *imparting* good advice.

A man who publishes his works in a volume has an infinite advantage over one who *communicates* his writings to the world in loose tracts.—ADDISON.

Yet hear what an unskilful friend may say,
So if a blind man should direct your way;
So I myself, though wanting to be taught,
May yet *impart* a hint that's worth your thought.
GOLDING.

Communication, v. Intercourse.

Communicative, Free,

Are epithets that convey no respectful sentiment of the object to which they are applied: a person is **Communicative**, who is ready to tell all he knows; he is **Free**, when he is ready to say all he thinks: the *communicative*

person has no regard for himself; the *free* person has no regard for others.

A *communicative* temper leads to the breach of all confidence; a *free* temper leads to violation of all decency; *communicativeness* of disposition produces much mischief; *freedom* of speech and behaviour occasions much offence. *Communicativeness* is the excess of sincerity; it offends by revealing what it ought to conceal: *freedom* is the abuse of sincerity; it offends by speaking what it ought not to think.

These terms are sometimes taken in a good sense; when a person is *communicating* for the instruction or amusement of others, and is *free* in imparting to others whatever he can of his enjoyments.

The most miserable of all beings is the most envious; as on the other hand the most *communicative* is the happiest.—GROVE.

Aristophanes was in private life of a *free*, open, and companionable temper.—CUMBERLAND.

Communion, Converse.

Communion, from *commune* and *common*, signifies the act of making common (*v. Common*).

Converse, from the Latin *converso* to *convert* or translate, signifies a transferring.

Both these terms imply a communication between minds; but the former may take place without corporeal agency, the latter never does; spirits hold *communion* with each other; people hold *converse*.

For the same reason a man may hold *communion* with himself; he holds *converse* always with another.

Where a long course of piety and close *communion* with God has purged the heart and rectified the will, knowledge will break in upon such a soul.—SOUTH.

In varied *converse* softening every theme,
You frequent pausing turn; and from her eyes,
Where meekness d sense, and amiable grace,
And lively sweetness dwell, enraptured drink
That nameless spirit of ethereal joy.—THOMSON.

Communion, v. Lord's supper.

Community, Society.

Both these terms are employed for a body of rational beings.

Community, from *communitas* and *communis* common (*v. Common*), signifies abstractedly the state of being *common*, and in an extended sense those who are in a state of common possession.

Society, in Latin *societas*, from *socius* a companion, signifies the state of being companions, or those who are in that state.

Community in any thing constitutes a *community*; a common interest, a common language, a common government, is the basis of that *community* which is formed by any number of individuals; *communities* are therefore divisible into large or small; the former may be states, the latter families; the coming together of many constitutes a *society*; *societies* are either private or public, according to the purpose for which they meet together; friends form *societies* for the purpose of pleasure; in-

different persons form *societies* for the purposes of business.

Community has always a restrictive and relative sense ; *society* has a general and unlimited import ; the most dangerous members of the *community* are those who attempt to poison the minds of youth with contempt for religion and disaffection to the state ; the morals of *society* are thus corrupted as it were at the fountain head.

Community refers to spiritual as well as corporeal agents ; *society* mostly to human beings only : the angels, the saints, and the spirits of just men made perfect, constitute a *community* ; with them there is more communion than association.

Was there ever any *community* so corrupt as not to include within it individuals of real worth?—BLAIR.

The great *community* of mankind is necessarily broken into smaller independent *societies*.—JOHNSON.

Commute, *v.* *Exchange*.

Compact, *v.* *Agreement*.

Compact, *v.* *Close*.

Companion, *v.* *Accompaniment*.

Companion, *v.* *Associate*.

Company, *v.* *Assembly*.

Company, *v.* *Association*.

Company, *v.* *Band*.

Company, *v.* *Society*.

Company, *v.* *Troop*.

Comparison, Contrast.

Comparison, from *compare*, and the Latin *comparo* or *com* and *par* equal, signifies the putting together of equals.

Contrast, in French *contraster*, Latin *contrasto* or *contra* and *sto* to stand against, signifies the placing one thing opposite to another.

Likeness in the quality and difference in the degree are requisite for a *comparison* ; likeness in the degree and opposition in the quality are requisite for a *contrast* : things of the same colour are *compared* ; those of an opposite colour are *contrasted* ; a *comparison* is made between two shades of red ; a *contrast* between black and white.

Comparison is of a practical utility, it serves to ascertain the true relation of objects ; *contrast* is of utility among poets, it serves to heighten the effect of opposite qualities : things are large or small by *comparison* ; they are magnified or diminished by *contrast* : the value of a coin is best learned by *comparing* it with another of the same metal ; the generosity of one person is most strongly felt when *contrasted* with the meanness of another.

They who are apt to remind us of their ancestors only put us upon making *comparisons* to their own disadvantage.—SPECTATOR.

In lovely *contrast* to this glorious view,

Calmly insignificant, then will we turn

To where the silver Thames first rural grows.

THOMSON.

Comparison, *v.* *Simile*.

Compassion, *v.* *Pity*.

Compassion, *v.* *Sympathy*.

Compatible, Consistent.

Compatible, compounded of *com* or *cum* with, and *pator* to suffer, signifies a fitness to be suffered together.

Consistent, in Latin *consistens*, participle of *consisto*, compounded of *con* and *sisto* to place, signifies the fitness to be placed together.

Compatibility has a principal reference to plans and measures ; *consistency* to character, conduct, and station. Every thing is *compatible* with a plan which does not interrupt its prosecution ; every thing is *consistent* with a person's station by which it is neither degraded nor elevated. It is not *compatible* with the good discipline of a school to allow of foreign interference ; it is not *consistent* with the elevated and dignified character of a clergyman to engage in the ordinary pursuits of other men.

Whatever is *incompatible* with the highest dignity of our nature should indeed be excluded from our conversation.—HAWKESWORTH.

Truth is always *consistent* with itself, and needs nothing to help it out.—TILLOTSON.

To Compel, Force, Oblige, Necessitate.

Compel, Latin *compello* or *pello* to drive, signifies to drive for a specific purpose or to a point.

Force, in French *force*, comes from the Latin *fortis* strong ; *force* being nothing but the exertion of strength.

Oblige, in French *obliger*, Latin *obligo*, compounded of *ob* and *ligo*, signifies to bind down. These three terms mark an external action on the will, but *compel* expresses more than *oblige*, and less than *force*. *Necessitate* is to make necessary.

Compulsion and *force* act much more directly and positively than *oblige* or *necessitate* ; and the latter indicates more of physical strength than the former. We are *compelled* by outward or inward motives ; we are *obliged* more by motives than any thing else ; we are *forced* sometimes by circumstances, though oftener by plain strength ; we are *necessitated* solely by circumstances. An adversary is *compelled* to yield who resigns from despair of victory ; he is *forced* to yield if he stand in fear of his life ; he is *obliged* to yield if he cannot withstand the entreaties of his friends ; he is *necessitated* to yield if he want the strength to continue.

An obstinate person must be *compelled* to give up his point ; a turbulent and disorderly man must be *forced* to go where the officers of justice choose to lead him : an unreasonable person must be *obliged* to satisfy a just demand : we are all occasionally *necessitated* to do that which is not agreeable to us.

Pecuniary want *compels* men to do many things inconsistent with their station. Honour and religion *oblige* men scrupulously to observe their word one to another. Hunger *forces* men to eat that which is most loathsome to the palate. The fear of a loss *necessitates* a man to give up a favourite project.

He would the ghosts of slaughter'd soldiers call.
These his dread wands did to short life compel.
And forc'd the fate of battles to foretel.—DRYDEN.

He that once owes more than he can pay is often obliged to bribe his creditors to patience, by increasing his debt.—JOHNSON.

I have sometimes fancied that women have not a retentive power, or the faculty of suppressing their thoughts, but that they are necessitated to speak every thing they think.—ADDISON.

Compendium, v. Abridgement.

Compensation, Satisfaction, Amends, Remuneration, Recompense, Requital, Reward.

The first three of these terms are employed to express a return for some evil; *remuneration*, *recompense*, and *requital*, a return for some good; *reward*, a return for either good or evil.

Compensation, Latin *compensatio*, compounded of *com* and *pensatio*, *pensus* and *pendo* to pay, signifies the paying what has become due.

Satisfaction, from *satisfy*, signifies the thing that satisfies, or makes up in return.

Amends, from the verb to *amend*, signifies the thing that makes good what has been bad.

Remuneration, from *remunerate*, Latin *remuneratus* or *remunero*, compounded of *re* and *munus* an office, or service, signifies what is given in return for a service.

Recompense, compounded of *re* and *compense*, signifies the thing paid back as an equivalent.

Requital, compounded of *re* and *quital*, or *quittal* from *quit*, signifies the making one's self clear by a return.

Reward is probably connected with regard, implying to take cognizance of the deserts of any one.

A *compensation* is something real; it is made for some positive injury sustained; justice requires that it should be equal in value, if not like in kind, to that which is lost or injured: a *satisfaction* may be imaginary, both as to the injury and the return; it is given for personal injuries, and depends on the disposition of the person to be satisfied; *amends* is real, but not always made so much for injuries done to others, as for offences committed by ourselves. Sufferers ought to have a *compensation* for the injuries they have sustained through our means, but there are injuries, particularly those which wound the feelings, for which there can be no *compensation*: tenacious and quarrelsome people demand *satisfaction*: their offended pride is not satisfied without the humiliation of their adversary: an *amends* is honourable which serves to repair a fault; the best *amends* which an offending person can make is to acknowledge his error and avoid a repetition: christianity enjoins its followers to do good, even to its enemies; but there is a thing called honour which impels some men after they have insulted their friends to give them the satisfaction of shedding their blood: this is termed an honourable *amends*; but will the survivors find any *compensation* in such an *amends* for

the loss of a husband, a father, or a brother? Not to offer any *compensation* to the utmost of our power, for any injury done to another, evinces a gross meanness of character, and selfishness of disposition: *satisfaction* can seldom be demanded with any propriety for any personal affront; although the true Christian will receive no *satisfaction* which is not inconsistent with the laws of God and man.

Compensation often denotes a return for services done, in which sense it approaches still nearer to *remuneration*, *recompense*, and *requital*; but the first two are obligatory; the latter are gratuitous. *Compensation* is an act of justice; the service performed involves a debt; the omission of paying it becomes an injury to the performer. The labourer is worthy of his hire; the time and strength of a poor man ought not to be employed without his receiving a *compensation*. *Remuneration* is a higher species of *compensation*; it is a matter of equity dependant upon a principle of honour in those who make it; it differs from the ordinary *compensation*, both in the nature of the service, and of the return. *Compensation* is made for bodily labour and menial offices; *remuneration* for mental exertions, for literary, civil or political offices; *compensation* is made to inferiors, or subordinate persons; *remuneration* to equals, and even superiors in education and birth, though not in wealth: a *compensation* is prescribed by a certain ratio; *remuneration* depends on collateral circumstances. A *recompense* is voluntary, both as to the service and the return; it is an act of generosity; it is not founded on the value of the service so much as on the intention of the server; it is not received so much as a matter of right, as of courtesy: there are a thousand acts of civility performed by others which are entitled to some *recompense*, though not to any specific *compensation*. *Requital* is a return for a kindness; the making it is an act of gratitude; the omission of it wounds the feelings: it sometimes happens that the only *requital* which a kind action obtains, is the animosity of the person served.

It belongs to the wealthy to make *compensation* for the trouble they give; it is scarcely possible to estimate too high what is done for ourselves, nor too low what we do for others. It is a hardship not to obtain the *remuneration* which we expect, but it is folly to expect that which we do not deserve. He who will not serve another, until he is sure of a *recompense* is not worthy of a *recompense*. Those who befriended the wicked must expect to be ill requited.

Reward conveys no idea of obligation; whoever rewards acts altogether optionally; the conduct of the agent produces the *reward*. In this sense, it is comparable with *compensation*, *amends*, and *recompense*; but not with *satisfaction*, *remuneration*, or *requital*: things as well as persons, may compensate, make *amends*, *recompense*, and *reward*; but persons only can give *satisfaction*, *remuneration*, and *requital*.

Reward respects the merit of the action; but *compensate* and the other words simply refer to the connection between the actions and their results: what accrues to a man as the just consequence of his conduct, be it good or bad, is a *reward*. *Compensation* and

amends serve to supply the loss or absence of any thing; *recompense* and *reward* follow from particular exertions. It is but a poor *compensation* for the loss of peace and health to have one's coffers filled with gold: a social intercourse by letter will make *amends* for the absence of those who are dear. It is a mark of folly to do anything, however trifling, without the prospect of a *recompense*, and yet we see this daily realized in persons who give themselves much trouble to no purpose. The *reward* of industry is ease and content: when a deceiver is caught in his own snare, he meets with the *reward* which should always attend deceit.

What can compensate for the loss of honour? What can make *amends* to a frivolous mind for the want of company? What *recompense* so sweet as the consciousness of having served a friend? What *reward* equals the *reward* of a good conscience?

Now goes the nightly thief prowling abroad
For plunder, much solicitous how best
He may *compensate* for a day of sloth,
By works of darkness and nocturnal wrongs.
COWPER.

Savage had the *satisfaction* of finding that though he could not reform his mother, he could punish her.—JOHNSON.

Nature has obscurely fitted the mole with eyes. But for *amends*, what she is capable of for her defence, and warning of danger, she has very eminently conferred upon her, for she is very quick of hearing.—ADDISON.

Remuneratory honors are proportioned at once to the usefulness and difficulty of performances.—JOHNSON.

Patriots have toiled, and in their country's cause
Bled nobly, and their deeds, as they deserve,
Receive proud *recompense*.—COWPER.

As the world is unjust in its judgements, so it is ungrateful in its *requitals*.—BLAIR.

There are no honorary *rewards* among us which are more esteemed by the person who receives them, and are cheaper to the prince, than the giving of medals.—ADDISON.

Competent, Fitted, Qualified.

Competent, in Latin *competens*, participle of *competo* to agree or suit, signifies suitable.

Fitted, from *fit* (v. *Becoming*).

Qualified, participle of *qualify* from the Latin *qualis* and *facio*, signifies made as it ought to be.

Competency mostly respects the mental endowments and attainments; *fitness* the disposition and character; *qualification* the artificial acquirements. A person is *competent* to undertake an office; *fitted* or *qualified* to fill a situation.

Familiarity with any subject aided by strong mental endowments gives *competency*: suitable habits and temper constitute the *fitness*: acquaintance with the business to be done, and expertness in the mode of performing it, constitutes the *qualification*: none should pretend to give their opinions on serious subjects who are not *competent* judges; none but lawyers are *competent* to decide in cases of law: none but medical men are *competent* to prescribe medicines; none but divines of sound learning, as well as piety, to determine on doctrinal questions: men of sedentary and studious habits, with a serious temper, are most *fitted* to be

clergymen; and those who have the most learning and acquaintance with the Holy Scriptures are the best *qualified* for the important and sacred office of instructing the people.

Many are *qualified* for managing the concerns of others, who would not be *competent* to manage a concern for themselves. Many who are *fitted* from their turn of mind for any particular charge, may be unfortunately *incompetent* for want of the requisite *qualifications*.

Man is not *competent* to decide upon the good or evil of many events which befall him in this life.—CUMBERLAND.

What is more obvious and ordinary than a mole? and yet what more palpable argument of Providence than it? The members of her body are so exactly *fitted* to her nature and manner of life.—ADDISON.

Such benefits only can be bestowed as others are capable to receive, and such pleasures imparted as others are *qualified* to enjoy.—JOHNSON.

Competition, Emulation, Rivalry.

Competition, from the Latin *competo*, compounded of *com* and *peto*, signifies to sue or seek together, to seek for the same object.

Emulation, in Latin *emulatio*, from *emulo*, and the Greek *αμύλλα* a contest, signifies the spirit of contending.

Rivalry, from the Latin *rivus* the bank of a stream, signifies the undivided or common enjoyment of any stream which is a natural source of discord.

Competition expresses the relation of a competitor, or the act of seeking the same object; *emulation* expresses a disposition of the mind towards particular objects; *rivalry* expresses both the relation and the disposition of a rival. *Emulation* is to *competition* as the motive to the action; *emulation* produces *competitors*, but it may exist without it: they have the same marks to distinguish them from *rivalry*.

Competition and *emulation* have honour for their basis; *rivalry* is but a desire for selfish gratification. A *competitor* strives to surpass by honest means; he cannot succeed so well by any other; a *rival* is not bound by any principle; he seeks to supplant by whatever means seem to promise success. An unfair *competitor* and a generous *rival* are equally unusual and inconsistent.

Competition animates to exertion; *rivalry* provokes hatred: **competition* seeks to merit success; *rivalry* is contented with obtaining it.

Competitors may sometimes become *rivals* in spirit, although *rivals* will never become *competitors*. It is further to be remarked, that *competition* supposes some actual effort for the attainment of a specific object set in view; *rivalry* may consist of a continued wishing for and aiming at the same general end without necessarily comprehending the idea of close action. *Competitors* are in the same line with each other; *rivals* may work toward the same point at a great distance from each other. Literary prizes are the objects of *competition* among scholars; the affections of a female are the object of *rivals*. William the Conqueror

* Vide Abbé Roubaud: "Emulation, rivalité."

and Harold were competitors for the crown of England; Æneas and Turnus were rivals for the hand of Lavinia. In the games which were celebrated by Æneas in honour of his father Anchises, the naval competitors were the most eager in the contest. Juno, Minerva, and Venus, were rival goddesses in their pretensions to beauty.

It cannot be doubted but there is as great a desire of glory in a ring of wrestlers or cudgel-players as in any other more refined competition for superiority.—HUGHES.

Of the ancients enough remains to excite our emulation and direct our endeavours.—JOHNSON.

To be no man's rival in love, or competitor in business is a character which, if it does not recommend you as it ought, to benevolence among those whom you live with, yet has it certainly this effect, that you do not stand so much in need of their approbation as if you aimed at more.—STEELE.

To Complain, Lament, Regret.

Complain, in French *complandre* or *plaindre*, Latin *plango* to beat the breast as a sign of grief, in Greek *πλῆγω* to strike.

Lament, *v.* To bewail.

Regret, compounded of *re* privative and *gratus* grateful, signifies to have a feeling the reverse of pleasant.

Complaint marks most of dissatisfaction; *lamentation* most of grief; *regret* most of pain. *Complaint* is expressed verbally; *lamentation* either by words or signs; *regret* may be felt without being expressed. *Complaint* is made of personal grievances; *lamentation* and *regret* may be made on account of others as well as ourselves. We *complain* of our ill health, of our inconveniences, or of troublesome circumstances; we *lament* our inability to serve another; we *regret* the absence of one whom we love. Selfish people have the most to *complain* of, as they demand most of others, and are most liable to be disappointed; anxious people are the most liable to *lament*, as they feel every thing strongly; the best-regulated mind may have occasion to *regret* some circumstances which give pain to the tender affections of the heart.

The folly of *complaint* has ever been the theme of moralists in all ages: it has always been regarded as the author and magnifier of evils; it dwells on little things until they become great; *lamentations* are not wiser though more excusable, especially if we *lament* over the misfortunes of others: *regret* is frequently tender, and always moderate: hence it is allowable to mortals who are encompassed with troubles to indulge in *regret*. We may *complain* without any cause, and *lament* beyond what the cause requires; but *regret* will always be founded on some real cause, and not exceed the cause in degree. It would be idle for a man to *complain* of his want of education, or *lament* over the errors and misfortunes of his youth, but he can never look back upon mispent time without sincere *regret*.

We all of us *complain* of the shortness of time, saith Seneca, and yet have much more than we know what to do with.—ADDISON.

Surely to dread the future is more reasonable than to lament the past.—JOHNSON.

Regret is useful and virtuous when it tends to the amendment of life.—JOHNSON.

To Complain, Murmur, Repine.

Complain, *v.* To complain.

Murmur, in German *murmeln*, conveys both in sound and sense the idea of dissatisfaction.

Repine is compounded of *re* and *pine*, from the English *pain*, Latin *pæna* punishment, and the Greek *πείνα* hunger, signifying to convert into pain.

The idea of expressing displeasure or dissatisfaction is common to these terms. *Complaint* is not so loud as *murmuring*, but more so than *repining*.

We *complain* or *murmur* by some audible method; we may *repine* secretly. *Complaints* are always addressed to some one; *murmurs* and *repinings* are often addressed only to one's self. *Complaints* are made of whatever creates uneasiness, without regard to the source from which they flow; *murmurings* are a species of *complaints* made only of that which is done by others for our inconvenience; when used in relation to persons, *complaint* is the act of a superior; *murmuring* that of an inferior; *repining* is always used in relation to the general disposition of things. When the conduct of another offends, it calls for *complaint*: when a superior aggrieves by the imposition of what is burdensome, it occasions *murmuring* on the part of the aggrieved; when disappointments arrive, or ambition is thwarted, men *repine* at their destiny.

Complaints and *murmurs* may be made upon every trivial occasion: *repinings* only on matters of moment. *Complaints*, especially such as respect one's self, are at best but the offspring of an uneasy mind; they betray great weakness, and ought to be suppressed: *murmurs* are culpable; they violate the respect and obedience due to superiors; those who *murmur* have seldom substantial grounds for *murmuring*; *repinings* are sinful, they arraign the wisdom and goodness of an infinitely wise and good Being. It will be difficult, by the aid of philosophy, to endure much pain without *complaining* religion only can arm the soul against all the ills of life; the rebellious Israelites were frequently guilty of *murmurings*, not only against Moses, but even against their Almighty Deliverer, notwithstanding the repeated manifestations of his goodness and power: a want of confidence in God is the only cause of *repinings*; he who sees the hand of God in all things cannot *repine*.

I'll not complain;

Children and cowards rail at their misfortunes.—TRAP.

Yet O my soul! thy rising murmurs stay,
Nor dare th' ALLWISE DISPOSER to arraign;
Or against his supreme decree,
With impious grief complain.—LYTTLETON.

Would all the duties of Greece combine,
In vain the gloomy thunder might repine;
Sole should he sit, with scarce a god to friend,
And see his Trojans to the shades descend.—POPE.

Complaint, Accusation.

Complaint, *v.* To complain.

Accusation, *v.* To accuse.

Both these terms are employed in regard to the conduct of others, but a *complaint* is

mostly made in matters that personally affect the complainant; an *accusation* is made of matters in general, but especially those of a moral nature. A *complaint* is made for the sake of obtaining redress; an *accusation* is made for the sake of ascertaining a fact or bringing to punishment. A *complaint* may be frivolous; an *accusation* false. People in subordinate stations should be careful to give no cause for *complaint*: the most guarded conduct will not protect any person from the unjust *accusations* of the malevolent.

On this occasion (of an interview with Addison), Pope made his *complaint* with frankness and spirit, as a man undeservedly neglected and opposed.—JOHNSON.

With guilt enter distrust and discord, mutual *accusation* and stubborn self-defence.—JOHNSON.

Complaisance, Deference, Condescension.

Complaisance, from *com* and *plaire* to please, signifies the act of complying with, or pleasing others.

Deference, in French *déference*, from the Latin *defero* to bear down, marks the inclination to defer, or acquiesce in the sentiments of another in preference to one's own.

Condescension marks the act of *con-descending* from one's own height to yield to the satisfaction of others, rather than rigorously to exact one's rights.

The necessities, the conveniences, the accommodations and allurements of society, of familiarity, and of intimacy, lead to *complaisance*; it makes sacrifices to the wishes, tastes, comforts, enjoyments, and personal feelings of others. Age, rank, dignity, and personal merit, call for *deference*: it enjoins compliance with respect to our opinions, judgments, pretensions, and designs. The infirmities, the wants, the defects and foibles of others, call for *condescension*: it relaxes the rigour of authority, and removes the distinction of rank or station.

Complaisance is the act of an equal; *deference* that of an inferior; *condescension* that of a superior. *Complaisance* is due from one well-bred person to another; *deference* is due to all superiors in age, knowledge, or station, whom one approaches; *condescension* is due from all superiors to such as are dependant on them for comfort and enjoyment.

All these qualities spring from a refinement of humanity; but *complaisance* has most of genuine kindness in its nature; *deference* most of respectful submission; *condescension* most of easy indulgence. *Complaisance* has unalloyed pleasure for its companion; it is pleased with doing; it is pleased with seeing that it has pleased; it is pleasure to the giver and pleasure to the receiver. *Deference* is not unmixed with pain; it fears to offend, or to fail in the part it has to perform; it is mingled with a consciousness of inferiority, and a fear of appearing lower than it deserves to be thought. *Condescension* is not without its alloy; it is accompanied with the painful sentiment of witnessing inferiority, and the no less painful apprehension of not maintaining its own dignity.

Complaisance is busied in anticipating and meeting the wishes of others; it seeks to amalgamate one's own will with that of another; *deference* is busied in yielding submission, doing homage, and marking one's sense of another's superiority: *condescension* employs itself in not opposing the will of others; in yielding to their gratification, and laying aside unnecessary distinctions of superiority. *Complaisance* among strangers is often the forerunner of the most friendly intercourse: it is the characteristic of self-conceit to pay *deference* to no one, because it considers no one as having superior worth: it is the common characteristic of ignorant and low persons when placed in a state of elevation, to think themselves degraded by any act of *condescension*.

Complaisance renders a superior amiable, an equal agreeable, and an inferior acceptable.—ADDISON.

Tom Courtly never fails of paying his obeisance to every man he sees, who has title or office to make him conspicuous; but his *deference* is wholly given to outward consideration.—STEEL.

The same noble *condescension* which never dwells but in truly great minds, and such as Homer would represent that of Ulysses to have been, discovers itself likewise in the speech which he made to the ghost of Ajax.—ADDISON.

Complaisant, *v. Civil*.

Complaisant, *v. Courteous*.

Complete, Perfect, Finished.

Complete, in French *complet*, Latin *completus* participle of *compleo* to fill up, signifies the quality of being filled, or having all that is necessary.

Perfect, in Latin *perfectus* participle of *perficio* to perform or do thoroughly, signifies the state of being done thoroughly.

Finished, from *finish* (*v. To close*), marks the state of being *finished*.

That is *complete* which has no deficiency; that is *perfect* which has positive excellence; and that is *finished* which has no omission in it.

That to which any thing can be added is *incomplete*; when it can be improved it is *imperfect*; when more labour ought to be bestowed upon it it is *unfinished*. A thing is *complete* in all its parts; *perfect* as to the beauty and design of the construction; and *finished* as it comes from the hand of the workman and answers his intention. A set of books is not *complete* when a volume is wanting; there is nothing in the proper sense *perfect* which is the work of man; but the term is used relatively for whatever makes the greatest approach to *perfection*: a *finished* performance evinces care and diligence on the part of the workman.

A thing may be *complete* or *finished* without being *perfect*; and it may be *perfect* without being either *complete* or *finished*. The works of the ancients are, as they have been handed down to us, *incomplete*, and some probably *unfinished*; and yet the greater part are *perfect* in their way: the works of the moderns are mostly *complete* and *finished*; yet but a small part have any claims even to human *perfection*.

None better guard against a cheat,
Than he who is a knave *complete*.—LEWIS.

It has been observed of children, that they are longer before they can pronounce *perfect* sounds, because *perfect* sounds are not pronounced to them.—HAWKESWORTH.

It is necessary for a man who would form to himself a *finished* taste of good writing, to be well versed in the works of the best critics ancient and modern.—ADDISON.

To Complete, Finish, Terminate.

Complete is to make complete (v. *Complete*).

Finish, v. *To close*.

Terminate, Latin *terminatus*, comes from *terminus* a term or boundary, signifying to make a boundary.

We *complete** what is undertaken by continuing to labour at it; we *finish* what is begun in a state of forwardness by putting the last hand to it; we *terminate* what ought not to last by bringing it to a close. So that the characteristic idea of *completing* is the conducting a thing to its final period; that of *finishing*, the arrival at that period; and that of *terminating*, the cessation of a thing.

Completing has properly relation to permanent works only, whether mechanical or intellectual; we desire a thing to be *completed* from a curiosity to see it in its entire state. To *finish* is employed for passing occupations; we wish a thing *finished* from an anxiety to proceed to something else, or a dislike to the thing in which we are engaged. *Terminating* respects discussions, differences, and disputes. Light minds undertake many things without *completing* any. Children and unsteady people set about many things without *finishing* any. Litigious people *terminate* one dispute only to commence another.

It is perhaps kindly provided by nature, that as the feathers and strength of a bird grow together, and her wings are not *completed* till she is able to fly, so some proportion should be preserved in the human kind between judgment and courage.—JOHNSON.

The artificer, for the manufacture which he *finishes* in a day, receives a certain sum; but the wit frequently gains no advantage from a performance at which he has toiled many months.—HAWKESWORTH.

The thought 'that our existence *terminates* with this life,' doth naturally check the soul in any generous pursuit.—BERKELEY.

Complete, v. *Whole*.

Completion, v. *Consummation*.

Complex, v. *Compound*.

Complexity, Complication, Intricacy.

Complexity and **Complication**, in French *complication*, Latin *complicatio* and *complico*, compounded of *com* and *plico*, signifies folding one thing within another.

Intricacy, Latin *intricatio* and *intrico*, compounded of *in* and *trico* or *trices*, small hairs which are used to ensnare birds, signifies a state of entanglement by means of many involutions.

Complexity expresses the abstract quality or state; *complication* the act: they both convey less than *intricacy*; *intricate* is that which is very complicated.

Complexity arises from a multitude of objects, and the nature of these objects; *complication* from an involvement of objects; and *intricacy* from a winding and confused involution. What is *complex* must be decomposed; what is *complicated* must be developed; what is *intricate* must be unravelled. A proposition is *complex*; affairs are *complicated*; the law is *intricate*.

Complexity puzzles; *complication* confounds; *intricacy* bewilders. A clear head is requisite for understanding that which is *complex*; keenness and penetration are required to lay open that which is *complicated*; a comprehensive mind, coupled with coolness and perseverance of research, are essential to disentangle that which is *intricate*. A *complex* system may have every perfection but the one that is requisite, namely, a fitness to be reduced to practice: *complicated* schemes of villainy commonly frustrate themselves; they require unity of design among too many individuals of different stations, interests, and vices, to allow of frequent success with such heterogeneous combinations: the *intricacy* of the law is but the natural attendant on human affairs; every question admits of different illustrations as to its causes, consequences, analogies, and bearings; it is likewise dependent on so many cases infinitely ramified as to impede the exercise of the judgment in the act of deciding.

The *complexity* of a subject often deters young persons from application to their business. There is nothing embarrasses a physician more than a *complication* of disorders, where the remedy for one impedes the cure for the other. Some affairs are involved in such a degree of *intricacy*, as to exhaust the patience and perseverance of the most laborious.

Through the dislodging deep
Light my blind way; the mineral strata thence
Thrust blooming, thence the vegetable world,
Or that the rising system more complex
Of animals, and higher still the mind.—THOMSON.

Every living creature, considered in itself, has many very complicated parts that are exact copies of some other parts which it possesses, and which are *complicated* in the same manner.—ADDISON.

When the mind, by insensible degrees, has brought itself to attention and close thinking, it will be able to cope with difficulties. Every abstruse problem, every intricate question, will not baffle or break it.—LOCKE.

Complication, v. *Complexity*.

To Compliment, v. *To adulate*.

To Comply, Conform, Yield, Submit.

Comply, v. *To accede*.

Conform, compounded of *con* and *form*, signifies to put into the same form.

Yield, v. *To accede*.

Submit, in Latin *submitto*, compounded of *sub* and *mitto*, signifies to put under, that is to say, to put one's self under another person.

Compliance and *conformity* are voluntary; *yielding* and *submission* are involuntary.

Compliance is an act of the inclination; *conformity* an act of the judgment: *compliance* is altogether optional; we *comply* with a thing or not, at pleasure: *conformity* is binding on the conscience; it relates to matters in which there is a right and a wrong. *Compliance* with

* Vide Girard: "Achever, finir, termines."

the fashions and customs of those we live with is a natural propensity of the human mind that may be mostly indulged without impropriety: *conformity* in religious matters, though not to be enforced by human law, is not on that account less binding on the consciences of every member in the community; the violation of this duty on trivial grounds involves in it that of more than one branch of the moral law.

Compliance and *conformity* are produced by no external action on the mind; they flow spontaneously from the will and understanding: *yielding* is altogether the result of foreign agency. We *comply* with a wish as soon as it is known; it accords with our feelings so to do: we *yield* to the entreaties of others; it is the effect of persuasion, a constraint upon or at least a direction of the inclination. We *conform* to the regulations of a community, it is a matter of discretion; we *yield* to the superior judgment of another, we have no choice or alternative. We *comply* cheerfully; we *conform* willingly; we *yield* reluctantly.

To *yield* is to give way to another, either with one's will, judgment, or outward conduct: *submission* is the giving up of one's self altogether; it is the substitution of another's will for one's own. *Yielding* is partial; we may *yield* in one case or in one action though not in another: *submission* is general; it includes a system of conduct.

We *yield* when we do not resist; this may sometimes be the act of a superior: we *submit* only by adopting the measures and conduct proposed to us; this is always the act of an inferior. *Yielding* may be produced by means more or less gentle, by enticing or insinuating arts, or by the force of argument; *submission* is made only to power or positive force: one *yields* after a struggle; one *submits* without resistance; we *yield* to ourselves or others; we *submit* to others only; it is a weakness to *yield* either to the suggestions of others or our own inclinations to do that which our judgments condemn; it is a folly to *submit* to the caprice of any one where there is not a moral obligation: it is obstinacy not to *yield* when one's adversary has the advantage; it is sinful not to *submit* to constituted authorities.

A cheerful *compliance* with the requests of a friend is the sincerest proof of friendship: the wisest and most learned of men have ever been the readiest to *conform* to the general sense of the community in which they live: the harmony of social life is frequently disturbed by the reluctance which men have to *yield* to each other; and the order of civil society frequently destroyed by the want of proper *submission* to superiors.

I would not be thought in any part of this relation to reflect upon Signor Nicolini, who in acting this part only *complies* with the wretched taste of his audience.—ADDISON.

Being of a lay profession, I humbly *conform* to the constitutions of the church and my spiritual superiors, and I hold this obedience to be an acceptable sacrifice to God.—HOWEL.

There has been a long dispute for precedence between the tragic and the heroic poets. Aristotle would have the latter *yield* the post to the former, but Mr. Dryden and many others would never *submit* to this decision.—ADDISON.

Compliant, Yielding, Submissive.

As epithets from the preceding verbs, serve to designate a propensity to the respective actions mostly in an excessive or improper degree.

A *compliant* temper *complies* with every wish of another good or bad; a *yielding* temper leans to every opinion right or wrong; a *submissive* temper *submits* to every demand, just or unjust.

A *compliant* person wants command of feeling; a *yielding* person wants fixedness of principle; a *submissive* person wants resolution: a *compliant* disposition will be imposed upon by the selfish and unreasonable; a *yielding* disposition is most unfit for commanding; a *submissive* disposition exposes a person to the exactions of tyranny.

Be silent and *complying*: you'll soon find
Sir John without a medicine will be kind.

HARRISON.

A peaceable temper supposes *yielding* and condescending manners.—BLAIR.

When force and violence and hard necessity have brought the yoke of servitude upon the people's neck, religion will supply them with a patient and a *submissive* spirit.—FLEETWOOD.

To Comply, v. To accede.

To Compose, Settle.

Compose, from the Latin *composui*, perfect of *compono* to put together, signifies to put in due order.

Settle is a frequentative of *set*.

We *compose* that which has been disjointed and separated, by bringing it together again; we *settle* that which has been disturbed and put in motion, by making it rest: we *compose* our thoughts when they have been deranged and thrown into confusion; we *settle* our mind when it has been fluctuating and distracted by contending desires; the mind must be *composed* before we can think justly; it must be *settled* before we can act consistently.

We *compose* the differences of others: we *settle* our own differences with others: it is difficult to *compose* the quarrels of angry opponents, or to *settle* the disputes of obstinate partisans.

Thy presence did each doubtful heart *compose*,
And factions wonder'd that they once arose.

TICKELL.

Perhaps my reason may but ill defend

My *settled* faith, my mind with age impair'd

SHENSTONE.

To Compose, v. To compound.

To Compose, v. To form.

Composed, Sedate.

Composed expresses the state of being *composed* (v. *To compose*).

Sedate, in Latin *sedatus*, participles of *sedo* to settle, signifies the quality of being settled.

Composed respects the air and looks externally, and the spirits internally; *sedate* relates to the deportment or carriage externally, and

the fixedness of the purpose internally: *composed* is opposed to ruffled or hurried, *sedate* to buoyant or volatile.

Composure is a particular state of the mind; *sedateness* is an habitual frame of mind; a part of the character: a *composed* mien is very becoming in the season of devotion; a *sedate* carriage is becoming in youth who are engaged in serious concerns.

Upon her nearer approach to Hercules she stepped before the other lady, who came forward with a regular composed carriage.—ADDISON.

Let me associate with the serious night,
And contemplation, her *sedate* compeer.—THOMSON.

Composed, v. *Calm*.

Compound, Complex.

Compound comes from the present of *compono* to *compound*, from the preterite of which, *composui*, is formed the verb *compose* (v. *To compose*).

Complex, v. *Complexity*.

The *compound* consists of similar and whole bodies put together; the *complex* consists of various parts linked together: adhesion is sufficient to constitute a *compound*; involution is requisite for the *complex*; we distinguish the whole that forms the *compound*; we separate the parts that form the *complex*: what is *compound* may consist only of two; what is *complex* consists always of several.

Compound and *complex* are both commonly opposed to the simple: but the former may be opposed to the single, and the latter to the simple: words are *compound*, sentences are *complex*.

Inasmuch as man is a *compound* and a mixture of flesh as well as spirit, the soul during its abode in the body does all things by the mediation of these passions, and inferior affections.—SOUTH.

With such perfection fram'd,
Is this *complex* stupendous scheme of things.
THOMSON.

To Compound, Compose.

Compound and compose, v. *To compose*.

Compound is used in the physical sense only; *compose* in the proper or the moral sense: words are *compounded* by making two or more into one; sentences are *composed* by putting words together so as to make sense: a medicine is *compounded* of many ingredients; society is *composed* of various classes.

The simple beauties of nature, if they cannot be multiplied, they may be *compounded*.—BATHURST.

The heathens, ignorant of the true source of moral evil, generally charged it on the obliquity of matter. This notion, as most others of theirs, is a *composition* of truth and error.—GROVE.

To Comprehend, v. *To comprise*.

To Comprehend, v. *To conceive*.

Comprehensive, Extensive.

Comprehensive, from *comprehend*, in Latin *comprehendo* or *com* and *prehendo* to take, signifies the quality of putting up together or including.

Extensive from *extend*, in Latin *extendo*, or *ex* and *tendo* to stretch out, signifies the quality of reaching to a distance.

Comprehensive respects quantity, *extensive* regards space: that is *comprehensive* that *comprehends* much, that is *extensive* that *extends* into a wide field: a *comprehensive* view of a subject includes all branches of it; an *extensive* view of a subject enters into minute details: the *comprehensive* is associated with the concise; the *extensive* with the diffuse: it requires a capacious mind to take a *comprehensive* survey of any subject; it is possible for a superficial thinker to enter very *extensively* into some parts, while he passes over others.

Comprehensive is employed only with regard to intellectual objects; *extensive* is used both in the proper and the improper sense: the signification of a word is *comprehensive*, or the powers of the mind are *comprehensive*; a plain is *extensive*, or a field of inquiry is *extensive*.

It is natural to hope that a *comprehensive* is likewise an elevated soul, and that whoever is wise is also honest.—JOHNSON.

The trade carried on by the Phenicians of Sidon and Tyre was more *extensive* and enterprising than that of any state in the ancient world.—ROBERTSON.

To Comprise, Comprehend, Embrace, Contain, Include.

Comprise, through the French *compris*, participle of *comprendre*, comes from the same source as *comprehend* (v. *Comprehensive*).

Embrace, v. *To clasp*.

Contain, in French *contenir*, Latin *contineo*, compounded of *con* and *teneo*, signifies to hold together within one place.

Include, in Latin *includo*, compounded of *in* and *cludo* or *claudio*, signifies to shut in or within a given space.

Persons or things *comprise* or *include*; things only *comprehend*, *embrace* and *contain*: a person *comprises* a certain quantity of matter within a given space; he *includes* one thing within another: an author *comprises* his work within a certain number of volumes, and *includes* in it a variety of interesting particulars.

When things are spoken of, *comprise*, *comprehend*, and *embrace*, have regard to the aggregate value, quantity, or extent; *include*, to the individual things which form the whole: *contain*, either to the aggregate or to the individual, being in fact a term of more ordinary application than any of the others. *Comprise* and *contain* are used either in the proper or the figurative sense: *comprehend*, *embrace*, and *include*, in the figurative sense only: a stock *comprises* a variety of articles; a library *comprises* a variety of books; the whole is *comprised* within a small compass: rules *comprehend* a number of particulars; laws *comprehend* a number of cases; countries *comprehend* a certain number of districts or divisions; terms *comprehend* a certain meaning; a discourse *embraces* a variety of topics; a plan, project, scheme, or system, *embraces* a variety of objects: a house *contains* one, two, or more persons; a city *contains* a number of houses; a book *contains* much useful matter; a society *contains* very many individuals; it *includes* none but all

a certain class; or it *includes* some of every class.

Their arms and fishing tackle *comprise* the personal effects of most savages; all the moral law of a Christian is *comprised* under the word charity: Sweden *comprehends* Finland and Lapland: London is said to *contain* above three millions of inhabitants: bills of mortality are made out in most large parishes, but they *include* only such persons as die of diseases; a calculator of expenses will always fall short of his estimate who does not *include* the minor contingencies which usually attach to every undertaking.

What, Egypt, do thy pyramids *comprise*,
What greatness in the high raised folly lies?
SEWELL.

That particular scheme which *comprehends* the social virtues may give employment to the most industrious temper, and find a man in business more than the most active station of life.—ADDISON.

The virtues of the several soils I sing,
Mæcenæus, now the needful succour bring;
Not that any song in such a scanty space
So large a subject fully can embrace.—DRYDEN.

All a woman has to do in this world is *contained* within the duties of a daughter, a sister, a wife, and a mother.—STEELE.

The universal axiom in which all complaisance is *included* is, that no man should give any preference to himself.—JOHNSON.

It is here worthy of observation that in the two last examples from Steele and Johnson the words *comprehend* and *comprise* would, according to established usage, have been more appropriate than *contain* and *include*.

Compulsion, *v.* Constraint.

Compunction, *v.* Repentance.

To Compute, *v.* To calculate.

To Compute, *v.* To estimate.

To Conceal, Dissemble, Disguise.

Conceal, is compounded of *con* and *ceal*, in French *celer*, Latin *celo*, Hebrew *cala* to have privately.

Dissemble, in French *dissimuler*, compounded of *dis* and *simulo* or *similis*, signifies to make a thing appear unlike what it is.

Disguise, in French *disguiser*, compounded of the privative *dis* or *de* and *guise*, in German *weise*, a manner or fashion, signifies to take a form opposite to the reality.

To *conceal* is simply to abstain from making known what we wish to keep secret; to *dissemble* and *disguise* signify to *conceal*, by assuming some false appearance; we *conceal* facts; we *dissemble* feelings; we *disguise* sentiments.

* Caution only is requisite in *concealing*; it may be effected by simple silence; art and address must be employed in *dissembling*; it mingles falsehood with all its proceedings; labour and cunning are requisite in *disguising*; it has nothing but falsehood in all its movements.

The *concealer* watches over himself that he

* Vide Abbé Girard: "Cacher, dissimuler, déguiser."

may not be betrayed into any indiscreet communication; the *dissembler* has an eye to others so as to prevent them from discovering the state of his heart; *disguise* assumes altogether a different face from reality, and rests secure under this shelter: it is sufficient to *conceal* from those who either cannot or will not see; it is necessary to *dissemble* with those who can see without being shown; but it is necessary to *disguise* from those who are anxious to discover and use every means to penetrate the veil that intercepts their sight.

Concealment is a matter of prudence often advisable, mostly innocent; when we have not resolution to shake off our vices, it is wisdom at least to *conceal* them from the knowledge of others.

According to Girard, it was a maxim with Louis XI. that in order to know how to govern, it was necessary to know how to *dissemble*: this, he adds, is true in all cases, even in domestic government; but if the word conveys as much the idea of falsehood in French as in English, then is this a French and not an English maxim; there are, however, many cases in which it is prudent to *dissemble* our resentments, if by allowing them time to die away we keep them from the knowledge of others. *Disguise* is altogether opposed to candour: an ingenuous mind revolts at it; an honest man will never find it necessary, unless the Abbé Girard be right in saying that "when the necessity of circumstances and the nature of affairs call for *disguise*, it is politic." Yet what train of circumstances can we conceive to exist which will justify policy founded upon the violation of truth? Intriguers, conspirators, and all who have dishonest purposes to answer, must practise *disguise* as the only means of success, but true policy is as remote from *disguise* as cunning is from wisdom.

Ridicule is never more strong than when it is *concealed* in gravity.—SPECTATOR.

Let school-taught pride *dissemble* all it can,
These little things are great to little man.
GOLDSMITH.

Good-breeding has made the tongue falsify the heart, and act a part of continual restraint, while nature has preserved the eyes to herself, that she may not be *disguised* or misrepresented.—STEELE.

To Conceal, Hide, Secrete.

Conceal, *v.* To conceal.

Hide, from the German *huthen* to guard against, and the old German *hedan* to *conceal*, and the Greek *κεχθην* to cover or put out of sight.

Secrete, in Latin *secretus*, participle of *secerno*, or *se* and *cerno*, to see or know by one's self, signifies to put in a place known only to one's self.

Concealing has simply the idea of not letting come to observation; *hiding* that of putting under cover; *secreting* that of setting at a distance or in unfrequented places: whatever is not seen is *concealed*, but whatever is *hidden* or *secreted* is intentionally put out of sight: a person *conceals* himself behind a hedge; he *hides* his treasures in the earth; he *secretes* what he has stolen under his cloak.

Conceal is more general than either *hide* or

secrete: all things are *concealed* which are *hidden* or *secreted*, but are not always *hidden* or *secreted* when they are *concealed*: both mental and corporeal objects are *concealed*; corporeal objects mostly and sometimes mental ones are *hidden*; corporeal objects only are *secreted*; we *conceal* in the mind whatever we do not make known: that is *hidden* which may not be discovered or cannot be discerned; that is *secreted* which may not be seen.

Facts are *concealed*, truths are *hidden*, goods are *secreted*.

Children should never attempt to *conceal* from their parents or teachers any error they have committed, when called upon for an acknowledgment; we are told in Scripture, for our consolation, that nothing is *hidden* which shall not be revealed; people seldom wish to *secrete* any thing but with the intention of *concealing* it from those who have a right to demand it back.

Be secret and discreet; Love's fairy favors
Are lost when not *conceal'd*.—DRYDEN.

Yet to be secret makes not sin the less,
'Tis only *hidden* from the vulgar view.—DRYDEN.

The whole thing is too manifest to admit of any doubt in any man how long this thing has been working; how many tricks have been played with the Dean's (Swift's) papers; how they were *secreted* from time to time—POPE.

Concealment, Secrecy.

Concealment (*v. To conceal*) is itself an action; **Secrecy**, from *secret*, is the quality of an action: *concealment* may respect the state of things; *secrecy* the conduct of persons: things may be *concealed* so as to be known to no one; but *secrecy* supposes some person to whom the thing *concealed* is known.

Concealment has to do with what concerns others; *secrecy* with that which concerns ourselves: what is *concealed* is kept from the observation of others; what is *secret* is known only to ourselves: there may frequently be *concealment* without *secrecy*, although there cannot be *secrecy* without *concealment*: *concealment* is frequently practised to the detriment of others; *secrecy* is always adopted for our own advantage or gratification: *concealment* is serviceable in the commission of crimes; *secrecy* in the execution of schemes: many crimes are committed with impunity when the perpetrators are protected by *concealment*; the best concerted plans are often frustrated for want of observing *secrecy*.

One instance of Divine Wisdom is so illustrious that I cannot pass it over without notice; that is, the *concealment* under which Providence has placed the future events of our life on earth.—BLAIR.

Shun *secrecy*, and talk in open sight,
So shall you soon repair your present evil plight.
SPENSER.

To Concede, v. To give up.

Conceit, Fancy.

Conceit comes immediately from the Latin *conceptus*, participle of *concipio* to conceive or form in the mind.

Fancy, in French *phantasie*, Latin *phantasia*, Greek *φαντασις*, from *phantazeo* to make appear, and *phantos* to appear.

These terms equally express the working of the imagination in its distorted state; but *conceit* denotes a much greater degree of distortion than *fancy*: our *conceits* are preposterous; what we *fancy* is unreal, or only apparent. *Conceit* applies only to internal objects; it is mental in the operation and the result; it is a species of invention: *fancy* is applied to external objects, or whatever acts on the senses: nervous people are subject to strange *conceits*; timid people *fancy* they hear sounds, or see objects in the dark which awaken terror.

Those who are apt to *conceit* oftener *conceit* that which is painful than otherwise; *conceit* either that they are always in danger of dying, or that all the world is their enemy. There are, however, insane people who *conceit* themselves to be kings and queens: and some indeed who are not called insane, who *conceit* themselves very learned whilst they know nothing, or very wise and clever while they are exposing themselves to perpetual ridicule for their folly, or very handsome while the world calls them plain, or very peaceable while they are always quarrelling with their neighbours, or very humble whilst they are tenaciously sticking for their own: it would be well if such *conceits* afforded a harmless pleasure to their authors, but unfortunately they only render them more offensive and disgusting than they would otherwise be.

Those who are apt to *fancy* never *fancy* any thing to please themselves; they *fancy* that things are too long or too short, too thick or too thin, too cold or too hot, with a thousand other *fancies* equally trivial in their nature; thereby proving that the slightest aberration of the mind is a serious evil, and productive of evil.

Desponding fear, of feeble fancies full,
Weak and unmanly, loosens every power.—THOMSON.

Some have been wounded with *conceit*,
And died of mere opinion strait.—BUTLER.

When taken in reference to intellectual objects, *conceit* is always in a bad sense: but *fancy* may be employed in a good sense.

Nothing can be more plainly impossible than for a man "to be profitable to God," and consequently nothing can be more absurd than for a man to cherish so irrational a *conceit*.—ADDISON.

My friend, Sir Roger de Coverley, told me t'other day, that he had been reading my paper upon Westminster Abbey, in which, says he, there are a great many ingenious *fancies*.—ADDISON.

Conceit, v. Pride.

Conceited, v. Opinionated.

To Conceive, Apprehend, Suppose, Imagine.

Conceive, v. Conceit.

Apprehend, v. To apprehend.

Suppose, in French *supposer*, Latin *supposui*, perfect of *suppono*, or *sub* and *pono* to put one thing in the place of another, signifies to have one thing in one's mind in lieu of another.

Imagine, in French *imaginer*, Latin *imagino*, from *imago* an image, signifies to reflect as an image or phantom in the mind.

Conceive, in the strict sense of the word, is the generic, the others the specific terms: since in *apprehending*, *imagining*, and *supposing*, we always *conceive* or form an idea, but not *vice versa*; the difference consists in the mode and object of the action: we *conceive* of things as proper or improper, and just or unjust, right or wrong, good or bad, this is an act of the judgment; we *apprehend* the meaning of another, this is by the power of simple perception, or of combination and reflection; we *suppose* and *imagine* that which has happened or may happen, these are both acts of the *imagination*; but the former rests commonly on some ground of reality; the latter may be the mere offspring of the brain.

What is *conceived* is conclusive; what is *apprehended* is rather dubious; both refer to matters of deduction, in distinction from *suppose* and *imagine*, which relate to matters of fact.

To *conceive* is an ordinary operation of the mind; it must precede every other; we cannot either think or act without *conceiving* *apprehend* is employed in cases where certainty cannot be had, where no determinate conclusion can be formed; we shall never *apprehend* where we can see distinctly before us: *suppose* is used in opposition to positive knowledge; no person *supposes* that of which he is positively informed: *imagine* is employed for that which in all probability does not exist; we shall not *imagine* what is evident and undeniable.

A state of innocence and happiness is so remote from all that we have ever seen, that although we can easily *conceive* it as possible, yet our speculations upon it must be general and confused.—JOHNSON.

Nothing is a misery,
Unless our weakness *apprehend* it so.
BEAUMONT AND FLETCHER.

It can scarce be *supposed* that the mind is more vigorous when we sleep, than when we are awake.—HAWKES-WORTH.

The Earl of Rivers did not *imagine* there could exist, in a human form, a mother that would ruin her own son without enriching herself.—JOHNSON'S LIFE OF SAVAGE.

To Conceive, Understand, Comprehend.

Conceive, in French *concevoir*, Latin *concipio*, compounded of *con* and *capio*, signifies to take or put together in the mind.

Understand signifies to stand under or near to the mind.

Comprehend, in Latin *comprehendo*, compounded of *com* and *prehendo*, signifies to seize or embrace within the mind.

These terms indicate the intellectual operations of forming ideas, that is, ideas of the complex kind in distinction from the simple ideas formed by the act of perception.

Conception is the simplest operation of the three; when we *conceive* we may have but one idea, when we *understand* or *comprehend* we have all the ideas which the subject is capable of presenting. We cannot *understand* or *comprehend* without *conceiving*; but we may often *conceive* that which we neither *understand* nor *comprehend*.

That which we cannot *conceive* is to us nothing; but the *conception* of it gives it an

existence, at least in our minds; but *understanding* and *comprehending* is not essential to the belief of a thing's existence. So long as we have reasons sufficient to *conceive* a thing as possible or probable, it is not necessary either to *understand* or *comprehend* them in order to authorize our belief. The mysteries of our holy religion are objects of *conception*, but not of *comprehension*. We *conceive* that a thing may be done without *understanding* how it is done; we *conceive* that a thing may exist without *comprehending* the nature of its existence. We *conceive* clearly, *understand* fully, *comprehend* minutely.

Conception is a species of invention; it is the fruit of the mind's operation within itself. *Understanding* and *comprehension* are employed solely on external objects; we *understand* and *comprehend* that which actually exists before us, and presents itself to our observation. *Conceiving* is the office of the imagination, as well as the judgment; *understanding* and *comprehension* are the office of the reasoning faculties exclusively.

* *Conceiving* is employed with regard to matters of taste, to arrangements, designs, and projects; *understanding* is employed on familiar objects which present themselves in the ordinary discourse and business of men; *comprehending* respects principles, lessons, and speculative knowledge in general. The artist *conceives* a design, and he who will execute it must *understand* it; the poet *conceives* that which is grand and sublime, and he who will enjoy the perusal of his *conceptions* must have refinement of mind, and capacity to *comprehend* the grand and sublime. The builder *conceives* plans, the scholar *understands* languages, the metaphysician *comprehends* subtle questions.

A ready *conception* supplies us with a stock of ideas on all subjects; a quick *understanding* catches the intentions of others with half a word; a penetrating mind *comprehends* the abstrusest points. There are human beings involved in such profound ignorance, that they cannot *conceive* of the most ordinary things that exist in civilized life: there are those who, though slow at *understanding* words, will be quick at *understanding* looks and signs: and there are others who, though dull at *conceiving* or *understanding* common matters, will have a power for *comprehending* the abstruser parts of the mathematics.

Whatever they cannot immediately *conceive* they consider as too high to be reached, or too extensive to be *comprehended*.—JOHNSON.

Swift pays no court to the passions; he excites neither surprise, nor admiration; he always *understands* himself, and his readers always *understand* him.—JOHNSON.

Our finite knowledge cannot *comprehend*
The principles of an unbounded sway.—SHIRLEY.

Conception, Notion.

Conception, from *conceive* (v. To *conceive*), signifies the thing *conceived*.

Notion, in French *notion*, Latin *notio*, from *notus* the participle of *nosco*, to know, signifies the thing known.

Conception is the mind's own work, what it

* Vide Abbé Girard; "Entendre, comprendre, concevoir."

pictures to itself from the exercise of its own powers; *notion* is the representation of objects as they are drawn from observation. *Conceptions* are the fruit of the imagination; *notions* are the result of reflection and experience. *Conceptions* are formed; *notions* are entertained. *Conceptions* are either grand or mean, gross or sublime, either clear or indistinct, crude or distinct; *notions* are either true or false, just or absurd. Intellectual culture serves to elevate the *conception*; the extension of knowledge serves to correct and refine the *notions*.

Some heathen philosophers had an indistinct *conception* of the Deity, whose attributes and character are unfolded to us in his revelation: the ignorant have often false *notions* of their duty and obligations to their superiors. The unenlightened express their gross and crude *conceptions* of a Superior Being by some material and visible object: the vulgar *notion* of ghosts and spirits is not entirely banished from the most cultivated parts of England.

Words signify not immediately and primely things themselves, but the *conceptions* of the mind concerning things.—SOUTH.

The story of Telemachus is formed altogether in the spirit of Homer, and will give an unlearned reader a *notion* of that great poet's manner of writing.—ADDISON.

It is natural for the imaginations of men who lead their lives in too solitary a manner to prey upon themselves, and form from their own *conceptions* beings and things which have no place in nature.—STEELE.

Considering that the happiness of the other world is to be the happiness of the whole man, who can question, but there is an infinite variety in those pleasures we are speaking of. Revelation, likewise, very much confirms this *notion* under the different views it gives us of our future happiness.—ADDISON.

Conception, v. Perception.

Concern, v. Affair.

Concern, v. Affect.

Concern, v. Care.

Concern, v. Interest.

To Concert, Contrive, Manage.

Concert is either a variation of *consort* a companion, or from the Latin *concerto* to debate together.

Contrive, from *contrivum* perfect of *contero* to bruise together, signifies to pound or put together in the mind so as to form a composition.

Manage, in French *menager*, compounded of the Latin *manus* and *ago*, signifies to lead by the hand.

There is a secret understanding in *concerting*; invention in *contriving*; execution in *managing*. There is mostly *contrivance* and *management* in *concerting*; but there is not always *concerting* in *contrivance* or *management*. Measures are *concerted*; schemes are *contrived*; affairs are *managed*.

Two parties at least are requisite in *concerting*, one is sufficient for *contriving* and *managing*. *Concerting* is always employed in all secret transactions; *contrivance* and *management* are used indifferently.

Robbers who have determined on any scheme of plunder *concert* together the means of carrying their project into execution; they *contrive*

various devices to elude the vigilance of the police; they *manage* every thing in the dark.

Those who are debarred the opportunity of seeing each other unrestrainedly, *concert* measures for meeting privately. The ingenuity of a person is frequently displayed in the *contrivances* by which he strives to help himself out of his troubles. Whenever there are many parties interested in a concern, it is never so well *managed* as when it is in the hands of one individual suitably qualified.

Modern statesmen are *concerting* schemes and engaged in the depth of politics, at the time when their forefathers were laid down quietly to rest, and had nothing in their heads but dreams.—STEELE.

When Cæsar was one of the masters of the mint, he placed the figure of an elephant upon the reverse of the public money: the word Cæsar signifying an elephant in the Punic language. This was artfully *contrived* by Cæsar; because it was not lawful for a private man to stamp his own figure upon the coin of the commonwealth.—ADDISON.

It is the great act and secret of Christianity, if I may use that phrase, to *manage* our actions to the best advantage.—ADDISON.

To Conciliate, Reconcile.

Conciliate, in Latin *conciliatus*, participle of *concilio*: and **Reconcile**, in Latin *reconcilio*, both come from *concilium* a council, denoting unity and harmony.

Conciliate and *reconcile* are both employed in the sense of uniting men's affections, but under different circumstances.

The *conciliator* gets the good-will and affections for himself; the *reconciler* unites the affections of two persons to each other. The *conciliator* may either gain new affections, or regain those which are lost; the *reconciler* always either renews affections which have been once lost, or fixes them where they ought to be fixed. The best means of *conciliating* esteem is by *reconciling* all that are at variance.

Conciliate is mostly employed for men in public stations; *reconcile* is indifferently employed for those in public or private stations. Men in power have sometimes the happy opportunity of *conciliating* the good-will of those who are most averse to their authority, and thus *reconciling* them to measures which would otherwise be odious.

Kindness and condescension serve to *conciliate*: a friendly influence, or a well-timed exercise of authority, is often successfully exerted in *reconciling*.

The preacher may enforce his doctrines in the style of authority, for it is his profession to summon mankind to their duty; but an uncommissioned instructor will study to *conciliate* whilst he attempts to correct.—CUMBERLAND.

It must be confessed a happy attachment, which can reconcile the Laplander to his freezing snows, and the African to his scorching sun.—CUMBERLAND.

Concise, v. Short.

To Conclude, v. To close.

To Conclude Upon, v. To decide.

Conclusion, Inference, Deduction.

Conclusion, from *conclude*, signifies the winding up of all arguments and reasoning.

Inference, from *infer*, in Latin *infero*, signifies what is brought in.

Deduction, from *deduct*, in Latin *deductus*, and *deduco* to bring out, signifies the bringing or drawing one thing from another.

A *conclusion* is full and decisive; an *inference* is partial and indecisive: a *conclusion* leaves the mind in no doubt or hesitation; it puts a stop to all farther reasoning: *inferences* are special *conclusions* from particular circumstances; they serve as links in the chain of reasoning. *Conclusions* are drawn from real facts; *inferences* are drawn from the appearances of things; *deductions* only from arguments or assertions.

Conclusions are practical; *inferences* ratiocinative; *deductions* are final. We *conclude* from a person's conduct or declarations what he intends to do, or leave undone; we *infer* from the appearance of the clouds, or the thickness of the atmosphere, that there will be a heavy fall of rain or snow; we *deduce* from a combination of facts, *inferences*, and assertions, that a story is fabricated. Hasty *conclusions* betray a want of judgment, or of firmness of mind: contrary *inferences* are frequently drawn from the same circumstances to serve the purposes of party, and support a favourite position; the *deductions* in such cases are not unfrequently true when the *inferences* are false.

He praises wine, and we *conclude* from thence
He lik'd his glass, on his own evidence.—ADDISON.

You might, from the single people departed, make some useful *inferences* or guesses how many there are left unmarried.—STEELE.

There is a consequence which seems very naturally deducible from the foregoing considerations. If the scale of being rises by such a regular progress so high as man, we may by a parity of reason suppose that it still proceeds gradually through those beings which are of a superior nature to him.—ADDISON.

Conclusive, Decisive, Convincing.

Conclusive applies either to practical or argumentative matters; **Decisive** to what is practical only; **Convincing** to what is argumentative only.

It is necessary to be *conclusive* when we deliberate, and *decisive* when we command. What is *conclusive* puts an end to all discussion, and determines the judgment; what is *decisive* puts an end to all wavering, and determines the will. Negotiators have sometimes an interest in not speaking *conclusively*; commanders can never retain their authority without speaking *decisively*; *conclusive* when compared to *convincing* is general; the latter is particular: an argument is *convincing*, a chain of reasoning *conclusive*. There may be much that is *convincing*, where there is nothing *conclusive*: a proof may be *convincing* of a particular circumstance; but *conclusive* evidence will bear upon the main question.

I will not disguise that Dr. Bentley, whose criticism is so *conclusive* for the forgery of those tragedies quoted by Plutarch, is of opinion "Thespis himself published nothing in writing."—CUMBERLAND.

Is it not somewhat singular that Young preserved, without any palliation, this preface (to his Satire on Women) so bluntly *decisive* in favour of laughing at the world, in the same collection of his works which contains the mournful, angry, gloomy *Night Thoughts*?—CROFT.

That religion is essential to the welfare of man can be proved by the most *convincing* arguments.—BLAIR.

Conclusive, v. Final.

Concomitant, v. Accompaniment.

Concord, Harmony.

Concord, in French *concorde*, Latin *concordia*, from *con* and *cors*, having the same heart and mind.

Harmony, in French *harmonie*, Latin *harmonia*, Greek, *armonia* from *arō* to fit or suit, signifies the state of fitting or suiting.

The idea of union is common to both these terms, but under different circumstances. *Concord* is generally employed for the union of wills and affections; *harmony* respects the aptitude to minds to coalesce. There may be *concord* without *harmony*, and *harmony* without *concord*. Persons may live in *concord* who are at a distance from each other; but *harmony* is mostly employed for those who are in close connexion, and obliged to co-operate. *Concord* should never be broken by relations under any circumstances; *harmony* is indispensable in all members of a family that dwell together. Interest will sometimes stand in the way of brotherly *concord*: a love of rule, and a dogmatical temper, will sometimes disturb the *harmony* of a family. *Concord* is as essential to domestic happiness as *harmony* is to the peace of society, and the uninterrupted prosecution of business. What *concord* can there be between kindred who despise each other? what *harmony* between the rash and the discreet?

The man that hath no music in himself,
Nor is not mov'd with *concord* of sweet sounds,
Is fit for treasons, villainies, and spoli.

SHAKESPEARE.

If we consider the world in its subservency to man, one would think it was made for our use; but if we consider it in its natural beauty and *harmony* one would be apt to conclude it was made for our pleasure.—ADDISON.

To Concur, v. To agree.

To Concur, v. To coincide.

Concurrence, v. Assent.

Concussion, v. Shock.

To Condemn, v. To blame.

To Condemn, v. To reprobate.

To Condemn, v. To sentence.

Condescension, v. Complaisance.

Condition, v. Article.

Condition, Station.

Condition, in French *condition*, Latin *conditio*, from *condo* to build or form, signifies properly the thing formed; and in an extended sense, the manner and circumstances under which a thing is formed.

Station, in French *station*, Latin *statio*, from *sto* to stand, signifies a standing place or point.

Condition has most relation to the circumstances, education, birth, and the like; *station* refers rather to the rank, occupation, or mode of life which one pursues. Riches suddenly

required are calculated to make a man forget his original condition; and to render him negligent of the duties of his station.

The condition of men in reality is often so different from what it appears, that it is extremely difficult to form an estimate of what they are, or what they have been. It is the folly of the present day, that every man is unwilling to keep the station which has been assigned to him by Providence: the rage for equality destroys every just distinction in society; the low aspire to be, in appearance, at least, equal with their superiors; and those in elevated stations do not hesitate to put themselves on a level with their inferiors.

The common charge against those who rise above their original condition, is that of pride.—JOHNSON.

The last day will assign to every one a station suitable to the dignity of his character.—ADDISON.

Condition, v. Situation.

Condolence, v. Sympathy.

Conduct, v. Behaviour.

To Conduce, Contribute.

Conduce, Latin *conduco*, compounded of *con* and *duco*, signifies to bring together for one end.

Contribute, in Latin *contributus*, participle of *contribuo*, compounded of *con* and *tribuo*, signifies to bestow for the same end.

To *conduce* signifies to serve the full purpose; to *contribute* signifies only to be a subordinate instrument: the former is always taken in a good sense, the latter in a bad or good sense. Exercise *conduces* to the health; it *contributes* to give vigour to the frame.

Nothing *conduces* more to the well-being of any community than a spirit of subordination among all ranks and classes. A want of firmness and vigilance in the government or magistrates *contributes* greatly to the spread of disaffection and rebellion.

Schemes of ambition never *conduce* to tranquillity of mind. A single failure may *contribute* sometimes to involve a person in perpetual trouble.

It is to be allowed that doing all honour to the superiority of heroes above the rest of mankind, must needs *conduce* to the glory and advantage of a nation.—STEELE.

The true choice of our diet, and our companions at it, seems to consist in that which *contributes* most to cheerfulness and refreshment.—FULLER.

To Conduct, Guide, Lead.

Conduct, Latin *conductus*, participle of *conduco*, signifies to carry with a person, or to make a thing go according to one's will.

Guide, in French *guider*, Saxon *weitan* or *wisan*, German, &c. *weisen* to show, Latin *video* to see or show, signifies properly to point out the way.

Lead, in Saxon *ladden*, *laden*, Danish *lede*, Swedish *leda*, low German *leiden*, high German *leiten*, is most probably connected with the obsolete German *leit*, *leige*, a way or road, Swedish *led*, Saxon *late*, &c. signifying properly to show or direct in the way.

* The first two of these terms convey, according to their real import, an idea of superior intelligence, which is not implied by the latter: on the other hand, this includes an idea of credit and ascendancy altogether unknown to the others. We *conduct* or *guide* those who do not know the road; we *lead* those who either cannot or will not go alone.

In the literal sense it is the head that *conducts*, the eye that *guides*, and the hand that *leads*. One conducts a law-suit; one *guides* a traveller; one *leads* an infant.

In the figurative sense the understanding *conducts*; rule *guides*; the will or influence *leads*. † Intelligence ought to *conduct* us in business; politeness ought to *guide* our behaviour in company; taste may *lead* us in the choice of pleasures.

We are *conducted* in a certain course, that we may do what is proper to be done; we are *guided* in a certain rout, that we may not go astray; we are *led* into society from a sociable temper. A general *conducts* an army according to his knowledge and experience; he is himself *guided* in what he does by fixed rules; he *leads* his army into the field of battle by the word of command. The pilot *conducts* the vessel; the steersman *guides* it: the coachman *guides* his horses on the road; he *leads* them into the stable.

A master of the ceremonies *conducts* all strangers whom he wishes to introduce into the company. A teacher *guides* his scholars in the acquirement of knowledge. A love of pleasure sometimes *leads* young people into the most destructive vices.

A wise man is willing to be *conducted*, in cases where he cannot with propriety *conduct* himself. An attentive perusal of the Scriptures is sufficient to *guide* us in the way of salvation. There is a weakness in suffering one's self to be *led* by the will of others: prudent people are willing to take good counsel, but they will always form their own resolutions.

We waited some time in expectation of the next worthy, who came in with a great retinue of historians, whose names I could not learn, most of them being natives of Carthage. The person thus *conducted*, who was Hannibal, seemed much disturbed.—ADDISON.

The brutes are *guided* by instinct and know no sorrow, the angels have knowledge and they are happy.—STEELE.

A general's office engages him to *lead* as well as to command his army.—SOUTH.

To Conduct, Manage, Direct

Conduct, v. To conduct, guide.

Manage, v. Care, charge.

Direct, in Latin *directus*, participle of *dirigo*, compounded of *di* and *rego* to regulate distinctly, signifies to put every thing in its right place.

Conducting requires most wisdom and knowledge; *managing* most action; *direction* most authority. A lawyer *conducts* the cause entrusted to him: a steward *manages* the mercantile concerns for his employer; a superintendent *directs* the movements of all the subordinate agents.

* Vide Abbé Girard; "Conduire, guider, mener."

† Vide Girard; "Conduire, guider, mener;" and Boubaud; "Guider, conduire, mener."

Conducting is always applied to affairs of the first importance: *management* is a term of familiar use to characterize a familiar employment; *direction* makes up in authority what it wants in importance; it falls but little short of the word *conduct*. A *conductor* conceives and plans; a *manager* acts or executes; a *director* commands. It is necessary to *conduct* with wisdom; to *manage* with diligence and attention; to *direct* with promptitude, precision, and clearness. A minister of state requires peculiar talents to *conduct* with success the various and complicated concerns which are connected with his office: he must exercise much skill in *managing* the various characters and clashing interests with which he becomes connected and possess much influence to *direct* the multiplied operations by which the grand machine of government is kept in motion.

When a general undertakes to *conduct* a campaign he will entrust the *management* of minor concerns to persons on whom he can rely; but he will *direct* in person whatever is likely to have any serious influence on his success.

The general purposes of men in the *conduct* of their lives, I mean with relation to this life only, end in gaining either the affection or esteem of those with whom they converse.—STEELE.

Good delivery is a graceful *management* of the voice, countenance, and gesture.—STEELE.

I have sometimes amused myself with considering the several methods of *managing* a debate, which have obtained in the world.—ADDISON.

To *direct* a wanderer in the right way is to light another man's candle by one's own, which loses none of its light by what the other gains.—GROVE.

Confederacy, v. Alliance.

Confederate, Accomplice.

Confederate, v. Ally.

Accomplice, v. Abettor.

Both these terms imply a partner in some proceeding, but they differ as to the nature of the proceeding: in the former case it may be lawful or unlawful; in the latter unlawful only. In this latter sense a *confederate* is a partner in a plot or secret association; an *accomplice* is a partner in some active violation of the laws. Guy Fawkes retained his resolution, till the last extremity, not to reveal the names of his *confederates*: it is the common refuge of all robbers and desperate characters to betray their *accomplices* in order to screen themselves from punishment.

Now march the bold *confederates* through the plain,
Well hors'd, well clad, a rich and shining train.
—DRYDEN.

It is not improbable that the Lady Mason (the grandmother of Savage) might persuade or compel his mother to desert, or perhaps she could not easily find *accomplices* wicked enough to concur in so cruel an action, as that of banishing him to the American plantations.—JOHNSON.

Confederate, v. Ally.

To Confer, Bestow.

Confer, in French conferer, Latin confero, compounded of con and fero, signifies to bring

something towards a person, or place it upon him.

Bestow is compounded of *be* and *stow*, which, like the vulgar word *stoke*, comes from the German *stauen* and *stomchen*, and is an onomatopœia, or representative of the action intended to be expressed, namely, that of disposing in a place.

Conferring is an act of authority; *bestowing* that of charity or generosity. Princes and men in power *confer*; people in a private station *bestow*. Honours, dignities, privileges, and rank, are the things *conferred*; favours, kindnesses, and pecuniary relief, are the things *bestowed*.

Merit, favour, interest, caprice, or intrigue, gives rise to *conferring*; necessity, solicitation and private affection, lead to *bestowing*. England affords more than one instance in which the highest honours of the state have been *conferred* on persons of distinguished merit, though not of elevated birth: it is the characteristic of Christianity, that it inspires its followers with a desire of *bestowing* their goods on the poor and necessitous.

It is not easy to *confer* a favour on the unthankful; the value of a kindness is greatly enhanced by the manner in which it is *bestowed*.

On him *confer* the poet's sacred name,
Whose lofty voice declares the heavenly flame.
—ADDISON.

It sometimes happens, that even enemies and envious persons *bestow* the sincerest marks of esteem when they least design it.—STEELE.

Conference, v. Conversation.

Confess, v. Acknowledge.

To Confide, Trust.

Confide, in Latin *confido*, compounded of *con* and *fido*, signifies to place a trust in a person.

Trust, v. Belief.

Both these verbs express a reliance on the fidelity of another, but *confide* is to *trust* as the species to the genus: we always *trust* when we *confide*, but not *vice-versâ*. We *confide* to a person that which is of the greatest importance to ourselves; we *trust* to him whenever we rest on his word for any thing. We need rely only on a person's integrity when we *trust* to him, but we rely also on his abilities and mental qualifications when we place *confidence*; it is an extraordinary *trust*, founded on a powerful conviction in a person's favour.

Confidence frequently supposes something secret as well as personal; *trust* respects only the personal interest. A king *confides* in his ministers and generals for the due execution of his plans, and the administration of the laws; one friend *confides* in another when he discloses to him all his private concerns: a merchant *trusts* to his clerks when he employs them in his business; individuals *trust* each other with portions of their property.

A breach of *trust* evinces a want of that common principle which keeps human society together; but a breach of *confidence*, betrays a

more than ordinary share of baseness and depravity.

Men live and prosper but in mutual trust.
A confidence of one another's truth.—SOUTHERN.

Hence, credit
And public trust 'twixt man and man are broken.
HOWE.

Confidence, *v. Assurance.*

Confidence, *v. Hope.*

Confident, Dogmatical, Positive.

Confident, from *confide* (*v. To confide*), marks the temper of *confiding* in one's self.

Dogmatical, from *dogma* a maxim or assertion, signifies the temper of dealing in unqualified assertions.

Positive, in Latin *positivus*, from *positus*, signifies fixed to a point.

The first two of these words denote an habitual or permanent state of mind; the latter either a partial or an habitual temper. There is much of *confidence* in *dogmatism* and *positivity*, but it expresses more than either. *Confidence* implies a general reliance on one's abilities in whatever we undertake; *dogmatism* implies a reliance on the truth of our opinion; *positivity* a reliance on the truth of our assertions. A *confident* man is always ready to act, as he is sure of succeeding; a *dogmatical* man is always ready to speak, as he is sure of being heard; a *positive* man is determined to maintain what he has asserted, as he is convinced that he has made no mistake.

Confidence is opposed to diffidence; *dogmatism* to scepticism; *positivity* to hesitation. A *confident* man mostly fails for want of using the necessary means to ensure success; a *dogmatical* man is mostly in error, because he substitutes his own partial opinions for such as are established; a *positive* man is mostly deceived because he trusts more to his own senses and memory than he ought. Self-knowledge is the most effectual cure for *self-confidence*; an acquaintance with men and things tends to lessen *dogmatism*; the experience of having been deceived one's-self, and the observation that others are perpetually liable to be deceived, ought to check the folly of being *positive* as to any event or circumstance that is past.

People forget how little it is that they know and how much less it is that they can do, when they grow *confident* upon any present state of things.—SOUTH.

If you are neither *dogmatical*, nor show either by your words or your actions that you are full of yourself, all will the more heartily rejoice at your victory.—BUDGELL.

Positive as you now are in your opinions, and *confident* in your assertions, be assured that the time approaches when both men and things will appear to you in a different light.—BLAIR.

Confine, *v. Border.*

To Confine, *v. To bound.*

Confined, *v. Contracted.*

Confinement, Imprisonment,
Captivity.

Confinement, *v. To bound, limit.*

Imprisonment, compounded of *in* and *prison*, French *prison*, from *pris* participle of *prendre*, Latin *prehendo* to take, signifies the act or state of being taken or laid hold of.

Captivity, in French *captivité*, Latin *captivitas* from *capio*, to take, signifies likewise the state of being, or being kept in possession by another.

Confinement is the generic, the other two specific terms. *Confinement* and *imprisonment* both imply the abridgment of one's personal freedom, but the former specifies no cause which the latter does. We may be *confined* in a room by ill health, or *confined* in any place by way of punishment; but we are never *imprisoned* but in some specific place appointed for the *confinement* of offenders, and always on some supposed offence. We are *captives* by the rights of war, when we fall into the hands of the enemy.

Confinement does not specify the degree or manner as the other terms do: it may even extend to the restricting the body of its free movements: while *imprisonment* simply *confines* the person within a certain extent of ground, or the walls of a *prison*; and *captivity* leaves a person at liberty to range within a whole country or district.

Confinement is so general a term, as to be applied to animals and even inanimate objects; *imprisonment* and *captivity* are applied in the proper sense to persons only, but they admit of a figurative application. Poor stray animals, who are found trespassing on unlawful ground, are doomed to a wretched *confinement*, rendered still more hard and intolerable by the want of food: the *confinement* of plants within too narrow a space will stop their growth for want of air. There is many a poor *captive* in a cage who, like Sterne's starling, would say, if it could, "I want to get out."

But now my sorrows, long with pain supprest,
Burst their *confinement* with impetuous away.
YOUNG.

Confinement of any kind is dreadful: let your imagination acquaint you with what I have not words to express, and conceive, if possible, the horrors of *imprisonment*, attended with reproach and ignominy.—JOHNSON.

For life, being weary of these worldly bars,
Never lacks power to dismiss itself;
In that each bondman, in his own hand, bears
The power to cancel his *captivity*;
ut I do think it cowardly and vile.

SHAKESPEARE.

To Confirm, Corroborate.

Confirm, in French *confirmer*, Latin *confirmo*, which is compounded of *con* and *firmitas*, signifying to make additionally firm.

Corroborate, in Latin *corroboratus* participle of *corroboro*, compounded of *cor* or *con* and *roboro* to strengthen, signifies to add to the strength.

The idea of strengthening is common to these terms, but under different circumstances: *confirm* is used generally; *corroborate* only in particular instances.

What *confirms* serves to *confirm* the minds of others; what *corroborates* strengthens one's self: a testimony may be *confirmed* or *corroborated*; but the thing *confirms*, the person *corroborates*:

when the truth of a person's assertions are called in question, it is fortunate for him when circumstances present themselves that *confirm* the truth of what he has said, or if he have respectable friends to *corroborate* his testimony.

There is an Abyssinian here who knew Mr. Bruce at Gondar. I have examined him, and he *confirms* Mr. Bruce's account.—SIR WM. JONES.

The secrecy of this conference very much favours my conjecture, that Augustus made an attempt to dissuade Tiberius from holding on the empire; and the length of time it took up *corroborates* the probability of that conjecture.—CUMBERLAND.

To Confirm, Establish.

Confirm, v. *To confirm, corroborate.*

Establish, from the word *stable*, signifies to make stable or able to stand.

The idea of strengthening is common to these as to the former terms, but with a different application: *confirm* respects the state of a person's mind, and whatever acts upon the mind; *establish* is employed with regard to whatever is external: a report is *confirmed*; a reputation is *established*: a person is *confirmed* in the persuasion or belief of any truth or circumstance; a thing is *established* in the public estimation.

The mind seeks its own means of *confirming* itself; things are *established* either by time or authority: no person should be hasty in giving credit to reports that are not fully *confirmed*, nor in giving support to measures that are not *established* upon the surest grounds; a reciprocity of good offices serves to *confirm* an alliance, or a good understanding between people and nations; interest or reciprocal affection serves to *establish* an intercourse between individuals, which has, perhaps, been casually commenced.

Trifles, light as air,
Are to the jealous, confirmations strong
As proofs of Holy Writ.—SHAKESPEARE.

The silk-worm, after having spun her task, lays her eggs and dies: but a man can never have taken in his full measure of knowledge, has not time to subdue his passions, or *establish* his soul in virtue, and come up to the perfection of his nature, before he is hurried off the stage.—ADDISON.

Conflict, Combat, Contest.

Conflict, in Latin *conflictus*, participle of *confingo*, compounded of *con* and *fligo*, in Greek *φάγγω* *phagō* for *φάβω* to flip or strike, signifies to strike against each other.

Combat, v. *Battle.*

Contest, in French *contester*, Latin *contestor*, compounded of *con* and *testor*, signifies to call or set witness against witness.

A striving for the superiority is the common characteristic of these terms, which is varied both in the manner and spirit of the action.

A *conflict* has more of violence in it than a *combat*, and a *combat* than a *contest*.

A *conflict* and *combat*, in the proper sense, are always attended with a personal attack; *contest* consists mostly of a striving for some common object.

A *conflict* is mostly sanguinary and desperate, it arises from the undisciplined operations of

the bad passions, animosity, and brutal rage; it seldom ends in any thing but destruction: a *combat* is often a matter of art and a trial of skill; it may be obstinate and lasting, though not arising from any personal resentment, and mostly terminates with the triumph of one party and the defeat of the other; a *contest* is interested and personal; it may often give rise to angry and even malignant sentiments, but is not necessarily associated with any bad passion; it ends in the advancement of one to the injury of the other.

The lion, the tiger, and other beasts of the forest, have dreadful *conflicts* whenever they meet; which seldom terminate but in the death of one if not both of the antagonists: it would be well if the use of the word were confined to the irrational part of the creation; but there have been wars and party-broils among men, which have occasioned *conflicts* the most horrible and destructive that can be conceived: that *combats* have been mere trials of skill is evinced by the *combats* in the ancient games of the Greeks and Romans, as also in the justs and tournaments of later date. *Contests* are as various as the pursuits and wishes of men: whatever is an object of desire for two parties becomes the ground of a *contest*: ambition, interest, and party zeal are always busy in furnishing men with objects for a *contest*.

In a figurative sense these terms are applied to the movements of the mind, the elements or whatever seems to oppose itself to another thing, in which sense they preserve the same analogy; violent passions have their *conflicts*; ordinary desires their *combats*; motives their *contests*: it is the poet's part to describe the *conflicts* between pride and passion, rage and despair, in the breast of the disappointed lover; reason will seldom come off victorious in its *combat* with ambition, avarice, a love of pleasure, or any predominant desire, unless aided by religion: where there is a *contest* between the desire of following one's will and a sense of propriety, the voice of a prudent friend may be heard and heeded.

Happy is the man who, in the *conflict* of desire between God and the world, can oppose not only argument to argument, but pleasure to pleasure.—BLAIR.

Elsewhere he saw, where Troilus defied
Achilles, and unequal *combat* tried.—DRYDEN.

Soon afterwards the death of the king furnished a general subject for poetical *contest*.—JOHNSON.

To Conform, v. *To comply.*

Conformable, Agreeable, Suitable.

Conformable signifies able to *conform* (*v.* *To comply*), that is, having a sameness of form.

Agreeable signifies the quality of being able to *agree* (*v.* *To agree*).

Suitable signifies able to *suit* (*v.* *To agree*). *Conformable* is employed for matters of obligation; *agreeable* for matters of choice; *suitable* for matters of propriety and discretion: what is *conformable* accords with some prescribed form or given rule of others; what is *agreeable* accords with the feelings, tempers, or judgments of ourselves or others; what is

suitable accords with outward circumstances: it is the business of those who act for others to act *conformably* to their directions; it is the part of a friend to act *agreeably* to the wishes of a friend; it is the part of every man to act *suitably* to his station.

The decisions of a judge must be strictly *conformable* to the letter of the law; he is seldom at liberty to consult his views of equity: the decision of a partisan is always *agreeable* to the temper of his party: the style of a writer should be *suitable* to his subject.

Conformable is most commonly employed for matters of temporary moment; *agreeable* and *suitable* are mostly said of things which are of constant value: we make things *conformable* by an act of discretion; they are *agreeable* or *suitable* by their own nature: a treaty of peace is made *conformable* to the preliminaries; a legislator must take care to frame laws *agreeably* to the Divine law; it is of no small importance for every man to act *suitably* to the character he has assumed.

A man is glad to gain numbers on his side, as they serve to strengthen him in his opinions. It makes him believe that his principles carry conviction with them, and are the more likely to be true, when he finds they are *conformable* to the reason of others as well as to his own. —ADDISON.

As you have formerly offered some arguments for the soul's immortality, *agreeable* both to reason and the Christian doctrine, I believe your readers will not be displeased to see how the same great truth shines in the pomp of Roman eloquence. —HUGHES.

I think banging a cushion gives a man too warlike or perhaps too theatrical a figure, to be *suitable* to a Christian congregation. —SWIFT.

Conformation, v. Form.

To Confound, v. To abash.

To Confound, v. To baffle.

To Confound, To Confuse.

Confound and Confuse are both derived from different parts of the same verb, namely, *confundo* and its participle *confusus*, signifying to pour or mix together without design that which ought to be distinct.

Confound has an active sense; *confuse* a neuter or reflective sense: a person *confounds* one thing with another; objects become *confused*, or a person *confuses* himself: it is a common error among ignorant people to *confound* names, and among children to have their ideas *confused* on commencing a new study.

The present age is distinguished by nothing so much as by *confounding* all distinctions, which is a great source of *confusion* in men's intercourse with each other, both in public and private life.

I to the tempest make the poles resound,
And the conflicting elements *confound*. —DRYDEN.

A *confused* report passed through my ears:
But full of hurry like a morning dream
It vanished in the bus'ness of the day. —LEE.

To Confound, v. To mix.

To Confront, Face.

Confront, from the Latin *frons* a forehead, implies to set face to face; and **Face**, from

the noun *face*, signifies to set the face towards any object.

The former of these terms is always employed for two or more persons with regard to each other; the latter for a single individual with regard to objects in general.

Witnesses are *confronted*; a person *faces* danger, or *faces* an enemy when people give contrary evidence it is sometimes necessary, in extra-judicial matters, to *confront* them, in order to arrive at the truth; the best test which a man can give of his courage, is to evince his readiness for *facing* his enemy whenever the occasion requires.

Whereto serves mercy,
But to *confront* the visage of offence.
SHAKESPEARE.

The rev'rend charioteer directs the course,
And strains his aged arm to lash the horse:
Hector they *face*; unknowing how to fear
Pierce he drove on. —POPE.

To Confuse, v. To abash.

To Confuse, v. To confound.

Confused, v. Indistinct.

Confusion, Disorder.

Confusion signifies the state of being *confounded* or *confused* (v. *To confound*).

Disorder, compounded of the privative *dis* and *order*, signifies the reverse of order.

Confusion is to *disorder* as the species to the genus: *confusion* supposes the absence of all order; *disorder* the derangement of order; there is always *disorder* in *confusion*, but not always *confusion* in *disorder*: a routed army, or a tumultuous mob, will be in *confusion* and will create *confusion*; a whisper or an ill-timed motion of an individual constitutes *disorder* in a school, or in an army that is drawn up.

Now seas and earth were in *confusion* lost,
A world of waters, and without a coast. —DRYDEN.

When you behold a man's affairs through negligence and misconduct involved in *disorder*, you naturally conclude that his ruin approaches. —BLAIR.

To Confute, Refute, Disprove, Oppugn.

Confute and **Refute**, in Latin *confuto* and *refuto*, are compounded of *con* against, *re* privative, and *futo*, obsolete for *arguo*, signifying to argue against or to argue the contrary.

Disprove, compounded of *dis* privative and *prove*, signifies to prove the contrary.

Oppugn, in Latin *oppugno*, that is, to fight in order to remove or overthrow.

To *confute* respects what is argumentative; *refute* what is personal; *disprove* whatever is represented or related; *oppugn* what is held or maintained.

An argument is *confuted* by proving its fallacy; a charge is *refuted* by proving one's innocence; an assertion is *disproved* by proving that it is false; a doctrine is *oppugned* by a course of reasoning.

Paradoxes may be easily *confuted*; calumnies may be easily *refuted*; the marvellous and incredible stories of travellers may be easily

disproved; heresies and sceptical notions ought to be *oppgued*.

The pernicious doctrines of sceptics, though often *confuted*, are as often advanced with the same degree of assurance by the free-thinking, and I might say the unthinking few who imbibe their spirit: it is the employment of libellists to deal out their malicious aspersions against the objects of their malignity in a manner so loose and indirect, as to preclude the possibility of *refutation*: it would be a fruitless and unthankful task to attempt to *disprove* all the statements which are circulated in a common newspaper. It is the duty of ministers of the Gospel to *oppgue* all doctrines that militate against the established faith of Christians.

The learned do, by turns, the learn'd *confute*.
Yet all depart unalter'd by dispute.—ORRERY.

Philip of Macedon *refuted* by the force of gold all the wisdom of Athens.—ADDISON.

Man's feeble race what ills await!
Labor and penury, the racks of pain,
Disease, and sorrow's weeping train,
And death, and refuge from the storm of fate,
The fond complaint, my song! *disprove*,
And justify the laws of Jove.—COLLINS.

Ramus was one of the first *oppguers* of the old philosophy, who disturbed with innovations the quiet of the schools.—JOHNSON.

To Congratulate, *v.* To felicitate.

Congregation, *v.* Assembly.

Congress, *v.* Assembly.

Conjecture, Supposition, Surmise.

Conjecture, in French *conjecture* Latin *conjectura*, from *conjicio* or *con* and *jacio*, signifies the thing put together or framed in the mind without design or foundation.

Supposition, in French *supposition*, from *suppono*, compounded of *sub* and *pono*, signifies to put one's thoughts in the place of reality.

Surmise, compounded of *sur* or *sub* and *mise* Latin *missus* participle of *mitto* to send or put forth, has the same original meaning as the former.

All these terms convey an idea of something in the mind independent of the reality; but *conjecture* is founded less on rational inference than *supposition*; and *surmise* less than either: any circumstance, however trivial, may give rise to a *conjecture*; some reasons are requisite to produce a *supposition*: a particular state of feeling or train of thinking may of itself create a *surmise*.

Although the same epithets are generally applicable to all these terms, yet we may with propriety say that a *conjecture* is idle; a *supposition* false; a *surmise* fanciful.

Conjectures are employed on events, their causes, consequences, and contingencies; *supposition* on speculative points; *surmise* on personal concerns. The secret measures of government give rise to various *conjectures*: all the *suppositions* which are formed respecting comets seem at present to fall short of the truth: the behaviour of a person will often occasion a *surmise* respecting his intentions

and proceedings, let them be ever so disguised. Antiquarians and etymologists deal much in *conjectures*: they have ample scope afforded them for asserting what can be neither proved nor denied; religionists are pleased to build many *suppositions* of a doctrinal nature on the Scriptures, or, more properly, on their own partial and forced interpretations of the Scriptures: it is the part of prudence, as well as justice, not to express any *surmises* which we may entertain, either as to the character or conduct of others, which may not redound to their credit.

Persons of studious and contemplative natures often entertain themselves with the history of past ages, or raise schemes and *conjectures* upon futurity.—ADDISON.

Even in that part which we have of the journey to Canterbury, it will be necessary, in the following Review of Chaucer, to take notice of certain defects and inconsistencies, which can only be accounted for upon the supposition, that the work was never finished by the author.—TYRWHITT.

Any the least *surmise* of neglect has raised an aversion in one man to another.—SOUTH.

To Conjecture, *v.* To guess.

Conjuncture, Crisis.

Conjuncture, in Latin *conjunctura* and *conjungo* to join together, signifies the joining together of circumstances.

Crisis, in Latin *crisis*, Greek *κρίσις* a judgment, signifies in an extended sense whatever decides or turns the scale.

Both these terms are employed to express a period of time marked by the state of affairs. A *conjuncture* is a joining or combination of corresponding circumstances tending towards the same end; a *crisis* is the high-wrought state of any affair which immediately precedes a change: a *conjuncture* may be favourable, a *crisis* alarming.

An able statesman seizes the *conjuncture* which promises to suit his purpose, for the introduction of a favourite measure: the abilities, firmness, and perseverance of Alfred the Great, at one important *crisis* of his reign, saved England from destruction.

Every virtue requires time and place, a proper object, and a fit *conjuncture* of circumstances for the due exercise of it.—ADDISON.

Thought he, this is the lucky hour,
Wines work, when vines are in the flower;
This *crisis* then I will set me to rest on,
And put her boldly to the question.—BUTLER.

To Connect, Combine, Unite.

Connect, Latin *connecto*, compounded of *con* and *necto*, signifies to knit together.

Combine, *v.* Association, combination.

Unite, *v.* to add, join.

The idea of being put together is common to these terms, but with different degrees of proximity. *Connected* is more remote than *combined*, and this than *united*. What is *connected* and *combined* remains distinct, but what is *united* loses all individuality. Things the most dissimilar may be *connected* or *combined*; things of the same kind only can be *united*.

Things or persons are *connected* more or less

remotely by some common property or circumstance that serves as a tie; they are *combined* by a species of juncture; they are *united* by a coalition; houses are *connected* by means of a common passage; the armies of two nations are *combined*; two armies of the same nation are *united*.

Trade, marriage, or general intercourse, create a *connection* between individuals; co-operation or similarity of tendency are grounds for *combination*; entire accordance leads to a *union*. It is dangerous to be *connected* with the wicked in any way; our reputation, if not our morals, must be the sufferers thereby. The most obnoxious members of society are those in whom wealth, talents, influence, and a lawless ambition, are *combined*. *United* is an epithet that should apply equally to nations and families; the same obedience to laws should regulate every man who lives under the same government; the same heart should animate every breast; the same spirit should dictate every action of every member in the community, who has a common interest in the preservation of the whole.

A right opinion is that which *connects* distant truths by the shortest train of intermediate propositions.—JOANSON.

Fancy can *combine* the ideas which memory has treasured.—HAWKESWORTH.

A friend is he with whom our interest is *united*.
HAWKESWORTH.

Connected, Related.

Connected, *v.* To connect.

Related, from *relate*, in Latin *relatus* participle of *refero* to bring back, signifies brought back to the same point.

These terms are employed in the moral sense, to express an affinity between subjects or matters of thought.

Connexion marks affinity in an indefinite manner; *relation* in a specific manner. A *connexion* may be either close or remote; a *relation* direct or indirect. What is *connected* has some common principle on which it depends; what is *related* has some likeness with the object to which it is *related*, it is a part of some whole.

It is odd to consider the *connexion* between despotism and barbarity, and how the making one person more than man, makes the rest less.—ADDISON.

All mankind are so *related*, that care is to be taken, in things to which all are liable, you do not mention what concerns one in terms which shall disgust another.—STEEL.

Connexion, *v.* Intercourse.

To Conquer, Vanquish, Subdue, Overcome, Surmount.

Conquer, in French *conquerir*, Latin *conquiro*, compounded of *con* and *quero*, signifies to seek or try to gain an object.

Vanquish is in French *vaincre*, Latin *vincio*, Greek (*per metathesis*) *νικω*, Hebrew *natach*.

Subdue, Latin *subdo*, signifies to give or put under.

Overcome, compounded of *over* and *come*, signifies to come over or get the mastery over one.

Surmount, in French *surmonter*, compounded of *sur* over, and *monter* to mount, signifies to rise above any one.

Persons or things are *conquered* or *subdued*: persons only are *vanquished*. An enemy or a country is *conquered*; a foe is *vanquished*; people are *subdued*.

We *conquer* an enemy by whatever means we gain the mastery over him; we *vanquish* him, when by force we make him yield; we *subdue* him by whatever means we check or destroy in him the spirit of resistance. A Christian tries to *conquer* his enemies by kindness and generosity; a warrior tries to *vanquish* them in the field; a prudent monarch tries to *subdue* his rebellious subjects by a due mixture of clemency and rigor.

One may be *vanquished* in a single battle; one is *subdued* only by the most violent and persevering measures. William the First *conquered* England by *vanquishing* his rival Harold; after which he completely *subdued* the English.

Alexander having *vanquished* all the enemies that opposed him, and *subdued* all the nations with whom he warred, fancied that he had *conquered* the whole world, and is said to have wept at the idea that there were no more worlds to *conquer*. He himself was at last *vanquished* by the deadliest of foes; namely, drunkenness.

Vanquish is used only in the proper sense; *conquer* and *subdue* are likewise employed figuratively, in which sense they are analogous to *overcome* and *surmount*. That is *conquered* and *subdued* which is in the mind; that is *overcome* and *surmounted* which is either internal or external. We *conquer* and *overcome* what makes no great resistance; we *subdue* and *surmount* what is violent and strong in its opposition; dislikes, attachments, and feelings in general, either for or against, are *conquered*; unruly and tumultuous passions are to be *subdued*; a man *conquers* himself; he *subdues* his spirit.

One *conquers* by ordinary means and efforts; one *subdues* by extraordinary means. Antipathies when cherished in early life, are not easily *conquered* in riper years: nothing but a prevailing sense of religion, and a perpetual fear of God, can ever *subdue* the rebellious wills and propensities of mankind.

It requires determination and force to *conquer* and *overcome*; patience and perseverance to *subdue* and *surmount*. Prejudices and prepossessions are *overcome*; obstacles and difficulties are *surmounted*: it too frequently happens that those who are eager to *overcome* their prejudices, in order to dispose themselves for the reception of new opinions, fall into greater errors than those they have abandoned: nothing truly great has ever been effected where great difficulties have not been encountered. It is the characteristic of genius to *surmount* every difficulty: Alexander conceived that he could *overcome* nature herself, and Hannibal succeeded in this very point: there were scarcely any obstacles which she opposed to him that he did not *surmount* by prowess and perseverance.

Whoever aims at Christian perfection must strive, with God's assistance, to conquer avarice, pride, and every inordinate propensity; to subdue wrath, anger, lust, and every carnal appetite; to overcome temptations, and to surmount trials and impediments which obstruct his course.

Real glory
Springs from the silent conquest of ourselves.
THOMSON.

There are two parts in our nature. The inferior part is generally much stronger, and has always the start of reason; which, if it were not aided by religion, would almost universally be vanquished.—BERKELEY.

Socrates and Marcus Aurelius are instances of men, who by the strength of philosophy have subdued their passions, are celebrated for good husbands.—SPECTATOR.

The patient mind by yielding overcomes.—PHILIPS.

Actuated by some high passion, a man conceives great designs, and surmounts all difficulties in the execution.—BLAIR.

Conqueror, Victor.

These terms, though derived from the preceding verbs (*v. To conquer, vanquish*), have notwithstanding, characteristics peculiar to themselves.

A conqueror is always supposed to add something to his possessions; a victor gains nothing but the superiority: there is no conquest where there is not something gotten; there is no victory where there is no contest: all conquerors are not victors, nor all victors conquerors; those who take possession of other men's lands by force of arms make a conquest; those who excel in any trial of skill are the victors.

Monarchs when they wage a successful war are mostly conquerors; combatants who compel their adversaries to yield are victors.

God assists us in the virtuous conflict, and will crown the conqueror with eternal rewards.—BLAIR.

Proud Gyas and his train,
In triumph rode the victors of the main.—DRYDEN.

Consanguinity *v.* Kindred.

Conscientious, Scrupulous.

Conscientious, from *science*, marks the quality of having a nice conscience.

Scrupulous, from *scruple*, signifies the quality of having scruples. *Scruple*, in Latin, *scrupulus* a little hard stone, which in walking gives pain.

Conscientious is to *scrupulous* as a whole to a part. A conscientious man is so altogether; a scrupulous man may have only particular scruples: the one is therefore always taken in a good sense; and the other at least in an indifferent, if not a bad sense.

A conscientious man does nothing to offend his conscience; but a scrupulous man has often his scruples on trifling or minor points: the Pharisees were scrupulous without being conscientious: we must therefore strive to be conscientious without being over scrupulous.

A conscientious person would rather distrust his own judgment than condemn his species. He would say, I have observed without attention or judged upon erroneous maxims I have trusted to profession when I ought to have attended to conduct.—BURKE.

I have been so very scrupulous in this particular, of not hurting any man's reputation, that I have foreborne mentioning even such authors as I could not name with honor.—ADDISON.

Conscious, *v.* Aware.

To be Conscious, *v.* To feel.

To Consecrate, *v.* To dedicate.

To Consent, Permit, Allow.

Consent, *v.* To accede.

Permit, in French *permettre*, Latin *permitto*, compounded of *per* and *mitto*, signifies to send or let go past.

Allow, *v.* To admit, allow.

The idea of determining the conduct of others by some authorized act of one's own is common to these terms, but under various circumstances. They express either the act of an equal or a superior.

As the act of an equal we consent to that in which we have an interest; we permit or allow what is for the accommodation of other; we allow by abstaining to oppose; we permit by a direct expression of our will; contracts are formed by the consent of the parties who are interested. The proprietor of an estate permits his friends to sport on his grounds; he allows of a passage through his premises. It is sometimes prudent to consent; complaisant to permit; good natured or weak to allow.

When applied to superiors, consent is an act of private authority; permit and allow are acts of private or public authority: in the first case, consent respects matters of serious importance; permit and allow regard those of an indifferent nature: a parent consents to the establishment of his children; he permits them to read certain books; he allows them to converse with him familiarly.

We must pause before we give our consent; it is an express sanction to the conduct of others; it involves our own judgment, and the future interests of those who are under our control. This is not always so necessary in permitting and allowing; they are partial actions, which require no more than the bare exercise of authority, and involve no other consequence than the temporary pleasure of the parties concerned. Public measures are permitted and allowed, but never consented to. The law permits or allows or the person who is authorized permits or allows. Permit in this case retains its positive sense; allow its negative sense, as before. Government permits individuals to fit out privateers in time of war; when magistrates are not vigilant, many things will be done which are not allowed. A judge is not permitted to pass any sentence, but what is strictly conformable to law; every man who is accused is allowed to plead his own cause, or entrust it to another, as he thinks fit.

O no! our reason was not vainly lent!
Nor is a slave, but by its own consent.—DRYDEN.

Shame, and his conscience
Will not permit him to deny it.—RANDOLPH.

I think the strictest moralists allow forms of address to be used, without much regard to their literal acceptation.—JOHNSON.

To Consent, *v.* To accede.

To Consent, *v.* To assent.

Consequence, Result.

Consequence, in French *consequence*, Latin *consequentia*, from *consequor* to follow, signifies that which follows in connection with something else.

Result, in French *resulte*, Latin *resulto*, or *resultus* and *resilio* to rebound, signifies that which springs or bounds back from another thing.

Consequences flow of themselves from the nature of things; *results* are drawn. *Consequences* proceed from actions in general; *results* proceed from particular efforts and attempts. *Consequences* are good or bad; *results* are successful or unsuccessful.

We endeavour to avert *consequences* which threaten to be bad; we endeavour to produce *results* that are according to our wishes. Not to foresee the *consequences* which are foreseen by others, evinces a more than ordinary share of indiscretion and infatuation. To calculate on a favourable *result* from an ill-judged and ill-executed enterprise, only proves a consistent blindness in the projector.

Jealousy often draws after it a fatal train of *consequences*.—ADDISON.

The state of the world is continually changing, and none can tell the *result* of the next vicissitude.—JOHNSON.

Consequence, v. Effect.

Consequence, v. Event.

Consequence, v. Importance.

Consequently, v. Naturally.

Consequently, v. Therefore.

To Consider, To Reflect.

Consider, in French *considerer*, Latin *considero*, a factitive, from *consido* to sit down, signifies to make to settle.

Reflect, in Latin *reflecto*, compounded of *re* and *flecto*, signifies to turn back or upon itself.

The operation of thought is expressed by these two words, but it varies in the circumstances of the action.

Consideration is employed for practical purposes; *reflection* for matters of speculation or moral improvement. Common objects call for *consideration*; the workings of the mind itself, or objects purely spiritual, occupy *reflection*. It is necessary to *consider* what is proper to be done, before we take any step; it is consistent with our natures, as rational beings, to *reflect* on what we are, what we ought to be, and what we shall be.

Without *consideration* we shall naturally commit the most flagrant errors; without *reflection* we shall never understand our duty to our Maker, our neighbour, and ourselves.

He who *considers* of a thing with prejudice has judged the cause before he hears it.—SOUTH.

Whoever *reflects* frequently on the uncertainty of his own duration, will find out that the state of others is not more permanent than his own.—JOHNSON.

To Consider, Regard.

Consider, v. To consider, reflect.

Regard, v. Care, concern.

There is most caution in *considering*; most attention is *regarding*.

Circumstances, situation, advantages, disadvantages, and the like, are objects of *consideration*; personal character, abilities, and qualities, are objects of *regard*. A want of *consideration* leads a person to form a very unfair judgment of others; a want of *regard* makes them *regardless* of their comfort, convenience, and respectability. We ought to have a *consideration* for all who are in our service, not to demand more of them than what we may reasonably expect: we ought at all times to have a *regard* for our own credit and respectability, among those who are witnesses of our conduct.

Considerate, v. Thoughtful.

Consideration, Reason.

Consideration, signifies the thing considered (v. *To consider, reflect*).

Reason, v. Cause, reason.

Considerations influence our actions; they are a species of motives: *reason* determines our belief or our conduct. *Considerations* are restrictive or negative: *reasons* are positive. We may have powerful *considerations* for forbearing to act, and powerful *reasons* for adopting one line of conduct in preference to another.

Considerations are almost always personal, affecting either our own interest or that of others; *reasons* are general, and vary according to the nature of the subject. No *consideration* of profit or advantage should induce a person to forfeit his word. The *reasons* which men assign for their conduct are often as absurd as they are false.

The folly of ascribing temporal punishments to any particular crimes, may appear from several *considerations*.—ADDISON.

The *reasons* assigned in a law of the 36th year of Edward III. for having pleas and judgements in the English tongue, might have been urged for having the laws themselves in that language.—TYRWHITT.

To Consign, Commit, Entrust.

Consign, in French *consigner*, Latin *consigno* compounded of *con* and *signo*, signifies to seal for a specific purpose, also to deposit.

Commit, in French *commettre*, Latin *committo*, compounded of *com* and *mitto* to put together, signifies to put into a person's hands.

Entrust, compounded of *en* and *trust*, signifies to put in trust.

The idea of transferring from one's self to the care of another is common to these terms. What is *consigned* is either given absolutely away from one's self, or only conditionally for one's own purpose: what is *committed* or *entrusted* is given conditionally. A person *consigns* his property over to another by a deed in law; a merchant *consigns* his goods to another, to dispose of them for his advantage;

he *commits* the management of his business to his clerks, and *entrusts* them with the care of his property.

Consign expresses a more positive measure than *commit*, and *commit* than *entrust*. When a child is *consign*ed to the care of another, it is an unconditional surrender of one's trust into the hands of another; but any person may be *committed* to the care of another with various limitations; and when he is *entrusted* to his care, it is both a partial and temporary matter, referring mostly to his personal safety, and that only for a limited time. A parent does most wisely to *consign* the whole management of his child's education to one individual, in whom he can confide; if he *commit* it in part only to any one's care, the deficiency in the charge is likely to remain unsupplied; in infancy children must be more or less *entrusted* to the care of servants, but prudent parents will diminish the frequency of these occasions as much as possible.

Papers are *consign*ed to an editor of a work for his selection and arrangement. The inspection of any public work is *committed* to proper officers. A person is *entrusted* with a secret.

Consign and *commit* are used in a figurative sense. A thing is *consign*ed to destruction, or *committed* to the flames. Death *consigns* many to an untimely grave: a writer *commits* his thoughts to the press.

And oft I wish, amidst the scene, to find,
Some spot to real happiness *consign'd*.

GOLDSMITH.

In a very short time Lady Macbeth removed her son from her sight, by *committing* him to the care of a poor woman.—JOHNSON'S LIFE OF SAVAGE.

Acacius was soon prevailed upon by his curiosity to set rocks and hardships at defiance, and *commit* his life to the winds.—JOHNSON.

Supposing both equal in their natural integrity, I ought in common prudence to fear foul play from an indigent person rather than from one whose circumstances seem to have placed him above the base temptation of money. This reason makes the commonwealth regard her richest subjects as the fittest to be *entrusted* with her highest employments.—ADDISON.

Consistent, *v. Compatible*.

Consistent, *v. Consonant*.

To Console, Solace, Comfort.

Console and Solace are derived from the same source, in French *consoler*, Latin *consolator* and *solatium*, possibly from *solum* the ground, which nourishes all things.

Comfort, *v. Comfort*.

Console and solace denote the relieving of pain; *comfort* marks the communication of positive pleasure. We *console* others with words; we *console* or *solace* ourselves with reflections; we *comfort* by words or deeds. *Console* is used on more important occasions than *solace*. We *console* our friends when they meet with afflictions; we *solace* ourselves when we meet with disasters; we *comfort* those who stand in need of comfort.

The greatest consolation which we can enjoy on the death of our friends is derived from the hope that they have exchanged a state of imperfection and sorrow for one that is full of

pure and unmixed felicity. It is no small solace to us in the midst of all our troubles, to consider that they are not so bad that they might not have been worse. The *comforts* which a person enjoys may be considerably enhanced by the comparison with what he has formerly suffered.

In afflictions men generally draw their consolation out of books of morality, which indeed are of great use to fortify and strengthen the mind against the impressions of sorrow.—ADDISON.

He that undergoes the fatigue of labour must *solace* his weariness with the contemplation of its reward.—JOHNSON.

Consonant, Accordant, Consistent.

Consonant, from the Latin *consonans*, participle of *con* and *sono* to sound together; signifies to sound, or be, in unison or harmony.

Accordant, from *accord* (*v. To agree*), signifies the quality of according.

Consistent, from the Latin *consistens*, participle of *consisto*, or *con* and *sisto* to place together, signifies the quality of being able to stand in unison together.

Consonant is employed in matters of representation; *accordant* in matters of opinion or sentiment; *consistent* in matters of conduct. A particular passage is *consonant* with the whole tenor of the Scriptures; a particular account is *accordant* with all one hears and sees on a subject; a person's conduct is not always *consistent* with his station.

The consonance of the whole Scriptures, in the Old and New Testaments, with regard to the character, dignity, and mission of our Blessed Saviour, has justly given birth to that form which constitutes the established religion of England. The *accordance* of the prophecies respecting our Saviour with the event of his birth, life, and sufferings, are incontestable evidences of his being the true Messiah. The *consistency* of a man's practice with his profession is the only criterion of his sincerity.

Consonant is opposed to *dissonant*; *accordant* to *discordant*; *consistent* to *inconsistent*. *Consonance* is not so positive a thing as either *accordance* or *consistency*, which respect real events, circumstances, and actions. *Consonance* mostly serves to prove the truth for anything, but *dissonance* does not prove its falsehood until it amounts to direct *discordance* or *inconsistency*. There is a *dissonance* in the accounts given by the four Evangelists of our Saviour, which serves to prove the absence of all collusion and imposture, since there is neither *discordance* nor *inconsistency* in what they have related or omitted.

Our faith in the discoveries of the Gospel will receive confirmation from discerning their *consonance* with the natural sentiments of the human heart.—BLAIR.

The difference of good and evil in actions is not founded on arbitrary opinions or institutions, but in the nature of things, and the nature of man; it *accords* with the universal sense of the human mind.—BLAIR.

Keep one *consistent* plan from end to end.—ADDISON.

Conspicuous, *v. Distinguished*.

Conspicuous, *v. Prominent*.

Conspiracy, *v. Combination*.

Constancy, Stability, Steadiness, Firmness.

Constancy, in French *constance*, Latin *constantia*, from *constans* and *consto*, compounded of *con* and *sto* to stand by or close to a thing, signifies the quality of adhering to the thing that has been once chosen.

Stability, in French *stabilité*, Latin *stabilitas* from *stabilis* and *sto* to stand, signifies the quality of being able to stand.

Steadiness, from *steady* or *staid*, Saxon *stetig*, high German *stätig*, Greek *σταβος*, *σταβος*, and *στημι* to stand, signifies a capacity for standing.

Firmness, from *ferme*, in French *ferme*, Latin *firmus*, comes from *fero* to bear, signifying the quality of bearing, upholding, or keeping.

Constancy respects the affections; *stability* the opinions; *steadiness* the action or the motives of a tion; *firmness* the purpose or resolution.

* *Constancy* prevents from changing, and furnishes the mind with resources against weariness or disgust of the same object; it preserves and supports an attachment under every change of circumstances: *stability* prevents from varying, it bears up the mind against the movements of levity or curiosity, which a diversity of objects might produce: *steadiness* prevents from deviating; it enables the mind to bear up against the influence of humour, which temperament or outward circumstances might produce; it fixes on one course and keeps to it: *firmness* prevents from yielding; it gives the mind strength against all the attacks to which it may be exposed; it makes a resistance, and comes off triumphant.

Constancy, among lovers and friends, is the favourite theme of poets; the world has, however, afforded but few originals from which they could copy their pictures: they have mostly described what is desirable rather than what is real. *Stability* of character is essential for those who are to command, for how can they govern others who cannot govern their own thoughts? *Steadiness* of deportment is a great recommendation to those who have to obey: how can any one perform his part well who suffers himself to be perpetually interrupted? *Firmness* of character is indispensable in the support of principles: there are many occasions in which this part of a man's character is likely to be put to a severe test.

Constancy is opposed to fickleness; *stability* to changeableness; *steadiness* to flightiness; *firmness* to pliancy.

Without *constancy* there is neither love, friendship, nor virtue in the world.—ADDISON.

With God there is no variableness, with man there is no *stability*. Virtue and vice divide the empire of his mind, and wisdom and folly alternately rule him.—BLAIR.

A manly *steadiness* of conduct is the object we are always to keep in view.—BLAIR.

A corrupted and guilty man can possess no true *firmness* of heart.—BLAIR.

Constant, v. Continual.

* Girard: "Stabilité, constance, fermeté."

Constant, v. Durable.

Consternation, v. Alarm.

To Constitute, Appoint, Depute.

Constitute, in Latin *constitutus*, participle of *constituo*, that is *con* and *statuo* to place together, signifies here to put or place for a specific purpose.

Appoint, v. To appoint.

Depute, in French *deputer*, Latin *deputo*, compounded of *de* and *puto* to esteem or assign, signifies to assign a certain office to a person.

The act of choosing some person or persons for an office, is comprehended under all these terms: *constitute* is a more solemn act than *appoint*, and this than *depute*: to *constitute* is the act of a body; to *appoint* and *depute*, either of a body or an individual: a community *constitutes* any one their leader; a monarch *appoints* his ministers; an assembly *deputes* some of its members.

To *constitute* implies the act of making as well as choosing; the office as well as the person is new: in *appointing*, the person but not the office is new. A person may be *constituted* arbiter or judge as circumstances may require; a successor is *appointed* but not *constituted*.

Whoever is *constituted* is invested with supreme authority derived from the highest sources of human power, common consent; whoever is *appointed* derives his authority from the authority of others, and has consequently but limited power: no individual can *appoint* another with authority equal to his own: whoever is *deputed* has private and not public authority; his office is partial, often confined to the particular transaction of an individual, or a body of individuals. According to the Romish religion, the Pope is *constituted* supreme head of the Christian church throughout the whole world; governors are *appointed* to distant provinces; persons are *deputed* to present petitions or make representations to government.

It has been the fashion of the present day to speak contemptuously of all *constituted* authorities: the *appointments* made by government are a fruitful source of discontent for those who follow the trade of opposition: a busy multitude, when agitated by political discussions, are ever ready to form societies and send *deputations*, in order to communicate their wishes to their rulers.

Where there is no *constituted* judge, as between independent states there is not, the vicinage itself is the natural judge.—BURKE.

The accusations against Columbus gained such credit in a jealous court, that a commissioner was *appointed* to repair to Hispaniola, and to inspect into his conduct.—ROBERTSON.

If the Commons disagree to the amendments, a conference usually follows between members *deputed* from each house.—BLACKSTONE.

To Constitute, v. To form.

Constitution, v. Frame.

Constitution, v. Government.

Constraint, Compulsion.

Constraint, from *constrain*, Latin *constringo* compounded of *con* and *stringo*, signifies the act of straining or tying together.

Compulsion signifies the act of compelling (*v. To compel*).

There is much of binding in *constraint*; of violence in *compulsion*: *constraint* prevents from acting agreeably to the will; *compulsion* forces to act contrary to the will: a soldier in the ranks moves with much *constraint*, and is often subject to much *compulsion* to make him move as is desired. *Constraint* may arise from outward circumstances; *compulsion* is always produced by some active agent: the forms of civil society lay a proper *constraint* upon the behaviour of men so as to render them agreeable to each other; the arm of the civil power must ever be ready to *compel* those who will not submit without *compulsion*: in the moments of relaxation, the actions of children should be as free from *constraint* as possible, which is one means of lessening the necessity for *compulsion* when they are called to the performance of their duty.

Commands are no *constraints*. If I obey them I do it freely.—MILTON.

Savage declared that it was not his design to fly from justice; that he intended to have appeared (to appear) at the bar without *compulsion*.—JOHNSON.

Constraint, Restraint.

Constraint, v. Constraint, compulsion.

Restraint, v. To coerce, restrain.

Constraint respects the movements of the body only; *restraint* those of the mind, and the outward actions: when they both refer to the outward actions, we say a person's behaviour is *constrained*; his feelings are *restrained*: he is *constrained* to act or not to act, or to act in a certain manner; he is *restrained* from acting at all, if not from feeling: the conduct is *constrained* by certain prescribed rules, by discipline and order; it is *restrained* by particular motives; whoever learns a mechanical exercise is *constrained* to move his body in a certain direction; the fear of detection often *restrains* persons from the commission of vices more than any sense of their enmity.

The behaviour of children must be more *constrained* in the presence of their superiors than when they are by themselves: the angry passions should at all times be *restrained*. A person who is in the slightest degree *constrained* to do a good action, does good only by halves: the inordinate passions and propensities of men are *restrained* by nothing so effectually as religion; whoever is *restrained* by shame only may seek gratification under the shelter of concealment.

When from *constraint* only the offices of seeming kindness are performed, little dependance can be placed on them.—BLAIR.

What *restraints* do they lie under who have no regards beyond the grave?—BERKELEY.

To Construct, v. To build.

To Consult, Deliberate.

Consult, in French *consulter*, Latin *consulto*, is a frequentative of *consulo*, signifying to counsel together (*v. Advice, counsel*).

Deliberate, in French *deliberer*, Latin *delibero*, compounded of *de* and *libro* or *libra* a balance, signifies to weigh as in a balance.

Consultations always require two persons at least; *deliberations* require many, or only a man's self: an individual may *consult* with one or many; assemblies commonly *deliberate*: advice and information are given and received in *consultations*: doubts, difficulties, and objections are started and removed in *deliberations*.

We communicate and hear when we *consult*; we pause and hesitate when we *deliberate*: those who have to co-operate must frequently *consult* together; those who have serious measures to decide upon must coolly *deliberate*.

Ulysses (as Homer tells us) made a voyage to the regions of the dead, to *consult* Tiresias how he should return to his country.—ADDISON.

Moloch declares himself abruptly for war, and appears incensed at his companions for losing so much time as even to *deliberate* upon it.—ADDISON.

To Consume, Destroy, Waste.

Consume, in French *consumer*, Latin *consumo*, compounded of *con* and *sumo*, signifies to take away altogether.

Destroy, in Latin *destruo*, compounded of *de* privative and *struo* to build, signifies to undo or scatter that which has been raised.

Waste, from the adjective *waste* or *desert*, signifies to make waste or naked.

The idea of bringing that to nothing which has been something is common to all these terms.

What is *consumed* is lost for any future purpose; what is *destroyed* is rendered unfit for any purpose whatever: *consume* may therefore be to *destroy* as the means to the end; things are often *destroyed* by being *consumed*: when food is *consumed* it serves the intended purpose; but when it is *destroyed* it serves no purpose, and is likewise unfit for any.

When iron is *consumed* by rust, or the body by disease, or a house by the flames the things in these cases are literally *destroyed* by *consumption*: on the other hand, when life or health is taken away, and when things are either worn or torn so as to be useless, they are *destroyed*.

In the figurative signification *consume* is synonymous with *waste*: the former implies a reducing to nothing; the latter conveys also the idea of misuse; to *waste* is to *consume* uselessly: much time is *consumed* in complaining, which might be employed in remedying the evils complained of; idlers *waste* their time because they do not properly estimate its value: those who *consume* their strength and their resources in fruitless endeavours to effect what is impracticable, are unfitted for doing what might be beneficial to themselves: it is an idle *waste* of one's powers to employ them in building up new systems, and making men dissatisfied with those already established.

Mr. Boyle, speaking of a certain mineral, tells us that a man may *consume* his whole life in the study, without arriving at the knowledge of its qualities.—ADDISON.

Let not a fierce unruly joy
The settled quiet of the mind *destroy*.—ADDISON.

For this I mourn, till grief or dire disease
Shall *waste* the form whose crime it was to please.
POPE.

Consummation, Completion.

Consummation, Latin *consummatio*, compounded of *con* and *summa* the sum, signifies the summing or winding up of the whole—the putting a final period to any concern.

Completion, signifies either the act of completing, or the state of being completed (*v. To complete*).

The arrival at a conclusion is comprehended in both these terms, but they differ principally in application; wishes are *consummated*; plans are *completed*: we often flatter ourselves that the *completion* of all our plans will be the *consummation* of all our wishes, and thus expose ourselves to grievous disappointments: the *consummation* of the nuptial ceremony is not always the *consummation* of hopes and joys; it is frequently the beginning of misery and disappointment: we often sacrifice much to the *completion* of a purpose which we afterwards find not worth the labour of attaining.

As epithets, *consummate* is employed only in a bad sense, and *complete* either in a good or bad sense: those who are regarded as *complete* fools are not unfrequently *consume* knaves: the theatre is not the only place for witnessing a farce: human life affords many of various descriptions; among the number of which we may reckon those as *complete* in their kind, which are acted at elections, where *consummate* folly and *consummate* hypocrisy are practised by turns.

It is not to be doubted but it was a constant practice of all that is praise-worthy, which made her capable of beholding death, not as the dissolution but the *consummation* of life.—STEELE.

As our concern is solely with that period when the incorporation of the two languages was *completed*, it is of no great importance to determine the precise time at which any word or phrase becomes naturalised.—TYR-WHITT.

Consumption, *v. Decay*.

Contact, Touch.

Contact, in Latin *contactus* participle of *contingo*, compounded of *con* and *tango* to touch together, is distinguished from the simple word **Touch**, not so much in sense as in grammatical construction; the former expressing a state, and referring to two bodies actually in that state; the latter on the other hand implying the abstract act of *touching*: we speak of things coming or being in *contact*, but not of the *contact* instead of the *touch* of a thing: the poison which comes from the poison-tree is so powerful in its nature that it is not necessary to come in *contact* with it in order to feel its baneful influence; some insects are armed with stings so inconceivably sharp, that the smallest *touch* possible is sufficient to produce a puncture into the flesh.

We are attracted towards each other by general sympathy, but kept back from *contact* in private interest.—JOHNSON.

O death! where is now thy sting? O grave! where is thy victory? Where are the terrors with which thou hast so long affrighted the nations? At the *touch* of the Divine rod, thy visionary horrors are fled.—BLAIR.

Contagion, Infection.

Both these terms imply the power of communicating something bad, but **Contagion**, from the Latin verb *contingo* to come in contact, proceeds from a simple touch; and **Infection**, from the Latin verb *inficio* or *in* and *facio* to put in, proceeds by receiving something inwardly, or having it infused.

Some things act more properly by *contagion*, others by *infection*: the more powerful diseases, as the plague or yellow fever, are communicated by *contagion*; they are therefore denominated *contagious*; the less virulent disorders, as fevers, consumptions, and the like, are termed *infectious*, as they are communicated by the less rapid process of *infection*: the air is *contagious* or *infectious* according to the same rule of distinction; when heavily overcharged with noxious vapours and deadly disease, it is justly entitled *contagious*, but in ordinary cases *infectious*. In the figurative sense, vice is for the same obvious reason termed *contagious*; and bad principles are denominated *infectious*: some young people, who are fortunate enough to shun the *contagion* of bad society are, perhaps, caught by the *infection* of bad principles, acting as a slow poison on the moral constitution.

If I send my son abroad, it is scarcely possible to keep him from the reigning *contagion* of rudeness.—LOCKE.

But we who only do infuse,
The rage in them like *bouté-feus*,
Tis our example that instils
In them the *infection* of our ills.—BUTLER.

Contagious, Epidemical, Pestilential

Contagious signifies having *contagion* (*v. Contagion*).

Epidemical, in Latin *epidemicus*, Greek επιδημικός, that is επι and δημοσ, among the people, signifies universally spread.

Pestilential, from the Latin *pestis* the plague, signifies having the plague, or a similar disorder.

The *contagious* applies to that which is capable of being caught, and ought not, therefore, to be touched; the *epidemical* to that which is already caught or circulated, and requires, therefore, to be stopped; the *pestilential* to that which may breed an evil, and is, therefore, to be removed: diseases are *contagious* or *epidemical*; the air or breath is *pestilential*.

They may all be applied morally or figuratively in the same sense.

We endeavour to shun a *contagious* disorder, that it may not come near us; we endeavour to purify a *pestilential* air, that it may not be inhaled to our injury; we endeavour to provide against *epidemical* disorders, that they may not spread any farther.

Vicious example is *contagious*; certain follies or vices of fashion are *epidemical* in almost

every age; the breath of infidelity is pestilential.

No foreign food the teeming ewes shall fear,
No touch contagious spread its influence here.
WARTON.

Among all the diseases of the mind, there is not one more epidemic or more pernicious than the love of flattery.—STEELE.

Capricious, wanton, bold, and brutal lust
Is meanly selfish: when resisted, cruel;
And like the blast of pestilential winds,
Taints the sweet bloom of nature's fairest forms.
MILTON.

To Contain, Hold.

Contain, v. To Comprise.

Hold in Saxon *healdan*, low German *hol-den*, *holle*, Danish *holde*, German *halten*, which is most probably connected with *haben* to have.

These terms agree in sense, but differ in application; the former is by comparison noble, the latter is ignoble in its use: *hold* is employed only for the material contents of hollow bodies; *contain* is employed for moral or spiritual contents: in familiar discourse a cask is said to *hold*, but in more polished language it is said to *contain* a certain number of gallons.

A coach *holds* or *contains* a given number of persons; a room *holds* a given quantity of furniture; a house or city *contains* its inhabitants.

But man, th' abstract
Of all perfection, which the workmanship
Of heav'n hath modell'd, in himself contains
Passions of several qualities.—FORD.

Death only this mysterious truth unfolds,
The mighty soul how small a body holds.—DRYDEN.

To Contain, v. To comprise.

To Contaminate, Defile, Pollute, Taint, Corrupt.

Contaminate, in Latin *contaminatus*, participle of *contamino*, comes from the Hebrew *tamah* to pollute.

Defile, compounded of *de* and *file* or *vile*, signifies to make vile.

Pollute, in Latin *pollutus*, participle of *polluo*, compounded of *per* and *lavo* or *lavo* to wash or dye, signifies to infuse thoroughly.

Taint, in French *teint*, participle of *teindre*, in Latin *tingo* to dye or stain.

Corrupt, in Latin *corruptus*, participle of *corrumpo*, compounded of *con* and *rumpo*, signifies to break to pieces.

Contaminate is not so strong an expression as *defile* or *pollute*; but it is stronger than *taint*; these terms are used in the sense of injuring purity: *corrupt* has the idea of destroying it. Whatever is impure *contaminates*, what is gross and vile in the natural sense *defiles*, and in the moral sense *pollutes*; what is contagious or infectious *corrupts*; and what is *corrupted* may *taint* other things. Improper conversation or reading *contaminates* the mind of youth; lewdness and obscenity *defile* the body and *pollute* the mind; loose company *corrupts* the morals; the coming in contact

with a *corrupted* body is sufficient to give a taint.

If young people be admitted to a promiscuous intercourse with society, they must unavoidably witness objects that are calculated to *contaminate* their thoughts if not their inclinations. They are thrown in the way of seeing the lips of females *defiled* with the grossest indecencies, and hearing or seeing things which cannot be heard or seen without *polluting* the soul: it cannot be surprising if after this their principles are found to be *corrupted* before they have reached the age of maturity.

The drop of water after its progress through all the channels of the street is not more *contaminated* with filth and dirt, than a simple story after it has passed through the mouths of a few modern tale-bearers.—HAWKESWORTH.

When from the mountain tops with hideous cry
And clatt'ring wings the hungry harpies fly,
They snatch the meat, *defiling* all they find,
And parting leave a loathsome stench behind.
DRYDEN.

Her virgin statue with their bloody hands
Polluted, and profan'd her holy bands.—DRYDEN.

All men agree that licentious poems do, of all writings,
soonest *corrupt* the heart.—STEELE.

Your teeming ewes shall no strange meadows try,
Nor fear a rot from *tainted* company.—DRYDEN.

To Contemn, Despise, Scorn, Disdain.

Contemn, in Latin *contemno*, compounded of *con* and *temno*, is probably changed from *tamino*, and the Hebrew *tamah*, to pollute or render worthless, which is the cause of contempt.

Despise, in Latin *despicio*, compounded of *de* and *specio*, signifies to look down upon, which is a strong mark of contempt.

Scorn, varied from our word *shorn*, signifies stripped of all honours and exposed to derision, which situation is the cause of scorn.

Disdain, compounded of *dis* privative and *dain* or *deign* to think worthy, signifies to hold altogether unworthy.

The above elucidations sufficiently evince the feeling towards others which gives birth to all these actions. But the feeling of *contempt* is not quite so strong as that of *despising*, nor that of *despising* so strong as those of *scorning* and *disdaining*: the latter of which expresses the strongest sentiment of all. Persons are *contemned* for their moral qualities; they are *despised* on account of their outward circumstances, their characters, or their endowments. Superiors may be *contemned*; inferiors only, real or supposed, are *despised*.

Contempt, as applied to persons, is not incompatible with a Christian temper when justly provoked by their character; but *despising* is distinctly forbidden and seldom warranted. Yet it is not so much our business to *contemn* others as to *contemn* that which is *contemptible*; but we are not equally at liberty to *despise* the person, or any thing belonging to the person, of another. Whatever springs from the free will of another may be a subject of *contempt*; but the casualties of fortune or the gifts of Providence, which are alike independent of personal merit, should never ex-

pose a person to be *despised*. We may, however, *contemn* a person for his impotent malice, or *despise* him for his meanness.

Persons are not *scorned* or *disdained*, but they may be treated with *scorn* or *disdain*; they are both improper expressions of *contempt* or *despise*; *scorn* marks the sentiment of a little vain mind; *disdain* of a haughty and perverted one. A beautiful woman looks with *scorn* on her whom she *despises* for the want of this natural gift. The wealthy man treats with *disdain* him whom he *despises* for his poverty. There is nothing excites the *contempt* of mankind so powerfully as a mixture of pride and meanness; a moment's reflection will teach us the folly and wickedness of *despising* another for that to which by the will of Providence we may the next moment be exposed ourselves; there are silly persons who will *scorn* to be seen in the company of such as have not an equal share of finery; and there are weak upstarts of fortune, who *disdain* to look at those who cannot measure purses with themselves.

Contempt and *derision* are hard words; but in what manner can one give advice to a youth in the pursuit and possession of sensual pleasures, or afford pity to an old man in the impotence and desire of enjoying them.—STEELE.

It is seldom that the great or the wise suspect that they are cheated and *despised*.—JOHNSON.

Infamous wretch!
So much below my *scorn*, I dare not kill thee.
DRYDEN.

Yet not for those,
For what the potent victor in his rage
Can else inflict, do I repent or change,
Though chang'd in outward lustre, that fix'd mind
And high *disdain* from sense of injur'd merit.
MILTON.

In speaking of things independently of others, or as immediately connected with ourselves, all these terms may be sometimes employed in a good or an indifferent sense.

When we *contemn* a mean action, and *scorn* to conceal by falsehood what we are called upon to acknowledge, we act the part of the gentleman as well as the Christian; but it is inconsistent with our infirm and dependant condition, that we should feel inclined to *despise* anything that falls in our way; much less are we at liberty to *disdain* to do any thing which our station requires; we ought to think nothing unworthy of us, nothing degrading to us, but that which is inconsistent with the will of God: there are, however, too many who affect to *despise* small favours as not reaching their fancied deserts, and others who *disdain* to receive any favour at all, from mistaken ideas of dependance and obligation.

A man of spirit should *contemn* the praise of the ignorant.—STEELE.

Thrice happy they, beneath their northern skies,
Who that worst fear, the fear of death, *despise*;
Provoke approaching fate, and bravely *scorn*
To spare that life which must so soon return.
ROWE.

It is in some sort owing to the bounty of Providence that *disdaining* a cheap and vulgar happiness, they frame to themselves imaginary goods, in which there is nothing can raise desire but the difficulty of obtaining them.—BERKELEY.

Virtue *disdains* to lend an ear
To the mad people's sense of right.—FRANCIS.

To Contemplate, Meditate, Muse.

Contemplate, in Latin *contemplatus* participle of *contemplor*, probably comes from *templum* a temple, as a place most fitted for *contemplation*.

Meditate, in Latin *meditatus*, participle of *meditor*, is probably changed from *melitor*, in Greek *μελιταιω* to modulate or attune the thoughts, as sounds are harmonised.

Muse is derived from *musa*, owing to the connexion between the harmony of a song and the harmony of the thoughts in *musings*.

Different species of reflexion are marked by these terms.

We *contemplate* what is present or before our eyes; we *meditate* on what is past or absent.

The heavens and all the works of the Creator are objects of *contemplation*; the ways of Providence are fit subjects for *meditation*. One *muses* on events or circumstances which have been just passing.

I sincerely wish myself with you to *contemplate* the wonders of God in the firmament, rather than the madness of man on the earth.—POPE.

But a very small part of the moments spent in *meditation* on the past produce any reasonable caution or salutary sorrow.—JOHNSON.

We may *contemplate* and *meditate* for the future, but never *muse*. In this case the two former terms have the sense of contriving or purposing: what is *contemplated* to be done is thought of more indistinctly than when it is *meditated* to be done: many things are had in *contemplation* which are never seriously *meditated* upon: between *contemplating* and *meditating* there is oftener a greater distance than between *meditating* and executing.

Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual, and it begins in *contemplation* of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb.—BLACKSTONE.

Thus plung'd in ills and *meditating* more,
The people's patience, tried, no longer bore
The raging mouster.—DRYDEN.

Meditating is a permanent and serious action; *musings* is partial and unimportant: *meditation* is a religious duty, it cannot be neglected without injury to a person's spiritual improvement; *musings* is a temporary employment of the mind on the ordinary concerns of life, as they happen to excite an interest for the time.

Contemplative and *musings*, as epithets, have a strong analogy to each other.

Contemplative is a habit of the mind; *musings* is a particular state of the mind. A person may have a *contemplative* turn, or be in a *musings* mood.

There is not any property or circumstance of my being that I *contemplate* with more joy than my immortality.—BERKELEY.

There is nothing so forced and constrained as what we frequently meet with in tragedies; to make a man under the weight of great sorrow, or full of *meditation* upon what he is going to execute, cast about for a simile to what he himself is, or the thing which he is going to act.—STEELE.

Musings as went on this and that,
Such trifles as I know not what.—FRANCIS.

Contemptible, Contemptuous.

These terms are very frequently, though very erroneously, confounded in common discourse.

Contemptible is applied to the thing deserving contempt; **Contemptuous** to that which is expressive of contempt. Persons, or what is done by persons, may be either contemptible or contemptuous; but a thing is only contemptible.

A production is contemptible; a sneer or look is contemptuous.

Silence, or a negligent indifference, proceeds from anger mixed with scorn, that shows another to be thought by you too contemptible to be regarded.—ADDISON.

My sister's principles in many particulars differ; but there has been always such a harmony between us that she seldom smiles upon those who have suffered me to pass with a contemptuous negligence.—HAWKSWORTH.

Contemptible, Despicable, Pitiful.

Contemptible is not so strong as **Despicable** or **Pitiful**.

A person may be contemptible for his vanity or weakness; but he is despicable for his servility and baseness of character; he is pitiful for his want of manliness and becoming spirit. A lie is at all times contemptible; it is despicable when it is told for purposes of gain or private interest; it is pitiful when accompanied with indications of unmanly fear. It is contemptible to take credit to one's self for the good action one has not performed; it is despicable to charge another with the faults which we ourselves have committed; it is pitiful to offend others, and then attempt to screen ourselves from their resentment under any shelter which offers. It is contemptible for a man in a superior station to borrow of his inferiors; it is despicable in him to forfeit his word; it is pitiful in him to attempt to conceal any thing by artifice.

Were every man persuaded from how mean and low a principle this passion (for flattery) is derived, there can be no doubt but the person who should attempt to gratify it would then be as contemptible as he is now successful.—STEELE.

To put on an artful part to obtain no other but an unjust praise from the undiscerning is of all endeavours the most despicable.—STEELE.

There is something pitifully mean in the inverted ambition of that man who can hope for annihilation, and please himself to think that his whole fabric shall crumble into dust.—STEELE.

Contemptuous, v. Contemtable.

Contemptuous, Scornful, Disdainful.

These epithets rise in sense by a regular gradation.

Contemptuous is general, and applied to whatever can express contempt; **Scornful** and **Disdainful** are particular; they apply only to outward marks: one is contemptuous who is scornful or disdainful, but not vice versa.

Words, actions, and looks are contemptuous; looks, sneers, and gestures are scornful and disdainful.

Contemptuous expressions are always unjustifiable; whatever may be the contempt

which a person's conduct deserves, it is unbecoming in another to give him any indications of the sentiment he feels. Scornful and disdainful smiles are resorted to by the weakest or the worst of mankind.

Prior never sacrifices accuracy to haste, nor indulges himself in contemptuous negligence or impatient idleness.—JOHNSON.

As soon as Mavia began to look round, and saw the vagabond Mirtillo who had so long absented himself from her circle, she looked upon him with that glance which in the language of ogiers is called the scornful.—STEELE.

In vain he thus attempts her mind to move,
With tears and prayers and late repenting love;
Disdainfully she looked, then turning round,
She fix'd her eyes unmov'd upon the ground.

DRYDEN.

To Contend, Strive, Vie.

Contend, in Latin *contendo*, compounded of *con* or *contra* and *tendo*, to bend one's steps, signifies to exert one's self against anything.

Strive is in Dutch *streven*, low German *strevan*, high German *streben*, and probably a frequentative of the Latin *strepo* to make a bustle.

Vie is probably changed from *vivo*, signifying to look at with the desire of excelling.

Contending requires two parties; strive either one or two. There is no contending where there is not an opposition; but a person may strive by himself.

Contend and strive differ in the object as well as the mode: we contend for a prize; we strive for the mastery; we may contend verbally; but we never strive without an actual effort, and labour more or less severe. We may contend with a person at a distance; but striving requires the opponent, when there is one, to be present. Opponents in matters of opinion contend for what they conceive to be the truth; sometimes they contend for titles; combatants strive to overcome their adversaries, either by dint of superior skill or strength.

Contend is frequently used in a figurative sense, in application to things: strive very seldom. We contend with difficulties; and in a spiritual meaning, we may be said to strive with the spirit.

Vie has more of striving than contending in it; we strive to excel when we vie, but we do not strive with any one; there is no personal collision or opposition: those we vie with may be as ignorant of our persons as our intentions. Vying is an act of no moment, but contending and striving are always serious actions; neighbours often vie with each other in the finery and grandeur of their house, dress, and equipage.

Mad as the seas and the winds, when both contend
Which is the master.—SHAKESPEARE.

Mad as the winds
When for the empire of the main they strive.—DENNIS.

Shall a form
Of elemental dross, of mould'ring clay,
Vie with these charms imperial?—MASON ON TRUTH.

To Contend, Contest, Dispute.

Contend, v. To contend, strive.

Contest, v. Combat, conflict.

Dispute, in Latin *disputo*, compounded of *dis* and *puto*, signifies to think different ways.

Contend is to *contest* as the genus to the species. To *contest* is a species of *contending*; we cannot *contest* without *contending*, although we may *contend* without *contesting*. To *contend* is confined to the idea of setting one's self up against another; *contest* and *dispute* must include some object *contested* or *disputed*. *Contend* is applied to all matters, either of personal interest or speculative opinion; *contest* always to the former; *dispute* mostly to the latter. Individuals or distinct bodies *contend*; nations *contest*. During the late long and eventful *contest* between England and France, the English *contended* with their enemies as successfully by land as by sea. Trifling matters may give rise to *contending*; serious points only are *contested*. *Contentions* are always conducted personally, and in general verbally; *contests* are carried on in different manners according to the nature of the object. The parties themselves mostly decide *contentions*; but *contested* matters mostly depend upon others to decide.

For want of an accommodating temper, men are frequently *contending* with each other about little points of convenience, advantage, or privilege, which they ought by mutual consent to share, or voluntarily to resign. When seats in parliament or other posts of honour are to be obtained by suffrages, rival candidates *contest* their claims to public approbation.

When we assert the right, and support this assertion with reasons, we *contend* for it; but we do not *contest* until we take serious measures to obtain what we *contend* for. *Contend* is to *dispute* as a part to the whole: two parties *dispute* conjointly; they *contend* individually. Each *contends* for his own opinion, which constitutes the *dispute*. Theological disputants often *contend* with more warmth than discretion for their favourite hypothesis. With regard to claims, it is possible to *dispute* the claim of another without *contending* for it for ourselves.

'Tis madness to *contend* with strength divine.—DRYDEN.

'Tis thus the spring of youth, the morn of life,
Bears in our minds the rival seeds of strife;
Then passion riots, reason then contends,
And on the conquest every bias depends.
SHENSTONE.

The poor worm
Shall prove her *contest* vain. Life's little day
Shall pass, and she is gone,—while I appear
Miauld with the bloom of youth through heaven's
eternal year.—MASON ON TRUTH.

Permit me not to languish out my days,
But make the best exchange of life for praise.
This arm, this lance, can well *dispute* the prize.
DRYDEN.

There has been a long *dispute* for precedence between the tragic and heroic poets.—ADDISON.

Contention, Strife.

Though derived from the preceding verbs (*v. To contend, strive*), have a distinct meaning in which they are analogous. The common idea to them is that of opposing one's self to another with an angry humour.

Contention is mostly occasioned by the

desire of seeking one's own. **Strife** springs from a quarrelsome temper. Greedy and envious people deal in *contention*, the former because they are fearful lest they should not get enough; the latter because they are fearful lest others should get too much. Where bad tempers that are under no control come in frequent collision, perpetual *strife* will be the consequence.

With these four more of lesser fame
And humble rank, attendant came;
Hypocrisy with smiling grace,
And Impudence, with brazen face,
Contention bold, with iron lungs,
And Slander, with her hundred tongues.
MOORE.

A solid and substantial greatness of soul looks down with a generous neglect on the censures and applauses of the multitude, and places a man beyond the little noise and *strife* of tongues.—ADDISON.

Contention, v. Dissension.

Contentment, Satisfaction.

Contentment, in French *contentment*, from *content*, in Latin *contentus*, participle of *contineo* to contain or hold, signifies the keeping one's self to a thing.

Satisfaction, in Latin *satisfactio*, compounded of *satis* and *facio*, signifies the making or having enough.

Contentment lies in ourselves: *satisfaction* is derived from external objects.

One is *contented* when one wishes for no more: one is *satisfied* when one has obtained what one wishes.

The *contented* man has always enough; the *satisfied* man receives enough.

The *contented* man will not be *dissatisfied*; but he who looks for *satisfaction* will never be *contented*. *Contentment* is the absence of pain; *satisfaction* is positive pleasure. *Contentment* is accompanied with the enjoyment of what one has: *satisfaction* is often quickly followed with the alloy of wanting more. A *contented* man can never be miserable; a *satisfied* man can scarcely be long happy. *Contentment* is a permanent and habitual state of mind; it is the restriction of all our thoughts, views, and desires within the compass of present possession and enjoyment: *satisfaction* is a partial and turbulent state of the feelings, which awakens rather than deadens desire. *Contentment* is suited to our present condition; it accommodates itself to the vicissitudes of human life: *satisfaction* belongs to no created being; one *satisfied* desire engenders another that demands *satisfaction*. *Contentment* is within the reach of the poor man, to whom it is a continual feast; but *satisfaction* has never been procured by wealth, however enormous, or ambition, however boundless and successful. We should therefore look for the *contented* man, where there are the fewest means of being *satisfied*. Our duty bids us be *contented*; our desires ask to be *satisfied*; but our duty is associated with our happiness; our desires are the sources of our misery.

True happiness is to no place confin'd,
But still is found in a *contented* mind.—ANONYMOUS.

Women who have been married some time, not having it in their heads to draw after them a numerous train of

followers, find their satisfaction in the possession of one man's heart.—SPECTATOR.

No man should be contented with himself that he barely does well, but he should perform every thing in the best manner he is able.—STEEL.

It is necessary to an easy and happy life to possess our minds in such a manner as to be well satisfied with our own reflections.—STEEL.

Contest, *v.* Conflict.

To Contest, *v.* To contend.

Contiguous, *v.* Adjacent.

Continence, *v.* Chastity.

Contingency, *v.* Accident.

Contingent, *v.* Accidental.

Continual, Perpetual, Constant.

Continual, in French *continuel*, Latin *continuus*, from *continere* to hold or keep together, signifies keeping together without intermission.

Perpetual, in French *perpetuel*, Latin *perpetuus*, from *perpeto* compounded of *per* and *peto* to seek thoroughly, signifies going on every where and at all times.

Constant, *v.* Constancy.

What is *continual* admits of no interruption : what is *perpetual* admits of no termination. There may be an end to that which is *continual*, and there may be intervals in that which is *perpetual*. Rains are *continual* in the tropical climates at certain seasons ; complaints among the lower orders are *perpetual*, but they are frequently without foundation. There is a *continual* passing and repassing in the streets of the metropolis during the day : the world, and all that it contains, are subject to *perpetual* change.

Constant, like *continual*, admits of no interruption ; but it may cease altogether. *Continual* respects the outward circumstances and events ; *constant* the temper of mind. The last ninety years have presented to the world a *continual* succession of events, that have exceeded in importance those going before ; the French revolution and the atrocities attendant upon it have been the *constant* theme of execration with the well-disposed part of mankind. To an intelligent parent it is a *continual* source of pleasure to watch the progress of his child in the acquirement of knowledge, and the development of his faculties ; it will likewise be his *constant* endeavour to train him up in principles of religion and virtue, while he is cultivating his talents, and storing his mind with science.

Open your ears, for which of you will stop
The vent of hearing when loud rumour speaks ;
Upon my tongue *continual* slanders ride,
That which in every language I pronounce.

SHAKESPEARE.

If affluence of fortune unhappily concur to favour the inclinations of the youthful, amusements and diversions succeed in a *perpetual* round.—BLAIR.

And there cut off
From social life, I felt a *constant* death.—THOMSON.

Continual, Continued.

Continual, Continued, *v.* Continued.

Both these terms mark length of duration, but the former admits of a certain degree of interruption, which the latter does not. What is *continual* may have frequent pauses ; what is *continued* ceases only to terminate. Rains are *continual* ; noises in a tumultuous street are *continued* : the bass in music is said to be *continued* : the mirth of a drunken party is one *continued* noise. *Continual* interruptions abate the vigour of application and create disgust : * in countries situated near the poles, there is one *continued* darkness for the space of five or six months ; during which time the inhabitants are obliged to leave the place.

Continual respects the duration of actions only ; *continued* is likewise applied to the extent or course of things : rumours are *continual* ; talking, walking, running, and the like, are *continued* ; but a line, a series, a scene or a stream of water, is *continued*.

And gulphy Simois rolling to the main
Helmets and shields and godlike heroes slain :
These turn'd by Phœbus from their wonted ways,
Delug'd the rampire nine *continual* days.—POPE.

Our life is one *continued* toil for fame.—MARTYN.

By too intense and *continued* application, our feeble powers would soon be worn out.—BLAIR.

Continuance, Continuation, Duration.

Continuance is said only of the time that a thing *continues* (*v.* To continue).

Continuation expresses the act of *continuing* what has been begun. The *continuance* of any particular practice may be attended with serious consequences. The *continuation* of a work depends on the abilities and will of the workman.

Continuance and *duration* are both employed for time ; things may be of long *continuance* or of long *duration* : but *continuance* is used only with regard to the conduct of men ; *duration* with regard to the existence of every thing. Whatever is occasionally done, and soon to be ended, is not for a *continuance* ; whatever is made, and soon destroyed, is not of long *duration* : there are many excellent institutions in England which promise to be of no less *continuance* than of utility. *Duration* is with us a relative term : things are of long or short *duration* : by comparison, the *duration* of the world and all sublunary objects is nothing in regard to eternity.

Providence seems to have equally divided the whole mass of mankind into different sexes, that every woman may have her husband, and that both may equally contribute to the *continuance* of the species.—STEEL.

The Pythagorean transmigration, the sensual habitation of the Mahometan, and the shady realms of Pluto, do all agree in the main point, the *continuation* of our existence.—BERKELEY.

Mr. Locke observes, " that we get the idea of time and *duration*, by reflecting on that train of ideas which succeed one another in our minds."—ADDISON.

* Vide Trueller : "Continual, continued."

Continuation, Continuity.

Continuation, as may be seen above (*v. Continuance*), is the act of *continuing*; *continuity* is the quality of *continuing*: the former is employed in the figurative sense for the duration of events and actions; the latter in the physical sense for the adhesion of the component parts of the bodies. The *continuation* of a history up to the existing period of the writer is the work of every age, if not of every year: there are bodies of so little *continuity* that they will crumble to pieces on the slightest touch.

The sun ascending into the northern signs begetteth first a temperate heat, which by his approach unto the solstice he intendeth; and by *continuation* the same even upon declination.—BROWNE'S VULGAR ERRORS.

A body always perceives the passages by which it insinuates; feels the impulse of another body where it yields thereto; perceives the separation of its *continuity*, and for a time resists it; in fine, perception is diffused through all nature.—BACON.

The sprightly breast demands
Incessant rapture; life, a tedious load,
Deny'd its *continuity* of joy.—SHENSTONE.

Continuation, *v. Continuance*.

To Continue, Remain, Stay.

Continue, *v. Continual, perpetual*.

Remain, in Latin *remaneo*, is compounded of *re* and *maneo*, Greek *μενα*, Hebrew *omad* to tarry.

Stay is but a variation of the word stand.

The idea of confining one's self to something is common to all these terms; but *continue* applies often to the sameness of action, and *remain* to the sameness of place or situation; the former has most of the active sense in it, and expresses a state of action; the latter is altogether neuter, and expresses a state of rest. We speak of *continuing* a certain course, of *continuing* to do, or *continuing* to be any thing; but of *remaining* in a position, in a house, in a town, in a condition, and the like.

There is more of will in *continuing*; more of necessity and circumstances in *remaining*. A person *continues* in office as long as he can perform it with satisfaction to himself, and his employers: a sentinel *remains* at his post or station. *Continue* is opposed to cease; *remain* is opposed to go. Things *continue* in motion; they *remain* stationary. The females among the brutes will sometimes *continue* to feed their young long after they are able to provide for themselves; many persons are restored to life after having *remained* several hours in a state of suspended animation.

Remain and *stay* are both perfectly neuter in their sense, but *remain* is employed for either persons or things; *stay* for persons only. It is necessary for some species of wood to *remain* long in the water in order to be seasoned: some persons are of so restless a temper that they cannot *stay* long in a place without giving symptoms of uneasiness.

When *remain* is employed for persons, it is often involuntary, if not compulsory; *stay* is altogether voluntary. Soldiers must *remain* where they are stationed. Friends *stay* at each others' houses as visitors. Former times

afford many instances of servants *continuing* faithful to their employers, even in the season of adversity; but so much are times altered, that at present, domestics never *remain* long enough in their places to create any bond of attachment between master and servant. Their time of *stay* is now limited to weeks and months, instead of being extended to years.

I have seen some Roman Catholic authors who tell us, that vicious writers *continue* in purgatory so long as the influence of their writings *continues* upon posterity.—ADDISON.

I will be true to thee, preserve thee ever,
The sad companion of this faithful breast;
While life and thought *remain*.—ROWE.

Where'er I go, my soul shall *stay* with thee:
'Tis but my shadow that I take away.—DEYDEN.

To Continue, Persevere, Persist, Pursue, Prosecute.

Continue, *v. Continual*.

Persevere, in French *persévérer*, Latin *perseverare*, compounded of *per* and *severus* strict and steady, signifies to be steady throughout or to the end.

Persist, in French *persistier*, Latin *persisto*, compounded of *per* and *sisto* or *sto*, signifies to stand by or to a thing.

Pursue and **Prosecute**, in French *poursuivre*, come from the Latin *prosequor* and its participle *prosecutus* signifying to follow after or keep on with.

The idea of not laying aside is common to these terms, which is the sense of *continue* without any other addition; the other terms, which are all species of *continuing*, include likewise some collateral idea which distinguishes them from the first, as well as from each other. *Continue* is comparable with *persevere* and *persist* in the neuter sense; with *pursue* and *prosecute* in the active sense. To *continue* is simply to do as one has done hitherto; to *persevere* is to *continue* without wishing to change, or from a positive desire to attain an object; to *persist* is to *continue* from a determination or will not to cease. The act of *continuing*, therefore, specifies no characteristic of the agent; that of *persevering* or *persisting* marks a direct temper of mind; the former is always used in a good sense, the latter in an indifferent or bad sense. We *continue* from habit or casualty; we *persevere* from reflection and the exercise of one's judgment; we *persist* from attachment. It is not the most exalted virtue to *continue* in a good course, merely because we have been in the habit of so doing; what is done from habit merely, without any fixed principle, is always exposed to change from the influence of passion or evil counsel: there is real virtue in the act of *perseverance*, without which many of our best intentions would remain unfulfilled, and our best plans would be defeated; those who do not *persevere* can do no essential good; and those who do *persevere* often effect what has appeared to be impracticable; of this truth the discoverer of America is a remarkable proof, who in spite of every mortification, rebuff, and disappointment, *persevered* in calling the attention of monarchs to his project, until

he at length obtained the assistance requisite for effecting the discovery of a new world.

Persevere is employed only in matters of some moment, in things of sufficient importance to demand a steady purpose of the mind; *persist* is employed in the ordinary business of life: a learner *perseveres* in his studies, in order to arrive at the necessary degree of improvement; a child *persists* in making a request, until he has obtained the object of his desire: there is always wisdom in *perseverance*, even though unsuccessful; there is mostly folly, caprice, or obstinacy, in *persistence*: how different the man who *perseveres* in the cultivation of his talents, from him who only *persists* in maintaining falsehoods or supporting errors!

Abdallah *continuing* to extend his former improvements, beautified this whole prospect with groves and fountains.—ADDISON.

If we *persevere* in studying to do our duty towards God and man, we shall meet with the esteem, love, and confidence of those who are around us.—BLAIR.

A great deal may be done by a course of beneficence obstinately *persisted* in; this, if any thing, being a likely way of establishing a moral habit.—GROVE.

The use of the word *persist*, however, as in the last example, is, to say the least of it, very singular, as the term is mostly employed in an indifferent, if not a bad sense.

Continue, when compared with *persevere* or *persist*, is always coupled with modes of action; but in comparison with *pursue* or *prosecute*, it is always followed by some object: we *continue* to do, *persevere*, or *persist* in doing something; but we *continue*, *pursue*, or *prosecute* some object which we wish to bring to perfection by additional labour.

Continue is equally indefinite, as in the former case; *pursue* and *prosecute* both comprehend collateral ideas respecting the disposition of the agent, and the nature of the object: to *continue* is to go on with a thing as it has been begun: to *pursue* and *prosecute* is to *continue* by some prescribed rule, or in some particular manner: a work is *continued*; a plan, measure, or line of conduct is *pursued*; an undertaking or a design is *prosecuted*: we may *continue* the work of another in order to supply a deficiency: we may *pursue* a plan that emanates either from ourselves or another; we *prosecute* our own work only in order to obtain some peculiar object: *continue*, therefore, expresses less than *pursue*, and this less than *prosecute*: the history of England has been *continued* down to the present period by different writers; Smollett has *pursued* the same plan as Hume, in the *continuation* of his history; Captain Cook *prosecuted* his work of discovery in three several voyages.

We *continue* a conversation which has been interrupted: we *pursue* a subject which has engaged our attention; we *pursue* a journey after a certain length of stay; we *prosecute* any particular journey which is important either on account of its difficulties or its object.

To *continue* is in itself altogether an indifferent action; to *pursue* is always a commendable action: to *prosecute* rises still higher in value: it is a mark of great instability not to *continue* any thing that we begin; it betrays a great want of prudence and discernment not to *pursue* some plan on every occasion which requires method; it is the characteristic of a

persevering mind to *prosecute* whatever it is deemed worthy to enter upon.

After having petitioned for power to resist temptation, there is so great an incongruity in not *continuing* the struggle, that we blush at the thought, and *persevere*, lest we lose all reverence for ourselves.—HAWKESWORTH.

Look round the habitable world, how few
Know their own good, or knowing it, *pursue*.
DRYDEN.

Will ye not now the pair of sages praise,
Who the same end *pursu'd* by several ways?
DRYDEN.

There will be some study which every man more zealously *prosecutes*, some darling subject on which he is principally pleased to converse.—JOHNSON.

Continued, v. Continual.

Continuity, v. Continuation.

To contract, v. To abridge.

Contract, v. Agreement.

Contracted, Confined, Narrow.

Contracted, from the verb *contract*, in Latin *contractus* participle of *contraho* to draw or come close together, signifies either the state or quality of being shrunk up, lessened in size, or brought within a smaller compass.

Confined, marks the state of being *confined* (v. To bound).

Narrow is a variation of near, signifying the quality of being near, close, or not extended.

Contraction arises from the inherent state of the object; *confined* is produced by some external agent: a limb is *contracted* from disease; it is *confined* by a chain: we speak morally of the *contracted* span of a man's life, and the *confined* view which he takes of a subject.

Contracted and *confined* respect the operations of things; *narrow* their qualities or accidents: whatever is *contracted* or *confined* is more or less *narrow*; but many things are *narrow* which have never been *contracted* or *confined*; what is *narrow* is therefore more positively so than either *contracted* or *confined*: a *contracted* mind has but few objects on which it dwells to the exclusion of others; a *confined* education is *confined* to few points of knowledge or information; a *narrow* soul is hemmed in by a single selfish passion.

Notwithstanding a *narrow* contracted temper be that which obtains most in the world, we must not therefore conclude this to be the genuine characteristic of mankind.—GROVE.

The presence of every created being is *confined* to a certain measure of space, and consequently his observation is stunted to a certain number of objects.—ADDISON.

Resentments are not easily dislodged from *narrow* minds.—CUMBERLAND.

In its present habitation, the soul is plainly *confined* in its operations.—BLAIR.

To Contradict, Oppose, Deny.

Contradict, from the Latin *contra* and *dictum*, signifies a speech against a speech.

Oppose, in French *opposer*, Latin *opponere*, perfect of *oppono* from *op* or *ob* and *pono*,

signifies to throw in the way or against a thing.

Deny, in French *denier*, Latin *denego*, is compounded of *de*, *ne*, and *ago* or *dico*, signifying to say no.

Contradict and *deny* are performed by words only; *oppose* either by words or actions: we *contradict* an assertion, *deny* a fact, *oppose* a person or his opinions: we may *contradict* ourselves or others; we *oppose* others only: if liars have not excellent memories they are sure to *contradict* themselves on a close examination; those who *oppose* others should be careful not to do it from a spirit of opposition.

When *contradict* respects other persons, it is frequently a mode of *opposition*, as we may most effectually *oppose* a person by *contradicting* what he asserts; but *contradiction* does not necessarily imply *opposition*; the former is simply a mode of action, the latter comprehends both the action and the spirit, with which it is dictated: we *contradict* from necessity or in self-defence; we *oppose* from conviction or some personal feeling of a less honourable nature: it is a breach of politeness ever to *contradict* flatly; it is a violation of the moral law to *oppose* without the most substantial ground.

Contradict is likewise used in denying what is laid to one's charge; but we may *deny* without *contradicting*, in answer to a question: *contradiction* respects indifferent matters; *denying* is mostly used in matters of immediate interest.

Contradiction is employed for correcting others; *denying* is used to clear one's self: we may *contradict* falsely when we have not sufficient ground for *contradicting*; and we may *deny* justly when we rebut an unfair charge.

In the Socratic way of dispute, you agree to every thing your opponent advances; in the Aristotelic, you are still *denying* and *contradicting* some part or other of what he says.—ADDISON.

There are many who are fond of *contradicting* the common reports of fame.—ADDISON.

One of the company began to rally him (an infidel) upon his devotion on shipboard, which the other *denied* in so high terms, that it produced the lie on both sides, and ended in a duel.—ADDISON.

The introduction of the bill may be *opposed*, as the bill itself may at either of the readings.—BLACKSTONE.

Contrary, *v. Adverse*.

Contrast, *v. Comparison*.

To Contribute, *v. To conduce*.

To Contribute, *v. To minister*.

Contribution, *v. Tax*.

Contrition, *v. Repentance*.

Contrivance, *v. Device*.

To Contrive, Devise, Invent.

Contrive, in French *controuver*, compounded of *con* and *trouver*, signifies to find out by putting together.

Devise, compounded of *de* and *vis*, in Latin *visus* seen, signifies to show or present to the mind.

Invent, in Latin *inventus*, participle of *invenio*, compounded of *in* and *venio*, signifies to come or bring into the mind.

To *contrive* and *devise* do not express so much as to *invent*: we *contrive* and *devise* in small matters; we *invent* in those of greater moment. *Contriving* and *devising* respect the manner of doing things; *inventing* comprehends the action and the thing itself; the former are but the new fashioning of things that already exist; the latter is, as it were, the creation of something new: to *contrive* and *devise* are intentional actions, the result of a specific effort; *invention* naturally arises from the exertion of an inherent power; we require thought and combination to *contrive* or *devise*; ingenuity is the faculty which is exerted in *inventing*.

Contriving requires even less exercise of the thoughts than *devising*: we *contrive* on familiar and common occasions; we *devise* in seasons of difficulty and trial. A *contrivance* is simple and obvious to a plain understanding: a *device* is complex and far fetched: it requires a ready conception and a degree of art.

Contrivances serve to supply a deficiency; or increase a convenience; *devices* are employed to extricate from danger, to remove an evil, or forward a scheme: the history of Robinson Crusoe derives considerable interest from the relation of the various *contrivances* by which he provide himself with the first articles of necessity and comfort; the history of robbers and adventurers is full of the various *devices* by which they endeavour to carry on their projects of plunder, or elude the vigilance of their pursuers; the history of civilized society contains an account of the various *inventions* which have contributed to the enjoyment or improvement of mankind.

My sentence is for open war; of wiles
More unexpert I boast not; them let those
Contrive who need, or when they need, not now.
MILTON.

The briskest nectar
Shall be his drink, and all th' ambrosial cakes
Art can devise for wanton appetite
Furnish his banquet.—NAEB.

Architecture, painting, and statuary, were *invented* with the design to lift up human nature.—ADDISON.

To Contrive, *v. To concert*.

To Control, *v. To check*.

To Controvert, *Dispute*.

Controvert, compounded of the Latin *contra* and *verto*, signifies to turn against another in discourse, or direct one's self against another.

Dispute, *v. To argue, debate*.

To *controvert* has regard to speculative points; to *dispute* respects matters of fact: there is more of opposition in *controversy*; more of doubt in *disputing*: a sophist *controverts*; a sceptic *disputes*: the plainest and sublimest truths of the Gospel have been all *controverted* in their turn by the self-sufficient inquirer: the authenticity of the Bible itself has been *disputed* by some few individuals: the existence of a God by still fewer.

Controversy is worse than an unprofitable task; instead of eliciting truth, it does but expose the failings of the parties engaged: *disputing* is not so personal, and consequently not so objectionable: we never *controvert* any point without seriously and decidedly intending to oppose the notions of another; we may sometimes *dispute* a point for the sake of friendly argument, or the desire of information: theologians and politicians are the greatest *controversialists*: it is the business of men in general to *dispute* whatever ought not to be taken for granted.

The demolishing of Dunkirk was so eagerly insisted on, and so warmly *controverted*, as had like to have produced a challenge.—BUDGELL.

Avoid *disputes* as much as possible.—BUDGELL.

Contumacious, v. Obstinate.

Contumacy, Rebellion.

Contumacy, from the Latin *contumax*, compounded of *contra* and *tumeo* to swell, signifies the swelling one's self up by way of resistance.

Rebellion, in Latin *rebellio*, from *rebello* or *re* and *bello* to war in return, signifies carrying on war against those to whom we owe, and have before paid, a lawful subjection.

Resistance to lawful authority is the common idea included in the signification of both these terms, but *contumacy* does not express so much as *rebellion*: the *contumacious* resist only occasionally; the *rebel* resists systematically: the *contumacious* stand only on certain points, and oppose the individual; the *rebel* sets himself up against the authority itself: the *contumacious* thwart and contradict, they never resort to open violence; the *rebel* acts only by main force: *contumacy* shelters itself under the plea of equity and justice; *rebellion* sets all law and order at defiance.

The censor told the criminal that he spoke in contempt of the court, and that he should be proceeded against for *contumacy*.—ADDISON.

The mother of Waller was the daughter of John Hampden of Hampden, in the same county, and sister to Hampden the zealot of *rebellion*.—JOHNSON.

To Convene, v. To assemble.

Convenient, Suitable.

Convenient, v. Commodious.

Suitable, v. Comfortable.

Convenient regards the circumstances of the individual; *suitable* respects the established opinions of mankind, and is closely connected with moral propriety: nothing is *convenient* which does not favour one's purpose: nothing is *suitable* which does not suit the person, place, and thing: whoever has anything to ask of another must take a *convenient* opportunity in order to ensure success; his address on such an occasion would be very *unsuitable*, if he affected to claim as a right what he ought to solicit as a favour.

If any man think it *convenient* to seem good, let him be so indeed, and then his goodness will appear to everybody's satisfaction.—MILTON.

Pleasure in general is the consequent apprehension of a *suitable* object, *suitably* applied to a rightly disposed faculty.—SOUTH.

Convenient, v. Commodious.

Convent, v. Cloister.

Convention, v. Assembly.

Conversant, Familiar.

Conversant, from *converse*, signifies turning over and over, consequently becoming acquainted.

Familiar, from the Latin *familiaris* to be of the same family, signifies the closest connection.

An acquaintance with things is implied in both these terms, but the latter expresses something more particular than the former.

A person is *conversant* in matters that come frequently before his notice; he is *familiar* with such as form the daily routine of his business: one who is not a professed lawyer may be *conversant* with the questions of law which occur on ordinary occasions; but one who is skilled in his profession will be *familiar* with all cases which may possibly be employed in support of a cause: it is *advisable* to be *conversant* with the ways of the world; but to be *familiar* with the greater part of them would not redound to one's credit or advantage.

The waking man is *conversant* with the world of nature; when he sleeps he retires to a private world that is particular to himself.—ADDISON.

Groves, fields, and meadows are at any season of the year pleasant to look upon, but never so much as in the opening of the spring, when they are all new and fresh with the first gloss of them, and not yet too *familiar* to the eye.—ADDISON.

Conversation, Dialogue, Conference, Colloquy.

Conversation denotes the act of holding *converse* (v. *Communion*).

Dialogue, in French *dialogue*, Latin *dialogos*, Greek *dialogos* compounded of *dis* and *logos*, signifies a speech between two.

Conference, from the Latin *con* and *fero* to put together, signifies consulting together on subjects.

Colloquy, in Latin *colloquium* from *col* or *con* and *loquor* to speak, signifies the act of talking together.

A *conversation* is always something actually held between two or more persons; a *dialogue* is mostly fictitious, and written as if spoken: any number of persons may take part in a *conversation*; but a *dialogue* always refers to the two persons who are expressly engaged: a *conversation* may be desultory, in which each takes his part at pleasure; a *dialogue* is formal, in which there will always be reply and rejoinder: a *conversation* may be carried on by any signs besides words, which are addressed personally to the individual present; a *dialogue* must always consist of express words: a prince holds frequent *conversations* with his ministers on affairs of state; Cicero wrote *dialogues* on the nature of the gods, and

many la er writers have adopted the *dialogue* form as a vehicle for conveying their sentiments : a *conference* is a species of *conversation* ; a *colloquy* is a species of *dialogue* ; a *conversation* is indefinite as to the subject, or the parties engaged in it ; a *conference* is confined to particular subjects and descriptions of persons ; a *conversation* is mostly occasional ; a *conference* is always specifically appointed : a *conversation* is mostly on indifferent matters ; a *conference* is mostly on national or public concerns : we have a *conversation* as friends ; we have a *conference* as ministers of state.

The *dialogue* naturally limits the number to two ; the *colloquy* is indefinite as to number : there may be *dialogues* therefore which are not *colloquies* ; but every *colloquy* may be denominated a *dialogue*.

I find so much Arabic and Persian to read, that all my leisure in a morning is hardly sufficient for a thousandth part of the reading that would be agreeable and useful, as I wish to be a match in *conversation* with the learned natives whom I happen to meet.—SIR WM. JONES.

Aurengzebe is written in rhyme, and has the appearance of being the most elaborate of all Dryden's plays. The personages are imperial, but the *dialogue* is often domestic, and therefore susceptible of sentiments accommodated to familiar incidents.—JOHNSON.

The *conference* between Gabriel and Satan abounds with sentiments proper for the occasion, and suitable to the persons of the two speakers.—ADDISON.

The close of this divine *colloquy* (between the Father and the Son) with the hymn of Angels that follow, are wonderfully beautiful and poetical.—ADDISON.

Converse, *v.* *Communion*.

Conversable, *v.* *Facetious*.

Convert, Proselyte.

Convert, from the Latin *converto*, signifies changed to something in conformity with the views of another.

Proselyte, from the Greek *προσληντος* and *προσερχομαι*, signifies come over to the side of another.

Convert is more extensive in its sense and application than *proselyte* : *convert* in its full sense includes every change of opinion, without respect to the subject ; *proselyte* in its strict sense refers only to changes from one religious belief to another : there are many *converts* to particular doctrines of Christianity, and *proselytes* from the Pagan, Jewish, or Mahomedan, to the Christian faith : there are political as well as religious *converts*, who could not with the same strict propriety be termed *proselytes*.

Conversion is a more voluntary act than *proselytism* ; it emanates entirely from the mind of the agent, independently of foreign influence ; it extends not merely to the abstract or speculative opinions of the individual, but to the whole current of his feelings and spring of his actions : it is the *conversion* of the heart and soul. *Proselytism* is an outward act, which need not extend beyond the conformity of one's words and actions to a certain rule : *convert* is therefore always taken in a good sense : it bears on the face of it the stamp of sincerity : *proselyte* is a term of more ambiguous meaning ; the *proselyte* is often the creature and tool of a party ; there may be many *proselytes* where there are no *converts*.

The *conversion* of a sinner is the work of God's grace, either by his special interposition, or by the ordinary influence of his Holy Word on the heart ; it is an act of great presumption, therefore, in those men who rest so strongly on their own particular modes and forms in bringing about this great work : they may without any breach of charity be suspected of rather wishing to make *proselyte* to their own party.

A believer may be excused by the most hardened atheist for endeavouring to make him a *convert*, because he does it with an eye to both their interests.—ADDISON.

False teachers commonly make use of base, and low, and temporal considerations, of little tricks and devices to make disciples and gain *proselytes*.—TILLOTSON.

To Convey, *v.* To bear.

To Convict, Detect.

Convict, from the Latin *convictus*, participle of *convincio* to make manifest, signifies to make guilt clear.

Detect, from the Latin *detectus*, participle of *detego*, compound of the privative *de* and *tego* to cover, signifies to uncover or lay open guilt.

A person is *convicted* by means of evidence ; he is *detected* by means of ocular demonstration. One is *convicted* of having been the perpetrator of some evil deed ; one is *detected* in the very act of committing the deed. One is *convicted* of crimes in a court of judicature ; one is *detected* in various misdemeanours by different casualties : punishment necessarily follows *conviction* ; but in the case of *detection*, it rests in the breast of the individual against whom the offence is committed.

Advice is offensive, not because it lays us open to unexpected regret, or *convicts* us of any fault which had escaped our notice, but because it shows us that we are known to others as well as ourselves.—JOHNSON.

Every member of society feels and acknowledges the necessity of *detecting* crimes.—JOHNSON.

Convict, *v.* *Criminal*.

Conviction, Persuasion.

Conviction, from *convince* (*v.* *Conclusive*), denotes either the act of *convincing* or the state of being *convinced*.

Persuasion, from *persuade*, expresses likewise either the act of *persuading* or the state of being *persuaded*. *Persuade*, in Latin, *persuadeo*, from the Greek *πρῶν* to delight, signifies to make thoroughly agreeable to the taste.

What *convince*s binds ; what *persuades* attracts. We are *convinced* by arguments ; it is the understanding which determines : we are *persuaded* by entreaties and personal influence ; it is the imagination or will which decides. Our *conviction* respects solely matters of belief or faith ; our *persuasion* respects matters of belief or practice : we are *convinced* that a thing is true or false ; we are *persuaded* that it is either right or wrong, advantageous or the contrary. A person will have half effected a thing who is *convinced* that it is in his power to effect it : he will be easily *persuaded* to do that which fur- his own interests,

Conviction respects our most important duties; *persuasion* is applied to matters of indifference. The first step to true repentance is a thorough *conviction* of the enormity of sin. The cure of people's maladies is sometimes promoted to a surprising degree by their *persuasion* of the efficacy of the remedy.

As *conviction* is the effect of substantial evidence, it is solid and permanent in its nature; it cannot be so easily changed and deceived: *persuasion*, depending on our feelings, is influenced by external objects, and exposed to various changes; it may vary both in the degree and in the object. *Conviction* answers in our minds to positive certainty; *persuasion* answers to probability.

The practical truths of Christianity demand our deepest *conviction*; of its speculative truths we ought to have a rational *persuasion*.

The *conviction* of the truth or falsehood of that which we have been accustomed to condemn or admire cannot be effected without powerful means; but we may be *persuaded* of the propriety of a thing to-day, which to-morrow we shall regard with indifference. We ought to be *convinced* of the propriety of avoiding every thing which can interfere with the good order of society; we may be *persuaded* of the truth of a person's narrative or not, according to the representation made to us; we may be *persuaded* to pursue any study or lay it aside.

When men have settled in themselves a *conviction* that there is nothing honourable which is not accompanied with innocence; nothing mean but what has guilt in it; riches, pleasures, and honours, will easily lose their charms, if they stand between us and our integrity.—STEELE.

Let the mind be possessed with the *persuasion* of immortal happiness annexed to the act, and there will be no want of candidates to struggle for the glorious prerogative.—CUMBERLAND.

Convincing, v. Conclusive.

Convivial, Social.

Convivial, in Latin *convivialis* from *convivo* to live together, signifies being entertained together.

Social, from *socius* a companion, signifies pertaining to company.

The prominent idea in *convivial* is that of sensual indulgence; the prominent idea in *social* is that of enjoyment from an intercourse with society. *Convivial* is a species of the *social*; it is the *social* in matters of festivity. What is *convivial* is *social*, but what is *social* is something more; the former is excelled by the latter as much as the body is excelled by the mind. We speak of *convivial* meetings, *convivial* enjoyments or the *convivial* board; but *social* intercourse, *social* pleasure, *social* amusements, and the like.

It is related by Carte, of the Duke of Ormond, that he used often to pass a night with Dryden, and those with whom Dryden consorted; who were, Carte has not told, but certainly the *convivial* table at which Ormond sat was not surrounded with a plebeian society.—JOHNSON.

Plato and Socrates shared many *social* hours with Aristophanes.—CUMBERLAND.

Convocation, v. Assembly.

To Convoke, v. To assemble.

Cool, Cold, Frigid.

In the natural sense, *Cool* is simply the absence of warmth; *Cold* and *Frigid* are positively contrary to warmth; the former in regard to objects in general, the latter to moral objects; in the physical sense the analogy is strictly preserved. *Cool* is used as it respects the passions and the affections; *cold* only with regard to the affections; *frigid* only in regard to the inclinations.

With regard to the passions, *cool* designates a freedom from agitation, which is a desirable quality. *Coolness* in a time of danger, and *coolness* in an argument, are alike commendable.

As *cool* and *cold* respect the affections, the *cool* is opposed to the friendly, the *cold* to the warm-hearted, the *frigid* to the animated; the former is but a degree of the latter. A reception is said to be *cool*; an embrace to be *cold*; a sentiment *frigid*. *Coolness* is an enemy to social enjoyments; *coldness* is an enemy to every moral virtue; *frigidity* destroys all force of character. *Coolness* is engendered by circumstances; it supposes the previous existence of warmth; *coldness* lies often in the temperament, or is engendered by habit; it is always something vicious; *frigidity* is occasional, and is always a defect. Trifling differences produce *coolness* sometimes between the best friends; trade sometimes engenders a *cold* calculating temper in some minds; those who are remarkable for apathy will often express themselves with *frigid* indifference on the most important subjects.

The jealous man's disease is of so malignant a nature, that it converts all it takes into its own nourishment. A *cold* behaviour is interpreted as an instance of aversion; a fond one raises his suspicions.—ADDISON.

It is wondrous that a man can get over the natural existence and possession of his own mind, so far as to take delight either in paying or receiving *cold* and repeated civilities.—STEELE.

The religion of the moderns abounds in topics so incomparably noble and exalted, as might kindle the flames of genuine oratory in the most *frigid* and barren genius.—WHARTON.

Cool, v. Dispassionate.

Copious, v. Plentiful.

Copiously, v. Largely.

To Copy, Transcribe.

Copy is probably changed from the Latin *capio* to take, because we take that from an object which we *copy*.

Transcribe, in Latin *transcribo*, that is *trans* over, and *scribo* to write, signifies literally to write over from something else, to make to pass over in writing from one to the other.

To *copy* respects the matter; to *transcribe* respects simply the act of writing. What is *copied* must be taken immediately from the original with which it must exactly correspond; what is *transcribed* may be taken from the *copy*, but not necessarily in an entire state. Things are *copied* for the sake of getting the contents; they are often *transcribed* for the sake of clearness and fair writing. A *copier* should be very exact; a *transcriber* should be

a good writer. Lawyers *copy* deeds, and have them afterwards frequently transcribed as occasion requires.

Aristotle tells us that the world is a *copy* or *transcript* of those ideas which are in the mind of the First Being, and that those ideas which are in the mind of man are a *transcript* of the world. To this we may add that words are the *transcript* of those ideas which are in the mind of man, and that writing or printing are the *transcript* of words.—ADDISON.

Copy, Model, Pattern, Specimen.

Copy, from the verb to *copy* (v. *To copy*), marks either the thing from which we *copy* or the thing *copied*.

Model, in French *modèle*, Latin *modulus* a little model or measure, signifies the thing that serves as a measure, or that is made after a measure.

Pattern, which is a variation of *patron*, from the French *patron*, Latin *patronus*, signifies the thing that directs.

Specimen, in Latin *specimen*, from *specio* to behold, signifies what is looked at for the purpose of forming our judgment by it.

* A *copy* and a *model* may be both employed either as an original work or as a work formed after an original.

In the former sense, *copy* is used in relation to impressions, manuscripts, or writings, which are made to be *copied* by the printer, the writer, or the engraver: *model* is used in every other case, whether in morality or the arts: the proof will seldom be faulty when the *copy* is clear and correct. There can be no good writing formed after a bad *copy*; no human being has ever presented us with a perfect *model* of virtue: the classic writers of antiquity ought to be carefully perused by all who wish to acquire a pure style, of which they contain unquestionably the best models.

Respecting these words, however, it is here farther to be observed, that a *copy* requires the closest imitation possible in every particular, but a *model* ought only to serve as a general rule: the former must be literally retraced by a mechanical process in all its lines and figures; it leaves nothing to be supplied by the judgment or will of the executor. A *model* often consists of little more than the outlines and proportions, whilst the dimensions and decorations are left to the choice of the workman. One who is anxious to acquire a fine hand will in the first instance rather imitate the errors of his *copy* than attempt any improvement of his own. A man of genius will not suffer himself to be cramped by a slavish adherence to any *model* however perfect.

In the second sense *copy* is used for painting, and *model* for relief. A *copy* ought to be faithful, a *model* ought to be just; the former should delineate exactly what is delineated by the original; the latter should adhere to the precise rules of proportion observed in the original. The pictures of Raphael do not lose their attractions even in bad *copies*: the simple *models* of antiquity often equal in value originals of modern conception.

* Vide Girard: "Copie, modèle."

Pattern and *specimen* approach nearest to *model* in signification: the idea of guidance or direction is prominent in them. The *model* always serves to guide in the execution of a work; the *pattern*, serves either to regulate the work or simply to determine the choice; the *specimen* helps only to form the opinion. The architect builds according to a certain *model*: the mechanic makes anything according to a *pattern* or a person fixes on having a thing according to the *pattern* offered him; the nature and value of things are estimated by the *specimens* shown of them. A *model* is always some whole complete in itself; a *pattern* may be either a whole or the part of a whole; a *specimen* is always a part. *Models* of ships, bridges, or other pieces of mechanism are sometimes constructed for the purpose of explaining most effectually the nature and design of the invention: whenever the make, colour, or materials of any article, either of convenience or luxury, is an object of consideration, it cannot be so rightly determined by any means as by producing a similar article to serve as a *pattern*: a single sentence in a book may be a sufficient *specimen* of the whole performance.

In the moral sense *pattern* respects the whole conduct of behaviour; *specimen* only individual actions. The female who devotes her time and attention to the management of her family and the education of her offspring is a *pattern* to those of her sex who depute the whole concern to the care of others. A person gives but an unfortunate *specimen* of his boasted sincerity who is found guilty of an evasion.

Longinus has observed that the description of love in Sappho is an exact *copy* of nature, and that all the circumstances which follow one another in such an hurry of sentiments, notwithstanding they appear repugnant to each other, are really such as happen in the frenzies of love.—ADDISON.

Socrates recommends to Alcibiades, as the *model* of his devotions, a short prayer which a Greek poet composed for the use of his friends.—ADDISON.

Xenophon, in the life of his imaginary prince, whom he describes as a *pattern* for real ones, is always celebrating the philanthropy or good nature of his hero.—ADDISON.

We know nothing of the scanty jargon of our barbarous ancestors; but we have *specimens* of our language when it began to be adapted to civil and religious purposes, and find it such as might naturally be expected, artless and simple.—JOHNSON.

To Copy, v. To imitate.

Coquet, Jilt.

There are many Jilts who become so from Coquets, but one may be a *coquet* without being a *jilt*. *Coquetry* is contented with employing little arts to excite notice; *jilting* extends to the violation of truth and honour, in order to awaken a passion which it afterwards disappoints. Vanity is the main spring by which *coquets* and *jilts* are impelled to action; but the former indulges her propensity mostly at her own expense only, while the latter does no less injury to the peace of others than she does to her own reputation. The *coquet* makes a traffic of her own charms by seeking a multitude of admirers; the *jilt* sports with the sacred passion of love, and barter it for the

gratification of any selfish propensity. *Coquetry* is a fault which should be guarded against by every female as a snare to her own happiness; *jilting* is a vice which cannot be practised without some depravity of the heart.

The *coquette* is indeed one degree towards the *fil*; but the heart of the former is bent upon admiring herself, and giving false hopes to her lovers; but the latter is not contented to be extremely amiable, but she must add to that advantage a certain delight in being a torment to others. — STEELE.

Cordial, v. Hearty.

Corner, Angle.

Corner answers to the French *coin*, and Greek *γωνία*, which signifies either a corner or a hidden place.

Angle, in Latin *angulus*, comes in all probability from *αγκυον* the elbow.

The vulgar use of *corner* in the ordinary concerns of life, and the technical use of *angle* in the science of mathematics, is not the only distinction between these terms.

Corner properly implies the outer extreme point of any solid body; *angle*, on the contrary, the inner extremity produced by the meeting of two right lines. When speaking therefore of solid bodies, *corner* and *angle* may be both employed; but in regard to simple right lines, the word *angle* only is applicable: in the former case a *corner* is produced by the meeting of the different parts of a body whether inwardly or outwardly; but an *angle* is produced by the meeting of two bodies; one house has many *corners*: two houses or two walls at least, are requisite to make an *angle*.

We likewise speak of making an *angle* by the direction that is taken in going either by land or sea, because such a course is equivalent to a right line; in that case the word *corner* could not be substituted; on the other hand the word *corner* is often used for a place of secrecy or obscurity, agreeably to the derivation of the term.

Some men, like pictures, are fitter for a *corner* than for a full light. — POPE.

Jewellers grind their diamonds with many sides and angles, that their lustre may appear many ways. — DERHAM.

Corporal, Corporeal, Bodily.

Corporal, Corporeal, and Bodily, as their origin bespeaks, have all relation to the same object, the *body*; but the two former are employed to signify relating or appertaining to the *body*, the latter to denote containing or forming part of the *body*. Hence we say, *corporal* punishment, *bodily* vigour or strength, *corporeal* substances; the Godhead *bodily*, the *corporeal* frame, *bodily* exertion.

Corporal is only employed for the animal frame in its proper sense; *corporeal* is used for animal substance in an extended sense; hence we speak of *corporeal* suffering and *corporeal* agents. *Corporeal* is distinguished from spiritual; *bodily* from mental. It is impossible to represent spiritual beings any other way than under a *corporeal* form; *bodily* pains, however severe, are frequently overpowered by mental pleasures.

Bettesworth was so little satisfied with this account that he publicly professed his resolution of a violent and *corporeal* revenge, but the inhabitants of St. Patrick's district embodied themselves in the Dean's (Swift's) defence. — JOHNSON.

When the soul is freed from all *corporeal* alliance then it truly exists. — HUGHES.

The soul is beset with a numerous train of temptations to evil, which arise from *bodily* appetites. — BLAIR.

Corporeal, v. Corporal.

Corporeal, Materia

Corporeal is properly a species of *material*; whatever is *corporeal* is *material*, but not *vice versa*. *Corporeal* respects animate bodies; *material* is used for everything which can act on the senses, animate or inanimate. The world contains *corporeal* beings, and consists of *material* substances.

Grant that *corporeal* is the human mind, it must have parts in infinitum join'd; And each of these must will, perceive, design, And draw confus'dly in a different line. JENYNS.

In the present *material* system in which we live, and where the objects that surround us are continually exposed to the examination of our senses, how many things occur that are mysterious and unaccountable! — BLAIR.

Corpse, v. Body.

Corpulent, Stout, Lusty.

Corpulent from *corpus* the body, signifies having fulness of body.

Stout, in Dutch *stott*, is no doubt a variation of the German *stättig* steady, signifying able to stand, solid, firm.

Lusty, in German, &c., *lustig* merry, cheerful, implies here a vigorous state of body.

Corpulent respects the fleshy state of the body; *stout* respects also the state of the muscles and bones: *corpulence* is therefore an incidental property; *stoutness* is a natural property: *corpulence* may come upon us according to circumstances; *stoutness* is the natural make of the body which is born with us. *Corpulence* and *lustiness* are both occasioned by the state of the health; but the former may arise from disease; the latter is always the consequence of good health: *corpulence* consists of an undue proportion of fat; *lustiness* consists of a due and full proportion of all the solids in the body.

Mallet's stature was diminutive, but he was regularly formed; his appearance, till he grew *corpulent*, was agreeable, and he suffered it to wait no recommendation that dress could give it. — JOHNSON.

Tho' I look old yet I am strong and *lusty*,
For in my youth I never did apply
Hot and rebellious liquors to my blood.
SHAKESPEARE.

Hence rose the Marsian and Sabellian race,
Strong limb'd and *stout*, and to the wars inclin'd.
DRYDEN.

To Correct, v. To amend.

To Correct, Rectify, Reform.

Correct, v. To amend.

Rectify, compounded of the Latin *rectus* and *rego* or *facio*, signifies literally to make right or as it should be.

Reform, compounded of *re* and *form*, signifies to make into a new form.

Correct respects ourselves or others; *rectify* has regard to one's self only.

Correct is either an act of authority or discretion; *rectify* is an act of discretion only. What is *corrected* may vary in its magnitude or importance, and consequently may require more or less trouble; what is *rectified* is always of a nature to be altered without great injury or effort. Habitual or individual faults are *corrected*; individual mistakes are *rectified*. A person *corrects* himself or another of a bad habit in speaking or pronouncing; he *rectifies* any error in his accounts. Mistakes in writing must be *corrected* for the advantage of the scholar; mistakes in pecuniary transactions cannot be too soon *rectified* for the satisfaction of all parties.

Reform like *rectify* is used only for one's self when it respects personal actions; but *reform* and *correct* are likewise employed for matters of general interest. *Correct* in neither case amounts to the same as *reform*. A person *corrects* himself of particular habits; he *reforms* his whole life; what is *corrected* undergoes a change, more or less slight; what is *reformed* assumes a new form and becomes a new thing. *Correction* is always advisable; it is the removal of an evil; *reform* is equally so as it respects a man's own conduct; but as it respects public matters, it is altogether of a questionable nature; a man cannot begin too soon to *reform* himself, nor too late to attempt *reforming* the constitutions of society. The abuses of government may always be advantageously *corrected* by the judicious hand of a wise minister; *reforms* in a state are always attended with a certain evil, and promise but an uncertain good; they are never recommended but by the young, the thoughtless, the busy, or the interested.

Desire is *corrected* when there is a tenderness or admiration expressed which partakes of the passion. Licitious language has something brutal in it which disgraces humanity.—STEELE.

A man has frequent opportunities of mitigating the fierceness of a party; of softening the envious, quieting the angry, and *rectifying* the prejudiced.—ADDISON.

Edward and Henry, now the boast of fame,
And virtuous Alfred, a more sacred name,
After a life of generous toils endur'd,
The Gauls subdu'd or property secur'd,
Ambition humbled, mighty cities storm'd,
Or laws establish'd and the world reform'd.

POPE.

Correct, Accurate.

Correct is equivalent to *corrected* (*v. To amend*), or set to rights.

Accurate (*v. Accurate*) implies properly done with care, or by the application of care. *Correct* is negative in its sense; *accurate* is positive; it is sufficient to be free from fault to be *correct*; it must contain every minute particular to be *accurate*. Information is *correct* which contains nothing but facts; it is *accurate* when it contains a vast number of details.

What is *incorrect* is allied to falsehood; what is *inaccurate* is general and indefinite. According to the dialect of modern times, in which gross vices are varnished over with smooth names, a liar is said to speak *incorrectly*; this

is however not only an *inaccurate* but an *incorrect* mode of speech, for a lie is a direct violation of truth, and the *incorrect* is only a deviation from it to greater or less extent.

Sallust, the most elegant and *correct* of all the Latin Historians, observes, that in his time when the most formidable states of the world were subdued by the Romans, the republic sunk into those two opposite vices of a quite different nature, luxury and avarice.—ADDISON.

Those ancients who were the most *accurate* in their remarks on the genius and temper of mankind, have with great exactness allotted inclinations and objects of desire to every stage of life.—STEELE.

Correction, Discipline, Punishment.

As *Correction* and *Discipline* have commonly required *Punishment* to render them efficacious, custom has affixed to them a strong resemblance in their application, although they are distinguished from each other by obvious marks of difference. The prominent idea in *correction* (*v. To correct*) is that of making right what has been wrong. In *discipline*, from the Latin *disciplina* and *disco* to learn, the leading idea is that of instructing or regulating. In *punishment*, from the Latin *punio*, and the Greek *peny* pain, the leading idea is that of inflicting pain.

Children are the peculiar subjects of *correction*; *discipline* and *punishment* are confined to no age. A wise parent *corrects* his child; a master maintains *discipline* in his school; a general preserves *discipline* in his army. Whoever commits a fault is liable to be *punished* by those who have authority over him; if he commits a crime he subjects himself to be *punished* by law.

Correction and *discipline* are mostly exercised by means of chastisement, for which they are often employed as a substitute; *punishment* is inflicted in any way that gives pain. *Correction* and *discipline* are both of them personal acts of authority exercised by superiors over inferiors, but the former is mostly employed by one individual over another; the latter has regard to a number who are the subjects of it directly or indirectly: *punishment* has no relation whatever to the agent by which the action is performed; it may proceed alike from persons or things. A parent who spares the due *correction* of his child, or a master who does not use a proper *discipline* in his school, will alike be *punished* by the insubordination and irregularities of those over whom they have a control.

There was once that virtue in this commonwealth, that a bad citizen was thought to deserve a severer *correction* than the bitterest enemy.—STEELE after CICERO.

The imaginations of young men are of a roving nature; and their passions under no *discipline* or restraint.—ADDISON.

When by just vengeance impious mortals perish,
The Gods behold their *punishment* with pleasure.

ADDISON.

Correctness, *v. Justness.*

Correspondent, Answerable, Suitable.

Correspondent, in French *correspondant*, from the Latin *cum* and *respondeo* to answer in unison or in uniformity.

Answerable and Suitable, from *answer* and *suit*, mark the quality or capacity of *answering* or *suiting*. *Correspondent* supposes a greater agreement than *answerable*, and *answerable* requires a greater agreement than *suitable*. Things that *correspond* must be alike in size, shape, colour, and every minute particular; those that *answer* must be fitted for the same purpose; those that *suit* must have nothing disproportionate or discordant. In the artificial dispositions of furniture, or all matters of art and ornament, it is of considerable importance to have some things made to *correspond*, so that they be placed in *suitable* directions to *answer* to each other.

In the moral application, actions are said not to *correspond* with professions; the success of an undertaking does not *answer* the expectation; particular measures do not *suit* the purpose of individuals. It ill *corresponds* with a profession of friendship to refuse assistance to a friend in the time of need: wild schemes undertaken without thought will never *answer* the expectations of the projectors; it never *suits* the purpose of the selfish and greedy to contribute to the relief of the necessitous.

As the attractive power in bodies is the most universal principle which produceth innumerable effects, so the *corresponding* social appetite in human souls is the great spring and source of moral actions.—BERKELEY.

All the features of the face and tones of the voice *answer* like strings upon musical instruments to the impressions made on them by the mind.—HUGHES.

When we consider the infinite power and wisdom of the Maker, we have reason to think that it is *suitable* to the magnificent harmony of the universe, that the species of creatures should also by gentle degrees ascend upward from us.—ADDISON.

To Corroborate, *v.* To confirm.

To Corrupt, *v.* To contaminate.

To Corrupt, *v.* To rot.

Corruption, *v.* Depravity.

Cost, Expense, Price, Charge.

Cost, in German *kost* or *kosten*, from the Latin *gustare* to taste, signifies originally support, and by an extended sense what is given for support.

Expense is compounded of *ex* and *pense*, in Latin *pensus* participle of *pendo* to pay, signifying the thing paid or given out.

Price, from the Latin *pretium*, and the Greek *πρῆτιον* from *πρᾶσσω* to sell, signifies the thing given for what is bought.

Charge, from to *charge* (*v.* To accuse), signifies the thing laid on as a charge.

The *cost* is what a thing costs or occasions to be laid out; the *expense* is that which is actually laid out; the *price* is that which a thing may fetch or cause to be laid out; the *charge* is that which is required to be laid out. As a *cost* commonly comprehends an *expense*, the terms are on various occasions used indifferently for each other: we speak of counting the *cost* or counting the *expense* of doing anything; at a great *cost* or at a great *expense*: on the other hand, of venturing to do a thing to one's *cost*, of growing wise at other people's *expense*.

The *cost* and the *price* have respect to the thing and its supposed value; the *expense* and the *charge* depend on the option of the persons. The *cost* of a thing must precede the *price*, and the *expense* must succeed the *charge*: we can never set a *price* on anything until we have ascertained what it has *cost* us; nor can we know or defray the *expense* until the *charge* be made. There may, however, frequently be a *price* where there is no *cost*, and *vice versa*; there may also be an *expense* where there is no *charge*; but there cannot be a *charge* without an *expense*. *Costs* in suit often exceed in value and amount the thing contended for: the *price* of things depends on their relative value in the eyes of others; what *costs* nothing sometimes fetches a high *price*; and other things cannot obtain a price equal to the first *cost*. *Expenses* vary with modes of living and men's desires; whoever wants much, or wants that which is not easily obtained, will have many *expenses* to defray; when the *charges* are exorbitant the *expenses* must necessarily bear a proportion.

Between the epithets *costly* and *expensive* there is the same distinction. Whatever is *costly* is naturally *expensive*, but not *vice versa*. Articles of furniture, of luxury, or indulgence, are *costly*, either from their variety or their intrinsic value; everything is *expensive* which is attended with much *expense*, whether of little or great value. Jewels are *costly*; travelling is *expensive*. The *costly* treasures of the East are imported into Europe for the gratification of those who cannot be contented with the produce of their native soil: those who indulge themselves in such *expensive* pleasures often lay up in store for themselves much sorrow and repentance in the time to come.

In the moral acceptance, the attainment of an object is said to *cost* much pains; a thing is persisted in at the *expense* of health, of honour, or of life.

The real patriot bears his private wrongs.
Rather than right them at the public cost.

BELLES.

If ease and politeness be only attainable at the *expense* of sincerity in the men, and chastity in the women, I flatter myself there are few of my readers who would not think the purchase made at too high a *price*.—ABER-CROMBY.

Would a man build for eternity, that is, in other words, would he be saved; let him consider with himself what *charges* he is willing to be at that he may be so.—SOUTH.

Costly, *v.* Valuable.

Cotemporary, *v.* Coeval.

Covenant, *v.* Agreement.

To Cover, Hide.

Cover, in French *couvrir*, is contracted from *contra* and *ouvrir*, signifying to do the contrary of open, to put out of view.

Hide, *v.* To conceal.

Cover is to *hide* as the means to the end: we commonly *hide* by *covering*; but we may easily *cover* without *hiding*, as also *hide* without *covering*. The ruling idea in the word *cover* is that of throwing or putting something over

a body : in the word *hide* is that of keeping carefully to one's self, from the observation of others.

To *cover* is an indifferent action, springing from a variety of motives, of convenience, or comfort; to *hide* is an action that springs from one specific intent, from care and concern for the thing, and the fear of foreign intrusion. In most civilized countries it is common to *cover* the head: in the Eastern countries females commonly wear veils to *hide* the face. There are many things which decency as well as health require to be *covered*; and others which from their very nature must always be *hidden*. Houses must be *covered* with roofs, and bodies with clothing; the earth contains many treasures, which in all probability will always be *hidden*.

Specious names are lent to *cover* vice.—SPECTATOR.

*Hide me from the face
Of God, whom to behold, was then my height
Of happiness.*—MILTON.

Cover, Shelter, Screen.

Cover probably denotes what serves as a cover and in the literal sense of the verb from which it is derived (*v. To cover*).

Shelter, like the word shield, comes from the German *schild*, old German *schelen* to cover.

Screen, from the Latin *scerno*, signifies to keep off or apart.

Cover is literally applied to many particular things which are employed in *covering*; but in the general sense which makes it analogous to the other terms, it includes the idea of concealing: *shelter* comprehends that of protecting from some immediate or impending evil: *screen* includes that of warding off some trouble. A *cover* always supposes something which can extend over the whole surface of a body; a *shelter* or a *screen* may merely interpose to a sufficient extent to serve the intended purpose. Military operations are sometimes carried on under *cover* of the night; a bay is a convenient *shelter* for vessels against the violence of the winds; a chair may be used as a *screen* to prevent the violent action of the heat, or the external air.

In the moral sense, a fair reputation is sometimes made the *cover* for the commission of gross irregularities in secret. When a person feels himself unable to withstand the attacks of his enemies, he seeks a *shelter* under the sanction and authority of a great name. Bad men sometimes use wealth and power to *screen* them from the punishment which is due to their offences.

There are persons who *cover* their own rudeness by calling their conduct honest bluntness.—RICHARDSON.

When on a bed of straw we sink together,
And the bleak winds shall whistle round our heads;
Wilt thou then talk to me thus?
Thus hush my cares, and *shelter* me with love?
OTWAY.

It is frequent for men to adjudge that in an art impossible, which they find that art does not effect; by which means they *screen* indolence and ignorance from the reproach they merit.—BACON.

Covering, v. Tegument, v.

Covetousness, Cupidity, Avarice.

Covetousness, from *covet*, and *cupido* to desire, signifies having a desire.

Cupidity is a more immediate derivative from the Latin signifying the same thing.

Avarice, v. Avaricious.

All these terms are employed to express an illicit desire after objects of gratification; but *covetousness* is applied to property in general; *cupidity* and *avarice* only to money or possessions. A child may display its *covetousness* in regard to the playthings which fall in its way; a man shows his *cupidity* in regard to the gains that fall in his way: we should therefore be careful to check a *covetous* disposition in early life, lest it show itself in the more hateful character of *cupidity* in advanced years. *Covetousness* is the natural disposition for having or getting; *cupidity* is the acquired disposition. As the love of appropriation is an innate characteristic in man, that of accumulating or wanting to accumulate, which constitutes *covetousness*, will show itself in some persons among the first indications of character: where the prospect of amassing great wealth is set before a man, as in the case of a governor of a distant province, it will evince great virtue in him if his *cupidity* be not excited.

The *covetous* man seeks to add to what he has: the *avaricious* man only strives to retain what he has: the *covetous* man sacrifices others to indulge himself; the *avaricious* man will sometimes sacrifice himself to indulge others; for generosity, which is opposed to *covetousness*, is sometimes associated with *avarice*.

Nothing lies on our hands with such uneasiness as time. Wretched and thoughtless creatures! In the only place where *covetousness* were a virtue, we turn prodigals.—ADDISON.

At last Swift's *avarice* grew too powerful for his kindness; he would refuse (his friends) a bottle of wine.—JOHNSON.

If prescription be once shaken, no species of property is secure, when it once becomes an object large enough to tempt the *cupidity* of indigent power.—BURKE.

Council, v. Assembly.

Counsel, v. Advice.

To Count, v. To calculate.

To Countenance, Sanction, Support.

Countenance, signifies to keep in countenance.

Sanction, in French *sanction*, Latin *sanctio* from *sanctus* sacred, signifies to ratify a decree or ordinance; in an extended sense to make anything binding.

Support, in French *supporter*, Latin *supporto*, compounded of *sup* or *sub* and *porto* to bear, signifies to bear from underneath, to bear up.

Persons are *countenanced*; things are *sanctioned*; persons or things are *supported*; persons are *countenanced* in their proceedings by the apparent approbation of others; measures are *sanctioned* by the consent or approbation of others; measures or persons are *supported* by every means which may forward the object.

There is most of encouragement in *coun-tenancing*; it consists of some outward demonstration of regard or good will towards the person: there is most of authority in *sanctioning*: it is the lending of a name, an authority or an influence, in order to strengthen and confirm the thing: there is most of assistance and co-operation in *support*: it is the employment of means to an end. Superiors only can *coun-tenance* or *sanction*: persons in all conditions may *support*: those who *coun-tenance* evil doers give a *sanction* to their evil deeds: those who *support* either an individual or a cause ought to be satisfied that they are entitled to *support*.

A good man acts with a vigor and suffers with a patience more than human, when he believes himself *coun-tenanced* by the Almighty.—BLAIR.

Men of the greatest sense are always diffident of their private judgment, until it receives a *sanction* from the public.—ADDISON.

The apparent insufficiency of every individual to his own happiness or safety compels us to seek from one another assistance and *support*.—JOHNSON

Countenance, v. Face.

To Counterfeit, v. To imitate.

Counterfeit, v. Spurious.

Country, v. Land.

Countryman, Peasant, Swain, Hind, Rustic, Clown.

Countryman, that is a man of the *country*, or one belonging to the *country*, is the general term applicable to all inhabiting the *country*, in distinction from a townsman.

Peasant in French *paysan* from *pays*, is employed in the same sense for any *countryman* among the inhabitants of the Continent, and is in consequence used in poetry or the grave style.

Swain in Saxon signified a labourer, but it has acquired, from its use in poetry, the higher signification of a shepherd.

Hind may in all probability signify one who is in the back ground, an inferior.

Rustic, from *rus* the *country*, signifies one born and bred in the *country*.

Clown, contracted from *colonus* a husbandman, signifies of course a menial in the *country*.

All these terms are employed as epithets to persons, and principally to such as live in the *country*: the terms *countryman* and *peasant* are taken in an indifferent sense, and may comprehend persons of different descriptions; they designate nothing more than habitual residence in the *country*: the other terms are employed for the lower orders of *countrymen*, but with collateral ideas favourable or unfavourable annexed to them: *swain*, *hind*, both convey the idea of innocence in a humble station, and are therefore always employed in poetry in a good sense: the *rustic* and *clown* both convey the idea of that uncouth rudeness and ignorance which is in reality found among the lowest orders of *countrymen*.

Though considering my former condition, I may now be called a *countryman*; yet you cannot call me a *rustic*

(as you would imply in your letter) as long as I live in so civil and noble a family.—HOWEL.

If by the poor measures and proportions of a man we may take an estimate of this great action (our Saviour's coming in the flesh), we shall quickly find how irksome it is to flesh and blood 'to have been happy,' to descend some steps lower, to exchange the estate of a prince for that of a *peasant*.—SOUTH.

As thus the snows arise, and foul and fierce
All winter drives along the darken'd air,
In his own loose revolving fields the swain
Disaster'd stands.—THOMSON.

The lab'ring hind his oxen shall disjoin.—DEYDEN.

In arguing too the person own'd his skill,
For ev'n tho' vanquish'd he could argue still;
While words of learned length and thundering sound
Amaz'd the gazing rustics rang'd around.

GOLDSMITH.

Th' astonish'd mother finds a vacant nest,
By the hard hand of unrelenting clouds
Robb'd.—THOMSON.

Couple, Brace, Pair.

Couple, in French *couple*, comes from the Latin *copulo* to join or tie together, *copula*, in Hebrew *cabel* a rope or a shackle, signifying things tied together; and as two things are with most convenience bound together, it has by custom been confined to this number.

Brace, from the French *bras* arm, signifies things locked together after the manner of the folded arms, which on that account are confined to the number of two.

Pair, in French *paire*, Latin *par* equal, signifies things that are equal, which can with propriety be said only of two things with regard to each other.

From the above illustration of these terms, it is clear that the number of two, which is included in all of them, is, with regard to the first, entirely arbitrary; that with regard to the second, it arises from the nature of the junction; and with regard to the third, it arises altogether from the nature of the objects; *couples* and *braces* are made by *coupling* and *bracing*; *pairs* are either so of themselves, or are made so by others; *couples* and *braces* always require a junction in order to make them complete; *pairs* require similarity only to make them what they are: *couples* are joined by a foreign tie; *braces* are produced by a peculiar mode of junction with the objects themselves.

Couple and *pair* are said of persons or things; *brace* in particular cases, only of animals or things, except in the burlesque style, where it may be applied to persons. When used for persons, the word *couple* has relation to the marriage tie: the word *pair* to the association or the moral union: the former term is therefore more appropriate when speaking of those who are soon to be married, or have just entered that state; the latter when speaking of those who are already fixed in that state: most *couples* that are joined together are equally happy in prospect, but not so in the completion of their wishes; it is the lot of comparatively very few to claim the title of the happy *pair*. When used for things, *couple* is promiscuously employed in familiar discourse for any two things put together; *brace* is used by sportsmen for birds which are shot, and supposed to be locked together; by sailors for

a part of their tackling, which is folded cross-wise ; as also in common life for an article of convenience crossed in a similar way, which serves to keep the dress of men in its proper place ; pair is of course restricted in its application to such objects only as are really *paired*.

In the midst of these sorrows which I had in my heart, methought there passed by me a couple of coaches with purple liveries.—ADDISON.

Six wings he wore, to shade
His lineaments divine ; the pair that clad
Each shoulder broad, came mantling o'er his breast
With regal ornament.—MILTON.

First hunter then, pursu'd a gentle brace,
Goodliest of all the forest, hart and hind.—MILTON.

Scarce any couple comes together, but their nuptials are declared in the newspaper with encomiums on each party.—JOHNSON.

Your fortune, happy pair, already made,
Leaves you no farther wish.—DRYDEN.

Dear Sheridan ! a gentle pair
Of Gaulstown lads (for such they are),
Besides a brace of grave divines,
Adore the smoothness of your lines.—SWIFT.

Courage, Fortitude, Resolution.

Courage, v. Bravery.

Fortitude, in French *fortitude*, Latin *fortitudo*, is the abstract noun from *fortis* strong

Resolution from the verb *resolve*, marks the habit of *resolving*.

Courage respects action, *fortitude* respects passion : a man has *courage* to meet danger, and *fortitude* to endure pain.

Courage is that power of the mind which bears up against the evil that is in prospect ; *fortitude* is that power which endures the pain that is felt : the man of *courage* goes with the same coolness to the mouth of the cannon, as the man of *fortitude* undergoes the amputation of a limb.

Horatius Cocles displayed his *courage* in defending a bridge aginst the whole army of the Etruscans : Caius Mucius displayed no less *fortitude* when he thrust his hand into the fire in the presence of King Porsenna, and avowed him as much by his language as his action.

Courage seems to be more of a manly virtue ; *fortitude* is more distinguishable as a feminine virtue : the former is at least most adapted to the male sex, who are called upon to act, and the latter to the females, who are obliged to endure ; a man without *courage* would be as ill prepared to discharge his duty in his intercourse with the world, as a woman without *fortitude* would be to support herself under the complicated trials of body and mind with which she is liable to be assailed.

We can make no pretensions to *courage* unless we set aside every personal consideration in the conduct we should pursue ; we cannot boast of *fortitude* where the sense of pain provokes a murmur or any token of impatience : since life is a chequered scene, in which the prospect of one evil is most commonly succeeded by the actual existence of another, it is a happy endowment to be able to ascend the scaffold with *fortitude*, or to mount the breach with *courage* as occasion may require.

Resolution is a minor species of *courage* ; it is *courage* in the minor concerns of life : *courage*

comprehends under it a spirit to advance ; *resolution* simply marks the will not to recede : we require *courage* to bear down all the obstacles which oppose themselves to us ; we require *resolution* not to yield to the first difficulties that offer : *courage* is an elevated feature in the human character which adorns the possessor ; *resolution* is that common quality of the mind which is in perpetual request ; the want of which degrades a man in the eyes of his fellow creatures. *Courage* comprehends the absence of all fear, the disregard of all personal convenience, the spirit to begin and the determination to pursue what has been begun ; *resolution* consists of no more than the last quality of *courage*, which respects the persistence in a conduct : *courage* is displayed on the most trying occasions ; *resolution* is never put to any severe test : *courage* always supposes some danger to be encountered ; *resolution* may be exerted in merely encountering opposition and difficulty : we have need of *courage* in opposing a formidable enemy ; we have need of *resolution* in the management of a stubborn will.

What can be more honourable than to have *courage* enough to execute the commands of reason and conscience ? —COLLIER.

With wonted *fortitude* she bore the smart,
And not a groan confess'd her burning heart.—GAY.

The unusual extension of my muscles on this occasion made my face ache to such a degree, that nothing but an invincible *resolution* and perseverance could have prevented me from falling back to my monosyllables.—ADDISON.

Courage, v. Bravery.

Course, Race, Passage.

Course, from *curro* to run, signifies either the act of running, or the space run over.

Race, from *run*, signifies the same act.

Passage, from *pass*, signifies either the act of passing or the space passed over.

With regard to the act of going, *course* is taken absolutely and indefinitely ; *race* relates to the object for which we run ; *passage* relates to the place passed over : thus a person may be swift in *course*, obtain a *race*, and have an easy *passage*.

Him neither rocks can crush, nor steel can wound
When Ajax fell not on th' ensanguined ground ;
In standing fight he mates Achilles' force,
Excell'd alone in swiftness in the *course*.—POPE.

Unhappy man whose death our hands shall grace,
Fate calls thee hence, and finished is thy *race*.—POPE.

Between his shoulders pierc'd the following dart,
And held its *passage* through the panting heart.
POPE.

We pursue whatever *course* we think proper ; we run the *race* that is set before us. *Course* is taken absolutely by itself ; *race* is considered in relation to others : a man pursues a certain *course* according to discretion ; he runs a *race* with another by way of competition. *Course* has a more particular reference to the space that is gone over ; *race* includes in it more particularly the idea of the mode of going : we speak of going in, or pursuing a particular *course* ; but always of running a *race*.

Course is as often used in the proper, as the

improper sense; *race* is seldom used figuratively, except in a spiritual application: a man's success and respectability in life depends much upon the *course* of moral conduct which he pursues; the Christian's *course* in this world is represented in Scripture 's a *race* which is set before him.

Course may be used in connexion with the object passed over or not; *passage* is seldom employed but in the direct connexion: we speak of a person's *course* in a place, or simply of his *course*; but we always speak of a person's *passage* through a place. *Course* and *passage* are used for inanimate, as well as animate objects; *race* is used for those only which are animate: a river has its *course*, and sometimes it is a dangerous *passage* for vessels; the horse or man runs the *race*.

So Mars omnipotent invades the plain
(The wide destroyer of the race of man);
Terror, his best loved son, attends his *course*,
Amid' with stern boldness, and enormous force.
POPE.

Remote from towns he ran his godly *race*,
Nor e'er had changed, nor wished to change his place.
GOLDSMITH.

Direct against which open'd from beneath,
Just o'er the blissful seat of paradise,
A *passage* down to earth, a *passage* wide.—MILTON.

Course, *v. Rout*.

Course, *v. Series*.

Course, *v. Way*.

Court, *v. Homage*.

Courteous, Complaisant, Courtly.

Courteous, from *court*, denotes properly belonging to a *court*, and by a natural extension of the sense, suitable to a *court*.

Complaisant, *v. Complaisance*.

Courteous in one respect comprehends in it more than *complaisant*: it includes the manner as well as the action; it is, properly speaking, polished *complaisance*: on the other hand, *complaisance* includes more of the disposition in it than *courteousness*: it has less of the polish, but more of the reality of kindness.

Courteousness displays itself in the address and the manners; *complaisance* in direct good offices: *courteousness* is most suitable for strangers; *complaisance* for friends or the nearest relatives: among well-bred men, and men of rank, it is an invariable rule to address each other *courteously* on all occasions whenever they meet, whether acquainted or otherwise; there is a degree of *complaisance* due between husbands and wives, brothers and sisters, and members of the same family, which cannot be neglected without endangering the harmony of their intercourse.

Courtly, though derived from the same word as *courteous*, is in some degree opposed to it in point of sense; it denotes a likeness to a *court*, but not a likeness which is favourable: *courtly* is to *courteous* as the form to the reality; the *courtly* consists of the exterior only, the latter of the exterior combined with the spirit; the former therefore seems to convey the idea of insincerity when contrasted with the latter, which must necessarily suppose the contrary: a *courtly* demeanour, or a *courtier* like demeanour may be suitable on

certain occasions; but a *courteous* demeanour is always desirable.

Courtly may likewise be employed in relation to things; but *courteous* has always respect to persons: we may speak of a *courtly* style, or *courtly* grandeur; but we always speak of *courteous* behaviour, *courteous* language, and the like.

And then I stole all *courtesy* from Heav'n,
And dress'd myself in such humility,
That I did pluck allegiance from men's hearts.
SHAKESPEARE.

To comply with the notions of mankind is in some degree the duty of a social being; because by compliance only he can please, and by pleasing only he can become useful; but as the end is not to be lost for the sake of the means, we are not to give up virtue for *complaisance*.—JOHNSON.

Yes, I know
He had a troublesome old-fashion'd way
Of shucking *courtly* ears with horrid truth.
THOMSON.

Courteous, *v. Affable*.

Courtly, *v. Courteous*.

To Crack, *v. To break*.

Crafty, *v. Cunning*.

To Crave, *v. To beg*.

To Create, *v. To cause*.

To Create, *v. To farm*.

To Create, *v. make*.

Credit, Favour, Influence.

Credit, from the Latin *creditus*, participle of *credo* to believe or trust, marks the state of being believed or trusted.

Favour, from the Latin *faveo*, and probably *favus* a honey comb, marks an agreeable or pleasant state of feeling.

Influence, in French *influence*, Latin *influentia*, from *influo* to flow upon, marks the state or power of acting upon any object so as to direct or move it.

These terms mark the state we stand in with regard to others as flowing out of their sentiments towards ourselves: *credit* arises out of esteem; *favour* out of goodwill or affection; *influence* out of either *credit* or *favour*: *credit* depends altogether on personal merit; *favour* may depend on the caprice of him who bestows it.

The *credit* which we have with others is marked by their confidence in our judgment; by their disposition to submit to our decisions; by their reliance in our veracity, or assent to our opinions: the *favour* we have with others is marked by their readiness to comply with our wishes; their subserviency to our views; attachment to our society: men of talent are ambitious to gain *credit* with their sovereigns, by the superiority of their counsel: weak men or men of ordinary powers are contented with being the favorites of princes, and enjoying their patronage and protection. *Credit* redounds to the honour of the individual, and stimulates him to noble exertions; it is beneficial in its results to all mankind, individually or collectively: *favour* redounds to the personal advantage, the selfish gratification of the individual; it is apt to inflame pride, and provoke jealousy. The honest exertion of our

abilities is all that is necessary to gain *credit* : there will always be found those who are just enough to give *credit* where *credit* is due : *favour*, whether in the gaining or maintaining, requires much finesse and trick ; much management of the humours of others ; much control of one's own humours ; what is thus gained with difficulty is often lost in a moment, and for a trifle. *Credit*, though sometimes obtained by falsehood, is never got without exertion ; but *favour*, whether justly or unjustly bestowed, often comes by little or no effort on the part of the receiver : a minister gains *credit* with his parishioners by the consistency of his conduct, the gravity of his demeanour, and the strictness of his life ; the *favour* of the populace is gained by arts, which men of upright minds would disdain to employ.

Credit and *favour* are the gifts of others ; *influence* is a possession which we derive from circumstances : there will always be *influence* where there is *credit* or *favour*, but it may exist independently of either : we have *credit* and *favour* for ourselves ; we exert *influence* over others : *credit* and *favour* serve one's own purposes ; *influence* is employed in directing others : weak people easily give their *credit*, or bestow their *favour*, by which an *influence* is gained over them to bend them to the will of others : the *influence* itself may be good or bad, according to the views of the person by whom it is exerted.

Truth itself shall lose its *credit*, if delivered by a person that has none.—SOUTH.

Hallifax thinking this a lucky opportunity of securing immortality made some advances of *favour*, and some overtures of advantage to Pope which he seems to have received with sullen coldness.—JOHNSON

What motive could induce Murray to murder a prince without capacity, without followers, without *influence* over the nobles, whom the queen, by her neglect, had reduced to the lowest state of contempt.—ROBERTSON.

Credit, v. Belief.

Credit, v. Name.

Creed, v. Faith.

Crew, v. Band.

Crime, Vice, Sin.

Crime, in Latin *crimen*, Greek κριμα, signifies a judgment, sentence, or punishment ; and also the cause of the sentence or punishment, in which latter sense it is here taken.

Vice, in Latin *vitium*, from *vito* to avoid, signifies that which ought to be avoided.

Sin, in Saxon *synne*, Swedish *synd*, German *sunde*, old German *sunta*, *sunto*, &c Latii *sontes*, Greek *συνος*, from *συνω* to hurt, signifies the thing that hurts ; *sin* being of all things the most hurtful.

A *crime* is a social offence ; a *vice* is a personal offence : every action which does injury to others, either individually or collectively, is a *crime* ; that which does injury to ourselves is a *vice*.

Crime consists in a violation of human laws ; *vice* in a violation of the moral law ; *sin* in a violation of the Divine law : *sin*, therefore, comprehends both *crime* and *vice* ; but there are many *sins* which are not *crimes* nor *vices* :

crimes are tried before a human court, and punished agreeably to the sentence of the judge ; *vices* and *sins* are brought before the tribunal of the conscience ; the former are punished in this world, the latter will be punished in the world to come, by the sentence of the Almighty : treason is one of the most atrocious *crimes* ; drunkenness one of the most dreadful *vices* ; religious hypocrisy one of the most heinous *sins*.

Crimes cannot be atoned for by repentance ; society demands reparation for the injury committed : *vices* continue to punish the offender as long as they are cherished ; *sins* are pardoned through the atonement and mediation of our blessed Redeemer, on the simple condition of sincere repentance. *Crimes* and *vices* disturb the peace and good order of society, they affect men's earthly happiness only ; *sin* destroys the soul, both for this world and the world to come : *crimes* sometimes go unpunished ; but *sin* carries its own punishment with it : murderers who escape the punishment due to their *crimes* commonly suffer the torments which attend the commission of such flagrant *sins*. *Crimes* are particular acts ; *vices* are habitual acts of commission ; *sins* are acts of commission or omission habitual or particular : personal security, respect for the laws, and regard for one's moral character, operate to prevent the commission of *crimes* or *vices* : the fear of God deters from the commission of *sin*.

A *crime* always involves a violation of a law ; a *vice*, whether in conduct or disposition, always diminishes moral excellence and involves guilt ; a *sin* always supposes some perversity of will in an accountable agent. Children may commit *crimes*, but we may trust that in the divine mercy they will not all be imputed to them as *sins*. Of *vices*, however as they are habitual, we have no right to suppose that any exception will be made in the account of our *sins*.

Crimes vary with times and countries ; *vices* may be more or less pernicious ; but *sin* is as unchangeable in its nature as the Being whom it offends. Smuggling and forgery are *crimes* in England, which in other countries are either not known or not regarded : the *vice* of gluttony is not so dreadful as that of drunkenness : every *sin* as an offence against an infinitely good and wise Being, must always bear the same stamp of guilt and enormity.

The most ignorant bestial knows and feels that, when he has committed an unjust or cruel action, he has committed a *crime* and deserves punishment.—BLAIR.

If a man makes his *vices* public, though they be such as seem principally to affect himself (as drunkenness or the like), they then become, by the bad example they set, of pernicious effects to society.—BLACKSTONE.

Every single gross act of *sin* is much the same thing to the conscience that a great blow or fall is to the head ; it stuns and bereaves it of all use of its senses for a time.—SOUTH.

Crime, Misdemeanour.

Crime, v. Crime.

Misdemeanour, signifies literally a wrong misdemeanour.

The former of these terms is to the latter as the genus to the species : a *misdemeanour* is in the technical sense a minor *crime*. House-

breaking is under all circumstances a *crime*; but shop-lifting or pilfering amounts only to a *misdemeanour*.

Corporal punishments are most commonly annexed to *crimes*; pecuniary punishments frequently to *misdemeanours*. In the vulgar use of these terms, *misdemeanour* is moreover distinguished from *crime*, by not always signifying a violation of public law, but only of private morals; in which sense the former term implies what is done against the state, and the latter that which offends individuals or small communities.

No *crime* of thine our present sufferings draws,
Not thou, but Heav'n's disposing will the cause.

POPE.

I mention this for the sake of several rural squires, whose reading does not rise so high as to "the present state of England," and who are often apt to usurp that precedence which by the laws of their country is not due to them. Their want of learning, which has planted them in this station, may in some measure excuse their *misdemeanour*.—ADDISON.

Criminal, Guilty.

Criminal, from *crime*, signifies belonging or relating to a *crime*.

Guilty, from *guilt*, signifies having *guilt*: *guilt* comes from the German *gelten*, to pay, and *gelt* a fine, debt.

Criminal respects the character of the offence; *guilty* respects the fact of committing the offence. The *criminality* of a person is estimated by all the circumstances of his conduct which resent themselves to observation; his *guilt* requires to be proved by evidence. The *criminality* is not a matter of question, but of judgment; the *guilt* is often doubtful, if not positively concealed. The higher the rank of a person, the greater his *criminality* if he does not observe an upright and irreproachable conduct: where a number of individuals are concerned in any unlawful proceeding, the difficulty of attaching the *guilt* to the real offender is greatly increased.

Criminality attaches to the aider, abettor, or encourager; but *guilt*, in the strict sense only, to the perpetrator of what is bad. A person may therefore sometimes be *criminal* without being *guilty*. He who conceals the offences of another may, under certain circumstances, be more *criminal* than the *guilty* person himself. On the other hand, we may be *guilty* without being *criminal*: the latter designates something positively bad, but the former is qualified by the object of the *guilt*. Those only are denominated *criminal* who offend seriously, either against public law or private morals; but a person may be said to be *guilty*, either of the greatest or the smaller offences. He who contradicts another abruptly in conversation is *guilty* of a breach of politeness, but he is not *criminal*.

Criminal is moreover applied as an epithet to the things done; *guilty* is mostly applied to the person doing. We commonly speak of actions, proceedings, intentions, and views, as *criminal*; but of the person, the mind, or the conscience, as *guilty*. It is very *criminal* to sow dissension among men; although there are too many who from a busy temper are *guilty* of this offence.

True modesty avoids everything that is *criminal*; false modesty everything that is unfashionable.—ADDISON.

Guilt hears appall'd with deeply troubled thought;
And yet not always on the *guilty* head
Descends the fated flash.—THOMSON.

Criminal, Culprit, Malefactor, Felon, Convict.

All these terms are employed for a public offender; but the first conveys no more than this general idea; whilst the others comprehend some accessory idea in their signification.

Criminal (*v. Criminal, guilty*) is a general term, and the rest are properly species of *criminals*.

Culprit, from the Latin *culpa*, and *prehensus* taken in a fault, signifies the *criminal* who is directly charged with his offence.

Malefactor, compound of the Latin terms *male* and *factor*, signifies an evil-doer, that is, one who does evil in distinction from him who does good.

Felon, from *felony*, in Latin *felonia* a capital crime, comes from the Greek *φίλος* an imposture, because fraud and villany are the prominent features of every capital offence.

Convict, in Latin *convictus*, participle of *convincere* to convince or prove, signifies one proved or found guilty.

When we wish to speak in general of those who by offences against the laws or regulations of society have exposed themselves to punishment, we denominate them *criminals*: when we consider them as already brought before a tribunal, we call them *culprits*; when we consider them in regard to the moral turpitude of their character, as the promoters of evil rather than of good, we entitle them *malefactors*; when we consider them as offending by the grosser violations of the law, they are termed *felons*; when we consider them as already under the sentence of the law, we denominate them *convicts*. The punishments inflicted on *criminals* vary according to the nature of their crimes, and the spirit of the laws by which they are judged: a guilty conscience will give a man the air of a *culprit* in the presence of those who have not authority to be either his accusers or judges: it gratified the malice of the Jews to cause our blessed Saviour to be crucified between two *malefactors*: it is an important regulation in the internal economy of a prison to have *felons* kept distinct from each other, particularly if their crimes are of an atrocious nature: it has not unfrequently happened, that when the sentence of the law has placed *convicts* in the lowest state of degradation, their characters have undergone so entire a reformation as to enable them to attain a higher pitch of elevation than they had ever enjoyed before.

If I attack the vicious, I shall only set upon them in a body, and will not be provoked by the worst usage I can receive from others to make an example of any particular *criminal*.—ADDISON.

The jury then withdrew a moment,
As if on weighty points to comment,
And right or wrong, resolv'd to save her,
They gave a verdict in her favour.
The culprit by escape grown bold,
Pilfers alike from young and old.—MOORE.

For this the *malefactor* goat was laid
On Bacchus' altar, and his forfeit paid.

DREYDEN.

He (Earl Ferrers) expressed some displeasure at being executed as a common felon, exposed to the eyes of such a multitude.—SMOLLET.

Attendance none shall need, nor train, where none
Are to behold the judgment, but the judged;
Those two: the third best absent is condemn'd
Convict by flight, and rebel to all law,
Conviction to the serpent none belongs.—MILTON.

Crisis, *v.* Conjunction.

Criterion, Standard.

Criterion, in Greek κριτήριον from κρίνω to judge, signifies the mark or rule by which one may judge.

Standard from the verb to stand, signifies the point at which one must stand, or beyond which one must not go.

The *criterion* is employed only in matters of judgment; the *standard* is used in the ordinary concerns of life. The former serves for determining the characters and qualities of things; the latter for defining quantity and measure. The language and manners of a person are the best *criterion* for forming an estimate of his station and education. In order to produce a uniformity in the mercantile transactions of mankind one with another, it is the custom of Government to fix a certain *standard* for the regulation of coins, weights, and measures.

The word *standard* may likewise be used figuratively in the same sense. The Bible is a *standard* of excellence both in morals and religion which cannot be too closely followed. It is impossible to have the same *standard* in the arts and sciences, because all our performances fall short of perfection, and will admit of improvement.

But have we then no law besides our will,
No just *criterion* fix'd to good or ill;
As well at noon we may obstruct our sight,
Then doubt if such a thing exists as light.—JENYNS.

Rate not the extension of the human mind
By the plebeian *standard* of mankind.—JENYNS.

Criticism, *v.* Animadversion.

To Criticise, *v.* To censure.

Crooked, *v.* Awkward.

Crooked, *v.* Awry.

Cross, *v.* Awkward.

Cross, *v.* Captious.

Crowd, *v.* Multitude.

Cruel, Inhuman, Barbarous, Brutal, Savage.

Cruel, from the Latin *crudelis* and *crudus* raw, rough, or untutored.

Inhuman, compounded of the privative *in* and *human*, signifies not human.

Barbarous, from the Greek βαρβάρως rude or unsettled, all mark a degree of bad feeling which is uncontrolled by culture or refinement.

Brutal, signifying like the *brute*; and **Savage**, from the Latin *sævus* fierce, and the Hebrew *zaal* a wolf, marks a still stronger degree of this bad passion.

Cruel is the most familiar and the least powerful epithet of all these terms; it designates

the ordinary propensity which is innate in man, and which if not overpowered by a better principle, will invariably show itself by the desire of inflicting positive pain on others, or abridging their comfort: *inhuman* and *barbarous* are higher degrees of *cruelty*; *brutal* and *savage* rise so much in degree above the rest as almost to partake of another nature. A child gives early symptoms of his natural *cruelty* by his ill treatment of animals; but we do not speak of his *inhumanity*, because this is a term confined to men, and more properly to their treatment of their own species, although extended in its sense to their treatment of the *brutes*: *barbarity* is but too common among children and persons of riper years. A person is *cruel* who neglects the creature he should protect and take care of: he is *inhuman* if he withhold from him the common marks of tenderness or kindness which are to be expected from one *human* being to another; he is *barbarous* if he find amusement in inflicting pain; he is *brutal* or *savage* according to the circumstances of aggravation which accompany the act of torturing.

Cruel is applied either to the disposition or the conduct; *inhuman* and *barbarous* mostly to the outward conduct: *brutal* and *savage* mostly to the disposition. *Cruelties* and even *barbarities*, too horrid to relate, are daily practised by men upon dogs and horses, the usefulest and most unoffending of *brutes*; either for the indulgence of a naturally *brutal* temper, or from the impulse of a *savage* fury; we need not wonder to find the same men *inhuman* towards their children or their servants. Domitian was notorious for the *cruelty* of his disposition; the Romans indulged themselves in the *inhuman* practice of making their slaves and convicts fight with wild beasts; but the *barbarities* which have been practised on slaves in the colonies of European states exceed everything in aocity that is related of ancient times; proving that, in spite of all the refinement which the religion of our blessed Saviour has introduced into the world, the possession of uncontrolled power will inevitably *brutalize* the mind and give a *savage* ferocity to the character.

Now be thy rage, thy fatal rage resign'd,
A *cruel* heart ill suits a manly mind.—POPE.

Relentless love the *cruel* mother led
The blood of her unhappy babes to shed,
Love lent the sword, the mother struck the blow,
Inhuman she, but more *inhuman* thou.—DRYDEN.

I have found out a gift for my far,
I have found where the wood pigeons breed,
But let me that plunder forbear,
She will say 'twas a *barbarous* deed.

SHENSTONE.

The play was acted at the other theatre, and the *brutal* petulance of Gibber was confuted, though perhaps not shamed, by general applause.—JOHNSON.

Brothers by brothers' inplous hands are slain!
Mistaken zeal how *savage* is thy reign!—JENYNS.

Cruel, *v.* Hardhearted.

To Crush, *v.* To break.

To Crush, *v.* To overwhelm.

Crutch, *v.* Staff.

To Cry, Weep.

Cry comes from the Greek κραεα, and the Hebrew *kara* to cry or call.

Weep, in low German *wapen*, is a variation of whine, in German *weinen*, which is an onomatopæa. An outward indication of pain is expressed by both these terms, but the former comprehends an audible expression accompanied or not with tears: the latter simply indicates the shedding of tears.

Crying arises from an impatience in suffering corporeal pains; children and weak people commonly *cry*: *weeping* is occasioned by mental grief; the wisest and best of men will not disdain sometimes to *weep*.

Crying is as selfish as it is weak; it serves to relieve the pain of the individual to the annoyance of the hearer; *weeping*, when called forth by other's sorrows, is an infirmity which no man would wish to be without: as an expression of generous sympathy it affords essential relief to the sufferer.

The babe clung *crying* to his nurse's breast,
Scared at the dazzling helm and nodding crest.

POPE.

Thy Hector, wrapt in everlasting sleep,
Shall neither hear thee sigh, nor see thee *weep*.

POPE.

To Cry, Scream, Shriek.

Cry, *v.* To cry, *weep*.

Scream and Shriek are variations of *cry*.

To *cry* indicates the utterance of an articulate or an inarticulate sound; *scream* is a species of *crying* in the first sense of the word; *shriek* is a species of *crying* in its latter sense.

Crying is an ordinary mode of loud utterance resorted to on common occasions; one *cries* in order to be heard: *screaming* is an intemperate mode of *crying*, resorted to from an impatient desire to be heard, or from a vehemence of feeling. People *scream* to deaf people from the mistaken idea of making themselves heard: whereas a distinct articulation will always be more efficacious. It is frequently necessary to *cry* when we cannot render ourselves audible by any other means; but it is never necessary or proper to *scream*. **Shriek** may be compared with *cry* and *scream*, as expressions of pain; in this case to *shriek* is more than to *cry*, and less than to *scream*. They both signify to *cry* with a violent effort. We may *cry* from the slightest pain or inconvenience; but one *shrieks* or *screams* only on occasions of great agony, either corporeal or mental. A child *cries* when it has hurt its finger; it *shrieks* in the moment of terror at the sight of a frightful object; or *screams* until some one comes to its assistance.

To *cry* is an action peculiar to no age or sex; to *scream* and to *shriek* are the common actions of women and children. Men *cry*, and children *scream* for assistance; excess of pain will sometimes compel a man to *cry* out, but it commonly makes a female *shriek*.

Like a thin smoke he sees the spirit fly,
And hears a feeble, lamentable *cry*.—POPE.

Rapacious at the mother's throat they fly,
And tear the screaming infant from her breast.

THOMSON.

The house is fill'd with loud laments and *cries*,
And *shrieks* of women rent the vaulted throne.

DRYDEN.

To Cry, Exclaim, Call.

All these terms express a loud mode of speaking; which is all that is implied in the sense of the word **Cry**, while in that of the two latter are comprehended accessory ideas.

To **Exclaim**, from the Latin *exclamo* or *ex clamo*, to *cry* out or aloud, signifies to *cry* with an effort.

Call comes from the Greek *καλεω*.

We *cry* from the simple desire of being heard at a distance; we *exclaim* from a sudden emotion or agitation of mind. A *cry* bespeaks distress and trouble; an *exclamation* bespeaks surprise, grief, or joy. We *cry* commonly in a large assembly or an open space, but we may *exclaim* in conversation with an individual.

To *cry* is louder and more urgent than to *call*. A man who is in danger of being drowned *cries* for help; he who wants to raise a loud *call* for assistance: a *cry* is a general or indirect address; a *call* is a particular and immediate address. We *cry* to all or any who may be within hearing; we *call* to an individual by name with a direct reference to him.

There while you groan beneath the load of life
They *cry*, behold the mighty Hector's wife!—POPE.

The dreadful day
No pause of words admits, no dull delay;
Fierce Discord storms, Apollo loud *exclaims*,
Fame *calls*, Mars thunders, and the field's in flames.

POPE.

Cry, *v.* Noise.

Culpable, Faulty.

Culpable, in Latin *culpabilis*, comes from *culpa* a fault or blame, signifying worthy of blame, fit to be blamed.

Faulty from *fault*, signifies having faults.

We are *culpable* from the commission of one *fault*; we are *faulty* from the number of *faults*; *culpable* is a relative term; *faulty* is absolute: we are *culpable* with regard to a superior whose intentions we have not fulfilled; we are *faulty* whenever we commit any *faults*. A master pronounces his servant as *culpable* for not having attended to his commands; an indifferent person pronounces another as *faulty* whose *faults* have come under his notice. It is possible therefore to be *faulty* without being *culpable*, but not *vice versa*.

In the common business of life we find the memory of one like that of another, and honestly impute omissions not to involuntary forgetfulness, but *culpable* inattention.

—JOHNSON.

In the consideration of human life the satirist never falls upon persons who are not glaringly *faulty*.—STEELE.

Culprit, *v.* Criminal.

Cultivation, Culture, Civilization, Refinement.

Cultivation, from the Latin *cultus*, denotes the act of *cultivating*, or state of being *cultivated*.

Culture from *cultus*, signifies the state only of being *cultivated*.

Civilization signifies the act of *civilizing*, or state of being *civilized*.

Refinement denotes the act of *refining*, or the state of being *refined*.

Cultivation is with more propriety applied to the thing that grows; *culture* to that in which it grows. The *cultivation* of flowers will not repay the labour unless the soil be prepared by proper *culture*. In the same manner, when speaking figuratively, we say the *cultivation* of any art or science; the *cultivation* of one's taste or inclination may be said to contribute to one's own skill or the perfection of the thing itself; but the mind requires *culture* previously to this particular exertion of the powers.

Civilization is the first stage of *cultivation*; *refinement* is the last; we *civilize* savages by divesting them of their rudeness, and giving them a knowledge of such arts as are requisite for civil society; we *cultivate* people in general by calling forth their powers into action and independent exertion; we *refine* them by the introduction of the liberal arts.

The introduction of Christianity has been the best means of *civilizing* the rudest nations. The *cultivation* of the mind in serious pursuits tends to *refine* the sentiments without debilitating the character; but the *cultivation* of the liberal arts may be pursued to a vicious extent, so as to introduce an excessive *refinement* of feeling that is incompatible with real manliness.

Cultivation is applied either to persons or things; *civilization* is applied to men collectively, *refinement* to men individually; we may *cultivate* the mind or any of its operations; or we may *cultivate* the ground, or anything that grows in the ground; we *civilize* nations; we *refine* the mind or the manners.

Notwithstanding this faculty (of taste) must be in some measure born with us, there are several methods of *cultivating* and improving it.—ADDISON.

But tho' Heav'n
In every breath has sown these early seeds
Of love and admiration, yet in vain
Without fair *culture's* kind parental aid.

AKENSIDE.

To *civilize* the rude unpolish'd world
And lay it under the restraint of laws,
To make man mild and sociable to man,
To *cultivate* the wild licentious savage
With wisdom, discipline, and liberal arts,
Th' embellishments of life! Virtues like these
Make human nature shine.—ADDISON.

Poetry makes a principal amusement among unpolished nations, but in a country verging to the extremes of *refinement*, painting and music come in for a share.—GOLD-SMITH.

Cultivation, Tillage, Husbandry.

Cultivation has a much more comprehensive meaning than either *tillage* or *husbandry*. **Tillage** is a mode of *cultivation* that extends no farther than the preparation of the ground for the reception of the seed; *cultivation* includes the whole process by which the produce of the earth is brought to maturity. We may *till* without *cultivating*; but we cannot *cultivate*, as far as respects the soil, without *tillage*. **Husbandry** is more extensive in its meaning than *tillage*, but not so extensive as *cultivation*.

Tillage respects the act only of *tilling* the ground; *husbandry* is employed for the office of *cultivating* for domestic purposes. A *cultivator* is a general term, defined only by

the object that is *cultivated*, as the *cultivator* of the grape, or the olive; a *tiller* is a labourer in the soil that performs the office for another; a *husbandman* is a humble species of *cultivator*, who himself performs the whole office of *cultivating* the ground for domestic purposes.

O softly-swelling hills
On which the power of *cultivation* lies,
And joys to see the wonders of his toil.—THOMSON.

The South-east parts of Britain had already before the age of Cæsar made the first and most ruinous step towards a civil settlement; and the Britons by *tillage* and *agriculture* had there increased to a great multitude.—HUME.

We find an image of the two states, the contemplative and the active, figured out in the persons of Abel and Cain, by the two primitive trades, that of the shepherd and that of the *husbandman*.—BACON.

Culture, v. Cultivation.

Cunning, v. Art.

Cunning, Crafty, Subtle, Sly, Wily.

Cunning, v. Art.

Crafty signifies having *craft*, that is, according to the original meaning of the word, having a knowledge of some trade or art; hence, figuratively applied to the character.

Subtle, in French *subtil*, and Latin *subtilis* thin, from *sub* and *tela* a thread drawn to be fine; hence in the figurative sense in which it is here taken, fine or acute in thought.

Sly is in all probability connected with slow, and sleek, or smooth; deliberation and smoothness entering very much into the sense of *sly*.

Wily signifies disposed to *wiles* or stratagems.

All these epithets agree in expressing an aptitude to employ peculiar and secret means to the attainment of an end; they differ principally in the secrecy of the means, or the degree of circumvention that is employed. The *cunning* man shows his dexterity simply in concealing; this requires little more than reservedness and taciturnity: the *crafty* man goes farther; he shapes his words and actions so as to lull suspicion: hence it is that a child may be *cunning*, but an old man will be *crafty*: a *subtle* man has more acuteness of invention than either, and all his schemes are hidden by a veil that is impenetrable by common observation: the *cunning* man looks only to the concealment of an immediate object; the *crafty* and *subtle* man have a remote object to conceal: thus men are *cunning* in their ordinary concerns: politicians are *crafty* or *subtle*: but the former is more so as to the end, and the latter as to the means. A man is *cunning* and *crafty* by deeds; he is *subtle* mostly by means of words alone, or words and actions combined. *Slyness* is a vulgar kind of *cunning*; the *sly* man goes cautiously and silently to work. *Witiness* is a species of *cunning* or *craft*, applicable only to cases of attack or defence.

There is still another secret that can never fail if you can once get it believed, and which is often practised by women of greater *cunning* than virtue. This is to change sides for a while with a jealous man, and to turn his own passion upon himself.—ADDISON.

Cunning is often to be met with in brutes themselves, and in persons who are but the fewest removes from them. —ADDISON.

You will find the examples to be few and rare of wicked unprincipled men attaining fully the accomplishment of their crafty designs.—BLAIR.

The part of Ulysses, in Homer's *Odyssey*, is very much admired by Aristotle, as perplexing that fable with very agreeable plots and intricacies, not only by the many adventures in his voyage and the subtlety of his behaviour, but by the various concealments and discoveries of his person in several parts of his poem.—ADDISON.

If you or your correspondent had consulted me in your discourse upon the eye, I could have told you that the eye of Leonora is *silly* watchful while it looks negligent.—STEEL.

Implore his aid; for Proteus only knows
The secret cause, and cure of all thy woes;
But first the *erly* wizard must be caught;
For unconstrain'd, he nothing tells for nought.
DRYDEN.

To Curb, *v. To check.*

To Cure, Heal, Remedy.

Cure, in Latin *curo*, signifies to take care of, that is, by distinction, to take care of that which requires particular care, in order to remove an evil.

Heal, in German *heilen*, comes from *heil* whole, signifying to make whole that which is unsound.

Remedy, in Latin *remedium*, is compounded of *re* and *medeor* to cure or heal, which comes from the Greek *ἰατρον* and *Μῆδία* *Mediā*, the country which contained the greatest number of healing plants. The particle *re* is here but an intensive.

To cure is employed for what is out of order; to heal for that which is broken: diseases are cured, wounds are healed; the former is a complex, the latter is a simple process. Whatever requires to be cured, is wrong in the system; it requires many and various applications internally and externally; whatever requires to be healed is occasioned externally by violence, and requires external applications. In a state of refinement men have the greatest number of disorders to be cured; in a savage state there is more occasion for the healing art.

Cure is used as properly in the moral as the natural sense; heal in the moral sense is altogether figurative. The disorders of the mind are cured with greater difficulty than those of the body. The breaches which have been made in the affections of relatives towards each other, can be healed by nothing but a Christian spirit of forbearance and forgiveness.

To remedy, in the sense of applying remedies, has a moral application, in which it accords most with cure. Evils are either cured or remedied, but the former are of a much more serious nature than the latter. The evils in society require to be cured; an omission, a deficiency, or a mischief, requires to be remedied.

When bad habits become inveterate they are put out of the reach of cure. It is an exercise for the ingenuity of man to attempt to remedy the various troubles and inconveniences which are daily occurring.

If the frail body feels disorder'd pangs,
Then drugs medicinal can give us ease;
The soul, no *Æsculapian* medicine can cure.
GENTLEMAN.

Scarcely an ill to human life belongs,
But what our follies cause, or mutual wrongs;
Or if some stripes from Providence we feel,
He strikes with pity, and but wounds to heal.
JENYNS.

Every man has frequent grievances which only the soltitude of friendship will discover and remedy.—JOHNSON.

Cure, Remedy.

Cure (*v. To cure*) denotes either the act of curing, or the thing that cures. **Remedy** is mostly employed for the thing that remedies. In the former sense the remedy is to the cure as the means to the end; a cure is performed by the application of a remedy. That is incurable for which no remedy can be found; but a cure is sometimes performed without the application of any specific remedy. The cure is complete when the evil is entirely removed; the remedy is sure which by proper application never fails of effecting the cure. The cure of disorders depends upon the skill of the physician and the state of the patient; the efficacy of remedies depends upon their suitable choice and application; but a cure may be defeated or a remedy made of no avail by a variety of circumstances independent of either.

A cure is sometimes employed for the thing that cures, but only in the sense of what infallibly cures. Quacks always hold forth their nostrums as infallible cures not for one but for every sort of disorder; experience has however fatally proved that the remedy in most cases is worse than the disease.

Why should he choose these miseries to endure
If death could grant an everlasting cure?
'Tis plain there's something whispers in his ear
(Tho' fain he'd hide it) he has much to fear.
JENYNS.

The great defect of Thomson's Seasons is want of method; but for this I know not that there was any remedy.—JOHNSON.

Curious, Inquisitive, Prying.

Curious, in French *curieux*, Latin *curiosus* from *cura* care, signifying full of care.

Inquisitive, in Latin *inquisitivus*, from *in-quirō* to inquire or search into, signifying a disposition to investigate thoroughly.

Prying from *pry*, changed from the French *preuver* to try, signifies the disposition to try or sift to the bottom.

The disposition to interest one's self in matters not of immediate concern is the idea common to all these terms. *Curiosity* is directed to all objects that can gratify the inclination, taste, or understanding; *inquisitiveness* to such things only as satisfy the understanding.

The curious person interests himself in all the works of nature and art; he is curious to try effects and examine causes: the inquisitive person endeavours to add to his store of knowledge. *Curiosity* employs every means which falls in its way in order to procure gratification; the curious man uses his own powers or those of others to serve his purpose: *inquisitiveness* is indulged only by means of verbal inquiry; the inquisitive person collects all from others. A traveller is curious who examines every thing for himself; he is inquisitive when he minutely questions others. *Inquisitiveness* is therefore to curiosity as a part to the whole; whoever is curious will naturally be inquisitive, and he who is inquisitive is so from a species of curiosity.

Curious and inquisitive may be both used in a bad sense; prying is never used otherwise than in a bad sense. *Inquisitive*, as in the

former case, is a mode of curiosity, and *prying* is a species of eager curiosity. A curious person takes unallowed means of learning that which he ought not to wish to know; an *inquisitive* person puts many impertinent and troublesome questions; a *prying* temper is unceasing in its endeavours to get acquainted with the secrets of others. *Curiosity* is a fault most frequent among females; *inquisitiveness* is most general among children; a *prying* temper belongs only to people of low character.

A well-disciplined mind checks the first risings of idle curiosity: children should be taught early to suppress an *inquisitive* temper, which may so easily become burdensome to others: those who are of a *prying* temper are insensible to every thing but the desire of unveiling what lies hidden; such a disposition is often engendered by the unlicensed indulgence of curiosity in early life, which becomes a sort of passion in riper years.

Sir Francis Bacon says, some have been so *curious* as to remark the times and seasons, when the stroke of an envious eye is most effectually pernicious.—STEELE.

Checking our *inquisitive* solicitude about what the Almighty hath concealed, let us diligently improve what he hath made known.—BLAIR.

By adhering tenaciously to his opinion, and exhibiting other instances of a *prying* disposition, Lord George Sackville had rendered himself disagreeable to the commander in chief.—SMOLLET.

Current, v. Stream.

Curse, v. Malediction.

Cursory, Hasty, Slight, Desultory.

Cursory, from the Latin *curro*, signifies run over or done in running.

Hasty signifies done in *haste*.

Slight is a variation of light.

Desultory from *desilio* to leap, signifies leaped over.

Cursory includes both *hasty* and *slight*: it includes *hasty* in as much as it expresses a quick motion; it includes *slight* in as much as it conveys the idea of a partial action: a view may be either *cursory* or *hasty*, as the former is taken by design, the latter from carelessness: a view may be either *cursory* or *slight*; but the former is not so imperfect as the latter: an author will take a *cursory* view of those points which are not necessarily connected with his subject; an author who takes a *hasty* view of a subject will mislead by his errors; he who takes a *slight* view will disappoint by the shallowness of his information. Between *cursory* and *desultory* there is the same difference as between running and leaping: we run in a line, but we leap from one part to another; so remarks that are *cursory* have still more or less connexion, but remarks that are *desultory* are without any coherence.

Savage mingled in *cursory* conversation with the same steadiness of attention as others apply to a lecture.—JOHNSON.

The emperor Macrinus had once resolved to abolish these rescripts (of the emperors), and retain only the general edicts; he could not bear that the *hasty* and crude answers of such princes as Commodus and Caracalla should be revered as laws.—BLACKSTONE.

The wits of Charles's time had seldom more than *slight* and superficial views.—JOHNSON.

If compassion ever be felt from the brute instinct of un-

instructed nature, it will only produce effects *desultory* and transient.—JOHNSON.

Curtail, v. Abridge.

Curved, v. Awry.

Custody v. Keeping.

Custom, Habit.

Custom, in French *coutume*, probably contracted from the Latin *consuetum* participle of *consuesco* to accustom.

Habit, in French *habit*, Latin *habitus* from *habeo* to have, marks the state of having or holding.

Custom is a frequent repetition of the same act; *habit* the effect of such repetition: the *custom* of rising early in the morning is conducive to the health, and may in a short time become such a *habit* as to render it no less agreeable than it is useful.

Custom supposes an act of the will; *habit* implies an involuntary movement: a *custom* is followed; a *habit* is acquired: whoever follows the *custom* of imitating the look, tone, or gesture of another, is liable to get the *habit* of doing the same himself: as *habit* is said to be second nature, it is of importance to guard against all *customs* to which we do not wish to become *habituated*: the drunkard is formed by the *custom* of drinking intemperately, until he becomes *habituated* to the use of spirituous liquors: the profane swearer who *accustoms* himself in early life to utter the oaths which he hears, will find it difficult in advanced years to break himself of the *habit* of swearing: the love of imitation is so powerful in the human breast, that it leads the major part of mankind to follow *custom* even in ridiculous things; Solomon refers to the power of *habit* when he says "train up a child in the way in which he should go; and when he is old he will not depart from it;" a power which cannot be employed too early in the aid of virtue and religion.

Custom is applicable to many; *habit* is confined to the individual: every nation has *customs* peculiar to itself; and every individual has *habits* peculiar to his age, station, and circumstance.

It is the *custom* of the Mahometans, if they see any printed or written paper upon the ground, to take it up and lay it aside carefully, as not knowing but it may contain some piece of the Alcoran.—ADDISON.

If a loose and careless life has brought a man into *habits* of dissipation, and led him to neglect those religious duties which he owed to his Maker, let him return to the regular worship of God.—BLAIR.

I dare not shock my reader with the description of the *customs* and manners of these barbarians (the Hottentots).—HUGHES.

Customary and *habitual*, the epithets derived from these words, admit of a similar distinction: the *customary* action is that which is repeated after the manner of a *custom*; the *habitual* action is that which is done by the force of *habit*.

This *customary* superiority grew too delicate for truth, and Swift, with all his penetration, allowed himself to be delighted with low flattery.—JOHNSON.

We have all reason to believe that, amidst numberless infirmities which attend humanity, what the great Judge will chiefly regard is the *habitual* prevailing turn of our heart and life.—BLAIR.

Custom, Fashion, Manner, Practice.

Customs, Fashions, and Manners, are all employed for communities of men: *custom* (*v. Custom, habit*) respects established and general modes of action: *fashion*, in French *façon*, from *facio* to do or make, regards partial and transitory modes of making or doing things: *manner*, in the limited sense in which it is here taken, signifies the *manner* or mode of men's living or behaving in their social intercourse.

Custom is authoritative; it stands in the place of law, and regulates the conduct of men in the most important concerns of life: *fashion* is arbitrary and capricious; it decides in matters of trifling import: *manners* are rational; they are the expressions of moral feelings. *Customs* are most prevalent in a barbarous state of society; *fashions* rule most where luxury has made the greatest progress; *manners* are most distinguishable in a civilized state of society.

Customs are in their nature as unchangeable as *fashions* are variable; *manners* depend on cultivation and collateral circumstances: *customs* die away or are abolished; *fashions* pass away, and new ones take their place; *manners* are altered either for the better or the worse: endeavours have been successfully employed in several parts of India to abolish the *custom* of infanticide, and that of women sacrificing themselves on the funeral piles of their husbands; the votaries of *fashion* are not contented with giving the law for the cut of the coat or the shape of the bonnet, but they wish to intrude upon the sphere of the scholar or the artist, by prescribing in matters of literature and taste; the influence of public opinion on the *manners* of a people has never been so strikingly illustrated as in the instance of the French nation during and since the Revolution.

Practice, in Latin *practica*, Greek *πρακτική*, from *πράσσω* to do, signifies actual doing or the thing done, that is by distinction the regularly doing, or the thing regularly done, in which sense it is most analogous to *custom*; but the former simply conveys the idea of actual performance; the latter includes also the accessory idea of repetition at stated periods: a *practice* must be defined as frequent or unfrequent, regular or irregular; but a *custom* does not require to be qualified by any such epithets: it may be the *practice* of a person to do acts of charity, as the occasion requires; but when he uniformly does a particular act of charity at any given period of the year, it is properly denominated his *custom*.

Both *practice* and *custom* are general or particular, but the former is absolute, the latter relative: a *practice* may be adopted by a number of persons without reference to each other: but a *custom* is always followed either by imitation or prescription: the *practice* of gaming has always been followed by the vicious part of society; but it is to be hoped for the honour of man that it will never become a *custom*.

The *custom* of representing the grief we have for the loss of the dead by our habits, certainly had its rise from the real sorrow of such as were too much distressed to take the care they ought of their dress.—STEELE.

Of beasts, it is confess'd, the ape
Comes nearest us in human shape;
Like man, he imitates each fashion;
And malice is his ruling passion.—SWIFT.

Their arms, their arts, their *manners*, I disclose,
And how they war, and whence the people rose.

DRYDEN.

Savage was so touched with the discovery of his real mother, that it was his frequent *practice* to walk in the dark evenings for several hours before her door, with hopes of seeing her as she might cross her apartments with a candle in her hand.—JOHNSON.

Custom, v. Usage.

Custom, v. Tax.

D.

Daily, Diurnal.

Daily, from *day* and *like*, signifies after the manner or in the time of the *day*.

Diurnal, from *die* *day*, signifies belonging to the *day*.

Daily is the colloquial term which is applicable to whatever passes in the *day* time; *diurnal* is the scientific term, which applies to what passes within or belongs to the astronomical *day*: the physician makes *daily* visits to his patients; the earth has a *diurnal* motion on its own axis.

All creatures else forget their *daily* care,
And sleep, the common gift of nature, share.

DRYDEN.

Half yet remains unsung, but narrow bound
Within the visible *diurnal* sphere.—MILTON.

Dainty, Delicacy.

These terms, which are in vogue among epicures, have some shades of difference in their signification not altogether undeserving of notice.

Dainty from *dain*, *deign*, and the Latin *dignus* worthy, is applied to that which is of worth or value,—of course only to such things as have a superior value in the estimation of epicures; and consequently conveys a more positive meaning than **Delicacy**: in as much as a *dainty* may be that which is extremely delicate, a *delicacy* is sometimes a species of *dainty*; but there are many *delicacies* which are altogether suited to the most delicate appetite, that are neither costly nor rare, two qualities which are almost inseparable from a *dainty*; those who indulge themselves freely in *dainties* and *delicacies* scarcely know what it is to eat with an appetite; but those who are temperate in their use of the enjoyments of life will be enabled to derive pleasure from ordinary objects.

My landlord's cellar stock'd with beer and ale,
Instantly brings the choicest liquors out,
Whether we ask'd for home brew'd or for stout,
For mead or cider; or with *dainties* fed,
Ring for a flask or two of white or red.—SWIFT.

She turns, on hospitable thoughts intent,
What choice to chuse for *delicacy* best.—MILTON.

Damage, v. Injury.

Damage, v. Loss.

Damp, v. Moisture.

Danger, Peril, Hazard.

Danger, in French *danger*, comes from the Latin *damnum* a loss or damage, signifying the chance of a loss.

Peril, in French *peril*, comes from *pereo*, which signifies either to go over, or to perish; and *periculum*, which signifies literally that which is undergone; designating a critical situation, a rude trial, which may terminate in one's ruin.

Hazard, v. Chance, hazard.

The idea of chance or uncertainty is common to all these terms; but the two former may sometimes be foreseen and calculated upon; the latter is purely contingent.

Danger and *peril* are applied to a positive evil; *hazard* may simply respect the loss of a good; risks are voluntarily run from the hope of good: there may be many *dangers* included in a *hazard*; and there cannot be a *hazard* without some *danger*.

A general *hazard* is a battle, in order to disengage himself from a difficulty; he may by this step involve himself in imminent danger of losing his honour or his life; but it is likewise possible that by his superior skill he may set both out of all *danger*: we are hourly exposed to *dangers* which no human foresight can guard against, and are frequently induced to engage in enterprises at the *hazard* of our lives, and of all that we hold dear.

Dangers are far and near, ordinary and extraordinary; they meet us if we do not go in search of them: *perils* are always distant and extraordinary; we must go out of our course to expose ourselves to them: in the quiet walk of life, as in the most busy and tumultuous, it is the lot of man to be surrounded by *danger*; he has nothing which he is not in *danger* of losing; and knows of nothing which he is not in *danger* of suffering: the mariner and the traveller who go in search of unknown countries put themselves in the way of undergoing *perils* both by sea and land.

Proud of the favors mighty Jove has shown,
On certain *dangers* we too rashly run.—POPE.

From that dire deluge through the watery waste,
Such length of years, such various *perils* past
At last escap'd, to Latium we repair.—DRYDEN.

One was their care, and their delight was one;
One common *hazard* in the war they shared.
—DRYDEN.

The same distinction exists between the epithets that are derived from these terms.

It is *dangerous* for a youth to act without the advice of his friends; it is *perilous* for a traveller to explore the wilds of Africa; it is *hazardous* for a merchant to speculate in time of war: experiments in matters of policy or government are always *dangerous*; a journey through deserts that are infested with beasts of prey is *perilous*; a military expedition conducted with inadequate means is *hazardous*.

Hear this, and tremble! all who would be great,
Yet know not what attends that *dangerous* wretched state.
—JENYNS.

The grisly boar is singled from his herd,
A match for Hercules; round him they fly

In circles wide, and each in passing sends
His feather'd death into his brawny sides;
But *perilous* th' attempt.—SOMERVILLE.

The previous steps being taken, and the time fixed for this *hazardous* attempt, Admiral Holmes moved with his squadron farther up the river about three leagues above the place appointed for the disembarkation, that he might deceive the enemy.—SMOLLET.

To Dare, v. To brave.

Daring, Bold.

Daring signifies having the spirit to *dare*.

Bold, v. Audacity.

These terms may be both taken in a bad sense; but *daring* much oftener than *bold*; in either case *daring* expresses much more than *bold*: he who is *daring* provokes resistance, and courts *danger*; but the *bold* man is contented to overcome the resistance that is offered to him: a man may be *bold* in the use of words only; he must be *daring* in actions: he is *bold* in the defence of truth; he is *daring* in military enterprise.

Too *daring* prince! ah! whither dost thou run?
Ah! too forgetful of thy wife and son.—POPE.

Thirty-six barrels of gunpowder were lodged in the cellar, the whole covered up with faggots and bullets: the doors *boldly* flung open, and everybody admitted as if it contained nothing dangerous.—HUME.

Dark, Obscure, Dim, Mysterious.

Dark, in Saxon *deore*, is doubtless connected with the German *dunkel* dark and *dunst* a vapour, which is a cause of darkness.

Obscure, in Latin *obscurus*, compounded of *ob* and *scurus*, Greek *σκοπεος* and *σκια* a shadow, signifies literally interrupted by a shadow.

Dim is but a variation of *dark*, *dunkel*, &c.

Darkness expresses more than *obscurity*: the former denotes the total privation of light; the latter only the diminution of light.

Dark is opposed to light; *obscur* to bright: what is *dark* is altogether hidden; what is *obscur* is not to be seen distinctly, or without an effort.

Darkness may be used either in a natural or moral sense; *obscurity* only in the latter; in which case the former conveys a more unfavourable idea: *darkness* serves to cover that which ought not to be hidden; *obscurity* intercepts our view of that which we would wish to see: the former is the consequence of design; the latter of neglect or accident: the letter sent by the conspirator in the gunpowder plot to his friend was *dark*; all passages in ancient writers which allude to circumstances no longer known, must necessarily be *obscur*: a corner may be said to be *dark* or *obscur*, but the former is used literally and the latter figuratively; the owl is obliged, from the weakness of its visual organs, to seek the *darkest* corners in the daytime; men of distorted minds often seek *obscur* corners, only from disappointed ambition.

Dim expresses a degree of *darkness*, but it is employed more in relation to the person seeing than to the object seen. The eyes are said to grow *dim*, or the sight *dim*. The light is said to be *dim*, by which things are but *dimly* seen.

Why are thy speeches *dark* and troubled
As Cretan seas, when vex'd by warring winds?
SMITH.

He that reads and grows no wiser seldom suspects his
own deficiency, but complains of hard words and *obscure*
sentences.—JOHNSON.

The stars shall fade away, the sun himself
Grow *dim* with age, and nature sink in years;
But thou shalt flourish in immortal youth.
ADDISON.

Mysterious denotes a species of the *dark*,
in relation to the actions of men; where a veil
is intentionally thrown over any object so as
to render it as incomprehensible as that which
is sacred. *Dark* is an epithet taken always in
the bad sense, but *mysterious* is always in an
indifferent sense. We are told in the Sacred
Writings, that men love *darkness* rather than
light, because their deeds are evil. Whatever,
therefore, is *dark* in the ways of men is natu-
rally presumed to be evil; but things may be
mysterious in the events of human life, with-
out the express intention of an individual to
render them so. The speeches of an assassin
and conspirator will be *dark*: any intricate
affair which involves the characters and con-
duct of men may be *mysterious*.

The same distinction exists between these
terms when applied to the ways of Providence,
which are said to be sometimes *dark*, in as
much as they present a cloudy aspect; and
mostly *mysterious*, in as much as they are past
finding out.

Randolph, an agent extremely proper for conducting
any *dark* intrigue, was dispatched into Scotland, and,
residing secretly among the lords of the congregation,
observed and quickened their motions.—ROBERTSON.

The affection which Mary in her letter expresses for
Bothwell, fully accounts for every subsequent part of her
conduct, which, without admitting this circumstance,
appears altogether *mysterious* and inconsistent.—ROBERT-
SON.

To Dart, v. To shoot.

Date, v. Time.

To Daub, v. To smear.

To Daunt, v. To dismay.

Days of Yore, v. Formerly.

Dead, v. Lifeless.

Deadly, Mortal, Fatal.

Deadly or **Deadlike** signifies like death
itself in its effects.

Mortal, in Latin *mortalis*, signifies belong-
ing to death.

Fatal, in Latin *fatalis*, signifies according
to fate.

Deadly is applied to what is productive of
death; **mortal** to what terminates in or is
liable to death; **fatal** applies not only to death,
but every thing which may be of great mis-
chief. A poison is *deadly*; a wound or a
wounded part is *mortal*; a step in walking, or
a step in one's conduct, may be *fatal*. Things
only are *deadly*; creatures are *mortal*. Hatred
is *deadly*; whatever has life is *mortal*. There
may be remedies sometimes to counteract that
which is *deadly*; but that which is *mortal* is
past all cure; and that which is *fatal* cannot
be retrieved.

On him amidst the flying numbers found,
Muryphilus inflicts a *deadly* wound.—POPE.

For my own part, I never could think that the soul,
while in a *mortal* body, lives.—HUGHES after XENO-
PHON.

O *fatal* change! become in one sad day
A senseless corse! inanimated clay.—POPE.

Deal, Quantity, Portion.

Deal, in Saxon *dæl*, Dutch *deel*, and Ger-
man *theil*, from *dalen*, *theilen*, &c., to divide,
signifies literally the thing divided or taken
off.

Quantity, in Latin *quantitas*, comes from
quantus, signifying how much.

Portion, through the Latin *pars* and *portio*,
comes from the Hebrew *parsh* to divide, sig-
nifying, like the word *deal*, the thing taken
off.

Deal always denotes something great, and
cannot be coupled with any epithet that does
not express much: *quantity* is a term of rela-
tive import; it either marks indefinitely the
how, or so much of a thing, or may be defined
by some epithet to express much or little:
portion is of itself altogether indefinite, and
admits of being qualified by any epithet to
express much or little: *deal* is a term confined
to familiar use, and sometimes substituted for
quantity, and sometimes for *portion*. It is
common to speak of a *deal* or a *quantity* of
paper, a *great deal* or a *great quantity* of
money; likewise of a *great deal* or a *great por-
tion* of pleasure, a *great deal* or a *great portion*
of wealth; and in some cases *deal* is more
usual than either *quantity* or *portion*, as a *deal*
of heat, a *deal* of rain, a *deal* of frost, a *deal* of
noise, and the like; but it is altogether inad-
missible in the higher style of writing.

Portion is employed only for that which is
detached from the whole; *quantity* may some-
times be employed for a number of wholes.
We may speak of a large or a small *quantity* of
books; a large or a small *quantity* of plants or
herbs; but a large or small *portion* of food, a
large or small *portion* of colour. *Quantity* is
used only in the natural sense: *portion* also
in the moral application. Material substances,
as wood, stone, metals, and liquids, are
necessarily considered with regard to *quantity*;
the qualities of the mind and the circum-
stances of human life are divided into *por-
tions*. A builder estimates the *quantity* of
materials which he will want for the comple-
tion of a house; the workman estimates the
portion of labour which the work will require.

This, my inquisitive temper, or rather impertinent
humour, of prying into all sorts of writing, with my
natural aversion to loquacity, gives me a good deal of
employment when I enter any house in the country.—
ADDISON.

There is never room in the world for more than a ce-
tain *quantity* or measure of renown.—JOHNSON.

The jars of generous wine, Accester's gift,
He set abroad, and for the feast prepar'd,
In equal *portion* with the venison shar'd.
BYDEN.

To Deal, v. To part.

Dealing, v. Trade.

Dearth, v. Scarcity.

Death, Departure, Decease, Demise.

Death signifies the act of *dying*.

Departure, signifies the act of *departing*.

Decease, from the Latin *decedo* to fall off, signifies the act of falling away.

Demise, from *demitto* to lay down, signifies literally resigning possession.

Death is a general or a particular term; it marks in the abstract sense the extinction of life, and is applicable to men or animals; to one or many. *Departure*, *decease*, and *demise*, are particular expressions suited only to the condition of human beings. * *Departure* is a Christian term, which carries with it an idea of a passage from one life to another; *decease* is a technical term in law, which is introduced into common life to designate one's falling off from the number of the living; *demise* is substituted for *decease* sometimes in speaking of princes.

Death of itself has always something terrific in it; but the Gospel has divested it of its terrors: the hour of *departure*, therefore, for a Christian, is often the happiest period of his mortal existence. *Decease* presents only the idea of leaving life to the survivors. Of *death* it has been said, that nothing is more certain than that it will come, and nothing more uncertain than when it will come. Knowing that we have here no resting place of abode, it is the part of wisdom to look forward to our *departure*. Property is in perpetual occupancy; at the *decease* of one possessor, it passes into the hands of another.

The *death* of an individual is sometimes attended with circumstances peculiarly distressing to those who are nearly related. The tears which are shed at the *departure* of those we love are not always indications of our weakness, but rather testimonies of their worth.

How quickly would the honours of illustrious men perish after *death*, if their souls performed nothing to preserve their fame.—HUGHES after XENOPHON.

The loss of our friends impresses upon us hourly the necessity of our own *departure*.—JOHNSON.

Though men see every day people go to their long home, they are not so apt to be alarmed at that, as at the *decease* of those who have lived longer in their sight.—STEELE.

So tender is the law of supposing even a possibility of the King's *death*, that his natural dissolution is generally called his *demise*.—BLACKSTONE.

As an epithet, *dead* is used collectively; *departed* is used with a noun only: *deceased* generally without a noun, to denote one or more according to the connection.

There is a respect due to the *dead*, which cannot be violated without offence to the living. It is a pleasant reflection to conceive of *departed* spirits, as taking an interest in the concerns of those whom they have left. All the marks on the body of the *deceased* indicated that he had met with his death by some violence.

The living and the *dead*, at his command,
Were coupled face to face, and hand to hand.

DRYDEN.

The sophisticated tyrants of Paris are loud in their declamations against the *departed* regal tyrants, who in former ages have vexed the world.—BURKE.

It was enacted in the reign of Edward I. that the ordinary shall be bound to pay the debts of the intestate, in the same manner that executors were bound in case the *deceased* left a will.—BLACKSTONE.

To Debar, *v.* To deprive.

To Debase, *v.* To abuse.

To Debate, *v.* To argue.

To Debate, *v.* To consult

To Debate, Deliberate.

Debate, *v.* To argue, dispute.

Deliberate, *v.* To consult, deliberate.

These terms equally mark the acts of pausing or withholding the decision, whether applicable to one or many. To *debate* supposes always a contrariety of opinion; to *deliberate* supposes simply the weighing or estimating the value of the opinion that is offered. Where many persons have the liberty of offering their opinions, it is natural to expect that there will be *debating*; when any subject offers that is complicated and questionable, it calls for mature *deliberation*. It is lamentable when passion gets such an ascendancy in the mind of any one, as to make him *debate* which course of conduct he shall pursue between virtue and vice; the want of *deliberation*, whether in private or public transactions, is a more fruitful source of mischief than almost any other.

To seek sage Nestor now the chief resolves;

With him in wholesome counsels to debate

What yet remains to save the sinking state.—POPE.

—When man's life is in debate.

The Judge can ne'er too long deliberate.—DRYDEN.

To Debilitate, *v.* To weaken.

Debility, Infirmary, Imbecility.

Debility, in Latin *debilitas*, from *debilio*, or *de* privative and *habilio*, signifies a deficiency, or not having.

Infirmary, in Latin *infirmitas* from *infirmus*, or in privative and *firmitas* strong, signifies the absence of strength.

Imbecility, in Latin *imbecillitas* from *imbecillus*, or in privative, and *becillus*, *bacillum* or *baculus* a staff, signifies not having a staff: all these terms denote a species of weakness, but the two former, particularly the first, respects that which is physical, and the latter that which is either physical or mental. *Debility* is constitutional, or otherwise; *imbecility* is always constitutional; *infirmary* is accidental, and results from sickness, or a decay of the frame. *Debility* may be either general or local; *infirmary* is always local; *imbecility* always general. *Debility* prevents the active performance of the ordinary functions of nature; it is a deficiency in the muscular power of the body: *infirmary* is a partial want of power, which interferes with, but does not necessarily destroy the activity: *imbecility* lies in the whole frame, and renders it almost entirely powerless.

Young people are frequently troubled with *debilities* in their ankles or legs, of which they are never cured. Old age is most exposed to *infirmities*; but there is no age at which human beings are exempt from *infirmary* of some kind or another. The *imbecility* natural to youth, both in body and mind, would make them willing to rest on the strength of their elders, if they were not too often misled by a mischievous confidence in their own strength.

* Vide Dr. Trusler: "Departure, death, decease."

As increasing years debilitate the body, so they weaken the force and diminish the warmth of the affections.—BLAIR.

This is weakness, not wisdom. I own, and on that account sinner to be trusted to the bosom of a friend, where I may safely lodge all my infirmities.—ATTERBURY.

It is seldom that we are otherwise than by affliction awakened to a sense of our imbecility.—JOHNSON.

Debt, Due.

Debt and Due are both derived from the same verb. *Debt* comes from *debitus* participle of the Latin verb *debeo*; and *due*, in French *du* participle of *devoir*, comes likewise from *debeo* to owe.

Debt is used always as a substantive; *due* either as a substantive or an adjective. A person contracts *debts* and receives his *due*. The *debt* is both obligatory and compulsory; it is a return for something equivalent in value, and cannot be dispensed with; what is *due* is obligatory, but not always compulsory. A *debtor* may be compelled to discharge his *debts*; but it is not always in the power of a man even to claim that which is his *due*. *Debt* is generally used in a mercantile sense; *due* either in a mercantile or moral sense. A *debt* is determined by law; what is *due* is fixed often by principles of equity and honour. He who receives the stipulated price of his goods receives his *debt*; he who receives praise and honour, as a reward of good actions, receives his *due*.

Debt may sometimes be used figuratively, as to pay the *debt* of nature.

Though Christ was as pure and undefiled, without the least spot of sin, as purity and innocence itself; yet he was pleased to make himself the greatest sinner in the world by imputation, and render himself a surety responsible for our *debts*.—SOUTH.

The ghosts rejected are th' unhappy crew,
Depriv'd of sepulchres and fun'ral *due*.—DRYDEN.

Decay, Decline, Consumption.

Decay, French *dechoir*, from the Latin *decado*, signifies literally to fall off or away.

Decline, from the Latin *declino*, or *de* and *clino*, signifies to turn away or lean aside.

The direction expressed by both these actions is very similar; it is a sideward movement, but *decay* expresses more than *decline*. What is *decayed* is fallen or gone; what *declines* leans towards a fall, or is going; when applied, therefore, to the same objects, a *decline* is properly the commencement of a *decay*. The health may experience a *decline* at any period of life from variety of causes, but it naturally experiences a *decay* in old age.

Consumption (*v. To consume*) implies a rapid decay.

* By *decay* things lose their perfection, their greatness, and their consistency; by *decline* they lose their strength, their vigor, and their lustre; by *consumption* they lose their existence. *Decay* brings to ruin; *decline* leads to an end or expiration. There are some things to which *decay* is peculiar, and some things to which *decline* is peculiar, and other things to which both *decay* and *decline* belong. The corruption to which material substances are particularly exposed is termed *decay*; the close of life, when health and strength begin to fall

away, is termed the *decline*; the *decay* of states in the moral world takes place by the same process as the *decay* of fabrics in the natural world; the *decline* of empires, from their state of elevation and splendour, is a natural figure drawn from the *decline* of the setting sun. *Consumption* is seldom applied to any thing but animal bodies.

The seas shall waste, the skies in smoke *decay*,
Rocks fall to dust, and mountains melt away;
But fix'd his word, his saving power remains,
Thy realm for ever lasts, thy own Messiah reigns.
POPE.

After the death of Julius and Augustus Cæsar the Roman empire *declined* every day.—SOUTH.

By degrees the empire shrivelled and pined a way; and from such a surfeit of immoderate prosperity passed at length into a final *consumption*.—SOUTH.

To decay, *v. To perish*.

Decease, *v. Death*.

Deceit, *v. Art*.

Deceit, Deception.

Deceit (*v. To deceive*) marks the propensity to deceive, or the practice of deceiving: **Deception** the art of deceiving (*v. To deceive*).

A *deceiver* is full of *deceit*: but a *deception* may be occasionally practised by one who has not this habit of deceiving. *Deceit* is a characteristic of so base a nature, that those who have it practise every species of *deception* in order to hide their characters from the observation of the world.

The practice of *deceit* springs altogether from a design, and that of the worst kind; but a *deception* may be practised from indifference, if not innocent motives, or may be occasioned even by inanimate objects.

A person or a conduct is *deceitful*; an appearance is *deceptive*. A *deceitful* person has always guile in his heart and on his tongue: jugglers practise various *deceptions* in the performance of their tricks for the entertainment of the populace. Parasites and sycophants are obliged to have recourse to *deceit*, in order to inveigle themselves into the favour of their patrons: there is no sense on which a *deception* can be practised with greater facility than on that of sight; sometimes it is an agreeable *deception*, as in the case of a panoramic exhibition.

I mean to plunge the boy in pleasing sleep,
And ravish'd in Idalian bowers to keep,
Or high Cythera, that the sweet *deceit*
May pass unscen, and none prevent the cheat.
DRYDEN.

All the joy or sorrow for the happiness or calamities of others is produced by an act of the imagination that realizes the event however fictitious, so that we feel, while the *deception* lasts, whatever emotions would be excited by the same good or evil happening to ourselves.—JOHNSON.

Deceit, Duplicity, Double-Dealing.

Deceit (*v. Deceit, deception*).

Duplicity signifies doubleness in dealing, the same as **Double-dealing**.

The former two may be applied either to habitual or particular actions, the latter only to particular actions. There may be much *deceit* or *duplicity* in a person's character or in his proceedings; there is *double-dealing* only where dealing goes forward. The *deceit* may be more or less veiled; the *duplicity* lies

* Vide Truster: "Decay, decline, decease."

very deep, and is always studied whenever it is put into practice. *Duplicity* in reference to actions is mostly employed for a course of conduct: *double-dealing* is but another term for *duplicity* on particular occasions. Children of reserved characters are frequently prone to *deceit*, which grows into consummate *duplicity* in riper years: the wealthy are often exposed to much *duplicity* when they choose their favourites among the low and ignorant: nothing gives rise to more *double-dealing* than the fabrication of wills.

The arts of *deceit* do continually grow weaker and less serviceable to them that use them.—TILLOTSON.

Necessity drove Dryden into a *duplicity* of character that is painful to reflect upon.—CUMBERLAND.

Maskwell (in the *Double-Dealer*) discloses by soliloquy that his motive for *double-dealing* was founded in his passion for Cynthia.—CUMBERLAND.

Deceitful, v. Fallacious.

Deceit, Fraud, Guile.

Deceit (v. *Deceit*, *deception*) is allied to *Fraud* in reference to actions; to *Guile* in reference to the character.

Deceit is here, as in the preceding article, indeterminate when compared with *fraud*, which is a specific mode of deceiving: *deceit* is practised only in private transactions; *fraud* is practised towards bodies as well as individuals in public as well as private; a child practises *deceit* towards its parents; *frauds* are practised upon government, on the public at large, or on tradesmen: *deceit* involves the violation of moral law, *fraud* that of the civil law. A servant may *deceive* his master as to the time of his coming or going, but he *defrauds* him of his property if he obtains it by any false means. *Deceit* as a characteristic is indefinite in magnitude; *guile* marks a strong degree of moral turpitude in the individual. The former is displayed in petty concerns; the latter, which contaminates the whole character, displays itself in inextricable windings and turnings that are suggested in a peculiar manner by the author of all evil. *Deceitful* is an epithet commonly and lightly applied to persons in general; but *guileless* is applied to characters which are the most diametrically opposed to, and at the greatest possible distance from, that which is false.

With such *deceits* he gain'd their easy hearts,
Too prone to credit his perfidious arts.—DRYDEN.

The story of the three books of the Sibyls sold to Tarquin was all a *fraud* devised for the convenience of state.—FRIEBAUX.

Was it for force or *guile*
Or some religious end, you rais'd this pile?—DRYDEN.

To Deceive, Delude, Impose upon.

Deceive, in French *decevoir*, Latin *decipio*, compounded of *de* privative, and *cipio* to take, signifies to take wrong.

Delude, in Latin *deludo*, compounded of *de* and *ludo*, signifies to play upon or to mislead by a trick.

Impose, in Latin *impono*, perfect of *impono*, signifies literally to lay or put upon.

Falseness is the leading feature in all these terms; they vary however in the circumstances of the action. To *deceive* is the most

general of the three; it signifies simply to produce a false conviction: the other terms are properly species of *deceiving*, including accessory ideas. *Deception* may be practised in various degrees; *deluding* is always something positive, and considerable in degree. Every false impression produced by external objects, whether in trifles or important matters, is a *deception*; but *delusion* is confined to errors in matters of opinion. We may be *deceived* in the colour or the distance of an object; we are *deluded* in what regards our principles or moral conduct.

A *deception* does not always suppose a fault on the part of the person *deceived*, but a *delusion* does. A person is sometimes *deceived* in cases where *deception* is unavoidable: he is *deluded* through a voluntary blindness of the understanding: artful people are sometimes capable of *deceiving* so as not even to excite suspicion; their plausible tales justify the credit that is given to them: when the ignorant enter into nice questions of politics or religion, it is their ordinary fate to be *deluded*.

Deception is practised by an individual on himself or others; a *delusion* is commonly practised on one's self; an *imposition* is always practised on another. Men *deceive* others from a variety of motives; they always *impose* upon them or purposes of gain, or the gratification of ambition. Men *deceive* themselves with false pretexts and false confidence; they *delude* themselves with vain hopes and wishes.

Professors in religion often *deceive* themselves as much as they do others: the grossest and most dangerous *delusion* into which they are liable to fall is that of substituting faith for practice, and an extravagant regard to the outward observances of religion for the mild and humble temper of Jesus: no *imposition* was ever so successfully practised upon mankind as that of Mahomet.

I would have all my readers take care how they mistake themselves for uncommon geniuses and men above rule, since it is very easy for them to be *deceived* in this particular.—BUDGELL.

Deluded by a seeming excellence.—ROSCOMMON.

As there seem to be in this manuscript some anachronisms and deviations from the ancient orthography, I am not satisfied myself that it is authentic, and not rather the production of one of those Grecian sophists who have *imposed* upon the world several spurious works of this nature.—ADDISON.

Deceiver, Impostor.

Deceiver and *impostor*, the derivatives from *deceive* and *impose*, have a farther distinction worthy of notice.

Deceiver is a generic term; *impostor* specific: every *impostor* is a species of *deceiver*: the words have however a distinct use. The *deceiver* practises *deception* on individuals; the *impostor* only on the public at large. The false friend and the faithless lover are *deceivers*; the assumed nobleman who practises *frauds* under his disguise, and the pretended prince who lays claim to a crown to which he was never born, are *impostors*.

Deceivers are the most dangerous members of society; they trifle with the best affections of our nature, and violate the most sacred obligations. *Impostors* are seldom so culpable as those who give them credit. It would require

no small share of credulity to be *deceived* by any of the impositions which have been hitherto practised upon the inconsiderate part of mankind.

That tradition of the Jews that Christ was stolen out of the grave is ancient: it was the invention of the Jews, and denies the integrity of the witnesses of his resurrection, making them *deceivers*.—TILLOTSON.

Our Saviour wrought his miracles frequently, and for a long time together; a time sufficient to have detected any impostor in.—TILLOTSON.

Decency, Decorum.

Though **Decency** and **Decorum** are both derived from the same word (*v. Becoming*), they have acquired a distinction in their sense and application. *Decency* respects a man's conduct; *decorum* his behaviour: a person conducts himself with *decency*; he behaves with *decorum*.

Indecency is a vice; it is the violation of public or private morals: *indecorum* is a fault; it offends the feelings of those who witness it. Nothing but a depraved mind can lead to *indecent* practices: indiscretion and thoughtlessness may sometimes give rise to that which is *indecorous*. *Decency* enjoins upon all relatives, according to the proximity of their relationship, to show certain marks of respect to the memory of the dead: regard for the feelings of others enjoins a certain outward *decorum* upon every one who attends a funeral.

Even religion itself, unless *decency* be the handmaid which waits upon her, is apt to make people appear guilty of sourness and ill humour.—SPECTATOR.

I will admit that a fine woman of a certain rank cannot have too many real vices; but at the same time I do insist upon it that it is essentially her interest not to have the appearance of any one. This *decorum*, I confess, will conceal her conquests, but on the other hand, if she will be pleased to reflect that those conquests are known sooner or later, she will not upon an average find herself a loser.—CHESTERFIELD.

Decent, *v. Becoming*.

Deception, *v. Deceit*.

To Decide, Determine, Conclude Upon.

Decide from the Latin *decido*, compounded of *de* and *cadere*, signifies to cut off or cut short a business.

Determine, from the Latin *determino*, compounded of *de* and *terminus* a term or boundary, signifies to fix the boundary.

Conclude, *v. To close, finish*.

The idea of bringing a thing to an end is common to the signification of all these words; but *decide* expresses more than *determine*, and *determine* more than *conclude*.

Decide and *determine* are both employed in matters relating to ourselves or others; *conclude* is employed in matters that respect the parties only who *conclude*. As it respects others, to *decide* is an act of greater authority than to *determine*: a parent *decides* for his child; a subordinate person may *determine* sometimes for those who are under him in the absence of his superi^r rs. In all cases, to *decide* is an act of greater importance than to *determine*. The nature and character of a thing is *decided* upon; its limits or extent are *determined* on. A judge *decides* on the law and

equity of the case; the jury *determine* as to the guilt or innocence of the person. An individual *decides* in his own mind on any measure, and the propriety of adopting it; he *determines* in his own mind as to *h. w.*, when, and where it shall be commenced.

One *decides* in all matters of question or dispute; one *determines* in all matters of fact. We *decide* in order to have an opinion; we *determine* in order to act. In complicated cases, where arguments of apparently equal weight are offered by men of equal authority, it is difficult to *decide*; when equally feasible plans are offered for our choice, we are often led to *determine* upon one of them from trifling motives.

To *determine* and *conclude* are equally practical: but *determine* seems to be more peculiarly the act of an individual; *conclude* may be the act of one or many. We *determine* by an immediate act of the will; we *conclude* on a thing by inference and deduction. Caprice may often influence in *determining*; but nothing is *concluded* on without deliberation and judgment. Many things may be *determined* of which are either never put into execution, or remain long unexecuted; but that which is *concluded* on is mostly followed by immediate action. To *conclude* on is properly to come to a final determination.

With mutual blood th' Ausonian soil is dyed,
While on its borders each their claim *decide*.
DRYDEN.

No mystic dream could make their fates appear;
Though now *determin'd* by Tydides' spear.—POPE.
But no frail man, however great or high,
Can be *concluded* blest before he die.—ADDISON.

Decided, Determined, Resolute.

A man who is **Decided** (*v. To decide*) remains in no doubt; he who is **Determined** is uninfluenced by the doubts or questions of others; he who is **Resolute** (*v. To determine, resolve*) is uninfluenced by the consequences of his actions. A *decided* character is at all times essential for a prince or a minister, but particularly so in an unsettled period like the present; a *determined* character is essential for a commander, or any one who has to exercise authority; a *resolute* character is essential for one who is engaged in dangerous enterprises. Pericles was a man of a *decided* temper which was well fitted to direct the affairs of government in a season of turbulence and disquietude: Titus Manlius Torquatus displayed himself to be a man of a *determined* character when he put to death his victorious son for a breach of military discipline: Brutus, the murderer of Cæsar, was a man of a *resolute* temper.

Almost all the high-bred republicans of my time have, after a short space, become the most *decided* thorough-paced courtiers.—BURKE.

A race *determined*, that to death contend;
So fierce these Greeks their last retreats defend
POPE.

Most of the propositions we think, reason, discourse, nay act upon, are such as we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth: yet some of them border so near upon certainty that we make no doubt at all about them; but assent to them as firmly, and act according to that assent as *resolutely*, as if they were infallibly demonstrated.—LOCKE.

Decided, Decisive.

Decided marks that which is actually decided: **Decisive** that which appertains to decision.

Decided is employed for persons or things; **decisive** only for things. A person's aversion or attachment is *decided*; a sentence, a judgement, or a victory, is *decisive*. A man of a decided character always adopts *decisive* measures. It is right to be *decidedly* averse to every thing which is immoral: we should be cautious not to pronounce *decisively* on any point where we are not perfectly clear and well grounded in our opinion. In every popular commotion it is the duty of a good subject to take a *decided* part in favour of law and order: such is the nature of law, that if it were not *decisive* it would be of no value.

A politic caution, a guarded circumspection, were among the ruling principles of our forefathers in their most *decided* conduct.—BURKE.

The sentence of superior judges is final, *decisive*, and irrevocable.—BLACKSTONE.

It is notorious that the measures of the national assembly are *decided* before they are debated.—BURKE.

Decision, Judgement, Sentence.

Decision signifies literally the act of deciding, or the thing decided upon (*v. To decide*).

Judgement signifies the act of judging or determining in general (*v. To decide*).

Sentence, in Latin *sententia*, signifies the opinion held or maintained.

These terms, though very different in their original meaning, are now employed so that the two latter are species of the former: a final conclusion of any business is comprehended in them all: but *decision* conveys none of the collateral ideas which is expressed by *judgement* and *sentence*: a *decision* has no respect to the agent; it may be said of one or many; it may be the *decision* of the court, of the nation, of the public, of a particular body of men, or of a private individual: but a *judgement* is given in a public court, or among private individuals: a *sentence* is passed in a court of law, or at the bar of the public.

A *decision* specifies none of the circumstances of the action: it may be a legal or an arbitrary *decision*; it may be a *decision* according to one's caprice, or after mature deliberation: a *judgement* is always passed either in a court of law, and consequently by virtue of authority: or it is passed by an individual by the authority of his own *judgement*: a *sentence* is always passed by the authority of law, or the will of the public.

A *decision* respects matters of dispute or litigation; it puts an end to all question: a *judgement* respects the guilt or innocence, the moral excellence or defects of a person; a *sentence* respects the punishment or consequent fate of the object: some questions are of so complicated a nature that it is not possible to bring them to a *decision*: men are forbidden by the Christian religion to be severe in their *judgements* on one another; the works of an author must sometimes await the *sentence* of impartial posterity before their value can be duly appreciated.

The *decisions* of the judges, in the several courts of

justice, are the principal and most authoritative evidence that can be given of the existence of such a custom as shall form a part of the common law.—BLACKSTONE.

It is the greatest folly to seek the praise or approbation of any being besides the Supreme Being; because no other being can make a right judgement of us.—ADDISON.

The guilty man has an honour for the judge who with justice pronounces against him the sentence of death itself.—STEELE.

Decisive, v. Conclusive.

Decisive, v. Decided.

Declaim, Inveigh.

Declaim, in Latin *declamo*, that is, *de* and *clamo*, signifies literally to cry aloud in a set form of words.

Inveigh, v. Abuse, invective.

The sense in which these words agree is that of using the language of displeasure against any person or thing: *declaim* is used generally, *inveigh* particularly: public men and public measures are subjects for the *declaimer*: private individuals afford subjects for *inveighing* against; the former is under the influence of particular opinions or prejudices; the latter is the fruit of personal resentment or displeasure: patriots (as they are called) are always *declaiming* against the conduct of those in power, or the state of the nation; and not unfrequently they profit by the opportunity of indulging their private pique by *inveighing* against particular members of the government who have disappointed their expectations of advancement. A *declaimer* is noisy: he is a man of words; he makes long and loud speeches: an *inveigher* is virulent and personal: he enters into private details, and often indulges his malignant feelings under an affected regard for morality.

The grave and the merry have equally thought themselves at liberty to conclude, either with *declamatory* complaints, or satirical censures of female folly.—JOHNSON.

Scarce were the flocks refresh'd with morning dew,
When Dancan stretch'd beneath an olive shade,
And wildly starting upward, thus *inveigh'd*
Against the conscious gods.—DRYDEN.

To Declare, Publish, Proclaim.

Declare, in Latin *declaro*, compounded of *de* and *claro* to clear, signifies literally to make clear or show plainly to a person.

Publish, v. To announce.

Proclaim, in Latin *proclamo*, compounded of *pro* and *clamo*, signifies to cry before or in the ears of others.

The idea of making known is common to all these terms: this is simply the signification of *declare*, but the other two include accessory ideas.

The word *declare* does not express any particular mode or circumstance of making known, as is implied by the others: we may *declare* publicly or privately; we *publish* and *proclaim* only in a public manner: we may *declare* by word of mouth, or by writing; we *publish* or *proclaim* by any means that will render the thing most generally known.

In *declaring*, the leading idea is that of speaking out that which passes in the mind; in *publishing*, the leading idea is that of

making public or common: in *proclaiming*, the leading idea is that of crying aloud: we may there often *declare* by *publishing* and *proclaiming*: a *declaration* is a personal act; it concerns the person *declaring*, or him to whom it is *declared*; its truth or falsehood depends upon the veracity of the speaker: a *publication* is of general interest; the truth or falsehood of it does not always rest with the *publisher*: a *proclamation* is altogether a public act, in which no one's veracity is implicated. Facts and opinions are *declared*; events and circumstances are *published*: the measures of government are *proclaimed*: it is folly for a man to *declare* anything to be true which he is not certain to be so, and wickedness in him to *declare* that to be true which he knows to be false: whoever *publishes* all he hears will be in great danger of *publishing* many falsehoods; whatever is *proclaimed* is supposed to be of sufficient importance to deserve the notice of all who may hear or read.

In cases of war or peace, princes are expected to *declare* themselves on one side or the other; in the political world intelligence is quickly *published* through the medium of the public papers; in private life domestic occurrences are *published* with equal celerity through the medium of tale-bearers; a *proclamation* is the ordinary mode by which a prince makes known his wishes, and issues his commands to his subjects; it is an act of indiscretion very common to young and ardent inquirers to *declare* their opinions before they are properly matured; the *publication* of domestic circumstances is oftentimes the source of much disquiet and ill-will in families; ministers of the gospel are styled messengers, who should *proclaim* its glad tidings to all people, and in all tongues.

The Greeks in shouts their joint assent *declare*,
The priest to reverence and release the fair.—POPE.

I am surprised that none of the fortune-tellers, or, as the French call them, the *Discours de bonne aventure*, who *publish* their bills in every quarter of the town, have not turned our lotteries to their advantage.—ADDISON.

Nine sacred heralds now, *proclaiming* loud
The monarch's will, suspend the listening crowd.
POPE.

To Declare, *v.* To discover.

To Declare, *v.* To express.

To Declare, *v.* To profess.

Decline, *v.* Decay.

To Decline, *v.* To refuse.

To Decorate, *v.* To adorn.

Decorum, *v.* Decency.

To Decoy, *v.* To allure.

To Decrease, *v.* To abate.

Decree, Edict, Proclamation.

Decree, in French *decret*, Latin *decretus*, from *decerno* to give judgement or pass sentence, signifies the sentence or resolution that is passed.

Edict, in Latin *edictus*, from *edico* to say out, signifies the thing spoken out or sent forth.

Proclamation, *v.* To declare.

A *decree* is a more solemn and deliberative act than an *edict*; on the other hand an *edict* is more authoritative than a *decree*. A *decree* is the decision of one or many; an *edict* speaks the will of an individual: councils and senates, as well as princes, make *decrees*; despotic rulers issue *edicts*.

Decrees are passed for the regulation of public and private matters; they are made known as occasion requires, but are not always public: *edicts* and *proclamations* contain the commands of the sovereign authority, and are directly addressed by the prince to his people. An *edict* is peculiar to a despotic government: a *proclamation* is common to a monarchical and aristocratic form of government; the ukase in Russia is a species of *edict*, by which the emperor makes known his will to his people; the king of England communicates to his subjects the determinations of himself and his council by means of a *proclamation*.

Are we condemn'd, by fate's unjust *decree*,
No more our houses and our homes to see?

DRYDEN.

This statute or act of parliament is placed among the records of the kingdom, there needing no formal promulgation to give it the force of a law, as was necessary by the civil law with regard to the emperor's *edicts*.—BLACKSTONE.

From the same original of the king's being the fountain of justice, we may also deduce the prerogative of issuing *proclamations*, which is vested in the king alone.—BLACKSTONE.

To Decry, *v.* To disparage.

To Dedicate, Devote, Consecrate, Hallow.

Dedicate, in Latin *dedicatus*, participle from *de* and *dico*, signifies to set apart by a promise.

Devote, in Latin *devotus*, participle from *devoeo*, signifies to vow for an express purpose.

Consecrate, in Latin *consecratus*, from *consecro* or *con* and *sacro*, signifies to make sacred by a special act.

Hallow from *holy*, or the German *heilig*, signifies to make holy.

There is something more positive in the act of *dedicating* than in that of *devoting*; but less so than in that of *consecrating*.

To *dedicate* and *devote* may be employed in both temporal and spiritual matters; to *consecrate* and *hallow* only in the spiritual sense: we may *dedicate* or *devote* anything that is at our disposal to the service of some object; but the former is employed mostly in regard to superiors, and the latter to persons without distinction of rank: we *dedicate* a house to the service of God: or we *devote* our time to the benefit of our friends, or the relief of the poor; we may *dedicate* or *devote* ourselves to an object; but the former always implies a solemn setting apart springing from a sense of duty; the latter an entire application of one's self from zeal and affection; in this manner he who *dedicates* himself to God abstracts himself from every object which is not immediately connected with the service of God; he who *devotes* himself to the ministry pursues it as the first object of his attention and regard: such a *dedication* of ourself is hardly consistent with our other duties as

members of society ; but a devotion of one's powers, one's time, and one's knowledge to the spread of religion among men is one of the most honourable and sacred kinds of devotion.

To consecrate is a species of formal dedication by virtue of a religious observance ; it is applicable mostly to places and things connected with religious works : hallow is a species of informal consecration applied to the same objects : the church is consecrated ; particular days are hallowed.

Warn'd by the seer, to her offended name
We rais'd and dedicated this wondrous frame.
DRYDEN.

Gilbert West settled himself in a very pleasant house at Wickham in Kent, where he devoted himself to piety.—JOHNSON.

The greatest conqueror in this holy nation did not only compose the words of his divine odes, but generally set them to music himself ; after which his works, though they were consecrated to the tabernacle, became the national entertainment.—ADDISON.

Without the walls a ruin'd temple stands,
To Ceres hallow'd once.—DRYDEN.

To Deduce, v. To derive.

To Deduct, Subtract.

Deduct, from the Latin *deductus* participle of *deduco*, and Subtract from *subtrahum* participle of *subtrahō*, have both the sense of taking from, but the former is used in a general, and the latter in a technical sense. He who makes an estimate is obliged to deduct ; he who makes a calculation is obliged to subtract.

The tradesman deducts what has been paid from what remains due ; the accountant subtracts small sums from the gross amount.

The popish clergy took to themselves the whole residue of the intestate's estate, after the two-thirds of the wife and children were deducted.—BLACKSTONE.

A codicil is a supplement to a will, being for its explanation or alteration, or to make some addition to or else some subtraction from the former dispositions of the testator.—BLACKSTONE.

Deduction, v. Conclusion.

Deed, Exploit, Achievement, Feat.

Deed, from *do*, expresses the thing done.

Exploit, in French *exploit*, most probably changed from *explicatus*, signifying the thing unfolded or displayed.

Achievement, from *achieve*, French *achever*, to finish, signifies what is accomplished or completed.

Feat, in French *fait*, Latin *factum*, from *facio*, signifies the thing done.

The first three words rise progressively on each other : deeds, compared with the others, is employed for that which is ordinary or extraordinary ; exploit and achievement are used only for the extraordinary ; the latter in a higher sense than the former.

Deeds must always be characterized as good or bad, magnanimous or atrocious, and the like ; exploit and achievement do not necessarily require such epithets ; they are always taken in the proper sense for something great. Exploit, when compared with achievement, is a term used in plain prose ; it designates not so much what is great as what is real ; achieve-

ment is most adapted to poetry and romance ; it soars above what the eye sees, or the ear hears, and affords scope for the imagination. Martial deeds are as interesting to the reader as to the performer : the pages of modern history will be crowded with the exploits of Englishmen both by sea and land, as those of ancient and fabulous history are with the achievements of their heroes and demi-gods. An exploit marks only personal bravery in action ; an achievement denotes elevation of character in every respect, grandeur of design, promptitude in execution, and valour in action.

An exploit may be executed by the design and at the will of another ; a common soldier or an army may perform exploits. An achievement is designed and executed by the achiever ; Hercules is distinguished for his achievements ; and in the same manner we speak of the achievements of knight-errants or of great commanders.

Feat approaches nearest to exploit in signification ; the former marks skill, and the latter resolution. The feats of chivalry displayed in jousts and tournaments were in former times as much esteemed as warlike exploits. Exploit and feat are often used in derision, to mark the absence of skill or bravery in the actions of individuals. The soldier who affects to be foremost in situations where there is no danger cannot be more properly derided than by terming his action an exploit ; he who prides himself on the display of skill in the performance of a paltry trick may be laughed at for having performed a feat.

Great Pollio ! thou for whom thy Rome prepares
The ready triumph of thy finish'd wars ;
Is there in fate an hour reserv'd for me
To sing thy deeds in numbers worthy thee?
DRYDEN.

High matter thou injoin'st me, O prime of men !
Sad task and hard, for how shall I relate
To human sense th' invisible exploits
Of warring spirits?—MILTON.

Great spoils and trophies, gain'd by thee they bear,
Then let thy own achievements be thy share.
DRYDEN.

Much I have heard
Of thy prodigious might, and feats perform'd.
MILTON.

Deed, v. Action.

To Deface, Disfigure, Deform.

Deface, Disfigure, and Deform, signify literally to spoil the face, figure, and form.

Deface expresses more than either deform and disfigure. To deface is an act of destruction ; it is the actual destruction of that which has before existed : to disfigure is either an act of destruction or an erroneous execution, which takes away the figure : to deform is altogether an imperfect execution, which renders the form what it should not be. A thing is defaced by design ; it is disfigured either by design or accident ; it is deformed either by an error or by the nature of the thing.

Persons only deface ; persons or things disfigure ; things are most commonly deformed of themselves. That may be defaced, the face or external surface of which may be injured or destroyed ; that may be disfigured or deformed, the figure or form of which is imperfect or

may be rendered imperfect. A fine painting or piece of writing is *defaced* which is torn or besmeared with dirt: a fine building is *disfigured* by any want of symmetry in its parts: a building is *deformed* that is made contrary to all form. A statue may be *defaced*, *disfigured*, and *deformed*: it is *defaced* when any violence is done to the face or any outward part of the body; it is *disfigured* by the loss of a limb; it is *deformed* if made contrary to the perfect form of a person or thing to be represented.

Inanimate objects are mostly *defaced* or *disfigured*, but seldom *deformed*; animate objects are either *disfigured* or *deformed*, but not *defaced*. A person may *disfigure* himself by his dress; he is *deformed* by the hand of nature.

Yet she had heard an ancient rumour fly
(Long cited by the people of the sky),
That times to come should see the Trojan race
Her Carthage ruin, and her towers *deface*.

DRYDEN.

It is but too obvious that errors are committed in this part of religion (devotion). These frequently *disfigure* its appearance before the world, and subject it to unjust reproach.—BLAIR.

A beauteous maid above; but magic art
With barking dogs, *deform'd* her nether part.

DRYDEN.

To Defame, *v.* To *asperser*.

To Defeat, *v.* To *beat*.

To Defeat, *v.* To *baffle*.

To Defeat, Foil, Disappoint,
Frustrate.

Defeat, *v.* To *beat*, *defeat*.

Foil may probably come from *fail* and the Latin *fallō* to deceive, signifying to make to fail.

Frustrate, in Latin *frustratus*, from *frustra*, signifies to make vain.

Disappoint, from the privative *dis* and the verb *appoint*, signifies literally to do away with has been appointed.

Defeat and *foil* are both applied to matters of enterprise; but that may be *defeated* which is only planned, and that is *foiled* which is in the act of being executed. What is rejected is *defeated*; what is aimed at or purposed is *frustrated*; what is calculated on is *disappointed*. The best-concerted schemes may sometimes be easily *defeated*: where art is employed against simplicity the latter may be easily *foiled*: when we aim at what is above our reach, we must be *frustrated* in our endeavours: when our expectations are extravagant, it seems to follow of course that they will be *disappointed*.

Design or accident may tend to *defeat*, design only to *foil*, accident only to *frustrate* or *disappoint*. The superior force of the enemy, or a combination of untoward events which are above the control of the commander, will serve to *defeat* the best-concerted plans of the best generals: men of upright minds can seldom *foil* the deep-laid schemes of knaves: when we see that the perversity of men is liable to *frustrate* the kind intentions of others in their behalf, it is wiser to leave them to their folly: the cross accidents of human life are a fruitful source of *disappointment* to those who suffer themselves to be affected by them.

The very purposes of wantonness are *defeated* by a carriage which has so much boldness.—STEELE.

The devil haunts those most where he hath greatest hopes of success: and is too eager and intent upon mischief to employ his time and temptations where he hath been so often *foiled*.—TILLOTSON.

Let all the Tuscans, all th' Arcadians join,
Nor these nor those shall *frustrate* my design.

DRYDEN.

It seems rational to hope that minds qualified for great attainments should first endeavour their own benefit. But this expectation, however plausible, has been very frequently *disappointed*.—JOHNSON.

Defect, *v.* Imperfection.

Defect, *v.* Blemish.

Defection, Revolt.

Defection, from the Latin *deficio*, signifies the act of falling off, or becoming deficient towards some object.

Revolt, compounded of *re* and *volt*, in French *voltiger* to bound, and the Latin *volo* to fly, signifies a bounding back from an object to which one has been attached.

Defection is a general, *revolt* a specific term, that is, it denotes a species of *defection*. *Defection* is applicable to any person or thing to which we are bound by any obligation; *revolt* is applicable only to the government to which one is bound. There may be a *defection* from religion, or any cause that is held sacred: a *revolt* is only against a monarch, or the supreme authority.

Defection does not designate the mode of the action; it may be quietly made or otherwise; a *revolt* is an act of violence, and always attended with violence. The *defection* may be the act of one; a *revolt* is properly the act of many. A general may be guilty of a *defection* who leaves the party to which he has hitherto adhered; a nation or a community may commit an act of *revolt* by shaking off the authority under which they have lived. A *defection* being mostly the act of an individual, or one part of a community against the whole, is mostly a culpable act: but a *revolt* may be a justifiable measure, when one nation *revolts* against another, under whose power it has been brought by force of arms: the Roman people were guilty of a *defection* when they left the senate and retired to Mount Aventine: the Germans frequently attempted to recover their liberty by *revolting* against the Romans.

At the time of the general *defection* from Nero, Virgilius Rufus was at the head of a very powerful army in Germany, which had pressed him to accept the title of emperor, but he constantly refused it.—MELMOTH.

Exeter, instigated by Githa, mother to king Harold, refused to admit a Norman garrison, and, betaking themselves to arms, were strengthened by the accession of the neighbouring inhabitants of Devonshire and Cornwall. The king hastened with his forces to chastise this *revolt*.—HUME.

Defective, Deficient.

Defective expresses the quality or property of having a *defect* (*v.* *Blemish*): *Deficient* is employed with regard to the thing itself that is wanting. A book may be *defective*, in consequence of some leaves being *deficient*. A *deficiency* is therefore often what constitutes a *defect*. Many things however may be *defective* without having any *deficiency*, and *vice versâ*. Whatever is mis-shapen, and falls either in beauty or utility, is *defective*.

that which is wanted to make a thing complete is *deficient*. It is a *defect* in the eye when it is so constructed that things are not seen at their proper distances; there is a *deficiency* in a tradesman's accounts when one side falls short of the other.

Things only are said to be *defective*; but persons may be termed *deficient* either in attention, in good breeding, in civility, or whatever else the occasion may require. That which is *defective* is most likely to be permanent; but a *deficiency* may be only occasional and easily rectified.

Providence, for the most part, sets us upon a level; if it renders us perfect in one accomplishment, it generally leaves us *defective* in another.—ADDISON.

If there be a *deficiency* in the speaker, there will not be sufficient attention and regard paid to the thing spoken.—SWIFT.

Defence, v. Apology.

To Defend, Protect, Vindicate.

Defend, v. Apology.

Protect, in Latin *proctum*, participle of *protego*, compounded of *pro* and *tego*, signifies to put anything before a person as a covering.

Vindicate, v. To assert.

Defend is a general term; it defines nothing with regard to the degree and manner of the action: *protect* is a particular and positive term, expressing an action of some considerable importance. Persons may *defend* others without distinction of rank or station: none but superiors *protect* their inferiors. *Defence* is an occasional action; *protection* is a permanent action. A person may be *defended* in any particular case of actual danger or difficulty; he is *protected* from what may happen as well as what does happen. *Defence* respects the evil that threatens; *protection* involves the supply of necessities and the affording comforts.

A master may justify an assault in *defence* of his servant, and a servant in *defence* of his master.—BLACKSTONE.

They who *protected* the weakness of our infancy are entitled to our *protection* in their old age.—BLACKSTONE.

Defence requires some active exertion either of body or mind; *protection* may consist only of the extension of power in behalf of any particular. A *defence* is successful or unsuccessful; a *protection* weak or strong. A soldier *defends* his country; a counsellor *defends* his client; a prince *protects* his subjects. Henry the Eighth styled himself *defender* of the faith (that is of the Romish faith) at the time that he was subverting the whole religious system of the Catholics: Oliver Cromwell styled himself *protector* at the time that he was overturning the government.

Savage (on his trial for the murder of Sinclair) did not deny the fact, but endeavoured to justify it by the necessity of *self-defence*, and the hazard of his own life if he had lost the opportunity of giving the thrust.—JOHNSON.

First give thy faith and plight, a prince's word,
Of sure *protection* by thy power and sword;
For I must speak what wisdom would conceal,
And truth invidious to the great reveal.—POPE.

In a figurative and extended sense, things may either *defend* or *protect* with a similar distinction: a coat *defends* us from the inclemencies of the weather; houses are a *protection*

not only against the changes of the seasons, but also against the violence of men.

How shall the vine with tender leaves *defend*
Her teeming clusters when the rains descend?
DRYDEN.

Some to the holly hedge
Nestling repair, and to the thicket some:
Some to the rude *protection* of the thorn
Commit their feeble offspring.—THOMSON.

To *vindicate* is a species of *defence* only in the moral sense of the word. Acts of importance are *defended*: those of trifling import are commonly *vindicated*. Cicero *defended* Milo against the charge of murder, in which he was implicated by the death of Clodius: a child or a servant *vindicates* himself when any blame is attached to him. *Defence* is employed either in matters of opinion or conduct; *vindicate* only in matters of conduct. No absurdities are too great to want occasional *defenders* among the various advocates to free enquiry; he who *vindicates* the conduct of another should be fully satisfied of the innocence of the person whom he *defends*.

While we can easily *defend* our character, we are no more disturbed at an accusation than we are alarmed by an enemy whom we are sure to conquer.—JOHNSON.

In this poem (the Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot) Pope seems to reckon with the public. He *vindicates* himself from censures, and with dignity rather than arrogance enforces his own claims to kindness and respect.—JOHNSON.

To Defend, v. To guard.

Defendant, Defender.

The **Defendant** defends himself (*v. To defend*): the **Defender** defends another. We are *defendants* when any charge is brought against us which we wish to refute: we are *defenders* when we undertake to rebut or refute the charge brought against another.

Of what consequence could it be to the cause whether the counsellor did or did not know the *defendant*?—SMOLLET.

The abbot of Paisley was a warm partizan of France, and a zealous *defender* of the established religion.—ROBERTSON.

Defender, v. Defendant.

Defender, Advocate, Pleader.

A **Defender** exerts himself in favour of one that wants support: an **Advocate** from the Latin *advoco* to call or to speak for, signifies one who is called to the assistance of another: he exerts himself in favour of any cause that offers: a **Pleader** from *plea* or *excuse*, signifies him who exerts himself in favour of one that is in distress. A *defender* attempts to keep off a threatened injury by rebutting the attack of another: an *advocate* states that which is to the advantage of the person or thing *advocated*; a *pleader* throws in *pleas* and *extenuations*; he blends entreaty with argument. Oppressed or accused persons and disputed opinions require *defenders*: that which falls in with the humours of men will always have *advocates*; the unfortunate and the guilty require *pleaders*.

St. Paul was a bold *defender* of the faith which is in Christ Jesus. Epicurus has been unjustly charged with being the *advocate* for pleasure in its gross and sensual sense, whence

the advocates for sensual indulgences have been termed Epicureans. Veturia and Volturnia, the wife and mother of Coriolanus, were pleaders in behalf of the Roman republic, too powerful for him to be able to refuse their request.

But the time was now come when Warburton was to change his opinion, and Pope was to find a defender in him who had contributed so much to the exaltation of his rival.—JOHNSON.

It is said that some endeavours were used to incense the Queen against Savage, but he found advocates to obviate at least part of their effect.—JOHNSON.

Next call the pleader from his learned strife.

To the calm blessings of a learned life.—HORNECK.

Defensible, Defensive.

Defensible is employed for the thing that is defended: **Defensive** for the thing that defends. An opinion or a line of conduct is *defensible*; a weapon or a military operation is *defensive*. The *defensible* is opposed to the *indefensible*; and the *defensive* to the *offensive*.

It is the height of folly to attempt to defend that which is *indefensible*; it is sometimes prudent to act on the *defensive*, when we are not in a condition to commence the offensive.

Impressing is only *defensible* from public necessity, to which all private considerations must give way.—BLACKSTONE.

A king, circumstanced as the present (King of France), has no generous interest that can excite him to action. At best his conduct will be passive and *defensive*.—BURKE.

Defensive, *v. Defensible*.

To Defer, *v. To delay*.

Deference, *v. Complaisance*.

Deficient, *v. Defective*.

Definite, Positive.

Definite in Latin *definitum*, participle of *definio*, compounded of *de* and *finis*, signifies that which is bounded by a line or limit.

Positive, in Latin *positivus* from *pono* to place, signifies that which is placed or fixed.

The understanding and reasoning powers are connected with what is *definite*, the will with what is *positive*. A *definite* answer leaves nothing to be explained: a *positive* answer leaves no room for hesitation or question. It is necessary to be *definite* in giving instructions, and to be *positive* in giving commands. A person who is *definite* in his proceedings with another puts a stop to all unreasonable expectations; it is necessary for those who have to exercise authority to be *positive*, in order to enforce obedience from the self-willed and contumacious.

We are not able to judge of the degree of conviction which operated at any particular time upon our own thoughts, but as it is recorded by some certain and definite effect.—JOHNSON.

The Earl Rivers being now in his own opinion on his death-bed, thought it his duty to provide for Savage among his other natural children, and therefore demanded a *positive* account of him.—JOHNSON.

Definition, Explanation.

A **Definition** is properly a species of **Explanation**. The former is used scientifically, the latter on ordinary occasions; the

former is confined to words, the latter is employed for words or things.

A *definition* is correct or precise; an *explanation* is general or ample.

The *definition* of a word defines or limits the extent of its signification; it is the rule for the scholar in the use of any word: the *explanation* of a word may include both definition and illustration: the former admits of no more words than will include the leading features in the meaning of any term; the latter admits of an unlimited scope for diffuseness on the part of the explainer.

As to politeness, many have attempted *definitions* of it. I believe it is best to be known by description, *definition* not being able to comprise it.—LORD CHATHAM.

If you are forced to desire further information or *explanation* upon a point, do it with proper apologies for the trouble you give.—LORD CHATHAM.

To Deform, *v. To deface*.

To Defraud, *v. To cheat*.

To Defy, *v. To brave*.

To Degrade, Disgrace.

Degrade, from the Latin *gradus* a step or degree, signifies to bring down, or a step lower.

Disgrace, from the Latin *gratia* favour, signifies to bring out of favour or esteem: an officer in the army is *degraded*; a minister of state or a courtier is *disgraced*.

In the general or moral application, *degrade* respects the external station or rank; *disgrace* refers to the moral estimation or character: one is often *disgraced* by a *degradation*, and likewise when there is no express *degradation*: whatever is low and mean is *degrading*; whatever is immoral is *disgraceful*: it is *degrading* for a nobleman to associate with prize-fighters and jockeys; it is *disgraceful* for him to countenance the violation of the laws which he is bound to protect: it is *degrading* for a clergyman to take part in the ordinary pleasures and diversions of mankind in general; it is *disgraceful* for him to indulge in any levities; Domitian *degraded* himself by the meanness of the employment which he chose; he *disgraced* himself by the cruelty which he mixed with his meanness: King John of England *degraded* himself as much by his mean compliance when in the power of the barons as he had *disgraced* himself before by his detestable tyranny and oppression.

The higher the rank of the individual, the greater his *degradation*: the higher his character, or the more sacred his office, the greater his *disgrace*, if he act inconsistently with its dignity: but these terms are not confined to the higher ranks of life; there is that which is *degrading* and *disgraceful* for every person, however low his station: when a man forfeits that which he owes to himself, and sacrifices his independence to his vices, he *degrades* himself below the scale of a rational agent; he thereby forfeits the good opinion of all who know him, and thus adds *disgrace* to his *degradation*.

Men are very liable to err in their judgments of what is *degrading* and *disgraceful*: all who are anxious to uphold the station and character in which they have been placed may

safely observe this rule, that nothing can be so *degrading* as the violation of truth and sincerity, and nothing so *disgraceful* as a breach of moral rectitude or propriety.

What she will to do or say
Seems wisest, virtuousest, discreetest, best;
All higher knowledge, in her presence, falls
Degraded.—MILTON.

When an hero is to be pulled down and *degraded*, it is best done in juggel.—ADDISON.

Philips died honoured and lamented, before any part of his reputation had withered, and before his patron St. John had *disgraced* him.—JOHNSON.

And where the vales with violets once were crown'd,
Now knotty burrs and thorns *disgrace* the ground. DRYDEN.

To *Degrade*, v. To *abase*.

To *Degrade*, v. To *disparage*.

To *Degrade*, v. To *humble*.

Degree, v. *Class*.

Deity, Divinity.

Deity, from *deus* a god, signifies a divine person.

Divinity, from *divinus*, signifies the *divine* essence or power: the *deities* of the heathens had little of *divinity* in them; the *divinity* of our Saviour is a fundamental article in the Christian faith.

The first original of the drama was religious worship, consisting only of a chorus, which was nothing else but a hymn to a *deity*.—ADDISON.

Why shrinks the soul
Back on herself, and startles at destruction?
'Tis the *divinity* that stirs within us.—ADDISON.

Dejection, Depression, Melancholy.

Dejection, from *dejectio* to cast down, and **Depression** from *deprimo* to press or sink down, have both regard to the state of the animal spirits.

Melancholy, from the Greek *μελαγχολία*, black bile, regards the state of the humours in general, or of the particular humour called the bile.

Dejection and *depression* are occasional, and depend on outward circumstances; *melancholy* is permanent, and lies in the constitution. *Depression* is but a degree of *dejection*: slight circumstances may occasion a *depression*; distressing events occasion a *dejection*: the death of a near and dear relative may be expected to produce *dejection* in persons of the greatest equanimity; lively tempers are most liable to *depressions*; *melancholy* is a disease which nothing but clear views of religion can possibly correct.

So bursting frequent from Atreides' breast,
Sighs following sighs his inward fears confest;
Now o'er the fields *dejected* he surveys,
From thousand Trojan fires the mountain blaze. POPE.

I will only desire you to allow me that Hector was in an absolute certainty of death, and *depressed* over and above with the conscience of being in an ill cause.—POPE.

I have read somewhere in the history of ancient Greece, that the women of the country were seized with an unaccountable *melancholy*, which disposed several of them to make away with themselves.—ADDISON.

To *Delay*, *Defer*, *Postpone*, *Procrastinate*, *Prolong*, *Protract*, *Retard*.

Delay, compounded of *de* and *lay*, signifies to lay or keep back,

Defer, compounded of *de* and *fer*, in Latin *fero*, signifies to put off.

Postpone, compounded of *post* and *pone*, from the Latin *pono* to place, signifies to place behind or after.

Procrastinate, from *pro* for and *cras* to-morrow, signifies to take to-morrow instead of to-day.

Prolong signifies to lengthen out the time, and **Protract** to draw out the time.

Retard, from *re* intensive and *tardum* slow, to make a thing go slow.

To *delay* is simply not to commence action; to *defer* and *postpone* are to fix its commencement at a more distant period: we may *delay* a thing for days, hours, and minutes; we *defer* or *postpone* it for months or weeks. *Delays* mostly arise from faults in the person *delaying*; they are seldom reasonable or advantageous; *deferring* and *postponing* are discretionary acts, which are justified by the circumstances; indolent people are most prone to *delay*; when a plan is not maturely digested, it is prudent to *defer* its execution until everything is in an entire state of preparation. *Procrastination* is a culpable *delay* arising solely from the fault of the *procrastinator*: it is the part of a dilatory man to *procrastinate* that which it is both his interest and duty to perform.

To *defer* is used without regard to any particular time or object; to *postpone* has always relation to something else: it is properly to *defer* until the completion of some period or event: a person may *defer* his visit from month to month; he *postpones* his visit until the commencement of a new year: a tardy debtor *delays* the settlement of his accounts; a merchant *defers* the shipment of any goods in consequence of the receipt of fresh intelligence; he *postpones* the shipment until after the arrival of the expected fleet.

We *delay* the execution of a thing; we *prolong* or *protract* the continuation of a thing; we *retard* the termination of a thing: we may *delay* answering a letter, *prolong* a contest, *protract* a law suit, and *retard* a publication.

From thee both old and young with profit learn,
The bounds of good and evil to discern;
Unhappy he who does his work adjourn,
And to to-morrow would the search *delay*;
His lazy morrow will be like to-day.—DRYDEN.

Never *defer* that till to-morrow which you can do to-day.—BUDGELL.

When I *postponed* to another summer my journey to England, could I apprehend that I never should see her again?—GIBBON.

Procrastination is the thief of time.—YOUNG.

Perhaps great Hector then had found his fate,
But Jove and destiny *prolong'd* his date.—POPE.
To this Euryalus: "You plead in vain,
And but *protract* the cause you cannot gain." VIRGIL.

I see the layers then
Of mingled mounds of more retentive earths,
That while the stealing moisture they transmit,
Retard its motion and forbid its waste.—THOMSON.

Delegate, Deputy.

Delegate, in Latin *delegatus*, from *delega*, signifies one commissioned.

Deputy, in Latin *deputatus*, from *deputa*, signifies one to whom a business is assigned. A *delegate* has a more active office than a

deputy ; he is appointed to execute some positive commission : a *deputy* may often serve only to supply the place or answer in the name of one who is absent : *delegates* are mostly appointed in public transactions ; *deputies* are chosen either in public or private matters : *delegates* are chosen by particular bodies for purposes of negotiation either in regard to civil or political affairs ; *deputies* are chosen either by individuals or small communities to officiate on certain occasions of a purely civil nature. the Hans towns in Germany used formerly to send *delegates* to the Diet at Ratisbon ; when Calais was going to surrender to Edward III., King of England, *deputies* were sent from the townsmen to implore his mercy.

Let chosen *delegates* this hour be sent,
Myself will name them, to Pelides' tent.—POPE.

Every member (of parliament), though chosen by one particular district, when elected and returned serves for the whole realm ; and therefore he is not bound, like a *deputy* in the united provinces, to consult with his constituents on any particular point.—BLACKSTONE.

But this
And all the much transported muse can sing,
Are to thy beauty, dignity, and use,
Unequal far, great *delegated* source
Of light and life, and grace, and joy below.
THOMSON.

The assembling of persons *deputed* from people at great distances is a trouble to them that are sent and a charge to them that send.—TEMPLE.

To Deliberate, *v.* To debate.

To Deliberate, *v.* To consult.

Deliberate, *v.* Thoughtful.

Delicacy, *v.* Dainty.

Delicate, *v.* Fine.

Delight, *v.* Pleasure.

Delightful, Charming.

Delightful is applied either to material or spiritual objects ; Charming mostly to objects of sense.

When they both denote the pleasure of the sense, *delightful* is not so strong an expression as *charming* : a prospect may be *delightful* or *charming* ; but the latter rises to a degree that carries the senses away captive.

Of music we should rather say that it was *charming* than *delightful*, as it acts on the senses in so powerful a manner : on the other hand we should with more propriety speak of a *delightful* employment to relieve distress, or a *delightful* spectacle to see a family living together in love and harmony.

Though there are several of those wild scenes that are more *delightful* than any artificial shows, yet we find the works of nature still more pleasant the more they resemble those of art.—ADDISON.

Nothing can be more magnificent than the figure Jupiter makes in the first Iliad, nor more *charming* than that of Venus in the first Æneid.—ADDISON.

To Delineate, Sketch.

Delineate, in Latin *delineatus* participle of *delineo*, signifies literally to draw the lines which include the contents.

Sketch, from the German *skizze*, Italian *schizzo*.

Both these terms are properly employed in

the art of drawing, and figuratively applied to moral subjects to express a species of descriptions : a *delineation* expresses something more than a *sketch* ; the former conveying not merely the general outlines or more prominent features, but also as much of the details as would serve to form a whole ; the latter, however, seldom contains more than some broad touches, by which an imperfect idea of the subject is conveyed.

A *delineation* therefore may be characterized as accurate, and a *sketch* as hasty or imperfect : an attentive observer who has passed some years in a country may be enabled to give an accurate *delineation* of the laws, customs, manners, and character of its inhabitants ; a traveller who merely passes through can give only a hasty *sketch* from what passes before his eyes.

When the Spaniards first arrived in America expresses were sent to the emperor of Mexico in paint, and the news of his country *delineated* by the strokes of a pencil.—ADDISON.

Sketch out a rough draught of my country, that I may be able to judge whether a return to it be really eligible.—ATTERBURY.

To Deliver, Rescue, Save.

Deliver, in French *delivrer*, compounded of *de* and *livrer*, in Latin *libero* to make free.

Rescue, connected with the French *secourir*, signifies by succour to get one out of a difficulty.

Save signifies literally to make safe.

The idea of taking or keeping from danger is common to these terms ; but *deliver* and *rescue* signify rather to take from ; *save* to keep from danger : we *deliver* and *rescue* from the evil that is ; we *save* from evils that may be as well as those that are. *Deliver* and *rescue* do not convey any idea of the means by which the end is produced ; *save* commonly includes the idea of some superior agency : a man may be *delivered* or *rescued* by any person without distinction ; he is commonly *saved* by a superior.

Deliver is an unqualified term, it is applicable to every mode of the action or species of evil ; to *rescue* is a species of *delivering*, namely, *delivering* from the power of another ; to *save* is applicable to the greatest possible evils ; a person may be *delivered* from a burden, from an oppression, from disease, or from danger, by any means ; a prisoner is *rescued* from the hands of an enemy ; a person is *saved* from destruction.

In our greatest fears and troubles we may ease our heart by reposing ourselves upon God, in confidence of his support and deliverance.—TILLOTSON.

My household gods, companions of my woes,
With pious care I *rescu'd* from our foes.—DRYDEN.

Now shameful flight alone can *save* the host,
Our blood, our treasure, and our glory lost.—POPE.

To Deliver, *v.* To give up.

To Deliver, *v.* To free.

Deliverance, Delivery,

Are drawn from the same verb (*v.* To deliver) to express its different senses of taking from or giving to ; the former denotes the taking something from one's self ; the latter implies giving something to another.

To wish for a Deliverance from that which is hurtful or painful is to a certain extent justifiable: the careful Delivery of property into the hands of the owner will be the first object of concern with a faithful agent.

Whate'er befalls your life shall be my care,
One death, or one deliverance, we will share.

DRYDEN.

With our Saxon ancestors the delivery of a turf was a necessary solemnity to establish the conveyance of lands.
—BLACKSTONE.

Delivery, v. Deliverance.

To Delude, v. To deceive.

Deluge, v. Overflow.

Delusion, v. Fallacy.

To Demand, v. To ask for.

To Demand, Require.

Demand, v. To ask.

Require, in Latin requiro, compounded of *re* and *quero*, signifies to seek for or to seek to get back.

We demand that which is owing and ought to be given; we require that which we wish and expect to have done. A demand is more positive than a requisition; the former admits of no question; the latter is liable to be both questioned and refused: the creditor makes a demand on the debtor; the master requires a certain portion of duty from his servant; it is unjust to demand of a person what he has no right to give; it is unreasonable to require of him what it is not in his power to do.

A thing is commonly demanded in express words; it is required by implication: a person demands admittance when it is not voluntarily granted; he requires respectful deportment from those who are subordinate to him.

In the figurative application the same sense is preserved: things of urgency and moment demand immediate attention; difficult matters require a steady attention.

Hear, all ye Trojans! all ye Grecian bands,
What Paris, author of the war, demands.—POPE.

Now, by my sovereign and his fate I swear,
Renown'd for faith in peace, and force in war,
Oft our alliance other lands desir'd,
And what we seek of you of us requir'd.—DRYDEN.

Surely the retrospect of life and the extirpation of lusts and appetites deeply rooted and widely spread may be allowed to demand some secession from business and folly.—JOHNSON.

Oh then how blind to all that truth requires,
Who think it freedom when a part aspires.

GOLDSMITH.

Demeanour, v. Behaviour.

Demise, v. Death.

**To Demolish, Raze, Dismantle,
Destroy.**

The throwing down what has been built up is the common idea included in all these terms.

Demolish, from the Latin *demolier*, and *mole* a mass or structure, signifies to decom-pound what has been fabricated into a mass.

Raze like *erase* (v. To blot out) signifies the making smooth or even with the ground,

Dismantle, in French *demanteler*, signifies to deprive a thing of its mantle or guard.

Destroy, from the Latin *destruo*, compounded of the privative *de* and *struo* to build, signifies properly to pull down.

A fabric is demolished by scattering all its component parts; it is mostly an unlicensed act of caprice; it is * rased by way of punishment, as a mark of public vengeance; a fortress is dismantled from motives of prudence, in order to render it defenceless; places are destroyed by various means and from various motives, that they may not exist any longer.

Individuals may demolish; public authority causes an edifice to be razed with the ground; a general orders towers to be dismantled and fortifications to be destroyed.

From the demolish'd towers the Trojans throw
Huge heaps of stones, that falling crush the foe.

DRYDEN.

Great Diomedes has compass'd round with walls,
The city which Argypa he calls,
From his own Argos nam'd; we touch'd with joy
The royal hand that raz'd unhappy Troy.—DRYDEN.
O'er the drear spot see desolation spread,
And the dismantled walls in ruins lie.—MOORE.

We, for myself I speak, and all the name
Of Grecians, who to Troy's destruction came,
Not one but suffered and too dearly bought
The prize of honor which in arms he sought.

DRYDEN.

Demon, v. Devil.

To Demonstrate, v. To prove.

To Demur, Hesitate, Pause.

Demur, in French *demeurer*, Latin *demorari*, signifies to keep back.

Hesitate, in Latin *hesitatum*, participle of *hesito*, a frequentative from *hæreo*, signifies to stick or remain a long time back.

Pause, in Latin *pausa*, from the Greek *pausô* to cease, signifies to make a stand.

The idea of stopping is common to these terms, to which signification is added some distinct collateral idea for each; we demur from doubt or difficulty; we hesitate from an undecided state of mind; we pause from circumstances. Demurring is the act of an equal; we demur in giving our assent: hesitating is often the act of a superior; we hesitate in giving our consent: when a proposition appears to be unjust we demur in supporting it, on the ground of its injustice; when a request of a dubious nature is made to us we hesitate in complying with it: prudent people are most apt to demur; but people of a wavering temper are apt to hesitate: demurring may be often unnecessary, but it is seldom injurious; hesitating is mostly injurious when it is not necessary; the former is employed in matters that admit of delay; the latter in cases where immediate decision is requisite.

Demurring and hesitating are both employed as acts of the mind: pausing is an external action: we demur and hesitate in determining; we pause in speaking or doing anything.

In order to banish an evil out of the world that does not only produce great uneasiness to private persons, but has also a very bad influence on the public, I shall endeavour to show the folly of demurring.—ADDISON.

* Vale, Abbé Girard: "Demolier, razer, dismanteler, destruire."

I want no solicitations for me to comply where it would be ungenerous for me to refuse; for can I *hesitate* a moment to take upon myself the protection of a daughter of Correllius?—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF PLINY.

Think, O think,
And ere thou plunge into the vast abyss,
Pause on the verge awhile, look down and see
Thy future mansion.—PORTEUS.

Demur, Doubt, Hesitation, Objection.

Demur, v. To demur.

Doubt, in Latin *dubito* from *duo* and *ito*, or *eo* to go, signifies to go two ways.

Hesitation, v. To demur.

Objection, from *obicio* or *ob* and *jacio* to throw in the way, signifies what is thrown in the way so as to stop our progress.

Demurs often occur in matters of deliberation; *doubt* in regard to matters of fact; *hesitation* in matters of ordinary conduct; and *objections* in matters of common consideration. It is the business of a counsellor to make *demurs*; it is the business of an inquirer to suggest *doubts*; it is the business of all occasionally to make a *hesitation* who are called upon to decide; it is the business of those to make *objections* whose opinion is consulted. Artabanus made many *demurs* to the proposed invasion of Greece by Xerxes: *doubts* have been suggested respecting the veracity of Herodotus as an historian: it is not proper to ask that which cannot be granted without *hesitation*; and it is not the part of an amiable disposition to make an *hesitation* in complying with a reasonable request: there are but few things which we either attempt to do or recommend to others that is not liable to some kind of an *objection*.

A *demur* stops the adjustment of any plan or the determination of any question; a *doubt* interrupts the progress of the mind in coming to a state of satisfaction and certainty: they are both applied to abstract questions or such as are of general interest. *Hesitation* and *objection* are more individual and private in their nature.

Hesitation lies mostly in the state of the will; *objection* is rather the offspring of the understanding. An *hesitation* interferes with the action; an *objection* affects the measure or the mode of action.

But with rejoinder and replies
Long bills, and answers stuff'd with lies,
Demur, impudence, and coyness,
The parties ne'er could issue join.—SWIFT.

This sceptical proceeding will make every sort of reasoning on every subject vain and frivolous, even that sceptical reasoning itself which has persuaded us to entertain a *doubt* concerning the agreement of our perceptions.—BURKE.

If every man were wise and virtuous, capable to discern the best use of time, and resolute to practise it, it might be granted, I think, without *hesitation*, that total liberty would be a blessing.—JOHNSON.

Lloyd was always raising *objections* and removing them.—JOHNSON.

To Denominate, v. To name.

Denomination, v. Name.

To Denote, Signify.

Denote, in Latin *denoto* or *noto*, from *notum* participle of *nosco*, signifies to cause to know.

Signify, from the Latin *signum* a sign, and *fio* to become, is to become or be made a sign, or guide for the understanding.

Denote is employed with regard to things and their characters; *signify* with regard to the thoughts or movements. A letter or character may be made to *denote* any number, as words are made to *signify* the intentions and wishes of the person. Among the ancient Egyptians hieroglyphics were very much employed to *denote* certain moral qualities; in many cases looks or actions will *signify* more than words. Devices and emblems of different descriptions drawn either from fabulous history or the natural world are likewise now employed to *denote* particular circumstances or qualities: the cornucopia *denotes* plenty; the beehive *denotes* industry; the dove *denotes* meekness; and the lamb gentleness: he who will not take the trouble to *signify* his wishes otherwise than by nods or signs must expect to be frequently misunderstood.

Another may do the same thing, and yet the action want that air and beauty which distinguish it from others, like that inimitable sunshine Titian is said to have diffused over his landscapes, which *denotes* them his.—SPECTATOR.

Simple abstract words are used to *signify* some one simple idea, without much adverting to others which may chance to attend it.—BURKE.

Dense, v. Thick.

To Deny, v. To contradict.

To Deny, Refuse.

Deny, in Latin *denego*, or *nego*, that is *ne* or *non* and *ago*, signifies to say no to a thing.

Refuse, in Latin *refusus*, from *re* and *fundo* to pour or cast, signifies to throw back that which is presented.

To *deny* respects matters of fact or knowledge; to *refuse* matters of wish or request. We *deny* what immediately belongs to ourselves; we *refuse* what belongs to another. We *deny* as to the past; we *refuse* as to the future: we *deny* our participation in that which has been; we *refuse* our participation in that which may be: to *deny* must always be expressly verbal; a *refusal* may sometimes be signified by actions or looks as well as words. A *denial* affects our veracity; a *refusal* affects our good nature.

To *deny* is likewise sometimes used in regard to one's own gratifications as well as to one's knowledge, in which case it is still more analogous to *refuse*, which regards the gratifications of another. In this case we say we *deny* a person a thing, but we *refuse* his request or *refuse* to do a thing. Some Christians think it very meritorious to *deny* themselves their usual quantity of food at certain times; they are however but sorry professors of Christianity if they *refuse* at the same time to give of their substance to the poor. Instances are not rare of misers who have *denied* themselves the common necessities of life, and yet have never *refused* to relieve those who were in distress, or assist those who were in trouble.

Deny is sometimes the act of unconscious agents; *refuse* is always a personal and intentional act. We are sometimes *denied* by circumstances the consolation of seeing our friends before they die; when prisoners want to see

their friends for sinister purposes they must be refused.

Jove to his Thetis nothing could *deny*,
Nor was the signal vain that shook the sky.—POPE.

O sire of Gods and men! Thy suppliant hear;
Refuse or grant; for what has Jove to fear?—POPE.

Inquire you how these pow'rs we shall attain?
'Tis not for us to know; our search is vain;
Can any one remember or relate
How he existed in the embryo state?
That light's *deny'd* to him which others see,
He knows perhaps you'll say—and so do we.

JENYNS.

To Deny, Disown.

Deny (*v. To deny*) approaches nearest to the sense of knowledge when applied to persons; **Disown**, that is, not to own, on the other hand bears a strong analogy to *deny* when applied to things.

In the first case *deny* is said with regard to one's knowledge of or connexion with a person; *disowning* on the other hand is a term of larger import, including the renunciation of all relationship or social tie; the former is said of those who are not related; the latter of such only as are related. Peter *denied* our Saviour; a parent can scarcely be justified in *disowning* his child let his vices be ever so enormous; a child can never *disown* its parent in any case with ut violating the most sacred duty.

In the second case *deny* is said in regard to things that concern others as well as ourselves; *disown* only in regard to what is done by one's self or that in which one is personally concerned. A person *denies* that there is any truth in the assertion of another; he *disowns* all participation in any affair. We may *deny* having seen a thing; we may *disown* that we did it ourselves. Our veracity is often the only thing implicated in a *denial*; our guilt, innocence, or honour are implicated in what we *disown*. A witness *denies* what is stated as a fact; the accused party *disowns* what is laid to his charge.

A *denial* is employed only for outward actions or events; that which can be related may be *denied*; *disowning* extends to whatever we can own or possess; we may *disown* our feelings, our name, our connexions, and the like.

Christians *deny* the charges which are brought against the gospel by his enemies. The apostles would never *disown* the character which they held as messengers of Christ.

If, like Zeno, any shall walk about and yet *deny* there is any motion in nature, surely that man was constituted for Antieira, and were a fit companion for those who, having a conceit they are dead, cannot be convicted under the society of the living.—BROWN.

Sometimes lest man should quite his pow'r *disown*,
He makes that pow'r to trembling nations known.

JENYNS.

To Deny, v. To disavow.

Departure, v. Death.

Departure, v. Exit.

Dependance, Reliance.

Dependance, from *depend* or *de* and *pend*, in Latin *pendo* to hang from, signifies literally to rest one's weight by hanging from that which is held.

Bely, compounded of *re* and *ly* or *lie*, signi-

fies likewise to rest one's weight by lying or hanging back from the object held.

Dependance is the general term; *reliance* is a species of *dependance*: we *depend* either on persons or things; we *rely* on persons only: *dependance* serves for that which is immediate or remote *reliance* serves for the future only. We *depend* upon a person for that which we are obliged to receive or led to expect from him; we *rely* upon a person for that which he has given us reason to expect from him.

Dependance is an outward condition or the state of external circumstances; *reliance* is a state of the feelings with regard to others. We *depend* upon God for all that we have or shall have; we *rely* upon the word of man for that which he has promised to perform. We may *depend* upon a person's coming from a variety of causes; but we *rely* upon it only in reference to his avowed intention.

A man who uses his best endeavours to live according to the dictates of virtue and right reason has two perpetual sources of cheerfulness, in the consideration of his own nature, and of that Being on whom he has a *dependance*.—ADDISON.

The tender truth shoots upward to the skies,
And on the faith of the new sun *relies*.—DRYDEN.

To Depict, v. To paint.

To Deplore, Lament.

Deplore, in Latin *deploro*, that is *de* and *ploro*, or *plungo*, to give signs of distress with the face or mouth.

Lament, v. To bewail.

Deplore is a much stronger expression than *lament*; the former calls forth tears from the bitterness of the heart; the latter excites a cry from the warmth of feeling. * *Deplorable* indicates despair; to *lament* marks only pain or distress. Among the poor we have *deplorable* instances of poverty, ignorance, vice, and wretchedness combined; among the higher classes we have often *lamentable* instances of extravagance and consequent ruin. A field of battle or a city overthrown by an earthquake is a spectacle truly *deplorable*: it is *lamentable* to see beggars putting on all the disguises of wretchedness in order to obtain by deceit what they might earn by honest industry. The condition of a dying man suffering under the agonies of an awakened conscience is *deplorable*; the situation of the relative or friend who witnesses the agony, without being able to afford consolation to the sufferer, is truly *lamentable*.

The wounds they wash'd, their pious tears they shed,
And laid along their oars *deplor'd* the dead.—POPE.

But let not chief the nightingale *lament*
Her ruin'd care, too delicately fram'd
To brook the harsh confinement of the cage.

THOMSON.

Deponent, Evidence, Witness.

Deponent, from the Latin *depono*, is the one laying down or open what he has heard or seen.

Evidence, from *evident*, is the one producing *evidence* or making *evident*.

Witness, from the Saxon *witian*, Teutonic

* Vide Trusler; "Lamentable, deplorable."

wissen, Greek *eida*, and Hebrew *ido* to know, is one who knows or makes known.

The *deponent* always declares upon oath: he serves to give information: the *evidence* is likewise generally bound by an oath; he serves to acquit or condemn: the *witness* is employed upon oath or otherwise; he serves to confirm or invalidate.

A *deponent* declares either in writing or by word of mouth; the *deposition* is preparatory to the trial: an *evidence* may give *evidence* either by words or actions; whatever serves to clear up, whether a person or an animal, the thing is used as an *evidence*; the *evidence* always comes forward on the trial: a *witness* is always a person in the proper sense, but may be applied figuratively to inanimate objects; he declares by word of mouth what he personally knows. Every *witness* is an *evidence* at the moment of trial, but every *evidence* is not a *witness*. When a dog is employed as an *evidence* he cannot be called a *witness*.

Evidence on the other hand is confined mostly to judicial matters; and *witness* extends to all the ordinary concerns of life. One person appears as an *evidence* against another on a criminal charge: a *witness* appears for or against; he corroborates the word of another, and is a security in all dealings or matters of question between man and man.

The pleader having spoke his best,
And witness ready to attest:
Who fairly could on oath depose,
When questions on the fact arose,
That every article was true.

Now further these deponents knew.—SWIFT.

Of the *evidence* which appeared against him (Savage) the character of the man was not unexceptionable; that of the woman notoriously infamous.—JOHNSON.

In case a woman be forcibly taken away and married, she may be a *witness* against her husband in order to convict him of felony.—BLACKSTONE.

In every man's heart and conscience, religion has many *witnesses* to its importance and reality.—BLAIR.

Deportment, v. Behaviour.

Deposit, Pledge, Security.

Deposit is a general term from the Latin *depositus* participle of *depono*, signifying to lay down, or put into the hands of another.

Pledge, comes probably from *plico*, signifying what engages by a tie or envelope.

Security signifies that which makes *secure*.

The term *deposit* has most regard to the confidence we place in another; *pledge* has most regard to the security we give for ourselves: *security* is a species of *pledge*. A *deposit* is always voluntarily placed in the hands of an indifferent person: a *pledge* and *security* are required from the parties who are interested. A person may make a *deposit* for purposes of charity or convenience; he gives a *pledge* or *security* for a temporary accommodation, or the relief of a necessity. Money is *deposited* in the hands of a friend in order to exchequer a commission: a *pledge* is given as an equivalent for that which has been received: a *security* is given by way of security for the performance of some agreement.

A *deposit* may often serve the purpose of a *security*; but it need not contain any thing so binding as either a *pledge* or a *security*: both of which involve a loss on the non-fulfilment

of a certain contract. A *pledge* is given for matters purely personal; a *security* is given in behalf of another.

Deposits are always transportable articles, consisting either of money, papers, jewels, or other valuables: a *pledge* is seldom pecuniary, but it is always some article of positive value, as estates, furniture, and the like, given at the moment of forming the contract: a *security* is always pecuniary, but it often consists of a promise, and not of any immediate resignation of one's property. *Deposits* are made and *securities* given by the wealthy; *pledges* are commonly given by those who are in distress.

Deposit is seldom used but in the proper sense; *pledge* and *security* may be employed in a figurative application.

It is without reason we praise the wisdom of our constitution, in putting under the discretion of the crown the awful trust of war and peace, if the ministers of the crown virtually return it again into our hands. The trust was placed there as a sacred *deposit*, to secure us against popular rashness in plunging into wars.—BURKE.

These garments once were his, and left to me.

The *pledges* of his promised loyalty.—DRYDEN.

John Doe was to become *security* for Richard Roe.—BURKE.

Depravity, Depravation, Corruption.

Depravity, from the Latin *pravitas* and *pravius*, in Greek *παῖος*, and the Hebrew *ran* or *roo* crooked or not straight, marks the quality of being crooked.

Depravation, in Latin *depravatio*, signifies a making crooked or not as it should be.

Corruption, in Latin *corruptio*, *corrumpo* from *rumpo* to break, marks the disunion and decomposition of the parts of any thing.

* All these terms are applied to objects which are contrary to the order of Providence, but the term *depravity* characterizes the thing, as it is; the terms *depravation* and *corruption* designate the making or causing it to be so: *depravity* therefore excludes the idea of any cause; *depravation* always carries us to the cause or external agency: hence we may speak of *depravity* as natural, but we speak of *depravation* as the result of circumstances: there is a *depravity* in man which nothing but the grace of God can correct; the introduction of obscenity on the stage tends greatly to the *depravation* of morals; bad company tends to the *corruption* of a young man's morals.

Nothing can show greater *depravity* of understanding than to delight in the show when the reality is wanting.—JOHNSON.

The *corruption* of our taste is not of equal consequence with the *depravation* of our virtue.—WATSON.

Depravity or *depravation* implies crookedness, or a distortion from the regular course; *corruption* implies a dissolution as it were in the component parts of bodies.

Cicero says (2 de *Finibus*) that *depravity* is applicable only to the mind and heart; but we say a *depraved* taste, and *depraved* humours in regard to the body. A *depraved* taste loathes common food, and longs for that which is unnatural and hurtful. *Corruption* is the natural process by which material substances are disorganized.

* Vide Roubaud: "Depravation, corruption."—Trueller; "Depravity, corruption."

In the figurative application of these terms they preserve the same signification. *Depravity* is characterized by being directly opposed to order, and an established system of things; *corruption* marks the vitiation or spoiling of things, and the ferment that leads to destruction. *Depravity* turns things out of their ordinary course; *corruption* destroys their essential qualities. *Depravity* is a vicious state of things, in which all is deranged and perverted; *corruption* is a vicious state of things, in which all is sullied and polluted. That which is *depraved* loses its proper manner of acting and existing; that which is *corrupted* loses its virtue and essence.

The *depravation* of human will was followed by a disorder of the harmony of nature.—JOHNSON.

We can discover that where there is universal innocence, there will probably be universal happiness; for why should afflictions be permitted to infect beings who are not in danger of *corruption* from blessings?—JOHNSON.

The force of irregular propensities and disordered imaginations produces a *depravity* of manners; the force of example and the dissemination of bad principles produce *corruption*. A judgment not sound or right is *depraved*; a judgment debased by that which is vicious is *corrupted*. What is *depraved* requires to be reformed: what is *corrupted* requires to be purified. *Depravity* has most regard to apparent and excessive disorders; *corruption* to internal and dissolute vices. "Manners," says Cicero, "are *corrupted* and *depraved* by the love of riches." Port Royal says that God has given up infidels to the wandering of a *corrupted* and *depraved* mind. These words are by no means a pleonasm or repetition, because they represent two distinct images; one indicates the state of a thing very much changed in its substance; the other the state of a thing very much opposed to regularity. "Good God! (says Masillon the preacher), what a dreadful account will the rich and powerful have one day to give; since, besides their own sins, they will have to account before Thee for public disorder, *depravity* of morals, and the *corruption* of the age!" Public disorders bring on naturally *depravity* of morals; and sins or vicious practices naturally give birth to *corruption*. *Depravity* is more or less open; it revolts the sober upright understanding; *corruption* is more or less disguised in its operations, but fatal in its effects: the former sweeps away every thing before it like a torrent; the latter infuses itself into the moral frame like a slow poison.

That is a *depraved* state of morals in which the gross vices are openly practised in defiance of all decorum: that is a *corrupt* state of society in which vice has secretly insinuated itself into all the principles and habits of men, and concealed its deformity under the fair semblance of virtue and honour. The manners of savages are most likely to be *depraved*; those of civilized nations to be *corrupt*, when luxury and refinement are risen to an excessive pitch. Cannibal nations present us with the picture of human *depravity*; the Roman nation during the time of the emperors, affords us an example of almost universal *corruption*.

From the above observations, it is clear that *depravity* is best applied to those objects to

which common usage has annexed the epithets of right, regular, fine, &c., and *corruption* to those which may be characterized by the epithets of scound, pure, innocent, or good. Hence we prefer to say *depravity* of mind and *corruption* of heart; *depravity* of principle and *corruption* of sentiment or feeling; a *depraved* character; a *corrupt* example; a *corrupt* influence.

The greatest difficulty that occurs in analyzing his (Swift's) character, is to discover by what *depravity* of intellect he took delight in reviving ideas from which almost every other mind shrinks with disgust.—JOHNSON.

Peace is the happy natural state of man;
War his *corruption*, his disgrace.—THOMSON.

No *depravity* of the mind has been more frequently or justly censured than ingratitude.—JOHNSON.

I have remarked in a former paper, that credulity is the common failing of inexperienced virtue, and that he who is spontaneously suspicious may be justly charged with radical *corruption*.—JOHNSON.

In reference to the arts or belles lettres we say either *depravity* or *corruption* of taste, because taste has its rules, is liable to be disordered, is or is not conformable to natural order, is regular or irregular; and on the other hand it may be so intermingled with sentiments and feelings foreign to its own native purity as to give it justly the title of *corrupt*.

The last thing worthy of notice respecting the two words *depravity* and *corruption*, is that the former is used for man in his moral capacity; but the latter for man in a political capacity: hence we speak of human *depravity*, but the *corruption* of government.

The *depravity* of mankind is so easily discoverable, that nothing but the desert or the cell can exclude it from notice.—JOHNSON.

Every government, say the politicians, is perpetually degenerating towards *corruption*.—JOHNSON.

To Depreciate, v. To disparage.

Depredation, Robbery.

Depredation, in Latin *deprædatio* from *præda* a prey, signifies the act of spoiling or laying waste, as well as taking away.

Robbery, on the other hand, signifies simply the removal or taking away from another by violence. Every *depredation*, therefore, includes a *robbery*, but not *vice versâ*. A *depredation* is always attended with mischief to some one, though not always with advantage to the *depredator*; but the *robber* always calculates on getting something for himself. *Depredations* are often committed for the indulgence of private animosity; *robbery* is always committed from a thirst for gain.

Depredation is either the public act of a community, or the private act of individuals; *robbery* mostly the private act of individuals. *Depredations* are committed wherever the occasion offers; in open or covert places: *robberies* are committed either on the persons or houses of individuals. In former times neighbouring states used to commit frequent *depredations* on each other, even when not in a state of open hostility; *robberies* were, however, then less frequent than at present.

Depredation is used in the proper and bad sense, for animals as well as for men; *robbery* may be employed figuratively, and in an indif-

ferent sense. Birds are great *depredators* in corn fields; bees may be said to plunder or rob flowers of their sweets.

As the delay of making war may sometimes be detrimental to individuals who have suffered by *depredations* from foreign potentates, our laws have, in some respects, armed the subject with powers to impel the prerogative, by directing the ministers to issue letters of marque.—BLACKSTONE.

From all this, what is my inference? That this new system of robbery in France cannot be rendered safe by any art.—BURKE.

Depression, v. Dejection.

To Deprive, v. To bereave.

To Deprive, Debar, Abridge.

Deprive, from *de* and *prive*, in Latin *privus* one's own, signifies to make not one's own what one has, or expects to have.

Debar, from *de* and *bar*, signifies to deprive by means of a bar.

Abridge, v. To abridge.

Deprive conveys the idea of either taking away that which one has, or withholding that which one may have; *debar* conveys the idea only of withholding; *abridge* conveys that also of taking away. *Depriving* is a coercive measure; *debar* and *abridge* are merely acts of authority. We are *deprived* of that which is of the first necessity; we are *debarred* of privileges, enjoyments, opportunities, &c.; we are *abridged* of comforts, pleasures, conveniences, &c. Criminals are *deprived* of their liberty; their friends are in extraordinary cases *debarred* the privilege of seeing them; thus men are often *abridged* of their comforts in consequence of their own faults.

Deprivation and *debarring* sometimes arise from things as well as persons; *abridging* is always the voluntary act of conscious agents. Misfortunes sometimes *deprive* a person of the means of living; the poor are often *debarred* by their poverty, the opportunity to learn their duty; it may sometimes be necessary to *abridge* young people of their pleasures when they do not know how to make a good use of them. Religion teaches men to be resigned under the severest *deprivations*: it is painful to be *debarred* the society of those we love, or to *abridge* others of any advantage which they have been in the habit of enjoying.

When used as reflective verbs they preserve the same analogy in their signification. An extravagant person *deprives* himself of the power of doing good. A person may *debar* himself of any pleasure from particular motives of prudence. A miser *abridges* himself of every enjoyment in order to gratify his ruling passion.

Of what small moment to your real happiness are many of those injuries which draw forth your resentment? Can they *deprive* you of peace of conscience, of the satisfaction of having acted a right part?—BLAIR.

Active and masculine spirits, in the vigour of youth, neither can nor ought to remain at rest. If they *debar* themselves from aiming at a noble object, their desires will move downward.—HUGHES.

The personal liberty of individuals in this kingdom cannot ever be *abridged* at the mere discretion of the magistrate.—BLACKSTONE.

Depth, Profundity.

Depth from *deep*, *dip* or *dive*, the Greek *δύπτο*, and the Hebrew *tabang* to dive, signifies the point under water which is dived for.

Profundity, from *profound*, in Latin *profundus*, compounded of *pro* or *procul* far, and *fundus* the bottom, signifies remoteness from the surface of any thing.

These terms do not differ merely in their derivation; but *depth* is indefinite in its signification; and *profundity* is a positive and considerable degree of *depth*. Moreover the word *depth* is applied to objects in general; *profundity* is confined in its application to moral objects: thus we speak of the *depth* of the sea or the *depth* of a person's learning; but his *profundity* of thought.

By these two passions of hope and fear, we reach forward into futurity, and bring up to our present thoughts objects that lie in the remotest *depths* of time.—ADDISON.

The peruser of Swift will want very little previous knowledge: it will be sufficient that he is acquainted with common words and common things; he is neither required to mount elevations nor to explore *profundities*.—JOHNSON.

To Depute, v. To constitute.

Deputy, v. Ambassador.

Deputy, v. Delegate.

To Derange, v. To disorder.

Derangement, Insanity, Lunacy, Madness, Mania.

Derangement, from the verb to *derange* implies the first stage of disordered intellect. **Insanity**, or unsoundness, implies positive disease, which is more or less permanent. **Lunacy**, is a violent sort of insanity, which was supposed to be influenced by the moon. **Madness**, and **Mania**, from the Greek *μανομαι* to rage implies *insanity* or *lunacy* in its most furious and confirmed stage. *Deranged* persons may sometimes be perfectly sensible in every thing but particular subjects. *Insane* persons are sometimes entirely restored. *Lunatics* have their lucid intervals, and *maniacs* their intervals of repose.

Derangement may sometimes be applied to the temporary confusion of a disturbed mind, which is not in full possession of all its faculties: *madness* may sometimes be the result of violently inflamed passions: and *mania* may be applied to any vehement attachment which takes possession of the mind.

Perhaps it might be no absurd or unreasonable regulation in the legislature to divest all *lunatics* of the privilege of *testimony*, and in cases of enormity to subject them to the common penalties of the law.—SMOLLET.

A *lunatic* is indeed sometimes merry, but the merry *lunatic* is never kind.—HAWKESWORTH.

The consequences of murder committed by a *maniac* may be as pernicious to society as those of the most criminal and deliberate assassination.—SMOLLET.

The locomotive *mania* of an Englishman circulates his person, and of course his cash, into every quarter of the kingdom.—CUMBERLAND.

To Deride, Mock, Ridicule, Rally, Banter.

Deride, compounded of *de* and the Latin *rideo*; and **Ridicule**, from *rideo*, both signify to laugh at.

Mock, in French *moquer*, Dutch *mooiken*, Greek *μωκω*, signifies likewise to laugh at.

Rally, in French *rallier*.

Banter, possibly from the French *badiner* to jest.

Strong expressions of contempt are designated by all these terms.

Derision and *mockery* evince themselves by the outward actions in general; *ridicule* consists more in words than actions; *rallying* and *bantering* almost entirely in words. *Deride* is not so strong a term as *mock*, but much stronger than *ridicule*. There is always a mixture of hostility in *derision* and *mockery*; but *ridicule* is frequently unaccompanied with any personal feeling of displeasure. *Derision* is often deep, not loud: it discovers itself in suppressed laughter, contemptuous sneers or gesticulations, and cutting expressions; *mockery* is mostly noisy and outrageous: it breaks forth in insulting buffoonery, and is sometimes accompanied with personal violence: the former consists of real but contemptuous laughter: the latter often of affected laughter and grimace. *Derision* and *mockery* are always personal; *ridicule* may be directed to things as well as persons. *Derision* and *mockery* are a direct attack on the individual, the latter still more so than the former: *ridicule* is as often used in writing as in personal intercourse.

Derision and *mockery* are practised by persons in any station; *ridicule* is mostly used by equals. A person is *derided* and *mocked* for that which is offensive as well as apparently absurd or extravagant; he is *ridiculed* for what is apparently ridiculous. Our Saviour was exposed both to the *derision* and *mockery* of his enemies: they *derided* him for what they dared to think his false pretensions to a superior mission; they *mocked* him by planting a crown of thorns on his head, and acting the farce of royalty before him.

Derision may be provoked by ordinary circumstances; *mockery* by that which is extraordinary. When the prophet Elijah in his holy zeal *mocked* the false prophets of Baal, or when the children *mocked* the prophet Elisha, the term *deride* would not have suited either for the occasion or the action; but two people may *deride* each other in their angry disputes; or unprincipled people may *deride* those whom they cannot imitate, or condemn. *Derision* and *mockery* are altogether incompatible with the Christian temper; *ridicule* is justifiable in certain cases, particularly when it is not personal. When a man renders himself an object of *derision*, it does not follow that any one is justified in *deriding* him; insults are not the means for correcting faults: *mockery* is very seldom used but for the gratification of a malignant disposition: although *ridicule* is not the test of truth, and ought not to be employed in the place of argument, yet there are some follies too absurd to deserve more serious treatment.

Rally and *banter*, like *derision* and *mockery*, are altogether personal acts, in which application they are very analogous to *ridicule*. *Ridicule* is the most general term of the three; we often *rally* and *banter* by *ridiculing*. There is more exposure in *ridiculing*; reproof in *rallying*; and provocation in *bantering*. A person may be *ridiculed* on account of his eccentrici-

ties; he is *rallied* for his defects; he is *bantered* for accidental circumstances: the two former actions are often justified by some substantial reason; the latter is an action as puerile as it is unjust, it is a contemptible species of *mockery*. Self-conceit and extravagant follies are oftentimes best corrected by good-natured *ridicule*: a man may deserve sometimes to be *rallied* for his want of resolution; those who are of an ill-natured turn of mind will *banter* others for their misfortunes, or their personal defects, rather than not say something to their annoyance.

Satan beheld their plight,
And to his mates thus in *derision* call'd:
O friends, why come not on those victors proud?
MILTON.

Impell'd with steps unceasing to pursue
Some fleeting good that *mocks* me with the view.
GOLDSMITH.

Want is the scorn of every fool,
And wit in rags is turn'd to *ridicule*.—DRYDEN.

The only piece of pleasantry in *Paradise Lost*, is where the evil spirits are described as *rallying* the angels upon the success of their new invented artillery.—ADDISON.

As to your manner of behaving towards these unhappy young gentlemen (at College) you describe, let it be manly and easy; if they *banter* your regularity, order, decency, and love of study, *banter* in return their neglect of it.—CHATHAM.

To Derive, Trace, Deduce.

Derive, from the Latin *de* and *rivus* a river, signifies to drain after the manner of water from its source.

Trace, in Italian *tracciare*, Greek *τρεχω* to run, Hebrew *darech* to go, signifies to go by a line drawn out, to follow the line.

Deduce, in Latin *deduco*, signifies to bring from.

The idea of drawing one thing from another is included in all the actions designated by these terms. The act of *deriving* is immediate and direct; that of *tracing* a gradual process; that of *deducing* by a ratiocinative process.

We discover causes and sources by *derivation*; we discover the course, progress, and commencement of things by *tracing*; we discover the grounds and reasons of things by *deduction*. A person *derives* his name from a given source: he *traces* his family up to a given period; principles or powers are *deduced* from circumstances or observations. The Trojans *derived* the name of their city from Tros, a king of Phrygia; they *traced* the line of their kings up to Dardanus; Copernicus *deduced* the principle of the earth's turning round from several simple observations, particularly from the apparent and contrary motion of bodies that are really at rest. The English tongue is of such mixed origin that there is scarcely any known language from which some one of its words is not *derivable*; it is an interesting employment to *trace* the progress of science and civilization in countries which have been involved in ignorance and barbarism; from the writings of Locke and other philosophers of an equally loose stamp, have been *deduced* principles both in morals and politics that are destructive to the happiness of men in civil society.

The kings among the heathens ever *derived* themselves or their ancestors from some god.—TEMPLE.

Let Newton, pure intelligence! whom God
To mortals lent to trace his boundless works,
From laws sublimely simple speak thy fame.
THOMSON.

From the discovery of some natural authority may
perhaps be deduced a truer original of all governments
among men than from any contracts.—TEMPLE.

To Derogate, *v.* To disparage.

To Describe, *v.* To relate.

Description, *v.* Account.

Description, *v.* Cast.

To Descry, *v.* To find.

To Descry, *v.* To see.

To Desert, *v.* To abandon.

To Desert, *v.* To abdicate.

Desert, Merit, Worth.

Desert from *deserve*. in Latin *deservio*, signifies to do service or be serviceable.

Merit, in Latin *meritus* participle of *mereor*, comes from the Greek *μερω* to share, because he who *merits* any thing has a right to share in it.

Worth, in German *worth*, is connected with *würde* dignity, and *burde* a burden, because one bears *worth* as a thing attached to the person.

Desert is taken for that which is good or bad; *merit* for that which is good only. We *deserve* praise or blame; we *merit* a reward. *Desert* consists in the action, work, or service performed; *merit* has regard to the character of the agent or the nature of the action. A person does not *deserve* a recompense until he has performed some service; he does not *merit* approbation if he have not done his part well.

Deserve is a term of ordinary import: *merit* applies to objects of greater moment: the former includes matters of personal and physical gratification; the latter those altogether of an intellectual nature. Children are always acting so as to *deserve* either reproof or commendation, reward or punishment; candidates for public applause or honours conceive they have frequent occasion to complain that they are not treated according to their *merits*. Criminals cannot always be punished according to their *deserts*: a noble mind is not contented with barely obtaining, it seeks to *merit* what it obtains.

The idea of value, which is prominent in the signification of the term *merit*, renders it closely allied to that of *worth*. The man of *merit* looks to the advantages which shall accrue to himself; the man of *worth* is contented with the consciousness of what he possesses in himself: *merit* respects the attainments or qualifications of a man; *worth* respects his moral qualities only. It is possible therefore for a man to have great *merit* and little or no *worth*. He who has great powers and uses them for the advantage of himself or others is a man of *merit*; he only who does good from a good motive is a man of *worth*. We look for *merit* among men in the discharge of their several offices or duties; we look for *worth* in their social capacities.

The beauteous champion views with marks of fear,
Smit with a conscious sense, retires behind,
And shuns the fate he well *deserv'd* to find.—POPE.

Praise from a friend or censure from a foe
Are lost on hearers that our *merits* know.—POPE.
To birth or office, no respect be paid,
Let *worth* determine here.—POPE.

From these words are derived the epithets *deserved* and *merited*, in relation to what we receive from others; and *deserving*, *meritorious*, *worthy*, and *worth*, in regard to what we possess in our-selves: a treatment is *deserved* or *undeserved*; reproaches are *merited* or *unmerited*: the harsh treatment of a master is easier to be borne when it is *undeserved* than when it is *deserved*: the reproaches of a friend are very severe when *unmerited*.

A labourer is *deserving* on account of his industry; an artist is *meritorious* on account of his professional abilities; a citizen is *worthy* on account of his benevolence and uprightness. The first person *deserves* to be well paid and encouraged; the second *merits* the applause which is bestowed on him; the third is *worthy* of confidence and esteem from all men. Betwixt *worthy* and *worth* there is this difference, that the former is said of intrinsic and moral qualities, the latter of extrinsic ones: a *worthy* man possesses that which calls for the esteem of others; but a man is *worth* the property which he can call his own: so in like manner a subject may be *worthy* the attention of a writer, or a thing may not be *worth* the while to consider.

A man has frequent opportunities of mitigating the fierceness of a party, or doing justice to the character of a *deserving* man.—ADDISON.

Pilgrimages to Rome were represented as the most *meritorious* acts of devotion.—HUME

Then the last *worthies* of declining Greece,
Fate call'd to glory, in unequal times,
Pensive appear.—THOMSON.

Desert, *v.* Solitary.

Design, Purpose, Intend, Mean.

Design, from the Latin *designare*, signifies to mark out as with a pen or pencil.

Purpose like *propose* comes from the Latin *proposui* perfect of *propono*, signifying to set before one's mind as an object of pursuit.

Intend, in Latin *intendo* to bend towards, signifies the bending of the mind towards an object.

Mean, in Saxon *maenen*, German, &c. *meinen*, probably connected with the word mind, signifying to have in the mind.

Design and *purpose* are terms of higher import than *intend* and *mean*, which are in familiar use; the latter still more so than the former. A *design* embraces many objects; a *purpose* consists of only one: * the former supposes something studied and methodical, it requires reflection: the latter supposes something fixed and determinate, it requires resolution. A *design* is attainable; a *purpose* is steady. We speak of the *design* as it regards the thing conceived: we speak of the *purpose* as it regards the temper of the person. Men of a sanguine or aspiring character are apt to form *designs* which cannot be carried into execution; whoever wishes to keep true to his *purpose* must not listen to many counsellors.

* V de Truelser: "Intention, design."

A *purpose* is the thing proposed or set before the mind; an *intention* is the thing to which the mind bends or inclines; *purpose* and *intend* differ therefore both in the nature of the action and the object; we *purpose* seriously; we *intend* vaguely: we set about that which we *purpose*; we may delay that which we have only *intended*; the execution of one's *purpose* rests mostly with one's self; the fulfilment of an *intention* depends upon circumstances; a man of a resolute temper is not to be diverted from his *purpose* by trifling objects; we may be disappointed in our *intentions* by a variety of unforeseen but uncontrollable events.

Mean, which is a term altogether of colloquial use, differs but little from *intend*, except that it is used for more familiar objects; to *mean* is simply to have in the mind; to *intend* is to lean with the mind towards anything.

Purpose is always applied to some proximate or definite object; *intend* and *mean* to that which is general or remote: we *purpose* to set out at a certain time or go a certain rout; we *mean* to set out as soon as we can, and go the way that shall be found most agreeable; the moralist designs by his writings to effect a reformation in the manners of men: a writer *purposes* to treat on a given subject in some particular manner; it is ridiculous to lay down rules which are not *intended* to be kept; an honest man always *means* to satisfy his creditors.

Design and *purpose* are taken sometimes in the abstract sense; *intend* and *mean* always in connexion with the agent who *intends* or *means*: we see a *design* in the whole creation which leads us to reflect on the wisdom and goodness of the Creator; whenever we see anything done we are led to inquire the *purpose* for which it is done; or are desirous of knowing the *intention* of the person in so doing: things are said to be done with a *design*, in opposition to that which happens by chance; they are said to be done for a *purpose*, in reference to the immediate *purpose* which is expected to result from them.

Design, when not expressly qualified by a contrary epithet, is used in a bad sense in connexion with a particular agent; *purpose*, *intention*, and *meaning*, in an indifferent sense: a *designing* person is full of latent and interested *designs*; there is nothing so good that it may not be made to serve the *purposes* of those who are bad: the *intentions* of a man must always be taken into the account when we are forming an estimate of his actions: ignorant people frequently *mean* much better than they do.

Nothing can evince greater depravity of mind than *designedly* to rob another of his good name; when a person wishes to get any information he *purposely* directs his discourse to the subject upon which he desires to be informed; if we *unintentionally* incur the displeasure of another, it is to be reckoned our misfortune rather than our fault; it is not enough for our endeavours to be well *meant*, if they be not also well directed.

Jove honours me and favors my *designs*,
His pleasure guides me, and his will confines.—POPE.
Proud as he is, that iron heart retains
His stubborn *purpose*, and his friends disdain.—POPE.

And must I then, O sire of floods!
Bear this fierce answer to the king of gods!
Correct it yet, and change thy rash *intent*;
A noble mind disdains not to repent.—POPE.
Then first Polydamus the silence broke,
Long weigh'd the signal, and to Hector spoke:
How oft, my brother! thy reproach I bear,
For words well *meant* and sentiments sincere.—POPE.

Design, Plan, Scheme, Project.

Design, v. To design.

Plan, in French *plan*, comes from *plane* or *plain*, in Latin *planus*, smooth or even, signifying in general any *plane* place, or in particular the even surface on which a building is raised: and by an extended application the sketch of the *plane* surface of any building or object.

Scheme, in Latin *schema*, Greek *σχημα* a form or figure, signifies the thing drawn out in the mind.

Project, in Latin *projectus*, from *projicio*, compounded of *pro* and *jacio*, signifies to cast or put forth, that is, the thing proposed.

Arrangement is the idea common to these terms: the *design* includes the thing that is to be brought about; the *plan* includes the means by which it is to be brought about: a *design* was formed in the time of James I. for overturning the government of the country; the *plan* by which this was to have been realized, consisted in placing gunpowder under the parliament-house and blowing up the assembly.

A *design* is to be estimated according to its intrinsic worth; a *plan* is to be estimated according to its relative value, or fitness for the *design*: a *design* is noble or wicked, a *plan* is practicable: every founder of a charitable institution may be supposed to have a good *design*; but he may adopt an erroneous *plan* for obtaining the end proposed.

Scheme and *project* respect both the end and the means, which makes them analogous to *design* and *plan*: the *design* stimulates to action; the *plan* determines the mode of action; the *scheme* and *project* consist most in speculation: the *design* and *plan* are equally practical, and suited to the ordinary and immediate circumstances of life; the *scheme* and *project* are contrived or conceived for extraordinary or rare occasions: no man takes any step without a *design*; a general forms the *plan* of his campaign; adventurous men are always forming *schemes* for gaining money; ambitious monarchs are full of *projects* for increasing their dominions.

Scheme and *project* differ principally in the magnitude of the objects to which they are applied; the former being much less vast and extensive than the latter: a *scheme* may be formed by an individual for attaining any trifling advantage; *projects* are mostly conceived in matters of state, or of public interest: the metropolis abounds with persons whose inventive faculties are busy in devising *schemes*, either of a commercial, a literary, a philosophical, or political description, by which they propose great advantages to the public, but still greater to themselves; the *project* of universal conquest which entered into the wild speculations of Alexander the

Great, did not, unfortunately for the world, perish at his death.

His deep *desire* unknown, the hosts approve
Atides' speech.—POPE.

It was at Marseilles that Virgil formed the *plan*, and collected the materials of all those excellent pieces which he afterwards finished.—WALSH.

The happy people in their wazen cells
Set tending public cares, and planning schemes
Of temperance for winter poor.—THOMSON.

Manhood is led on from hope to hope, and from *project* to *project*.—JOHNSON.

To Designate, *v.* To name.

To Desire, *v.* To beg.

To Desire, Wish, Long for, Hanker after, Covet.

Desire, in Latin *desidero*, comes from *desido* to rest or fix upon with the mind.

Wish, in German *wünschen*, comes from *wonne* pleasure, signifying to take pleasure in a thing

Long, from the German *langen* to reach after, signifies to seek after with the mind.

Hanker, *hanger*, or *hang*, signifies to hang on an object with one's mind.

Covet, *v.* *Covetous*.

Desire is imperious, it demands gratification; *wish* is less vehement, it consists of a strong inclination; *longing* is an impatient and continued species of desire; *hankering* is a desire for that which is set out of one's reach; *coveting* is a desire for that which belongs to another, or what it is in his power to grant: we *desire* or *long* for that which is near at hand, or within view: we *wish* for and *covet* that which is more remote, or less distinctly seen; we *hanker* after that which has been once enjoyed: a discontented person *wishes* for more than he has: he who is in a strange land *longs* to see his native country; vicious men *hanker* after the pleasures which are denied them: ambitious men *covet* honours, avaricious men *covet* riches.

Desires ought to be moderated; *wishes* to be limited; *longings*, *hankerings*, and *covetings*, to be suppressed: uncontrolled *desires* become the greatest torments; unbounded *wishes* are the bane of all happiness; ardent *longings* are mostly irrational, and not entitled to indulgence; *coveting* is expressly prohibited by the Divine law.

Desire, as it regards others, is not less imperative than when it respects ourselves: it lays an obligation on the person to whom it is expressed: a *wish* is gentle and unassuming; it appeals to the good nature of another: we act by the *desire* of a superior, and according to the *wishes* of an equal: the *desire* of a parent will amount to a command in the mind of a dutiful child: his *wishes* will be anticipated by the warmth of affection.

When men have discovered a passionate *desire* of fame in the ambitious man (as no temper of mind is more apt to shew itself) they become sparing and reserved in their commendations.—ADDISON.

It is as absurd in an old man to *wish* for the strength of youth, as it would be in a young man to wish for the strength of a bull or a horse.—STEELE.

Extended on the fun'ral couch he lies,
And soon as morning paints the eastern skies,
The sight is granted to thy *longing* eyes.—POPE.

The wife is an old coquette that is always *hankering* after the diversions of the town.—ADDISON.

You know Chaucer has a tale, where a knight saves his head by discovering it was the thing which all women most *coveted*.—GAY.

To Desist, Leave Off.

Desist, from the Latin *desisto*, signifies to take one's self off.

Desist is applied to actions good, indifferent, or offensive to some person; *Leave off* to actions that are indifferent; the former is voluntary or involuntary, the latter voluntary: we are frequently obliged to *desist*; but we *leave off* at our option: it is prudent to *desist* from using our endeavours when we find them ineffectual; it is natural for a person to *leave off* when he sees no further occasion to continue his labour: he who annoys another must be made to *desist*; he who does not wish to offend will *leave off* when requested.

So ev'n and morn accomplished the sixth (day),

Yet not till the Creator form'd his work;

Desisting, though unwearied, up return'd.—MILTON.

Vanity, the most innocent species of pride, was most frequently predominant: he (Savage) could not easily *leave off* when he had once begun to mention himself or his works.—JOHNSON.

Desolate, *v.* Solitary.

Desolation, *v.* Ravage.

Despair, Desperation, Despondency.

Despair, *Desperation*, from the French *desespoir*, compounded of the privative *de* and the Latin *spes* hope, signifies the absence or the annihilation of all hope.

Despondency, from *despond*, in Latin *despondeo*, compounded of the privative *de* and *spondeo* to promise, signifies literally to deprive in a solemn manner, or cut off from every gleam of hope.

Despair is a state of mind produced by the view of external circumstances; *desperation* and *despondency* may be the fruit of the imagination; the former therefore always rests on some ground, the latter are sometimes ideal: *despair* lies mostly in reflection; *desperation* and *despondency* in the feelings; the former marks a state of vehement and impatient feeling, the latter that of falling and mournful feeling. *Despair* is often the forerunner of *desperation* and *despondency*, but it is not necessarily accompanied with effects so powerful: the strongest mind may have occasion to *despair* when circumstances warrant the sentiment; men of an impetuous character are apt to run into a state of *desperation*; a weak mind full of morbid sensibility is most liable to fall into *despondency*.

Despair interrupts or checks exertion; *desperation* impels to greater exertions; *despondency* unfits for exertion: when a physician *despairs* of making a cure, he lays aside the application of remedies; when a soldier sees nothing but death or disgrace before him, he is driven to *desperation*, and redoubles his efforts; when a tradesman sees before him nothing but failure for the present, and want for the future, he may sink into *despondency*; *despair* is justifiable as far as it is a rational calculation into futurity from present ap-

pearances: *desperation* may arise from extraordinary circumstances or the action of strong passions; in the former case it is unavoidable, and may serve to rescue from great distress; in the latter case it is mostly attended with fatal consequence: *despondency* is a disease of the mind, which nothing but a firm trust in the goodness of Providence can obviate.

Despair and grief distract my lab'ring mind;
Gods! what a crime my impious heart design'd.
POPE.

It may be generally remarked of those who squander what they know their fortune is not sufficient to allow, that in their most jovial moments there always breaks out some proof of discontent and impatience: they either scatter with a wild *desperation*, or pay their money with a peevish anxiety.—JOHNSON.

Thomson submitting his productions to some who thought themselves qualified to criticise he heard of nothing but faults, but finding other judges more favourable, he did not suffer himself to sink into *despondence*.—JOHNSON.

Desperate, Hopeless.

Desperate (*v. Despair*) is applicable to persons or things: **Hopeless** to things only: a person makes a *desperate* effort; he undertakes a *hopeless* task.

Desperate when applied to things, expresses more than *hopeless*; the latter marks the absence of hope as to the attainment of good, the former marks the absence of hope as to the removal of an evil: a person who is in a *desperate* condition is overwhelmed with actual trouble for the present, and the prospect of its continuance for the future; he whose case is *hopeless* is without the prospect of effect in the end he has in view: gamblers are frequently brought into *desperate* situations when bereft of every thing that might possibly serve to lighten the burdens of their misfortunes: it is a *hopeless* undertaking to endavour to reclaim men who have plunged themselves deep into the labyrinths of vice.

Before the ships a *desperate* stand they made,
And fir'd the troops, and call'd the gods to aid.
POPE.

Th' Eneæas wish in vain their wonted chief,
Hopeless of flight, more *hopeless* of relief.
DRYDEN.

Desperation, *v. To despair.*

Despicable, *v. Contemtable.*

To Despise, *v. To contemn.*

Despondency, *v. To despair.*

Despotic, *v. Absolute.*

Destination, *v. Destiny.*

To Destine, *v. To allot.*

Destiny, Fate, Lot, Doom.

Destiny, from *destine* (*v. To appoint*) signifies either the power that *destines*, or the thing *destined*.

Fate, *v. Chance.*

Lot, in German *loos*, signifies a ticket, die, or any other thing by which the casual distribution of things is determined; and in an extended sense, it expresses the portion thus assigned by chance.

Doom, in Saxon *dome*, Danish *døm*, most

probably like the word *deem*, comes from the Hebrew *dan* to judge, signifying the thing judged, *sp ken*, or decreed.

All these terms are employed with regard to human events which are not under one's control: among the heathens *destiny* and *fate* were considered as deities, who each in his way could direct human affairs, and were both superior even to Jupiter himself: the *Destinies*, or *Fæces* as they were termed, presided only over life and death; but *fate* was employed in ruling the general affairs of men. Since revelation has instructed mankind in the nature and attributes of the true God, these blind powers are now not acknowledged to exist in the over-ruling providence of an all-wise and an all good Being; the terms *destiny* and *fate* therefore have now only a relative sense, as to what happens without the will or control of the individual who is the subject of it.

Destiny is used in regard to one's station and walk in life; *fate* in regard to what one suffers; *lot* in regard to what one gets or possesses; and *doom* is that portion of one's *destiny* or *fate* which depends upon the will of another: *destiny* is marked out; *fate* is fixed; a *lot* is assigned: a *doom* is passed.

It was the *destiny* of Julius Caesar to act a great part in the world, and to establish a new form of government at Rome; it was his *fate* at last to die by the hands of assassins, the chief of whom had been his avowed friends; had he been contented with a humbler *lot* than that of an empire, he might have enjoyed honours, riches, and a long life; his *doom* was sealed by the last step which he took in making himself emperor: it is not permitted for us to inquire into our future *destiny*; it is our duty to submit to our *fate*, to be contented with our *lot*, and prepared for our *doom*: a parent may have great influence over the *destiny* of his child, by the education he gives to him, or the principles he instils into his mind; there are many who owe their unhappy *fate* entirely to the want of early habits of piety; riches or poverty may be assigned to us as our *lot*, but the former will not ensure us happiness, nor the latter prevent us from being happy if we have a contented temper: criminals must await the *doom* of an earthly judge; but all men, as sinners, must meet the *doom* which is prepared for them at the awful day of judgment.

It is the *destiny* of some men to be always changing their plan of life; it is but too frequently the *fate* of authors to labour for the benefit of mankind, and to reap nothing for themselves but poverty and neglect: it is the *lot* but of very few, to enjoy what they themselves consider a competency.

If death be your design—at least, said she,
Take us along to share your *destiny*.—DRYDEN.

The gods these armies and this force employ,
The hostile gods conspire the *fate* of Troy.—POPE.

To labor is the *lot* of man below,
And when Jove gave us life, he gave us woe.—POPE.

Oh! grant me, gods! ere Hector meets his *doom*,
All I can ask of Heav'n, an early tomb.—POPE.

Destiny, Destination.

Both *Destiny* and *Destination* are used for the thing *destined*; but the former is said in relation to a man's important concerns,

the latter only of particular circumstances; in which sense it may likewise be employed for the act of *destining*.

Destiny is the point or line marked out in the walk of life; *destination* is the place fixed upon in particular: as every man has his peculiar *destiny*, so every traveller has his particular *destination*. *Destiny* is altogether set above human control; no man can determine, though he may influence, the *destiny* of another: *destination* is, however, the specific act of an individual, either for himself or another: we leave the *destiny* of a man to develop itself; but we may inquire about his own *destination*, or that of his children: it is a consoling reflection that the *destinies* of short-sighted mortals, like ourselves, are in the hands of One who both can and will overrule them to our advantage if we place full reliance in Him; in the *destination* of children for their several professions or callings, it is of importance to consult their particular turn of mind, as well as inclination.

Milton had once designed to celebrate king Arthur, as he hints in his verses to Mansus; but "Arthur was reserved," says Fenton, "to another *destiny*."—JOHN BORN.

Moore's original *destination* appears to have been for trade.—JOHNSON.

Destitute, v. Bare.

Destitute, v. Forsaken.

To Destroy, v. To consume.

To Destroy, v. To demolish.

Destruction, Ruin,

Destruction, from *destruo* and the Latin *destruo*, signifies literally to unbuild that which is raised up.

Ruin, from the Latin *ruo* to fall, signifies that which is fallen into pieces.

Destruction is an act of immediate violence; *ruin* is a gradual process; a thing is *destroyed* by some external action upon it; a thing falls to ruin of itself: we witness *destruction* wherever war or the adverse elements rage; we witness *ruin* whenever the works of man are exposed to the effects of time: nevertheless if *destruction* be more forcible and rapid, *ruin* is on the other hand more sure and complete: what is *destroyed* may be rebuilt or replaced; but what is *ruined* is lost for ever, it is past recovery: when houses or towns are *destroyed*, fresh ones rise up in their place; but when commerce is *ruined*, it seldom returns to its old course.

Destruction admits of various degrees; *ruin* is something positive and general. The property of a man may be *destroyed* to a greater or less extent, without necessarily involving his *ruin*. The *ruin* of a whole family is oftentimes the consequence of *destruction* by fire. Health is *destroyed* by violent exercises, or some other active cause; it is *ruined* by a course of imprudent conduct. The happiness of a family is *destroyed* by broils and discord; the morals of a young man are *ruined* by a continued intercourse with vicious companions.

Destruction may be used either in the proper or the improper sense; *ruin* has mostly a moral application. The *destruction* of both

body and soul is the consequence of sin; the *ruin* of a man, whether in his temporal or spiritual concerns, is inevitable, if he follow the dictates of misguided passion.

Destruction hangs o'er yon devoted wall,
And nodding Ilium waits th' impending fall.—POPE.
The day shall come, that great avenging day,
Which Troy's proud glories in the dust shall lay;
When Priam's pow'rs, and Priam's self, shall fall,
And one prodigious ruin swallow all.—POPE.

Destructive, Ruin, Pernicious.

Destructive, signifies producing *destruction* (v. *Destruction*).

Ruinous signifies either having or causing *ruin* (v. *Destruction*).

Pernicious, from the Latin *pernicius* or *per* and *neco* to kill violently, signifies causing violent and total dissolution.

Destructive and *ruinous*, as the epithets of the preceding terms, have a similar distinction in their sense and application; fire and sword are *destructive* things; a poison is *destructive*: consequences are *ruinous*; a condition or state is *ruinous*: intestine commotions are *ruinous* to the prosperity of a state.

Pernicious approaches nearer to *destructive* than to *ruinous*; both the former imply tendency to dissolution, which may be more or less gradual; but the latter refers us to the result itself, to the *dissolution* as already having taken place: hence we speak of the instrument or cause as being *destructive* or *pernicious*, and the action or event as *ruinous*: *destructive* is applied in the most extended sense to every object which has been created or supposed to be so; *pernicious* is applicable only to such objects as act only in a limited way: sin is equally *destructive* to both body and soul; certain food is *pernicious* to the body; certain books are *pernicious* to the mind.

"Tis yours to save us if you cease to fear;
Flight, more than shameful, is *destructive* here."
POPE.

There have been found in history few conquests more ruinous than that of the Saxons.—HUME.

The effects of divisions (in a state) are *pernicious* to the last degree, not only with regard to those advantages which they give the common enemy; but to those private evils which they produce in the heart of almost every particular person.—ADDISON.

Desultory, v. Cursory.

To Detach, v. To separate.

To Detain, v. To hold.

To Detect, Discover.

Detect, from the Latin *de* privative and *lego* to cover, and **Discover**, from the privative *dis* and *cover*, both originally signify to deprive of a covering.

Detect is always taken in a bad sense; *discover* in an indifferent sense. A person is *detected* in what he wishes to conceal; a person or a thing is *discovered* that has unintentionally lain concealed. Thieves are *detected* in picking pockets; a lost child is *discovered* in a wood, or in some place of security. *Detection* is the act of the moment; it is effected by the aid of the senses: a *discovery* is the consequence of efforts, and is brought about by

circutious means, and the aid of the understanding. A plot is *detected* by any one who communicates what he has seen and heard; many murders have been *discovered* after a lapse of years by ways the most extraordinary. Nothing is *detected* but what is actually passing; many things are *discovered* which have long passed. Wicked men go on in their career of vice with the hope of escaping *detection*; the *discovery* of one villany often leads to that of many more.

Cunning when it is once *detected* loses its force.

ADDISON.

We are told that the Spartans, though they punished theft in the young men when it was *discovered*, looked upon it as honourable if it succeeded.—ADDISON.

To Detect, v. To convict.

To Deter, Discourage, Dishearten.

Deter, in Latin *deterreo*, compounded of *de* and *terreo*, signifies to frighten away from a thing.

Discourage and Dishearten, by the privative *dis*, signify to deprive of courage or heart. One is *deterred* from commencing any thing, one is *discouraged* or *disheartened* from proceeding. A variety of motives may *deter* any one from an undertaking; but a person is *discouraged* or *disheartened* mostly by the want of success or the hopelessness of the case. The wicked are sometimes *deterred* from committing enormities by the fear of punishment; projectors are *discouraged* from entering into fresh speculations by observing the failure of others: there are few persons who would not be *disheartened* from renewing their endeavours, when they had experienced nothing but ill-success. The prudent and the fearful are alike easily to be *deterred*; impatient people are most apt to be *discouraged*; faint-hearted people are easiest *disheartened*. The foolhardy and the obdurate are the least easily *deterred* from their object; the persevering will not suffer themselves to be *discouraged* by particular failures; the resolute and self-confident will not be *disheartened* by trifling difficulties.

But thee or fear *deters*, or sloth detains:

No drop of all thy father warms thy veins.—POPE.

The proud man *discourages* those from approaching him who are of a mean condition, and who must want his assistance.—ADDISON.

Be not *disheartened* then, nor cloud those looks,

That want to be more cheerful and serene,

Than when fair morning first smiles on the world.

MILTON.

To Determine, v. To decide.

To Determine, Resolve.

Determine, v. To decide.

Resolve, v. Courage.

To *determine* is more especially an act of the judgement; * to *resolve* is an act of the will: the former requires examination and choice; we *determine* how or what we shall do: the latter requires a firm spirit; we *resolve* that we will do what we have *determined* upon. Our *determinations* should be prudent, that they may not cause repentance; our

resolutions should be fixed, in order to prevent variation. There can be no co-operation with a man who is *undetermined*; it will be dangerous to co-operate with a man who is *irresolute*.

In the ordinary concerns of life we have frequent occasion to *determine* without *resolving*; in the discharge of our moral duties, or the performance of any office, we have occasion to *resolve* without *determining*. A master *determines* to dismiss his servant; the servant *resolves* on becoming more diligent. Personal convenience or necessity gives rise to the *determination*; a sense of duty, honour, fidelity, and the like, gives birth to the *resolution*. A traveller *determines* to take a certain route; a learner *resolves* to conquer every difficulty in the acquirement of learning. Humour or change of circumstances occasions a person to alter his *determination*; timidity, fear, or defect in principle, occasions the *resolution* to waver. Children are not capable of *determining*; and their best *resolutions* fall before the gratification of the moment. Those who *determine* hastily are frequently under the necessity of altering their *determinations*; there are no *resolutions* so weak as those that are made on a sick bed: the return of health is quickly succeeded by a recurrence to our former course of life.

In matters of science, *determine* is to fix the mind, or to cause it to rest in a certain opinion; to *resolve* is to lay open what is obscure, to clear the mind from doubt and hesitation. We *determine* points of question; we *resolve* difficulties. It is more difficult to *determine* in matters of rank or precedence than in cases where the solid and real interests of men are concerned: it is the business of the teacher to *resolve* the difficulties which are proposed by the scholar. Every point is not proved which is *determined*; nor is every difficulty *resolved* which is answered.

When the mind hovers among such a variety of allurements, one had better settle on a way of life that is not the very best we might have chosen, than grow old without *determining* our choice.—ADDISON.

The *resolution* of dying to end our miseries does not show such a degree of magnanimity, as a *resolution* to bear them, and submit to the dispensations of Providence.—ADDISON.

We pray against nothing but sin, and against evil in general (in the Lord's prayer), leaving it with Omniscience to *determine* what is really such.—ADDISON.

I think there is no great difficulty in *resolving* your doubts. The reasons for which you are inclined to visit London are, I think, not of sufficient strength to answer the objections.—JOHNSON.

To Determine, v. To fix.

Determined, v. Decided.

To Detest, v. To abhor.

To Detest, v. To hate.

Detestable, v. Abominable.

To Detract, v. To asperse.

To Detract, v. To disparage.

Detriment, v. Disadvantage.

Devastation, v. Ravage.

To Develope, v. To unfold.

* Vide Abbé Girard; "Decision, resolution."

To Deviate, Wander, Swerve, Stray.

Deviate, from *devious*, and the Latin *de vid*, signifies literally to turn out of the way.

Wander, in German *wandern*, or *wandeln*, probably connected with *wenden* to turn, and the Greek *βαινω* to go, signifies in general the act of going.

Serve, probably from the German *schweifen* to ramble, *schreiben* to hover, fluctuate, &c., signifies to take an unsteady, wide, and indirect course.

Stray is probably a change from *erro* to wander.

Deviate always supposes a direct path; *wander* includes no such idea. The act of *deviating* is commonly faulty, that of *wandering* is indifferent: they may frequently exchange significations; the former being justifiable by necessity; and the latter arising from an unsteadiness of mind. *Deviate* is mostly used in the moral acceptation; *wander* may be used in either sense. A person *deviates* from any plan or rule laid down; he *wanders* from the subject in which he is engaged. As no rule can be laid down which will not admit of an exception, it is impossible but the wisest will find it necessary in their moral conduct to *deviate* occasionally; yet every wanton *deviation* from an established practice evinces a culpable temper on the part of the *deviator*. Those who *wander* into the regions of metaphysics are in great danger of losing themselves; it is with them as with most *wanderers*, that they spend their time at best but idly.

To *swerve* is to *deviate* from that which one holds right; to *stray* is to *wander* in the same bad sense: men *swerve* from their duty to consult their interest; the young *stray* from the path of rectitude to seek that of pleasure.

While we remain in this life we are subject to innumerable temptations, which, if listened to, will make us *deviate* from reason and goodness.—SPECTATOR.

Our aim is happiness; 'tis yours, 'tis mine;
He said; " 'tis the pursuit of all that live;
Yet few attain it, if 'twas e'er attain'd;
But they the widest *wander* from the mark,
Who thro' the flow'ry paths of sauntering joy
Seek this coy goddess."—ARMSTRONG.

Nor number, nor example, with him wrought,
To *swerve* from truth.—MILTON.

Why have I *stray'd* from pleasure and repose,
To seek a good each government bestows?
GOLDSMITH.

To Deviate, v. To digress.

Device, Contrivance.

Device, from *devise*, compounded of *de* and *visus* or *video* to see, signifies to bring to light.

Contrivance, from *contrive* (v. *Contrive*).

There is an exercise of art displayed in both these actions; but the former has most of ingenuity, trick, or cunning; the latter more of deduction and plain judgment in it. A *device* always consists of some invention or something newly made; a *contrivance* mostly respects the mode, arrangement, or disposition of things. Artists are employed in conceiving *devices*; men in general use *contrivances* for the ordinary concerns.

A *device* is often employed for bad and frau-

dulent purposes; *contrivances* mostly serve for innocent purposes of domestic life. Beggars have various *devices* for giving themselves the appearance of wretchedness and exciting the compassion of the spectator: those who are reduced to the necessity of supplying their wants commonly succeed by forming *contrivances* of which they had not before any conception. *Devices* are the work of the human understanding only; *contrivances* are likewise formed by animals. Men employ *devices* with an intention either to deceive or to please others; animals have their *contrivances* either to supply some want or to remove some evil.

As I have long lived in Kent, and there often heard how the Kentish men evaded the conqueror by carrying green boughs over their heads; it put me in mind of practising this *device* against Mr. Simper.—STEELE.

All the temples as well as houses of the Athenians were the effects of Nestor's (the architect) study and labour, inasmuch that it was said, Sure Nestor will now be famous; for the habitations of gods, as well as men, are built by his *contrivance*.—STEELE.

Devil, Demon.

Devil, in Saxon *deost*, Welsh *diafol*, French *diable*, Italian *diavolo*, Dutch *duivel*, Greek *δαιμονος* from *δαιμων* to traduce, signifies properly a calumniator, and is always taken in the bad sense, for the spirit which incites to evil, and tempts men through the medium of their evil passions.

Demon, in Latin *dæmon*, Greek *δαίμων* from *δαν* to know, signifies one knowing, that is, having preternatural knowledge, and is taken either in a bad or good sense for the power that acts within us and controls our actions.

Since the devil is represented as the father of all wickedness, associations have been connected with the name that render its pronunciation in familiar discourse offensive to the chastened ear; while *demon* is a term of indifferent application, that is commonly substituted in its stead to designate either a good or an evil spirit.

Malice and fraud are the peculiar characteristics of the *devil*; rage is properly that of a *demon*. The *devil* is said in proverbial discourse to be in such things as go contrary to our wishes; the *demon* of jealousy is said to possess the mind that is altogether carried away with that passion. Men who wish to have credit for more goodness than they possess, and to throw the load of guilt off themselves, attribute to the *devil* a perpetual endeavour to draw them into the commission of crimes; wherever the *demon* of discord has got admittance there is a farewell to all the comforts of social life.

The enemies we are to contend with are not men but *devils*.—TILLOTSON.

My good *demon* who sat at my right hand during the course of this whole vision, observing in me a burning desire to join that glorious company told me he highly approved of that generous ardor with which I seemed transported.—ADDISON.

To Devise, v. To contrive.

To Devise, Bequeath.

Devise, compounded of *de* and *vis* or *visus* participle of *video* to see or show, signifies to point out specifically.

• Vide Abbé Girard; "Diable, demon."

Bequeath, compounded of *be* and *queath*, in Saxon *cuesan*, from the Latin *quæso* to say, signifies to give over to a person by saying or by word of mouth.

To *devise* is a formal, to *bequeath* is an informal assignment of our property to another on our death. We *devise* therefore only by a legal testament; we may *bequeath* simply by word of mouth, or by any expression of our will: we can *devise* only that which is property in the eye of the law; we may *bequeath* in the moral sense anything which we cause to pass over to another; a man *devises* his lands; he *bequeaths* his name or his glory to his children.

The right of inheritance or descent to his children and relations seems to have been allowed much earlier than the right of *devising* by testament.—BLACKSTONE.

With this, the Modes to lab'ring age *bequeath*
New lungs.—DRYDEN

Devoid, *v. Empty.*

To Devote, *v. To addict.*

To Devote, *v. To dedicate.*

Devout, *v. Holy.*

Dexterity, Address, Ability.

Dexterity, in Latin *dexteritas*, comes from *dexter* the right hand, because that is the one most fitted for action.

Address signifies properly the mode of address or of managing one's-self (*v. Address*).

Ability (*v. Ability*) signifies the power of having or holding one's-self.

Dexterity, says the Abbe Givard,* respects the manner of executing things; it is the mechanical facility of performing an office: *address* refers to the use of means in executing; *ability* to the discernment of the things themselves.

Dexterity and *address* are but in fact modes of *ability*: the former may be acquired; the latter is the gift of nature: we may have *ability* to any degree (*v. Ability*), but *dexterity* and *address* are positive degrees of *ability*. To form a good government there must be *ability* in the prince or his ministers; *address* in those to whom the detail of operations is entrusted; and *dexterity* in those to whom the execution of orders is entrusted. With little *ability* and long habit in transacting business, we may acquire a *dexterity* in dispatching it, and *address* in giving it whatever turn will best suit our purpose.

Dexterity lends an air of ease to every action; *address* supplies art and ingenuity in contrivance; *ability* enables us to act with intelligence and confidence. To manage the whip with *dexterity*, to carry on an intrigue with *address*, to display some *ability* on the turf, will raise a man high in the rank of the present fashionables.

It is often observed that the race is won as much by the *dexterity* of the rider as by the vigor and fleetness of the animal.—EARL OF BATH.

It was no sooner dark than she conveyed into his room a young maid of no disagreeable figure, who was one of her attendants, and did not want *address* to improve the opportunity for the advancement of her fortune.—SPECULATOR.

* Vide "Dextérité, adresse, habilité."

It is not possible for our small party and small *ability* to extend their operations so far as to be much felt among such numbers.—COWPER.

Dexterous, *v. Clever.*

Dialect, *v. Language.*

Dialogue, *v. Conversation.*

To Dictate, Prescribe.

Dictate, from the Latin *dictatus* and *dictum* a word, signifies to make a word for another; and **Prescribe** literally signifies to write down for another (*v. To appoint*), in which sense the former of these terms is used technically for a principal who gets his secretary to write down his words as he utters them; and the latter for a physician who writes down for his patient what he wishes him to take as a remedy.

They are used figuratively for a species of counsel given by a superior; to *dictate* is however a greater exercise of authority than to *prescribe*. To *dictate* amounts even to more than to command; it signifies commanding with a tone of unwarrantable authority, or still oftener a species of commanding by those who have no right to command; it is therefore mostly taken in a bad sense. To *prescribe* partakes altogether of the nature of counsel, and nothing of command: it serves as a rule to the person *prescribed*, and is justified by the superior wisdom and knowledge of the person *prescribing*; it is therefore always taken in an indifferent or a good sense. He who *dictates* speaks with an adventitious authority; he who *prescribes* has the sanction of reason.

To *dictate* implies an entire subservency in the person *dictated* to: to *prescribe* carries its own weight with it in the nature of the thing *prescribed*. Upstarts are ready to *dictate* even to their superiors on every occasion that offers; modest people are often fearful of giving advice lest they should be suspected of *prescribing*.

The physician and divine are often heard to *dictate* in private company with the same authority which they exercise over their patients and disciples.—BUDGELL.

In the form which is *prescribed* to us (the Lord's prayer), we only pray for that happiness which is our chief good, and the great end of our existence, when we petition the Supreme for the coming of his kingdom.—ADDISON.

Dictate, Suggestion.

Dictate signifies the thing *dictated*, and has an imperative sense as in the former case (*v. To dictate*).

Suggestion signifies the thing *suggested*, and conveys the idea of its being proposed secretly or in a gentle manner.

A *dictate* comes from the conscience, the reason, or the passion: *suggestions* spring from the mind, the will, or the desire. *Dictate* is taken either in a good or bad sense: *suggestion* mostly in a bad sense. It is the part of a Christian at all times to listen to the *dictates* of conscience: it is the characteristic of a weak mind to follow the *suggestions* of envy. A man who yields to the *dictates* of passion renounces the character of a rational being: whoever does not resist the *suggestions* of his

own evil mind is very far gone in corruption, and will never be able to bear up long against temptation.

Dictate is employed only for what passes inwardly; *suggestion* may be used for any action on the mind by external objects. No man will err essentially in the ordinary affairs of life who is guided by the *dictates* of plain sense. It is the lot of sinful mortals to be drawn to evil by the *suggestions* of Satan as well as their own evil inclinations.

When the *dictates* of honour are contrary to those of religion and equity, they are the greatest depravations of human nature.—ADDISON.

Did not conscience *suggest* this natural relation between guilt and punishment; the mere principle of approbation or disapprobation, with respect to moral conduct, would prove of small efficacy.—BLAIR.

Dictionary, Style, Phrase, Phraseology.

Dictionary, from the Latin *dictio*, saying, is put for the mode of expressing ourselves.

Style comes from the Latin *stylus* the bodkin with which they both wrote and corrected what they had written on their waxen tablets; whence the word has been used for the manner of writing in general.

Phrase, in Greek *φρασις* from *φραζω* to speak, and **Phraseology** from *φρασις* and *λογος*, both signify the manner of speaking.

Dictio expresses much less than *style*: the former is applicable to the first efforts of learners in composition; the latter only to the original productions of a matured mind.

Errors in grammar, false construction, a confused disposition of words, or an improper application of them, constitutes bad *dictio*: but the niceties, the elegancies, the peculiarities, and the beauties of composition, which mark the genius and talent of the writer, are what is comprehended under the name of *style*. *Dictio* is a general term, applicable alike to a single sentence or a connected composition; *style* is used in regard to a regular piece of composition.

As *dictio* is a term of inferior import, it is of course mostly confined to ordinary subjects, and *style* to the productions of authors. We should speak of a person's *dictio* in his private correspondence, but of his *style* in his literary works. *Dictio* requires only to be pure and clear; *style* may likewise be terse, polished, elegant, florid, poetic, sober, and the like.

Dictio is said mostly in regard to what is written; *phrase* and *phraseology* are said as often of what is spoken as what is written; as that a person has adopted a strange *phrase* or *phraseology*. The former respects single words; the latter comprehends a succession of *phrases*.

Prior's *dictio* is more his own than that of any among the successors of Dryden.—JOHNSON.

I think we may say with justice that when mortals converse with their Creator, they cannot do it in so proper a style as in that of the Holy Scriptures.—ADDISON.

Rude am I in speech,
And little blest with the soft *phrase* of speech.
SHAKESPEARE.

I was no longer able to accommodate myself to the accidental current of my conversation; my notions grew particular and paradoxical, and my *phraseology* formal and unfashionable.—JOHNSON.

Dictionary, Encyclopædia.

Dictionary, from the Latin *dictum* a saying or word, is a register of words.

Encyclopædia, from the Greek *εγκυκλο-παιδεια* or *εν* in, *κυκλος* a circle, and *παιδεια* learning signifies a register of things.

The definition of words, with their various changes, modifications, uses, acceptations and applications, are the proper subjects of a *dictionary*; the nature and property of things, with their construction, uses, powers, &c., &c., are the proper subjects of an *encyclopædia*. A general acquaintance with all arts and sciences as far as respects the use of technical terms, and a perfect acquaintance with the classical writers in the language, are essential for the composition of a *dictionary*; an enire acquaintance with all the minutæ of every art and science is requisite for the composition of an *encyclopædia*. A single individual may qualify himself for the task of writing a *dictionary*, but the universality and diversity of knowledge contained in an *encyclopædia* render it necessarily the work of many.

The term *dictionary* has been extended in its application to any work alphabetically arranged, as biographical, medical, botanical *dictionaries*, and the like; but still preserving this distinction, that a *dictionary* always contains only a general or partial illustration of the subject proposed, whilst an *encyclopædia* embraces the whole circuit of science.

If a man that lived an age or two ago should return into the world again, he would really want a *dictionary* to help him to understand his own language.—TILLOTSON.

Every science borrows from all the rest, and we cannot attain any single one without the *encyclopædia*.—GLANVILLE.

Dictionary, Lexicon, Vocabulary, Glossary, Nomenclature.

Dictionary, v. *Dictionary*, is a general term; **Lexicon** from *λεγω* to say; **Vocabulary** from *vox*, a word; **Glossary** from *gloss* to explain, from *γλωσσα* the tongue; and **Nomenclature** from *nomen*, are all species of the *dictionary*.

Lexicon is a species of *dictionary* appropriately applied to the dead languages. A Greek or Hebrew *lexicon* is distinguished from a *dictionary* of the French or English languages. A *vocabulary* is a partial kind of *dictionary* which may comprehend a simple list of words, with or without explanation, arranged in order or otherwise. A *glossary* is an explanatory *vocabulary*, which commonly serves to explain the obsolete terms employed in any old author. A *nomenclature* is literally a list of names, and in particular a reference to proper names.

To Die, Expire.

Die, in low German *doen*, Danish *doe*, from the Greek *θωω* to kill, designates in general the extinction of being.

Expire, from the Latin *e* or *ex* and *spiro* to breathe out, designates the last action of life in certain objects.

She died every day she lived.—ROWE.

Pope died in the evening of the thirtieth day of May, 1744, so placidly, that the attendants did not discern the exact time of his expiration.—JOHNSON.

* There are beings, such as trees and plants, which are said to live, although they have not breath; these *die*, but do not *expire*: there are other beings which absorb and emit air, but do not live; such as the flame of a lamp, which does not *die*, but it *expires*. By a natural metaphor, the time of being is put for the life of objects; and hence we speak of the date *expiring*, the term *expiring*, and the like; and as life is applied figuratively to moral objects, so may death to objects not having physical life.

A parliament may *expire* by length of time.

BLACKSTONE,

A dissolution is the civil death of parliament.

BLACKSTONE.

When Alexander the Great died, the Grecian monarchy expired with him.—SOUTH.

To Die, *v.* To perish.

Diet, *v.* Food.

Diet, *v.* Assembly.

To Differ, Vary, Disagree, Dissent.

Differ, in Latin *differeo* or *dis* and *fero*, signifies to make into two.

Vary, *v.* To change, alter.

Disagree is literally not to agree.

Dissent, in Latin *dissentio* or *dis* and *sentio*, signifies to think or feel apart or differently.

Differ, vary, and disagree, are applicable either to persons or things; dissent to persons only. First as to persons: to differ is the most general and indefinite term, the rest are but modes of difference: we may differ from any cause, or in any degree; we vary only in small matters; thus persons may differ or vary in their statements. There must be two at least to differ; and there may be an indefinite number: one may vary, or an indefinite number may vary: two or a specific number disagree: thus two or more may differ in an account which they give; one person may vary at different times in the account which he gives; and two particular individuals disagree: we may differ in matters of fact or speculation; we vary only in matters of fact; we disagree mostly in matters of speculation. Historians may differ in the representation of an affair, and authors may differ in their views of a particular subject; narrators vary in certain circumstances; two particular philosophers disagree in accounting for a phenomenon.

To disagree is the act of one man with another: to dissent is the act of one or more in relation to a community; thus two writers on the same subject may disagree in their conclusions, because they set out from different premises; men dissent from the established religion of their country according to their education and character.

When applied to the ordinary transactions of life, differences may exist merely in opinion, or with a mixture of more or less acrimonious and discordant feeling; variances arise from a

collision of interests; disagreements from asperity of humour; dissensions from a clashing of opinions; differences may exist between nations, and may be settled by cool discussions; when variances arise between neighbours, their passions often interfere to prevent accommodations; when the members of a family consult interest or humour rather than affections, there will be necessarily disagreements; and when many members of a community have an equal liberty to express their opinions, there will necessarily be dissensions.

The ministers of the different potentates conferred and conferred; but the peace advanced so slowly that speedier methods were found necessary, and Bollingbroke was sent to Paris to adjust differences with less formality.—JOHNSON.

How many bleed

By shameful variance betwixt man and man.

THOMSON.

On his arrival at Geneva, Goldsmith was recommended as a travelling tutor to a young gentleman who had been unexpectedly left a sum of money by a near relation. This connexion lasted but a short time: they disagreed in the south of France and parted.—JOHNSON.

When Carthage shall contend the world with Rome,

Then is your time for faction and debate,

For partial favor and permitted hate;

Let now your immature dissension cease.—DRYDEN.

In regard to things, differ is said of two things with respect to each other; vary of one thing in respect to itself: thus two tempers differ from each other, and a person's temper varies from time to time. Things differ in their essences, they vary in their accidents; thus the genera and species of things differ from each other, and the individuals of each species vary: differ is said of everything promiscuously, but disagree is only said of such things as might agree; thus two trees differ from each other by the course of things, but two numbers disagree which are intended to agree.

We do not know in what either reason or instinct consist, and therefore cannot tell with exactness in what they differ.—JOHNSON.

That mind and body often sympathize

Is plain; such is this union nature ties;

But then as often too they disagree,

Which proves the soul's superior progeny.

JENYNS.

Trade and commerce might doubtless be still varied a thousand ways, out of which would arise such branches as have not been touched.—JOHNSON.

Difference, Variety, Diversity,
Medley.

Difference signifies the cause or the act of differing.

Variety, from various or vary, in Latin *varius*, probably comes from *varus* a speck or speckle, because this is the best emblem of variety.

Diversity, in Latin *diversitas*, comes from *diverto*, compounded of *di* and *verto*, and signifies to turn asunder.

Medley comes from the word *meddle*, which is but a change from *mingle*, *mix*, &c

Difference and variety seem to lie in the things themselves; diversity and medley are created either by accident or design: a difference may lie in two objects only; a variety cannot exist without an assemblage; a difference is discovered by means of a comparison which the mind forms of objects to prevent confu-

* Truaser; "Die, expire."

sion; *variety* strikes on the mind, and pleases the imagination with many agreeable images; it is opposed to dull uniformity: the acute observer traces *differences*, however minute, in the objects of his research, and by this means is enabled to class them under their general or particular heads; *nature affords such an infinite *variety* in everything which exists, that if we do not perceive it the fault is in ourselves; *diversity* arises from an assemblage of objects naturally contrasted; a *medley* is produced by an assemblage of objects so ill suited as to produce a ludicrous effect.

Diversity exists in the tastes or opinions of men; a *medley* is produced by the concurrence of such tastes or opinions as can in no wise coalesce: where the minds of men are disengaged from the shackles of superstition and despotism, there will be a great *diversity* of opinions; where a number of men come together with different habits, we may expect to find a *medley* of characters; good taste may render a *diversity* of colour agreeable to the eye; caprice or bad taste will be apt to form a ridiculous *medley* of colours and ornaments. A *diversity* of sounds heard at a suitable distance in the stillness of the evening, will have an agreeable effect on the ear; a *medley* of noises, whether heard near or at a distance, must always be harsh and offensive.

Homer does not only outshine all other poets in the *variety*, but also in the novelty of his characters.—ADDISON.

The goodness of the Supreme Being is no less seen in the *diversity*, than in the multitude of living creatures.—ADDISON.

What unnatural motions and counter-ferments must such a *medley* of intemperance produce in the body!—ADDISON.

Difference, Distinction.

Difference, v. Difference, variety.

Distinction, v. To abstract, distinguish.

Difference lies in the thing; *distinction* is the act of the person; the former is, therefore, to the latter as the cause to the effect; the *distinction* rests on the *difference*: those are equally bad logicians who make a *distinction* without a *difference*, or who make no *distinction* where there is a *difference*. Sometimes *distinction* is put for the ground of *distinction*, which brings it nearer in sense to *difference*, in which case the former is a species of the latter: a *difference* is either external or internal: a *distinction* is always external: we have *differences* in character, and *distinctions* in dress: the *difference* between profession and practice, though very considerable, is often lost sight of by the professors of Christianity; in the sight of God, there is no rank or *distinction* that will screen a man from the consequences of unpurged sins.

O son of Tydeus, cease! be wise, and see
How vast the *difference* of the gods and thee.
POPE.

When I was got into this way of thinking, I presently grew conceited of the argument, and was just preparing to write a letter of advice to a member of parliament, for opening the freedom of our towns and trades, for taking away all manner of *distinctions* between the natives and foreigners.—STEELE.

* Vide Ablé Girard; "Difference, diversité, variété, bigarrure."

Difference, Dispute, Altercation, Quarrel.

Difference, v. To differ.

Dispute, v. To argue.

Altercation, in Latin *altercatio* and *alterco* from *alterum* and *con* another mind, signifies the expressing another opinion.

Quarrel, in French *querelle*, from the Latin *queror* to complain, signifies having a complaint against another.

All these terms are here taken in the general sense of a *difference* on some personal question; the term *difference* is here as general and indefinite as in the former case (*v. To differ, vary*): a *difference*, as distinguished from the others, is generally of a less serious and personal kind; a *dispute* consists not only of angry words, but much ill blood and unkind offices: an *altercation* is a wordy *dispute*, in which *difference* of opinion is drawn out into a multitude of words on all sides; *quarrel* is the most serious of all *differences*, which leads to every species of violence: a *difference* may sometimes arise from a misunderstanding, which may be easily rectified; *differences* seldom grow to *disputes* but by the fault of both parties; *altercations* arise mostly from pertinacious adherence to, and obstinate defence of, one's opinions; *quarrels* mostly spring from injuries real or supposed: *differences* subsist between men in an individual or public capacity; they may be carried on in a direct or indirect manner; *disputes* and *altercations* are mostly conducted in a direct manner between individuals; *quarrels* may arise betwixt nations or individuals, and be carried on by acts of offence directly or indirectly.

Ought lesser *differences* altogether to divide and estrange those from one another, whom such ancient and sacred bands unite?—BLAIR.

I have often been pleased to hear *disputes* on the Exchange adjusted between an inhabitant of Japan and an alderman of London.—ADDISON.

In the house of Peers the bill passes through the same forms as in the other house, and if rejected no more notice is taken, but it passes *sub silentio* to prevent unbecoming *altercation*.—BLACKSTONE.

Unvex'd with *quarrels*, undisturb'd with noise,
The country king his peaceful realm enjoys.
DRYDEN.

Different, Distinct, Separate.

* **Different, v. To differ, vary.**

Distinct, in Latin *distinctus* participle of *distinguo* (*v. To abstract, separate*).

Separate, v. To abstract.

Difference is opposed to similitude; there is no *difference* between objects absolutely alike: *distinctness* is opposed to identity; there can be no *distinction* where there is only one and the same being: *separation* is opposed to unity; there can be no *separation* between objects that coalesce or adhere: things may be *different* and not *distinct*, or *distinct* and not *different*: *different* is said altogether of the internal properties of things; *distinct* is said of things as objects of vision, or as they appear either to the eye or the mind: when two or more things are seen only as one, they may be *different*, but

* Vide Bauzée: "Distinction, diversité, separation."

they are not *distinct*; but whatever is seen as two or more things, each complete in itself, is *distinct*, although it may not be *different*: two roads are said to be *different* which run in *different* directions, but they may not be *distinct* when seen on a map: on the other hand, two roads are said to be *distinct* when they are observed as two roads to run in the same direction but they need not in any particular to be *different*: two stars of *different* magnitudes may, in certain directions, appear as one, in which case they are *different*, but not *distinct*: two books on the same subject, and by the same author, but not written in continuation of each other, are *distinct* books, but not *different*.

What is *separate* must in its nature be generally *distinct*; but every thing is not *separate* which is *distinct*: when houses are *separate* they are obviously *distinct*; but they may frequently be *distinct* when they are not positively *separated*: the *distinct* is marked out by some external sign, which determines its beginning and its end; the *separate* is that which is set apart, and to be seen by itself: *distinct* is a term used only in determining the singularity or plurality of objects; the *separate* only in regard to their proximity or to distance from each other: we speak of having a *distinct* household, but of living in *separate* apartments; of dividing one's subject into *distinct* heads, or of making things into *separate* parcels: the body and soul are *different*, in as much as they have *different* properties; they are *distinct* in as much as they have marks by which they may be distinguished, and at death they will be *separate*.

No hostile arms approach your happy ground;
Far *different* is my fate.—DRYDEN.

His *separate* troops let every leader call,
Each strengthen each, and all encourage all,
What chief or soldier of the numerous band,
Or bravely fights or ill obeys command.

When thus *distinct* they war, soon shall be known.
POPE.

Different, Several, Divers, Sundry, Various.

All these terms are employed to mark a number (*v. To differ, vary*), but *Different* is the most indefinite of all these terms, as its office is rather to define the quality than the number, and is equally applicable to few and many; it is opposed to singularity, but the other terms are employed positively to express many. *Several*, from *to sever*, signifies split or made into many; they may be either *different* or alike: there may be *several* different things, or *several* things alike; but there cannot be *several* divers things, for the word *divers* signifies properly many *different*. *Sundry*, from *asunder* or apart, signifies many things scattered or at a distance, whether as it regards time or space. *Various* expresses not only a greater number, but a greater *diversity* than all the rest.

The same thing often affects *different* persons *differently*: an individual may be affected *several* times in the same way; or particular persons may be affected at *sundry* times and in *divers* manners; the ways in which men are affected are so *various* as not to admit of enumeration: it is not so much to understand

different languages as to understand *several* *different* languages: *divers* modes have been suggested and tried for the good education of youth, but most of too theoretical a nature to admit of being reduced successfully to practice: an incorrect writer omits *sundry* articles that belong to a statement; we need not wonder at the misery which is introduced into families by extravagance and luxury, when we notice the infinitely *various* allurements for spending money which are held out to the young and the thoughtless.

It is astonishing to consider the *different* degrees of care that descend from the parent to the young, so far as is absolutely necessary for the leaving a posterity.—ADDISON.

The bishop has *several* courts under him, and may visit at pleasure every part of his diocese.—BLACKSTONE.

In the frame and constitution of the ecclesiastical polity, there are *divers* ranks and degrees.—BLACKSTONE.

Fat olives of *sundry* sorts appear,
Of *sundry* shapes their unctuous berries bear.
DRYDEN.

As land is improved by sowing it with *various* seeds, so is the mind by exercising it with *different* studies.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF FLINNY.

Different, Unlike.

Different is positive, *Unlike* is negative: we look at what is *different*, and draw a comparison; but that which is *unlike* needs no comparison: a thing is said to be *different* from every other thing, or *unlike* to any thing seen before; which latter mode of expression obviously conveys less to the mind than the former.

How *different* is the view of past life in the man who is grown old in knowledge and wisdom from that of him who is grown old in ignorance and folly.—ADDISON.

How far *unlike* those chiefs of race divine,
How vast the difference of their deeds and mine.
POPE.

Difficult, v. Arduous.

Difficult, v. Hard.

Difficulties, Embarrassments, Troubles.

These terms are all applicable to a person's concerns in life; but *Difficulties* relate to the *difficulty* (*v. Difficulty*) of conducting a business; *Embarrassments* relate to the confusion attending a state of debt; and *Trouble* to the pain which is the natural consequence of not fulfilling engagements or answering demands. Of the three, the term *difficulties* expresses the least, and that of *troubles* the most. A young man on his entrance into the world will unavoidably experience *difficulties*, if not provided with ample means in the outset. But let his means be ever so ample, if he have not prudence and talents fitted for business, he will hardly keep himself free from *embarrassments*, which are the greatest *troubles* that can arise to disturb the peace of a man's mind.

Young Cunningham was recalled to Dublin, where he continued for four or five years, and of course experienced all the *difficulties* that attend distressed situations.—JOHNSON.

Few men would have had resolution to write books with such *embarrassments* (as Milton laboured under).—JOHNSON.

Virgil's sickness, studies, and the *troubles* he met with, turned his hair grey before the usual time.—WALSH.

Difficulty, Obstacle, Impediment.

Difficulty, in Latin *difficultas* and *difficilis*, compounded of the privative *dis* and *facilis* easy, from *facio* to do, signifies not easy to be done.

Obstacle, in Latin *obstaculum* from *obsto* to stand in the way, signifies the thing that stands in the way between a person and the object he has in view.

Impediment, in Latin *impedimentum* from *impedio* compounded of *in* and *pedes*, signifying something that entangles the feet.

All these terms include in their signification that which interferes either with the actions or views of men: the *difficulty** lies most in the nature and circumstances of the thing itself; the *obstacle* and *impediment* consist of that which is external or foreign: a *difficulty* interferes with the completion of any work; an *obstacle* interferes with the attainment of any end; an *impediment* interrupts the progress, and prevents the execution of one's wishes: a *difficulty* embarrasses, it suspends the powers of acting or deciding; an *obstacle* opposes itself, it is properly met in the way, and intervenes between us and our object; an *impediment* shackles and puts a stop to our proceedings: we speak of encountering a *difficulty*, surmounting an *obstacle*, and removing an *impediment*: the disposition of the mind often occasions more *difficulties* in negotiations than the subjects themselves; the eloquence of Demosthenes was the greatest *obstacle* which Philip of Macedon experienced in his political career; ignorance of the language is the greatest *impediment* which a foreigner experiences in the pursuit of any object out of his own country.

Truth has less of trouble and *difficulty*, of entanglement and perplexity, of danger and hazard in it.—TILLOTSON.

One *obstacle* must have stood not a little in the way of that preferment after which Young seems to have panted. Though he took orders, he never entirely shook off politics.—CROFT.

The necessity of complying with times, and of sparing persons, is the great *impediment* of biography.—JOHNSON.

Diffident, *v. Distrustful.*

Diffident, *v. Modest.*

Diffuse, Prolix.

Both mark defects of style opposed to brevity.

Diffuse, in Latin *diffusus* participle of *diffundo* to pour out or spread wide, marks the quality of being extended in space.

Prolix, in French *prolize*, changed from *prolaxus*, signifies to let loose in a wide space.

The *diffuse* is properly opposed to the precise; the *prolix* to the concise or laconic. A *diffuse* writer is fond of amplification, he abounds in epithets, tropes, figures, and illustrations; the *prolix* writer is fond of circumlocution, minute details, and trifling particulars. *Diffuseness* is a fault only in degree, and according to circumstances; *prolixity* is a

* Vide Abbé Girard: "Difficulté, obstacle, empêchement."

positive fault at all times. The former leads to the use of words unnecessarily; the latter to the use of phrases, as well as words, that are altogether useless: the *diffuse* style has too much of repetition; the *prolix* style abounds in tautology. *Diffuseness* often arises from an exuberance of imagination; *prolixity* from the want of imagination; on the other hand the former may be coupled with great superficiality, and the latter with great solidity.

Gibbon and other modern writers have fallen into the error of *diffuseness*. Lord Clarendon and many English writers preceding him are chargeable with *prolixity*.

Few authors are more clear and perspicuous on the whole than Archbishop Tillotson and Sir William Temple, yet neither of them are remarkable for precision; they are loose and *diffuse*.—BLAIR.

I look upon a tedious talker, or what is generally known by the name of a story teller, to be much more insufferable than a *prolix* writer.—STEELE.

To Diffuse, *v. To spread.*

Digest, *v. Abridgement.*

To Digest, *v. To dispose.*

Dignified, *v. Majestic.*

Dignity, *v. Honor.*

To Digress, Deviate.

Both in the original and the accepted sense, these words express going out of the ordinary course; but **Digress** is used only in particular, and **Deviate** in general cases.

We *digress* only in a narrative whether written or spoken; we *deviate* in actions as well as in words, in our conduct as well as in writings.

Digress is mostly taken in a good or indifferent sense; *deviate* in an indifferent or bad sense. Although frequent *digressions* are faulty, yet occasionally it is necessary to *digress* for the purposes of explanation; every *deviation* is bad, which is not sanctioned by the necessity of circumstances.

The *digressions* in the Tale of a Tub, relating to Wotton and Bentley, must be confessed to discover want of knowledge or want of integrity.—JOHNSON.

A resolution was taken (by the authors of the Spectator) of courting general approbation by general topics: to this practice they adhered with few *deviations*.—JOHNSON.

To Dilate, Expand.

Dilate, in Latin *dilatari* from *di* apart and *latus* wide, that is, to make very wide.

Expand, in Latin *expando* compounded of *ex* and *pando* to spread, from the Greek *phaivo* to appear or show, signifying to set forth or lay open to view by spreading out.

The idea of drawing anything out so as to occupy a greater space is common to these terms in opposition to contracting. *Dilate* is an intransitive verb; *expand* is transitive or intransitive; the former marks the action of any body within itself; the latter an external action on any body. A bladder *dilates* on the admission of air, or the heart *dilates* with joy; knowledge *expands* the mind, or a person's views *expand* with circumstances. In the circulation of the blood through the body, the vessels are exposed to a perpetual *dilatation*.

and contraction : the gradual expansion of the mind by the regular modes of communicating knowledge to youth is unquestionably to be desired ; but the sudden expansion of a man's thoughts from a comparative state of ignorance by any powerful action is very dangerous.

The conscious heart of charity would warm,
And her wish with benevolence dilate.—THOMSON.

The poet (Thomson) leads us through the appearances of things as they are successively varied by the vicissitudes of the year, and imparts to us so much of his own enthusiasm that our thoughts expand with his imagery.—JOHNSON.

Dilatory, v. Slow.

Diligent, v. Active.

Diligent, Expeditious, Prompt.

All these terms mark the quality of quickness in a commendable degree.

Diligent from *diligere* to love (*v. Active, diligent*) marks the interest one takes in doing something ; he is * *diligent* who loses no time, who keeps close to the work.

Expeditious, from the Latin *expedio* to dispatch, marks the desire one has to complete the thing begun. He who is *expeditious* applies himself to no other thing that offers ; he finishes everything in its turn.

Prompt, from the Latin *promove* to draw out or make ready, marks one's desire to get ready ; he is *prompt* who works with spirit so as to make things ready. Idleness, dilatoriness, and slowness, are the three defects opposed to these three qualities. The *diligent* man has no reluctance in commencing his labour ; the *expeditious* man never leaves it ; the *prompt* man brings it quickly to an end. It is necessary to be *diligent* in the concerns which belong to us, to be *expeditious* in any business that requires to be terminated, to be *prompt* in the execution of orders that are given to us.

We must be *diligent* in our particular calling and charge, in that province and station which God has appointed us, whatever it be.—TILLOTSON.

The regent assembled an army with his usual *expedition*, and marched to Glasgow.—ROBERTSON.

To him she hasted, in her face excuse
Came prologue, and apology too *prompt*,
Which with bland words at will, she thus address'd.
MILTON.

Diligent, v. Sedulous.

Dim, v. Dark.

To Diminish, v. To abate.

Diminutive, v. Little.

Diocese, v. Bishopric.

To Direct, Regulate.

We *Direct* for the instruction of individuals. We *Regulate* for the good order or convenience of many.

To *direct* is personal, it supposes authority ; to *regulate* is general, it supposes superior information. An officer *directs* the movements of his men in military operations ;

* Vide Abbé Girard ; " *Diligent, expeditif, prompt.*"

steward or master of the ceremonies *regulates* the whole concerns of an entertainment : the *director* is often a man in power ; the *regulator* is always the man of business ; the latter is frequently employed to act under the former. The Bank of England has its *directors*, who only take part in the administration of the whole ; the *regulation* of the subordinate part, and of the details of business, is entrusted to the superior clerks.

To *direct* is always used with regard to others ; to *regulate*, frequently with regard to ourselves. One person *directs* another according to his better judgment ; he *regulates* his own conduct by principles or circumstances.

Canst thou with all a monarch's cares oppress,
Oh Atreus' son ! canst thou indulge thy rest ?
It fits a chief, who mighty nations guides,
Directs in council, and in war presides.—POPE.

Strange disorders are bred in the minds of those men whose passions are not *regulated* by reason.—ADDISON.

It is the business of religion and philosophy not so much to extinguish our passions, as to *regulate* and *direct* them to valuable well-chosen objects.—ADDISON.

To Direct, v. To conduct.

Direct, v. Straight.

Direction, Address, Superscription.

Direction (*v. To direct*) marks that which directs.

Address (*v. To address*) is that which addresses.

Superscription from *super* and *scribo*, signifies that which is written over.

Although these terms may be used promiscuously for each other, yet they have a peculiarity of signification by which their proper uses are defined : a *direction* may serve to direct to places as well as to persons ; an *address* is never used but in direct application to the person ; a *superscription* has more respect to the thing than the person. A *direction* may be written or verbal ; an *address* in this sense is always written ; a *superscription* must not only be written but either on or over some other thing : a *direction* is given to such as go in search of persons and places, it ought to be clear and particular : an *address* is put either on a card, and a letter, or in a book ; it ought to be suitable to the station and situation of the person addressed : a *superscription* is placed at the head of other writings or over tombs and pillars : it ought to be appropriate.

There could not be a greater chance than that which brought to light the powder treason, when Providence, as it were, watch'd a king and kingdom out of the very jaws of death only by the mistake of a word in the *direction* of a letter.—SOUTH.

We think you may be able to point out to him the evil of succeeding ; if it be solicitations, you will tell him where to *address* it.—LORD CHESTERFIELD.

Deceit and hypocrisy carry in them more of the express image and *superscription* of the devil than any bodily sins whatsoever.—SOUTH.

Direction, Order.

Direction, v. To direct.

Order, v. To command.

Direction contains most of instruction in it ; *order* most of authority. *Directions* should be followed ; *orders* obeyed. It is necessary to

direct those who are unable to act for themselves: it is necessary to *order* those whose business it is to execute the *orders*. *Directions* given to servants and children must be clear, simple, and precise; *orders* to tradespeople may be particular or general.

Directions extend to the moral conduct of others, as well as the ordinary concerns of life; *orders* are confined to the personal convenience of the individual. A parent *directs* a child as to his behaviour in company, or as to his conduct when he enters life; a teacher *directs* his pupil in the choice of books, or in the distribution of his studies: the master gives *orders* to his attendants to be in waiting for him at a certain hour; or he gives *orders* to his tradesmen to provide what is necessary.

Then meet me forthwith at the notary's,
Give him *direction* for this merry bond.—SHAKESPEARE.

To execute laws is a royal office: to execute *orders* is not to be a king.—BURKE.

Directly, Immediately, Instantly, Instantaneously.

Directly signifies in a *direct* or straight manner.

Immediately signifies without any medium or intervention.

Instantly and Instantaneously, from *instant*, signifies in an instant.

Directly is most applicable to the actions of men; *immediately* and *instantly* to either actions or events. *Directly* refers to the interruptions which may intentionally delay the commencement of any work; *immediately* in general refers to the space of time that intervenes. A diligent person goes *directly* to his work; he suffers nothing to draw him aside: good news is *immediately* spread abroad upon its arrival; nothing intervenes to retard it. *Immediately* and *instantly*, or *instantaneously*, both mark a quick succession of events, but the latter in a much stronger degree than the former. *Immediately* is negative; it expresses simply that nothing intervenes; *instantly* is positive, signifying the very existing moment in which the thing happens. A person who is of a willing disposition goes or runs *immediately* to the assistance of another; but the ardour of affection impels him to fly *instantly* to his relief, as he sees the danger. A surgeon does not proceed *directly* to dress a wound: he first examines it in order to ascertain its nature: men of lively minds *immediately* see the source of their own errors: people of delicate feelings are *instantly* alive to the slightest breach of decorum. A course of proceeding is *direct*, the consequences are *immediate*, and the effects *instantaneous*.

Besides those things which *directly* suggest the idea of danger, and those which produce a similar effect from a mechanical cause, I know of nothing sublime which is not some modification of power.—BURKE.

Admiration is a short-lived passion, that *immediately* decays upon growing familiar with the object.—ADDISON.

A painter must have an action, not successive, but *instantaneous*; for the time of a picture is a single moment.—JOHNSON.

Disability, v. Inability

Disadvantage, Injury, Hurt, Detriment, Prejudice.

Disadvantage implies the absence of an *advantage* (v. *Advantage*).

Injury, in Latin *injuria* from *jus*, properly signifies what is contrary to right or justice, but extends in its sense to every loss or deficiency which is occasioned.

Hurt signifies in the northern languages beaten or wounded.

Detriment, in Latin *detrimētum* from *detritum* and *deterere* to wear away, signifies the effect of being worn out.

Prejudice, in the improper sense of the word (v. *Bias*), implies the ill which is supposed to result from *prejudice*.

Disadvantage is rather the absence of a good; *injury* is a positive evil: the want of education may frequently be a *disadvantage* to a person by retarding his advancement; the ill word of another may be an *injury* by depriving him of friends. *Disadvantage*, therefore, is applied to such things as are of an *adventitious* nature: the *injury* to that which is of essential importance. *Hurt*, *detriment*, and *prejudice*, are all species of *injuries*. *Injury*, in general, implies whatever ill befalls an object by the external action of other objects, whether taken in relation to physical or moral evil to persons, or to things; *hurt* is that species of *injury* which is produced by more direct violence; too close an application to study is *injurious* to the health; reading by an improper light is *hurtful* to the eyes; so in a moral sense, the light reading which a circulating library supplies is often *injurious* to the morals of young people; all violent affections are *hurtful* to the mind. The *detriment* and *prejudice* are species of *injury* which affect only the outward circumstances of a person; the former implying what may lessen the value of an object, the latter what may lower it in the esteem of others. Whatever affects the stability of a merchant's credit is highly *detrimental* to his interests: whatever is *prejudicial* to the character of a man should not be made the subject of indiscriminate conversation.

It is prudent to conceal that which will be to our *disadvantage*, unless we are called upon to make the acknowledgement. There is nothing material that is not exposed to the *injuries* of time, if not to those of actual violence. Excesses of every kind carry their own punishment with them, for they are always *hurtful* to the body. The price of a book is often *detrimental* to its sale. The intemperate zeal, or the inconsistent conduct of religious professors is highly *prejudicial* to the spread of religion.

Even the greatest actions of a celebrated person labor under this *disadvantage*, that however surprising and extraordinary they may be they are no more than what are expected from him.—ADDISON.

The number of those who by abstracted thoughts become useless is inconsiderable, in respect of them who are *hurtful* to mankind by an active and restless disposition.—BARTLETT.

In many instances we clearly perceive that more or less knowledge dispensed to man would have proved *detrimental* to his state.—BLAIR.

That the heathens have spoken things to the same sense

of this saying of our Saviour is so far from being any prejudice to this saying, that it is a great commendation of it.—TILLOTSON.

Disaffection, Disloyalty.

Disaffection is general: Disloyalty is particular; it is a species of *disaffection*.

Men are *disaffected* to the government; *disloyal* to their prince. *Disaffection* may be said with regard to any form of government; *disloyalty* only with regard to a monarchy. Although both terms are commonly employed in a bad sense, yet the former does not always convey the unfavourable meaning which is attached to the latter. A man may have reasons to think himself justified in *disaffection*; but he will never attempt to offer any thing in justification of *disloyalty*. A usurped government will have many *disaffected* subjects with whom it must deal leniently; the best king may have *disloyal* subjects, upon whom he must exercise the rigor of the law. Many were *disaffected* to the usurpation of Oliver Cromwell, because they would not be *disloyal* to their king.

Yet, I protest, it is no salt desire
Of seeing countries shifting for a religion;
Nor any *disaffection* to the state
Where I was bred, and unto which I owe
My dearest plots, hath brought me out.

BEN JONSON.

Milton being cleared from the effects of his *disloyalty*, had nothing required from him but the common duty of living in quiet.—JOHNSON.

To Disagree, *v.* To differ.

To Disappear, Vanish.

To Disappear signifies not to appear (*v.* Air).

Vanish, in French *evanuir*, Latin *evaneo* or *evanesco*, compounded of *e* and *vaneo*, in Greek *φαίνω* to appear, signifies to go out of sight.

To disappear comprehends no particular mode of action; to vanish includes in it the idea of a rapid motion. A thing disappears either gradually or suddenly; it vanishes on a sudden: it disappears in the ordinary course of things; it vanishes by an unusual effort, a supernatural or a magic power. Any object that recedes or moves away will soon disappear; in fairy tales things are made to vanish the instant they are beheld. To disappear is often a temporary action; to vanish, generally, conveys the idea of being permanently lost to the sight. The stars appear and disappear in the firmament; lightning vanishes with a rapidity that is unequalled.

Red meteors run across th' ethereal space,
Stars disappear'd and comets took their place.

DRYDEN.

Whilst I was lamenting this sudden desolation that had been made before me, the whole scene vanished.—ADDISON.

To Disappoint, *v.* To defeat.

Disapprobation, *v.* Displeasure.

To Disapprove, Dislike.

To Disapprove is not to approve or to think not good.

To Dislike is not to like, or to find unlike or unsuitable to one's wishes.

Disapprove is an act of the judgement; dislike is an act of the will. To approve or disapprove is peculiarly the part of a superior, or one who determines the conduct of others; to dislike is altogether a personal act, in which the feelings of the individual are consulted. It is a misuse of the judgement to disapprove where we need only dislike; it is a perversion of the judgement to disapprove, because we dislike.

The poem (Samson Agonistes) has a beginning and an end, which Aristotle himself could not have disapproved, but it must be allowed to want a middle.—JOHNSON.

The man of peace will bear with many whose opinions or practices he dislikes, without an open and violent rupture.—BLAIR.

Disaster, *v.* Calamity.

To Disavow, Deny.

To Disavow is to avow that a thing is not; to Deny (*v.* To deny) is to assert that a thing is not.

A disavowal is a general declaration; a denial is a particular assertion; the former is made voluntarily and unasked for, the latter is always in direct answer to a charge; we disavow in matters of general interest where truth only is concerned; we deny in matters of personal interest where the character of feelings are implicated.

What is disavowed is generally in support of truth; what is denied may often be in direct violation of truth: an honest mind will always disavow whatever has been erroneously attributed to it; a timid person sometimes denies what he knows to be true from a fear of the consequences; many persons have disavowed being the author of the letters which are known under the name of Junius; the real authors who have denied their concern in it (as doubtless they have) availed themselves of the subterfuge, that since it was the affair of several, no one individually could call himself the author.

Dr. Solander disavows some of those narrations (in Hawkesworth's voyages), or at least declares them to be grossly misrepresented.—BEATTIE.

The king now denied his knowledge of the conspiracy against Rizzio, by public proclamations.—ROBERTSON.

Disbelief, Unbelief.

Disbelief properly implies the believing that a thing is not, or refusing to believe that it is. Unbelief expresses properly a believing the contrary of what one has believed before: disbelief is most applicable to the ordinary events of life; unbelief to serious matters of opinion: our disbelief of the idle tales which are told by beggars, is justified by the frequent detection of their falsehood; our Saviour had compassion on Thomas for his unbelief, and gave him such evidences of his identity, as dissipated every doubt.

The atheist has not found his post tenable, and is therefore retired into deism, and a disbelief of revealed religion only.—ADDISON.

The opposites to faith are unbelief and credulity.

TILLOTSON.

To Discard, *v.* To dismiss.

To Discern, *v.* To perceive.

Discernment, Penetration, Discrimination, Judgement.

Discernment expresses the judgement or power of *discerning* (v. *To perceive*).

Penetration denotes the act or power of *penetrating*, from *penetrate*, in Latin *penetratus* participle of *penetro* and *penetus* within, signifying to see into the interior.

Discrimination denotes the act or power of *discriminating*, from *discriminate*, in Latin *discriminatus* participle of *discrimino* to make a difference.

Judgement denotes the power of *judging*, from *judge*, in Latin *judico*, compounded of *jus* and *dico*, signifying to pronounce right.

The first three of these terms do not express different powers, but different modes of the same power; namely, the power of seeing intellectually, or exerting the intellectual sight.

Discernment is not so powerful a mode of intellectual vision as *penetration*; the former is a common faculty, the latter is a higher degree of the same faculty; it is the power of seeing quickly, and seeing in spite of all that intercepts the sight, and keeps the object out of view: a man of common *discernment* discerns characters which are not concealed by any particular disguise; a man of *penetration* is not to be deceived by any artifice, however thoroughly cloaked or secured, even from suspicion.

Discernment and *penetration* serve for the discovery of individual things by their outward marks; *discrimination* is employed in the discovery of differences between two or more objects; the former consists of simple observation, the latter combines also comparison: *discernment* and *penetration* are great aids towards *discrimination*; he who can discern the springs of human action, or *penetrate* the views of men, will be most fitted for *discriminating* between the characters of different men.

Although *judgement* derives much assistance from the three former operations, it is a totally distinct power: the former only discover the things that are, it acts on external objects by seeing them: the latter is creative; it produces by deduction from that which passes inwardly.* The former are speculative; they are directed to that which is to be known, and are confined to present objects, they serve to discover truth and falsehood, perfections and defects, motives and pretexts: the latter is practical; it is directed to that which is to be done, and extends its views to the future; it marks the relations and connections of things; it foresees their consequences and effects.

Of *discernment*, we say that it is clear; it serves to remove all obscurity and confusion: of *penetration*, we say that it is acute; it pierces every veil which falsehood draws before truth, and prevents us from being deceived: of *discrimination*, we say that it is nice; it renders our ideas accurate, and serves to prevent us from confounding objects: of *judgement*, we say that it is solid or sound; it renders the conduct prudent, and prevents us

from committing mistakes or involving one's self in embarrassments.

When the question is to estimate the real qualities of either persons or things, we exercise *discernment*; when it is required to lay open that which art or cunning has concealed, we must exercise *penetration*: when the question is to determine the proportions and degrees of qualities in persons or things, we must use *discrimination*; when called upon to take any step, or act any part, we must employ *judgement*. *Discernment* is more or less indispensable for every man in private or public station; he who has the most promiscuous dealings with men, has the greatest need of it; *penetration* is of peculiar importance for princes and statesmen: *discrimination* is of great utility for commanders, and all who have the power of distributing rewards and punishments: *judgement* is an absolute requisite for all to whom the execution or management of concerns is entrusted.

Cool age advances venerably wise,

Turns on all hands its deep *discerning eyes*.—POPE.

He is as slow to decide, as he is quick to apprehend, calmly and deliberately weighing every opposite reason that is offered, and tracing it with a most judicious *penetration*.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF PLINY.

Perhaps there is no character through all Shakspeare drawn with more spirit and just *discrimination* than Shylock's.—HENLEY.

I love him, I confess, extremely; but my affection does by no means prejudice my *judgement*.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF PLINY.

To Discharge, v. To dismiss.

Disciple, v. Scholar.

Discipline, v. Correction.

To Disclaim, Disown.

Disclaim and **Disown** are both personal acts respecting the individual who is the agent: to *disclaim* is to throw off a *claim*, as to *disown* (v. *To acknowledge*) is not to admit as one's own; as *claim*, from the Latin *clamo*, signifies to declare with a loud tone what we want as our own; so to *disclaim* is with an equally loud or positive tone, to give up a *claim*: this is a more positive act than to *disown*, which may be performed by insinuation, or by the mere abstaining to own.

He who feels himself disgraced by the actions that are done by his nation, or his family, will be ready to *disclaim* the very name which he bears in common with the offending party; an absurd pride sometimes impels men to *disown*, their relationship to those who are beneath them in external rank and condition: an honest mind will *disclaim* all right to praise which it feels not to belong to itself; the fear of ridicule sometimes makes a man *disown* that which would redound to his honour.

The thing call'd life, with ease I can *disclaim*,

And think it over-sold to purchase fame.—DRYDEN.

Here Priam's son, Deiphobus, he found,

He scarcely knew him, striving to *disown*

His blotted form, and blushing to be known.

DRYDEN.

To Disclose, v. To publish.

To Discompose, v. To disorder.

To Disconcert, v. To baffle.

* Vide Abbé Girard: "Discernment, judgement."

To Disconcert, *v. To disorder.*

To Discontinue, *v. To cease.*

Discord, Strife.

Discord derives its signification from the harshness produced in music by the clashing of two strings which do not suit with each other; whence in the moral sense, the chords of the mind which come into an unsuitable collision produce a *discord*.

Strife comes from the word *strive*, to denote the action of *striving*, that is, in an angry manner (*v. To contend*); where there is *strife*, there must be *discord*; but there may be *discord* without *strife*: *discord* consists most in the feeling; *strife* consists most in the outward action. *Discord* evinces itself in various ways; by looks, words, or actions; *strife* displays itself in words or acts of violence. *Discord* is fatal to the happiness of families; *strife* is the greatest enemy to peace between neighbours: *discord* arose between the Goddesses on the apple being thrown into the assembly; Homer commences his poem with the *strife* that took place between Agamemnon and Achilles.

Discord may arise from mere difference of opinion; *strife* is in general occasioned by some matter of personal interest; *discord* in the councils of a nation is the almost certain forerunner of its ruin; the common principles of politeness forbid *strife* among persons of good breeding.

Good Heav'n! what dire effects from civil *discord* flow.
DRYDEN.

Let men their days in senseless *strife* employ,
We in eternal peace and constant joy.—POPE.

Discord, *v. Dissension.*

To Discover, *v. To detect.*

To Discover, Manifest, Declare.

Discover signifies simply to take off the covering from any thing.

Manifest signifies to make *manifest* (*v. Apparent*).

Declare (*v. To declare*).

The idea of making known is conveyed by all these terms; but *discover* expresses less than *manifest*, and that than *declare*; we *discover* by indirect means or signs more or less doubtful; we *manifest* by unquestionable marks; we *declare* by express words; talents and dispositions *discover* themselves; particular feelings and sentiments *manifest* themselves; facts, opinions, and sentiments are *declared*: children early *discover* a turn for some particular art or science; a person *manifests* his regard for another by unequivocal proofs of kindness; a person of an open disposition is apt to *declare* his sentiments without disguise.

Things are said to *discover*, persons only *manifest* or *declare* in the proper sense; but they may be used figuratively; it is the nature of every thing subliminary to *discover* symptoms of decay more or less early; it is particularly painful when any one *manifests* an unfriendly disposition from whom we had reason to expect the contrary.

Several brute creatures *discover* in their actions something like a faint glimmering of reason.—ADDISON.

At no time perhaps did the legislature *manifest* a more tender regard to that fundamental principle of British constitutional policy, hereditary monarchy, than at the time of the revolution.—BURKE.

Langhorne, Boyer, and Powell, presbyterian officers who commanded bodies of troops in Wales, were the first that declared themselves against the parliament.—HUME.

To Discover, *v. To find.*

To Discover, *v. To uncover.*

To Discourage, *v. To deter.*

To Discourse, *v. To speak.*

Discredit, Disgrace, Reproach, Scandal.

Discredit signifies the loss of *credit*; **Disgrace**, the loss of grace, favour or esteem; **Reproach** stands for the thing that deserves to be *reproached*; and **Scandal** for the thing that gives *scandal* or offence.

The conduct of men in their various relations with each other may give rise to the unfavourable sentiment which is expressed in common by these terms. Things are said to reflect *discredit*, or *disgrace* to bring *reproach* or *scandal*, on the individual. These terms seem to rise in sense one upon the other: *disgrace* is a stronger term than *discredit*; *reproach* than *disgrace*; and *scandal* than *reproach*.

Discredit interferes with a man's *credit* or respectability; *disgrace* marks him out as an object of unfavourable distinction; *reproach* makes him a subject of *reproachful* conversation; *scandal* makes him an object of offence or even abhorrence. As regularity in hours, regularity in habits or modes of living, regularity in payments, are a *credit* to a family; so is any deviation from this order to its *discredit*: as moral rectitude, kindness, charity, and benevolence, serve to ensure the goodwill and esteem of men; so do instances of unfair dealing, cruelty, inhumanity, and an unfeeling temper, tend to the *disgrace* of the offender: as a life of distinguished virtue or particular instances of moral excellence may cause a man to be spoken of in strong terms of commendation; so will flagrant atrocities or a course of immorality cause his name and himself to be the general subject of *reproach*: as the profession of a Christian with a consistent practice is the greatest ornament which a man can put on so is the profession with an inconsistent practice the greatest deformity that can be witnessed; it is calculated to bring a *scandal* on the religion itself in the eyes of those who do not know and feel its intrinsic excellences.

Discredit depends much on the character, circumstances, and situation of those who *discredit* and those who are *discredited*. Those who are in responsible situations, and have had confidence reposed in them, must have a peculiar guard over their conduct not to bring *discredit* on themselves: *disgrace* depends on the temper of men's minds as well as collateral circumstances: where a nice sense of moral propriety is prevalent in any community, *disgrace* inevitably attaches to a deviation from good morals. *Reproach* and

scandal refer more immediately to the nature of the actions than the character of the persons: the former being employed in general matters; the latter mostly in a religious application: it is greatly to the *discredit* of all heads of public institutions, when they allow of abuses that interfere with the good order of the establishment, or divert it from its original purpose: in Sparta the slightest intemperance reflected great *disgrace* on the offender: in the present age, when the views of men on Christianity and its duties are so much more enlightened than they ever were, it is a *reproach* to every nation that continues to traffic in the blood of its fellow creatures: the blasphemous indecencies of which religious enthusiasts are guilty in the excess of their zeal is a *scandal* to all sober-minded Christians.

When a man is made up wholly of the dove without the least grain of the serpent in his composition, he becomes ridiculous in many circumstances of his life, and very often *discredits* his best actions.—ADDISON.

And where the vales with violets once were crown'd,
Now knotty briars and thorns *disgrace* the ground.
DRYDEN.

The cruelty of Mary's persecution equalled the deeds of those tyrants who have been the *reproach* to human nature.—ROBERTSON.

Oh! hadst thou died when first thou saw'st the light,
Or dy'd at least before thy nuptial rite;
A better fate than vainly thus to boast,
And fly the *scandal* of the Trojan host.—POPE.

Discretion, v. Judgement.

To Discriminate, v. To distinguish.

Discrimination, v. Discernment.

To Discuss, Examine.

Discuss, in Latin *discussus* participle of *discutio*, signifies to shake asunder or to separate thoroughly so as to see the whole composition.

Examine, in Latin *examine* comes from *examen* the middle beam or thread by which the poise of the balance is held, because the judgement holds the balance in examining.

The intellectual operation expressed by these terms is applied to objects that cannot be immediately discerned or understood, but they vary both in mode and degree. *Discussion* is altogether carried on by verbal and personal communication; *examination* proceeds by reading, reflection, and observation: we often *examine* therefore by *discussion*, which is properly one mode of *examination*: a *discussion* is always carried on by two or more persons; an *examination* may be carried on by one only: politics are a frequent though not always a pleasant subject of *discussion* in social meetings: complicated questions cannot be too thoroughly *examined*; *discussion* serves for amusement rather than for any solid purpose; the cause of truth seldom derives any immediate benefit from it, although the minds of men may become invigorated by a collision of sentiment: *examination* is of great practical utility in the direction of our conduct: all decisions must be partial, unjust, or imprudent, which are made without previous *examination*.

A country fellow distinguishes himself as much in the church-yard as a citizen does upon the change; the whole

parish politics being generally *discussed* in that place either after sermon or before the bell rings.—ADDISON.

Men follow their inclinations without *examining* whether there be any principles which they ought to form for regulating their conduct.—BLAIR.

Disdain, v. Haughtiness.

To Disdain, v. To contemn.

Disdainful, v. Contemptuous.

Disease, v. Disorder.

Diseased, v. Sick.

To Disengage, Disentangle, Extricate.

Disengage signifies to make free from an engagement.

Disentangle is to get rid of an entanglement.

Extricate, in Latin *extricatus*, from *ex* and *trica*, a hair, or noose, signifies to get as it were out of a noose. As to *engage* signifies simply to bind, and *entangle* signifies to bind in an involved manner, to *disentangle* is naturally applied to matters of greater difficulty and perplexity than to *disengage*: and as the term *extricate* includes the idea of that which would hold fast and keep within a tight involvement, it is employed with respect to matters of the greatest possible embarrassment and intricacy, we may be *disengaged* from an oath; *disentangled* from pecuniary difficulties; *extricated* from a suit at law: it is not right to expect to be *disengaged* from all the duties which attach to men as members of society: he who enters into disputes about contested property must not expect to be soon *disentangled* from law: when a general has committed himself by coming into too close a contact with a very superior force, he may think himself fortunate if he can *extricate* himself from his awkward situation with the loss of half his army.

In old age the voice of nature calls you to leave to others the bustle and contest of the world, and gradually to *disengage* yourselves from a burden which begins to exceed your strength.—BLAIR.

Savage seldom appeared to be melancholy but when some sudden misfortune had fallen upon him, and even then in a few moments he would *disentangle* himself from his perplexity.—JOHNSON.

Nature felt its inability to *extricate* itself from the consequences of guilt; the Gospel reveals the plan of Divine interposition and aid.—BLAIR.

To Disentangle, v. To disengage.

To Disfigure, v. To deface.

To Disgrace, v. To abase.

To Disgrace, v. To degrade.

To Disgrace, v. To discredit.

To Disgrace, v. To dishonour.

To Disguise, v. To conceal.

Disgust, Loathing, Nausea.

Disgust, from *dis* and *gust*, in Latin *gustus*, the taste, denotes the aversion of the taste to an object.

Loathing, v. To abhor.

Nausea, in Latin *nausea*, from the Greek *nav*, a ship, properly denotes sea sickness.

Disgust is less than *loathing*, and that than *nausea*. When applied to sensible objects we are disgusted with dirt; we *loathe* the smell of food if we have a sickly appetite; we *nauseate* medicine; and when applied metaphorically, we are *disgusted* with affectation: we *loathe* the endearments of those who are offensive: we *nauseate* all the enjoyments of life, after having made an imtemperate use of them, and discovered their inanity.

An enumeration of examples to prove a position which nobody denied, as it was from the beginning superfluous, must quickly grow *disgusting*.—JOHNSON.

Thus winter falls,
A heavy gloom oppressive o'er the world,
Through nature shedding influence malign,
The soul of man dies in him, *loathing* life. THOMSON.

Th' irreligious oil,
So gentle late and blandishing, in floods
Of raucid bile o'erflows: what tumults hence,
What horrors rise, were *nauseous* to relate. ARMSTRONG.

Disgust, *v. Dislike*.

To Dishearten, *v. To deter*.

Dishonest, Knavish.

Dishonest marks the contrary to *honest*: **Knavish** marks the likeness to a *knave*.

Dishonest characterizes simply the mode of action: *knavish* characterizes the agent as well as the action: what is *dishonest* violates the established laws of man; what is *knavish* supposes peculiar art and design in the accomplishment. It is *dishonest* to take any thing from another which does not belong to one; it is *knavish* to get it by fraud or artifice, or by imposing on the confidence of another. We may prevent *dishonest* practices by ordinary means of security; but we must not trust ourselves in the company of *knavish* people if we do not wish to be over-reached.

Gaming is too unreasonable and *dishonest* for a gentleman to addict himself to it.—LORD LYTLETON.

Not to laugh when nature prompts is but a *knavish* hypocritical way of making a mask of one's face.—POPE.

Dishonour, Disgrace, Shame.

Dishonour signifies what does away honour.

Disgrace, *v. To degrade*.

Shame signifies what produces *shame*.

Disgrace is more than *dishonour* and less than *shame*. The *disgrace* is applicable to those who are not sensible of the *dishonour*, and the *shame* for those who are not sensible of the *disgrace*. The tender mind is alive to *dishonour*; those who yield to their passions, or are hardened in their vicious courses, are alike insensible to *disgrace* or *shame*. *Dishonour* is seldom the consequence of any offence, or offered with any intention of punishing; it lies mostly in the consciousness of the individual. *Disgrace* and *shame* are the direct consequences of misconduct; but *disgrace* attaches to the punishment which lowers a person in his own eyes; *shame* to that which lowers him in the eyes of others: the former is not so degrading nor so exposed to notice as the

latter: a citizen feels it a *dishonour* not to be chosen to those offices of trust and honour for which he considers himself eligible: it is a *disgrace* to a school-boy to be placed the lowest in his class, which is heightened into *shame* if it brings him into punishment.

The fear of *dishonour* acts as a laudable stimulus to the discharge of one's duty; the fear of *disgrace* or *shame* serves to prevent the commission of vices or crimes. A soldier feels it a *dishonour* not to be placed at the post of danger, but he is not always sufficiently alive to the *disgrace* of being punished, nor is he deterred from his irregularities by the open *shame* to which he is sometimes put in the presence of his fellow-soldiers.

As epithets they likewise rise in sense, and are distinguished by other characteristics: a *dishonourable* action is that which violates the principles of honour; a *disgraceful* action is that which reflects *disgrace*; a *shameful* action is that of which one ought to be fully *ashamed*: it is very *dishonourable* for a man not to keep his word; very *disgraceful* for a gentleman to associate with those who are his inferiors in station and education; very *shameful* for him to use his rank and influence over the lower orders only to mislead them from their duty. A person is likewise said to be *dishonourable* who is disposed to bring *dishonour* upon himself: but things only are *disgraceful* or *shameful*. A *dishonourable* man renders himself an outcast among his equals; he must then descend to his inferiors, among whom he may become familiar with the *disgraceful* and the *shameful*: men of cultivation are alive to what is *dishonourable*; men of all stations are alive to that which is for them *disgraceful*, or to that which is in itself *shameful*. The sense of what is *dishonourable* is to the superior what the sense of the *disgraceful* is to the inferior; but the sense of what is *shameful* is independent of rank or station, and forms a part of that moral sense which is inherent in the breast of every rational creature. Whoever therefore cherishes in himself a lively sense of what is *dishonourable* or *disgraceful* is tolerably secure of never committing any thing that is *shameful*.

'Tis no *dishonour* for the brave to die.—DRYDEN.

I was secretly concerned to see human nature in so much wretchedness and *disgrace*, but could not forbear smiling to hear Sir Roger advise the old woman to avoid all communications with the devil.—ADDISON.

Where the proud theatres disclose the scene
Which interwoven Britons seem to raise,
And show the triumph which their *shame* displays. DRYDEN.

Disinclination, *v. Dislike*.

To Disjoin *v. To separate*.

To Disjoint, Dismember.

Disjoint signifies to separate at the joint.

Dismember signifies to separate the members.

The terms here spoken of derive their distinct meaning and application from the signification of the words *joint* and *member*. A limb of the body may be *disjointed* if it be so put out of the *joint* that it cannot act; but the body itself is *dismembered* when the different limbs or parts are separated from each other.

So in the metaphorical sense our ideas are said to be *disjointed* when they are so thrown out of their order that they do not fall in with one another; and kingdoms are said to be *dismembered* where any part or parts are separated from the rest.

Along the woods, along the morish fens,
Sighs the sad genius of the coming storm,
And up among the loose *disjointed* cliffs.

THOMSON.

Where shall I find his corpse? What earth sustains
His trunk *dismembered* and his cold remains?

DRYDEN.

And yet deluded man,
A scene of crude *disjointed* visions past,
And broken slumbers, rises still resolv'd,
With new flush'd hopes to run the giddy round.

THOMSON.

The kingdom of East Saxony was *dismembered* from that of Kent.—HUME.

Dislike, *v.* Aversion.

To Dislike, *v.* To disapprove.

Dislike, Displeasure, Dissatisfaction,
Distaste, Disgust.

Dislike, *v.* Aversion.

Displeasure signifies the opposite to pleasure.

Dissatisfaction is the opposite to satisfaction.

Distaste is the opposite to an agreeable taste.

Dislike and *dissatisfaction* denote the feeling or sentiment produced either by persons or things; *displeasure*, that produced by persons only; *distaste* and *disgust*, that produced by things only.

In regard to persons, *dislike* is the sentiment of equals and persons unconnected; *displeasure* and *dissatisfaction*, of superiors, or such as stand in some sort of relation to us. Strangers may feel a *dislike* upon seeing each other; parents or masters may feel *displeasure* or *dissatisfaction*: the former sentiment is occasioned by their supposed faults in character; the latter by their supposed defective services. I *dislike* a person for his *assumption* or loquacity; I am *displeased* with him for his carelessness, and *dissatisfied* with his labour. *Displeasure* is awakened by whatever is done amiss: *dissatisfaction* is caused by what happens amiss or contrary to our expectation. Accordingly the word *dissatisfaction* is not confined to persons of a particular rank, but to the nature of the connexion which subsists between them. Whoever does not receive what they think themselves entitled to from another are *dissatisfied*. A servant may be *dissatisfied* with the treatment he meets with from his master; and may be said therefore to express *dissatisfaction*, though not *displeasure*.

The jealous man is not indeed angry if you *dislike* another; but if you find those faults which are found in his own character, you discover not only your *dislike* of another, but of himself.—ADDISON.

The threatenings of conscience suggest to the sinner some deep and dark malignity contained in guilt, which has drawn upon his head such high *displeasure* from heaven.—BLAIR.

I do not like to see any thing destroyed: any void in society. It was therefore with no disappointment or *dissatisfaction* that my observation did not present to me any incorrigible vice in the noblesse of France.—BURKE.

In regard to things, *dislike* is a casual feeling not arising from any specific cause. A *dissatisfaction* is connected with our desires and expectations: we *dislike* the performance of an actor from one or many causes, or from no apparent cause; but we are *dissatisfied* with his performance if it fall short of what we were led to expect. In order to lessen the number of our *dislikes* we ought to endeavour not to *dislike* without a cause; and in order to lessen our *dissatisfaction* we ought to be moderate in our expectation.

Dislike, *distaste*, and *disgust*, rise on each other in their signification. *Distaste* expresses more than *dislike*: and *disgust* more than *distaste*. *Dislike* is a partial feeling, quickly produced and quickly subsiding; *distaste* is a settled feeling gradually produced, and permanent in its duration: *disgust* is either transitory or otherwise; momentarily or gradually produced, but stronger than either of the two others.

Caprice has a great share in our likes and *dislikes*: *distaste* depends upon the changes to which the constitution physically and mentally is exposed: *disgust* owes its origin to the nature of things and their natural operation on the minds of men. A child likes and *dislikes* his playthings without any apparent cause for the change of sentiment: after a long illness a person will frequently take a *distaste* to the food or the amusements which before afforded him much pleasure: what is indecent or filthy is a natural object of *disgust* to every person whose mind is not depraved. It is good to suppress unfounded *dislikes*: it is difficult to overcome a strong *distaste*: it is advisable to divert our attention from objects calculated to create *disgust*.

Dryden's *dislike* of the priesthood is imputed by Langbaine, and I think by Brown, to a repulse which he suffered when he solicited ordination.—JOHNSON.

Because true history, through frequent satiety and similitude of things, works a *distaste* and misprision in the minds of men, poesy cheereth and refresheth the soul, chanting things rare and various.—BACON.

Vice, for vice is necessary to be shown, should always *disgust*.—JOHNSON.

Dislike, Disinclination.

Dislike, *v.* Dislike.

Disinclination is the reverse of inclination (*v.* Attachment).

Dislike applies to what one has or does; *disinclination* only to what one does: we *dislike* the thing we have, or *dislike* to do a thing; but we are *disinclined* only to do a thing.

They express a similar feeling that differs in degree. *Disinclination* is but a small degree of *dislike*; *dislike* marks something contrary; *disinclination* does not amount to more than the absence of an inclination. None but a disobliging temper has a *dislike* to comply with reasonable requests; but the most obliging disposition may have an occasional *disinclination* to comply with a particular request.

Murmurs rise with mix'd applause,
Just as they favour or *dislike* the cause.—DRYDEN.

To be grave to a man's mirth, or inattentive to his discourse, argues a *disinclination* to be entertained by him.—STEELE.

Disloyalty, *v. Disaffection.*

Dismal, *v. Dull.*

To Dismantle, *v. To demolish.*

To Dismay, Daunt, Appal.

Dismay, in French *desmayer*, is probably changed from *desmouvoir*, signifying to move or pull down the spirit.

Daunt, changed from the Latin *domitus*, conquered, signifies to bring down the spirit.

Appal, compounded of the intensive *ap* or *ad* and *paleo* to grow pale, signifies to make pale with fear.

The effect of fear on the spirit is strongly expressed by all these terms; but *dismay* expresses less than *daunt*, and this than *appal*. We are *dismayed* by alarming circumstances; we are *daunted* by terrifying; we are *appalled* by horrid circumstances. A severe defeat will *dismay* so as to lessen the force of resistance: the fiery glare from the eyes of a ferocious beast will *daunt* him who was venturing to approach: the sight of an apparition will *appal* the stoutest heart.

So flies a herd of bees, that hear, *dismay'd*,
The lions roaring through the midnight shade.

POPE.

Jove got such heroes as my sire, whose soul
No fear could *daunt*, nor earth, nor hell controul.

POPE.

Now the last ruin the whole host *appal*;
Now Greece had trembled in her wooden walls,
But wise Ulysses call'd Tydides forth.—POPE.

To Dismember, *v. To disjoint.*

To Dismiss, Discharge, Discard.

Dismiss, in Latin *dimissus*, participle of *dimitto*, compounded of *di* and *mitto*, signifies to send asunder or away.

Discharge signifies to release from a charge.

Discard, in Spanish *descartar*, compounded of *des* and *cartar*, signifies to lay cards out or aside, to cast them off.

The idea of removing to a distance is included in all these terms; but with various collateral circumstances. *Dismiss* is the general term; *discharge* and *discard* are modes of dismissing: *dismiss* is applicable to persons of all stations, but used more particularly for the higher orders: *discharge* on the other hand is confined to those in a subordinate station. A clerk is *dismissed*; a menial servant is *discharged*: an officer is *dismissed*; a soldier is *discharged*.

Neither *dismiss* nor *discharge* define the motive of the action; they are used indifferently for that which is voluntary, or the contrary: *discard*, on the contrary, always marks a dismissal that is not agreeable to the party *discarded*. A person may request to be *dismissed* or *discharged*, but never to be *discarded*. The *dismissal* or *discharge* frees a person from the obligation or necessity of performing a certain duty; the *discarding* throws him out of a desirable rank or station.

Dismiss the people then, and give command
With strong repeat to hearten every band.—POPE.

In order to an accommodation, they agreed upon this preliminary, that each of them should immediately *dismiss* his privy councillor.—ADDISON.

Mr. Pope's errands were so frequent and frivolous that the footmen in time avoided and neglected him, and the Earl of Oxford *discharged* some of his servants for their obstinate refusal of his messages.—JOHNSON.

I am so great a lover of whatever is French, that I lately *discarded* an English admirer because he neither spoke that tongue nor drank claret.—BUDGELL.

They are all applied to things in the moral sense: we are said to *dismiss* our fears, to *discharge* a duty, and to *discard* a sentiment from the mind.

Resume your courage, and *dismiss* your care.—DRYDEN.

If I am bound to pay money on a certain day, I *discharge* the obligation if I pay it before twelve o'clock at night.—BLACKSTONE.

Justice *discards* party, friendship, and kindred.

ADDISON.

Disorder, *v. Confusion.*

To Disorder, Derange, Disconcert, Discompose.

Disorder signifies to put out of order.

Derange, from *de* and *range* or *rank*, signifies to put out of the rank in which it was placed.

Disconcert signifies to put out of the concert or harmony.

Discompose signifies to put out of a state of composure.

All these terms express the idea of putting out of order; but the three latter vary as to the mode or object of the action: The term *disorder* is used in a perfectly indefinite form, and might be applied to any object. As every thing may be in order, so may everything be *disordered*; yet it is seldom used except in regard to such things as have been in a natural order. *Derange* and *disconcert* are employed in speaking of such things as have been put into an artificial order. To *derange* is to *disorder* that which has been systematically arranged, or put in a certain range; and to *disconcert* is to *disorder* that which has been put together by concert or contrivance: thus the body may be *disordered*; a man's affairs or papers *deranged*; a scheme *disconcerted*. To *discompose* is a species of *derangement* in regard to trivial matters: thus a tucker, a frill, or a cap, may be *discomposed*. The slightest change of diet will *disorder* people of tender constitutions: misfortunes are apt to *derange* the affairs of the most prosperous: the unexpected return of a master to his home *disconcerts* the schemes which have been formed by the domestics: those who are particular as to their appearance are careful not to have any part of their dress *discomposed*.

When applied to the mind *disorder* and *derange* are said of the intellect; *disconcert* and *discompose* of the ideas or spirits: the former denoting a permanent state; the latter a temporary or transient state. The mind is said to be *disordered* when the faculty of ratiocination is in any degree interrupted; the intellect is said to be *deranged* when it is brought into a positive state of incapacity for action; persons are sometimes *disordered* in

their minds for a time by particular occurrences, who do not become actually *deranged*; a person is said to be *disconcerted* who suddenly loses his collectedness of thinking; he is said to be *discomposed* who loses his regularity of feeling. A sense of shame is the most apt to *disconcert*: the more irritable the temper the more easily one is *discomposed*.

Since devotion itself may *disorder* the mind, unless its heats are tempered with caution or prudence, we should be particularly careful to keep our reason as cool as possible.—ADDISON.

All passion implies a violent emotion of mind; of course it is apt to *derange* the regular course of our ideas.—BLAIR.

There are men whose powers operate only at leisure and in retirement; and whose intellectual vigor deserts them in conversation; whom mercurial confuses, and objection *disconcerts*.—JOHNSON.

But with the changeful temper of the skies,
As rains condense, and sunshiny rarefies,
So turn the species in their alter'd minds,
Compos'd by calms, and *discompos'd* by winds.
DRYDEN.

Disorder, Disease, Distemper, Malady.

Disorder signifies the state of being out of order.

Disease signifies the state of being ill at case.

Distemper signifies the state of being out of temper, or out of a due temperament.

Malady, from the Latin *malus* evil, signifies an ill.

All these terms agree in their application to the state of the animal body. *Disorder* is, as before (*v. To disorder*), the general term, and the other specific. In this general sense *disorder* is altogether indefinite; but in its restricted sense it expresses less than all the rest: it is the mere commencement of a *disease*: *disease* is also more general than the other terms, for it comprehends every serious and permanent *disorder* in the animal economy, and is therefore of universal application. The *disorder* is slight, partial, and transitory: the *disease* is deep rooted and permanent. The *disorder* may lie in the extremities: the *disease* lies in the humours and the vital parts. Occasional head-aches, colds, or what is merely cutaneous, are termed *disorders*; fevers, dropsies, and the like, are *diseases*. *Distemper* is used for such particularly as throw the animal frame most completely out of its temper or course, and is consequently applied properly to virulent *disorders*, such as the small-pox. *Malady* has less of a technical sense than the other terms; it refers more to the suffering than to the state of the body. There may be many *maladies* where there is no *disease*; but *diseases* are themselves in general *maladies*. Our *maladies* are frequently born with us; but our *diseases* may come upon us at any time of life. Blindness is in itself a *malady*, and may be produced by a *disease* in the eye. Our *disorders* are frequently cured by abstaining from those things which caused them; the whole science of medicine consists in finding out suitable remedies for our *diseases*; our *maladies* may be lessened with patience, although they cannot always be alleviated or removed by art.

All these terms may be applied with a

similar distinction to the mind as well as the body. The *disorders* are either of a temporary or a permanent nature; but unless specified to the contrary, are understood to be temporary: *diseases* consist in vicious habits: our *distempers* arise from the violent operations of passion: our *maladies* lie in the injuries which the affections occasion. Any perturbation in the mind is a *disorder*: avarice is a *disease*: melancholy is a *distemper* as far as it throws the mind out of its bias; it is a *malady* as far as it occasions suffering.

Strange *disorders* are bred in the mind of those men whose passions are not regulated by virtue.—ADDISON.

The jealous man's *disease* is of so malignant a nature that it converts all it takes into its own nourishment.—ADDISON.

A person that is crazed, though with pride or malice, is a sight very mortifying to human nature; but when the *distemper* arises from any indiscreet fervours of devotion, it deserves our compassion in a more particular manner.—ADDISON.

Phillips has been always praised without contradiction as a man modest, blameless, and pious, who bore narrowness of fortune without discontent, and tedious and painful *maladies* without impatience.—JOHNSON.

Disorderly, *v. Irregular*.

To Disown, *v. To deny*.

To Disown, *v. To disclaim*.

To Disparage, Detract, Traduce, Depreciate, Degrade, Decry.

Disparage, compounded of *dis* and *parage*, from *par* equal, signifies to make a thing unequal or below what it ought to be.

Detract, *v. To asperse*.

Traduce, in Latin *traduco* or *transduco*, signifies to carry from one to another that which is unfavourable.

Depreciate, from the Latin *pretium* a price, signifies to bring down the price.

Degrade, *v. To abase*.

Decry signifies to literally cry down.

The idea of lowering the value of an object is common to all these words, which differ in the circumstances and object of the action. *Disparagement* is the most indefinite in the manner: *detract* and *traduce* are specific in the forms by which an object is lowered; *disparagement* respects the mental endowments and qualifications: *detract* and *traduce* are said of the moral character; the former, however, in a less specific manner than the latter. We *disparage* a man's performance by speaking slightly of it: we *detract* from the merits of a person by ascribing his success to chance; we *traduce* him by handing about tales that are unfavourable to his reputation: thus authors are apt to *disparage* the writings of their rivals; or a soldier may *detract* from the skill of his commander; or he may *traduce* him by relating scandalous reports.

To *disparage*, *detract*, and *traduce*, can be applied only to persons, or that which is personal; *depreciate*, *degrade*, and *decry*, to whatever is an object of esteem; we *depreciate* and *degrade*, therefore, things as well as persons, and *decry* things: to *depreciate* is, however, not so strong a term as to *degrade*, for the language which is employed to *depreciate* will

be mild compared with that used for *degrading* : we may *depreciate* an object by implication, or in indirect terms ; but harsh and unseemly epithets are employed for *degrading* ; thus a man may be said to *depreciate* human nature who does not represent it as capable of its true elevation ; he *degrades* it who sinks it below the scale of rationality. We may *depreciate* or *degrade* an individual, a language, and the like ; we *decry* measures and principles : the former two are an act of an individual ; the latter is properly the act of many. Some men have such perverted notions that they are always *depreciating* whatever is esteemed excellent in the world : they whose interests have stifled all feelings of humanity have *degraded* the poor Africans, in order to justify the enslaving of them : political partisans commonly *decry* the measures of one party, in order to exalt those of another.

It is a hard and nice subject for a man to speak of himself ; it grates his own heart to say any thing of *disparagement*, and the reader's ears to hear any thing of praise from him.—COWLEY.

I have very often been tempted to write invectives upon those who have *detracted* from my works ; but I look upon it as a peculiar happiness that I have always hindered my resentments from proceeding to this extremity.—ADDISON.

Both Homer and Virgil had their compositions usurped by others ; both were envied and *traduced* during their lives.—WALSH.

The business of our modish French authors is to *depreciate* human nature, and consider it under its worst appearances.—ADDISON.

Akenside certainly retained an unnecessary and outrageous zeal for what he called and thought liberty ; a zeal which sometimes disguises from the world an envious desire of plundering wealth, or *degrading* greatness.—JOHNSON.

Ignorant men are very subject to *decry* those beauties in a celebrated work which they have not eyes to discover.—ADDISON.

To Disparage, Derogate, Degrade.

Disparage, *v.* To *disparage*.

Derogate, in Latin *derogatus*, from *derogo*, to repeal in part, signifies to take from a thing.

Degrade, *v.* To *abase*.

Disparage is here employed, not as the act of persons, but of things, in which case it is allied to *derogate*, but retains its indefinite and general sense as before ; circumstances may *disparage* the performances of a writer ; or they may *derogate* from the honours and dignities of an individual : it would be a high *disparagement* to an author to have it known that he had been guilty of plagiarism ; it *derogates* from the dignity of a magistrate to take part in popular measures. To *degrade* is here, as in the former case, a much stronger expression than the other two ; whatever *disparages* or *derogates* does but take away a part from the value ; but whatever *degrades* a thing sinks it many degrees in the estimation of those in whose eyes it is *degraded* ; in this manner religion is *degraded* by the low arts of its enthusiastic professors : whatever tends to the *disparagement* of learning or knowledge does injury to the cause of truth ; whatever *derogates* from the dignity of a man in any office is apt to *degrade* the office itself.

The man who scruples not breaking his word in little things, would not suffer in his own conscience so great pain for failures of consequence, as he who thinks every little offence against truth and justice a *disparagement*.—STEELE.

I think we may say, without *derogating* from those wonderful performances (the *Iliad* and *Æneid*), that there is an unquestionable magnificence in every part of *Paradise Lost*, and indeed a much greater than could have been formed upon any Pagan system.—ADDISON.

Of the mind that can deliberately pollute itself with ideal wickedness, for the sake of spreading the contagion in society, I wish not to conceal or excuse the depravity. Such *degradation* of the dignity of genius cannot be contemplated but with grief and indignation.—JOHNSON.

Disparity, Inequality.

Disparity, from *dis* and *par*, in Greek *παρά* with or by, signifies an unfitness of objects to be by one another.

Inequality, from the Latin *æquus*, even, signifies having no regularity.

Disparity applies to two objects which should meet or stand in coalition with each other ; *inequality* is applicable to those that are compared with each other : the *disparity* of age, situation, and circumstances, is to be considered with regard to persons entering into a matrimonial connection ; the *inequality* in the portion of labour which is to be performed by two persons, is a ground for the *inequality* of their recompense : there is a great *inequality* in the chance of success, where there is a *disparity* of acquisitions in rival candidates : the *disparity* between David and Goliath was such as to render the success of the former more strikingly miraculous ; the *inequality* in the conditions of men is not attended with a corresponding *inequality* in their happiness.

You formerly observed to me, that nothing made a more ridiculous figure in a man's life than the *disparity* we often find in him, sick and well.—POPE.

Inequality of behaviour, either in prosperity or adversity, are alike ungraceful in man that is born to die.—STEELE.

Dispassionate, Cool.

Dispassionate is taken negatively, it marks merely the absence of passion ; *Cool* (*v.* *Cool*) is taken positively, it marks an entire freedom from passion.

Those who are prone to be passionate must learn to be *dispassionate* ; those who are of a *cool* temperament will not suffer their passions to be roused. *Dispassionate* solely respects angry or irritable sentiments ; *cool* respects any perturbed feeling ; when we meet with an angry disputant it is necessary to be *dispassionate*, in order to avoid quarrels : in the moment of danger our safety often depends upon our *coolness*.

As to violence the lady (Madame D'Acier) has infinitely the better of the gentleman (M. de la Moitte). Nothing can be more polite, *dispassionate*, or sensible, than his manner of managing the dispute.—POPE.

I conceived this poem, and gave loose to a degree of resentment, which perhaps I ought not to have indulged, but which in a cooler hour I cannot altogether condemn.—COWPER.

To Dispatch, *v.* To hasten.

To Dispel, Disperse.

Dispel, from the Latin *pello* to drive, signifies to drive away.

Disperse signifies merely to cause to come asunder.

Dispel is a more forcible action than to *disperse*: we destroy the existence of a thing by *dispelling* it; we merely destroy the junction or cohesion of a body by *dispersing* it: the sun *dispels* the clouds and darkness; the wind *disperses* the clouds, or a surgeon *disperses* a tumour.

Dispel is used figuratively; *disperse* only in the natural sense; gloom, ignorance, and the like, are *dispelled*: books, people, papers, and the like, are *dispersed*.

As when a western whirlwind, charg'd with storms,
Dispels the gathering clouds that Notus forms.—POPE.
The foe *dispers'd*, their bravest warriors kill'd,
Fierce as a whirlwind now I swept the field.—POPE.

To Dispense, Distribute.

Dispense, from the Latin *pendo*, to pay or bestow, signifies to bestow in different directions; and **Distribute**, from the Latin *tribuo*, to bestow, signifies the same thing.

Dispense is an indiscriminate action; *distribute* is a particularizing action: we *dispense* to all; we *distribute* to each individually: nature *dispenses* her gifts bountifully to all the inhabitants of the earth; a parent *distributes* among his children different tokens of his parental tenderness.

Dispense is an indirect action that has no immediate reference to the receiver; *distribute* is a direct and personal action communicated by the giver to the receiver: Providence *dispenses* his favours to those who put a sincere trust in Him; a prince *distributes* marks of his favour and preference among his courtiers.

Though nature weigh our talents, and *dispense*
To every man his modicum of sense;
Yet much depends, as in the tiller's toil,
On culture, and the sowing of the soil.—COWPER.

Pray be no niggard in *distributing* my love plentifully
among our friends at the mans of court.—HOWEL.

To Disperse, v. To dispel.

To Disperse, v. To spread.

To Display, v. To show.

To Displease, Offend, Vex.

Displease (*v. Dislike, displeasure*) naturally marks the contrary of pleasing.

Offend, from the Latin *offendo*, signifies to stumble in the way of.

Vex, in Latin *veco*, is a frequentative of *veho*, signifying literally to toss up and down.

These words express the painful sentiment which is felt by the supposed impropriety of another's conduct.

Displease is not always applied to that which personally concerns ourselves; although *offend* and *vex* have always more or less of what is personal in them: a superior may be *displeased* with one who is under his charge for improper behaviour towards persons in general; he will be *offended* with him for disrespectful behaviour towards himself; circumstances as well as actions serve to *displease*; a supposed intention or design is requisite in order to *offend*: we may be *displeased* with a person, or at a thing; one is mostly *offended* with the person; a child may be *displeased* at not having any particular

liberty or indulgence granted to him; he may be *offended* with his play-fellow for an act of incivility or unkindness.

Displease respects mostly the inward state of feeling; *offend* and *vex* have most regard to the outward cause which provokes the feeling: a humourous person may be *displeased* without any apparent cause; but a captious person will at least have some avowed trifle for which he is *offended*. *Vex* expresses more than *offend*; it marks in fact frequent efforts to *offend*, or the act of *offending* under aggravated circumstances: we often unintentionally *displease* or *offend*; but he who *vexes* has mostly that object in view in so doing: any instance of neglect *displeases*; any marked instance of neglect *offends*; any aggravated instance of neglect *vexes*. The feeling of *displeasure* is more perceptible and vivid than that of *offence*; but it is less durable: the feeling of *vexation* is as transitory as that of *displeasure*, but stronger than either. *Displeasure* and *vexation* betray themselves by an angry word or look; *offence* discovers itself in the whole conduct: our *displeasure* is unjustifiable when it exceeds the measure of another's fault; it is a mark of great weakness to take *offence* at trifles; persons of the greatest irritability are exposed to the most frequent *vexations*.

As epithets they admit of a similar distinction: it is very *displeasing* to parents not to meet with the most respectful attentions from children, when they give them counsel; and such conduct on the part of children is highly *offensive* to God; when we meet with an *offensive* object, we do most wisely to turn away from it: when we are troubled with *vexatious* affairs, our best and only remedy is patience.

Meantime imperial Neptune heard the sound
Of raging billows breaking on the ground;
Displeas'd and fearing for his wat'ry reign,
He rear'd his awful head above the main.

DRYDEN.

Nathan's fable of the poor man and his lamb had so good an effect as to convey instruction to the ear of a king without *offending* it.—ADDISON.

These and a thousand mix'd emotions more,
From ever-changing views of good and ill,
Form'd infinitely various, *vex* the mind
With endless storm.—THOMSON.

Displeasure, v. Dislike.

Displeasure, Anger, Disapprobation.

Displeasure, v. Dislike.

Anger, v. Anger.

Disapprobation is the reverse of *approbation* (*v. Assent*).

Between *displeasure* and *anger* there is a difference both in the degree, the cause, and the consequence, of the feeling: *displeasure* is always a softened and gentle feeling; *anger* is always a harsh feeling, and sometimes rises to vehemence and madness. *Displeasure* is always produced by some adequate cause, real or supposed; but *anger* may be provoked by every or any cause, according to the temper of the individual: *displeasure* is mostly satisfied with a simple verbal expression; but *anger*, unless kept down with great force, always seeks to return evil for evil. *Displeasure* and *disapprobation* are to be compared in as much as they respect the conduct of those who are under the direction of others: *displeasure* is an

act of the will, it is an angry sentiment; *disapprobation* is an act of the judgment, it is an opposite opinion: any mark of self-will in a child is calculated to excite *displeasure*; a mistaken choice in matrimony may produce *disapprobation* in the parent.

Displeasure is always produced by that which is already come to pass; *disapprobation* may be felt upon that which is to take place: a master feels *displeasure* at the carelessness of his servant; a parent expresses his *disapprobation* of his son's proposal to leave his situation: it is sometimes prudent to check our *displeasure*; and mostly prudent to express our *disapprobation*: the former cannot be expressed without inflicting pain; the latter cannot be withheld when required without the danger of misleading.

Man is the merriest species of the creation, all above or below him are serious; he sees things in a different light from other beings, and finds his mirth arising from objects that perhaps cause something like pity or *displeasure* in a higher nature.—ADDISON.

From *anger* in its full import, protracted into malevolence and exerted in revenge, arise many of the evils to which the life of man is exposed.—JOHNSON.

The Queen Regent's brothers knew her secret *disapprobation* of the violent measures they were driving on.—ROBERTSON.

Disposal, Disposition.

These words derive their different meanings from the verb to *dispose* (*v. To dispose*), to which they owe their common origin.

Disposal is a personal act; it depends upon the will of the individual: *Disposition* is an act of the judgment; it depends upon the nature of the things.

The removal of a thing from one's self is involved in a *disposal*; the good order of the things is comprehended in their *disposition*. The *disposal* of property is in the hands of the rightful owner: the success of a battle often depends upon the right *disposition* of an army.

In the Reign of Henry the Second, if a man died without wife or issue, the whole of his property was at his own *disposal*.—BLACKSTONE.

In case a person made no *disposition* of such of his goods as were testable, he was and is said to die intestate.—BLACKSTONE.

To Dispose, Arrange, Digest.

Dispose, in French *disposer*, Latin *disposui*, preterite of *dispono* or *dis* and *pono*, signifies to place apart.

Arrange, *v. To class*.

Digest, in Latin *digestus* participle of *digero* or *dis* and *gero*, signifies to gather apart with design.

The idea of a systematic laying apart is common to all and proper to the word *dispose*.

We *dispose* when we *arrange* and *digest*; but we do not always *arrange* and *digest* when we *dispose*: they differ in the circumstances and object of the action. There is less thought employed in *disposing* than in *arranging* and *digesting*; we may *dispose* ordinary matters by simply assigning a place to each; in this manner trees are *disposed* in a row, but we *arrange* and *digest* by an intellectual effort; in the first case by putting those together which ought to go together; and in the latter case

by both separating that which is dissimilar, and bringing together that which is similar; in this manner books are *arranged* in a library according to their size or their subject; the materials for a literary production are *digested*; or the laws of the land are *digested*. What is not wanted should be neatly *disposed* in a suitable place; nothing contributes so much to beauty and convenience as the *arrangement* of every thing according to the way and manner in which they should follow: when writings are involved in great intricacy and confusion, it is difficult to *digest* them.

In an extended and moral application of these words, we speak of a person's time, talent, and the like, being *disposed* to a good purpose; of a man's ideas being purposely *arranged*, and of being *digested* into form. On the *disposition* of a man's time and property will depend in a great measure his success in life; on the *arrangement* of accounts greatly depends facility in conducting business; on the habit his of *digesting* our thoughts depends in a great measure correctness of thinking.

Then near the altar of the darning king,
Disposed in rank their hecatomb they bring.—POPE.

When a number of distinct images are collected by these erratic and hasty surveys, the fancy is busied in *arranging* them.—JOHNSON.

The marks and impressions of diseases, and the changes and devastations they bring upon the internal parts, should be very carefully examined and orderly *digested* in the comparative anatomy we speak of.—BACON.

To *Dispose*, *v. To place*.

Disposition, Temper.

Disposition from *dispose* (*v. To dispose*), signifies here the state of being *disposed*.

Temper, like *temperament*, from the Latin *temperamentum* and *tempero* to temper or manage, signifies the thing modelled or formed.

These terms are both applied to the mind and its bias; but *disposition* respects the whole frame and texture of the mind; *temper* respects only the bias or tone of the feelings.

Disposition is permanent and settled; *temper* is transitory and fluctuating. The *disposition* comprehends the springs and motives of actions; the *temper* influences the actions for the time being: it is possible and not infrequent to have a good *disposition* with a bad *temper*, and vice versa. A good *disposition* makes a man a useful member of society, but not always a good companion; a good *temper* renders him acceptable to all and peaceable with all, but essentially useful to none: a good *disposition* will go far towards correcting the errors of *temper*; but where there is a bad *disposition* there are no hopes of amendment.

My friend has his eye more upon the virtue and *disposition* of his children than their advancement or wealth.—STEELE.

The man who lives under an habitual sense of the Divine presence keeps up a perpetual cheerfulness of *temper*.—ADDISON.

Akenside was a young man warm with every notion that by nature or accident had been connected with the sound of liberty, and by an eccentricity which such *dispositions* do not easily avoid, a lover of contradiction, and no friend to anything established.—JOHNSON.

In coffee-houses a man of my *temper* is in his element for if he cannot talk he can be still more agreeable to his company as well as pleased in himself in being a hearer.—STEELE.

Disposition, Inclination.

Disposition in the former section is taken for the general frame of the mind; in the present case for its particular frame.

Inclination, v. Attachment.

Disposition is more positive than *inclination*. We may always expect a man to do that which he is *disposed* to do; but we cannot always calculate upon his executing that to which he is merely *inclined*.

We indulge a *disposition*; we yield to an *inclination*. The *disposition* comprehends the whole state of the mind at the time; an *inclination* is particular, referring always to a particular object. After the performance of a serious duty, no one is expected to be in a *disposition* for laughter or merriment: it is becoming to suppress our *inclination* to laughter in the presence of those who wish to be serious; we should be careful not to enter into controversy with one who shows a *disposition* to be unfriendly. When a young person discovers any *inclination* to study, there are hopes of his improvement.

It is the duty of every man who would be true to himself, to obtain if possible a *disposition* to be pleased.—STEELE.

There never was a time believe me, when I wanted an *inclination* to cultivate your esteem, and promote your interest.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

Disposition, v. Disposal.**To Disprove, v. To confute.****To Dispute, v. To argue.****To Dispute, v. To contend.****To Dispute, v. To controvert.****Dispute, v. Difference.****To Disregard, Neglect, Slight.**

Disregard signifies properly not to regard.

Neglect, in Latin *negelectus* participle of *negligo*, compounded of *neg*, and *lego*, not to choose.

Slight, from *light*, signifies to make light of or set light by.

We *disregard* the warnings, the words, or opinions of others; we *neglect* their injunctions or their precepts. To *disregard* results from the settled purpose of the mind; to *neglect* from a temporary forgetfulness or oversight. What is *disregarded* is seen and passed over; what is *neglected* is generally not thought of at the time required. What is *disregarded* does not strike the mind at all, what is *neglected* enters the mind only when it is before the eye: the former is an action employed on the present objects; the latter on that which is past: what we *disregard* is not esteemed; what we *neglect* is often esteemed but not sufficiently to be remembered or practised: a child *disregards* the prudent counsels of a parent; he *neglects* to use the remedies which have been prescribed to him.

Disregard and *neglect* are frequently not personal acts; they respect the thing more than the person; *slight* is altogether an intentional act towards an individual.

We *disregard* or *neglect* things often from a heedlessness of temper; the consequence

either of youth or habit: we *slight* a person from feelings of dislike or contempt. Young people should *disregard* nothing that is said to them by their superiors; nor *neglect* anything which they are enjoined to do; nor *slight* any one to whom they owe personal attention.

The new notion that has prevailed of late years that the Christian religion is little more than a good system of morality, must in course draw on a *disregard* to spiritual exercises.—GIBSON.

Beauty's a charm, but soon the charm will pass,

While lilies lie neglected on the plain;

While dusky hyacinths for use remain.—DRYDEN

When once devotion fancies herself under the influence of a divine impulse, it is no wonder she *slights* human ordinances.—ADDISON.

Dissatisfaction, v. Dislike.**To Dissemble, v. To conceal.****Dissembler, v. Hypocrite.****To Disseminate, v. To spread.****Dissension, Contention, Discord.**

Dissension marks either the act or the state of *dissenting*.

Contention marks the act of *contending* (v. *To contend*).

Discord, v. Contention.

A collision of opinions produces *dissension*; a collision of interests produces *contention*; a collision of humours produces *discord*. A love of one's own opinion, combined with a *disregard* for the opinions of others, gives rise to *dissension*; selfishness is the main cause of *contention*; and an ungoverned temper that of *discord*.

Dissension is peculiar to bodies or communities of men; *contention* and *discord* to individuals. A Christian temper of conformity to the general will of those with whom one is in connection would do away *dissension*; a limitation of one's desire to that which is attainable by legitimate means would put a stop to *contention*; a correction of one's impatient and irritable humour would check the progress of *discord*. *Dissension* tends not only to alienate the minds of men from each other, but to dissolve the bonds of society; *contention* is accompanied by anger, ill will, envy, and many evil passions; *discord* interrupts the progress of the kind affections, and bars all tender intercourse.

At the time the poem we are now treating of was written the *dissension* of the barons, who were then so many petty princes, ran very high.—ADDISON.

Because it is apprehended there may be great *contention* about precedence, the proposer humbly desires the assistance of the learned.—SWIFT.

But shall celestial *discord* never cease?

'Tis better ended in a lasting peace.—DRYDEN.

Dissension, v. Difference.**To Dissent, v. To differ.****Dissenter, v. Heretic.****Dissertation, v. Essay.****Dissimulation, v. Simulation.****To Dissipate, v. To spend.****Dissolute, v. Loose.**

Distant, Far, Remote.

Distant is employed as an adjunct or otherwise; **Far** is used only as an adverb. We speak of *distant* objects, or objects being *distant*; but we speak of things only as being *far*.

Distant, in Latin *distans* compounded of *di* and *stans* standing asunder, is employed only for bodies at rest; *far*, in German *fern*, most probably from *gefahren* participle of *fahren*, in Greek *πορευ* to go, signifies gone or removed away, and is employed for bodies either stationary or otherwise; hence we say that a thing is *distant*, or it goes, runs, or flies *far*.

Distant is used to designate great space; *far* only that which is ordinary: the sun is ninety-four millions of miles *distant* from the earth; a person lives not very *far* off, or a person is *far* from the spot.

Distant is used absolutely to express an intervening space. **Remote**, in Latin *remotus* participle of *removeo* to remove, rather expresses the relative idea of being gone out of sight. A person is said to live in a *distant* country or in a *remote* corner of any country.

They bear a similar analogy in the figurative application; when we speak of a *remote* idea it designates that which is less liable to strike the mind than a *distant* idea. A *distant* relationship between individuals is never altogether lost sight of; when the connection between objects is very *remote* it easily escapes observation.

It is a pretty saying of Thales, "Falsehood is just as *far distant* from truth as the ears from the eyes," by which he would intimate that a wise man would not easily give credit to the reports of actions which he has not seen.—SPECTATOR.

O might a parent's careful wish prevail,
Far, far from Ilion should thy vessels sail,
And thou from camps *remote* the danger shun,
Which now, alas! too nearly threatens my son.
POPE.

Distaste, *v. Dislike*.

Distemper, *v. Disorder*.

Distinct, *v. Different*.

Distinction, *v. Difference*.

Distinctly, *v. Clearly*.

To Distinguish, *v. To Abstract*.

To Distinguish, Discriminate.

Distinguish, *v. To Abstract*.

Discriminate, *v. Discernment*.

To *distinguish* is the general; to *discriminate* is the particular term: the former is an indefinite; the latter a definite action. To *discriminate* is in fact to *distinguish* specifically; hence we speak of a *distinction* as true or false, but of a *discrimination* as nice.

We *distinguish* things as to their divisibility or unity; we *discriminate* them as to their inherent properties; we *distinguish* things that are alike or unlike, to separate or collect them; we *discriminate* those that are different, for the purpose of separating one from the other: we *distinguish* by means of the senses as well as the understanding; we *discriminate* by the understanding only: we *distinguish* things by their colour, or we *dis-*

tinguish moral objects by their truth or falsehood; we *discriminate* the characters of men, or we *discriminate* their merits according to circumstances.

"'Tis easy to *distinguish* by the sight
The colour of the soil, and black from white.
DEYDEN.

A satire should expose nothing but what is corrigible; and make a due *discrimination* between those who are and those who are not the proper objects of it.—ADDISON.

To Distinguish, *v. To perceive*.

To Distinguish, *v. To signalize*.

Distinguished, Conspicuous, Noted, Eminent, Illustrious.

Distinguished signifies having a mark of *distinction* by which a thing is to be *distinguished* (*v. To abstract*).

Conspicuous, in Latin *conspicuus*, from *conspicio*, signifies easily to be seen.

Noted, from *notus* known, signifies well known.

Eminent, in Latin *eminens*, from *emineo* or *e* and *maneo*, signifies remaining or standing out above the rest.

Illustrious, in Latin *illustis*, from *lustrum* to shine, signifies shone upon.

The idea of an object having something attached to it to excite notice is common to all these terms. *Distinguished* in its general sense expresses little more than this idea: the rest are but modes of the *distinguished*. A thing is *distinguished* in proportion as it is distinct or separate from others; it is *conspicuous* in proportion as it is easily seen; it is *noted* in proportion as it is widely known. In this sense a rank is *distinguished*; a situation is *conspicuous*; a place is *noted*. Persons are *distinguished* by external marks or by characteristic qualities; persons or things are *conspicuous* mostly from some external mark; persons or things are *noted* mostly by collateral circumstances.

A man may be *distinguished* by his decorations, or he may be *distinguished* by his manly air, or by his abilities: a person is *conspicuous* by the gaudiness of his dress; a house is *conspicuous* that stands on a hill: a person is *noted* for having performed a wonderful cure; a place is *noted* for its fine waters.

We may be *distinguished* for things good, bad, or indifferent: we may be *conspicuous* for our singularities or that which only attracts vulgar notice: we may be *noted* for that which is bad, and mostly for that which is the subject for vulgar discourse: we can be *eminent* and *illustrious* only for that which is really good and praiseworthy; the former applies however mostly to those things which set a man high in the circle of his acquaintance; the latter to that which makes him shine before the world. A man of *distinguished* talent will be apt to excite envy if he be not also *distinguished* for his private virtue: affectation is never better pleased than when it can place itself in such a *conspicuous* situation as to draw all eyes upon itself: lovers of fame are sometimes contented to render themselves *noted* for their vices or absurdities: nothing is

more gratifying to a man than to render himself eminent for his professional skill : it is the lot of but few to be illustrious, and those few are very seldom to be envied.

In an extended and moral application, these terms may be employed to heighten the character of an object : a favour may be said to be distinguished, piety eminent, and a name illustrious.

Amidst the agitations of popular government, occasions will sometimes be afforded for eminent abilities to break forth with peculiar lustre. But while public agitations allow a few individuals to be uncommonly distinguished, the general condition of the public remains calamitous and wretched.—BLAIR.

Before the gate stood Pyrrhus, threatening loud,
With glittering arms conspicuous in the crowd.
DRYDEN.

Upon my calling in, lately at one of the most noted Temple coffee houses, I found the whole room, which was full of young students, divided into several parties, each of which was deeply engaged in some controversy.—BUDGE.

Of Prior, eminent as he was both by his abilities and station, very few memorials have been left by his cotemporaries.—JOHNSON.

Hail, sweet Saturnian soil of fruitful grain
Great parent, greater of illustrious men.—DRYDEN.

Next add our cities of illustrious name,
Their costly labour and stupendous frame.—DRYDEN.

To Distort, v. To turn.

Distracted, v. Absent.

Distress, v. Adversity.

To Distress, v. To afflict.

Distress, Anxiety, Anguish, Agony.

Distress, v. Adversity.

Anxiety, in French *anxiété*, and Anguish, in French *angoisse*, both come from the Latin *ango*, *anxi* to strangle.

Agony, in French *agonie*, Latin *agonia*, Greek *ayonia*, from *ayonizo* to contend or strive, signifies a severe struggle with pain and suffering.

Distress is the pain felt when in a strait from which we see no means of extricating ourselves ; anxiety that pain which one feels on the prospect of an evil. Distress always depends upon some outward cause ; anxiety often lies in the imagination. Distress is produced by the present, but not always immediate evil ; anxiety respects that which is future ; anguish arises from the reflection on the evil that is past ; agony springs from witnessing that which is immediate or before the eye.

Distress is not peculiar to any age ; where there is a consciousness of good and evil, pain and pleasure, distress will inevitably exist from some circumstance or another. Anxiety, anguish, and agony belong to riper years : infancy and childhood are deemed the happy periods of human existence ; because they are exempt from the anxieties attendant on every one who has a station to fill, and duties to discharge. Anguish and agony are species of distress, of the severer kind, which spring altogether from the maturity of reflection, and the full consciousness of evil. A child is in distress when it loses its mother, and the mother is also in distress when she misses her child. The station of a parent is, indeed, that which is most productive, not only of distress,

but anxiety, anguish, and agony : the mother has her peculiar anxieties for her child, whilst rearing it in its infant state ; the father has his anxiety for its welfare on its entrance into the world : they both suffer the deepest anguish when their child disappoints their dearest hopes, by running a career of vice, and finishing its wicked course by an untimely, and sometimes ignominious end : not unfrequently they are doomed to suffer the agony of seeing a child encircled in flames from which he cannot be snatched, or sinking into a watery grave from which he cannot be rescued.

How many, rack'd with honest passions, droop
In deep retir'd distress ! How many stand
Around the death-bed of their dearest friends,
And point the parting anguish.—THOMSON.

If you have any affection for me, let not your anxiety, on my account, injure your health.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICELO.

In the anguish of his heart, Adam expostulates with his Creator for having given him an unasked existence.—ADDISON.

These are the charming agonies of love,
Whose misery delights. But through the heart
Should jealousy its venom once diffuse,
'Tis then delightful misery no more,
But agony unmix'd.—THOMSON.

To Distress, Harass, Perplex.

Distress, v. Distress.

Harass, in French *harasser*, probably from the Greek *apaρσσω* to beat.

Perplex, in Latin *perplexus*, participle of *perplector*, compounded of *per* and *plector*, to wind round and entangle.

A person is distressed either in his outward circumstances or his feelings ; he is harassed mentally or corporeally ; he is perplexed in his understanding, more than in his feelings : a deprivation distresses ; provocations and hostile measures harass ; stratagems and ambiguous measures perplex ; a besieged town is distressed by the cutting off its resources of water and provisions ; the besieged are harassed by perpetual attacks ; the besiegers are perplexed in all their manoeuvres and plans, by the counter-manouvres and contrivances of their opponents ; a tale of woe distresses ; continual alarms and incessant labour harass ; unexpected obstacles and inextricable difficulties perplex.

We are distressed and perplexed by circumstances ; we are harassed altogether by persons, or the intentional efforts of others : we may relieve another in distress, or may remove a perplexity ; but the harassing ceases only with the cause which gave rise to it.

O friend ! Ulysses' shouts invade my ear ;
Distress'd he seems, and no assistance near.—POPE.

Persons who have been long harassed with business and care sometimes imagine that when life declines, they cannot make their retirement from the world too complete.—BLAIR.

Would being end with our expiring breath,
How soon misfortunes would be puff'd away.
A trifling shock can shiver us to the dust,
But th' existence of the immortal soul,
Futurity's dark road perplexes still.
GENTLEMAN.

To Distribute, v. To dispense.

To Distribute, v. To divide.

District, Region, Tract, Quarter.

District, in Latin *districtus*, from *distingo* to bind separately, signifies a certain part marked off specifically.

Region, in Latin *regio* from *rego* to rule, signifies a portion that is within rule.

Tract, in Latin *tractus*, from *traho* to draw, signifies a part drawn out.

Quarter signifies literally a fourth part.

These terms are all applied to country; the former two comprehending divisions marked out on political grounds: the latter a geographical or an indefinite division: *district* is smaller than a *region*; the former refers only to part of a country, the latter frequently applies to a whole country: a *quarter* is indefinite, and may be applied either to a *quarter* of the world or a particular neighbourhood: a *tract* is the smallest portion of all, and comprehends frequently no more than what may fall within the compass of the eye. We consider a *district* only with relation to government: every magistrate acts within a certain *district*: we speak of a *region* when considering the circumstances of climate, or the natural properties which distinguish different parts of the earth, as the *regions* of heat and cold: we speak of the *quarter* simply to designate a point of the compass; as a person lives in a certain *quarter* of the town that is north, or south-east, or west, &c., and so also in an extended application, we say, to meet with opposition in an unexpected *quarter*: we speak of a *tract* to designate the land that runs on in a line as a mountainous *tract*.

The very inequality of representation, which is so foolishly complained of, is perhaps the very thing which prevents us from thinking or acting as members for *districts*.—BURKE.

Between those *regions* and our upper light

Deep forests and impenetrable night

Possess the middle space.—DRYDEN.

My timorous muse

Unambitious *tracts* pursues.—COWLEY.

There is no man in any rank who is always at liberty to act as he would incline. In some *quarter* or other he is limited by circumstances.—BLAIR.

Distrustful, Suspicious, Diffident.

Distrustful signifies full of *distrust*, or not putting *trust* in (*v. Belief*).

Suspicious signifies having *suspicion*, from the Latin *suspicio*, or *sub* and *specio* to look at askance, or with a wry mind.

Diffident, from the Latin *diffido* or *disfido*, signifies having no faith.

Distrustful is said either of ourselves or others; *suspicious* is said only of others; *diffident* only of ourselves: to be *distrustful* of a person is to impute no good to him; to be *suspicious* of a person is to impute positive evil to him; he who is *distrustful* of another's honour or prudence will abstain from giving him his confidence; he who is *suspicious* of another's honesty will be cautious to have no dealings with him. *Distrustful* is a particular state of feeling; *suspicious* an habitual state of feeling: a person is *distrustful* of another, owing to particular circumstances: he is *suspicious* from his natural temper.

As applied to himself, a person is *distrustful*

of his own powers, to execute an office assigned, or he is generally of a *diffident* disposition: it is faulty to *distrust* that in which we ought to trust; there is nothing more criminal than a *distrust* in Providence; on the other hand, there is nothing better than a *distrust* in our own powers to withstand temptation: *suspicion* is justified more or less according to circumstances; but a too great proneness to *suspicion* is liable to lead us into many acts of injustice towards others: *diffidence* is becoming in youth, so long as it does not check their laudable exertions.

Before strangers, Pitt had something of the scholar's timidity and *distrust*.—JOHNSON.

And oft, though wisdom wake, *suspicion* sleeps

At wisdom's gate, and to simplicity

Resigns his charge.—MILTON.

As an actor, Mr. Cunningham obtained little reputation, for his *diffidence* was too great to be overcome.—JOHNSON.

To Disturb, Interrupt.

Disturb (*v. Commotion*).!

Interrupt, from the Latin *inter* and *rumpo*, signifies to break in between so as to stop the progress.

We may be *disturbed* either inwardly or outwardly; we are *interrupted* only outwardly: our minds may be *disturbed* by disquieting reflections, or we may be *disturbed* in our rest or in our business by unseemly noises; but we can be *interrupted* only in our business or pursuits: the *disturbance* therefore depends upon the character of the person; what *disturbs* one man will not *disturb* another: an *interruption* is however something positive; what *interrupts* one person will *interrupt* another: the smallest noises may *disturb* one who is in bad health; illness or the visits of friends will *interrupt* a person in any of his business.

The same distinction exists between these words when applied to things as to persons: whatever is put out of its order or proper condition is *disturbed*; thus water which is put into motion from a state of rest is *disturbed*: whatever is stopped in the evenness or regularity of its course is *interrupted*; thus water which is turned out of its ordinary channel is *interrupted*.

If aught *disturb* the tenor of his breast,

'Tis but the wish to strike before the rest.—POPE.

The foresight of the hour of death would continually *interrupt* the course of human affairs.—BLAIR.

To Disturb, v. To trouble.

Disturbance, v. Commotion.

To Dive, v. To plunge.

To Dive Into, v. To pry.

Divers, v. Different.

Diversion, v. Amusement.

Diversity, v. Difference.

To Divert, v. To amuse.

Diverted, v. Absent.

To Divide, Separate, Part.

Divide, in Latin *divideo*, compounded of *di* and *video*, signifies to make appear as *apart* or two, or to make really two.

Separate, v. Abstract.**Part** signifies to make into parts.

That is said to be *divided* which has been or is conceived to be a whole; that is *separated* which might be joined: a river *divides* a town by running through it; mountains or seas *separate* countries: to *divide* does not necessarily include a *separation*; although a *separation* supposes a *division*: an army may be *divided* into larger or smaller portions, and yet remain united; but during a march, or an engagement, these companies are frequently *separated*.

Opinions, hearts, minds, &c., may be *divided*: corporeal bodies only are *separated*: the minds of men are often most *divided* when in person they are least *separated*; and those, on the contrary, who are *separated* at the greatest distance from each other may be the least *divided*.

If we *divide* the life of most men into twenty parts, we shall find at least nineteen of them filled with gaps and chasms which are neither filled up with pleasure or business.—ADDISON.

Where there is the greatest and most honourable love, it is sometimes better to be joined in death than *separated* in life.—STEELE.

To *part* approaches nearer to *separate* than to *divide*: the latter is applied to things only; the two former to persons, as well as things: a thing becomes smaller by being *divided*; it loses its junction with, or cohesion to, another thing by being *parted*. a loaf of bread is *divided* by being cut into two; two loaves are *parted* which have been baked together.

Sometimes *part*, as well as *divide*, is used in the application of that which is given to several, in which case they bear the same analogy as before: several things are *parted*, one thing is *divided*: a man's personal effects may be *parted*, by common consent, among his children; but his estate, or the value of it, must be *divided*; whatever can be disjoined without losing its integrity is *parted*, otherwise it is *divided*: in this sense, our Saviour's garments are said to have been *parted*, because they were distinct things; but the vesture which was without seam must have been *divided* if they had not cast lots for it.

As disjunction is the common idea attached to both *separate* and *part*, they are frequently used in relation to the same objects: houses may be both *separated* and *parted*; they are *parted* by that which does not keep them at so great a distance, as when they are said to be *separated*: two houses are *parted* by a small opening between them; they are *separated* by an intervening garden: fields are with more propriety said to be *separated*; rooms are said more properly to be *parted*.

With regard to persons, *part* designates the actual leaving of the person; *separate* is used in general for that which lessens the society; the former is often casual, temporary, or partial; the latter is positive and serious: the *parting* is momentary; the *separation* may be longer or shorter: two friends *part* in the streets after a casual meeting; two persons *separate* on the road who had set out to travel together: men and their wives often *part* without coming to a positive *separation*: some couples are *separated* from each other in every respect but that of being directly *parted*:

the moment of *parting* between friends is often more painful than the *separation* which afterwards ensues.

I pray let me retain some room, though never so little, in your thoughts, during the time of this our *separation*.—HOWELL.

The prince pursued the *parting* deity
With words like these, "Ah whither do you fly?"
Unkind and cruel to deceive your son.—DRYDEN.

To Divide, Distribute, Share.**Divide, v. To divide, separate.**

Distribute, v. In Latin *distributus*, from *distribuo*, or *dis* and *tribuo*, signifies to bestow a part.

Share, from the word *shear*, and the German *scheeren*, signifies simply to cut.

The act of *dividing* does not extend beyond the thing *divided*; that of *distributing* and *sharing* comprehends also the purpose of the action: we *divide* the thing; we *distribute* to the person: we may *divide* therefore without *distributing*; or we may *divide* in order to *distribute*; thus we *divide* our lands into distinct fields for our private convenience; or we *divide* a sum of money into so many parts, in order to *distribute* it among a given number of persons: on the other hand, we may *distribute* without *dividing*; for money, books, fruit, and many other things may be *distributed*, which require no *division*.

To *share* is to make into parts the same as *divide*, and it is to give those parts to some persons, the same as *distribute*; but the person who *shares* takes a part himself; he who *distributes* gives it always to others: a loaf is *divided* in order to be eaten; bread is *distributed* in loaves among the poor; the loaf is *shared* by a poor man with his poorer neighbour, or the profits of a business are *shared* by the partners.

To *share* may imply either to give or receive; to *distribute* implies giving only; we *share* our own with another: or another *shares* what we have; but we *distribute* our own to others.

Nor cease your sowing till mid winter ends,
For this, through twelve bright signs Apollo guides
The year, and earth in several climes *divides*.
DRYDEN.

Two urns by Jove's high throne have ever stood,
The source of evil one, and one of good;
From thence the cup of mortal man he fills,
Blessings to these, to those *distributes* ill.—POPE.

Why grieves my son? Thy anguish let me *share*,
Reveal the cause, and trust a parent's care.—POPE.

They will be so much the more careful to determine properly, as they shall (will) be obliged to *share* the expenses of maintaining the masters.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF PLINY.

Divine, v. Ecclesiastic.**Divine, v. Godlike.****To Divine, v. To guess.****Divine, v. Holy.****Divinity, v. Deity.****Division, v. Part.****Diurnal, v. Daily.****To Divulge, v. To publish.****To Do, v. To act.****To Do, v. To make.**

Docile, Tractable, Ductile.

Docile, in Latin *docilis*, from *doceo* to teach, is the Latin term for ready to be taught.

Tractable, from the Latin *traho* to draw, signifies ready to be drawn.

Ductile from *duco* to lead, signifies ready to be led.

The idea of submitting to the directions of another is comprehended in the signification of all these terms: *docility* marks the disposition to conform our actions in all particulars to the will of another, and lies altogether in the will; *tractability* and *ductility* are modes of *docility*, the former in regard to the conduct, the latter in regard to the principles and sentiments: *docility* is in general applied to the ordinary actions of the life, where simply the will is concerned; *tractability* is applicable to points of conduct in which the judgment is concerned; *ductility* to matters in which the character is formed: a child ought to be *docile* with its parents at all times; it ought to be *tractable* when acting under the direction of its superiors; it ought to be *ductile* to imbibe good principles: the want of *docility* may spring from a defect in the disposition; the want of *tractableness* may spring either from a defect in the temper or from self-conceit; the want of *ductility* lies altogether in a natural stubbornness of character: *docility*, being altogether independent of the judgment, is applicable to the brutes as well as to men; *tractableness* and *ductility* is applicable mostly to thinking and rational objects only, though sometimes extended to inanimate or moral objects: the ox is a *docile* animal; the humble are *tractable*; youth is *ductile*.

The Persians are not wholly void of martial spirit; and if they are not naturally brave, they are at least extremely *docile*, and might with proper discipline be made excellent soldiers.—SIR WM. JONES.

Their reindeer form their riches: these their tents,
Their robes, their beds, and all their homely wealth,
Supply their wholesome fare, and cheerful cups;
Obsequious at their call, the *docile* tribe
Yield to the sledge their necks.—THOMSON.

The people without being servile, must be *tractable*.—BURKE.

The will was then (before the fall) *ductile* and pliant to all the motions of right reason.—SOUTH.

Doctrine, Precept, Principle.

Doctrine, in French *doctrine*, Latin *doctrina*, from *doceo* to teach, signifies the thing taught.

Precept, from the Latin *præcipio*, signifies the thing laid down.

Principle, in French *principe*, Latin *principium* signifies the beginning of things, that is, their first or original component parts.

A *doctrine* requires a teacher; a *precept* requires a superior with authority; a *principle* requires only an illustrator. A *doctrine* is always framed by some one; a *precept* is enjoined or laid down by some one; a *principle* lies in the thing itself. A *doctrine* is composed of *principles*; a *precept* rests upon *principles* or *doctrines*. Pythagoras taught the *doctrine* of the metempsychosis, and enjoined many *precepts* on his disciples for the regulation of their conduct, particularly that they should

abstain from eating animal food, and be only silent hearers for the first five years of their scholarship: the former of these rules depended upon the preceding doctrine of the soul's transmigration to the bodies of animals; the latter rested on that simple *principle* of education, the entire devotion of the scholar to the master.

We are said to believe in *doctrines*; to obey *precepts*; to imbibe or hold *principles*. *Doctrine* is that which constitutes our faith; *precepts* are that which directs the practice: both are the subjects of rational assent, and suited only to the matured understanding; *principles* are often admitted without examination; and imbibed as frequently from observation and circumstances as from any direct personal efforts; children as well as men acquire *principles*.

This seditious, unconstitutional *doctrine* of electing kings is now publicly taught, avowed, and printed.—BURKE.

Pythagoras's first rule directs us to worship the gods, as is ordained by law, for that is the most natural interpretation of the *precept*.—ADDISON.

If we had the whole history of zeal, from the days of Cain to our times, we should see it filled with many scenes of slaughter and bloodshed, as would make a wise man very careful not to suffer himself to be actuated by such a *principle*, when it regards matters of opinion and speculation.—ADDISON.

Doctrine, Dogma, Tenet.

A *Doctrine* originates with an individual.

Dogma, from the Greek *δογμα* and *δοκεω* to think, signifies something thought, admitted, or taken for granted; this lies with a body or number of individuals.

Tenet, from the Latin *teneo* to hold or maintain, signifies the thing held or maintained, and is a species of principle (*v. Doctrine*) specifically maintained in matters of opinion by persons in general.

A *doctrine* rests on the authority of the individual by whom it is framed; the *dogma* on the authority of the body by whom it is maintained; a *tenet* rests on its own intrinsic merits. Many of the *doctrines* of our blessed Saviour are held by faith in him; they are subjects of persuasion by the exercise of our rational powers: the *dogmas* of the Romish church are admitted by none but such as admit its authority: the *tenets* of republicans, levellers, and freethinkers have been unblushingly maintained both in public and private.

Unpractic'd he to fawn or seek for pow'r

By *doctrines* fashion'd to the varying hour;

Far other aims his heart had learn'd to prize,

More skill'd to raise the wretched than to rise.

GOLDSMITH.

There are in England abundance of men who tolerate in the true spirit of toleration. They think the *dogmas* of religion, though in different degrees, are all of moment, and that amongst them there is, as amongst all things of value, a just ground of preference.—BURKE.

One of the puritanical *tenets* was the illegality of all games of chance.—JOHNSON.

Dogma, v. Doctrine.

Dogmatical, v. Confident.

Doleful, v. Pitiful.

Domestic, v. Servant.

Domineering, v. Imperious.

Dominion, v. Power.

Dominions, v. Territory.

Donation, v. Benefaction.

Donation, v. Gift.

Doom, v. Destiny.

Double-Dealing, v. Deceit.

Doubt, v. Demur.

To Doubt, Question.

Doubt, in French *douter*, Latin *dubito* from *dubius*, which comes from *dvo* and *εὑρισκω*, in the same manner as our frequentative double, signifying to have two opinions.

Question, in Latin *questio*, from *quæro* to inquire, signifies to make a question.

Both these terms express the act of the mind in staying its decision. *Doubt* lies altogether in the mind; it is a less active feeling than *question*: by the former we merely suspend decision; by the latter we actually demand proofs in order to assist us in deciding. We may *doubt* in silence; we cannot *question* without expressing it directly or indirectly.

He who suggests *doubts* does it with caution; he who makes a *question* throws in difficulties with a degree of confidence. *Doubts* insinuate themselves into the mind oftentimes involuntarily on the part of the *doubter*; *questions* are always made with an express design. We *doubt* in matters of general interest, on abstruse as well as common subjects: we *question* mostly in ordinary matters that are of a personal interest: we *doubt* the truth of a position: we *question* the veracity of an author. The existence of mermaids was *doubted* for a great length of time; but the testimony of creditable persons who have lately seen them, ought now to put it out of all *doubt*. When the practicability of any plan is *questioned*, it is unnecessary to enter any farther into its merits.

The *doubt* is frequently confined to the individual; the *question* frequently respects others. We *doubt* whether we shall be able to succeed: we *question* another's right to interfere: we *doubt* whether a thing will answer the end proposed; we *question* the utility of anyone making the attempt.

There are many *doubtful* cases in medicine, where the physician is at a loss to decide: there are many *questionable* measures proposed by those who are in or out of power which demand consideration. A disposition to *doubt* everything is more inimical to the cause of truth than the readiness to believe everything; a disposition to *question* whatever is said or done by others, is much more calculated to give offence than to prevent deception.

For my part I think the being of a God is so little to be *doubted*, that I think it is almost the only truth we are sure of.—ADDISON.

Our business in the field of fight
Is not to *question*, but to prove our might.—POPE.

Doubt, Suspense.

Doubt respects that which we should believe: **Suspense** that which we wish to know or ascertain. We are in *doubt* for the want of evidence; we are in *suspense* for the want of certainty. *Doubt* interrupts our progress in the attainment of truth; *suspense* impedes us in the attainment of our objects: the former is connected principally with the understanding; the latter acts altogether upon the hopes. We have our *doubts* about things that have no regard to time: we are in *suspense* about what is to happen in future. Those are the least inclined to *doubt* who have the most thorough knowledge of a subject; those are the least exposed to the unpleasant feeling of *suspense* who confine their wishes to the present.

Gold is a wonderful clearer of the understanding; it dissipates every *doubt* and scruple in an instant.—ADDISON.

The bundle of hay on either side striking his (the ass's) sight and smell in the same proportion, would keep him in perpetual *suspense*.—ADDISON.

Doubtful, Dubious, Uncertain, Precarious.

The **Doubtful** admits of doubt (v. *Doubt*, *suspense*): the **Dubious** creates suspense. The *doubtful* is said of things in which we are required to have an opinion; the *dubious* respects events and things that must speak for themselves. In *doubtful* cases it is advisable for a judge to lean to the side of mercy; while the issue of a contest is *dubious*, all judgment of the parties, or of the case, must be carefully avoided.

Doubtful and *dubious* have always a relation to the person forming the opinion on the subject in question; **Uncertain** and **Precarious** are epithets which designate the qualities of the things themselves. Whatever is *uncertain* may from that very circumstance be *doubtful* or *dubious* to those who attempt to determine upon them; but they may be designated for their *uncertainty* without any regard to the opinions which they may give rise to.

A person's coming may be *doubtful* or *uncertain*; the length of his stay is oftener described as *uncertain* than as *doubtful*. The *doubtful* is opposed to that on which we form a positive conclusion; the *uncertain* to that which is definite or prescribed. The efficacy of any medicine is *doubtful*; the manner of its operation may be *uncertain*. While our knowledge is limited, we must expect to meet with many things that are *doubtful*; as everything in the world is exposed to change, and all that is future is entirely above our control, we must naturally expect to find everything *uncertain*, but what we see passing before us.

Precarious, from the Latin *precarious* and *precor* to pray, signifies granted to entreaty, depending on the will or humour of another, whence it is applicable to whatever is obtained from others. *Precarious* is the highest species of *uncertainty*, applied to such things as depend on future casualties in opposition to that which is fixed and determined by design. The weather is *uncertain*; the subsistence of

a person who has no stated income or source of living must be *precarious*. It is *uncertain* what day a thing may take place, until it is determined; there is nothing more *precarious* than what depends upon the favours of princes.

The Greeks with stain Tlepolemus retir'd,
Whose fall Ulysses view'd with fury fir'd:
Doubtful if Jove's great son he should pursue,
Or pour his vengeance on the Lycian crew.—POPE.

At the lower end of the room is to be a side-table for persons of great fame, but *dubious* existence; such as Hercules, Theseus, Aeneas, Achilles, Hector, and others.—SWIFT.

Near old Antandros, and at Ida's foot,
The timber of the sacred grove we cut;
And build our fleet *uncertain*, yet to find
What place the Gods for our repose assign'd.
DRYDEN.

The frequent disappointments incident to hunting, induced men to establish a permanent property in their flocks and herds, in order to sustain themselves in a less *precarious* manner.—BLACKSTONE.

Downfall, v. Fall.

To Doze, v. To sleep.

To Drag, v. To draw.

To Drain, v. To spend.

**To Draw, Drag, Haul, or Hale,
Pull, Pluck, Tug.**

Draw comes from the Latin *traho* to draw, and the Greek *δρασσω* to lay hold of.

Drag, through the medium of the German *tragen* to carry, comes also from *traho* to draw.

Haul or Hale comes from the Greek *ελαω* to draw.

Pull is in all probability changed from *pello* to drive or thrust.

Pluck is in the German *plucken*, &c.

Tug comes from *ziehen* to pull.

Draw expresses here the idea common to the first three terms, namely, of putting a body in motion from behind one's self or towards one's self; to *drag* is to *draw* a thing with violence, or to *draw* that which makes resistance; to *haul* is to *drag* it with still greater violence. We *draw* a cart; we *drag* a body along the ground; or *haul* a vessel to the shore. To *pull* signifies only an effort to *draw* without the idea of motion: horses *pull* very long sometimes before they can *draw* a heavily laden cart up hill. To *pluck* is to *pull* with a sudden twitch, in order to separate; thus feathers are *plucked* from animals. To *tug* is to *pull* with violence; thus men *tug* at the oar.

Furious he said, and tow'rd the Grecian crew,
(Seiz'd by the crest) the unhappy warrior *draw*:
Struggling he follow'd, while th' embroider'd thong,
That ty'd his helmet, *drag'd* the chief along.—POPE.

Some hoisting levers, some the wheels prepare,
And fasten to the horse's feet; the rest
With cables *haul* along the unwieldy beast.
DRYDEN.

Two magnets are placed, one of them in the roof and the other in the floor of Mahomet's burying-place at Mecca, and *pull* the impostor's iron coffin with such an equal attraction, that it hangs in the air between both of them.—ADDISON.

Even children follow'd with endearing wile,
And *pluck'd* his gown to share the good man's smile.
GOLDSMITH.

Clear'd, as I thought, and fully fix'd at length,
To learn the cause, I *tugg'd* with all my strength.
DRYDEN.

In the moral application of the words we may be said to be *drawn* by anything which can act on the mind to bring us near to an object; we are *dragged* only by means of force; we *pull* a thing towards us by a direct effort. To *haul*, *pluck*, and *tug* are seldom used but in the physical application.

Hither we sail'd, a voluntary throng,
To avenge a private, not a public wrong;
What else to Troy the assembled nations *draw*,
But thine—ungrateful! and thy brother's *draw*.
POPE.

'Tis long since I for my celestial wife,
Loath'd by the Gods have *drag'd* a lingering life.
POPE.

Hear this, remember, and our fury read,
Nor *pull* th' unwilling vengeance on thy head.
POPE.

To Dread, v. To apprehend.

Dread, v. Awe.

Dreadful, v. Fearful.

Dreadful, v. Formidable.

Dream, Reverie.

Dream, in Dutch *drom*, &c., comes either from the Celtic *drem* a sight, or the Greek *δραμα* a fable, or as probably from the word *rom*, signifying to wander, in Hebrew *rom* to be agitated.

Reverie, in French *reverie*, like the English *rave*, comes from the Latin *rabies*, signifying that which is wandering or incoherent.

Dreams and *reveries* are alike opposed to the reality, and have their origin in the imagination; but the former commonly passes in sleep, and the latter when awake: the *dream* may and does commonly arise when the imagination is in a sound state; the *reverie* is the fruit of a heated imagination: *dreams* come in the course of nature; *reveries* are the consequence of a peculiar ferment.

When the term *dream* is applied to the act of one that is awake, it admits of another distinction from *reverie*. They both designate what is confounded, but the *dream* is less extravagant than the *reverie*. Ambitious men please themselves with *dreams* of future greatness; enthusiasts debase the purity of the Christian religion by blending their own wild *reveries* with the doctrines of the Gospel. He who indulges himself in idle *dreams* lays up a store of disappointment for himself when he recovers his recollection, and finds that it is nothing but a *dream*: a love of singularity operating on an ardent mind will too often lead men to indulge in strange *reveries*.

Gay's friends persuaded him to sell his share of South-Sea stock, but he *dreamed* of dignity and splendour, and could not bear to obstruct his own fortune.—JOHNSON.

I continued to sit motionless with my eyes fixed upon the curtain some moments after it fell. When I was roused from my *reverie* I found myself almost alone.—HAWKESWORTH.

**Dregs, Sediment, Dross, Scum,
Refuse.**

Dregs, from the German *dreck* dirt, signifies the dirty part which separates from a liquor.

Sediment, from *sedeo* to sit, signifies that which settles at the bottom.

Dross is probably but a variation of *dregs*.

Scum, from the German *schaum*, signifies the same as foam or froth.

Refuse signifies literally that which is refused or thrown away.

All these terms designate the worthless part of any body; but *dregs* is taken in a worse sense than *sediment*; for the *dregs* is that which is altogether of no value; but the *sediment* may sometimes form a necessary part of the body. The *dregs* are mostly a *sediment* in liquors, but many things are a *sediment* which are not *dregs*. After the *dregs* are taken away, there will frequently remain a *sediment*; the *dregs* are commonly the corrupt part which separates from compound liquids, as wine or beer; the *sediment* consists of the heavy particles which belong to all simple liquids, not excepting water itself. The *dregs* and *sediment* separate of themselves, but the *scum* and *dross* are forced out by a process; the former from liquids, and the latter from solid bodies rendered liquid or otherwise.

Refuse, as its derivation implies, is always said of that which is intentionally separated to be thrown away, and agrees with the former terms only in as much as they express what is worthless.

Of these terms, *dregs*, *scum*, and *refuse* admit likewise of a figurative application. The *dregs* and *scum* of the people are the corruptest part of any society; and the *refuse* is that which is most worthless and unfit for a respectable community.

Epitomes of history are the corruptions and moths that have fretted and corroded many sound and excellent bodies of history and reduced them to base and unprofitable *dregs*.—BACON.

For it is not bare agitation, but the *sediment* at the bottom that troubles and defiles the water.—SOUTH.

For the composition, too, I admit the Algerine community resemble that of France, being formed out of the very *scum*, scandal, disgrace, and pest of the Turkish Asia.—BUTKE.

Now cast your eyes around, while I dissolve
The mist and film that mortal eyes involve;
Furze from your sight the *dross*, and make you see
The shape of each avenging deity.—DRYDEN.

Next of his men and ships he makes review,
Draws out the best and ablest of the crew;
Down with the falling stream the *refuse* run
To raise with joyful news his drooping son.
—DRYDEN.

To Drench, *v.* To soak.

Drift, *v.* Tendency.

Droll, *v.* Laughable.

To Droop, *v.* To flag.

To Drop, *v.* To fall.

Dross, *v.* Dregs.

To Drowse, *v.* To sleep.

Drowzy, *v.* Heavy.

Drowzy, *v.* Sleepy.

Drudge, *v.* Servant.

Drudgery, *v.* Work.

Drunkenness, *v.* Intoxication.

Dubious, *v.* Doubtful.

Ductile, *v.* Docile.

Due, *v.* Debt.

Dull, *v.* Heavy.

Dull, *v.* Insipid.

Dull, Gloomy, Sad, Dismal.

Dull may probably come from the Latin *dolor*, signifying generally that which takes off from the brightness or vivacity or perfection of anything.

Gloomy, from the German *glumm* muddy, signifies the same as tarnished.

Sad is probably connected with shade, to imply obscurity, which is most suitable to sorrow.

Dismal, compounded of *dis* and *mal* or *malus*, signifies very evil.

When applied to natural objects they denote the want of necessary light: in this sense metals are more or less *dull* according as they are stained with dirt; the weather is either *dull* or *gloomy* in different degrees; that is, *dull* when the sun is obscured by clouds, and *gloomy* when the atmosphere is darkened by fogs or thick clouds. A room is *dull*, *gloomy*, or *dismal*, according to circumstances: it is *dull* if the usual quantity of light and sound be wanting; it is *gloomy* if the darkness and stillness be very considerable; it is *dismal* if it be deprived of every convenience that fits it for a habitation; in this sense a dungeon is a *dismal* abode. *Sad* is not applied so much to sensible as moral objects, in which sense the distressing events of human life, as the loss of a parent or a child, is justly denominated *sad*.

In regard to the frame of mind which is designated by these terms, it will be easily perceived from the above explanation. As slight circumstances produce *dulness*, any change, however small, in the usual flow of spirits may be termed *dull*. *Gloom* weighs heavy on the mind, and gives a turn to the reflections and the imagination: depressing thoughts of futurity will spread a *gloom* over every other object. *Dismal* denotes a strong state of depression in the spirits. *Sad* indicates a wounded state of the heart; feelings of unmixed pain.

While man is a retainer to the elements and a sojourner in the body, it must be content to submit its own quickness and spirituality to the *dulness* of its vehicle.—SOUTH.

Achilles' wrath, to Greece the direful spring
Of woes unnumber'd, heav'nly goddess sing!
That wrath which hurl'd to Pluto's gloomy reign
The souls of mighty chiefs untimely slain.—1 OPE

For nine long nights, through all the dusky air
The pyre's thick flaming shot a *dismal* glare.—POPE.

Henry II. of France, by a splinter unhappily thrust into his eye at a solemn jousting, was sent out of the world by a *sad* but very accidental death.—SOUTH.

Dull, *v.* Stupid.

Dumb, *v.* Silent.

Duplicity, *v.* Deceit.

Durable, Lasting, Permanent.

Durable is said of things that are intended to remain a shorter time than that which is **Lasting**; and **Permanent** expresses less than **durable**.

Durable, from the Latin *durus* hard, respects the texture of bodies, and marks their capacity to hold out; **lasting**, from the verb to *last* or the adjective *last*, signifies to remain the *last* or longest, and is applicable only to that which is supposed of the longest *duration*. **Permanent**, from the Latin *permaneo*, signifies remaining to the end.

Durable is naturally said of material substances; and **lasting** of those which are spiritual; although in ordinary discourse sometimes they exchange offices: **permanent** applies more to the affairs of men.

That which perishes quickly is not **durable**: that which ceases quickly is not **lasting**; that which is only for a time is not **permanent**. Stone is more **durable** than iron, and iron than wood: in the feudal times animosities between families used to be **lasting**: a clerk has not a **permanent** situation in an office. However we may boast of our progress in the arts, we appear to have lost the art of making things as **durable** as they were made in former times: the writings of the moderns will many of them be as **lasting** monuments of human genius as those of the ancients; one who is of a contented, moderate disposition will generally prefer a **permanent** situation with small gains to one that is very lucrative but temporary and precarious.

If writings be thus **durable**, and may pass from age to age, through the whole course of time, how careful should an author be of not committing anything to print that may corrupt posterity.—ADDISON.

I must desire my fair readers to give a proper direction to their being admired; in order to which they must endeavour to make themselves the objects of reasonable and **lasting** admiration.—ADDISON.

Land comprehends all things in law of a **permanent** substantial nature.—BLACKSTONE.

Durable, Constant.

Durability (*v. Durable*) lies in the thing.

Constancy (*v. Constancy*) lies in the person.

What is **durable** is so from its inherent property; what is **constant** is so by the power of the mind. No **durable** connections can be formed where avarice or lust prevails.

Some states have suddenly emerged, and even in the depths of their calamity have laid the foundation of a towering and **durable** greatness.—BURKE.

Since we cannot promise ourselves **constant** health, let us endeavour at such a temper as may be our best support in the decay of it.—STEELE.

Duration, v. Continuance.

Duration, Time.

In the philosophical sense, according to Mr. Locke, **Time** is that mode of **Duration** which is formed in the mind by its own power of observing and measuring the passing objects.

In the vulgar sense in which **duration** is synonymous with time, it stands for the time of *duration*, and is more particularly applicable

to the objects which are said to last; *time* being employed in general for whatever passes in the world.

Duration comprehends the beginning and end of any portion of *time*, that is the how long of a thing; *time* is employed more frequently for the particular portion itself, namely, the *time* when we mark the *duration* of a sound from the *time* of its commencement to the *time* that it ceases: the *duration* of a prince's reign is an object of particular concern to his subjects if he be either very good or the reverse; the *time* in which he reigns is marked by extraordinary events: the historian computes the *duration* of reigns and of events in order to determine the antiquity of a nation; he fixes the exact *time* when each person begins to reign and when he dies, in order to determine the number of years that each reigned.

I think another probable conjecture (respecting the soul's immortality) may be raised from our appetite to *duration* itself.—STEELE.

The *time* of the fool is long because he does not know what to do with it; that of the wise man, because he distinguishes every moment of it with useful or amusing thoughts.—ADDISON.

Dutiful, Obedient, Respectful.

Dutiful signifies full of a sense of duty or full of what belongs to duty.

Obedient signifies ready to obey.

Respectful signifies literally full of respect.

The *obedient* and *respectful* are but modes of the *dutiful*; we may be *dutiful* without being either *obedient* or *respectful*; but we are so far *dutiful* as we are either *obedient* or *respectful*. *Duty* denotes what is due from one being to another; it is independent of all circumstances; *obedience* and *respect* are relative *duties* depending upon the character and station of individuals: as we owe to no one so much as to our parents, we are said to be *dutiful* to no earthly being besides; and in order to deserve the name of *dutiful*, a child during the period of his childhood ought to make a parent's will to be his law, and at no future period ought that will ever to be an object of indifference: we may be *obedient* and *respectful* to others besides our parents, although to them *obedience* and *respect* are in the highest degree and in the first case due; yet servants are enjoined to be *obedient* to their masters, wives to their husbands, and subjects to their king.

Respectful is a term of still greater latitude than either, for as the characters of men as much as their stations demand *respect*, there is a *respectful* deportment due towards every superior.

For one cruel parent we meet with a thousand *undutiful* children.—ADDISON.

The *obedience* of children to their parents is the basis of all government, and set forth as the measure of that *obedience* which we owe to those whom Providence has placed over us.—ADDISON.

Let your behaviour towards your superiors in dignity, age, learning, or any distinguished excellence, be full of *respect* and deference.—CHATHAM.

Duty, Obligation.

Duty, as we see in the preceding section, consists altogether of what is right or due from one being to another.

Obligation, from the Latin *obligo* to bind, signifies the bond or necessity which lies in the thing.

All *duty* depends upon moral *obligation* which subsists between man and man, or man and his Maker; in this abstract sense, therefore, there can be no *duty* without a previous *obligation*, and where there is an *obligation* it involves a *duty*; but in the vulgar acceptation, *duty* is applicable to the conduct of men in their various relations; *obligation* only to particular circumstances or modes of action: we have *duties* to perform as parents and children, as husbands and wives, as rulers and subjects, as neighbours and citizens; the debtor is under an *obligation* to discharge a debt; and he who has promised is under an

obligation to fulfil his promise: a conscientious man, therefore, never loses sight of the *obligations* which he has at different times to discharge.

The *duty* is not so peremptory as the *obligation*; the *obligation* is not so lasting as the *duty*: our affections impel us to the discharge of *duty*; interest or necessity impels us to the discharge of an *obligation*: it may therefore sometimes happen that the man whom a sense of *duty* cannot actuate to do that which is right, will not be able to withstand the *obligation* under which he has laid himself.

The ways of Heav'n, judg'd by a private breast,
Is often what's our private interest,
And therefore those who would that will obey,
Without their interest must their *duty* weigh.
DRYDEN.

No man can be under an *obligation* to believe anything who hath not sufficient means whereby he may be assured that such a thing is true.—TILLOTSON.

To Dwell, *v.* To abide

E.

Each, *v.* All.

Eager, Earnest, Serious.

Eager, *v.* Avidity.

Earnest most probably comes from the thing *earnest*, in Saxon *thornest* a pledge, or token of a person's real intentions, whence the word has been employed to qualify the state of any one's mind, as settled or fixed.

Serious, in Latin *serius* or *sine risu*, signifies without laughter.

Eager is used to qualify the desires or passions; *earnest* to qualify the wishes or sentiments; the former has either a physical or moral application, the latter altogether a moral application: a child is *eager* to get a plaything; a hungry person is *eager* to get food; a covetous man is *eager* to seize whatever comes within his grasp: a person is *earnest* in solicitation; *earnest* in exhortation; *earnest* in devotion.

Eagerness is mostly faulty; it cannot be too early restrained; we can seldom have any substantial reason to be *eager*: *earnestness* is always taken in a good sense; it denotes the inward conviction of the mind, and the warmth of the heart when awakened by important objects.

A person is said to be *earnest*, or in *earnest*: a person or thing is said to be *serious*: the former characterizes the temper of the mind, the latter characterizes the object itself. In regard to persons, in which alone they are to be compared, *earnest* expresses more than *serious*; the former is opposed to lukewarmness, the latter to unconcernedness: we are *earnest* as to our wishes or our persuasions; we are *serious* as to our intentions: the *earnestness* with which we address another depends upon the force of our conviction; the *seriousness* with which we address them depends upon our sincerity, and the nature of the subject: the preacher *earnestly* exhorts

his hearers to lay aside their sins; he *seriously* admonishes those who are guilty of irregularities.

The panting steeds impatient fury breathe,
But snort and tremble at the gulf beneath:
Eager they view'd the prospect dark and deep,
Vast was the leap, and headlong hung the steep.
POPE.

Then even superior to ambition, we
With *earnest* eye anticipate those scenes
Of happiness and wonder.—THOMSON.

It is hardly possible to sit down to the *serious* perusal of Virgil's works, but a man shall rise more disposed to virtue and goodness.—WALSH.

Eagerness, *v.* Avidity.

Early, *v.* Soon.

To Earn, *v.* To acquire.

Earnest, *v.* Eager.

Earnest, Pledge.

In the proper sense, the **Earnest** (*v.* *Eager*) is given as a token of our being in *earnest* in the promise we have made; the **Pledge**, in all probability from *plico* to fold or implicate, signifies a security by which we are engaged to indemnify for a loss.

The *earnest* has regard to the confidence inspired; the *pledge* has regard to the bond or tie produced: when a contract is only verbally formed, it is usual to give *earnest*; whenever money is advanced, it is common to give a *pledge*.

In the figurative application the terms bear the same analogy: a man of genius sometimes, though not always, gives an *earnest* in youth of his future greatness; children are the dearest *pledges* of affection between parents.

Nature has wove into the human mind
This anxious care for names we leave behind,
To extend our narrow views beyond the tomb,
And give an *earnest* of a life to come.—JENYNS.

Fairest of stars last in the train of night,
 If better thou belong not to the dawn,
 Sure pledge of day that crown'st the smiling morn
 With thy bright circlet praise him in thy sphere.
 MILTON.

Ease, Quiet, Rest, Repose.

Ease comes immediately from the French *aïse* glad, and that from the Greek *αἴσος* young, fresh.

Quiet, in Latin *quietus*, comes probably from the Greek *καμῖναι* to lie down, signifying a lying posture.

Rest, in German *rast*, comes from the Latin *resto* to stand still or make a halt.

Repose comes from the Latin *reposui*, perfect of *repono* to place back, signifying the state of placing one's self backward.

The idea of a motionless state is common to all these terms: *ease* and *quiet* respect action on the body; *rest* and *repose* respect the action of the body; we are *easy* or *quiet* when freed from any external agency that is painful; we have *rest* or *repose* when the body is no longer in motion.

Ease denotes an exemption from any painful action in general; *quiet* denotes an exemption from that in particular, which noise, disturbance, or the violence of others, may cause: we are *easy*, or at *ease*, when the body is in a posture agreeable to itself, or when no circumjacent object presses unequally upon it; we are *quiet* when there is an agreeable stillness around: our *ease* may be disturbed either by internal or external causes; our *quiet* is most commonly disturbed by external objects: we may have *ease* from pain, bodily or mental; we have *quiet* at the will of those around us: a sick person is often far from enjoying *ease*, although he may have the good fortune to enjoy the most perfect *quiet*: a man's mind is often *uneasy* from its own faulty constitution; it suffers frequent *disquietudes* from the vexatious tempers of others: let a man be in ever such *easy* circumstances, he may still expect to meet with *disquietudes* in his dealings with the world: wealth and contentment are the great promoters of *ease*; retirement is the most friendly to *quiet*.

Rest simply denotes the cessation of motion; *repose* is that species of *rest* which is agreeable after labour: we *rest* as circumstances require; in this sense, our Creator is said to have *rested* from the work of creation: *repose* is a circumstance of necessity; the weary seek *repose*; there is no human being to whom it is not sometimes indispensable. We may *rest* in a standing posture; we can *repose* only in a lying position: the dove which Noah first sent out could not find *rest* for the sole of its foot; soldiers who are hotly pursued by an enemy, have no time or opportunity to take *repose*: the night is the time for *rest*; the pillow is the place for *repose*.

Vile shrubs are shorn for browse; the towering height
 Of unctuous trees are torches for the night;
 And shall we doubt (indulging *easy* sloth)
 To sow, to set, and to reform their growth?—DRYDEN.

But *easy quiet*, a secure retreat,
 A harmless life that knows not how to cheat,
 With homebred plenty the rich owner bless,
 And rural pleasures crown his happiness.

DRYDEN.

The peaceful peasant to the wars is press'd,
 The fields lie fallow in inglorious *rest*.—DRYDEN.

Nor can the tortur'd wave here find *repose*,
 But raging still amid the shaggy rocks,
 Now flashes o'er the scatter'd fragments.

THOMSON.

Ease, Easiness, Facility, Lightness.

Ease (*v. Ease*) denotes either the abstract state of a person or quality of a thing; **Easiness**, from *easy*, signifying having *ease*, denotes simply an abstract quality which serves to characterize the thing: a person enjoys *ease*, or he has an *easiness* of disposition: *ease* is said of that which is borne, or that which is done; *easiness* and **Facility**, from the Latin *facilis* easy, most commonly of that which is done; the former in application to the thing as before, the latter either to the person or the thing: we speak of the *easiness* of the task, but of a person's *facility* in doing it: we judge of the *easiness* of a thing by comparing it with others more difficult; we judge of a person's *facility* by comparing him with others who are less skilful.

Ease and **Lightness** are both said of what is to be borne; the former in a general, the latter in a particular sense. Whatever presses in any form is not *easy*; that which presses by excess of weight is not *light*: a coat may be *easy* from its make; it can be *light* only from its texture.

The same distinction exists between their derivatives, to *ease*, *facilitate*, and *lighten*; to *ease* is to make *easy* or free from pain, as to *ease* a person of his labour; to *facilitate* is to render a thing more practicable or less difficult, as to *facilitate* a person's progress; to *lighten* is to take off an excessive weight, as to *lighten* a person's burdens.

Ease is the utmost that can be hoped for a sedentary and unactive habit.—JOHNSON.

Nothing is more subject to mistake and disappointment than anticipated judgment concerning the *easiness* or difficulty of any undertaking.—JOHNSON.

Every one must have remarked the *facility* with which the kindness of others is sometimes gained by those to whom he never could have imparted his own.—JOHNSON.

Trifles, *light* as air,
 Are to the jealous confirmations strong
 As proofs of holy writ.—SHAKESPEARE.

Easiness, *v. Ease*.

Easy, Ready.

Easy (*v. Ease, easiness*) signifies here a freedom from obstruction in ourselves.

Ready, in German *bereit*, Latin *paratus*, signifies prepared.

Easy marks the freedom of being done; *ready* the disposition or willingness to do; the former refers mostly to the thing or the manner, the latter to the person: the thing is *easy* to be done; the person is *ready* to do it: it is *easy* to make professions of friendship in the ardour of the moment; but every one is not *ready* to act up to them, when it interferes with his convenience or interest.

As epithets both are opposed to difficult, but agreeably to the above explanation of the terms; the former denotes a freedom from such difficulties or obstacles as lie in the nature of the thing itself; the latter an

exemption from such as lie in the temper and character of the person; hence we say a person is *easy* of access whose situation, rank, employments, or circumstances, do not prevent him from admitting others to his presence; he is *ready* to hear when he himself throws no obstacles in the way, when he lends a willing ear to what is said. So likewise a task is said to be *easy*: a person's wit, or a person's reply, to be *ready*: a young man who has birth and fortune, wit and accomplishments, will find an *easy* admittance into any circle: the very name of a favourite author will be a *ready* passport for the works to which it may be affixed.

When used adverbially, they bear the same relation to each other. A man is said to comprehend *easily* who from whatever cause finds the thing *easy* to be comprehended; he pardons *readily* who has a temper *ready* to pardon.

An *easy* manner of conversation is the most desirable quality a man can have.—STEELE.

The scorpion *ready* to receive thy laws,
Yields half his region and contracts his claws.
DRYDEN.

Ebullition, Effervescence, Fermentation.

These technical terms have a strong resemblance in their signification, but they are not strictly synonymous; they have strong characteristic differences.

Ebullition, from the Latin *ebullitio* and *ebulli*, compounded of *e* and *bullio* to boil forth, marks the *commotion of a liquid acted upon by fire, and in chemistry it is said of two substances, which by penetrating each other occasion bubbles to rise up.

Effervescence, from the Latin *effervescencia*, and *effervesco* to grow hot, marks the commotion which is excited in liquors by a combination of substances; such as of acids, which are mixed and commonly produce heat.

Fermentation, from the Latin *fermentatio* and *fermentum*, or *fermentum*, from *ferveo* to grow hot, marks the internal movement which is excited in a liquid of itself, by which its components undergo such a change, or decomposition, as to form a new body.

Ebullition is a more violent action than *effervescence*; *fermentation* is more gradual and permanent than either. Water is exposed to *ebullition* when acted upon by any powerful degree of external heat; iron in aqua fortis occasions an *effervescence*; beer and wine undergo a *fermentation* before they reach a state of perfection.

These words are all employed in a figurative sense, which is drawn from their physical application. The passions are exposed to *ebullitions*, in which they break forth with all the violence that is observable in water agitated by excessive heat; the heart and affections are exposed to *effervescence* when powerfully awakened by particular objects; minds are said to be in a *ferment* which are agitated by conflicting feelings: *ebullition* and *effervescence* are applicable only to individuals; *fermentation* to one or many.

* Vide Beauzée; "Ebullition, effervescence, fermentation."

If the angry humours of an irascible temper be not restrained in early life, they but too frequently break forth in the most dreadful *ebullitions* in maturer years; religious zeal when not constrained by the sober exercise of judgment, and corrected by sound knowledge, is an unhappy *effervescence* that injures the cause which it espouses, and often proves fatal to the individual by whom it is indulged: the *ferment* which was produced in the public mind by the French revolution exceeded everything that is recorded in history of popular commotions in past ages, and will, it is to be hoped, never have its parallel at any future period. There can be no *ebullition* or *fermentation* without *effervescence*; but there may be *effervescence* without either of the former.

Milbourn, indeed, a clergyman, attacked it (Dryden's Virgil), but his outrages seem to be the *ebullitions* of a mind agitated by stronger resentment than had poetry can excite.—JOHNSON.

Dryden's was not one of the gentle bosoms; he hardly conceived love but in its turbulent *effervescence* with some other desire.—JOHNSON.

The tumult of the world raises that eager *fermentation* of spirit which will ever be sending forth the dangerous fumes of folly.—BLAIR.

Eccentric, v. Particular.

Ecclesiastic, Divine, Theologian.

An **Ecclesiastic** derives his title from the office which he bears in the *ecclesia* or church; a **Divine** and **Theologian** from their pursuit after, or engagement in, *divine* or *theological* matters. An *ecclesiastic* is connected with an episcopacy; a *divine* or *theologian* is unconnected with any form of church government.

An *ecclesiastic* need not in his own person perform any office, although he fills a station; a *divine* not only fills a station, but actually performs the office of teaching; a *theologian* neither fills any particular station nor discharges any specific duty, but merely follows the pursuit of studying *theology*. An *ecclesiastic* is not always a *divine*, nor a *divine* an *ecclesiastic*; a *divine* is always more or less a *theologian*, but every *theologian* is not a *divine*.

Among the Roman Catholics all monks, and in the Church of England the various dignitaries who perform the episcopal functions, are entitled *ecclesiastics*. There are but few denominations of Christians who have not appointed teachers who are called *divines*. Professors or writers on *theology* are peculiarly denominated *theologians*.

Our old English monks seldom let any of their kings depart in peace who had endeavoured to diminish the power or wealth of which the *ecclesiastics* were in those times possessed.—ADDISON.

Nor shall I dwell on our excellence in metaphysical speculations; because he that reads the works of our *divines* will easily discover how far human subtilty has been able to penetrate.—JOHNSON.

I looked on that sermon (of Dr. Price's) as the public declaration of a man much connected with literary caballers, intriguing philosophers, and political *theologians*.—BURKE.

To Eclipse, Obscure.

Eclipse, in Greek *εκλειψις*, comes from *εκλειπω* to fail, signifying to cause a failure of light.

Obscure, from the adjective *obscure* (v. *Dark*), signifies to cause the intervention of a shadow.

In the natural as well as the moral application *eclipse* is taken in a particular and relative signification; *obscure* is used in a general sense. Heavenly bodies are *eclipsed* by the intervention of other bodies between them and the beholder; things are in general *obscured* which are in any way rendered less striking or visible. To *eclipse* is therefore a species of *obscuring*: that is always *obscured* which is *eclipsed*; but everything is not *eclipsed* which is *obscured*.

So, figuratively, real merit is *eclipsed* by the intervention of superior merit; it is often *obscured* by an ungracious exterior in the possessor, or by his unfortunate circumstances.

Sarcasms may *eclipse* thine own,
But cannot blur my lost renown.—BUTLER.

Among those who are the most richly endowed by nature and accomplished by their own industry, how few are there whose virtues are not *obscured* by the ignorance, prejudice, or envy of their beholders.—ADDISON.

Economical, v. *Oeconomical*.

Ecstasy, **Rapture**, **Transport**.

There is a strong resemblance in the meaning and application of these words. They all express an extraordinary elevation of the spirits, or an excessive tension of the mind.

Ecstasy marks a passive state, from the Greek *εκστασις* and *εξιστημι* to stand, or to be out of one's self, out of one's mind. **Rapture** from the Latin *rapio*, to seize or carry away; and **Transport** from *trans* and *porto* to carry beyond one's self, rather designate an active state, a violent impulse with which it hurries itself forward. *Ecstasy* and *rapture* are always pleasurable, or arise from pleasurable causes: *transport* respects either pleasurable or painful feelings: joy occasions *ecstasies* or *raptures*: joy and anger have their *transports*.

An *ecstasy* benumbs the faculties; it will take away the power of speech, and often of thought; it is commonly occasioned by sudden and unexpected events: *rapture*, on the other hand, often invigorates the powers, and calls them into action; it frequently arises from deep thought: the former is common to all persons of ardent feelings, but more particularly to children, ignorant people, or to such as have not their feelings under control; *rapture*, on the contrary, is applicable to persons with superior minds, and to circumstances of peculiar importance. *Transports* are but sudden bursts of passion, which generally lead to intemperate actions, and are seldom indulged even on joyous occasions except by the volatile and passionate: a reprieve from the sentence of death will produce an *ecstasy* of delight in the pardoned criminal. Religious contemplation is calculated to produce holy *raptures* in a mind strongly imbued with pious zeal: in *transports* of rage men have committed enormities which have cost them bitter tears of repentance ever after.

What followed was all *ecstasy* and trance:
Immortal pleasures round my swivelling eyes did dance.
DRYDEN.

By swift degrees the love of nature works,
And warms the bosom, till at last sublim'd
To *rapture* and enthusiastic heat,
We feel the present Deity.—THOMSON.

When all thy mercies, O my God I
My rising soul surveys,
Transported with the view, I'm lost
In wonder, love, and praise.—ADDISON.

Edge, v. *Border*.

Edict, v. *Decree*.

Edifice, **Structure**, **Fabric**.

Edifice, in Latin *œdificium* from *œdifico* or *œdes* and *facio*, to make a house, signifies properly the house made.

Structure, from the Latin *structura* and *struo* to raise, signifies the raising a thing, or the thing raised.

Fabric, from the Latin *fabrico*, signifies either *fabricating* or the thing *fabricated*.

Edifice in its proper sense is always applied to a building; *structure* and *fabric* are either employed as abstract actions or the results and fruits of actions: in the former case they are applied to many objects besides buildings; *structure* referring to the act of raising or setting up together; *fabric* to that of framing or contriving.

As *edifice* bespeaks the thing itself, it requires no modification, since it conveys of itself the idea of something superior: the word *structure* must always be qualified; it is employed only to designate the mode of action: *fabric* is itself a species of epithet, it designates the object as something contrived by the power of art or by design. *Edifices* dedicated to the service of religion have in all ages been held sacred: it is the business of the architect to estimate the merits or demerits of any *structure*: when we take a survey of the vast *fabric* of the universe, the mind becomes bewildered with contemplating the infinite power of its Divine author.

When employed in the abstract sense of actions, *structure* is limited to objects of magnitude, or such as consist of complicated parts; *fabric* is extended to everything in which art or contrivance is requisite; hence we may speak of the *structure* of vessels, and the *fabric* of cloth, iron ware, and the like.

The levellers only pervert the natural order of things; they load the *edifice* of society by setting up in the air what the solidity of the *structure* requires to be on the ground.—BURKE.

In the whole *structure* and constitution of things, God hath shown himself to be favourable to virtue, and inimical to vice and guilt.—BLAIR.

By destiny compell'd, and in despair,
The Greeks grew weary of the tedious war,
And, by Minerva's aid, a *fabric* rear'd.—DRYDEN.

Education, **Instruction**, **Breeding**.

Instruction and **Breeding** are to **Education** as parts to a whole: *instruction* respects the communication of knowledge, and *breeding* respects the manners or outward conduct; but *education* comprehends not only both these, but the formation of the mind, the regulation of the heart, and the establishment of the principles: good *instruction* makes one wiser; good *breeding* makes one more polished and agreeable: good *education* makes one really good. A want of *education* will always be to the injury if not to the ruin of the sufferer: a want of *instruction* is of more or less inconvenience,

according to circumstances : a want of *breeding* only unites a man for the society of the cultivated. *Education* belongs to the period of childhood and youth ; *instruction* may be given at different ages ; *good-breeding* is best learnt in the early part of life.

A mother tells her infant that two and two make four, the child remembers the proposition, and is able to count four for all the purposes of life, till the course of his *education* brings him among philosophers, who fright him from his former knowledge, by telling him that four is a certain aggregate of units.—JOHNSON.

To illustrate one thing by its resemblance to another, has been always the most popular and efficacious art of *instruction*.—JOHNSON.

My *breeding* abroad hath shown me more of the world than yours has done.—WENTWORTH.

To Efface, *v.* To blot out.

To Effect, *v.* To accomplish.

Effect, Consequence.

Effect and Consequence agree in expressing that which follows anything, but the former marks what follows from a connexion between the two objects ; the term *consequence* is not thus limited : an *effect* is that which necessarily flows out of the cause, between which the connexion is so intimate that we cannot think of the one without the other. In the nature of things, causes will have *effects* ; and for every *effect* there will be a cause : a *consequence*, on the other hand, may be either casual or natural ; it is that on which we can calculate. *Effect* applies either to physical or moral objects, *consequence* only to moral subjects.

There are many diseases which are the *effects* of mere intemperance ; an imprudent step in one's first setting out in life is often attended with fatal *consequences*. A mild answer has the *effect* of turning away wrath : the loss of character is the general *consequence* of an irregular life.

A passion for praise produces very good *effects*.
ADDISON.

Were it possible for anything in the Christian faith to be erroneous, I can find no ill *consequences* in adhering to it.—ADDISON.

To Effect, Produce, Perform.

The two latter are in reality included in the former ; what is *effected* is both *produced* and *performed* ; but what is *produced* or *performed* is not always *effected*.

Effect, in Latin *effectus*, participle of *eficio*, compounded of *e* and *facio*, signifies to make out anything.

Produce, from the Latin *produco*, signifies literally to draw forth.

Perform, compounded of *per* and *form*, signifies to form thoroughly or carry through.

To *produce*, signifies to bring some thing forth or into existence ; to *perform*, to do something to the end : to *effect* is to *produce* by *performing* : whatever is *effected* is the consequence of a specific design ; it always requires therefore a rational agent to *effect* ; what is *produced* may follow incidentally, or arise from the action of an irrational agent or an inanimate object ; what is *performed* is done by specific efforts ; it is therefore, like *effect*, the

consequence of design, and requires a rational agent.

Effect respects both the end and the means by which it is brought about : *produce* respects the end only ; *perform* the means only. No person ought to calculate on *effecting* a reformation in the morals of men, without the aid of religion ; changes both in individuals and communities are often *produced* by trifles.

To *effect* is said of that which emanates from the mind of the agent himself ; to *perform*, of that which is marked out by rule, or prescribed by another. We *effect* a purpose ; we *perform* a part, a duty or office. A true Christian is always happy when he can *effect* a reconciliation between parties who are at variance ; it is a laudable ambition to strive to *perform* one's part creditably in society.

The united powers of hell were joined together for the destruction of mankind, which they *effected* in part.—ADDISON.

Though prudence does in a great measure *produce* our good or ill fortune, there are many unforeseen occurrences which pervert the finest schemes that can be laid by human wisdom.—ADDISON.

Where there is a power to *perform*, God does not accept the will.—SOUTH.

Effective, Efficient, Effectual, Efficacious.

Effective signifies capable of *effecting* ; **Efficient** signifies literally *effecting* ; **Effectual** and **Efficacious** signify having the *effect*, or possessing the power to *effect*. The former two are used only in regard to physical objects, the latter two in regard to moral objects. An army or a military force is *effective* ; a cause is *efficient* ; a remedy or cure is *effectual* ; a medicine is *efficacious*.

An end or result is *effectual*, the means are *efficacious*. No *effectual* stop can be put to the vices of the lower orders, while they have a vicious example from their superiors : a seasonable exercise of severity on an offender is often very *efficacious* in quelling a spirit of insubordination. When a thing is not found *effectual*, it is requisite to have recourse to farther measures ; that which has been proved to be *inefficacious* should never be adopted.

I should suspend my congratulations on the new liberties of France, until I was informed how it had been combined with government, with the discipline of the armies, and the collection of an *effective* revenue.—BURKE.

No searcher has yet found the *efficient* cause of sleep.—JOHNSON.

Nothing so *effectually* deadens the taste of the sublime, as that which is light and radiant.—BURKE.

He who labours to lessen the dignity of human nature, destroys many *efficacious* motives for practising worthy actions.—WARTON.

Effects, *v.* Goods.

Effectual, *v.* Effective.

Effeminate, *v.* Female.

Effervescence, *v.* Ebullition.

Efficacious, *v.* Effective.

Efficient, *v.* Effective.

Effigy, *v.* Likeness.

Effort, *v.* Endeavour.

Effrontery, *v.* Audacity.

Effusion, Ejaculation.

Effusion signifies the thing poured out, and **Ejaculation** the thing ejaculated or thrown out, both indicating a species of verbal expression; the former either by utterance or in writing; the latter only by utterance. The *effusion* is not so vehement or sudden as the *ejaculation*; the *ejaculation* is not so ample or diffuse as the *effusion*; *effusion* is seldom taken in a good sense; *ejaculation* rarely otherwise. An *effusion* commonly flows from a heated imagination uncorrected by the judgement; it is therefore in general not only incoherent, but extravagant and senseless; an *ejaculation* is produced by the warmth of the moment, but never without reference to some particular circumstance. Enthusiasts are full of extravagant *effusions*; contrite sinners will often express their penitence in pious *ejaculations*.

Brain-sick opiniaters please themselves in nothing but the ostentation of their own extemporary *effusions*.—SOUTH.

All which prayers of our Saviour's and others of like brevity are properly such as we call *ejaculations*.—SOUTH.

Egoistical, *v. Opiniated*.

Ejaculation, *v. Effusion*.

Elder, *v. Senior*.

Elderly, Aged, Old.

These three words rise by gradation in their sense; **Aged** denotes a greater degree of age than **Elderly**; and **Old** still more than either.

The *elderly* man has passed the meridian of life; the *aged* man is fast approaching the term of our existence; the *old* man has already reached this term, or has exceeded it. In conformity, however, to the vulgar prepossession against age and its concomitant infirmities, the term *elderly* or *aged* is always more respectful than *old*, which latter word is often used by way of reproach, and can seldom be used free from such an association, unless qualified by an epithet of praise, as good or venerable.

I have a race of orderly, *elderly*, persons of both sexes, at my command.—SWIFT.

A godlike race of heroes once I knew,
Such as no more these *aged* eyes shall view.—POPE.

The field of combat fills the young and bold,
The solemn council best becomes the *old*.—POPE.

To Elect, *v. To choose*.

Elegant, *v. Graceful*.

Elevate, *v. To lift*.

Eligible, Graceful.

Eligible or fit to be elected, and **Preferable** fit to be preferred, serve as epithets in the sense of *choose* and *prefer* (*v. To choose, prefer*); what is *eligible* is desirable in itself, what is *preferable* is more desirable than another. There may be many *eligible* situations out of which perhaps there is but one *preferable*. Of persons, however, we say rather that they are *eligible* to an office than *preferable*.

The middle condition is the most *eligible* to the man who would improve himself in virtue.—ADDISON.

The saying of Plato is, that labour is *preferable* to idleness as brightness to rust!—HUGHES.

Elocution, Eloquence, Oratory, Rhetoric.

Elocution and **Eloquence** are derived from the same Latin verb, *eloquor* to speak out.

Oratory, from *oro* to implore, signifies the art of making a set speech.

Elocution consists in the manner of delivery; *eloquence* in the matter that is delivered. We employ *elocution* in repeating the words of another; we employ *eloquence* to express our own thoughts and feelings. *Elocution* is requisite for an actor; *eloquence* for a speaker.

Eloquence lies in the person; it is a natural gift; *oratory* lies in the mode of expression; it is an acquired art. **Rhetoric**, from *peo* to speak, is properly the theory of that art of which *oratory* is the practice. But the term *rhetoric* may be sometimes employed in an improper sense for the display of *oratory* or scientific speaking. *Eloquence* speaks one's own feelings; it comes from the heart, and speaks to the heart: *oratory* is an imitative art; it describes what is felt by another. *Rhetoric* is the affectation of *oratory*.

An afflicted parent who pleads for the restoration of her child that has been torn from her, will exert her *eloquence*; a counsellor at the bar, who pleads the cause of his client, will employ *oratory*; vulgar partisans are full of *rhetoric*.

Eloquence often consists in a look or an action; *oratory* must always be accompanied with language. There is a dumb *eloquence* which is not denied even to the brutes, and which speaks more than all the studied graces of speech and action employed by the *orator*.

Between *eloquence* and *oratory* there is the same distinction as between nature and art: the former can never be perverted to any base purposes; it always speaks truth: the latter will as easily serve the purposes of falsehood as of truth.

The political partisan who paints the miseries of the poor in glowing language and artful periods, may often have *oratory* enough to excite dissatisfaction against the government, without having *eloquence* to describe what he really feels.

Soft *elocution* does thy style renown,
And the sweet accents of the peaceful gown,
Gentle or sharp according to thy choice
To laugh at follies or to lash at vice.—DRYDEN.

Some other poets knew the art of speaking well; but Virgil, beyond this, knew the admirable secret of being *eloquently* silent.—WALSH.

As harsh and irregular sounds are not harmony, so neither is banging a cushion *oratory*.—SWIFT.

Be but a person in credit with the multitude, he shall be able to make popular rambling stuff pass for high *rhetoric* and moving preaching.—SOUTH.

Eloquence, *v. Elocution*.

To Elucidate, *v. To explain*.

To Elude, *v. To escape*.

To Elude, *v. To avoid*.

To Emanate, *v. To arise*.

To Embarrass, Perplex, Entangle.**Embarrass**, *v. Difficulty.***Perplex**, *v. To distress.***Entangle**, *v. To disengage.*

Embarrass respects a person's manners or circumstances; *perplex* his views and conduct; *entangle* is said of particular circumstances. *Embarrassments* depend altogether on ourselves: the want of prudence and presence of mind are the common causes; *perplexities* depend on extraneous circumstances as well as ourselves; extensive dealings with others are mostly attended with *perplexities*: *entanglements* arise mostly from the evil designs of others.

That *embarrasses* which interrupts the even course or progress of one's actions: that *perplexes* which interferes with one's decisions: that *entangles* which binds a person in his actions. Pecuniary difficulties *embarrass*, or contending feelings produce *embarrassment*. contrary counsels or interests *perplex*: law-suits *entangle*. Steadiness of mind prevents *embarrassment* in the outward behaviour. Firmness of character is requisite in the midst of *perplexities*: caution must be employed to guard against *entanglements*.

Cervantes had so much kindness for Don Quixote, that however he *embarrasses* him with absurd distresses, he esteems him so much sense and virtue as may preserve our esteem.—JOHNSON.

It is scarcely possible in the regularity and composure of the present time, to image the tumult of absurdity and clamour of contradiction which *perplexed* doctrine, disordered practice, and disturbed both public and private quiet in the time of the rebellion.—JOHNSON.

I presume you do not *entangle* yourself in the particular controversies between the Romanists and us.—CLARENDON.

Embarrassments, *v. Difficulties.***To Embellish**, *v. To adorn.***Emblem**, *v. Figure.***To Embolden**, *v. To encourage.***To Embrace**, *v. To clasp.***To Embrace**, *v. To comprize.***Embryo, Fœtus.**

Embryo, in French *embryon*, Greek εμβρυον, from βρωω to germinate, signifies the thing germinated. **Fœtus**, in French *fœtus*, Latin *fœtus*, from *foveo* to cherish, signifies the thing cherished, both words referring to what is formed in the womb of the mother; but *embryo* properly implies the first fruit of conception, and the *fœtus* that which is arrived to a maturity of formation. Anatomists tell us that the *embryo* in the human subject assumes the character of the *fœtus* about the forty-second day after conception.

Fœtus is applicable only in its proper sense to animals: *embryo* has a figurative application to plants and fruits when they remain in a confused and imperfect state, and also a moral application to plans, or whatever is roughly conceived in the mind.

To Emend, *v. To amend.***To Emerge**, *v. To rise.***Emergency**, *v. Exigency.***Eminent**, *v. Distinguished.***Emissary, Spy.**

Emissary, in Latin *emissarius*, from *emitto* to send forth, signifies one sent out.

Spy, in French *espion*, from the Latin *specio* to look into or look about, signifies one who searches.

Both these words designate a person sent out by a body on some public concern among their enemies; but they differ in their office according to the etymology of the words.

The *emissary* is by distinction sent forth, he is sent so as to mix with the people to whom he goes, to be in all places, and to associate with every one individually as may serve his purpose; the *spy* on the other hand takes his station wherever he can best perceive what is passing; he keeps himself at a distance from all but such as may particularly aid him in the object of his search.

The object of an *emissary* is, by direct communication with the enemy, to sow the seeds of dissension, to spread false alarms, and to disseminate false principles; the object of a *spy* is to get information of an enemy's plans and movements.

Although the office of *emissary* and *spy* are neither of them honourable, yet that of the former is more disgraceful than that of the latter. The *emissary* is generally employed by those who have some illegitimate object to pursue; *spies* on the other hand are employed by all regular governments in a time of warfare.

In the time of the Revolution, the French sent their *emissaries* into every country, civilized or uncivilized, to fan the flame of rebellion against established governments. At Sparta, the trade of a *spy* was not so vile as it has been generally esteemed; it was considered as a self-devotion for the public good, and formed a part of their education.

What generally makes pain itself, if I may so say, more painful, is that it is considered as the *emissary* of the king of terrors.—BURKE.

He (Henry I.) began with the Earl of Shrewsbury, who was watched for some time by *spies*, and then indicted upon a charge of forty-five articles.—HUME.

To Emit, Exhale, Evaporate.

Emit, from the Latin *emitto*, expresses properly the act of sending out: **Exhale**, from *halitus* the breath, and **Evaporate**, from *vapour*, vapour or steam, are both modes of emitting.

Emit is used to express a more positive effort to send out; *exhale* and *evaporate* designate the natural and progressive process of things: volcanoes *emit* fire and flames: the earth *exhales* the damps, or flowers *exhale* perfumes; liquids *evaporate*.

Animals may *emit* by an act of volition: things *exhale* or *evaporate* by an external action upon them; they *exhale* that which is foreign to them; they *evaporate* that which constitutes a part of their substance.

The pole-cat is reported to *emit* such a stench from itself when pursued, as to keep

its pursuers at a distance from itself; bogs and fens *exhale* their moisture when acted upon by the heat : water *evaporates* by means of steam when put into a state of obullition.

Full in the blazing sun great Hector shin'd
Like Mars commission'd to confound mankind ;
His nodding helm emits a steamy ray,
His piercing eyes through all the battle stray.—POPE.

Here paus'd a moment, while the gentle gale
Convey'd that freshness the cool seas *exhale*.—POPE.

After allowing the first fumes and heat of their zeal to *evaporate*, she (Elizabeth) called into her presence a certain number of each house.—ROBERTSON.

Emolument, v. Gain.

Emotion, v. Agitation.

Emphasis, v. Stress.

Empire, Kingdom.

Although these two words obviously refer to two species of states, where the princes assume the title of either emperor or king, yet the difference between them is not limited to this distinction.

* The word **Empire** carries with it the idea of a state that is vast, and composed of many different people; that of **Kingdom** marks a state more limited in extent, and united in its composition. In *kingdoms* there is a uniformity of fundamental laws; the difference in regard to particular laws or modes of jurisprudence being merely variations from custom, which do not affect the unity of political administration. From this uniformity, indeed, in the functions of government, we may trace the origin of the words *king* and *kingdom*: since there is but one prince or sovereign ruler, although there may be many employed in the administration. With *empires* it is different: one part is sometimes governed by fundamental laws, very different from those by which another part of the same *empire* is governed; which diversity destroys the unity of government, and makes the union of the state to consist in the submission of certain chiefs to the commands of a superior general or chief. From this very right of commanding, then, it is evident that the words *empire* and *emperor* derive their origin; and hence it is that there may be many princes or sovereigns, and *kingdoms*, in the same *empire*.

As a farther illustration of these terms, we need only look to their application from the earliest ages in which they were used, down to the present period. The word *king* had its existence long prior to that of *emperor*, being doubtless derived, through the channel of the northern languages, from the Hebrew *cohen* a priest, since in those ages of primitive simplicity, before the lust of dominion had led to the extension of power and conquest, he who performed the sacerdotal office was unanimously regarded as the fittest person to discharge the civil functions for the community. So in like manner among the Romans the corresponding word *rex*, which comes from *rego*, and the Hebrew *regna* to feed, signifies a pastor or shepherd, because he who filled the office acted both spiritually and civilly as their

guide. Rome therefore was first a *kingdom*, while it was formed of only one people: it acquired the name of *empire* as soon as other nations were brought into subjection to it, and became members of it; not by losing their distinctive character as nations, but by submitting themselves to the supreme command of their conquerors.

For the same reason the German *empire* was so denominated, because it consisted of several states independent of each other, yet all subject to one ruler or emperor; so likewise the Russian *empire*, the Ottoman *empire*, and the Mogul *empire*, which are composed of different nations; and on the other hand the *kingdom* of Spain, of Portugal, of France, and of England, all of which, though divided into different provinces, were, nevertheless, one people, having but one ruler. While France, however, included many distinct countries within its jurisdiction, it properly assumed the name of an *empire*; and England having by a legislative act united to itself a country distinct both in its laws and customs, has likewise with equal propriety, been denominated the British *empire*.

A *kingdom* can never reach to the extent of an *empire*, for the unity of government and administration which constitutes its leading feature cannot reach so far, and at the same time requires more time than the simple exercise of superiority, and the right of receiving certain marks of homage, which suffice to form an *empire*. Although a *kingdom* may not be free, yet an *empire* can scarcely be otherwise than despotic in its form of government. Power, when extended and ramified, as it must unavoidably be in an *empire*, derives no aid from the personal influence of the sovereign, and requires therefore to be dealt out in portions far too great to be consistent with the happiness of the subject.

Cicero thinks they who command the sea command the *empire*.—BACON.

In the vast fabric of *kingdoms* and commonwealths, it is in the power of kings and rulers to extend and enlarge the bounds of *empire*.—BACON.

Empire, Reign, Dominion.

In the preceding article **Empire** has been considered as a species of state: in the present case it conveys the idea of power,* or an exercise of sovereignty. In this sense it is allied to the word **Reign**, which, from the verb to *reign*, signifies the act of *reigning*; and to the word **Dominion**, which, from the Latin *dominus* a lord, signifies either the power or the exercise of the power of a lord.

Empire is used more properly for the people or nations; *reign* for the individuals who hold the power: hence we say the *empire* of the Assyrians, or of the Turks; the *reign* of the Cæsars, or the Paleologi. The glorious epocha of the *empire* of the Babylonians is the *reign* of Nebuchadnezzar; that of the *empire* of the Persians is the *reign* of Cyrus; that of the *empire* of the Greeks is the *reign* of Alexander; that of the Romans is the *reign* of Augustus; these are the four great *empires* foretold by the prophet Daniel: it is neither long *reigns*,

* Vide Abbé Bauzée: "Empire, royaume."

* Vide Abbé Girard: "Empire, règne."

nor their frequent changes, which occasion their fall—it is the abuse of power.

All the epithets applied to the word *empire*, in this sense, belong equally to *reign*; but all which are applied to *reign* are not suitable in application to *empire*. We may speak of a *reign* as long and glorious; but not of an *empire* as long and glorious, unless the idea be expressed paraphrastically. The *empire* of the Romans was of longer duration than that of the Greeks: but the glory of the latter was more brilliant, from the rapidity of its conquests: the *reign* of George the Third was one of the longest and most eventful recorded in history.

Empire and *reign* are both applied in the proper sense to the exercise of public authority; *dominion* applies to the personal act, whether of a sovereign or a private individual: a sovereign may have *dominion* over many nations by the force of arms; but he holds his *reign* over one nation by the force of law. Hence the word *dominion* may, in the proper sense, be applied to the power which man exercises over the brutes, over inanimate objects, or over himself; but if *empire* and *reign* be applied to any thing but civil government, or to nations, it is only in the improper sense: thus a female may be said to hold her *empire* among her admirers; or fashions may be said to have their *reign*. In this application of the terms, *empire* is something wide and all-commanding; *reign* is that which is steady and settled; *dominion* is full of control and force.

The sage historic muse
Should next conduct us through the deeps of time.
Show us how *empire* grew, declined, and fell.
THOMSON.

Let great Achilles, to the gods resign'd,
To reason yield the *empire* of his mind.—POPE.

The frigid zone,
Where for relentless months continual night
Holds o'er the glittering waste her starry *reign*.
THOMSON.

By timely caution those desires may be repressed to which indulgence would give absolute *dominion*.—JOHNSON.

To Employ, Use.

Employ, from the Latin *implico*, signifies to implicate, or apply for any special purpose.

Use, from the Latin *usus* and *utor*, signifies to enjoy or derive benefit from.

Employ expresses less than *use*; it is in fact a species of partial *using*: we always *use* when we *employ*; but we do not always *employ* when we *use*. We *employ* whatever we take into our service, or make subservient to our convenience for a time; we *use* whatever we entirely devote to our purpose. Whatever is *employed* by one person may, in its turn, be *employed* by another, or at different times be *employed* by the same person: but what is *used* is frequently consumed or rendered unfit for a similar *use*. What we *employ* may frequently belong to another; but what one *uses* is supposed to be his exclusive property. On this ground we may speak of *employing* persons as well as things; but we speak of *using* things only, and not persons, except in the most degrading sense. Persons, time, strength, and power, are *employed*; houses, furniture, and all materials, of which either necessities or conveniences are composed, are *used*. It is

a part of wisdom to *employ* well the short portion of time which is allotted to us in this sublunary state, and to *use* the things of this world so as not to abuse them. No one is excused from the guilt of an immoral action, by suffering himself to be *employed* as an instrument to serve the purposes of another: we ought to *use* our utmost endeavours to abstain from all connexion with such as wish to implicate us in their guilty practices.

Thou, Godlike Hector! all thy force *employ*:
Assemble all th' united bands of Troy.—POPE.

Straight the broad belt, with gay embroidery grac'd
He loos'd, the corset from his breast unbrac'd;
Then suck'd the blood, and sov'reign balm infus'd,
Which Chiron gave, and Æsculapius us'd.—POPE.

Employment, v. Business.

Empower, v. Commission.

Empty, Vacant, Void, Devoid.

Empty, in Saxon *empti*, not improbably derived from the Latin *inopis* poor or wanting.

Vacant, in Latin *vacans* or *vaco*, Hebrew *bekak* to empty.

Void and **Devoid**, in Latin *viduus*, and Greek *δύος*, signifies solitary or bereft.

Empty is the term in most general use; *vacant*, *void*, and *devoid*, are employed in particular cases: *empty* and *vacant* have either a proper or an improper application; *void* or *devoid* only a moral acceptation.

Empty, in the natural sense, marks an absence of that which is substantial, or adapted for filling; *vacant* designates or marks the absence of that which should occupy or make use of a thing. That which is hollow may be *empty*: that which respects an even space may be *vacant*. A house is *empty* which has no inhabitants; a seat is *vacant* which is without an occupant; a room is *empty* which is without furniture; a space on paper is *vacant* which is free from writing.

In their figurative application *empty* and *vacant* have a similar analogy: a dream is said to be *empty*, or a title *empty*; a stare is said to be *vacant* or an hour *vacant*. *Void* or *devoid* are used in the same sense as *vacant*, as qualifying epithets, but not prefixed as adjectives, and always followed by some object; thus we speak of a creature as *void* of reason, and of an individual as *devoid* of common sense.

To honor Thetis' son he bends his care,
And plunge the Greeks in all the woes of war;
Then bids an *empty* phantom rise to sight,
And thus commands the vision of the night.
POPE.

An inquisitive man is a creature naturally very *vacant* of thought in itself, and therefore forced to apply itself to foreign assistance.—STEELE.

My next desire is, *void* of care and strife,
To lead a soft, secure, inglorious life.—DRYDEN.

We Tyrians are not so *devoid* of sense,
Nor so remote from Phœbus' influence.—DRYDEN.

Empty, v. Hollow.

Emulation, v. Competition.

To Enchant, v. To charm.

To Encircle, v. To surround.

To Enclose, v. To circumscribe.

Encomium, Eulogy, Panegyric.

Encomium, in Greek *εγκομιον*, signified a set or form of verses, used for the purposes of praise.

Eulogy, in Greek *ευλογία* from *ευ* and *λογος*, signifies literally speaking well of any one.

Panegyric, in Greek *πανηγυρικον*, from *πας* the whole, and *αγορα* an assembly, signifies that which is spoken before an assembly, a solemn oration.

The idea of praise is common to all these terms; but the first seems more properly applied to the thing, or the unconscious object; the second to persons in general, their characters and actions; the third to the person of some particular individual: thus we bestow *encomiums* upon any work of art, or production of genius, without reference to the performer; we bestow *eulogies* on the exploits of a hero, who is of another age or country; but we write *panegyrics* either in a direct address, or in direct reference to the person who is *panegyricized*: the *encomium* is produced by merit, real or supposed; the *eulogy* may spring from admiration of the person *eulogized*; the *panegyric* may be mere flattery, resulting from servile dependance; great *encomiums* have been paid by all persons to the constitution of England: our naval and military heroes have received the *eulogies* of many besides their own countrymen; authors of no mean reputation have condescended to deal out their *panegyrics* pretty freely, in dedications to their patrons.

Our lawyers are, with justice, copious in their *encomiums* on the common law.—BLACKSTONE.

Salust would say of Cato, "That he had rather be than appear good;" but indeed this *eulogium* rose no higher than to an inoffensiveness.—STEELE.

On me, when dunces are satiric,

I take it for a *panegyric*.—SWIFT.

To Encompass, v. To surround.

To Encounter, v. To attack.

To Encourage, v. To cheer.

To Encourage, Animate, Incite, Impel, Urge, Stimulate, Instigate.

Encourage, v. To cheer.

Animate, v. To animate.

Incite, from the Latin *cito*, and the Hebrew *sat*, to stir up, signifies to put into motion towards an object.

Impel, v. To actuate.

Urge, in Latin *urgeo*, comes from the Greek *ορυσσω* to set to work.

Stimulate, from the Latin *stimulus* a spur or goad, and **Instigate**, from the Latin *stigo*, and Greek *στιζω*, signify literally to goad.

The idea of actuating, or calling into action, is common to these terms, which vary in the circumstances of the action.

Encouragement acts as a persuasive: *animate* as an *impelling* or enlivening cause: those who are weak require to be *encouraged*; those who are strong become stronger by being *animated*: the former require to have their difficulties removed, their powers renovated, their doubts and fears dispelled; the latter may

have their hopes increased, their prospect brightened, and their powers invigorated; we are *encouraged* not to give up or slacken in our exertions; we are *animated* to increase our efforts: the sinner is *encouraged* by offers of pardon, through the merits of a Redeemer, to turn from his sinful ways; the Christian is *animated* by the prospect of a blissful eternity, to go on from perfection to perfection.

What *encourages* and *animates* acts by the finer feelings of our nature; what *incites* acts through the medium of our desires: we are *encouraged* by kindness; we are *animated* by the hope of reward; we are *incited* by the desire of distinction: what *impels*, *urges*, *stimulates*, and *instigates*, acts forcibly, be the cause internal or external: we are *impelled* and *stimulated* mostly by what is internal; we are *urged* and *instigated* by both the internal and external, but particularly the latter: we are *impelled* by motives; we are *stimulated* by passions; we are *urged* and *instigated* by the representations of others: a benevolent man is *impelled* by motives of humanity to relieve the wretched: an ardent mind is *stimulated* by ambition to great efforts: we are *urged* by entreaties to spare those who are in our power; one is *instigated* by malicious representations to take revenge on a supposed enemy.

We may be *impelled* and *urged* though not properly *stimulated* or *instigated* by circumstances; in this case the two former differ only in the degree of force in the *impelling* cause: less constraint is laid on the will when we are *impelled*, than when we are *urged*, which leaves no alternative or choice: a monarch is sometimes *impelled* by the state of the nation to make a peace less advantageous than he would otherwise do; he is *urged* by his desperate condition to throw himself upon the mercy of the enemy: a man is *impelled* by the mere necessity of choosing to take one road in preference to another; he is *urged* by his pecuniary embarrassments to raise money at a great loss.

We may be *impelled*, *urged*, and *stimulated* to that which is bad; we are never *instigated* to that which is good: we may be *impelled* by curiosity to pry into that which does not concern us; we may be *urged* by the entreaties of those we are connected with to take steps of which we afterwards repent; we may be *stimulated* by a desire of revenge to many foul deeds; but those who are not hardened in vice require the *instigation* of persons more abandoned than themselves, before they will commit any desperate act of wickedness.

Encouragement and *incitement* are the abstract nouns either for the act of *encouraging* or *inciting*, or the thing that *encourages* or *incites*: the *encouragement* of laudable undertakings is itself laudable: a single word or look may be an *encouragement*: the *incitement* of passion is at all times dangerous, but particularly in youth: money is said to be an *incitement* to evil. *Incentive*, which is another derivative from *incite*, has a higher application for things that *incite* than the word *incitement*: the latter being mostly applied to sensible, and the former to spiritual objects: savoury food is an *incitement* to sensualists to indulge in gross acts of intemperance: a religious man

wants no *incentives* to virtues: his own breast furnishes him with those of the noblest kind. *Impulse* is the derivative from *impel*, which denotes the act of *impelling*; *stimulus*, which is the root of the word *stimulate*, naturally designates the instrument, namely, the spur or goad with which one is *stimulated*; hence we speak of acting by a blind *impulse*, or wanting a *stimulus* to exertion.

Every man *encourages* the practice of that vice which he commits in appearance, though he avoids it in fact.—HAWKESWORTH.

He that prosecutes a lawful purpose, by lawful means, acts always with the approbation of his own reason; he is *animated* through the course of his endeavours by an expectation which he knows to be just.—JOHNSON.

While a rightful claim to pleasure or to affluence must be procured either by slow industry or uncertain hazard, there will always be multitudes whom cowardice or impatience incite to more safe and speedy methods of getting wealth.—JOHNSON.

Thus, while around the wave-subjected soil
Impels the natives to repeated toil,
Industrious habits in each bosom reign.

GOLDSMITH.

The magistrate cannot *urge* obedience upon such potent grounds as the minister.—SOUTH.

For every want that *stimulates* the breast
Becomes a source of pleasure when redrest.

GOLDSMITH.

There are few *instigations* in this country to a breach of confidence.—HAWKESWORTH.

To Encourage, Advance, Promote,
Prefer, Forward.

To Encourage, *v.* To encourage, animate.
Advance, *v.* To advance.

Promote, from the Latin *promoveo*, signifies to move forward.

Prefer, from the Latin *præfero* or *fero* and *præ* to set before, signifies to set up before others.

To Forward is to put forward.

The idea of exerting one's influence to the advantage of an object is included in the signification of all these terms, which differ in the circumstances and mode of the action: to *encourage*, *advance*, and *promote*, are applicable to both persons and things; *prefer* to persons only; *forward* to things only.

First as to persons, *encourage* is partial as to the end, and indefinite as to the means: we may *encourage* a person in any thing however trivial, and by any means: thus we may *encourage* a child in his rudeness, by not checking him; or we may *encourage* an artist or man of letters in some great national work; but to *advance*, *promote*, and *prefer*, are more general in their end, and specific in the means: a person may *advance* himself, or may be *advanced* by others; he is *promoted* and *preferred* only by others: a person's *advancement* may be the fruit of his industry, or result from the efforts of his friends; *promotion* and *preference* are the work of one's friends: the former in regard to offices in general, the latter mostly in regard to ecclesiastical situations: it is the duty of every one to *encourage*, to the utmost of his power, those among the poor who strive to obtain an honest livelihood; it is every man's duty to *advance* himself in life by every legitimate means; it is the duty and the pleasure of every good man in the state to *promote* those who show themselves

deserving of *promotion*: it is the duty of a minister to accept of *preference* when it offers, but it is not his duty to be solicitous for it.

When taken in regard to things *encourage* is used in an improper or figurative acceptance; the rest are applied properly: if we *encourage* an undertaking, we give courage to the undertaker; but when we speak of *advancing* a cause, or *promoting* an interest, or *forwarding* a purpose, these terms properly convey the idea of keeping things alive, or in a motion towards some desired end: to *advance* is however generally used in relation to whatever admits of extension and aggrandizement; *promote* is applied to whatever admits of being brought to a point of maturity or perfection; *forward* is but a partial term, employed in the sense of *promote* in regard to particular objects: thus we *advance* religion or learning; we *promote* an art or an invention; we *forward* a plan.

Religion depends upon the *encouragement* of those that are to dispense and assert it.—SOUTH.

No man's lot is so unalterably fixed in this life, but that a thousand accidents may either forward or disappoint his *advancement*.—HUGHES.

Your zeal in *promoting* my interest deserves my warmest acknowledgements.—BEATTIE.

If I were now to accept *preference* in the church, I should be apprehensive that I might strengthen the hands of the gainsayers.—BEATTIE.

The great *encouragement* which has been given to learning for some years last past, has made our own nation as glorious upon this account as for its late triumphs and conquests.—ADDISON.

I love to see a man zealous in a good matter, and especially when his zeal shows itself for *advancing* morality, and *promoting* the happiness of mankind.—ADDISON.

It behoves us not to be wanting to ourselves in *forwarding* the intention of nature by the culture of our minds.—BERKELEY.

To Encourage, Embolden.

To *Encourage* is to give courage, and to *Embolden* to make bold; the former impelling to action in general, the latter to that which is more difficult or dangerous: we are *encouraged* to persevere; the resolution is thereby confirmed: we are *emboldened* to begin; the spirit of enterprise is roused. Success *encourages*; the chance of escaping danger *emboldens*.

Outward circumstances, however trivial, serve to *encourage*; the urgency of the occasion, or the importance of subject, serves to *embolden*: a kind word or a gentle look *encourages* the suppliant to tender his petition; where the cause of truth and religion is at stake, the firm believer is *emboldened* to speak out with freedom: timid dispositions are not to be *encouraged* always by trivial circumstances, but sanguine dispositions are easily *emboldened*: the most flattering representations of friends are frequently necessary to *encourage* the display of talent; the confidence natural to youth is often sufficient of itself to *embolden* men to great undertakings.

Intrepid through the midst of danger go,
Their friends *encourage* and amaze the foe.

DRYDEN.

Embolden'd then, nor hesitating more,
Fast, fast, they plunge amid the flashing sword.

THOMSON.

To Encroach, Intrench, Intrude, Invade, Infringe.

Encroach, in French *encrocher*, is compounded of *en* or *in* and *crouch* cringe or creep, signifying to creep into any thing.

Intrench, compounded of *in* and *trench*, signifies to *trench* or dig beyond one's own ground into another's ground.

Intrude, from the Latin *intrudo*, signifies literally to thrust upon; and **Invade**, from *invado*, signifies to march in upon.

Infringe, from the Latin *infringo* compounded of *in* and *frango*, signifies to break in upon.

All these terms denote an unauthorised procedure; but the two former designate gentle or silent actions, the latter violent if not noisy actions.

Encroach is often an imperceptible action, performed with such art as to elude observation; it is according to its derivation, an insensible creeping into: *intrench* is in fact a species of *encroachment*, namely, that perceptible species which consists in exceeding the boundaries in marking out the ground or space: it should be one of the first objects of a parent to check the first indications of an *encroaching* disposition in their children; according to the building laws, it is made actionable for any one to *intrench* upon the street or public road with their houses or gardens.

Encroach and *intrench* respect property only; *intrude*, *invade*, and *infringe*, are used with regard to other objects: *intrude* and *invade* designate an unauthorised entry; the former in violation of right equity or good manners; the latter in violation of public law: the former is more commonly applied to individuals; the latter to nations or large communities: *unbidden* guests *intrude* themselves sometimes into families to their no small annoyance: an army never *invades* a country without doing some mischief: nothing evinces greater ignorance and impertinence than to *intrude* one's self into any company where we may of course expect to be unwelcome; in the feudal times, when civil power was invested in the hands of the nobility and petty princes, they were incessantly *invading* each other's territories.

Invade has likewise an improper as well as a proper acceptation; in the former case it bears a close analogy to *infringe*: we speak of *invading* rights, or *infringing* rights; but the former is an act of greater violence than the latter: by a tyrannical and arbitrary exercise of power the rights of the subject are *invaded*; by gradual steps and imperceptible means their liberties may be *infringed*: *invade* is used only for public privileges; *infringe* is applied also to private and individual.

King John of England *invaded* the rights of the Barons in so senseless and arbitrary a manner as to provoke their resistance, and thus promote the cause of civil liberty; it is of importance to the peace and well-being of society that men should, in their different relations, stations, and duties, guard against any *infringement* on the sphere or department of such as come into the closest connexion with them.

It is observed by one of the fathers that he who restrains himself in the use of things lawful will never *encroach* upon things forbidden.—JOHNSON.

Religion *entrenches* upon none of our privileges, *invades* none of our pleasures.—SOUTH.

One of the chief characteristics of the golden age, of the age in which neither care nor danger had *intruded* on mankind, is the community of possessions.—JOHNSON.

No sooner were his eyes in slumber bound,
When from above a more than mortal sound
Invades his ears.—DRYDEN.

The King's partisans maintained that, while the prince commands no military force, he will in vain by violence attempt an *infringement* of laws so clearly defined by means of late disputes.—HUME.

To Encumber, v. To clog.

Encyclopædia, v. Dictionary.

End, v. Aim.

To End, Close, Terminate.

To bring any thing to its last point is the common idea in the signification of these terms.

To **End** is the simple action of putting an *end* to, without any collateral idea; it is therefore the generic term. To **Close** is to *end* gradually. To **Terminate** is to *end* in a specific manner. There are persons even in civilized countries so ignorant as, like the brutes, to *end* their lives as they began them, without one rational reflection: the Christian *closes* his career of active duty only with the failure of his bodily powers. A person *ends* a dispute, or puts an *end* to it, by yielding the subject of contest; he *terminates* the dispute by entering into a compromise.

Greece in her single heroes strove in vain,
Now hosts oppose thee, and thou must be slain:
So shall my days in one sad tenor run,
And end with sorrows as they first begun.—POPE.

Orestes, Acamas, in front appear,
And Enomaus and Thoos close the rear.—POPE.

As I had a mind to know how each of these roads terminated, I joined myself with the assembly that were in the flower and vigour of their age, and called themselves the band of lovers.—ADDISON.

End, Extremity.

Both these words imply the last of those parts which constitute a thing; but the **End** designates that part generally: the **Extremity** marks the particular point. The *extremity* is from the Latin *extremus* the very last *end*, that which is outermost. Hence *end* may be said of that which bounds any thing; but *extremity* of that which extends farthest from us: we may speak of the *ends* of that which is circular in its form, or of that which has no specific form; but we speak of the *extremities* of that only which is supposed to project lengthwise.

The *end* is opposed to the beginning; the *extremity* to the centre or point from which we reckon. When a man is said to go to the *end* of a journey or the *end* of the world, the expression is in both cases indefinite and general; but when he is said to go to the *extremities* of the earth or the *extremities* of a kingdom, the idea of relative distance is manifestly implied.

He who goes to the *end* of a path may possibly have a little farther to go in order to

reach the *extremity*. In the figurative application *end* and *extremity* differ so widely as not to admit of any just comparison.

Now with full force the yielding horn he bends,
Drawn to an arch, and joins the doubling *ends*.
POPE.

Our female projectors were all the last summer so taken up with the improvement of their petticoats that they had not time to attend to anything else; but having at length sufficiently adorned their lower parts, they now begin to turn their thoughts upon the other *extremity*.—
ADDISON.

End, *v. Sake*.

To Endeavour, *v. To attempt*.

To Endeavour, Aim, Strive,
Struggle.

Endeavour, *v. Attempt*.

Aim, *v. Aim*.

Strive, *v. Discord, strife*.

Struggle is a frequ- native from *strive*.

To *endeavour* is general in its object; *aim* is particular; we *endeavour* to do whatever we set about; we *aim* at doing something which we have set before ourselves as a desirable object. To *strive* is to *endeavour* earnestly; to *struggle* is to *strive* earnestly.

An *endeavour* springs from a sense of duty; we *endeavour* to do that which is right, and avoid that which is wrong. *aiming* is the fruit of an aspiring temper; the object *aimed* at is always something superior either in reality or imagination, and calls for particular exertion: *striving* is the consequence of an ardent desire; the thing *striven* for is always conceived to be of importance: *struggling* is the effect of necessity; it is proportioned to the difficulty of attainment, and the resistance which is opposed to it; the thing *struggled* for is indispensably necessary.

Those only who *endeavour* to discharge their duty to God and their fellow creatures can expect real tranquillity of mind. Whoever *aims* at the acquirement of great wealth or much power opens the door for much misery to himself. As our passions are acknowledged to be our greatest enemies when they obtain the ascendancy, we should always *strive* to keep them under our control. There are some men who *struggle* through life to obtain a mere competence; and yet die without succeeding in their object.

We ought to *endeavour* to correct faults, to *aim* at attaining Christian perfection, to *strive* to conquer bad habits: these are the surest means of saving us from the necessity of *struggling* to repair an injured reputation.

'Tis no uncommon thing, my good Sancho, for one half of the world to use the other half like brutes, and then *endeavour* to make 'em so.—STERNE.

However men may *aim* at elevation,
'Tis properly a female passion.—SHENSTONE.

All understand their great Creator's will,
Strive to be happy, and in that fulfil,
Mankind excepted, lord of all beside,
But only slave to folly, vice, and pride.

JENYNS.

So the boat's brawny crew the current stem,
And slow advancing *struggle* with the stream.
DRYDEN.

Endeavour, Effort, Exertion.

Endeavour, *v. Attempt* and *To endeavour*.

Effort, is changed from the Latin *effort* from *effero* to bring forth, that is, to bring out power.

Exertion, in Latin *exertio* from *exero*, signifies the putting forth power.

The idea of calling our powers into action is common to these terms: *endeavour* expresses little more than this common idea, being a term of general import: *effort* and *exertion* are particular modes of *endeavour*: the former being a special strong *endeavour*, the latter a continued strong *endeavour*. An *endeavour* is called forth by ordinary circumstances: *effort* and *exertion* by those which are extraordinary. An *endeavour* flows out of the condition of our being and constitution; as rational and responsible agents we must make daily *endeavours* to fit ourselves for an hereafter; as willing and necessitous agents, we use our *endeavours* to obtain such things as are agreeable or needful for us: when a particular emergency arises we make a great *effort*; and when a serious object is to be obtained we make suitable *exertions*.

An *endeavour* is indefinite both as to the end and the means: the end may be immediate or remote; the means may be either direct or indirect: but in an *effort* the end is immediate; the means are direct and personal: we may either make an *endeavour* to get into a room, or we may make an *endeavour* to obtain a situation in life; but we make *efforts* to speak, or we make *efforts* to get through a crowd. An *endeavour* may call forth one or many powers; an *effort* calls forth but one power: the *endeavour* to please in society is laudable, if it do not lead to vicious compliances; it is a laudable *effort* of fortitude to suppress our complaints in the moment of suffering. The *exertion* is as comprehensive in its meaning as the *endeavour*, and as positive as the *effort*; but the *endeavour* is most commonly, and the *effort* always, applied to individuals only; whereas the *exertion* is applicable to nations as well as individuals. A tradesman uses his best *endeavours* to please his customers: a combatant makes desperate *efforts* to overcome his antagonist: a candidate for literary or parliamentary honours uses great *exertions* to surpass his rival; a nation uses great *exertions* to raise a navy or extend its commerce.

To walk with circumspection and steadiness in the right path ought to be the constant *endeavour* of every rational being.—JOHNSON.

The influence of custom is such, that to conquer it will require the utmost *efforts* of fortitude and virtue.—JOHNSON.

The discomfitures which the republic of assassins has suffered have uniformly called forth new *exertions*.—BURKE.

Endless, *v. Eternal*.

To Endow, *v. To invest*:

Endowment, *v. Gift*.

Endurance, *v. Patience*.

To Endure, *v. To suffer*.

Enemy, Foe, Adversary, Opponent,
Antagonist.

Enemy, in Latin *inimicus*, compounded of

in private and *amicus* a friend signifies one that is unfriendly.

Foe, in Saxon *fah* most probably from the old Teutonic *flan* to hate, signifies one that bears a hatred.

Adversary, in Latin *adversarius* from *adversus* against, signifies one that takes part against another; *adversarius* in Latin was particularly applied to those who contested a point in law with another.

Opponent, in Latin *opponens* participle of *oppono* or *obpono* to place in the way, signifies one pitted against another.

Antagonist, in Greek *ανταγωνιστος* compounded of *αντι* against, and *αγωνισμα* to contend, signifies one struggling with another.

An *enemy* is not so formidable as a *foe*; the former may be reconciled, but the latter remains always deadly. An *enemy* may be so in spirit, in action, or in relation; a *foe* is always so in spirit, if not in action likewise; a man may be an *enemy* to himself, though not a *foe*. Those who are national or political *enemies* are often private friends, but a *foe* is never any thing but a *foe*. A single act may create an *enemy*, but continued warfare creates a *foe*.

Enemies are either public or private, collective or personal; in the latter sense the word *enemy* is most analogous in signification to that of *adversary*, *opponent*, *antagonist*. * *Enemies* seek to injure each other commonly from a sentiment of hatred; the heart is always more or less implicated; *adversaries* set up their claims, and frequently urge their pretensions with angry strife; but interest more than sentiment stimulates to action; *opponents* set up different parties, and treat each other sometimes with acrimony; but their differences do not necessarily include any thing personal: *antagonists* are a species of *opponents* who are in actual engagement: emulation and direct exertion, but not anger, is concerned in making the *antagonist*. *Enemies* make war, aim at destruction, and commit acts of personal violence: *adversaries* are contented with appropriating to themselves some object of desire, or depriving their rival of it; cupidity being the moving principle, and gain the object; *opponents* oppose each other systematically and perpetually; each aims at being thought right in their disputes: tastes and opinions are commonly the subjects of debate, self-love oftener than a love of truth is the moving principle; *antagonists* engage in a trial of strength; victory is the end; the love of distinction or superiority the moving principle; the contest may lie either in mental or physical exertion; may aim at superiority in a verbal dispute or in a manual combat. There are nations whose subjects are born *enemies* to those of a neighbouring nation: nothing evinces the radical corruption of any country more than when the poor man dares not show himself as an *adversary* to his rich neighbour without fearing to lose more than he might gain; the ambition of some men does not rise higher than that of being the *opponent* to ministers: Scaliger and Petavius among the French were great *antagonists* in their day, as were Boyle and Bentley

among the English; the Horatii and Curiatii were equally famous *antagonists* in their way.

Enemy and *foe* are likewise employed in a figurative sense for moral objects: our passions are our *enemies* when indulged; envy is a *foe* to happiness.

Plutarch says very finely, that a man should not allow himself to hate even his *enemies*.—ADDISON.

So frown'd the mighty combatants, that hell
Grew darker at their frown; so match'd they stood;
For never but once more was either like
To meet so great a *foe*.—MILTON.

Those disputants (the persecutors) convince their *adversaries* with a sorites commonly called a pile of fagots.—ADDISON.

The name of Boyle is indeed revered, but his works are neglected; we are contented to know that he conquered his *opponents*, without inquiring what cavils were produced against him.—JOHNSON.

Sir Francis Bacon observes that a well written book, compared with its rivals and *antagonists*, is like Moses's serpent that immediately swallowed up those of the Egyptians.—ADDISON.

Energy, Force, Vigour.

Energy, in French *energie*, Latin *energia*, Greek *ενεργια* from *ενεργεω* to operate inwardly, signifies the power of producing positive effects.

Force, *v.* To compel.

Vigour, from the Latin *vigoro* to flourish, signifies unimpaired power, or that which belongs to a subject in a sound or flourishing state.

With *energy* is connected the idea of activity; with *force* that of capability; with *vigour* that of health. *Energy* lies only in the mind; *force* and *vigour* are the property of either body or mind. Knowledge and freedom combine to produce *energy* of character; *force* is a gift of nature that may be increased by exercise. *Vigour*, both bodily and mental, is an ordinary accompaniment of youth, but is not always denied to old age.

Our powers owe much of their *energy* to our hopes: "possunt quis posse videntur." When success seems attainable, diligence is enforced.—JOHNSON.

On the passive main
Descends th' ethereal *force*, and with strong gust
Turns from its bottom the discolour'd deep.
THOMSON.

No man at the age and *vigour* of thirty is fond of sugar-plums and rattles.—SOUTH.

To Enervate, *v.* To weaken.

To Enfeeble, *v.* To weaken.

To Engage, *v.* To attract.

To Engage, *v.* To bind.

Engagement, *v.* Battle.

Engagement, *v.* Business.

Engagement, *v.* Promise.

To Engender, *v.* To breed.

To Engrave, *v.* To imprint.

Engraving, *v.* Picture.

To Engross, *v.* To absorb.

Enjoyment, Fruition, Gratification.

Enjoyment, from *enjoy* to have the joy or pleasure, signifies either the act of *enjoying*, or the pleasure itself derived from that act.

* Vide Abb Girard; "Ennemi, adversaire, antagoniste."

Fruition, from *fruo* to *enjoy*, is employed only for the act of *enjoying*; we speak either of the *enjoyment* of any pleasure, or of the *enjoyment* as a pleasure: we speak of those pleasures which are received from the *fruition*, in distinction from those which are had in expectation. *Enjoyment* is either corporeal or spiritual, as the *enjoyment* of music, or the *enjoyment* of study; but the *fruition* of eating, or any other sensible, or at least external object; hope intervenes between the desire and the *fruition*.

Gratification, from the verb to *gratify*, to make grateful or pleasant, signifies either the act of giving pleasure, or the pleasure received. *Enjoyment* springs from every object which is capable of yielding pleasure; by distinction however, and in the latter sense, from moral and rational objects: but *gratification*, which is a species of *enjoyment*, is obtained through the medium of the senses. *Enjoyment* is not so vivid as *gratification*: *gratification* is not so permanent as *enjoyment*. Domestic life has its peculiar *enjoyments*; brilliant spectacles afford *gratification*. Our capacity for *enjoyment* depends upon our intellectual endowments; our *gratification* depends upon the tone of our feelings, and the nature of our desires.

The *enjoyment* of fame brings but very little pleasure, though the loss or want of it be very sensible and afflictive.—ADDISON.

The man of pleasure little knows the perfect joy he loses from the disappointing *gratifications* which he pursues.—ADDISON.

Fame is a good so wholly foreign to our natures that we have no faculty in the soul adapted to it, nor any organ in the body to relish it; an object of desire placed out of the possibility of *fruition*.—ADDISON.

To Enlarge, Increase, Extend.

Enlarge, signifies literally to make large or wide, and is applied to dimension and extent.

Increase, from the Latin *increasco* to grow to a thing, is applicable to quantity, signifying to become greater in size by the junction of other matter.

Extend, in Latin *extendo*, or *ex* and *tendo*, signifies to stretch out, that is, to make greater in space. We speak of *enlarging* a house, a room, premises, or boundaries; of *increasing* an army, or property, capital, expense, &c.; of *extending* the boundaries of an empire. We say the hole or cavity *enlarges*, the head or bulk *enlarges*, the number *increases*, the swelling, inflammation, and the like, *increase*: so likewise in the figurative sense, the views, the prospects, the powers, the ideas, and the mind, are *enlarged*; pain, pleasure, hope, fear, anger, or kindness, is *increased*; views, prospects, connexions, and the like, are *extended*.

Great objects make
Great minds, *enlarging* as their views *enlarge*,
Those still more godlike, as these more divine.
YOUNG.

Good sense alone is a sedate and quiescent quality which manages its possessions well, but does not *increase* them.—JOHNSON.

The wise *extending* their inquiries wide,
See how both states are by connexion ty'd;
Fools view but part, and not the whole survey,
So crowd existence all into a day.—JENYNS.

To Enlighten, *v.* To *illuminate*.

To Enlist, *v.* To *enrol*.

To Enliven, *v.* To *animate*.

Enmity, Animosity, Hostility.

Enmity lies in the heart; it is deep and malignant: **Animosity**, from *animus* a spirit, lies in the passions; it is fierce and vindictive: **Hostility**, from *hostis* a political enemy, lies in the action; it is mischievous and destructive.

Enmity is something permanent; *animosity* is partial and transitory; in the feudal ages, when the darkness and ignorance of the times prevented the mild influence of Christianity, *enmities* between particular families were handed down as an inheritance from father to son; in free states, party spirit engenders greater *animosities* than private disputes.

Enmity is altogether personal; *hostility* mostly respects public measures; *animosity* respects either one or many individuals. *Enmity* often lies concealed in the heart; *animosity* mostly betrays itself by some open act of *hostility*. He who cherishes *enmity* towards another is his own greatest enemy; he who is guided by a spirit of *animosity* is unfit to have any command over others; he who proceeds to wanton *hostility* often provokes an enemy where he might have a friend.

In some instances, indeed, the *enmity* of others cannot be avoided without a participation in their guilt; but then it is the *enmity* of those with whom neither wisdom nor virtue can desire to associate.—JOHNSON.

I will never let my heart reproach me with having done any thing towards increasing those *animosities* that extinguish religion, deface government, and make a nation miserable.—ADDISON.

Erasmus himself had, it seems, the misfortune to fall into the hands of a party of Trojans who laid on him with so many blows and buffets, that he never forgot their *hostilities* to his dying day.—ADDISON.

Enmity, *v.* *Hatred*.

Enormous, Huge, Immense, Vast.

Enormous, from *e* and *norma* a rule, signifies out of rule or order.

Huge, is in all probability connected with *high*, which is *hoog* in Dutch.

Immense, in Latin *immensus*, compounded of *in* privative and *mensus* measured, signifies not to be measured.

Vast, in French *vaste*, Latin *vastus*, from *vaco*, to be vacant, open, or wide, signifies extended in space.

Enormous and *huge* are peculiarly applicable to magnitude; *immense* and *vast* to extent, quantity, and number. *Enormous* expresses more than *huge*, as *immense* expresses more than *vast*: what is *enormous* exceeds in a very great degree all ordinary bounds; what is *huge* is great only in the superlative degree. The *enormous* is always out of proportion; the *huge* is relatively extraordinary in its dimensions. Some animals may be made *enormously* fat by a particular mode of feeding; to one who has seen nothing but level ground common hills will appear to be *huge* mountains.

The *immense* is that which exceeds all calculation: the *vast* comprehends only a very great or unusual excess. The distance between the earth and sun may be said to be *immense*: the distance between the poles is *vast*.

Of all these terms *huge* is the only one confined to the proper application, and in the proper sense of size: the rest are employed with regard to moral objects. We speak only of a *huge* animal, a *huge* monster, a *huge* mass, a *huge* size, a *huge* bulk, and the like; but we speak of an *enormous* waste, an *immense* difference, and a *vast* number.

The epithets *enormous*, *immense*, and *vast*, are applicable to the same objects, but with the same distinction in their sense. A sum is *enormous* which exceeds in magnitude not only everything known, but everything thought of or expected: a sum is *immense* that scarcely admits of calculation: a sum is *vast* which rises very high in calculation. The national debt of England has risen to an *enormous* amount: the revolutionary war has been attended with an *immense* loss of blood and treasure to the different nations of Europe: there are individuals who, while they are expending *vast* sums on their own gratifications, refuse to contribute anything to the relief of the necessitous.

The Thracian Acarnus his falchion found,
And hew'd the *enormous* giant to the ground.—POPE.

Great Arethous, known from shore to shore,
By the *huge*, knotted iron nace he bore,
No lance he shook, nor bent the twanging bow,
But broke with this the battle of the foe.—POPE.

Well was the crime, and well the vengeance sparr'd,
E'n power *immense* had found such battle hard.
POPE.

Just on the brink they neigh and paw the ground,
And the turf trembles, and the skies resound;
Eager they view'd the prospect dark and deep,
Vast was the leap, and headlong hung the steep.
POPE.

Enormous, Prodigious, Monstrous.

Enormous (vide *Enormous*).

Prodigious comes from *prodigy*, in Latin *prodigium*, which in all probability comes from *prodigo* to lavish forth, signifying literally breaking out in excess or extravagance.

Monstrous from *monster*, in Latin *monstrum*, and *monstro* to show or make visible, signifies remarkable, or exciting notice.

The *enormous* contradicts our rules of estimating and calculating: the *prodigious* raises our minds beyond their ordinary standard of thinking: the *monstrous* contradicts nature and the course of things. What is *enormous* excites our surprise or amazement: what is *prodigious* excites our astonishment: what is *monstrous* does violence to our senses and understanding. There is something *enormous* in the present scale upon which property, whether public or private, is amassed and expended: the works of the ancients in general, but the Egyptian pyramids in particular, are objects of admiration, on account of the *prodigious* labour which was bestowed on them: ignorance and superstition have always been active in producing *monstrous* images for the worship of its blind votaries.

Jove's bird on sounding pinions beat the skies,
A bleeding serpent of *enormous* size,
His talons truss'd, alive and curling round,
He stung the bird whose throat receiv'd the wound.
POPE.

I dreamed that I was in a wood of so *prodigious* an extent, and out into such a variety of walks and alleys, that all mankind were lost and bewildered in it.—ADDISON.

Nothing so *monstrous* can be said or feign'd
But with belief and joy is entertain'd.—DRYDEN.

Enough, Sufficient.

Enough, in German *genug*, comes from *genügen*, to satisfy.

Sufficient, in Latin *sufficiens*, participle of *sufficio*, compounded of *sub* and *facio*, signifies made or suited to the purpose.

He has *enough* whose desires are satisfied; he has *sufficient* whose wants are supplied. We may therefore frequently have *sufficiency* when we have not *enough*. A greedy man is commonly in this case who has never *enough*, although he has more than a *sufficiency*. *Enough* is said only of physical objects of desire: *sufficient* is employed in a moral application, for that which serves the purpose. Children and animals never have *enough* food, nor the miser *enough* money: it is requisite to allow *sufficient* time for everything that is to be done, if we wish it to be done well.

My loss of honour's great *enough*,
Thou need'st not brand it with a scoff.—BUTLER.

The time present seldom affords *sufficient* employment for the mind of man.—ADDISON.

Enrapture, v. *Charm*.

To Enrol, Inlist, Register, Record.

Enrol, compounded of *en* or *in* and *roll*, signifies to place in a roll, that is, in a roll of paper or a book.

Inlist, compounded of *in* and *list*, signifies to put down in a list.

Register, in Latin *registrum*, comes from *regestum* participle of *regero*, signifying to put down in writing.

Record, in Latin *recordor*, compounded of *re* back or again, and *cor* the heart, signifies to bring back to the heart, or call to mind by a memorandum.

Enrol and *inlist* respect persons only; *register* respects persons and things; *record* respects things only. *Enrol* is generally applied to the act of inserting names in an orderly manner into any book; *inlist* is a species of *enrolling* applicable only to the military. The *enrolment* is an act of authority; the *inlisting* is the voluntary act of an individual. Among the Romans it was the office of the censor to *enrol* the names of all the citizens in order to ascertain their number, and estimate their property: in modern times soldiers are mostly raised by means of *inlisting*.

In the moral application of the terms, to *enrol* is to assign a certain place or rank; to *inlist* is to put one's self under a leader, or attach one's self to a party. Hercules was *enrolled* among the Gods; the common people are always ready to *inlist* on the side of anarchy and rebellion. To *enrol* and *register*, both imply writing down in a book; but the former

is a less formal act than the latter. The insertion of the bare name or designation in a certain order is enough to constitute an *enrolment*; but *registering* comprehends the birth, family, and other collateral circumstances of the individual. The object of *registering* likewise differs from that of *enrolling*: what is *registered* serves for future purposes, and is of permanent utility to society in general; but what is *enrolled* often serves only a particular or temporary end. Thus in numbering the people it is necessary simply to *enrol* their names; but when in addition to this it was necessary, as among the Romans, to ascertain their rank in the state, everything connected with their property, their family, and their connexion, required to be *registered*; so in like manner, in more modern times, it has been found necessary for the good government of the state to *register* the births, marriages, and deaths of every citizen; it is manifest, therefore, that what is *registered*, as far as respects persons, may be said to be *enrolled*; but what is *enrolled* is not always *registered*.

Register, in regard to *record*, has a no less obvious distinction: the former is used for domestic and civil transactions, the latter for public and political events. What is *registered* serves for the daily purposes of the community collectively and individually; what is *recorded* is treasured up in a special manner for particular reference and remembrance at a distance. The number or names of streets, houses, carriages, and the like, are *registered* in different offices; deeds and documents which regard grants, charters, privileges, and the like, either of individuals or particular towns, are *recorded* in the archives of nations. To *record* is, therefore, a formal species of *registering*: we *register* when we *record*; but we do not always *record* when we *register*.

In an extended and figurative application things may be said to be *registered* in the memory; or events *recorded* in history. We have a right to believe that the actions of good men are *registered* in heaven, and that their names are *enrolled* among the saints and angels; the particular sayings and actions of princes are *recorded* in history, and handed down to the latest posterity.

Anciently no man was suffered to abide in England above forty days, unless he were *enrolled* in some tithing or decenary. —BLACKSTONE.

The time never was when I would have *intisted* under the banners of any faction, though I might have carried a pair of colours, if I had not spurned them, in either legion. —SIR WM. JONES.

I hope you take care to keep an exact journal, and to *register* all occurrences and observations, for your friends here expect such a book of travels as has not often been seen. —JOHNSON.

The medals of the Romans were their current money; when an action deserved to be *recorded* in coin, it was stamped perhaps upon an hundred thousand pieces of money, like our shillings or half-pence. —ADDISON.

Ensamble, v. Example.

To Enslave, Captivate.

To **Enslave** is to bring into a state of slavery.

To **Captivate** is to make a captive.

There is as much difference between these terms as between *slavery* and *captivity*: he

who is a *slave* is fettered both body and mind; he who is a *captive* is only constrained as to his body: hence to *enslave* is always taken in the bad sense; *captivate* mostly in the good sense: *enslave* is employed literally or figuratively; *captivate* only figuratively: we may be *enslaved* by persons, or by our gross passions; we are *captivated* by the charms or beauty of an object.

The will was then (before the fall) subordinate, but not *enslaved* to the understanding. —SOUTH.

Men should beware of being *captivated* by a kind of savage philosophy, women by a thoughtless gallantry. —ADDISON.

To Ensue, v. To follow.

To Entangle, v. To embarrass.

To Entangle, v. To ensnare.

Enterprize, v. Attempt.

Enterprizing, Adventurous.

These terms mark a disposition to engage in that which is extraordinary and hazardous; but **Enterprizing**, from *enterprize* (*v. Attempt*), is connected with the understanding; and **Adventurous**, from *adventure*, venture or trial, is a characteristic of the passions. The *enterprizing* character conceives great projects, and pursues objects that are difficult to be obtained; the *adventurous* character is contented with seeking that which is new, and placing himself in dangerous and unusual situations. An *enterprizing* spirit belongs to the commander of an army, or the ruler of a nation; an *adventurous* disposition is suitable to men of low degree. Peter the Great possessed, in a peculiar manner, an *enterprizing* genius; Robinson Crusoe was a man of an *adventurous* turn. *Enterprizing* characterizes persons only; but *adventurous* is also applied to things, to signify containing *adventures*; hence a journey, or a voyage, or a history, may be denominated *adventurous*.

One Wood, a man *enterprizing* and rapacious, had obtained a patent, empowering him to coin one hundred and eighty thousand pounds of half-pence and farthings for the kingdom of Ireland. —JOHNSON.

But 'tis enough
In this late age, *advent'rous* to have touch'd
Light on the numbers of the Samian sage;

High heaven forbids the bold presumptions strain.
THOMSON.

To Enter Upon, v. To begin.

To Entertain, v. To amuse.

Entertainment, v. Amusement.

Entertainment, v. Feast.

Enthusiast, Fanatic, Visionary.

The **Enthusiast**, **Fanatic**, and **Visionary**, have disordered imaginations; but the *enthusiast* is only affected inwardly with an extraordinary fervor, the *fanatic* and *visionary* betray that fervor by some outward mark; the former by singularities of conduct, the latter by singularities of doctrine. *Fanatics* and *visionaries* are therefore always more or less *enthusiasts*; but *enthusiasts* are not always *fanatics* or *visionaries*. *Εὐθυσιασται* among the Greeks, from *εὐ* in and *θεος* God, signified those supposed to have, or pretending to have

Divine inspiration. *Fanatics* were so called among the Latins, from *fana* (temples) in which they spent an extraordinary portion of their time; they, like the *εθυσιασταί* of the Greeks, pretended to revelations and inspirations, during the influence of which they indulged themselves in many extravagant tricks, cutting themselves with knives, and distorting themselves with every species of antic gesture and grimace.

Although we are professors of a pure religion, yet we cannot boast an exemption from the extravagancies which are related of the poor heathens; we have many who indulge themselves in similar practices, under the idea of honoring their Maker and Redeemer. There are *fanatics* who profess to be under extraordinary influences of the spirit; and there are *enthusiasts* whose intemperate zeal disqualifies them for taking a beneficial part in the sober and solemn services of the church. *Visionary* signifies properly one who deals in *visions*, that is, in the pretended appearance of supernatural objects; a species of *enthusiasts* who have sprung up in more modern times. The leaders of sects are commonly *visionaries*, having adopted this artifice to establish their reputation and doctrines among their deluded followers; Mahomet was one of the most successful *visionaries* that ever pretended to divine inspiration; and since his time there have been *visionaries*, particularly in England, who have raised religious parties, by having recourse to the same expedient: of this description were Swedenborg, Huntington, Brothers, and the like.

Fanatic was originally confined to those who were under religious frenzy, but the present age has presented us with the monstrosity of *fanatics* in irreligion and anarchy. *Enthusiast* is applied in general to every one who is filled with an extraordinary degree of fervor: *visionary* to one who deals in fanciful speculation. The former may sometimes be innocent, if not laudable, according to the nature of the object; the latter is always censurable: the *enthusiast* has always a warm heart; the *visionary* has only a fanciful head. The *enthusiast* will mostly be on the side of virtue even though in an error; the *visionary* pleads no cause but his own. The *enthusiast* suffers his imagination to follow his heart; the *visionary* makes his understanding bend to his imagination. Although in matters of religion, *enthusiasm* should be cautiously guarded against, yet we admire to see it roused in behalf of one's country and one's friends: *visionaries*, whether in religion, politics, or science, are dangerous as members of society, and offensive as companions.

Cherish true religion as preciously as you will fly with abhorrence and contempt, superstition and *enthusiasm*.—CHATHAM.

They who will not believe that the philosophical *fanatics* who guide in these matters have long entertained the design (of abolishing religion), are utterly ignorant of their character.—BURKE.

The sons of infamy ridicule every thing as romantic that comes in competition with their present interest, and treat those persons as *visionaries* who dare stand up in a corrupt age, for what has not its immediate reward joined to it.—ADDISON.

To Entice, v. To allure.

To Entice, v. To prevail upon.

Entire, v. Whole.

To Entitle, v. To name.

To Entrap, v. To insnare.

To Entreat, v. To beg.

Entreaty, v. Prayer.

To Entrust, v. To consign.

To Enveigle, v. To insnare.

Envious, v. Invidious.

To Environ, v. To surround.

Envoy, v. Ambassador.

Epicure, v. Sensualist.

Epidemical, v. Contagious.

Epistle, v. Letter.

Epithet, Adjective.

Epithet is the technical term of the rhetorician. **Adjective** that of the grammarian. The same word is an *epithet* as it qualifies the sense; it is an *adjective* as it is a part of speech: thus in the phrase "Alexander the Great" great is an *epithet* inasmuch as it designates Alexander in distinction from all other persons: it is an *adjective*, as it expresses a quality in distinction from the noun Alexander, which denotes a thing. The *epithet* *επιθητον* is the word added by way of ornament to the diction; the *adjective*, from *adjectivum*, is the word added to the noun as its appendage, and made subservient to it in all its inflections. When we are estimating the merits of any one's style or composition, we should speak of the *epithets* he uses; when we are talking of words, their dependencies, and relations, we should speak of *adjectives*: an *epithet* is either gentle or harsh, an *adjective* is either a noun or a pronoun *adjective*.

All *adjectives* are *epithets*, but all *epithets* are not *adjectives*: thus in Virgil's *Pater Æneas*, the *pater* is an *epithet*, but not an *adjective*.

Epitome, v. Abridgement.

Epocha, v. Time.

Equable, v. Equal.

Equal, Even, Equable, Like or Alike, Uniform.

Equal, in Latin *æqualis*, comes from *æquus*, and probably the Greek *εἰσος*, *similis*, like.

Even is in Saxon *efen*, German *eben*, Swedish *efven*, *jafn*, or *aem*, Greek *οἰος* like.

Equable, in Latin *equabilis*, signifies susceptible of equality.

Like, is in Dutch *lik*, Saxon *gelig*, German *gleich*, Gothic *tholick*, Latin *ialis*, Greek *τηλικος* such as.

Uniform, compounded of *unus* one, and *forma* form, bespeaks its own meaning.

All these epithets are opposed to difference. **Equal** is said of degree, quantity, number, and dimensions, as *equal* in years; of an *equal* age; an *equal* height: *even* is said of the surface and position of bodies; a board is made *even* with another board; the floor or the ground is *even*;

like is said of accidental qualities in things, as *alike* in colour or in feature: *uniform* is said of things only as to their fitness to correspond; those which are *unlike* in color, shape, or make, or not *uniform*, cannot be made to match as pairs: *equable* is used only in the moral acceptation, in which all the others are likewise employed.

As moral qualities admit of degree, they admit of *equality*: justice is dealt out in *equal* portions to the rich and the poor; God looks with an *equal* eye on all mankind. As the natural path is rendered uneven by high and low ground, so the *evenness* of the temper, in the figurative sense, is destroyed by changes of humour, by elevations and depressions of the spirits; and the *equability* of the mind is hurt by the vicissitudes of life, from prosperous to adverse: *even* and *equable* are applied to the same mind in relation to itself: *like* or *alike* is applied to the minds of two or more; hence we say they are *alike* in disposition, in sentiment, in wishes, &c.: *uniform* is applied to the temper, habits, character, or conduct: hence a man is said to preserve a *uniformity* of behaviour towards those whom he commands; friendship requires that the parties be *equal* in station, *alike* in mind, and *uniform* in their conduct: wisdom points out to us an *even* tenor of life, from which we cannot depart either to the right or to the left without disturbing our peace; it is one of her maxims that we should not lose the *equability* of our temper under the most trying circumstances.

Equality is the life of conversation; and he is as much out who assumes to himself any part above another, as he who considers himself below the rest of society.—STEELE.

Good nature is insufficient (in the marriage state) unless it be steady and *uniform*, and accompanied with an *evenness* of temper.—SPECTATOR.

In Swift's works is found an *equable* tenour of easy language, which rather trickles than flows.—JOHNSON.

'E'en now familiar as in life he came;
Alas! how different, yet how *like* the same.—POPE.

To Equip, *v. To fit.*

Equitable, *v. Fair.*

Equity, *v. Justice.*

Equivocal, *v. Ambiguous.*

To Equivocate, *v. To evade.*

Era, *v. Time.*

To Eradicate, Extirpate, Exterminate.

To Eradicate, from *radix*, the root, is to get out by the root: **Extirpate**, from *ex* and *stirps* the stem, is to get out the stock, to destroy it thoroughly. In the natural sense we may *eradicate* noxious weeds whenever we pull them from the ground; but we can never *extirpate* all noxious weeds, as they always disseminate their seeds and spring up afresh. These words are seldomer used in the physical than in the moral sense; where the former is applied to such objects as are conceived to be plucked up by the roots, as habits, vices, abuses, evils; and the latter to whatever is united or supposed to be united into a race or family, and is destroyed root and branch. Youth is the season when vicious habits may

be thoroughly *eradicated*; by the universal deluge the whole human race was *extirpated*, with the exception of Noah and his family.

Exterminate, in Latin *exterminatus*, participle of *extermino*, from *ex* or *extra* and *terminus*, signifies to expel beyond a boundary (of life), that is, out of existence. It is used only in regard to such things as have life, and designates a violent and immediate action; *extirpate*, on the other hand, may designate a progressive action: the former may be said of individuals, but the latter is employed in the collective sense only. Plague, pestilence, famine, *extirpate*: the sword *exterminates*.

It must be every man's care to begin by *eradicating* those corruptions which, at different times, have tempted him to violate conscience.—BLAIR.

Go thou, inglorious, from th' embattled plain;
Ships thou hast store, and nearest to the main,
A nobler care the Grecians shall employ,
To combat, conquer, and *extirpate* Troy.—POPE.

So violent and black were Haman's passions, that he resolved to *exterminate* the whole nation to which Mordecai belonged.—BLAIR.

To Erase, *v. To blot out.*

To Erect, *v. To build.*

To Erect, *v. To institute.*

To Erect, *v. To lift.*

Errand, *v. Message.*

Error, Mistake, Blunder.

Error, in French *erreur*, Latin *error*, from *erro* to wander, marks the act of wandering, as applied to the rational faculty. A **Mistake** is a taking amiss or wrong.

Blunder is not improbably changed from blind, and signifies anything done blindly.

Error in its universal sense is the general term, since every deviation from what is right in rational agents is termed *error* which is strictly opposed to truth; *error* is the lot of humanity; into whatever we attempt to do or think *error* will be sure to creep: the term therefore is of unlimited use; the very mention of it reminds us of our condition: we have *errors* of judgment; *errors* of calculation; *errors* of the head; and *errors* of the heart. The other terms designate modes of *error*, which mostly refer to the common concerns of life: *mistake* is an *error* of choice; *blunder* an *error* of action: children and careless people are most apt to make *mistakes*; ignorant, conceited, and stupid people commonly commit *blunders*: a *mistake* must be rectified; in commercial transactions it may be of serious consequence: a *blunder* must be set right; but *blunderers* are not always to be set right; and *blunders* are frequently so ridiculous as only to excite laughter.

Idolatry may be looked upon as an *error* arising from mistaken devotion.—ADDISON.

It happened that the king himself passed through the gallery during this debate, and smiling at the *mistake* of the dervise, asked him how he could possibly be so dull as not to distinguish a palace from a caravansary.—ADDISON.

Pope allows that Dennis had detected one of those *blunders* which are called bulls.—JOHNSON.

Error, Fault.

Error (*v. Error*) respects the act; **Fault**, from *fail*, respects the agent: an *error* may lay in the judgment, or in the conduct; but a *fault* lies in the will or intention: the *errors* of youth must be treated with indulgence; but their *faults* must on all accounts be corrected: *error* is said of that which is individual and partial; *fault* is said likewise of that which is habitual: it is an *error* to use intemperate language at any time; it is a *fault* in the temper of some persons that they cannot restrain their anger.

Bold is the task when subjects, grown too wise,
Instruct a monarch where his *error* lies.—POPE.

Other *faults* are not under the wife's jurisdiction, and should if possible escape her observation, but jealousy calls upon her particularly for its cure.—ADDISON.

Erudition, *v. Knowledge*.

Eruption, Explosion.

The **Eruption**, from *e* and *rumpo*, signifies the breaking forth, that is, the coming into view by a sudden bursting; **Explosion**, from *ex* and *plaudo*, signifies bursting out with a noise: hence of flames there will be properly an *eruption*, but of gunpowder an *explosion*; volcanoes have their *eruptions* at certain intervals, which are sometimes attended with *explosions*: on this account *eruptions* are applied to the human body for whatever comes out as the effects of humour, and may be applied in the same manner to any indications of humour in the mind; *explosions* are also applied to the agitations of the mind which burst out.

Sin may truly reign, where it does not actually rage and pour itself forth in continual *eruptions*.—SOUTH.

A burst of fury, an exclamation seconded by a blow, is the first natural *explosion* of a soul so stung by scorpions as Macbeth's.—CUMBERLAND.

To Escape, Elude, Evade.

Escape, in French *échapper*, comes in all probability from the Latin *exipio* to take out of, to get off.

Elude, *v. To avoid*.

Evade, from the Latin *evado*, compounded of *e* and *vado*, signifies to go or get out of a thing.

The idea of being disengaged from that which is not agreeable is comprehended in the sense of all these terms; but *escape* designates no means by which this is effected; *elude* and *evade* define the means, namely, the efforts which are used by one's self: we are simply disengaged when we *escape*; but we disengage ourselves when we *elude* and *evade*; we *escape* from danger; we *elude* search: our *escapes* are often providential, and often narrow; our success in *eluding* depends on our skill: there are many bad men who *escape* hanging by the mistake of a word; there are many who *escape* detection by the art with which they *elude* observation and inquiry.

Elude and *evade* both imply the practice of art; but the former consists mostly of actions, the latter of words as well as actions: a thief *eludes* those who are in pursuit of him by dexterous modes of concealment; he *evades*

the interrogatories of the judge by equivocating replies.

One is said to *elude* a punishment, and to *evade* a law.

Vice oft is hid in virtue's fair disguise,
And in her borrow'd form escapes inquiring eyes.
SPECTATOR.

It is a vain attempt
To bind the ambitious and unjust by treaties;
These they *elude* a thousand specious ways.
THOMSON.

The Earl Rivers had frequently inquired for his son (Savage), and had always been amused with *evasive* answers.—JOHNSON.

To *Eschew*, *v. To avoid*.

To *Escort*, *v. To accompany*.

Especially, Particularly, Principally, Chiefly.

Especially and **Particularly** are exclusive or superlative in their import; they refer to one object out of many that is superior to all; **Principally** and **Chiefly** are comparative in their import; they designate in general the superiority of some objects over others. *Especially* is a term of stronger import than *particularly*, and *principally* expresses something less general than *chiefly*: we ought to have God before our eyes at all times, but *especially* in those moments when we present ourselves before him in prayer; the heat is very oppressive in all countries under the torrid zone, but *particularly* in the deserts of Arabia, where there is a want of shade and moisture; it is *principally* among the higher and lower orders of society that we find *vices* of every description to be prevalent; patriots who declaim so loudly against the measures of government do it *chiefly* (may I not say solely?) with a view to their own interest.

All love has something of blindness in it, but the love of money *especially*.—SOUTH.

Particularly let a man dread every gross act of sin.—SOUTH.

Neither Pythagoras nor any of his disciples were, properly speaking, practitioners of physic, since they applied themselves *principally* to the theory.—JAMES.

The reformers gained credit *chiefly* among persons in the lower and middle classes.—ROBERTSON.

To *Espy*, *v. To find*.

Essay, *v. To attempt*.

Essay, Treatise, Tract, Dissertation.

All these words are employed by authors to characterize compositions varying in their form and contents. **Essay**, which signifies a trial or attempt (*v. Attempt*), is here used to designate in a specific manner an author's attempt to illustrate any point; it is most commonly applied to small detached pieces, which contain only the general thoughts of a writer on any given subject, and afford room for amplification into details also; though by Locke in his "*Essay on the Understanding*," Beattie in his "*Essay on Truth*," and other authors, it is modestly used for their connected and finished endeavours to elucidate a doctrine. A **Treatise** is more systematic than an *essay*; it treats on the subject in a methodical form, and conveys the idea of

Something laboured, scientific, and instructive. A *Tract* is only a species of small *treatise*, drawn up upon particular occasions, and published in a separate form: they are both derived from the Latin *tractus*, participle of *traho* to draw, manage, or handle. *Dissertation*, from *dissero* to argue, is with propriety applied to performances of an argumentative nature.

Essays are either moral, political, philosophical, or literary: they are the crude attempts of the youth to digest his own thoughts, or they are the more mature attempts of the man to communicate his thoughts to others: of the former description are the prize *essays* in schools; and of the latter are the innumerable *essays* which have been published on every subject, since the time of Bacon to the present day: *treatises* are mostly written on ethical, political, or speculative subjects, such as Feneion's, Milton's, or Lock's *treatise* on education; De Lolme's *treatise* on the constitution of England; Colquhoun's *treatise* on the police: *dissertations* are employed on disputed points of literature, as Bentley's *dissertation* upon the epistles of Phalaris, De Pauw's *dissertations* on the Egyptians and Chinese: *tracts* are ephemeral productions, mostly on political and religious subjects, which seldom survive the occasion which gave them birth; of this description are the pamphlets which daily issue from the press, for or against the measures of government, or the public measures of any particular party.

The *essay* is the most popular mode of writing; it suits the writer who has not either talent or inclination to pursue his inquiries farther, and it suits the generality of readers who are amused with variety and superficiality: the *treatise* is adapted for the student; he will not be contented with the superficial *essay*, when more ample materials are within his reach: the *tract* is formed for the political partisan; it receives its interest from the occurrence of the motive; the *dissertation* interests the disputant.

It is my frequent practice to visit places of resort in this town, to observe what reception my works meet with in the world; it being a privilege asserted by Monsieur Montaigne and others, of vain-glorious memory, that we writers of *essays* may talk of ourselves.—STEELE.

The very title of a moral *treatise* has something in it austere and shocking to the careless and inconsiderate.—ADDISON.

A modern philosopher, quoted by Monsieur Bayle in his learned *dissertation* on the souls of brutes, says, Deus est anima brutorum, God himself is the soul of brutes.—ADDISON.

I desire my reader to consider every particular paper or discourse as a distinct *tract* by itself.—ADDISON.

Essential, *v. Necessary.*

To Establish, *v. To confirm.*

To Establish, *v. To fix.*

To Establish, *v. To institute.*

To Esteem, *v. To appraise.*

Esteem, Respect, Regard.

Esteem, *v. To appraise.*

Respect, from the Latin *respicio*, signifies to look back upon, to look upon with attention.

Regard, *v. To attend to.*

A favourable sentiment towards particular objects is included in the meaning of all these terms.

Esteem and *respect* flow from the understanding; *regard* springs from the heart, as well as the head: *esteem* is produced by intrinsic worth; *respect* by extrinsic qualities; *regard* is affection blended with *esteem*: it is in the power of every man, independently of all collateral circumstances, to acquire the *esteem* of others; but *respect* and *regard* are within the reach of a limited number only: the high and the low, the rich and the poor, the equal and the unequal, are each, in their turn, the objects of *esteem*; those only are objects of *respect* who have some mark of distinction, or superiority either of birth, talent, acquisitions, or the like; *regard* subsists only between friends, or those who stand in close connection with each other: industry and sobriety excite our *esteem* for one man, charity and benevolence our *esteem* for another; superior learning or abilities excite our *respect* for another; a long acquaintance, or a reciprocity of kind offices, excite a mutual *regard*.

How great honour and *esteem* will men declare for one whom perhaps they never saw before.—TILLOTSON.

Then what for common good my thoughts inspire,
Attend, and in the son *respect* the sire.—POPE.

Cheerfulness bears the same friendly *regard* to the mind as to the body.—ADDISON.

To Esteem, *v. To value.*

To Estimate, *v. To appraise.*

To Estimate, Compute, Rate.

Estimate, *v. To appraise.*

Compute, *v. To calculate.*

Rate, in Latin *ratus*, participle of *reor* to think, signifies to weigh in the mind.

All these terms mark the mental operation by which the sum, amount, or value of things is obtained: to *estimate* is to obtain the aggregate sum in one's mind, either by an immediate or a progressive act; to *compute* is to obtain the sum by the gradual process of putting together items; to *rate* is to fix the relative value in one's mind by deduction and comparison: a builder *estimates* the expense of building a house on a given plan; a proprietor of houses *computes* the probable diminution in the value of his property in consequence of wear and tear; the surveyor *rates* the present value of lands or houses.

In the moral acceptance they bear the same analogy to each other: some men are apt to *estimate* the adventitious privileges of birth or rank too high; it would be a useful occupation for men to *compute* the loss they sustain by the idle waste of time on the one hand, and its necessarily unprofitable consumption on the other; he who *rates* his abilities too high is in danger of despising the means which are essential to secure success; and he who *rates* them too low is apt to neglect the means, from despair of success.

To those who have skill to *estimate* the excellence and difficulty of this great work (Pope's translation of Homer) it must be very desirable to know how it was performed.—JOHNSON.

From the age of sixteen the life of Pope, as an author, may be computed.—ADAMSON.

Sooner we learn and seldom we forget
What critics scorn, than what they highly rate.
HUGHES.

Eternal, Endless, Everlasting.

The *Eternal* is set above time, the *Endless* lies within time; it is therefore by a strong figure that we apply *eternal* to any thing sublunary; although *endless* may with propriety be applied to that which is heavenly: that is properly *eternal* which has neither beginning nor end; that is *endless* which has a beginning, but no end: God is, therefore, an *eternal*, but not an *endless* being; there is an *eternal* state of happiness or misery, which awaits all men, according to their deeds in this life; but their joys or sorrows may be *endless* as regards the present life.

That which is *endless* has no cessation; that which is *Everlasting* has neither interruption nor cessation: the *endless* may be said of existing things; the *everlasting* naturally extends itself into futurity: hence we speak of *endless* disputes, an *endless* warfare; an *everlasting* memorial, an *everlasting* crown of glory.

Distance immense between the powers that shine
Above, *eternal*, deathless, and divine,
And mortal man!—POPE.

The faithful Mydon, as he turn'd from fight
His flying coursers, sunk to *endless* night.—POPE.

Back from the car he tumbles to the ground,
And *everlasting* shades his eyes surround.—POPE.

Eucharist, *v.* *Lord's Supper*.

Eulogy, *v.* *Encomium*.

To Evade, *v.* *To escape*.

To Evade, Equivocate, Prevaricate.

Evade, *v.* *To escape*.

Equivocate, *v.* *Ambiguity*.

Prevaricate, in Latin *prævaricatus* participle of *præ* and *varicare* to go loosely, signifies to shift from side to side.

These words designate an artful mode of escaping the scrutiny of an inquirer: we *evade* by artfully turning the subject or calling off the attention of the inquirer; we *equivocate* by the use of equivocal expressions; we *prevaricate* by the use of loose and indefinite expressions; we avoid giving satisfaction by *evading*; we give a false satisfaction by *equivocating*; we give dissatification by *prevaricating*. *Evading* is not so mean a practice as *equivocating*; it may be sometimes prudent to *evade* a question which we do not wish to answer; but *equivocations* are employed for the purposes of falsehood and interest: *prevarications* are still meaner; and are resorted to mostly by criminals in order to escape detection.

Whenever a trader has endeavoured to *evade* the just demands of his creditors, this hath been declared by the legislature to be an act of bankruptcy.—BLACKSTONE.

When Satan told Eve "Thou shalt not surely die," it was in his *equivocation* "Thou shalt not incur present death."—BROWN'S VULGAR ERRORS.

There is no *prevaricating* with God when we are on the very threshold of his presence.—CUMBERLAND.

To Evaporate, *v.* *To emit*.

Evasion, Shift, Subterfuge.

Evasion (*v.* *To evade*) is here taken only in the bad sense; *Shift* and *Subterfuge* are modes of *evasion*: the former signifies that gross kind of *evasion* by which one attempts to shift off an obligation from one's self; the *subterfuge*, from *subter* under and *fugio* to fly, is a mode of *evasion* in which one has recourse to some screen or shelter.

The *evasion*, in distinction from the others, is resorted to for the gratification of pride or obstinacy: whoever wishes to maintain a bad cause must have recourse to *evasions*; candid minds despise all *evasions*: the *shift* is the trick of a knave; it always serves a paltry low purpose; he who has not courage to turn open thief will use any *shifts* rather than not get money dishonestly: the *subterfuge* is the refuge of one's fears; it is not resorted to from the hope of gain, but from the fear of a loss; not for purposes of interest, but for those of character; he who wants to justify himself in a bad cause has recourse to *subterfuge*.

The question of a future state was hung up in doubt or handed between conflicting disputants through all the quirks and *evasions* of sophistry and logic.—CUMBERLAND.

When such little *shifts* come once to be laid open, how poorly and wretchedly must that man needs sneak, who finds himself both guilty and baffled too.—SOUTH.

What farther *subterfuge* can Turnus find?—DRYDEN.

Even, *v.* *Equal*.

Even, Smooth, Level, Plain.

Even, *v.* *Equal*.

Smooth, is in all probability connected with smear.

Level, in Saxon *lafel*, signifies a carpenter's instrument.

Plain, *v.* *Apparent*.

Even and *smooth* are both opposed to roughness: but that which is *even* is free only from great roughness or irregularities; that which is *smooth* is free from every degree of roughness, however small: a board is *even* which has no knots or holes: it is not *smooth* unless its surface be an entire plane: the ground is said to be *even*, but not *smooth*; the sky is *smooth*, but not *even*.

Even is to level, when applied to the ground what *smooth* is to even: the *even* is free from protuberances and depressions on its exterior surface; the *level* is free from rises: a path is said to be *even*; a meadow is *level*: ice may be *level*, though it is not *even*: a walk up the side of a hill may be *even*, although the hill itself is the reverse of a *level*: the *even* is said of that which unites and forms one uninterrupted service; but the *level* is said of things which are at a distance from each other, and are discovered by the eye to be in a parallel line: hence the floor of a room is *even* with regard to itself; it is *level* with that of another room.

Evenness respects the surface of bodies; *plainness* respects their direction and freedom from external obstructions: a path is *even* which has no indentures or footmarks; a path is *plain* which is not stopped up or interrupted.

by wood, water, or any other thing intervening.

When we look at a naked wall, from the evenness of the object the eye runs along its whole space, and arrives quickly at its termination.—BURKE.

The effects of a rugged and broken surface seem stronger than where it is smooth and polished.—BURKE.

The top is level, an offensive seat
Of war.—DRYDEN.

A blind man would never be able to imagine how the several prominences and depressions of a human body could be shown on a plain piece of canvas that has on it no unevenness.—ADDISON.

When applied figuratively, these words preserve their analogy: an even temper is secured from all violent changes of humour; a smooth speech is divested of everything which can ruffle the temper of others; but the former is always taken in a good sense; and the latter mostly in a bad sense, as evincing an illicit design or a purpose to deceive: a plain speech, on the other hand, is divested of everything obscure or figurative, and is consequently a speech free from disguise and easy to be understood. Even and level are applied to conduct or condition; the former as regards ourselves; the latter as regards others; he who adopts an even course of conduct is in no danger of putting himself upon a level with those who are otherwise his inferiors.

A man who lives in a state of vice and impotence can have no title to that evenness and tranquillity of mind which is the health of the soul.—ADDISON.

Falseness turns all above us into tyranny and barbarity; and all of the same level with us into discord.—SOUTH.

Event, Incident, Accident, Adventure, Occurrence.

Event, in Latin *eventus*, participle of *evenio* to come out, signifies that which falls out or turns up.

Incident, in Latin *incidens*, from *incido*, signifies that which falls in or forms a collateral part of any thing.

Accident, *v. Accident*.

Adventure, from the Latin *advenio* to come to, signifies what comes to or befalls one.

Occurrence, from the Latin *occurro*, signifies that which runs or comes in the way.

These terms are expressive of what passes in the world, which is the sole signification of the term *event*; whilst to that of the other terms are annexed some accessory ideas: an *incident* is a personal event; an *accident* an unpleasant event; an *adventure* an extraordinary event; an *occurrence* an ordinary or domestic event; *event* in its ordinary and limited acceptation excludes the idea of chance; *accident* excludes that of design; *incident*, *adventure*, and *occurrence*, are applicable in both cases.

Events affect nations and communities as well as individuals; *incidents* and *adventures* affect particular individuals, *accidents* and *occurrences* affect persons or things particularly or generally, individually or collectively: the making of peace, the loss of a battle, or the death of a prince, are national events; the forming a new acquaintance and the revival of an old one are incidents that have an interest for the parties concerned; an escape from

shipwreck, an encounter with wild beasts or savages, are adventures which individuals are pleased to relate, and others to hear; a fire, the fall of a house, the breaking of a limb, are accidents or occurrences; a robbery or the death of individuals are properly occurrences which afford subjects for a newspaper, and excite an interest in the reader.

Event, when used for individuals, is always of greater importance than an *incident*. The settlement of a young person in life, the adoption of an employment, or the taking a wife, are events but not incidents; whilst on the other hand the setting out on a journey or the return, the purchase of a house or the despatch of a vessel, are characterized as incidents and not events.

It is farther to be observed that *accident*, *event*, and *occurrence* are said only of that which is supposed really to happen: incidents and adventures are often fictitious; in this case the incident cannot be too important, nor the adventure too marvellous. History records the events of nations; plays require to be full of incident in order to render them interesting; romances and novels derive most of their charms from the extravagance of the adventures which they describe; periodical works supply the public with information respecting daily occurrences.

These events, the permission of which seems to accuse his goodness now, may in the consummation of things both magnify his goodness and exalt his wisdom.—ADDISON.

I have laid before you only small incidents seemingly frivolous, but they are principally evils of this nature which make marriages unhappy.—STEELE.

To make an episode, "take any remaining adventure of your former collection," in which you could no way involve your hero, or any unfortunate accident that was too good to be thrown away.—POPE.

I think there is somewhere in Montaigne mention made of a family book, wherein all the occurrences that happened from one generation of that house to another were recorded.—STEELE.

Event, Issue, Consequence.

The **Event** (*v. Event*) terminates; the **Issue** (*v. To arise*) flows out; the **Consequence** (*v. Consequence*) follows.

The term *event* respects great undertakings; *issue* particular efforts; *consequence* respects everything which can produce a consequence. Hence we speak of the event of a war; the issue of a negotiation; and the consequences of either. The measures of government are often unjustly praised or blamed according to the event; the fate of a nation sometimes hangs on the issue of a battle; its conquest is one of the consequences which follows the defeat of its armies. We must be prepared for events, which are frequently above our control; we must exert ourselves to bring about a favourable issue; address and activity will go far towards ensuring success; but if after all our efforts we still fail, it is our duty to submit with patient resignation to the consequences.

It has always been the practice of mankind to judge of actions by the event.—JOHNSON.

A mild, unruffled, self-possessing mind is a blessing more important to real felicity than all that can be gained by the triumphant issue of some violent contest.—BLAIR.

Henley in one of his advertisements had mentioned Pope's treatment of Savage; this was supposed by Pope

to be the *consequence* of a complaint made by Savage to Henley, and was therefore mentioned by him with much resentment.—JOHNSON.

Ever, v. Always.

Everlasting, v. Eternal.

Every, v. All.

Evidence, v. Deposition.

Evidence, Testimony, Proof.

Evidence is whatever makes *evident*; **Testimony** is that which is derived from an individual, namely, *testis* the witness.

Where the *evidence* of our own senses concurs with the *testimony* of others, we can have no grounds for withholding our assent to the truth of an assertion; but when these are at variance, it may be prudent to pause. *Evidence* may comprehend the *testimony* of many; *testimony* is confined to the *evidence* of one. Where a body of respectable *evidence* tends to convict a criminal of guilt, the jury cannot attach much weight to the partial *testimony* of one or two individuals. The *evidence* serves to inform and illustrate; the *testimony* serves to confirm and corroborate: we may give *evidence* exclusively with regard to things; but we bear *testimony* with regard to persons. In all law-suits respecting property, rights, and privileges, *evidence* must be heard in order to substantiate or invalidate a case: in personal and criminal indictments the *testimony* of witnesses is required either for or against the accused party. The *evidence* and *proof* are both signs of something existing: the *evidence* is an evident sign; the *proof* is positive: the *evidence* appeals to the understanding; the *proof* to the senses: the *evidence* produces conviction or a moral certainty; the *proof* produces satisfaction or a physical certainty.

The term *evidence* is applied to that which is moral or intellectual; *proof* is employed mostly for facts or physical objects. All that our Saviour did and said were *evidences* of his divine character, which might have produced faith in the minds of many, even if they had not such numerous and miraculous *proofs* of his power. *Evidence* may be internal, or lie in the thing itself; *proof* is always external. The internal *evidences* of the truth of Divine Revelation are even more numerous than those which are external; our Saviour's reappearance among his disciples did not satisfy the unbelieving Thomas of his identity until he had the farther *proofs* of feeling the holes in his hands and his side.

Of Swift's general habits of thinking, if his letters can be supposed to afford any *evidence*, he was not a man to be either loved or envied.—JOHNSON.

Ye Trojan flames, your *testimony* bear
What I perform'd, and what I suffer'd there.
DRYDEN.

Of the fallaciousness of hope, and the uncertainty of schemes, every day gives some new *proof*.—JOHNSON.

Evident, v. Apparent.

Evil or Ill, Misfortune, Harm, Mischief.

Evil, in its full sense, comprehends every quality which is not good, and consequently

the other terms express only modifications of *evil*.

The word is however more limited in its application than its meaning, and admits therefore of a just comparison with the other words here mentioned. They are all taken in the sense of *evils* produced by some external cause, or *evils* inherent in the object and arising out of it. The *evil*, or, in its contracted form, the *Ill*, befalls a person; the *Misfortune* comes upon him; the *Harm* is taken, or he receives the *harm*; the *Mischief* is done him. *Evil* in its limited application is taken for *evils* of the greatest magnitude; it is that which is *evil* without any mitigation or qualification of circumstances. The *misfortune* is a minor *evil*; it depends upon the opinion and circumstances of the individual; what is a *misfortune* in one respect may be the contrary in another respect. An untimely death, the fracture or loss of a limb, are denominated *evils*; the loss of a vessel, the overturning of a carriage, and the like, are *misfortunes*, inasmuch as they tend to the diminution of property; but as all the casualties of life may produce various consequences, it may sometimes happen that that which seems to have come upon us by our *ill* fortune turns out ultimately of the greatest benefit; in this respect, therefore, *misfortune* is but a partial *evil*: of *evil* it is likewise observable, that it has no respect to the sufferer as a moral agent; but *misfortune* is used in regard to such things as are controllable or otherwise by human foresight. The *evil* which befalls a man is opposed only to the good which he in general experiences; but the *misfortune* is opposed to the good fortune or the prudence of the individual. Sickness is an *evil*, let it be endured or caused by whatever circumstances it may; it is a *misfortune* for an individual to come in the way of having this *evil* brought on himself: his own relative condition in the scale of being is here referred to.

Harm and *mischief* are species of minor *evils*; the former of which is much less specific than the latter both in the nature and cause of the *evil*. A person takes *harm* from circumstances that are not known; the *mischief* is done to him from some positive and immediate circumstance. He who takes cold takes *harm*; the cause of which, however, may not be known or suspected: a fall from a horse is attended with *mischief*, if it occasion a fracture or any *evil* to the body. *Evil* and *misfortune* respect persons only as the objects; *harm* and *mischief* are said of inanimate things as the object. A tender plant takes *harm* from being exposed to the cold air: *mischief* is done to it when its branches are violently broken off or its roots are laid bare.

Misfortune is the incidental property of persons who are its involuntary subjects; but *evil*, *harm*, and *mischief*, are the inherent and active properties of things that flow out of them as effects from their causes: *evil* is said either to lie in a thing or attend it as a companion or follower; *harm* properly lies in the thing; *mischief* properly attends the thing as a consequence. In political revolutions there is *evil* in the thing and *evil* from the thing; *evil* when it begins, *evil* when it ends, and *evil* long after it has ceased: it is a dangerous question for any young person to put to him-

self—what *harm* is there in this or that indulgence? He who is disposed to put this question to himself will not hesitate to answer it according to his own wishes: the *mischiefs* which arise from the unskilfulness of those who undertake to be their own coachmen are of so serious a nature that in course of time they will probably deter men from performing such unsuitable offices.

Yet think not thus, when freedom's *ills* I state,
I mean to flatter kings or court the great.

GOLDSMITH.

A misery is not to be measured from the nature of the *evil*, but from the temper of the sufferer.—ADDISON.

Misfortune stands with her bow ever bent
Over the world; and he who wounds another
Directs the goddess, by that part where he wounds,
There to strike deep her errors in himself.—YOUNG.

To me the labours of the field resign,
Ole Paris injured; all the war be mine,
Fall he that must, beneath his rival's arms,
And leave the rest secure of future *harm*.—POPE.

To mourn a *mischiefe* that is past and gone,
Is the next way to draw new *mischiefe* on.
SHAKESPEARE.

Evil, *v. Bail.*

To Evince, *v. To argue.*

To Evince, *v. To prove.*

Exact, *v. Accurate.*

Exact, Extort.

Exact, in Latin *exactus*, participle of *exigere* to drive out, signifies the exercise of simple force; but **Extort**, from *extortus*, participle of *extorqueo* to wring out, marks the exercise of unusual force. In the application, therefore, to *exact* is to demand with force, it is commonly an act of injustice; to *extort* is to get with violence, it is an act of tyranny. The collector of the revenue *exact*s when he gets from the people more than he is authorized to take: an arbitrary prince *extorts* from his conquered subjects whatever he can grasp at. In the figurative sense, deference, obedience, applause, and admiration, are *exact*ed; a confession, an acknowledgment, a discovery, and the like, are *extort*ed.

While to the established church is given that protection and support which the interests of religion render proper and due, yet no rigid conformity is *exact*ed.—BLAIR.

If I err in believing that the souls of men are immortal, not while I live would I wish to have this delightful error *extort*ed from me.—STEELE.

Exact, Nice, Particular, Punctual.

Exact, *v. Accurate.*

Nice, in Saxon *nise*, comes in all probability from the German *geniessen*, &c., to enjoy, signifying a quick and discriminating taste.

Particular signifies here directed to a particular point.

Punctual, from the Latin *punctum* a point, signifies keeping to a point.

Exact and *nice* are to be compared in their application, either to persons or things; *particular* and *punctual* only in application to persons. To be *exact*, is to arrive at perfection; to be *nice*, is to be free from faults; to be *particular*, is to be *nice* in certain particulars; to be *punctual*, is to be *exact* in certain points. We are *exact* in our conduct or in what we do; *nice* and *particular* in our mode of doing it; *punctual* as to the time and season for doing

it. It is necessary to be *exact* in our accounts; to be *nice* as an artist in the choice and distribution of colours; to be *particular*, as a man of business, in the number and the details of merchandizes that are to be delivered out; to be *punctual* in observing the hour or the day that has been fixed upon.

Exactness and *punctuality* are always taken in a good sense; they designate an attention to that which cannot be dispensed with: they form a part of one's duty: *niceness* and *particularity* are not always taken in the best sense; they designate an excessive attention to things of inferior importance; to matters of taste and choice. Early habits of method and regularity will make a man very *exact* in the performance of all his duties, and *particularly punctual* in his payments: an over-*niceness* in the observance of mechanical rules often supplies the want of genius: it is the mark of a contracted mind to amuse itself with *particularities* about dress, personal appearance, furniture, and the like.

When *exact* and *nice* are applied to things, the former expresses more than the latter; we speak of an *exact* resemblance, and a *nice* distinction. The *exact* point is that which we wish to reach; the *nice* point is that which it is difficult to keep.

We know not so much as the true names of either Homer or Virgil, with any *exactness*.—WALSH.

Every age a man passes through, and way of life he engages in, has some particular vice or imperfection naturally cleaving to it, which it will require his *nice*st care to avoid.—BUDGE.

I have been the more *particular* in this inquiry, because I hear there is scarce a village in England that has not a Moll White in it.—ADDISON.

The trading part of mankind suffer by the want of *punctuality* in the dealings of persons above them.—STEELE.

To Exalt, *v. To lift.*

Examination, Search, Inquiry, Research, Investigation, Scrutiny.

Examination, *v. To discuss.*

Search, in French *chercher*, is a variation of seek and see.

Inquiry, *v. To ask.*

Research is an intensive of search.

Investigation, from the Latin *vestigium* a track, signifies seeking by the tracks or footsteps.

Scrutiny, from the Latin *scrutor* to search, and *scrutum* lumber, signifies looking for amongst lumber and rubbish, to ransack.

Examination is the most general of these terms, which all agree in expressing an active effort to find out that which is unknown. An *examination* is made either by the aid of the senses or the understanding, the body or the mind; a search is principally a physical action; the *inquiry* is mostly intellectual; we *examine* a face or we *examine* a subject; we *search* a house or a dictionary; we *inquire* into a matter. An *examination* is made for the purpose of forming a judgment; a *search* is made for ascertaining a fact; an *inquiry* is made in order to arrive at truth. To *examine* a person, is either by means of questions to get at his mind, or by means of looks to be-

come acquainted with his person ; to *search* a person is by corporeal conduct to learn what he has about him. We *examine* the features of those who interest us ; officers of justice *search* those who are suspected. *Examinations* and *inquiries* are both made by means of questions ; but the former is an official act for a specific end, the latter is a private act for purposes of convenience or pleasure. Students undergo *examinations* from their teachers ; they pursue their *inquiries* for themselves.

An *examination* or an *inquiry* may be set on foot on any subject ; but the *examination* is direct ; it is the setting of things before the view, corporeal or mental, in order to obtain a conclusion : the *inquiry* is indirect ; it is a circuitous method of coming to the knowledge of what was not known before. The student *examines* the evidences of Christianity, that he may strengthen his own belief ; the government institute an *inquiry* into the conduct of subjects. A *research* is a remote *inquiry* : an *investigation* is a minute *inquiry* ; a *scrutiny* is a strict *examination*. Learned men of inquisitive tempers make their *researches* into antiquity : magistrates *investigate* doubtful and mysterious affairs ; physicians *investigate* the causes of diseases ; men *scrutinize* the actions of those whom they hold in suspicion. Acuteness and penetration are peculiarly requisite in making *researches* ; patience and perseverance are the necessary qualifications of the *investigator* ; a quick discernment will essentially aid the *scrutinizer*.

The body of man is such a subject as stands the utmost test of *examination*.—ADDISON.

If you *search* purely for truth, it will be indifferent to you where you find it.—BUDGE.

Inquiries after happiness are not so necessary and useful to mankind as the arts of consolation.—ADDISON.

To all inferior animals 'tis giv'n

T' enjoy the state allotted them by heav'n ;

No vain *researches* e'er disturb their rest.—JENYNS.

We have divided natural philosophy into the *investigation* of causes, and the production of effects.—BACON.

Before I go to bed, I make a *scrutiny* what peccant humours have reigned in me that day.—HOWELL.

To *Examine*, v. To *discuss*.

To *Examine*, Search, Explore.

Examine, v. *Examination*.

Search, v. *Examination*.

Explore, in Latin *exploro*, compounded of *ex* and *ploro*, signifies properly to burst out.

These words are here considered as they designate the looking upon places or objects, in order to get acquainted with them. To *examine* expresses a less effort than to *search*, and this expresses less than to *explore*.

We *examine* objects that are near ; we *search* those that are hidden or removed at a certain distance ; we *explore* those that are unknown or very distant. The painter *examines* a landscape in order to take a sketch of it ; the botanist *searches* after curious plants ; the inquisitive traveller *explores* unknown regions.

An author *examines* the books from which he intends to draw his authorities ; the antiquarian *searches* every corner in which he hopes to find a monument of antiquity ; the classic scholar *explores* the learning and wisdom of the ancients.

Men will look into our lives, and *examine* our actions, and inquire into our conversations : by these they will judge the truth and reality of our profession.—TILLOTSON.

Not thou, nor they shall *search* the thoughts, that roll Up in the close recesses of my soul.—POPE.

Hector, he said, my courage bids me meet This high achievement, and *explore* the fleet.—POPE.

Example, Pattern, Ensample.

Example, in Latin *exemplum*, very probably changed from *exsimulum* and *exsimulo* or *simulo*, signifies the thing framed according to a likeness.

Pattern, v. *Copy*.

Ensample, signifies that which is done according to a *sample* or *example*.

All these words are taken for that which ought to be followed ; but the *example* must be followed generally ; the *pattern* must be followed particularly, not only as to what, but how a thing is to be done : the former serves as a guide to the judgment ; the latter to guide the actions. The *example* comprehends what is either to be followed or avoided ; the *pattern* only that which is to be followed or copied : the *ensample* is a species of *example*, the word being employed only in the solemn style. The *example* may be presented either in the object itself or the description of it ; the *pattern* displays itself most completely in the object itself ; the *ensample* exists only in the description. Those who know what is right should set the *example* of practising it ; and those who persist in doing wrong, must be made an *example* to deter others from doing the same : every one, let his age and station be what it may, may afford a *pattern* of Christian virtue ; the child may be a *pattern* to his playmates of diligence and dutifulness ; the citizen may be a *pattern* to his fellow-citizens of sobriety, and conformity to the laws ; the soldier may be a *pattern* of obedience to his comrades : our Saviour has left us an *example* of Christian perfection, which we ought to imitate, although we cannot copy it : the Scripture characters are drawn as *ensamples* for our learning.

The king of men his hardy host inspires
With loud command, with great *examples* fires.

POPE.

The fairy way of writing, as Mr. Dryden calls it, is more difficult than any other that depends upon the poet's fancy, because he has no power to follow in it.—ADDISON.

Sir Knight, that doest that voyage rashly take,
By this forbidden way in my despite,
Doest by other's death *ensample* take.—SPENSER.

Example, Precedent.

Example, v. *Example*.

Precedent, from the Latin *precedens* preceding, signifies by distinction that preceding which is entitled to notice.

Both these terms apply to that which may be followed or made a rule ; but the *example* is commonly present or before our eyes ; the *precedent* is properly something past ; the *example* may derive its authority from the individual ; the *precedent* acquires its sanction from time and common consent : we are led by the *example*, or we copy the *example* ; we are guided or governed by the *precedent*. The

former is a private and often a partial affair; the latter is a public and often a national concern: we quote *examples* in literature, and *precedents* in law.

Thames! the most lov'd of all the ocean's sons,
O could I flow like thee! and make thy stream
My great *example*, as it is my theme.—DENHAM.

At the revolution they threw a politic veil over every circumstance which might furnish a *precedent* for any future departure from what they had then settled for ever.—BURKE.

Example, Instance.

Example (*v. Example, pattern*) refers in this case to the thing.

Instance, from the Latin *insto*, signifies that which stands or serves as a resting point.

The *example* is set forth by way of illustration or instruction; the *instance* is adduced by way of evidence or proof. Every *instance* may serve as an *example*, but every *example* is not an *instance*. The *example* consists of moral or intellectual objects; the *instance* consists of actions only. Rules are illustrated by *examples*: characters are illustrated by *instances*: the best mode of instructing children is by furnishing them with *examples* for every rule that is laid down; the Roman history furnishes us with many extraordinary *instances* of self-devotion for their country.

Let me (my son) an ancient fact unfold.
A great *example* drawn from times of old.—POPE.

Many *instances* may be produced from good authorities, that children actually suck in the several passions and depraved inclinations of their nurses.—STEELE.

To Exasperate, *v. To aggravate*.

To Exceed, Surpass, Excel, Transcend, Outdo.

Exceed, from the Latin *excedo*, compounded of *ex* and *cedo* to pass out of, or beyond the line, is the general term. **Surpass**, compounded of *sur* over, and *pass*, is one species of exceeding. **Excel**, compounded of *ex* and *cello* to lift or move over, is another species.

Exceed, in its limited acceptation, conveys no idea of moral desert; *surpass* and *excel* are always taken in a good sense. It is not so much persons as things which *exceed*; both persons and things *surpass*; persons only *excel*. One thing *exceeds* another, as the success of an undertaking *exceeds* the expectations of the undertaker, or a man's exertions *exceed* his strength; one person *surpasses* another, as the English have *surpassed* all other nations in the extent of their naval power; or one thing *surpasses* another, as poetry *surpasses* painting in its effects on the imagination: one person *excels* another; thus formerly the Dutch and Italians *excelled* the English in painting.

We may *surpass* without any direct or immediate effort; we cannot *excel* without effort. Nations as well as individuals will *surpass* each other in particular arts and sciences, as much from local and adventitious circumstances as from natural genius and steady application; no one can expect to *excel* in learning whose indolence gets the better of his ambition. The derivatives *excessive* and *excellent* have this obvious distinction between

them, that the former always signifies *exceeding* in that which ought not to be *exceeded*; and the latter *exceeding* in that where it is honourable to *exceed*: he who is habitually *excessive* in any of his indulgencies must be insensible to the *excellence* of a temperate life.

Transcend, from *trans* beyond and *scendo* or *scando* to climb, signifies climbing beyond; and **Outdo** signifies doing out of the ordinary course: the former, like *surpass*, refers rather to the state of things; and *outdo*, like *excel*, to the exertions of persons: the former rises in sense above *surpass*; but the latter is only employed in particular cases, that is, to *excel* in action: *excel* is, however, confined to that which is good; *outdo* to that which is good or bad. The genius of Homer *transcends* that of almost every other poet: Heliogabalus *outdid* every other emperor in extravagance.

Man's boundless avarice *exceeds*,
And on his neighbours round about him feeds.
WALLER.

Dryden often *surpasses* expectation, and Pope never falls below it.—JOHNSON.

To him the king: How much thy years *excel*
In arts of counsel, and in speaking well.—POPE.

Auspicious prince, in arms a mighty name,
But yet whose actions far *transcend* your fame.
DREYDEN.

The last and crowning instance of our love to our enemies is to pray for them. For by this a man would fail to *outdo* himself.—SOUTH.

To Excel, v. To exceed.

Excellence, Superiority.

Excellence is an absolute term; **Superiority** is a relative term: many may have *excellence* in the same degree, but they must have *superiority* in different degrees; *superiority* is often superior *excellence*, but in many cases they are applied to different objects.

There is a moral *excellence* attainable by all who have the will to strive after it; but there is an intellectual and physical *superiority* which is above the reach of our wishes, and is granted to a few only.

Base envy withers at another's joy,
And hates that *excellence* it cannot reach.
THOMSON.

To be able to benefit others is a condition of freedom and *superiority*.—TILLOTSON.

Except, v. Besides.

Except, v. Unless.

Exception, v. Objection.

Excess, Superfluity, Redundancy.

Excess is that which exceeds any measure; **Superfluity** from *super* and *fluo* to flow over; and **Redundancy**, from *redundo* to stream back or over, signifies an *excess* of a good measure. We may have an *excess* of heat or cold, wet or dry, when we have more than the ordinary quantity; but we have a *superfluity* of provisions when we have more than we want. *Excess* is applicable to any object; but *superfluity* and *redundancy* are species of *excess*; the former applicable in a particular manner to that which is an object of our desire; and *redundancy* to matters of expression or feeling. We may have an *excess* of

prosperity or adversity; a *superfluity* of good things; and a *redundancy* of speech or words.

It is wisely ordered in our present state that joy and fear, hope and grief should act alternately as checks and balances upon each other, in order to prevent an *excess* in any of them.—BLAIR.

When by force or policy, by wisdom, or by fortune, property and *superiority* were introduced and established, then they whose possessions swelled above their wants naturally laid out their *superfluities* on pleasure.—JOHN SON.

The defeat or *redundance* of a syllable might be easily covered in the recitation.—TYERWHIT.

Excessive, Immoderate, Intemperate.

The **Excessive** is beyond measure; the **Immoderate**, from *modus* a mode or measure, is without measure; the **Intemperate** from *tempus* a time or term, is that which is not kept within bounds.

Excessive designates *excess* in general; *immoderate* and *intemperate* designate *excess* in moral agents. The *excessive* lies simply in the thing which exceeds any given point: the *immoderate* lies in the passions which range to a boundless extent; the *intemperate* lies in the will which is under no control. Hence we speak of an *excessive* thirst physically considered; an *immoderate* ambition or lust of power; an *intemperate* indulgence, an *intemperate* warmth. *Excessive* admits of degrees; what is *excessive* may exceed in a greater or less degree: *immoderate* and *intemperate* mark a positively great degree of *excess*; the former still higher than the latter: *immoderate* is in fact the highest conceivable degree of *excess*.

The *excessive* use of anything will always be attended with some evil consequence: the *immoderate* use of wine will rapidly tend to the ruin of him who is guilty of the *excess*; the *intemperate* use of wine will proceed by a more gradual but not less sure process to his ruin.

Excessive designates what is partial; *immoderate* is used oftener for what is partial than what is habitual; *intemperate* oftener for what is habitual than what is partial. A person is *excessively* displeased on particular occasions: he is an *immoderate* eater at all times, or only *immoderate* in that which he likes: he is *intemperate* in his language when his anger is *intemperate*; or he leads an *intemperate* life. The *excesses* of youth do but too often settle into confirmed habits of *intemperance*.

Who knows not the language that attends every *excessive* indulgence in pleasure?—BLAIR.

One of the first objects of wish to every one is to maintain a proper place and rank in society: this among the vain and ambitious is always the favourite aim. With them it arises to *immoderate* expectations founded on their supposed talents and imagined merits.—BLAIR.

Let no wantonness of youthful spirits, no compliance with the *intemperate* mirth of others, ever betray you into profane sallies.—BLAIR.

To **Exchange**, *v.* To *change*.

To **Exchange**, **Barter**, **Truck**,
Commute.

To **Exchange** (*v.* To *change*) is the general term signifying to take one for another, or put one thing in the place of another; the rest are but modes of *exchanging*. To **Barter** (*v.* To

change) is to *exchange* one article of trade for another. To **Truck**, from the Greek *τροχάω* to wheel, signifying to bandy about, is a familiar term to express a familiar action for *exchanging* one article of private property for another. **Commute**, from the Latin syllable *com* or *contra* and *mutō* to change, signifies an *exchanging* one mode of punishment for another we may exchange one book for another traders barter trinkets for gold dust; coachmen or stablemen *truck* a whip for a handkerchief; government *commutes* the punishment of death for that of banishment.

Pleasure can be *exchanged* only for pleasure.

HAWKESWORTH.

Some men are willing to barter their blood for lucre.—BURKE.

Shows all her secrets of house-keeping,

For candles how she *trucks* her dripping.—SWIFT.

Henry levied upon his vassals in Normandy a sum of money in lieu of their service, and this *commutation*, by reason of the great distance, was still more advantageous to his English vassals.—HUME.

Exchange, *v.* **Interchange**.

To **Excite**, *v.* To *awaken*.

To **Excite**, **Incite**, **Provoke**.

Excite, *v.* To *awaken*.

Incite, *v.* To *encourage*.

Provoke, *v.* To *aggravate*:

To *excite* is said more particularly of the inward feelings; *incite* is said of the external actions; *provoke* is said of both.

A person's passions are *excited*; he is *incited* by any particular passion to a course of conduct; a particular feeling is *provoked*, or he is *provoked* by some feeling to a particular step. Wit and conversation *excite* mirth; men are *incited* by a lust for gain to fraudulent practices; they are *provoked* by the opposition of others to *intemperate* language and *intemperate* measures. To *excite* is very frequently used in a physical acceptance; *incite* always, and *provoke* mostly, in a moral application. We speak of *exciting* hunger, thirst, or perspiration; of *inciting* to noble actions; of *provoking* impertinence, *provoking* scorn or resentment.

When *excite* and *provoke* are applied to similar objects, the former designates a much stronger action than the latter. A thing may *excite* a smile, but it *provokes* laughter; it may *excite* displeasure, but it *provokes* anger; it may *excite* joy or sorrow, but it *provokes* to madness.

Can then the sons of Greece (the sage rejoind'd)

Excite compassion in Achilles' mind?—POPE.

To her the God: Great Hector's soul *incite*

To dare the boldest Greek to single fight,

Till Greece *provok'd* from all her numbers show

A warrior worthy to be Hector's foe.—POPE.

Among the other torments which this passion produces, we may usually observe, that none are greater mourners than jealous men, when the person who *provoked* their jealousy is taken from them.—ADDISON.

To **Exclaim**, *v.* To *cry*.

To **Exculpate**, *v.* To *apologise*.

To **Exculpate**, *v.* To *exonerate*.

Excursion, Ramble, Tour, Trip, Jaunt.

Excursion signifies going out of one's course, from the Latin *ex* and *cursus* the course or prescribed path: a **Ramble** is a going without any course or regular path, from *ramus*, of which it is a frequentative: a **Tour**, from the word *turn* or return, is a circuitous course: a **Trip**, from the Latin *tripudio* to go on the toes like a dancer, is properly a pedestrian excursion or tour, or any short journey that might be made on foot: **Jaunt**, from the French *jante* the felly of a wheel, and *janter* to put the felly in motion. To go abroad in a carriage is an idle *excursion*, or one taken for mere pleasure: travellers who are not contented with what is not to be seen from a high road make frequent *excursions* into the interior of the country. Those who are fond of rural scenery, and pleased to follow the bent of their inclinations, make frequent *rambles*. Those who set out upon a sober scheme of enjoyment from travelling, are satisfied with making the *tour* of some one country or more. Those who have not much time for pleasure take *trips*. Those who have no better means of spending their time make *jaunts*.

I am now so rus-in-urbelsh, I believe I shall stay here, except little *excursions* and vagaries, for a year to come. GRAY.

I am going on a short *ramble* to my Lord Oxford's.—POPE.

My last summer's *tour* was through Worcestershire, Gloucestershire, Monmouthshire, and Shropshire.—GRAY.

I hold the resolution I told you in my last of seeing you if you cannot take a *trip* hither before I go.—POPE.

To Excuse, v. To apologize.

To Excuse, Pardon.

We **Excuse** (*v. To apologize*) a person or thing by exempting him from blame.

We **Pardon** (from the prepositive *par* or *per* and *dono* to give) by giving up to another the offence he has committed.

We *excuse* a small fault, we *pardon* a great fault: we *excuse* that which personally affects ourselves; we *pardon* that which offends against morals: we may *excuse* as equals; we can *pardon* only as superiors. We *exercise* good nature in *excusing*: we *exercise* generosity or mercy in *pardon*ing. Friends *excuse* each other for the unintentional omission of formalities; it is the privilege of the supreme magistrate to *pardon* criminals whose offences will admit of *pardon*: the violation of good manners is *inexcusable* in those who are cultivated; falsehood is *unpardonable* even in a child.

I will not quarrel with a slight mistake,
Such as our nature's frailty may *excuse*.
ROSCOMMON.

Those who know how many volumes have been written on the poems of Homer and Virgil, will easily *pardon* the length of my discourse upon Milton.—ADDISON.

Excuse, v. Pretence.

Execrable, v. Abominable.

Execution, v. Malediction.

To Execute, v. To accomplish.

To Execute, Fulfil, Perform.

Execute (*v. To accomplish*), in Latin *executus* participle of *exequor*, compounded of *ex* and *sequor*, is to follow up to the end.

To **Fulfil** is to fill up to the full of what is wanted.

To **Perform** is to form thoroughly or make complete.

To *execute* is more than to *fulfil*, and to *fulfil* than to *perform*. To *execute* is to bring about an end; it involves active measures, and is peculiarly applicable to that which is extraordinary, or that which requires particular spirit and talents; schemes of ambition are *executed*: to *fulfil* is to satisfy a moral obligation; it is applicable to those duties in which rectitude and equity are involved; we *fulfil* the duties of citizens; to *perform* is to carry through by simple action or labour; it is more particularly applicable to the ordinary and regular business of life; we *perform* a work or a task. One *executes* according to the intentions of others; the soldier *executes* the orders of his general; the merchant *executes* the commissions of his correspondent: one *fulfils* according to the wishes and expectations of others; it is the part of an honest man to enter into no engagements which he cannot *fulfil*; it is the part of a dutiful son, by diligence and assiduity, to endeavour to *fulfil* the expectations of an anxious parent: one *performs* according to circumstances, what suits one's own convenience and purposes; every good man is anxious to *perform* his part in life with credit and advantage to himself and others.

Why delays
His hand to *execute* what his decree
Fix'd on this day?—MILTON.

To whom the white-arm'd goddess thus replies:
Enough thou know'st the tyrant of the skies,
Severely bent his purpose to *fulfil*.
Unmov'd his mind, and unrestrain'd his will.—POPE.

When those who round the wasted fires remain,
Perform the last sad office to the slain.—DRYDEN.

Exempt, v. Free.

Exemption, v. Privilege.

To Exercise, Practise.

Exercise, in Latin *exerceo*, from *ex* and *arceo*, signifies to drive or impel forth.

Practise, from the Greek *πρασσω* to do, signifies to perform a part.

These terms are equally applied to the actions and habits of men; but we *exercise* in that where the powers are called forth; we *practise* in that where frequency and habitude of action is requisite; we *exercise* an art; we *practise* a profession: we may both *exercise* or *practise* a virtue; but the former is that which the particular occurrence calls forth, and which seems to demand a peculiar effort of the mind; the latter is that which is done daily and ordinarily: thus we in a peculiar manner are said to *exercise* patience, fortitude, or forbearance; to *practise* charity, kindness, benevolence, and the like.

Every virtue requires time and place, a proper object, and a fit conjuncture of circumstances for the due *exercise* of it.—ADDISON.

All men are not equally qualified for getting money; but it is in the power of every one alike to *practise* this virtue (of thrift).—BUDGE.

A similar distinction characterizes these words as nouns: the former applying solely to the powers of the body or mind; the latter solely to the mechanical operations: the health of the body and the vigour of the mind are alike impaired by the want of *exercise*; in every art *practice* is an indispensable requisite for acquiring perfection: the *exercise* of the memory is of the first importance in the education of children; constant *practice* in writing is almost the only means by which the art of penmanship is acquired.

Reading is to the mind what *exercise* is to the body.—ADDISON.

Long *practice* has a sure improvement found,
With kindled fires to burn the barren ground. DRYDEN.

Exercise, v. Exert.

To Exert, Exercise.

The employment of some power or qualification that belongs to one's self is the common idea conveyed by these terms; but **Exert** (v. *Endeavour*) may be used for what is internal or external of one's self; **Exercise** (v. *Exercise*) only for that which forms an express part of one's self: hence we speak of *exerting* one's strength, or *exerting* one's voice, or *exerting* one's influence: of *exercising* one's limbs, *exercising* one's understanding, or *exercising* one's tongue.

Exert is often used only for an individual act of calling forth into action; *exercise* always conveys the idea of repeated or continued *exertion*: thus a person who calls to another *exerts* his voice; he who speaks aloud for any length of time *exercises* his lungs.

How has Milton represented the whole Godhead, *exerting* itself towards man in its full benevolence, under the threefold distinction of a Creator, a Redeemer, and Comforter.—ADDISON.

God made no faculty, but he also provided it with a proper object upon which it might *exercise* itself.—SOUTH.

Exertion, v. Endeavour.

To Exhale, v. To emit.

To Exhaust, v. To spend.

To Exhibit, v. To give.

To Exhibit, v. To show.

Exhibition, v. Show.

To Exhilarate, v. To animate.

To Exhort, Persuade.

Exhort, in Latin *exhortor*, compounded of *ex* and *hortor*, from the Greek *ὑπὸ* perfect passive of *ἰσχύω* to excite or impel.

Persuade, v. Conviction.

Exhortation has more of impelling in it; *persuasion* more of drawing: a superior *exhorts*; his words carry authority with them, and rouse to action: a friend and an equal *persuades*; he wins and draws by the agreeableness or kindness of his expressions. *Exhortations* are employed only in matters of duty or necessity; *persuasions* are employed in matters of pleasure or convenience.

Their pinions still
In loose libations stretch'd, to trust the void
Trembling refuse, till down before them fly
The parent guides, and chide, *exhort*, command. THOMSON.
Gay's friends *persuaded* him to sell his share in the South Sea stock, but he dreamed of dignity and splendor.—JOHNSON.

Exigency, Emergency.

Necessity is the idea which is common to the signification of these terms: the former, from the Latin *exigo* to demand, expresses what the case demands; and the latter, from *emergeo*, to arise out of, denotes what rises out of the case.

The *exigency* is more common, but less pressing; the *emergency* is imperious when it comes, but comes less frequently: a prudent traveller will never carry more money with him than what will supply the *exigencies* of his journey; and in case of an *emergency* will rather borrow of his friends than risk his property.

Savage was again confined to Bristol, where he was every day hunted by bailiffs. In this *exigence* he once more found a friend who sheltered him in his house.—JOHNSON.

When it was formerly the fashion to husband a lie and to trump it up in some extraordinary *emergency*, it generally did execution; but at present every man is on his guard.—ADDISON.

To Exile, v. To banish.

To Exist, v. To be.

To Exist, Live.

Exist, v. To be.

Live, through the medium of the Saxon *libban*, and the other northern dialects, comes in all probability from the Hebrew *leb* the heart, which is the seat of animal life.

Existence is the property of all things in the universe; *life*, which is the inherent power of motion, is the particular property communicated by the Divine Being to some parts only of his creation: *exist*, therefore, is the general, and *live* the specific, term: whatever *lives*, *exists* according to a certain mode; but many things *exist* without *living*: when we wish to speak of things in their most abstract relation, we say they *exist*; when we wish to characterize the form of *existence*, we say they *live*.

Existence, in its proper sense, is the attribute which we commonly ascribe to the Divine Being, and it is that which is immediately communicable by himself; *life* is that mode of *existence* which he has made to be communicable by other objects besides himself: *existence* is taken only in its strict and proper sense, independent of all its attributes and appendages; but *life* is regarded in connection with the means by which it is supported, as animal life, or vegetable life. In like manner, when speaking of spiritual objects, *exist* retains its abstract sense, and *live* is employed to denote an active principle: animosities should never *exist* in the mind; and everything which is calculated to keep them *alive* should be kept at a distance.

Can any now remember or relate

How he *existed* in an embryo state?—JENYNS.

Death to such a man is rather to be looked upon as the period of his mortality, than the end of his *life*.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF FLINBY.

Exit, Departure.

Both these words are metaphorically employed for death, or a passage out of this life: the former is borrowed from the act of going off the stage; the latter from the act of setting off on a journey. *Exit* seems to convey the idea of volition; for we speak of making our *exit*: *departure* designates simply the event; the hour of a man's *departure* is not made known to him. When we speak of an *exit*, we think only of the place left; when we speak of a *departure*, we think of the place gone to: the unbeliever may talk of his *exit*; the Christian most commonly speaks of his *departure*.

There are no ideas strike more forcibly upon our imaginations than those which are raised from reflections upon the *exits* of great and excellent men.—STEELE.

Our Saviour prescribes faith in himself as a special remedy against that trouble which possessed the minds of his disciples upon the apprehension of his *departure* from them.—TILLOTSON.

To Exonerate, Exculpate.

Exonerate, from *onus* a burthen, signifies to take off the burthen of a charge or of guilt; to **Exculpate**, from *culpa* a fault or blame, is to throw off the blame; the first is the act of another the second is one's own act: we *exonerate* him upon whom a charge has lain, or who has the load of guilt; we *exculpate* ourselves when there is any danger of being blamed: circumstances may sometimes tend to *exonerate*; the explanation of some person is requisite to *exculpate*: in a case of dishonesty the absence of an individual at the moment when the act was committed will altogether *exonerate* him from suspicion; it is fruitless for any one to attempt to *exculpate* himself from the charge of faithlessness who is detected in conniving at the dishonesty of others.

This tyrant God, the belly! Take that from us
With all its bestial appetites, and man,
Exonerated man, shall be all soul.—GUMBERLAND.

By this fond and easy acceptance of *exculpatory* comment, Pope testified that he had not intentionally attacked religion.—JOHNSON.

To Expand, *v. To dilate.*

To Expand, *v. To spread.*

To Expect, *v. To await.*

Expectation, *v. Hope.*

Expedient, Resource.

The **Expedient** is an artificial means; the **Resource** is a natural means; a cunning man is fruitful in *expedients*: a fortunate man abounds in *resources*: Robinson Crusoe adopted every *expedient* in order to prolong his existence, at a time when his *resources* were at the lowest ebb.

When there happens to be anything ridiculous in a visage, the best *expedient* is for the owner to be pleasant upon himself.—STEELE.

Since the accomplishment of the revolution, France has destroyed every *resource* of the state which depends upon opinion.—BURKE.

Expedient, Fit.

Expedient, from the Latin *expedio* to get in readiness for a given occasion, supposes a

certain degree of necessity from circumstances; **Fit** (*v. Fit*) for the purpose, signifies simply an agreement with, or suitability to, the circumstances: what is *expedient* must be *fit*, because it is called for; what is *fit* need not be *expedient*, for it may not be required. The *expediency* of a thing depends altogether upon the outward circumstances; the *fitness* is determined by a moral rule: it is imprudent not to do that which is *expedient*: it is disgraceful to do that which is *unfit*: it is *expedient* for him who wishes to prepare for death, occasionally to take an account of his life; it is not *fit* for him who is about to die to dwell with anxiety on the things of this life.

To far the greater number it is highly *expedient* that they should by some settled scheme of duties be rescued from the tyranny of caprice.—JOHNSON.

Salt earth and bitter are not *fit* to sow,
Nor will be tam'd and meided by the plough.
DRYDEN.

Expedient, *v. Necessary.*

To Expedite, *v. To hasten.*

Expeditious, *v. Diligent.*

To Expel, *v. To banish.*

To Expend, *v. To spend.*

Expense, *v. Cost.*

Experience, Experiment, Trial, Proof.

Experience, **Experiment**, from the Latin *experior*, compounded of *e* or *ex* and *perio* or *pario*, signifies to bring forth, that is, the thing brought to light, or the act of bringing to light.

Trial signifies the act of *trying*, from *try*, in Latin *tento*, Hebrew *tur*, to explore, examine, search.

Proof signifies either the act of *proving*, from the Latin *probo* to make good, or the thing made good, *proved* to be good.

By all the actions implied in these terms, we endeavour to arrive at a certainty respecting some unknown particular: *experience* is that which has been tried; an *experiment* is the thing to be tried: *experience* is certain, as it is a deduction from the past for the service of the present; the *experiment* is uncertain, and serves a future purpose: *experience* is an unerring guide, which no man can desert without falling into error; *experiments* may fail, or be superseded by others more perfect.

Experience serves to lead us to moral truth; *experiments* aid us in ascertaining speculative truth: we profit by *experience* to rectify practice; we make *experiments* in theoretical inquiries: he, therefore, who makes *experiments* in matters of *experience* rejects a steady and definite mode of coming at the truth for one that is variable and uncertain, and that too in matters of the first moment: the consequences of such a mistake are obvious, and have been too fatally realized in the present age, in which *experience* has been set at naught by every wild speculator, who has recommended *experiments* to be made with all the forms of moral duty and civil society.

The *experiment*, *trial*, and *proof* have equally the character of uncertainty; but the *experi-*

ment is employed only in matters of an intellectual nature; the *trial* is employed in matters of a personal nature, on physical as well as mental objects; the *proof* is employed in moral subjects: we make an *experiment* in order to know whether a thing be true or false; we make a *trial* in order to know whether it be capable or incapable, convenient or inconvenient, useful or the contrary; we put a thing to the *proof* in order to determine whether it be good or bad, real or unreal; *experiments* tend to confirm our opinions; they are the handmaids of science: the philosopher doubts every position which cannot be demonstrated by repeated *experiments*: *trials* are of absolute necessity in directing our conduct, our taste, and our choice; we judge of our strength or skill by *trials*; we judge of the effect of colours by *trials*, and the like: the *proof* determines the judgment, as in common life, according to the vulgar proverb, "The *proof* of the pudding is in the eating;" so in the knowledge of men and things, the *proof* of men's characters and merits is best made by observing their conduct.

A man may, by *experience*, be persuaded that his will is free: that he can do this, or not do it.—TILLOTSON.

Any one may easily make this *experiment* and even plainly see that there is no bud in the corn which ants lay up.—ADDISON.

But he himself betook another way,
To make more *trial* of his hardiment,
And seek adventures, as he with prince Arthur went.
SPENSER.

O goodly usage of those ancient times!
In which the sword was servant unto right;
When not for malice and contentious crynes,
But all for praise and *proof* of manly might.
SPENSER.

Experiment, v. Experience.

Expert, v. Clever.

To Expiate, v. To atone.

To Expire, v. To die.

To Explain, Expound, Interpret.

Explain signifies to make plain, v. *Apparent*.

Expound, from the Latin *expono*, compounded of *ex* and *pono*, signifies to set forth in detail.

Interpret, in Latin *interpreto* and *interpretes*, compounded of *inter* and *partes*, that is, *linguas* tongues, signifying to get the sense of one language by means of another.

To *explain* is the generic, the rest are specific: to *expound* and *interpret* are each modes of *explaining*. Single words or sentences are *explained*: a whole work, or considerable parts of it, are *expounded*: the sense of any writing or symbolical sign is *interpreted*. It is the business of the philologist to *explain* the meaning of words by a suitable definition; it is the business of the divine to *expound* Scripture; it is the business of the antiquarian to *interpret* the meaning of old inscriptions, or of hieroglyphics.

An *explanation* serves to assist the understanding, to supply a deficiency, and remove obscurity; an *exposition* is an ample *explanation*, in which minute particulars are detailed, and the connection of events in the narrative is kept up; it serves to assist the memory and

awaken the attention: both the *explanation* and *exposition* are employed in clearing up the sense of things as they are, but the *interpretation* is more arbitrary; it often consists of affixing or giving a sense to things which they have not previously had: hence it is that the same passages in authors admit of different *interpretations*, according to the character or views of the commentator.

There are many practical truths in the Bible which are so plain and positive that they need no literal *explanation*; but its doctrines, when faithfully *expounded*, may be brought home to the hearts and consciences of men: although the partial *interpretations* of illiterate and enthusiastic men are more apt to disgrace than to advance the cause of religion.

To *explain* and *interpret* are not confined to what is written or said, they are employed likewise with regard to the actions of men; *exposition* is, however, used only with regard to writings. The major part of the misunderstandings and animosities which arise among men might easily be obviated by a timely *explanation*; it is the characteristic of good-nature to *interpret* the looks and actions of men as favourably as possible. The *explanation* may sometimes flow out of circumstances; the *interpretation* is always the act of a voluntary and rational agent. The discovery of a plot or secret scheme will serve to *explain* the mysterious and strange conduct of such as were previously acquainted with it. According to an old proverb, "Silence gives consent;" for thus at least they are pleased to *interpret* it, who are interested in the decision.

It is a serious thing to have connection with a people who live only under positive, arbitrary, and changeable institutions: and these not perfected, nor supplied, nor *explained*, by any common acknowledged rule of moral science.—BURKE.

One meets now and then with persons who are extremely learned and knotty in *expounding* clear cases.—STEELE.

It does not appear that among the Romans any man grew eminent by *interpreting* another; and perhaps it was more frequent to translate for exercise or amusement than for fame.—JOHNSON.

To Explain, Illustrate, Elucidate.

Explain, v. To explain, expound.

Illustrate, in Latin, *illustratus* participle of *illustro*, compounded of the intensive syllable *in* and *lustro*, signifies to make a thing bright, or easy to be surveyed and examined.

Elucidate, in Latin *elucidatus* participle of *elucido*, from *lux* light, signifies to bring forth into the light.

To *explain* is simply to render intelligible; to *illustrate* and *elucidate* are to give additional clearness: everything requires to be *explained* to one who is ignorant of it; but the best informed will require to have abstruse subjects *illustrated*, and obscure objects *elucidated*. We always *explain* when we *illustrate* or *elucidate*, and we always *elucidate* when we *illustrate*, but not vice versa.

We *explain* by reducing compounds to simples, and generals to particulars; we *illustrate* by means of examples, similes, and allegorical figures; we *elucidate* by commentaries, or the statement of facts. Words are the common subject of *explanation*; moral truths require

illustration; poetical allusions and dark passages in writers require *elucidation*. All *explanations* given to children should consist of as few words as possible, so long as they are sufficiently explicit.

I know I meant just what you *explain*; but I did not *explain* my own meaning so well as you.—POPE.

It is indeed the same system as mine, but *illustrated* with a ray of your own.—POPE.

If our religious tenets should ever want a farther *elucidation*, we shall not call on atheism to *explain* them.—BURKE.

Explanation, v. Definition.

Explanatory, Explicit, Express.

Explanatory signifies containing or belonging to *explanation* (v. *To explain*).

Explicit, in Latin *explicatus* from *explico* to unfold, signifies unfolded or laid open.

Express, in Latin *expressus*, signifies the same as expressed or delivered in specific terms.

The *explanatory* is that which is superadded to clear up difficulties or obscurities. A letter is *explanatory* which contains an *explanation* of something preceding, in lieu of any thing new. The *explicit* is that which of itself obviates every difficulty; an *explicit* letter, therefore, will leave nothing that requires *explanation*: the *explicit* admits of a free use of words; the *express* requires them to be unambiguous. A person ought to be *explicit* when he enters into an engagement; he ought to be *express* when he gives commands.

An *explanatory* law stops the current of a precedent statute, nor does either of them admit extension afterwards.—BACON.

Since the revolution the bounds of prerogative and liberty have been better defined, the principles of government more thoroughly examined and understood, and the rights of the subject more *explicitly* guarded by legal provisions, than in any other period of the English history.—BLACKSTONE.

I have destroyed the letter I received from you by the hands of Lucius Aruntius, though it was much too innocent to deserve so severe a treatment; however, it was your express desire I should destroy it, and I have complied accordingly.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

Explicit, v. Explanatory.

Exploit, v. Deed.

To Explore, v. To examine.

Explosion, v. Eruption.

Exposed, v. Subject.

To Expostulate, Remonstrate.

Expostulate, from *postulo* to demand, signifies to demand reasons for a thing.

Remonstrate, from *monstro* to show, signifies to show reasons against a thing.

We *expostulate* in a tone of authority; we *remonstrate* in a tone of complaint. He who *expostulates* passes a censure, and claims to be heard; he who *remonstrates* presents his case and requests to be heard. *Expostulation* may often be the precursor of violence; *remonstrance* mostly rests on the force of reason and representation: he who admits of *expostulation* from an inferior undermines his own authority; he who is deaf to the *remonstrances* of his friends is far gone in folly: the *expostu-*

lation is mostly on matters of personal interest; the *remonstrance* may as often be made on matters of propriety. The Scythian ambassadors *expostulated* with Alexander against his invasion of their country; King Richard *expostulated* with Wat Tyler on the subject of his insurrection; Artabanus *remonstrated* with Xerxes on the folly of his projected invasion.

With the hypocrite it is not my business at present to *expostulate*.—JOHNSON.

I have been but a little time conversant with the world, yet I have had already frequent opportunities of observing the little efficacy of *remonstrance* and complaint.—JOHNSON.

To Expound, v. To explain.

Express, v. Explanatory.

To Express, Declare, Signify, Testify, Utter.

To *Express*, from the Latin *exprimo* to press out, is said of whatever passes in the mind; to *Declare* (v. *To declare*) is said only of sentiments and opinions. A man *expresses* anger, joy, sorrow, and all the affections in their turn; he *declares* his opinion for or against any particular measure.

To *express* is the simple act of communication, resulting from our circumstances as social agents; to *declare* is a specific and positive act that is called for by the occasion: the former may be done in private, the latter is always more or less public. An *expression* of one's feelings and sentiments to those whom we esteem is the supreme delight of social beings; the *declaration* of our opinions may be prudent or imprudent, according to circumstances. Words, looks, gestures, or movements, serve to *express*: actions, as well as words, may sometimes *declare*: sometimes we cannot *express* our contempt in so strong a manner as by preserving a perfect silence when we are required to speak; an act of hostility, on the part of a nation, is as much a *declaration* of war as if it were *expressed* in positive terms.

Thus Roman youth deriv'd from ruin'd Troy,
In rude Saturnian rhymes *express* their joy.
DRYDEN.

Th' unerring sun by certain signs *declares*,
What the late ev'n or early morn prepares.
DRYDEN.

To *express* and *Signify* are both said of words; but *express* has always regard to the agent, and the use which he makes of the words. *Signify*, from *signum* a sign, and *facio* to make, has respect to the things of which the words are made the usual signs: hence it is that a word may be made to *express* one thing, while it *signifies* another: and hence it is that many words, according to their ordinary *signification*, will not *express* what the speaker has in his mind, and wishes to communicate: the monosyllable *no* *signifies* simple negation; but according to the temper of the speaker, and the circumstances under which it is spoken, it may *express* ill-nature, anger, or any other bad passion.

To *signify* and *Testify*, like the word *express*, are employed in general for any art of communication otherwise than by words; but *express* is used in a stronger sense than either of the former. The passions and strongest

movements of the soul are *expressed*; the simple intentions or transitory feelings of the mind are *signified* or *testified*. A person *expresses* his joy by the sparkling of his eye, and the vivacity of his countenance; he *signifies* his wishes by a nod; he *testifies* his approbation by a smile. People of vivid sensibility must take care not to *express* all their feelings; those who expect a ready obedience from their inferiors must not adopt a haughty mode of *signifying* their will; nothing is more gratifying to an ingenuous mind than to *testify* its regard for merit, wherever it may discover itself.

Express may be said of all sentient beings, and, by a figure of speech, even of those which have no sense; *signify* is said of rational agents only. The dog has the most *expressive* mode of showing his attachment and fidelity to his master; a *significant* look or smile may sometimes give rise to suspicion, and lead to the detection of guilt. To *signify* and *testify*, though closely allied in sense and application, have this difference, that to *signify* is simply to give a sign of what passes inwardly, to *testify* is to give that sign in the presence of others. A person *signifies* by letter his intention of being at a certain place at a given time; he *testifies* his sense of favours conferred, by every mark of gratitude and respect.

Utter, from the preposition *out*, signifying to bring out, differs from *express* in this, that the latter respects the thing which is communicated, and the former the means of communication. We *express* from the heart; we *utter* with the lips: to *express* an uncharitable sentiment is a violation of Christian duty; to *utter* an unseemly word is a violation of good manners: those who say what they do not mean, *utter* but not *express*; those who show by their looks what is passing in their hearts, *express* but do not *utter*.

As the Supreme Being has *expressed*, and as it were printed his ideas in the creation, men *express* their ideas in books.—ADDISON.

On him confer the Poet's sacred name,
Whose lofty voice declares the heavenly flame.
ADDISON.

If there be no cause *expressed* the gaoler is not bound to detain the prisoner. For the law judges in this respect, saith Sir Edward Coke, like Festus the Roman governor; that it is unreasonable to send a prisoner, and not to *signify* withal the crimes alleged against him.—BLACKSTONE.

What consolation can be had, Dryden has afforded, by living to repent, and to *testify* his repentance (for his immoral writings).—JOHNSON.

The multitude of angels, with a shout
Loud as from numbers without number, sweet
As from blessed voices, uttering joy.—MILTON.

Expression, v. Word.

Expressive, v. Significant.

To Expunge, v. To blot out.

To Extend, v. To enlarge.

To Extend, v. To reach.

Extensive, v. Comprehensive.

Extent, v. Limit.

To Extenuate, Palliate.

Extenuate, from the Latin *tenuis* thin, small, signifies literally to make small.

Palliate, in Latin *palliativus*, participle of *pallio*, from *pallium* a cloak, signifies to throw a cloak over a thing so that it may not be seen.

These terms are both applicable to the moral conduct, and express the act of lessening the guilt of any impropriety. To *extenuate* is simply to lessen guilt without reference to the means: to *palliate* is to lessen it by means of art. To *extenuate* is rather the effect of circumstances: to *palliate* is the direct effort of an individual. Ignorance in the offender may serve as an *extenuation* of his guilt, although not of his offence: it is but a poor *palliation* of a man's guilt to say that his crimes have not been attended with the mischief which they were calculated to produce.

Savage endeavoured to *extenuate* the fact (of having killed Sinclair), by urging the suddenness of the whole action.—JOHNSON.

Mons. St. Evremont had endeavoured to *palliate* the superstitious of the Roman Catholic religion.—ADDISON.

Exterior, v. Outside.

Exterior, v. Outward.

To Exterminate, v. To eradicate.

External, v. Outward.

To Extirpate, v. To eradicate.

To Extol, v. To praise.

To Extort, v. To exact.

Extraneous, Extrinsic, Foreign.

Extraneous, compounded of *exterraneus*, or *ex* and *terra*, signifies out of the land, not belonging to it.

Extrinsic, in Latin *extrinsecus*, compounded of *extra* and *secus*, signifies outward, external.

Foreign, from the Latin *foris* out of doors, signifies not belonging to the family.

The *extraneous* is that which forms no necessary or natural part of anything: the *extrinsic* is that which forms a part or has a connexion, but only in an indirect form; it is not an inherent or component part: the *foreign* is that which forms no part whatever, and has no kind of connexion. A work is said to contain *extraneous* matter, which contains much matter not necessarily belonging to, or illustrative of the subject: a work is said to have *extrinsic* merit when it borrows its value from local circumstances, in distinction from the *intrinsic* merit, or that which lies in the contents.

Extraneous and *extrinsic* have a general and abstract sense; but *foreign* has a particular signification; they always pass over to some object either expressed or understood: hence we say *extraneous* ideas, or *extrinsic* worth; but that a particular mode of acting is *foreign* to the general plan pursued. Anecdotes of private individuals would be *extraneous* matter in a general history: the respect and credit which men gain from their fellow citizens by an adherence to rectitude is the *extrinsic* advantage of virtue; the peace of a good conscience and the favour of God, are its *intrinsic* advantages: it is *foreign* to the purpose of one who is

making an abridgement of a work, to enter into details in any particular part.

That which makes me believe is something *extraneous* to the thing that I believe.—LOCKE.

Affluence and power are advantages *extrinsic* and adventitious.—JOHNSON.

For loveliness

Needs not the aid of *foreign* ornaments;

But is when unadorn'd adorn'd the most.—THOMSON.

Extraordinary, Remarkable,

Are epithets both opposed to the ordinary; and in that sense the **Extraordinary** is that which in its own nature is **Remarkable**: but things, however, may be *extraordinary* which are not *remarkable*, and the contrary. The *extraordinary* is that which is out of the ordinary course, but it does not always excite remark, and is not therefore *remarkable*, as when we speak of an *extraordinary* loan, an *extraordinary* measure of government: on the other hand, when the *extraordinary* conveys the idea of what deserves notice, it expresses much more than *remarkable*. There are but few *extraordinary* things, many things are *remarkable*: the *remarkable* is eminent; the *extraordinary* is supereminent: the *extraordinary* excites our astonishment; the *remarkable* only awakens our interest and attention. The *extraordinary* is unexpected; the *remarkable* is sometimes looked for: every instance of sagacity and fidelity in a dog is *remarkable*, and some *extraordinary* instances have been related which would almost stagger our belief.

The love of praise is a passion deep in the mind of every *extraordinary* person.—HUGHES.

The heroes of literary history have been no less *remarkable* for what they have suffered than for what they have achieved.—JOHNSON.

Extravagant, Prodigal, Lavish, Profuse.

Extravagant, from *extra* and *vagans*, signifies in general wandering from the line; and **Prodigal**, from the Latin *prodigus*, and *prodigo* to launch forth, signifies in general to send forth, or give out in great quantities.

Lavish comes probably from the Latin *lavo* to wash, signifying to wash away in waste.

Profuse, from the Latin *profusus* participle of *profundo* to pour forth, signifies pouring out freely.

The idea of using immoderately is implied in all these terms, but *extravagant* is the most general in its meaning and application. The *extravagant* man spends his money without reason; the *prodigal* man spends it in excesses; the former errs against plain sense, the latter violates the moral law: the *extravagant* man will ruin himself by his follies; the *prodigal* by his vices. One may be *extravagant* with a small sum where it exceeds ones means; one cannot be *prodigal* without great property. *Extravagance* is practised by both sexes; *prodigality* is peculiarly the vice of the male sex. *Extravagance* is opposed to meanness; *prodigality* to avarice. Those who know the true value of money as contributing to their own enjoyments, or those of others, will guard against *extravagance*. Those who lay a

restraint on their passions can never fall into *prodigality*.

Extravagant and *prodigal* serve to designate habitual as well as particular actions; *lavish* and *profuse* are employed only for that which is particular: hence we say to be *lavish* of one's money, one's presents, and the like; to be *profuse* in one's entertainments, both of which may be modes of *extravagance*. An *extravagant* man, however, in the restricted sense, mostly spends upon himself to indulge his whims and idle fancies; but a man may be *lavish* and *profuse* upon others from a misguided generosity.

In a moral use of these terms, a man is *extravagant* in his praises who exceeds either in measure or application: he is *prodigal* of his strength who consumes it by an excessive use: he is *lavish* of his compliments who deals them out so largely and promiscuously as to render them of no service: he is *profuse* in his acknowledgments who repeats them oftener, or delivers them in more words, than are necessary.

Extravagant and *profuse* are said only of individuals; *prodigal* and *lavish* may be said of many in a general sense. A nation may be *prodigal* of its resources; a government may be *lavish* of the public money, as an individual is *extravagant* with his own, and *profuse* in what he gives another.

No one is to admit into his petitions to his Maker, things superfluous and *extravagant*.—SOUTH.

Here patriots live, who for their country's good, In fighting fields, were *prodigal* of blood.—DRYDEN.

See where the winding vale its *lavish* stores Irriguous spreads.—THOMSON.

Cicero was most liberally *profuse* in commending the ancients and his contemporaries.—ADDISON after PLUTARCH.

Extreme, v. Extremity.

Extremity, v. End.

Extremity, Extreme.

Extremity is used in the proper or the improper sense; **Extreme** in the improper sense: we speak of the *extremity* of a line or an avenue, the *extremity* of distress, but the *extreme* of the fashion.

In the moral sense, *extremity* is applicable to the outward circumstances; *extreme* to the opinions and conduct of men: in matters of dispute between individuals it is a happy thing to guard against coming to *extremities*; it is the characteristic of volatile tempers to be always in *extremes*, either the *extreme* of joy or the *extreme* of sorrow.

Savage suffered the utmost *extremities* of poverty, and often fasted so long that he was seized with faintness.—JOHNSON.

The two *extremes* to be guarded against are despotism, where all are slaves, and anarchy, where all would rule and none obey.—BLAIR.

To Extricate, v. Disengage.

Extrinsic, v. Extraneous.

Exuberant, Luxuriant.

Exuberant, from the Latin *exuberans* or *ex ubero*, signifies very fruitful or superabundant: **Luxuriant**, in Latin *luxurians*

from *luxus*, signifies expanding with unrestrained freedom. These terms are both applied to vegetation in a flourishing state; but *exuberance* expresses the excess, and *luxuriance* the perfection: in a fertile soil where plants are left unrestrainedly to themselves there will be an *exuberance*; plants are to be seen in their *luxuriance* only in seasons that are favourable to them: in the moral application, *exuberance* of intellect is often attended with a restless ambition that is incompatible both with the happiness and advance-

ment of its possessor; *luxuriance* of imagination is one of the greatest gifts which a poet can boast of.

Another Flora there of bolder hues
And richer sweets, beyond our garden's pride
Plays o'er the fields, and showers with sudden hand
Exuberant spring.—THOMSON.

On whose *luxurious* herbage, half conceal'd,
Like a fall'n cedar, far diffus'd his train,
Cas'd in green scales, the crocodile extends.
THOMSON.

To Eye, *v.* To look.

F.

Fable, Tale, Novel, Romance.

Fable, in Latin *fabula* from *for* to speak or tell, and **Tale**, from *to tell*, both designate a species of narration; **Novel**, from the Italian *novella*, is an extended tale; **Romance**, from the Italian *romanzo*, is a wonderful tale, or a tale of wonders, such as was most in vogue in the dark ages of European literature.

Different species of composition are expressed by the above words: the *fable* is allegorical; its actions are natural, but its agents are imaginary: the *tale* is fictitious, but not imaginary; both the agents and actions are drawn from the passing scenes of life. Gods and goddesses, animals and men, trees, vegetables, and inanimate objects in general may be made the agents of a *fable*; but of a *tale*, properly speaking, only men or supernatural spirits can be the agents: of the former description are the celebrated *fables* of *Æsop*; and of the latter the *tales* of Marmontel, the *tales* of the Genii, the Chinese *tales*, &c.: *fables* are written for instruction; *tales* principally for amusement: *fables* consist mostly of only one incident or action, from which a *novel* may be drawn; *tales* always of many which excite an interest for an individual.

The *tale* when compared with the *novel* is a simple kind of fiction, it consists of but few persons in the drama; whilst the *novel*, on the contrary, admits of every possible variety in characters: the *tale* is told without much art or contrivance to keep the reader in suspense, without any depth of plot or importance in the catastrophe; the *novel* affords the greatest scope for exciting an interest by the rapid succession of events, the involvements of interests, and the unravelling of its plot. If the *novel* awakens the attention, the *romance* rivets the whole mind and engages the affections; it presents nothing but what is extraordinary and calculated to fill the imagination: of the former description, Cervantes, La Sage, and Fielding, have given us the best specimens; and of the latter we have the best modern specimens from the pen of Mrs. Radcliffe.

When I travelled, I took a particular delight in hearing the songs and *fables* that are come from father to son, and are most in vogue among the common people.—ADDISON.

Of Jason, Theseus, and such worthies old,
Light seem the *tales* antiquity has told.—WALLER.

A *novel* conducted upon one uniform plan, containing a series of events in familiar life, is in effect a protracted comedy not divided into acts.—CUMBERLAND.

In the *romances* formerly written, every transaction and sentiment was so remote from all that passes among men, that the reader was in little danger of making any application to himself.—JOHNSON.

Fabric, *v.* **Edifice**.

To Fabricate, *v.* To invent.

Fabrication, *v.* **Fiction**.

To Face, *v.* To confront.

Face, Front.

Figuratively designate the particular parts of bodies which bear some sort of resemblance to the human face or forehead.

Face is applied to that part of bodies which serves as an index or rule, and contains certain marks to direct the observer; **Front** is employed for that part which is most prominent or foremost: hence we speak of the face of a wheel or clock, the face of a painting or the face of nature; but the front of a house or building, and the front of a stage: hence, likewise, the propriety of the expressions, to put a good face on a thing, to show a bold front.

A common soldier, a child, a girl, the door of an inn, have changed the face of fortune, and almost of nature.—BURKE.

Where the deep trench in length extended lay,
Compacted troops stand wedg'd in firm array,
A dreadful front.—POPE.

Face, Countenance, Visage.

Face, in Latin *facies*, from *facio* to make, signifies the whole form or make.

Countenance, in French *contenance*, from the Latin *contineo*, signifies the contents, or what is contained in the face. **Visage**, from *viso* and *video* to see, signifies the particular form of the face as it presents itself to view; properly speaking a kind of countenance.

The face consists of a certain set of features; the countenance consists of the general aggregate of looks produced by these features; the visage consists of such looks in particular cases: the face is the work of nature; the countenance and visage are the work of the mind: the face remains the same, but the

countenance and *visage* are changeable. The *face* belongs to brutes as well as men; the *countenance* is the peculiar property of man: the *visage* is peculiarly applicable to superior beings: the last term is employed only in the grave or lofty style.

No part of the body besides the *face* is capable of as many changes as there are different emotions in the mind, and of expressing them all by those changes.—HUGHES.
As the *countenance* admits of so great variety, it requires also great judgement to govern it.—HUGHES.

A sudden trembling seized on all his limbs;
His eyes distorted grew, his *visage* pale;
His speech forsook him.—OTWAY.

Facetious, Conversable, Pleasant, Jocular, Jocose.

All these epithets designate that companionable quality which consists in loveliness of speech.

Facetious, in Latin *facetus*, may probably come from *for* to speak, denoting the versatility with which a person makes use of his words.

Conversable is literally able to hold a conversation.

Pleasant (*v. Agreeable*) signifies making ourselves *pleasant* with others, or them pleased with us.

Jocular signifies after the manner of a joke.

Jocose signifies using or having jokes.

Facetious may be employed either for writing or conversation; the rest only in conversation: the *facetious* man deals in that kind of discourse which may excite laughter; a *conversable* man may instruct as well as amuse; the *pleasant* man says everything in a *pleasant* manner; his *pleasantry* even on the most delicate subject is without offence; the person speaking is *jocose*; the thing said, or the manner of saying it, is *jocular*: it is not for any one to be always *jocose*, although sometimes one may assume a *jocular* air when we are not at liberty to be serious. A man is *facetious* from humour; he is *conversable* by means of information; he indulges himself in occasional *pleasantry*, or allows himself to be *jocose*, in order to enliven conversation; a useful hint is sometimes conveyed in *jocular* terms.

I have written nothing since I published, except a certain *facetious* history of John Gilpin.—COWPER.

But here my lady will object,
Your intervals of time to spend,
With so *conversable* a friend,
It would not signify a pin
Whatever climate you were in.—SWIFT.

Aristophanes wrote to please the multitude; his *pleasantries* are coarse and unpolite.—WARTON.

Thus Venus sports,
When, cruelly *jocose*,
She ties the fatal noose,

And binds unequals to the brazen yokes.—CREECH.

Pope sometimes condescended to be *jocular* with servants or inferiors.—JOHNSON.

Facility, *v. Ease*.

Fact, *v. Circumstance*.

Faction, Party.

*These two words equally suppose the union of many persons, and their opposition

to certain views different from their own: but **Faction**, from *factio* making, denotes an activity and secret machination against those whose views are opposed; and **Party**, from the verb to part or split, expresses only a division of opinion.

The term *party* has of itself nothing odious, that of *faction* is always so: any man, without distinction of rank, may have a *party* either at court or in the army, in the city or in literature, without being himself immediately implicated in raising it; but *factions* are always the result of active efforts: one may have a *party* for one's merit, from the number and ardour of one's friends; but a *faction* is raised by busy and turbulent spirits for their own purposes: Rome was torn by the intestine *factions* of Caesar and Pompey; France, during the Revolution, was successively governed by some ruling *faction* which raised itself upon the ruins of that which it had destroyed. *Factions* are not so prevalent in England as *parties*, owing to the peculiar excellence of the constitution; but there are not wanting *factious* spirits who, if they could overturn the present balance of power which has been so happily obtained, would have an opportunity of practising their arts alternately on the high and low, and carrying on their schemes by the aid of both. *Faction* is the demon of discord, armed with the power to do endless mischief, and intent alone on destroying whatever opposes its progress; woe to that state into which it has found an entrance; *party* spirit may show itself in noisy debate; but while it keeps within the legitimate bounds of opposition, it is an evil that must be endured.

It is the restless ambition of a few artful men that thus breaks a people into *factions*, and draws several well-meaning persons to their interest by a specious concern for their country.—ADDISON.

As men formerly became eminent in learned societies by their parts and acquisitions, they now distinguish themselves by the warmth and violence with which they espouse their respective *parties*.—ADDISON.

Faction, Seditious.

Faction, in Latin *factiosus* from *facio* to do, signifies the same as busy or intermeddling; ready to take an active part in matters not of one's own immediate concern.

Seditious, in Latin *seditiosus*, signifies prone to sedition (*v. Insurrection*).

Factious is an epithet to characterize the tempers of men; *seditious* characterizes their conduct: the *factious* man attempts to raise himself into importance, he aims at authority, and seeks to interfere in the measures of government; the *seditious* man attempts to excite others, and to provoke their resistance to established authority; the first wants to be a law-giver; the second does not hesitate to be a law-breaker: the first wants to direct the state; the second to overturn it: the *factious* man is mostly in possession of either power, rank, or fortune; the *seditious* man is seldom elevated in station or circumstances above the mass of the people. The Roman tribunes were in general little better than *factious* demagogues; such, in fact, as abound in all republics: Wat Tyler was a *seditious* disturber of the peace. *Factious* is mostly applied to

* Vide Beauzée: "Faction, parti."

individuals; *seditions* is employed for bodies of men: hence we speak of a *factious* nobleman, a *seditions* multitude.

Pope lived at this time (in 1739) among the great with that reception and respect to which his works entitled him, and which he had not impaired by any private misconduct or *factious* partiality.—JOHNSON.

France is considered (by the ministry) as merely a foreign power, and the *seditions* English only as a domestic faction.—BURKE.

Factor, Agent.

Though both these terms, according to their origin, imply a maker or doer, yet, at present, they have a distinct signification: the word *factor* is used in a limited, and the word *agent* in a general sense; the *factor* only buys and sells on the account of others; the *agent* transacts every sort of business in general; merchants and manufacturers employ *factors* abroad to dispose of goods transmitted; lawyers are frequently employed as *agents* in the receipt and payment of money, the transfer of estates, and various other pecuniary concerns.

Their devotion (that is of the puritanical rebels) served all along but as an instrument to their avarice, as a *factor* or under *agent* to their extortion.—SOUTH.

No expectations, indeed, were then formed from renewing a direct application to the French regicides, through the *Agent* General, for the humiliation of sovereigns.—BURKE.

Faculty, Ability, Talent.

Faculty, in Latin *facultas*, changed from *facilitas* facility, which (*v. Ease*) signifies doableness, or the property of being able to do or bring about effects.

Ability, *v. Ability*.

Talent, from the Latin *talentum*, a Greek coin exceeding one hundred pounds sterling in value, derives its figurative signification of a gift, possession, or power, from the use our Saviour has made of it in more than one parable.

The common idea of power is what renders these words synonymous: *faculty* is a power derived from nature; *ability* may be derived either from circumstances or otherwise: the *faculty* is a permanent possession, it is held by a certain tenure; the *ability* is an incidental possession; it is whatever we have while we have it at our disposal, but it may vary in degree and quality with times and seasons. The powers of seeing and hearing are *faculties*; health, strength and fortune, are *abilities*. A *faculty* is some specific power which is directed to one single object; it is the power of acting according to a given form: *ability* is in general the power of doing; *faculty* therefore might, in the strict sense, be considered as a species of *ability*.

A man uses the *faculties* with which he is endowed; he gives according to his *ability*: *faculties* and *talents* both owe their being to nature; but a *faculty* may be either physical or mental; a *talent* is altogether mental: the *faculty* of speech, and the rational *faculty*, are the grand marks of distinction between man and the brute; the *talent* of mimicry, of dramatic acting, and of imitation in general, is what distinguishes one man from the other.

These terms are all used in the plural, agreeably to the above explanation: *faculties* include all the endowments of body or mind, which are the inherent properties of the being, as when we speak of a man's retaining his *faculties* or having his *faculties* impaired: *abilities* include, in the aggregate, whatever a man is able to do; hence we speak of a man's *abilities* in speaking, writing, learning, and the like; *talents* are the particular endowments of the mind, which belong to the individual; hence we say, the *talents* which are requisite for a minister of state are different from those which qualify a man for being a judge.

No fruit our palate courts, or flow'r our smell,

But on its fragrant bosom nations dwell;

All form'd with proper faculties to share;

The daily bounties of their Maker's care.—JENYNS.

Human *ability* is an unequal match for the violent and unforeseen vicissitudes of the world.—BLAIR.

'Tis not, indeed, my *talent* to engage

In lofty trifles, or to swell my page

With wind and noise.—DRYDEN.

To Fail, Fall Short, Be Deficient.

Fail, in French *faillir*, German, &c. *fehlen*, like the word *fall*, comes from the Latin *fallere* to deceive, and the Hebrew *repal* to fall or decay.

To *fail* marks the result of actions or efforts; a person *fails* in his undertaking: **Fall Short** designates either the result of actions, or the state of things; a person *falls short* in his calculation, or in his account; the issue *falls short* of the expectation: to **Be Deficient** marks only the state or quality of objects; a person is *deficient* in good manners. People frequently *fail* in their best endeavours for want of knowing how to apply their abilities; when our expectations are immoderate, it is not surprising if our success *falls short* of our hopes and wishes: there is nothing in which people discover themselves to be more *deficient* than in keeping ordinary engagements.

To *fail* and *be deficient* are both applicable to the characters of men; but the former is mostly employed for the moral conduct, the latter for the outward behaviour: hence a man is said to *fail* in his duty, in the discharge of his obligations, in the performance of a promise, and the like: but to be *deficient* in politeness, in attention to his friends, in his address in his manner of entering a room, and the like.

I would not willingly laugh but instruct; or if I sometimes *fail* in this point, when my mirth ceases to be instructive, it shall never cease to be innocent.—ADDISON.

There is not in my opinion any thing more mysterious in nature than this instinct in animals, which thus rises above reason, and *falls* infinitely short of it.—ADDISON.

While all creation speaks the pow'r divine,
Is it *deficient* in the main design?—JENYNS.

Failing, *v. Failure*.

Failing, *v. Imperfection*.

Failure, Failing.

Failure (*v. To fail*) bespeaks the action, or the result of the action; a **Failing** is the habit, or the habitual *failure*: the former is

said of our undertakings, the latter of our moral character. *Failure* is opposed to success; a *failing* to a perfection. The merchant must be prepared for *failures* in his speculations; the statesman for *failures* in his projects; the result of which depends upon contingencies that are above human control. With our *failings*, however, it is somewhat different; we must never rest satisfied that we are without them, nor contented with the mere consciousness that we have them.

Though some violations of the petition of rights may perhaps be imputed to him (Charles I.), these are more to be ascribed to the necessity of his situation, than to any *failure* in the integrity of his principles.—HUME.

There is scarcely any *failing* of mind or body, which instead of producing shame and discontent, its natural effects, has not one time or other gladdened vanity with the hope of praise.—JOHNSON.

Failure, Miscarriage, Abortion.

Failure (*v. To fail*) has always a reference to the agent and his design; **Miscarriage**, that is, the carrying or going wrong, is applicable to all sublimary concerns, without reference to any particular agent; **Abortion**, from the Latin *aborior* to deviate from the rise, or to pass away before it be come to maturity, is in the proper sense applied to the process of animal nature, and in the figurative sense, to the thoughts and designs which are conceived in the mind.

Failure is more definite in its signification, and limited in its application; we speak of the *failures* of individuals, but of the *miscarriages* of nations or things; a *failure* reflects on the person so as to excite towards him some sentiment, either of compassion, displeasure, or the like; a *miscarriage* is considered mostly in relation to the course of human events; hence the *failure* of Xerxes' expedition reflected disgrace upon himself; but the *miscarriage* of military enterprizes in general are attributable to the elements, or some such untoward circumstance. The *abortion* in its proper sense, is a species of *miscarriage*; and in application a species of *failure* as it applies only to the designs of conscious agents; but it does not carry the mind back to the agent, for we speak of the *abortion* of a scheme with as little reference to the schemer as when we speak of the *miscarriage* of an expedition.

He that attempts to show, however modestly, the *failures* of a celebrated writer, shall surely irritate his admirers.—JOHNSON.

The *miscarriages* of the great designs of princes are recorded in the histories of the world.—JOHNSON.

All *abortion* is from infirmity and defect.—SOUTH.

Failure, *v. Insolvency.*

Faint, Languid.

Faint, from the French *faner* to fade, signifies that which is faded or withered, which has lost its spirit.

Languid, in Latin *languidus*, from *languo* to languish, signifies languished.

Faint is less than *languid*; *faintness* is in fact in the physical application the commencement of *languor*; we may be *faint* for a short time, and if continued and extended through the limbs it becomes *languor*; thus we say to

speak with a *faint* tone, and have a *languid* frame. In the figurative application to make a *faint* resistance, to move with a *languid* air: to form a *faint* idea, to make a *languid* effort.

Low the woods
Bow their hoar head; and here the *languid* sun,
Faint from the west, emits his evening ray.
THOMSON.

Fair, Clear.

Fair, in Saxon *fagar*, comes probably from the Latin *pulcher* beautiful.

Clear, *v. Clear*, bright.

Fair is used in a positive sense; *clear* in a negative sense: there must be some brightness in what is *fair*, there must be no spots in what is *clear*. The weather is said to be *fair*, which is not only free from what is disagreeable, but somewhat enlivened by the sun; it is *clear* when it is free from clouds or mists. A *fair* skin approaches to white; a *clear* skin is without spots or irregularities.

In the moral application, a *fair* fame speaks much in praise of a man; a *clear* reputation is free from faults. A *fair* statement contains every thing that can be said *pro* and *con*; a *clear* statement is free from ambiguity or obscurity. *Fairness* is something desirable and inviting; *clearness* is an absolute requisite, it cannot be dispensed with.

His *fair* large front, and eyes sublime, declar'd
Absolute rule.—MILTON.

I thither went
With unexperienced thought, and laid me down
On the green bank, to look into the *clear*
Smooth lake.—MILTON.

Fair, Honest, Equitable, Reasonable.

Fair, *v. Fair*, clear.¹

Honest, in Latin *honestus*, comes from *honor* honour.

Equitable, signifies having *equity*, or according to *equity*.

Reasonable signifies having *reason*, or according to *reason*.

Fair is said of persons or things; *honest* mostly characterizes the person, either, as to his conduct or his principle. When *fair* and *honest* are both applied to the external conduct the former expresses more than the latter: a man may be *honest* without being *fair*; he cannot be *fair* without being *honest*. *Fairness* enters into every minute circumstance connected with the interests of the parties, and weighs them alike for both; *honesty* is contented with a literal conformity to the law, it consults the interest of one party; the *fair* dealer looks to his neighbour as well as himself, he wishes only for an equal share of advantage; a man may be an *honest* dealer while he looks to no one's advantage but his own: the *fair* man always acts from a principle of right; the *honest* man may be so from a motive of fear.

When these epithets are employed to characterize the man generally, *fairness* expresses less than *honesty*; the former is employed only in regard to commercial transactions or minor personal concerns; the latter ranks among the first moral virtues, and elevates a

man high above his fellow creatures. A man is *fair* who is ready to allow his competitor the same advantages as he enjoys himself in every matter however trivial: or he is *honest* in all his looks, words, and actions: neither his tongue nor his countenance ever belie his heart. A *fair* man makes himself acceptable.

"An *honest* man's the noblest work of God."

When *fair* is employed as an epithet to qualify things, or to designate their nature, it approaches very near in signification to *equitable* and *reasonable*; they are all opposed to what is unjust: *fair* and *equitable* suppose two objects put in collision; *reasonable* is employed abstractedly; what is *fair* and *equitable* is so in relation to all circumstances; what is *reasonable* is so of itself. An estimate is *fair* in which profit and loss, merit and demerit, with every collateral circumstance is duly weighed: a judgement is *equitable* which decides suitably and advantageously for both parties; a price is *reasonable* which does not exceed the limits of reason or propriety. A decision may be either *fair* or *equitable*; but the former is said mostly in regard to trifling matters, even in our games and amusements, and the latter in regard to the important rights of mankind. It is the business of the umpire to decide *fairly* between the combatants or the competitors for a prize; it is the business of the judge to decide *equitably* between men whose property is at issue.

A demand, a charge, a proposition, or an offer, may be said to be either *fair* or *reasonable*: but the former term always bears a relation to what is right between man and man; the latter to what is right in itself according to circumstances.

If the worldling prefer those means which are the *fairest*, it is not because they are *fair*, but because they seem to him most likely to prove successful.—BLAIR.

Should he at length, so truly good and great,
Prevail, and rule with *honest* views the state,
Then must he toil for an ungrateful race,
Submit to clamour, libels, and disgrace.—JENYNS.

A man is very unlikely to judge *equitably* when his passions are agitated by a sense of wrong.—JOHNSON.

The *reasonableness* of a test is not hard to be proved.—JOHNSON.

Faith, v. Belief.

Faith, Creed.

Faith (*v. Belief*) denotes either the principle of trusting, or the thing trusted.

Creed, from the Latin *credo* to believe, denotes the thing believed.

These words are synonymous when taken for the thing trusted in or believed; but they differ in this, that *faith* has always a reference to the principle in the mind; *creed* only respects the thing which is the object of *faith*: the former is likewise taken generally and indefinitely; the latter particularly and definitely, signifying a set form: hence we say to be of the same *faith*, or to adopt the same *creed*. The holy martyrs died for the *faith*, as it is in Christ Jesus; every established form of religion will have its peculiar *creed*. The Church of England has adopted that *creed*

which it considers as containing the purest principles of Christian *faith*.

St. Paul affirms, that a sinner is at first justified and received into the favour of God, by sincere profession of the Christian *faith*.—TILLOTSON.

Supposing all the great points of atheism were formed into a kind of *creed*, I would fain ask whether it would not require an infinitely greater measure of *faith* than any set of articles which they so violently oppose?—ADDISON.

Faith, Fidelity.

Though derived from the same source (*v. Belief*), they differ widely in meaning: **Faith** here denotes a mode of action, namely, an acting true to the *faith* which others repose in us; **Fidelity**, a disposition of the mind to adhere to that *faith* which others repose in us. We keep our *faith*, we show our *fidelity*.

Faith is a public concern, it depends on promises; *fidelity* is a private or personal concern, it depends upon relationships and connexions. A breach of *faith* is a crime that brings a stain on a nation, for *faith* ought to be kept even with an enemy. A breach of *fidelity* attaches disgrace to the individual; for *fidelity* is due from a subject to a prince, or from a servant to his master, or from married people one to another. No treaty can be made with him who will keep no *faith*; no confidence can be placed in him who discovers no *fidelity*. The Danes kept no *faith* with the English; fashionable husbands and wives in the present day seem to think there is no *fidelity* due to each other.

The pit resounds with shrieks, a war succeeds
For breach of public *faith*, and unexampled deeds.
DRYDEN.

When one hears of negroes who upon the death of their masters hang themselves upon the next tree, who can forbear admiring their *fidelity*, though it expresses itself in so dreadful a manner?—ADDISON.

Faithful, Trusty.

Faithful signifies full of *faith* or *fidelity* (*v. Faith, fidelity*).

Trusty signifies fit or worthy to be *trusted* (*v. Belief*).

Faithful respects the principle altogether; it is suited to all relations and stations, public and private: *trusty* includes not only the principle, but the mental qualifications in general; it applies to those in whom particular *trust* is to be placed. It is the part of a Christian to be *faithful* to all his engagements; it is a particular excellence in a servant to be *trusty*. *Faithful* is applied in the improper sense to an unconscious *agent*; *trusty* may be applied with equal propriety to things as to persons. We may speak of a *faithful* saying, or a *faithful* picture; a *trusty* sword, or a *trusty* weapon.

What we hear
With weaker passion will affect the heart,
Than when the faithful eye beholds the part.
FRANCIS,

He took the quiver and the *trusty* bow
Athenas used to bear.—DRYDEN

The steeds they left their *trusty* servants hold.
POPE.

Faithless, Unfaithful.

Faithless is mostly employed to denote a breach of *faith*; and **Unfaithful** to mark

the want of fidelity (*v. Faith, fidelity*). The former is positive; the latter is rather negative, implying a deficiency. A prince, a government, a people, or an individual, is said to be *faithless*: a husband, a wife, a servant, or any individual, *unfaithful*. Mettius Sufferius, the Alban Dictator, was *faithless* to the Roman people when he withheld his assistance in the battle, and strove to go over to the enemy: a man is *unfaithful* to his employer, who sees him injured by others without doing his utmost to prevent it. A woman is *faithless* to her husband who breaks the marriage vow; she is *unfaithful* to him when she does not discharge the duties of a wife to the best of her abilities.

The sire of men and monarch of the sky
Th' advice approv'd, and bade Minerva fly,
Dissolve the league, and all her arts employ
To make the breach the *faithless* act of Troy.
POPE.

At length ripe vengeance o'er their head impends,
But Jove himself the *faithless* race defends.—POPE.

If e'er with life I quit the Trojan plain,
If e'er I see my sire and spouse again,
This bow, *unfaithful* to my glorious aims,
Broke by my hand shall feed the blazing flames.
POPE.

Faithless, Perfidious, Treacherous.

Faithless (*v. Faithless*) is the generic term, the rest are specific terms; a breach of good *faith* is expressed by them all, but *faithless* expresses no more: the others include accessory ideas in their signification.

Perfidious, in Latin *perfidiosus*, signifies literally breaking through faith in a great degree, and now implies the addition of hostility to the breach of *faith*.

Treacherous, most probably changed from *traitorous*, comes from the Latin *trado* to betray, and signifies one species of active hostile breach of *faith*.

A *faithless* man is *faithless* only for his own interest; a *perfidious* man is expressly so to the injury of another. A friend is *faithless* who consults his own safety in time of need; he is *perfidious* if he profits by the confidence reposed in him to plot mischief against the one to whom he has made vows of friendship. *Faithlessness* does not suppose any particular efforts to deceive; it consists of merely violating that *faith* which the relation produces; *perfidy* is never so complete as when it has most effectually assumed the mask of sincerity. Whoever deserts his friend in need is guilty of *faithlessness*: but he is guilty of *perfidy* who draws from him every secret in order to effect his ruin.

Inkle was not only a *faithless* but a *perfidious* lover. *Faithlessness*, though a serious offence, is unhappily not unfrequent; there are too many men who are unmindful of their most important engagements; but we may hope for the honour of humanity, that there are not many instances of *perfidy*, a vice which exceeds every other in atrocity, as it makes virtue itself subservient to its own base purposes.

Perfidy may lie in the will to do; *treachery* lies altogether in the thing done; one may therefore be *perfidious* without being *treacherous*. A friend is *perfidious* whenever he

evinces his *perfidy*; but he is said to be *treacherous* only in the particular instance in which he betrays the confidence and interests of another. I detect a man's *perfidy*, or his *perfidious* aims, by the manner in which he attempts to draw my secrets from me; I am made acquainted with his *treachery* not before I discover that my confidence is betrayed and my secrets are divulged. On the other hand we may be *treacherous* without being *perfidious*. *Perfidy* is an offence mostly between individuals; it is rather a breach of fidelity (*v. Faith, fidelity*) than of faith; *treachery* on the other hand includes breaches of private or public faith. A servant may be both *perfidious* and *treacherous* to his master; a citizen may be *treacherous*, but not *perfidious* towards his country.

It is said that in the South Sea Islands, when a chief wants a human victim, their officers will sometimes invite their friends or relations to come to them, when they take the opportunity of suddenly falling upon them and dispatching them: here is *perfidy* in the individual who acts this false part; and *treachery* in the act of betraying him who is murdered. When the schoolmaster of Falerii delivered his scholars to Camillus, he was guilty of *treachery* in the act, and of *perfidy* towards those who had reposed confidence in him. When Romulus ordered the Sabine women to be seized, it was an act of *treachery*, but not of *perfidy*; so in like manner, when the daughter of Tarpeius opened the gates of the Roman citadel to the enemy.

Old Priam, fearful of the war's event,
This hapless Polydore to Thracia sent.
From noise and tumults, and destructive war,
Committed to the *faithless* tyrant's care.—DRYDEN.

When a friend is turned into an enemy, the world is just enough to accuse the *perfidiousness* of the friend, rather than the indiscretion of the person who confided in him.—ADDISON.

Shall then the Grecians fly, oh dire disgrace!
And leave unpunish'd this *perfidious* race!—POPE.

And had not Heav'n in the fall of Troy design'd,
Enough was said and done t' inspire a better mind;
Then had our lances pierc'd the *treach'rous* wood,
And Ilium towers, and Priam's empire, stood.
DRYDEN.

Fall, Downfall, Ruin.

Fall and Downfall, from the German *fallen*, has the same derivation as *fail* (*v. To fail*).

Ruin, *v. Destruction*.

Whether applied to physical objects or the condition of persons, *fall* expresses less than *downfall*, and this less than *ruin*. *Fall* applies to that which is erect: *downfall* to that which is elevated: everything which is set up, although as trifling as a stick, may have a *fall*; but we speak of the *downfall* of the loftiest trees or the tallest spires. A *fall* may be attended with more or less mischief, or even with none at all; but *downfall* and *ruin* are accompanied with the dissolution of the bodies that *fall*. The higher a body is raised, and the greater the art that is employed in the structure, the completer the *downfall*; the greater the structure the more extended the *ruin*. In the figurative application we may speak of the *fall* of man from a state of

innocence, a state of ease, or a state of prosperity, or his *downfall* from greatness or high rank. He may recover from his *fall*, but his *downfall* is commonly followed by the entire ruin of his concerns, and often of himself. The *fall* of kingdoms, and the *downfall* of empires, must always be succeeded by their ruin as an inevitable result.

The fall of kings.

The rage of nations, and the crush of states,
Move not the man, who, from the world escap'd,
To nature's voice attends.—ADDISON.

Histories of the *downfall* of empires are read with tranquillity.—JOHNSON.

Old age seizes upon an ill-spent youth like fire upon a rotten house; it was rotten before, and must have *fallen* of itself; so that is no more than one *ruin* preventing another.—SOUTH.

To Fall, Drop, Droop, Sink, Tumble.

Fall, *v. Fall*.

Drop and **Droop**, in German *A tropfen*, low German, &c. *druppen*, is an onomatopoeia of the falling of a drop.

Sink, in German *senken*, is an intensive of *siegen* to incline downward.

Tumble, in German *tummeln*, is an intensive of *tauern* to reel backwards and forwards.

Fall is the generic, the rest specific terms: to *drop* is to *fall* suddenly, and mostly in the form of a drop; to *droop* is to *drop* in part; to *sink* is to *fall* gradually; to *tumble* is to *fall* awkwardly or contrary to the usual mode. In cataraets the water *falls* perpetually and in a mass; in rain it *drops* partially; in ponds the water *sinks* low. The head *droops*, but the body may *fall* or *drop* from a height, it may *sink* down to the earth, it may *tumble* by accident.

Fall, *drop*, and *sink*, are employed in a moral sense; *drop* in the physical sense. A person *falls* from a state of prosperity; words *drop* from the lips, and *sink* into the heart. Corn, or the price of corn, *falls*; a subject *drops*; a person *sinks* into poverty or in the estimation of the world.

Yet come it will, the day decreed by fates,
(How my heart trembles, while my tongue relates!)
The day when thou, imperial Troy! must bend,
And see thy warriors *fall* and glories end.—POPE.
The wounded bird, ere yet she breathed her last,
With flagging wings alighted on the mast,
A moment hung, and spread her pinions there.
Then sudden *dropt* and left her life in air.—POPE.
Thrice Dido tried to raise her *drooping* head,
And fainting, thrice *fell* growling on the bed.
DRYDEN.

Down *sunk* the priest; the purple hand of death
Clos'd his dim eye, and fate suppress'd his breath.
POPE.

Full on his ancle *dropt* the pond'rous stone,
Burst the strong nerves, and crush'd the solid bone,
Supine he *tumbles* on the crimson'd sands.—POPE.

To Fall Short, *v. To fail*.

Fallacious, Deceitful, Fraudulent.

Fallacious comes from the Latin *fallax* and *fallo* to deceive, signifying the property of misleading.

Deceitful, *v. To deceive*.

Fraudulent signifies after the manner of a fraud.

The *fallacious* has respect to falsehood in opinion; *deceitful* to that which is externally false: our hopes are often *fallacious*; the appearances of things are often *deceitful*. *Fallacious*, as characteristic of the mind, excludes the idea of design; *deceitful* excludes the idea of mistake; *fraudulent* is a gross species of the *deceitful*. It is a *fallacious* idea for any one to imagine that the faults of others can serve as any extenuation of his own; it is a *deceitful* mode of acting for any one to advise another to do that which he would not do himself; it is *fraudulent* to attempt to get money by means of a falsehood.

But when Ulysses, with *fallacious* arts,
Had made impression on the people's hearts,
And forg'd a treason in my patron's name,
My kinsman fell.—DRYDEN.

Such is the power which the sophistry of self-love exercises over us, that almost every one may be imagined to measure himself by a *deceitful* scale.—BLAIR.

Ill-fated Paris! slave to woman-kind,
As smooth of face as *fraudulent* of mind.—POPE.

Fallacy, Delusion, Illusion.

A **Fallacy** (*v. Fallacious*) is commonly the act of some conscious agent, and includes an intention to deceive; a **Delusion** (*v. To deceive*) and **Illusion** may be the work of inanimate objects. We endeavour to detect the *fallacy* which lies concealed in a proposition: we endeavour to remove the *delusion* to which the judgement has been exposed; and to dissipate the *illusion* to which the senses or fancy are liable.

In all the reasonings of freethinkers there are *fallacies* against which a man cannot always be on his guard. The ignorant are perpetually exposed to *delusions* when they attempt to speculate on matters of opinion; amongst the most serious of these *delusions* we may reckon that of substituting their own feelings for the operations of Divine grace. The ideas of ghosts and apparitions are mostly attributable to the *illusions* of the senses and the imagination.

There is indeed no transaction which offers stronger temptations to *fallacy* and sophistication than epistolary intercourse.—JOHNSON.

As when a wandering fire,
Hovering and blazing with *delusive* light,
Misleads th' amazed night-wanderer from his way.
MILTON.

Fame, glory, wealth, honour, have in the prospect pleasing *illusions*.—STEELE.

Falsehood, *v. Fiction*.

Falsehood, *v. Untruth*.

Falsity, *v. Untruth*.

To Falter, *v. To hesitate*.

Fame, Reputation, Renown.

Fame (from the Greek *φημι* to say) is the most noisy and uncertain; it rests upon report: **Reputation** (*v. Character, reputation*) is silent and solid; it lies more in the thoughts, and is derived from observation.

Renown, in French *renommée*, from *nom* a name, signifies the reverberation of a name; it is as loud as *fame*, but more substantial and better founded: hence we say that a person's

fame is gone abroad; his *reputation* is established; and he has got *renown*.

Fame may be applied to any object, good, bad, or indifferent; *reputation* is applied only to real eminence in some department; *renown* is employed only for extraordinary men and brilliant exploits. The *fame* of a quack may be spread among the ignorant multitude by means of a lucky cure; the *reputation* of a physician rests upon his tried skill and known experience; the *renown* of a general is proportioned to the magnitude of his achievements.

Europe with Africa in his *fame* shall join,
But neither shore his conquests shall confine.
DRYDEN.

Pope doubtless approached Addison, when the *reputation* of their wit first brought them together, with the respect due to a man whose abilities were acknowledged.
—JOHNSON.

Well-constituted governments have always made the profession of a physician both honourable and advantageous. Homer's Machaon and Virgil's Iapetus were men of *renown*, heroes in war.—JOHNSON.

The artist finds greater returns in profit, as the author in *fame*.—ADDISON.

How doth it please and fill the memory
With deeds of brave *renown*, while on each hand
Historic urns and breathing statues rise,
And speaking busts.—DYER.

Fame, Report, Rumour, Hearsay.

Fame (v. *Fame*) has a reference to the thing which gives birth to it; it goes about of itself without any apparent instrumentality. *Report* (from *re* and *porto* to carry back, or away from an object) has always a reference to the *reporter*. *Rumour*, in Latin *rumor* from *ruo* to rush or to flow, has a reference to the flying nature of words that are carried; it is therefore properly a dying *report*. *Hearsay* refers to the receiver of that which is said: it is limited therefore to a small number of speakers, or reporters. *Fame* serves to form or establish a character either of a person or a thing; it will be good or bad according to circumstances; the *fame* of our Saviour's miracles went abroad through the land; a *report* serves to communicate information of events; it may be more or less correct according to the veracity or authenticity of the *reporter*; *reports* of victories mostly precede the official confirmation: a *rumour* serves the purposes of fiction; it is more or less vague, according to the temper of the times and the nature of the events; every battle gives rise to a thousand *rumours*: the *hearsay* serves for information or instruction, and is seldom so incorrect as it is *familiar*.

Space may produce new worlds, whereof so rife,
There went a *fame* in heav'n, that he ere long
Intended to create.—MILTON.

What liberties any man may take in imputing words to me which I never spoke, and what credit Cæsar may give to such *reports*, these are points for which it is by no means in my power to be answerable.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

For which of you will stop
The vent of hearing, when loud *rumour*
Speaks?—SHAKESPEARE.

What influence can a mother have over a daughter, from whose example the daughter can only have *hearsay* benefits?—RICHARDSON.

Familiar, v. Conversant.

Familiar, v. Free.

Familiarity, v. Acquaintance.

Family, House, Lineage, Race.

Divisions of men, according to some rule of relationship or connexion, is the common idea in these terms.

Family is the most general in its import, from the Latin *familia* a family, *famulus* a servant, in Greek *oikia* an assembly, and the Hebrew *omel* to labour; it is applicable to those who are bound together upon the principle of dependance.

House figuratively denotes those who live in the same house, and is commonly extended in its signification to all that passes under the same roof; hence we rather say that a woman manages her *family*; that a man rules his *house*. The *family* is considered as to its relationships; the number, union, condition and quality of its members: the *house* is considered more as to what is transacted within its walls. We speak of a numerous *family*, a united or affectionate *family*, a mercantile *house*, and the *house* (meaning the members of the *house* of parliament). If a man cannot find happiness in the bosom of his *family*, he will seek for it in vain elsewhere: the credit of a *house* is to be kept up only by prompt payments.

In an extended application of these words they are made to designate the quality of the individual, in which case *family* bears the same familiar and indiscriminate sense as before: *house* is employed as a term of grandeur. *When we consider the *family* in its domestic relations, in its habits, manners, connexions, and circumstances, we speak of a genteel *family*, a respectable *family*, the royal *family*: but when we consider it with regard to its political and civil distinctions, its titles and its power, then we denominate it a *house*, as an illustrious *house*: the *house* of Bourbon, of Brunswick, or of Hanover; the imperial *house* of Austria. Any subject may belong to an ancient or noble *family*: princes are said to be descended from ancient *houses*. A man is said to be of *family* or of no *family*: we may say likewise that he is of a certain *house*; but to say that he is of no *house* would be superfluous.† In republics there are *families* but not *houses*, because there is no nobility; in China likewise, where the private virtues only distinguish the individual or his *family*, the term *house* is altogether inapplicable.

To live in a *family* where there is but one heart and as many good strong heads as persons, and to have a place in that enlarged single heart, is such a state of happiness as I cannot hear of without feeling the utmost pleasure.—FIELDING.

An empty man of a great *family* is a creature that is scarce conversible.—ADDISON.

The princes of the *house* of Tudor, partly by the vigour of their administration, partly by the concurrence of favorable circumstances, had been able to establish a more regular system of government.—HUME.

Family includes in it every circumstance of connexion and relationship; *Lineage* respects only consanguinity: *family* is employed mostly for those who are coeval; *lineage* is generally used for those who have gone before. When the Athenian general Iphicrates, son of a shoemaker, was reproached by Harmodius

* Vide Abbé Girard; "Famille, maison."

† Abbé Roubaud; "Race, lineage, famille, maison."

with his birth, he said, I had rather be the first than the last of my *family*: David was of the lineage of Abraham, and our Saviour was of the lineage of David.

Race, from the Latin *radix* a root, denotes the origin or that which constitutes their original point of resemblance. A *family* supposes the closest alliance; a *race* supposes no closer connexion than what a common property creates. *Family* is confined to a comparatively small number; *race* is a term of extensive import, including all mankind, as the human *race*; or particular nations, as the *race* of South-sea islanders: or a particular *family*, as the *race* of the Heraclides: from Hercules sprang a *race* of heroes.

A nation properly signifies a great number of *families* derived from the same blood, born in the same country, and living under the same government and civil constitutions.—TEMPLE.

We want not cities, nor Sicilian coasts,
Where king Acestes Trojan lineage boasts.
DRYDEN.

Nor knows our youth of noblest race,
To mount the manag'd steed or urge the chace;
More skill'd in the mean arts of vice,
The whirling troque or law-forbidden dice.
FRANCIS.

Famous, Celebrated, Renowned, Illustrious.

Famous signifies literally having *fame* or the cause of *fame*: it is applicable to that which causes a noise or sensation; to that which is talked of, written upon, discussed, and thought of; to that which is reported of far and near; to that which is circulated among all ranks and orders of men.

Celebrated signifies literally kept in the memory by a *celebration* or memorial, and is applicable to that which is praised and honoured with solemnity.

Renowned signifies literally possessed of a name, and is applicable to whatever extends the name, or causes the name to be often repeated.

Illustrious signifies literally what has or gives a lustre: it is applicable to whatever confers dignity.

Famous is a term of indefinite import; it conveys of itself frequently neither honour nor dishonour, since it is employed indifferently as an epithet for things praiseworthy or otherwise; it is the only one of these terms which may be used in a bad sense. The others rise in a gradually good sense.

* The *celebrated* is founded upon merit and the display of talent in the arts and sciences; it gains the subject respect: the *renowned* is founded upon the possession of rare or extraordinary qualities, upon successful exertions and an accordance with public opinion; it brings great honour or glory to the subject: the *illustrious* is founded upon those solid qualities which not only render one known but distinguished; it ensures regard and veneration.

A person may be *famous* for his eccentricities; *celebrated* as an artist, a writer, or a player; *renowned* as a warrior or a statesman;

* Vide Abbé Girard; "Fameux, illustre, celebre, renommé."

illustrious as a prince, a statesman, or a senator.

The maid of Orleans, who was decried by the English, and idolized by the French, is equally *famous* in both nations. There are *celebrated* authors whom to censure even in that which is censurable, would endanger one's reputation. The *renowned* heroes of antiquity have, by the perusal of their exploits, given birth to a race of modern heroes not inferior to themselves. Princes may shine in their life-time, but they cannot render themselves *illustrious* to posterity except by the monuments of goodness and wisdom which they leave after them.

I thought it an agreeable change to have my thoughts diverted from the greatest among the dead and fabulous heroes, to the most *famous* among the real and living.—ADDISON.

Whilst I was in this learned body I applied myself with no much diligence to my studies, that there are very few *celebrated* books either in the learned or modern tongues which I am not acquainted with.—ADDISON.

Castor and Pollux first in martial force,
One bold on foot, and one renown'd for horse.
POPE.

The reliefs of the envious man are those little blemishes that discover themselves in an *illustrious* character.—ADDISON.

Fanatic, v. Enthusiast.

Fanciful, Fantastical, Whimsical, Capricious.

Fanciful signifies full of *fancy* (*v. Conceit*).

Fantastical signifies belonging to the phantasy, which is the immediate derivative from the Greek.

Whimsical signifies either like a whim, or having a whim.

Capricious signifies having *caprice*.

Fanciful and *fantastical* are both employed for persons and things; *whimsical* and *caprice* is mostly employed for persons, or what is personal. *Fanciful*, in regard to persons, is said of that which is irregular in the taste or judgement; *fantastical* is said of that which violates all propriety, as well as regularity: the former may consist of a simple deviation from rule; the latter is something extravagant. A person may, therefore, sometimes be advantageously *fanciful*, although he can never be *fantastical* but to his discredit. Lively minds will be *fanciful* in the choice of their dress, furniture, or equipage: the affectation of singularity frequently renders people *fantastical* in their manners as well as their dress.

Fanciful is said mostly in regard to errors of opinion or taste; it springs from an aberration of the mind: *whimsical* is a species of the *fanciful* in regard to one's likes or dislikes: *capricious* respects errors of temper or irregularities of feeling. The *fanciful* does not necessarily imply instability, but the *capricious* excludes the idea of fixedness. One is *fanciful* by attaching a reality to that which only passes in one's own mind; one is *whimsical* in the inventions of the *fancy*; one is *capricious* by acting and judging without rule or reason in that which admits of both. A person discovers himself to be *fanciful* who makes difficulties and objections which have no foundation in the external objects, but in

his own mind; he discovers himself to be *capricious* when he likes and dislikes the same thing in quick succession; he discovers himself to be *whimsical* who falls upon unaccountable modes, and imagines unaccountable things. Sick persons are apt to be *fanciful* in their food; females, whose minds are not well disciplined, are apt to be *capricious*; the English have the character of being a *whimsical* nation. In application to things, the terms *fanciful* and *fantastical* preserve a similar distinction; what is *fanciful* may be the real and just combination of a well regulated *fancy*, or the unreal combination of a dis-tempered *fancy*: the *fantastical* is not only the unreal, but the distorted combination of a disordered *fancy*. In sculpture or painting drapery may be *fancifully* disposed: the airiness and showiness which would not be becoming even in the dress of a young female would be *fantastical* in that of an old woman.

There is something very sublime, though very *fanciful*, in Plato's description of the Supreme Being, that, "truth is his body, and light his shadow."—ADDISON.

The English are naturally *fanciful*.—ADDISON.

Methinks heroic poetry, till now,
Like some *fantastic* fairy land did show.
COWLEY.

'Tis this exalted power, whose business lies
In nonsense and impossibilities:
This made a *whimsical* philosopher
Before the spacious world a tub prefer.
ROB' HESTER.

Many of the pretended friendships of youth are founded on *capricious* liking.—BLAIR.

Fancy, v. Conceit.

Fancy, Imagination.

From what has already been said on **Fancy** (*v. Conceit and fanciful*) the distinction between it and **Imagination**, as operations of thought, will be obvious. *Fancy*, considered as a power, simply brings the object to the mind, or makes it appear; but *imagination*, from *image*, in Latin *imago*, or *imitatio*, or *imitatio*, is the power which presents the images or likenesses of things. The *fancy*, therefore, only employs itself about things without regarding their nature; but the *imagination* aims at tracing a resemblance, and getting a true copy. The *fancy* consequently forms combinations, either real or unreal, as chance may direct; but the *imagination* is seldom led astray. The *fancy* is busy in dreams, or when the mind is in a disordered state; but the *imagination* is supposed to act when the intellectual powers are in full play. The *fancy* is employed on light and trivial objects, which are present to the senses; the *imagination* soars above all vulgar objects, and carries us from the world of matter into the world of spirits, from time present to the time to come. A milliner or mantua-maker may employ her *fancy* in the decorations of a cap or gown; but the poet's *imagination* depicts every thing grand, every thing bold, and every thing remote.

Although Mr. Addison has thought proper, for his convenience, to use the words *fancy* and *imagination* promiscuously when writing on this subject, yet the distinction, as above pointed out, has been observed both in familiar discourse and in writing. We say that

we *fancy*, not that we *imagine*, that we see or hear something; the pleasures of the *imagination*, not of the *fancy*.

There was a certain lady of thin airy shape, who was very active in this solemnity; her name was *Fancy*.—ADDISON.

And as *imagination* bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shape.—SHAKESPEARE.

Philosophy! I say, and call it He;
For whatso'er the painter's *fancy* be,
It a male virtue seems to me.—COWLEY.

Whatever be his subject, Milton never fails to fill the *imagination*.—JOHNSON.

Eager he rises, and in *fancy* hears
The voice celestial murmuring in his ears.—POPE.

Grief has a natural eloquence belonging to it, and breaks out in more moving sentiments than can be supplied by the finest *imagination*.—ADDISON.

Does airy *fancy* cheat
My mind, well pleas'd with the deceit?—CREECH.

There are forms which naturally create respect in the beholders, and at once inflame and chasten the *imagination*.—STEELE.

Fantastical, v. Fanciful.

Far, v. Distant.

Fare, Provision.

Fare, from the German *fahren* to go or be, signifies in general the condition or thing that comes to one.

Provision, from *provide*, signifies the thing provided for one.

These terms are alike employed for the ordinary concerns of life, and may either be used in the limited sense for the food one procures, or in general for whatever necessary or convenience is procured; to the term *fare* is annexed the idea of accident; *provision* includes that of design: a traveller on the continent must frequently be contented with humble *fare*, unless he has the precaution of carrying his *provisions* with him.

This night at least with me forget your care,
Cheesnuts, and curds, and cream, shall be your *fare*.
DRYDEN.

The winged nation wanders through the skies,
And o'er the plains and shady forest flies;
They breed, they brood, instruct, and educate,
And make *provision* for the future state.—DRYDEN.

Farmer, Husbandman, Agriculturist.

Farmer, from the Saxon *feorm* food, signifies one managing a *farm*, or cultivating the ground for a subsistence: **Husbandman** is one following *husbandry*, that is, the tillage of land by manual labour; the *farmer*, therefore, conducts the concern, and the *husbandman* labours under his direction: **Agriculturist**, from the Latin *ager* a field, and *colo* to till, signifies any one engaged in the art of cultivation. The *farmer* is always a practitioner; the *agriculturist* may be a mere theorist: the *farmer* follows husbandry solely as a means of living; the *agriculturist* follows it as a science: the former tills the land upon given admitted principles; the latter frames new principles, or alters those that are established. Betwixt the *farmer* and the *agriculturist* there is the same difference as between practice and theory: the former may be assisted by the latter, so long as they can go hand in hand; but in the case of a collision, the *farmer* will

be of more service to himself and his country than the *agriculturist*: *farming* brings immediate profit from personal service; *agriculture* may only promise future, and consequently contingent advantages.

To check this plague, the skilful *farmer* chaff
And blazing straw before his orchard burns.
THOMSON.

An improved and improving *agriculture*, which implies
a great augmentation of labour, has not yet found itself
at a stand.—BURKE.

Old Husbandmen I at Sabinum know,
Who, for another year, dig, plough, and sow.
DENHAM.

To Fascinate, *v.* To charm.

Fashion, *v.* Custom

Of Fashion, of Quality, of Distinction.

These epithets are employed promiscuously in colloquial discourse; but not with strict propriety: * by men of *fashion* are understood such men as live in the *fashionable* world, and keep the best company; by men of *quality* are understood men of rank or title; by men of *distinction* are understood men of honourable superiority, whether by wealth, office, or pre-eminence in society.

Gentry and merchants, though not men of *quality*, may, by their mode of living, be men of *fashion*; and by the office they hold in the state, they may likewise be men of *distinction*.

The free manner in which people of *fashion* are discoursed on at such meetings (of tradespeople) is but a just reproach of their failures in this kind (in payment).—STEELE.

The fine dress of a lady of *quality* is often the product of an hundred climes.—ADDISON.

It behoves men of *distinction*, with their power and example, to preside over the public diversions in such a manner as to check anything that tends to the corruption of manners.—STEELE.

To Fashion, *v.* To form.

Fast, *v.* Abstinence.

To Fasten, *v.* To fix.

Fastidious, Squeamish.

Fastidious, in Latin *fastidiosus* from *fastus* pride, signifies proudly nice, not easily pleased: *Squeamish*, changed from *qualmish* or weak-stomached, signifies, in the moral sense, foolishly sickly, easily disgusted.

A female is *fastidious* when she criticizes the dress or manners of her rival; she is *squeamish* in the choice of her own dress, company, words, &c. Whoever examines his own imperfections will cease to be *fastidious*; whoever restrains humour and caprice will cease to be *squeamish*.

The perception as well as the senses may be improved to our own disgust; and we may by diligent cultivation of the powers of dislike raise in time an artificial *fastidiousness*.—JOHNSON.

Were the fates more kind
Our narrow luxuries would soon grow stale;
Were these exhaustless, nature would grow sick
And, cloy'd with pleasure, *squeamishly* complain
That all is vanity, and life a dream.—ARMSTRONG.

Fatal, *v.* Deadly.

Fate, *v.* Destiny.

Fatigue, Weariness, Lassitude.

Fatigue, from the Latin *fatigo*, that is, *fatim* abundantly or powerfully, and *ago* to act, or *agito* to agitate, designates an effect from a powerful or stimulating cause.

Weariness, from *weary*, a frequentative of *wear*, marks an effect from a continued or repeated cause.

Lassitude, from the Latin *lassus*, changed from *laxus* relaxed, marks a state without specifying a cause.

Fatigue is an exhaustion of the animal or mental powers; *weariness* is a wearing out the strength, or breaking the spirits; *lassitude* is a general relaxation of the animal frame: the labourer experiences *fatigue* from the toils of the day; the man of business, who is harassed by the multiplicity and complexity of his concerns, suffers *fatigue*; and the student, who labours to fit himself for a public exhibition of his acquisitions, is in like manner exposed to *fatigue*: *weariness* attends the traveller who takes a long or pathless journey; *weariness* is the lot of the petitioner, who attends in the anti-chamber of a great man; the critic is doomed to suffer *weariness*, who is obliged to drag through the shallow but voluminous writings of a dull author; and the enlightened hearer will suffer no less *weariness* in listening to the absurd effusions of an extemporaneous preacher.

Lassitude is the consequence of a distempered system, sometimes brought on by an excess of *fatigue*, sometimes by sickness, and frequently by the action of the external air.

One of the amusements of idleness is reading without the *fatigue* of close attention.—JOHNSON.

For want of a process of events, neither knowledge nor elegance preserve the reader from *weariness*.—JOHNSON.

The cattle in the fields show evident symptoms of *lassitude* and disgust in an unpleasant season.—COWPER.

Favour, *v.* Benefit.

Favour, *v.* Credit.

Favour, *v.* Grace.

Favourable, Propitious.

In a former paragraph (*v.* *Auspicious*) I have shown *propitious* to be a species of the *favourable*, namely, the *favourable* as it springs from the design of an agent; what is *propitious*, therefore, is always *favourable*, but not *vice versa*: the *favourable* properly characterizes both persons and things; the *propitious* in the proper sense, characterizes the person only: as applied to persons, an equal may be *favourable*; a superior only is *propitious*: the one may be *favourable* only in inclination; the latter is *favourable* also in granting timely assistance. Cato was *favourable* to Pompey; the gods were *propitious* to the Greeks: we may all wish to have our friends *favourable* to our projects; none but heathens expect to have a blind destiny *propitious*. In the improper sense, *propitious* may be applied to things with a similar distinction: whatever is well-disposed to us, and secures our endeavours, or serves our purpose, is *favourable*; whatever efficaciously protects us, speeds our exertions, and decides our success, is *pro-*

* Vide Trusler: "Of Fashion, Of Quality, Of Distinction."

pitious to us : on ordinary occasions, a wind is said to be *favourable* which carries us to the end of our voyage ; but it is said to be *propitious* if the rapidity of our passage forwards any great purpose of our own.

You have indeed every *favourable* circumstance for your advancement that can be wished.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

But ah ! what use of valour can be made,
When Heaven's *propitious* powers refuse their aid.
DRYDEN.

Fault, *v. Blemish.*

Faulty, *v. Error.*

Faulty, *v. Culpable.*

To Fawn, *v. To coax.*

Faalty, *v. Homage.*

To Fear, *v. To apprehend.*

Fearful, *v. Afraid.*

Fearless, *v. Bold.*

Fearful, Dreadful, Frightful, Tremendous, Terrible, Terrific, Horrible, Horrid.

Fearful here signifies full of that which causes *fear* (*v. Alarm*) : **Dreadful**, full of what causes *dread* (*v. Apprehension*) ; **Frightful**, full of what causes *fright* (*v. Afraid*) or *apprehension* ; **Tremendous**, that which causes *trembling* ; **Terrible**, or **Terrific**, causing *terror* (*v. Alarm*) ; **Horrible**, or **Horrid**, causing *horror*. The application of these terms is easily to be discovered by these definitions : the first two affect the mind more than the senses ; all the others affect the senses more than the mind : a contest is *fearful* when the issue is important, but the event doubtful ; the thought of death is *dreadful* to one who feels himself unprepared. The *frightful* is less than the *tremendous* ; the *tremendous* than the *terrible* ; the *terrible* than the *horrible* : shrieks may be *frightful* ; thunder and lightning may be *tremendous* ; the roaring of a lion is *terrible* ; the glare of his eye *terrific* ; the actual spectacle of killing is *horrible* or *horrid*. In their general application, these terms are often employed promiscuously to characterize whatever produces very strong impressions : hence we may speak of a *frightful*, *dreadful*, *terrible*, or *horrid* dream ; or *frightful*, *dreadful*, or *terrible* tempest ; *dreadful*, *terrible*, or *horrid* consequences.

She wept the terrors of the *fearful* wave,
Too oft, alas ! the wandering lover's grave.—FALCONER.
And dar'st thou threat to snatch my prize away,
Due to the deeds of many a *dreadful* day.—POPE.

Frightful convulsions writh'd his tortur'd limbs.
FENTON.

Out of the limb of the murdered monarchy has arisen
A vast, *tremendous*, unformed spectre, in a far more *terrible*
guise than any which ever yet overpowered the
imagination of man.—BURKE.

Deck'd in sad triumph for the mournful field,
O'er her broad shoulders hangs his *horrid* shield.
POPE.

Feasible, *v. Colorable.*

Feast, Banquet, Carousal, Entertainment, Treat.

As Feasts, in the religious sense, from *festus*, are always days of leisure, and fre-

quently of public rejoicing, this word has been applied to any social meal for the purposes of pleasure : this is the idea common to the signification of all these words, of which *feast* seems to be the most general ; and for all of which it may frequently be substituted, although they have each a distinct application : *feast* conveys the idea merely of enjoyment ; **Banquet** is a splendid *feast*, attended with pomp and state ; it is a term of noble use, particularly adapted to poetry and the high style : **Carousal**, in French *carrouse*, in German *gerüsch* or *rausch* intoxication, from *rauschen* to intoxicate, is a drunken *feast* : **Entertainment** and **Treat** convey the idea of hospitality.

A *feast* may be given by princes or their subjects, by nobility or commonalty : the *banquet* is confined to men of high estate ; and more commonly spoken of in former times, when ranks and distinctions were less blended than they are at present : the dinner which the Lord Mayor of London annually gives is properly denominated a *feast* ; the mode in which Cardinal Wolsey received the French ambassadors might entitle every meal he gave to be denominated a *banquet*. A *feast* supposes indulgence of the appetite, both in eating and drinking, but not intemperately ; a *carousal* is confined mostly to drinking, and that to an excess : a *feast*, therefore, is always a good thing, unless it ends in a *carousal* : a *feast* may be given by one or many, at private or public expense ; but an *entertainment* and a *treat* are altogether personal acts, and the terms are never used but in relation to the agents : every *entertainment* is a *feast* as far as respects enjoyment at a social board ; but no *feast* is an *entertainment* unless there be some individual who specifically provides for the *entertainment* of others : we may all be partakers of a *feast*, but we are guests at an *entertainment* : the Lord Mayor's *feast* is not strictly an *entertainment*, although that of Cardinal Wolsey was properly so : an *entertainment* is given between friends and equals, to keep alive the social affections ; a *treat* is given by way of favour to those whom one wishes to oblige : a nobleman provides an *entertainment* for a particular party whom he has invited ; he gives a *treat* to his servants, his tenants, his tradespeople, or the poor of his neighbourhood.

New purple hangings clothe the palace walls,
And sumptuous *feasts* are made in splendid halls.
DRYDEN.

With hymns divine the joyous *banquet* ends,
The psalms lengthen'd till the sun descends.—POPE.

This game, these *carousals* Ascanius taught,
And, building Alba, to the Latins brought.—DRYDEN.

I could not but smile at the account that was yesterday given me of a modest young gentleman, who being invited to an *entertainment*, though he was not used to drink, had not the confidence to refuse his glass in his turn.—ADDISON.

I do not insist that you spread your table with so unbounded a profusion as to furnish out a splendid *treat* with the remains.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

Feast, *entertainment*, and *treat*, are taken in a more extended sense, to express other pleasures besides those of the table : *feast* retains its signification of a vivid pleasure, such as voluptuaries derive from delicious viands ; *entertainment* and *treat* retain the idea of being

granted by way of courtesy: we speak of a thing as being a *feast* or high delight: and of a person contributing to one's *entertainment*, or giving one a *treat*. To an envious man the sight of wretchedness, in a once prosperous rival, is a *feast*: to a benevolent mind the spectacle of an afflicted man relieved and comforted is a *feast*: to a mind ardent in the pursuit of knowledge, an easy access to a well-stocked library is a continual *feast*: men of a happy temper give and receive *entertainment* with equal facility; they afford *entertainment* to their guests by the easy cheerfulness which they impart to everything around them; they in like manner derive *entertainment* from everything they see, or hear, or observe: a *treat* is given or received only on particular occasions; it depends on the relative circumstances and tastes of the giver and receiver; to one of a musical turn one may give a *treat* by inviting him to a musical party; and to one of an intelligent turn it will be equally a *treat* to be of the party which consists of the enlightened and conversable.

Beattie is the only author I know, whose critical and philosophical researches are diversified and embellished by a poetical imagination that makes even the driest subject and the least a *feast* for an epicure in books.—COWPER.

Let us consider to whom we are indebted for all these *entertainments* of sense.—ADDISON.

Sing my praise in strain sublime,
Treat not me with doggrel rhyme.—SWIFT.

Feast, Festival, Holiday.

Feast, in Latin *festum*, or *festus*, changed most probably from *fesce* and *feria*, which latter, in all probability, comes from the Greek *sepa* sacred, because these days were kept sacred or vacant from all secular labour: **Festival** and **Holiday**, as the words themselves denote, have precisely the same meaning in their original sense, with this difference, that the former derives its origin from heathenish superstition, the latter owes its rise to the establishment of Christianity in its reformed state.

A *feast*, in the Christian sense of the word, is applied to every day which is regarded as sacred, and observed with particular solemnity, except Sundays; a *holyday*, or, according to its modern orthography, a *holiday*, is simply a day on which ordinary business is suspended: among the Roman Catholics, there are many days which are kept holy, and consequently by them denominated *feasts*, which in the English reformed church are only observed as *holidays*, or days of exemption from public business; of this description are the Saints' days, on which the public offices are shut: on the other hand, Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide, are regarded in both churches more as *feasts* than as *holidays*.

Feast, as a technical term, is applied only to certain specified *holidays*; a *holiday* is an indefinite term, it may be employed for any day or time in which there is a suspension of business; there are, therefore, many *feasts* where there are no *holidays*, and many *holidays* where there are no *feasts*: a *feast* is altogether sacred; a *holiday* has frequently nothing sacred in it, not even in its cause; it may be a simple, ordinary transaction, the

act of an individual: a *feast* has always either a sacred or a serious object. A *feast* is kept by religious worship; a *holiday* is kept by idleness; a *feast* is kept by mirth and festivity: some *feasts* are *festivals*, as in the case of the carnival at Rome; some *festivals* are *holidays*, as in the case of weddings and public thanksgivings.

First, I provide myself a nimble thing,

To be my page, a variety of crafts;

Next, two new suits for *feasts* and gala days.

CUMBERLAND.

It happen'd on a summer's holiday,

That to the green wood shade he took his way.

DRYDEN.

Many worthy persons urged how great the harmony was between the *holidays* and their attributes (if I may call them so), and what a confusion would follow if Michaelmas-day, for instance, was not to be celebrated when poultry geese are in their highest perfection.—WALPOLE.

In so enlightened an age as the present, I shall perhaps be ridiculed if I hint, as my opinion, that the observation of certain *festivals* is something more than a mere political institution.—WALPOLE.

Feat, v. Deed.

Feeble, v. Weak.

To Feel, Be Sensible, Conscious.

From the simple idea of a sense, the word **Feel** has acquired the most extensive signification and application in our language, and may be employed indifferently for all the other terms, but not in all cases: to *feel* is said of the whole frame, inwardly and outwardly: it is the accompaniment of existence: to **Be Sensible**, from the Latin *sentio*, is said only of the senses. It is the property of all living creatures to *feel* pleasure and pain in a greater or less degree: those creatures which have not the sense of hearing will not be *sensible* of sounds.

In the moral application, to *feel* is peculiarly the property or act of the heart; to be *sensible* is that of the understanding: an ingenious mind *feels* pain when it is *sensible* of having committed an error: one may, however, *feel* as well as be *sensible* by means of the understanding; a person *feels* the value of another's service; is *sensible* of his kindness: one *feels* or is *sensible* of what passes outwardly; one is **Conscious** only of what passes inwardly, from *con* or *cum* and *scio* to know to one's self: we *feel* the force of another's remark; we are *sensible* of the evil which must spring from the practice of vice; we are *conscious* of having fallen short of our duty.

The devout man does not only believe, but *feels* there is a Deity.—ADDISON.

There is, doubtless, a faculty in spirits by which they apprehend one another, as our senses do material objects; and there is no question but our souls, when they are disembodied, will, by this faculty, be always *sensible* of the Divine presence.—ADDISON.

A creature of a more exalted kind

Was wanting yet, and then was man design'd;

Conscious of thought, of more capacious breast,

For empire form'd and fit to rule the rest.—DRYDEN.

Feeling, Sensation, Sense.

Feeling and **Sensation** express either the particular act, or the general property of *feeling*; **Sense** expresses the general property, or the particular mode of *feeling*.

Feeling is, as before said (*v. To feel*), the general, sensation and sense are the special terms: *feeling* is either physical or moral; *sensation* is mostly physical; *sense* physical in the general, and moral in the particular application.

We speak either of the *feeling* or *sensation* of cold, the *feeling* or *sense* of virtue: it is not easy to describe the *feelings* which are excited by the cutting of cork or the sharpening of a saw; the *sensation* which pervades the frame after bathing is exceedingly grateful to one who is accustomed to the water: the pleasures of *sense* are not comparable with those of intellect.

The term *feeling* is most adapted to ordinary discourse; that of *sensation* is better suited to the grave and scientific style: a child may talk of an unpleasant *feeling*; a professional man talks of the *sensation* of giddiness, a gnawing *sensation*, or of *sensations* from the rocking of a vessel, the motion of a carriage, and the like: it is our duty to command and curb our *feelings*: it is folly to watch every passing *sensation*.

The *feeling*, in a moral sense, has its seat in the heart; it is transitory and variable: *sense* has its seat in the understanding; it is permanent and regular. We may have *feelings* of anger, ill-will, envy, and the like, which cannot be too quickly overpowered, and succeeded by those of love, charity, and benevolence; although there is no *feeling*, however good, which does not require to be kept under control by a proper *sense* of religion.

I am sure the natural *feeling* as I have just said, is a far more predominant ingredient in this war than in that of any other that was ever waged by this kingdom.—BURKE.

Those ideas to which any agreeable *sensation* is annexed are easily excited, as leaving behind them the most strong and permanent impressions.—SOMERVILLE.

In distances of things, their shapes, and size,
Our reason judges better than our eyes;
Declares not this the soul's pre-eminence,
Superior to, and quite distinct from *SENSE*!
JENYNS.

Feeling, Sensibility, Susceptibility.

Feeling, in the present case, is taken for a positive characteristic, namely, the property of *feeling* (*v. To feel*) in a strong degree; in this sense *feeling* expresses either a particular act, or an habitual property of the mind.

Sensibility is always taken in the sense of a habit. Traits of *feeling* in young people are happy omens in the estimation of the preceptor: an exquisite *sensibility* is not a desirable gift; it creates an infinite disproportion of pain. *Feeling* and *sensibility* are here taken as moral properties, which are awakened as much by the operations of the mind within itself as by external objects: *Susceptibility*, from the Latin *suscipio* to take or receive, designates that property of the body or the mind which consists in being ready to take an affection from external objects; hence we speak of a person's *susceptibility* to take cold or his *susceptibility* to be affected with grief, joy, or any other passion: if an excess of *sensibility* be an evil, an excess of *susceptibility* is a still greater evil; it makes us slaves to every circumstance, however trivial, which comes under our notice.

Gentleness is native *feeling* improved by principle.

BLAIR.

By long habit in carrying a burden we lose in great part our *sensibility* of its weight.—JOHNSON.

It pleases me to think that it was from a principle of gratitude in me that my mind was *susceptible* of such generous transport (in my dreams) when I thought myself repaying the kindness of my friend.—BYRON.

To Feign, Pretend.

Feign, in Latin *fingere* or *fingo* comes from the Greek *πνυω* to fix or stamp.

Pretend, in Latin *pretendo*, signifies properly to stretch before, that is, to put on the outside.

These words may be used either for doing or saying; they are both opposed to what is true, but they differ from the motives of the agent: to *feign* is taken either in a bad or an indifferent sense; to *pretend* always in a bad sense: one *feigns* in order to gain some future end; a person *feigns* sickness in order to be excused from paying a disagreeable visit: one *pretends* in order to serve a present purpose; a child *pretends* to have lost his book who wishes to excuse himself for his idleness.

To *feign* consists often of a line of conduct; to *pretend* consists always of words: Ulysses *feigned* madness in order to escape from going to the Trojan war; according to Virgil, the Grecian Sinon *pretended* to be a deserter come over to the Trojan camp: in matters of speculation, to *feign* is to invent by force of the imagination; to *pretend* is to set up by force of self-conceit: it is *feigned* by the poets that Orpheus went down into hell and brought back Eurydice his wife; infidel philosophers *pretend* to account for the most mysterious things in nature upon natural, or, as they please to term it, rational principles.

To win me from his tender arms,
Unnumber'd suitors came,
Who praised me for imputed charms,
And felt or *feign'd* a flame.—GOLDSMITH.

An affected delicacy is the common improvement in those who *pretend* to be refined above others.—STEELE.

To Feign, *v. To invent*.

To Felicitate, Congratulate.

Felicitate, from the Latin *felix* happy, signifies to make happy, and is applicable only to ourselves; *Congratulate*, from *gratus* pleasant or agreeable, is to make agreeable, and is applicable either to ourselves or others: we *felicitate* ourselves on having escaped the danger; we *congratulate* others on their good fortune.

The astronomers, indeed, expect her (night) with impatience, and *felicitate* themselves upon her arrival.—JOHNSON.

The fierce young hero who had overcome the Curiatii, instead of being *congratulated* by his sister for his victory, was upbraidcd by her for having slain her lover.—ADDISON.

Felicity, *v. Happiness*.

Fellowship, Society.

Both these terms are employed to denote a close intercourse; but *Fellowship* is said of men as individuals, *Society* of them collectively: we should be careful not to hold

fellowship with any one of bad character, or to join the *society* of those who profess bad principles.

Ill becomes it me
To wear at once thy garter and thy chains,
Though by my former dignity I swear,
That, were I reinstated in my throne,
Thus to be join'd in *fellowship* with thee
Would be the first ambition of my soul.

GILBERT WEST.

Unhappy he! who from the first of joys,
Society, cut off, is left alone,
Amid this world of death.—THOMSON.

Felon, *v.* Criminal.

Female, Feminine, Effeminate.

Female is said of the sex itself, and **Feminine** of the characteristics of the sex. **Female** is opposed to male, **feminine** to masculine.

In the *female* character we expect to find that which is *feminine*. The *female* dress, manners, and habits, have engaged the attention of all essayists, from the time of Addison to the present period.

The *feminine* is natural to the *female*; the *effeminate* is unnatural to the male. A *feminine* air and voice, which is truly grateful to the observer in the one sex, is an odious mark of *effeminacy* in the other. Beauty and delicacy are *feminine* properties; robustness and vigour are masculine properties; the former therefore when discovered in a man entitle him to the epithet of *effeminate*.

Once more her haughty soul the tyrant bends,
To prayers and mean submissions she descends;
No *female* arts or aids she left untried.
Nor counsels unexplo'd, before she died.—DRYDEN.

Her heavenly form
Angelic; but more soft and *feminine*
Her graceful innocence.—MILTON.

Our martial ancestors, like some of their modern successors, had no other amusement (but hunting) to entertain their vacant hours; despising all arts as *effeminate*.—BLACKSTONE.

Feminine, *v.* Female.

Fence, Guard, Security.

Fence, from the Latin *fendo*, to fend or keep off, denotes that which serves to prevent the attack of an external enemy. **Guard**, which is but a variety of *ward*, from the German *wahren* to see, and *wachen* to watch, signifies that which keeps from any danger. **Security** implies that which secures or prevents injury, mischief, and loss.

A *fence* in the proper sense is an inanimate object; a *guard* is a living agent; the former is of permanent utility, the latter acts to a partial extent; in the figurative sense they retain the same distinction. Modesty is a *fence* to a woman's virtue; the love of the subject is the monarch's greatest *safeguard*. There are prejudices which favour religion and subordination, and act as *fences* against the introduction of licentious principles into the juvenile or unenlightened mind; a proper sense of an overruling providence will serve as a *guard* to prevent the admission of improper thoughts. The *guard* only stands at the entrance, to prevent the ingress of evil: the *security* stops up all the avenues, it locks up with firmness. A *guard* serves to prevent the ingress of every thing that may have an evil intention or

tendency: the *security* rather secures the possession of what one has, and prevents a loss. A king has a *guard* about his person to keep off all violence.

Whatever disregard certain modern refiners of morality may attempt to throw on all the instituted means of public religion, they must in their lowest view be considered as the out-guards and *fences* of virtuous conduct.—BLAIR.

Let the heart be either wounded by sore distress, or agitated by violent emotions; and you shall presently see that virtue without religion is inadequate to the government of life. It is destitute of its proper *guard*, of its firmest support, of its chief encouragement.—BLAIR.

Goodness from its own nature hath this *security*, that it brings men under the danger of no law.—TILLOTSON.

Fermentation, *v.* Ebullition.

Ferocious, Fierce, Savage.

Ferocious and **Fierce** are both derived from the Latin *ferox*, which comes from *fera*, a wild beast.

Savage, *v.* Cruel.

Ferocity marks the untamed character of a cruel disposition: *fierceness* has a greater mixture of pride and anger in it, the word *fiers* in French being taken for haughtiness: *savageness* marks a more permanent, but not so violent a sentiment of either cruelty or anger as the two former. **Ferocity** and **fierceness** are in common applied to the brutes, to designate their natural tempers: *savage* is mostly employed to designate the natural tempers of man, when uncontrolled by the force of reason and a sense of religion. **Ferocity** is the natural characteristic of wild beasts; it is a delight in blood that needs no outward stimulus to call it into action; but it displays itself most strikingly in the moment when the animal is going to grasp, or when in the act of devouring, its prey: *fierceness* may be provoked in many creatures, but it does not discover itself unless roused by some circumstance of aggravation; many animals become *fierce* by being shut up in cages, and exposed to the view of spectators: *savageness* is as natural a temper in the uncivilized man as *ferocity* or *fierceness* in the brute; it does not wait for an enemy to attack, but is restless in search of some one whom it may make an enemy, and have an opportunity of destroying. It is an easy transition for the *savage* to become the *ferocious* cannibal, gutting himself in the blood of his enemies, or the *fierce* antagonist to one who sets himself up in opposition to him.

In an extended application of these terms, they bear the same relation to each other: the countenance may be either *ferocious*, *fierce*, or *savage*, according to circumstances. A robber who spends his life in the act of unlawfully shedding blood acquires a *ferocity* of countenance; a soldier who follows a predatory and desultory mode of warfare betrays the licentiousness of his calling, and his undisciplined temper, in the *fierceness* of his countenance: the tyrant whose enjoyment consists in inflicting misery on his dependents or subjects evinces the *savageness* of his temper by the *savage* joy with which he witnesses their groans and tortures.

The *ferocious* character of Meloch appears both in the battle and the council with exact consistency.—JOHN-SON.

The tempest falls.
The weary winds sink, breathless. But who knows
What *fercer* tempest yet may shake this night?
THOMSON.

Nay, the dire monsters that infest the flood,
By nature dreadful, and athirst for blood,
His will can calm, their *savage* tempers bind.
And turn to mild protectors of mankind.—YOUNG.

Ferryman, v. Waterman.

Fertile, Fruitful, Prolific.

Fertile in Latin *fertilis*, from *fero* to bear, signifies capable of bearing or bringing to light.

Fruitful signifies full of *fruit*, or containing within itself much fruit.

Prolific is compounded of *proles* and *facio* to make a progeny.

Fertile expresses in its proper sense the faculty of sending forth from itself that which is not of its own nature, and is peculiarly applicable to the ground which causes every thing within itself to grow up. *Fruitful* expresses a state containing or possessing abundantly that which is of the same nature; it is, therefore, peculiarly applicable to trees, plants, vegetables, and whatever is said to bear fruit. *Prolific* expresses the faculty of generating; it conveys therefore the idea of what is creative, and is peculiarly applicable to animals. We may say that the ground is either *fertile* or *fruitful*, but not *prolific*: we may speak of a female of any species being *fruitful* and *prolific*, but not *fertile*; we may speak of nature as being *fruitful*, but neither *fertile* nor *prolific*. A country is *fertile* as it respects the quality of the soil; it is *fruitful* as it respects the abundance of its produce; it is possible, therefore, for a country to be *fruitful* by the industry of its inhabitants, which was not *fertile* by nature.

An animal is said to be *fruitful* as it respects the number of young which it has; it is said to be *prolific* as it respects its generative power. Some women are more fruitful than others; but there are many animals more *prolific* than human creatures. The lands in Egypt are rendered *fertile* by means of mud which they receive from the overflowing of the Nile: they consequently produce harvests more *fruitful* than in almost any other country. Among the Orientals barrenness was reckoned a disgrace, and every woman was ambitious to be *fruitful*: there are some insects particularly amongst the noxious tribes, which are so *prolific*, that they are not many hours in being before they begin to breed.

In the figurative application they admit of a similar distinction. A man is *fertile* in expedients who readily contrives upon the spur of the occasion; he is *fruitful* in resources who has them ready at his hand; his brain is *prolific* if it generates an abundance of new conceptions. A mind is *fertile* which has powers that admit of cultivation and expansion; an imagination is *fruitful* that is rich in stores of imagery; a genius is *prolific* that is rich in invention. Females are *fertile* in expedients and devices; ambition and avarice

are the most *fruitful* sources of discord and misery in public and private life; novel-writers are the most *prolific* class of authors.

Why should I mention those, whose oozy soil
Is render'd *fertile* by the o'erflowing Nile.—JENYNS.

When first the soil receives the *fruitful* seed,
Make no delay, but cover it with speed.—DRYDEN.

And where in pomp the sun-burnt people ride
On painted barges o'er the teeming tide,
Which pouring down from Ethiopian lands,
Makes green the soil, with slime and black *prolific*
sands.—DRYDEN.

To every work Warburton brought a memory full
fraught, together with a fancy *fertile* of combinations.—JOHNSON.

The philosophy received from the Greeks has been *fruitful* in controversies, but barren of works.—BACON.

Parent of light! all-seeing sun,
Fruitful beam, whose rays dispense
The various gifts of Providence.—GAY.

Fervour, Ardour.

Fervour, from *ferveo* to boil, is not so violent a heat as **Ardour**, from *ardeo* to burn. The affections are properly *fervent*; the passions are *ardent*: we are *fervent* in feeling, and *ardent* in acting; the *fervour* of devotion may be rational; but the *ardour* of zeal is mostly intemperate. The first martyr, Stephen, was filled with a holy *fervour*; St. Peter, in the *ardour* of his zeal, promised his master to do more than he was able to perform.

The joy of the Lord is not to be understood of high raptures and transports of religious *fervour*.—BLAIR.

Do men hasten to their devotions with that *ardour* that they would to a lewd play!—SOUTH.

Festival, v. Feast.

Festivity, Mirth.

There is commonly **Mirth** with **Festivity**, but there may be frequently *mirth* without *festivity*. The *festivity* lies in the outward circumstances; *mirth* in the temper of the mind. *Festivity* is rather the producer of *mirth* than the *mirth* itself. *Festivity* includes the social enjoyments of eating, drinking, dancing, cards, and other pleasures; *mirth* includes in it the buoyancy of spirits, which is engendered by a participation in such pleasures.

Pisistratus, fearing that the *festivity* of his guests would be interrupted by the misconduct of Thrasippus, rose from his seat, and intreated him to stay.—CUMBERLAND.

Low lies that house where nut-brown draughts inspir'd,
Where greybeard *mirth* and smiling toil retir'd.
GOLDSMITH.

To Fetch, v. To bring.

Fetter, v. Chain.

Feud, v. Quarrel.

Fickle, v. Changeable.

Fiction, Fabrication, Falsehood.

Fiction is opposed to what is real; **Fabrication** and **Falsehood** to what is true. *Fiction* relates what may be though not what is: *fabrication* and *falsehood* relate what is not as what is, and vice-versa. *Fiction* serves for amusement and instruction: *fabrication* and *falsehood* serve to mislead and deceive. *Fiction* and *fabrication* both require invention: *falsehood* consists of simple contradiction. The fables of *Æsop* are *fictions* of the simplest kind, but

yet such as required a peculiarly lively fancy and inventive genius to produce: the *fabrication* of a play as the production of Shakespeare's pen was once executed with sufficient skill to impose for a time upon the public credulity: a good memory is all that is necessary in order to avoid uttering falsehoods that can be easily contradicted and confuted. In an extended sense of the word *fiction* it approaches still nearer to the sense of *fabricate*, when said of the *fictions* of the ancients, which were delivered as truth, although admitted now to be false: the motive of the narrator is what here constitutes the difference; namely, that in the former case he believes what he relates to be true, in the latter he knows it to be false. The heathen mythology consists principally of the *fictions* of the poets; newspapers commonly abound in *fabrication*.

As epithets *fictitious* and *false* are very closely allied: for what is *fictitious* is *false* though all that is *false* is not *fictitious*: the *fictitious* is that which has been feigned, or *falsely* made by some one; the *false* is simply that which is *false* by the nature of the thing: the *fictitious* account is therefore the invention of an individual, whose veracity is thereby impeached; but there may be many *false* accounts unoriginally circulated.

All that the Jews tell us of their twofold Messiah is a mere *fiction*, framed without as much as a pretence to any foundation in Scripture for it. —PRIDEAUX.

With reason has Shakespeare's superiority been asserted in the *fabrication* of his preternatural machines. —CUMBERLAND.

When speech is employed only as the vehicle of *falsehood*, every man must disunite himself from others. —JOHNSON.

Fictitious, v. Artful.

Fidelity, v. Faith.

Fierce, v. Fervacious.

Fieri, v. Hot.

Figure, Metaphor, Allegory, Emblem, Symbol, Type.

Figure in Latin *figura*, from *figo* to feign, signifies any thing painted or feigned by the mind.

Metaphor, in Greek *μεταφορα*, from *μεταφερω* to transfer, signifies a transfer of one object to another.

Allegory, in Greek *αλληγορια*, from *αλλος* another, and *αγορευω* to relate, signifies the relation of something under a borrowed term.

Emblem, in Greek *εμβλημα*, from *εμβαλλω* to impress, signifies the thing stamped on as a mark.

Symbol, from the Greek *συμβαλλω* to consider attentively, signifies the thing cast or conceived in the mind, from its analogy to represent something else.

Type, in Greek *τυπος*, from *τυπω* to strike or stamp, signifies an image of something that is stamped on something else.

Likeness between two objects, by which one is made to represent the other, is the common idea in the signification of these terms. **Figure** is the most general of these terms, comprehending every thing which is *figured*

by means of the imagination; the rest are but modes of the *figure*. The *figure* consists either in words or in things generally: we may have a *figure* in expression, a *figure* on paper, a *figure* on wood or stone, and the like. It is the business of the imagination to draw *figures* out of any thing: the *metaphor* and *allegory* consist of a representation by means of words only: the *figure*, in this case, is any representation which the mind makes to itself of a resemblance between objects, which is properly a *figure* of thought, which when clothed in words is a *figure* of speech: the *metaphor* is a *figure* of speech of the simplest kind, by which a word acquires other meanings besides that which is originally affixed to it, as when the term *head*, which properly signifies a part of the body, is applied to the leader of an army. The *allegory* is a continued *metaphor* where attributes, modes, and actions, are applied to the objects thus *figured*, as in the *allegory* of sin and death in Milton.

The *emblem* is that sort of *figure* of thought by which we make corporeal objects to stand for moral properties; thus the dove is represented as the *emblem* of meekness, or the beehive is made the *emblem* of industry: the *symbol* is that species of *emblem* which is converted into a constituted sign among men; thus the olive and laurel are the *symbols* of peace, and have been recognized as such among barbarous as well as enlightened nations. The *type* is that species of *emblem* by which one object is made to represent another mystically; it is, therefore, only employed in religious matters, particularly in relation to the coming, the office, and the death of our Saviour; in this manner the offering of Isaac is considered as a *type* of our Saviour's offering himself as an atoning sacrifice.

The spring bears the same *figure* among the seasons of the year, that the morning does among the divisions of the day, or youth among the stages of life. —ADDISON.

No man had a happier manner of expressing the affections of one sense by *metaphors* taken from another than Milton. —BURKE.

Virgil has cast the whole system of Platonic philosophy, so far as regards the soul of man, into beautiful *allegories*. —ADDISON.

The stork's the *emblem* of true piety. —BEAUMONT.

I need not mention the justness of thought which is observed in the generation of these *symbolical* persons (in Milton's *allegory* of sin and death). —ADDISON.

All the remarkable events under the law were *types* of Christ. —BLAIR.

Figure, v. Form.

Filthy, v. Nasty.

Final, Conclusive.

Final, in French *final*, Latin *finalis*, from *finis* the end, signifies having an end.

Conclusive (v. *Conclusive*) signifies shutting up, or coming to a conclusion.

Final designates simply the circumstance of being the last; **conclusive** the mode of finishing or coming to the last: a determination is *final* which is to be succeeded by no other; a reasoning is *conclusive* that puts a stop to farther question. The *final* is arbitrary; it depends upon the will to make it so or not: the *conclusive* is relative; it depends upon the circumstances and the understanding: a per-

son gives a *final* answer at option ; but in order to make an answer *conclusive* it must be satisfactory to all parties.

Neither with us in England hath there been (till very lately) any *final* determination upon the right of authors at the common law.—BLACKSTONE.

I hardly think the example of Abraham's complaining, that unless he had some children of his body, his steward Eliezer of Damascus would be his heir, is quite *conclusive* to show that he made him so by will.—BLACKSTONE.

Final, v. Last.

To Find, Find Out, Discover, Espy, Descry.

Find, in German *finden*, &c., is most probably connected with the Latin *venio*, signifying to come in the way.

Discover, v. To detect.

Espy, in French *espier*, comes from the Latin *espicio*, signifying to see a thing out.

Descry, from the Latin *discerno*, signifies to distinguish a thing from others.

To *find* signifies simply to come within sight of a thing, which is the general idea attached to all these terms : they vary, however, either in the mode of the action or in the object. What we *find* may become visible to us by accident, but what we *find out* is the result of an effort. We may *find* any thing as we pass along in the streets ; but we *find out* mistakes in an account by carefully going over it, or we *find out* the difficulties which we meet with in learning, by redoubling our diligence. What is *found* may have been lost to ourselves, but visible to others. What is *discovered* is always remote and unknown, and when *discovered* is something new. A piece of money may be *found* lying on the ground ; but a mine is *discovered* under ground. When Captain Cook *discovered* the islands in the South Sea, many plants and animals were *found*. What is not *discoverable* may be presumed not to exist ; but that which is *found* may be only what has been lost. What has once been *discovered* cannot be *discovered* again ; but what is *found* may be many times *found*. *Find out* and *discover* differ principally in the application ; the former being applied to familiar, and the latter to scientific objects ; scholars *find out* what they have to learn ; men of research *discover* what escapes the notice of others.

To *espy* is a species of *finding out*, namely, to *find out* what is very secluded or retired ; and *descry* is a species of *discovering*, or observing at a distance, or among a number of objects. An astronomer *discovers* fresh stars or planets ; he *finds* those on particular occasions which have been already *discovered*. A person *finds out* by continued enquiry any place to which he had been long directed ; he *espies* an object which lies concealed in a corner or secret place ; he *decries* a horseman coming down a hill.

Find and *discover* may be employed with regard to objects, either of a corporeal or intellectual kind ; *espy* and *descry* only with regard to sensible objects of corporeal vision ; *find*, either for those that are external or internal ; *discover*, only for those that are external. The distinction between them is the same as before ; we *find* by simple enquiry ; we *discover* by reflection and study ; we *find out* the

motives which influence a person's conduct ; we *discover* the reasons or causes of things ; the *finding* serves the particular purpose of the *finder* ; the *discovery* serves the purpose of science, by adding to the stock of general knowledge.

When *find* is used as a purely intellectual operation, it admits of a new view, in relation both to *discover* and to *invent*, as may be seen in the following article.

He *finds* the fraud, and with a smile demands,
On what design the boy had bound his hands.
—DRYDEN.

Socrates, who was a great admirer of Cretan institutions, set his excellent wit to *find out* some good cause and use of this evil inclination (the love of boys).—WALSH.

Cunning is a kind of short-sightedness that *discovers* the minutest objects which are near at hand, but is not able to discern things at a distance.—ADDISON.

There Agamemnon, Priam here he *espies*,
And fierce Achilles, who both kings defies.—DRYDEN.

Through this we pass, and mount the tower from whence
With unavailing arms, the Trojans make defence ;
From this the trembling king had oft descried
The Grecian camp, and saw their navy ride.—DRYDEN.

To Find, Find Out, Discover, Invent,

Find, v. To find.

Discover, v. To discover.

Invent, in Latin *invenio* from *invenio*, signifies to come at or light upon.

To *find* or *find out* is said of things which do not exist in the forms in which a person finds them ; to *discover* is said of that which exists in an entire state ; *invent* is said of that which is new made or modelled. The merit of *finding* or *inventing* consists in newly applying or modifying the materials, which exist separately ; the merit of *discovering* consists in removing the obstacles which prevent us from knowing the real nature of the thing : imagination and industry are requisite for *finding* or *inventing* ; acuteness and penetration for *discovering*. A person *finds* reasons for justifying himself ; he *discovers* traits of a bad disposition in another. Cultivated minds *find* sources of amusement within themselves, or a prisoner *finds* means of escape. Many traces of a universal deluge have been *discovered* : the physician *discovers* the nature of a particular disorder.

Find is applicable to the operative arts : *invent* to the mechanical ; *discover* to the speculative. We speak of *finding* modes for performing actions, and effecting purposes ; of *inventing* machines, instruments, and various matters of use or elegance ; of *discovering* the operations and laws of nature. Many fruitless attempts have been made to *find* the longitude : men have not been so unsuccessful in *finding out* various arts, for communicating their thoughts, commemorating the exploits of their nations, and supplying themselves with luxuries ; nor have they failed in every species of machine or instrument which can aid their purpose. Harvey *discovered* the circulation of the blood ; Toricelli *discovered* the gravity of the air ; by geometry the properties of figures are *discovered* ; by chemistry the properties of compound substances ; but the geometrician *finds* by reasoning the solution of any problem ; or by investigating, he *finds out* a clearer method of solving the same problems ; or he

invents an instrument by which the proof can be deduced from ocular demonstration. Thus the astronomer *discovers* the motions of the heavenly bodies, by means of the telescope which has been *invented*.

Long practice has a sure improvement *found*.
With kindled fires to burn the barren ground.—SEWARD.

Since the harmonic principles were *discovered*, music has been a great independent science.—SEWARD.

The sire of gods and men, with hard decrees,
Forbids our plenty to be bought with ease;
Himself *invented* first the shining shure,
And whetted human industry by care.—DRYDEN.

To Find Fault With, Blame, Object To.

All these terms denote not simply feeling, but also expressing dissatisfaction with some person or thing. To *Find Fault* with signifies here to point out a *fault*, either in some person or thing; to *Blame* is said only of the person; *Object* is applied to the thing only: we *find fault* with a person for his behaviour; we *find fault* with our seat, our conveyance, and the like; we *blame* a person for his temerity or his improvidence; we *object* to a measure that is proposed. We *find fault* with or *blame* that which has been done; we *object* to that which is to be done.

Finding fault is a familiar action applied to matters of personal convenience or taste; *blame* and *object* to, particularly the latter, are applied to serious objects. *Finding fault* is often the fruit of a discontented temper; there are some whom nothing will please, and who are ever ready to *find fault* with whatever comes in their way: *blame* is a matter of discretion; we *blame* frequently in order to correct: *objecting* to is an affair either of caprice or necessity; some capriciously *object* to that which is proposed to them merely from a spirit of opposition; others *object* to a thing from substantial reasons.

Tragi-comedy you have yourself *found fault* with very justly.—BUDGELE.

It is a most certain rule in reason and moral philosophy, that where there is no choice, there can be no *blame*.—SOUTH.

To Find Out, *v.* To find (descry).

To Find Out, *v.* To find (invent).

Fine, *v.* Beautiful.

Fine, Delicate, Nice.

It is remarkable of the word *Fine* (*v.* *Beautiful*), that it is equally applicable to large and small objects: *Delicate*, in Latin *delicatus*, from *delicia* delights, and *delicio* to allure, is applied only to small objects. *Fine*, in the natural sense, denotes smallness in general. *Delicate* denotes a degree of *fineness* that is agreeable to the taste. Thread is said to be *fine* as opposed to the coarse and thick; silk is said to be *delicate*, when to *fineness* of texture it adds softness. The texture of a spider's web is remarkable for its *fineness*; that of the ermine's fur is remarkable for its *delicacy*. In writing, all up-strokes must be *fine*; but in superior writing they will be *delicately fine*. When applied to colours, the *fine* is coupled with the bold and strong; *delicate* with what

is faint, soft, and fair: black and red may be *fine* colours; white and pink *delicate* colours. The tulip is reckoned one of the *finest* flowers; the white moss-rose is a *delicate* flower. A *fine* painter delineates with boldness; but the artist who has a *delicate* taste, throws *delicate* touches into the grandest delineations.

In their moral application these terms admit of the same distinction: the *fine* approaches either to the strong or to the weak; the *delicate* is a high degree of the *fine*; as a *fine* thought, which may be lofty; or *fine* feeling, which is acute and tender; and *delicate* feeling, which exceeds the former in *fineness*. The French use their word *fin* only in the latter sense, of acuteness, and apply it merely to the thoughts and designs of men, answering either to our word *subtle*, as *un homme fin*, or *neat*, as *une satire fine*.

Every thing that results from nature alone lies out of the province of instruction; and no rules that I know of will serve to give a *fine* form, a *fine* voice, or even those *fine* feelings, which are amongst the first properties of an actor.—CUMBERLAND.

Chief, lovely Spring! in thee and thy soft scenes
The smiling God is seen: while water, earth,
And air, attest his bounty, which exalts
The brute creation to this *finer* thought.

THOMSON.

Under this head of elegance I reckon those *delicate* and regular works of art, as elegant buildings or pieces of furniture.—BURKE.

Delicate is said of that which is agreeable to the sense and the taste; *Nice* to what is agreeable to the appetite: the former is a term of refinement; the latter of epicurism and sensual indulgence. The *delicate* affords pleasure only to those whose thoughts and desires are purified from what is gross; the *nice* affords pleasure to the young, the ignorant, and the sensual: thus *delicate* food, *delicate* colours, *delicate* shapes and form, are always acceptable to the cultivated; a meal, a show, a colour, and the like, which suits its appetite, or meets its fancy, will be *nice* to a child.

When used in a moral application *nice*, which is taken in a good sense, approaches nearer to the signification of *delicate*. A person may be said to have a *delicate* ear in music, whose ear is offended with the smallest discordance; he may be said to have a *nice* taste or judgement in music, who scientifically discriminates the beauties and defects of different pieces. A person is *delicate* in his choice, who is guided by taste and feeling; he is *nice* in his choice, who adheres to a strict rule.

A point in question may be either *delicate* or *nice*; it is *delicate*, as it is likely to touch the tender feelings of any party; it is *nice*, as it involves contrary interests, and becomes difficult of determination. There are *delicacies* of behaviour which are learnt by good breeding, but which minds of a refined cast are naturally alive too, without any particular learning; there are *niceties* in the law, which none but men of superior intellect can properly enter into and discriminate.

The commerce in the conjugal state is so *delicate*, that it is impossible to prescribe rules for it.—STEELE.

The highest point of good breeding, if any one can hit it, is to show a very nice regard to your own dignity, and, with that in your heart, to express your value for the man above you.—STEELE.

Fine, Mulet, Penalty, Forfeiture.

Fine, from the Latin *finis* the end or purpose, signifies, by an extended application, satisfaction by way of amends for an offence.

Mulet, in Latin *mulcta* comes from *mulgeo* to draw or wipe, because an offence is wiped off by money.

Penalty, in Latin *penalitas*, from *pena* a pain, signifies what gives pain by way of punishment.

Forfeiture, from *forfeit*, in French *forfait*, from *forfaire*, signifies to do away or lose by doing wrong.

The *fine* and *mulet* are always pecuniary; a *penalty* may be pecuniary; a *forfeiture* consists of any personal property; the *fine* and *mulet* are imposed; the *penalty* is inflicted or incurred; the *forfeiture* is incurred.

The violation of a rule or law is attended with a *fine* or *mulet*, but the former is a term of general use; the latter is rather a technical term in law: a criminal offence incurs a *penalty*; negligence of duty occasions the *forfeiture*.

A *fine* or *mulet* serve either as punishment to the offender, or as an amends for the offence: a *penalty* always inflicts some kind of pain as a punishment on the offender: a *forfeiture* is attended with loss as a punishment to the delinquent. Among the Chinese, all offences are punished with *finer* or flogging: the Roman Catholics were formerly subject to *penalties* if detected in the performance of their religious worship: societies subject their members to *forfeitures* for the violation of their laws.

Too dear a *fine*, ah much lamented maid!
For warring with the Trojans thou hast paid.
DRYDEN.

For to prohibit and dispense,
To find out or to make offence,
To set what characters they please,
And *mulcts* on sin, or godliness,
Must prove a pretty thriving trade.—BUTLER.

It must be confessed, that as for the laws of men, gratitude is not enjoined by the sanction of *penalties*.—SOUTH.

The Earl of Hereford, being tried secundum leges Normannorum, could only be punished by a *forfeiture* of his inheritance.—TYRERWHITE.

In the Roman law, if a lord manumits his slave, gross ingratitude in the person so made free *forfeits* his freedom.—SOUTH.

Finesse, *v.* *Artifice*.

Finical, Spruce, Foppish.

These epithets are applied to such as attempt at finery by improper means. The **Finical** is insignificantly fine; the **Spruce** is laboriously and artfully fine; the **Foppish** is fantastically and affectedly fine. The *finical* is said mostly of manners and speech; the *spruce* is said of the dress; the *foppish* of dress and manners.

A *finical* gentleman clips his words and screws his body into as small a compass as possible to give himself the air of a delicate person: a *spruce* gentleman strives not to have a fold wrong in his frill or cravat, nor a hair of his head to lie amiss: a *foppish* gentleman seeks by extravagance in the cut of his clothes, and by the tawdriness in their orna-

ments, to render himself distinguished for finery. A little mind, full of conceit for itself, will lead a man to be *finical*: a vacant mind that is anxious to be pleasing will not object to the employment of rendering the person *spruce*: a giddy, vain mind, eager after applause, impels a man to every kind of *foppery*.

At the top of the building (Blenheim house) are several cupolas and little turrets that have but an ill effect, and make the building look at once *finical* and heavy.—POPE.

Methinks I see thee *spruce* and fine,
With coat embroider'd richly shine.—SWIFT.

The learned, full of inward pride,
The *fops* of outward show deride.—GAY.

To Finish, *v.* *To close*.

To Finish, *v.* *To complete*.

Finished, *v.* *Completed*.

Finite, Limited.

Finite, from *finis* an end, is the natural property of things; and **Limited**, from *limes* a boundary, is the artificial property: the former is opposite only to the *infinite*; but the latter, which lies within the *finite*, is opposed to the *unlimited* or the *infinite*. This world is *finite*, and space *infinite*; the power of a prince is *limited*. It is not in our power to extend the bounds of the *finite*, but the *limited* is mostly under our control. We are *finite* beings, and our capacities are variously *limited* either by nature or circumstances.

Methinks this single consideration of the progress of a *finite* spirit to perfection will be sufficient to extinguish all envy in inferior natures, and all contempt in superior.—ADDISON.

Those complaints which we are apt to make of our *limited* capacity and narrow view, are just as unreasonable as the childish complaints of our not being formed with a microscopic eye.—BLAIR.

Fire, Heat, Warmth, Glow.

In the proper sense these words are easily distinguished, but not so easily in the improper sense; and as the latter depends principally upon the former, it is not altogether useless to enter into some explanation of their physical meaning.

Fire is with regard to **Heat** as the cause to the effect; it is itself an inherent property in some material bodies, and when in action communicates *heat*: * *fire* is perceptible to us by the eye, as well as the touch; *heat* is perceptible only by the touch: we distinguish *fire* by means of the flame it sends forth, or by the changes which it produces upon other bodies; but we discover *heat* only by the sensations which it produces in ourselves.

Fire has within itself the power of communicating *heat* to other bodies at a distance from it; but *heat*, when it lies in bodies without *fire*, is not communicable, or even perceptible, except by coming in contact with the body. *Fire* is producible in some bodies at pleasure, and when in action will communicate itself without any external influence; but *heat* is always to be produced and kept in being by some external agency: *fire* spreads; but *heat* dies away. *Fire* is producible only in certain bodies; but *heat* may be produced

* Vide Eberhardt; "Hitze, Feuer, Wärme."

in many more bodies: *fire* may be elicited from a flint, or from wood, steel, and some few other materials; but *heat* is producible, or exists to a greater or less degree, in all material substances.

Heat and *Warmth* differ principally in degree; the latter being a gentle degree of the former. The term *heat* is, however, in its most extensive sense, applicable to that universal principle which pervades all nature, animate and inanimate, and seems to vivify the whole; it is this principle which appears either under the form of *fire*, or under the more commonly conceived form of *heat*, as it is generally understood, and as I have here considered it. *Heat* in this limited sense is less active than *fire*, and more active than *warmth*: the former is produced in bodies, either by the violent action of *fire*, as in the boiling of water, the melting of lead, or the violent friction of two hard bodies; the latter is produced by the simple expulsion of cold, as in the case of feathers, wool, and other substances, which produce and retain *warmth*.

Heat may be the greatest possible remove, but *warmth* may be the smallest possible remove from cold; the latter is opposite to coolness, which borders on cold. *Heat* is that which to our feelings is painful; but *warmth* is that which is always grateful. In animate bodies *fire* cannot long exist, as it is in its nature consuming and destructive; it is incompatible with animal life: *heat* will not exist, unless when the body is in a diseased or disordered state; but *warmth* is that portion of *heat* which exists in every healthy subject: by this the hen hatches and rears her young, by this the operation of gestation is carried on in the female. *Glow* is a partial *heat* or *warmth* which exists, or is known to exist, mostly in the human frame; it is commonly produced in the body when it is in its most vigorous state, and its nerves are firmly braced by the cold.

From the above analysis the figurative application of these terms, and the grounds upon which they are so employed, will be easily discerned. As *fire* is the strongest and most active principle in nature, which seizes everything within its reach with the greatest possible rapidity, genius is said to be possessed of *fire*, which flies with rapidity through all the regions of thought, and forms the most lively images and combinations; but when *fire* is applied to the eye or the looks, it borrows its meaning from the external property of the flame, which is very aptly depicted in the eye or the looks of lively people. As *heat* is always excessive and mostly violent, those commotions and fermentations of the mind which flow from the agitation of the passions, particularly of the angry passions, is termed *heat*. As *warmth* is a gentle and grateful property, it has with most propriety been ascribed to the affections. As *glow* is a partial but vivid feeling of the body, so is friendship a strong but particular affection of the mind; hence the propriety of ascribing a *glow* to friendship.

Age damps the *fire* of the poet. Disputants in the *heat* of the contest are apt to forget all the forms of good breeding. A man of tender moral feelings speaks with *warmth* of a noble

action, or takes a *warm* interest in the concerns of the innocent and the distressed. A youth in the full *glow* of friendship feels himself prepared to make any sacrifices in supporting the cause of his friend.

That modern love is no such thing
As what those ancient poets sing.
A *fire* celestial, chaste, refin'd.—SWIFT.

The *heat* of Milton's mind might be said to sublimate his learning.—JOHNSON.

I fear I have pressed you farther upon this occasion than was necessary; however, I know you will excuse my *warmth* in the cause of a friend.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO TO CÆSAR.

The frost-concocted glebe
Draws in abundant vegetable soul,
And gathers vigour for the coming year;
A stronger *glow* sits on the lively cheek
Of ruddy *fire*.—THOMSON.

Firm, Fixed, Solid, Stable.

Firm, v. Constancy.

Fixed denotes the state of being *fixed*.

Solid, in Latin *solidus*, comes from *solum* the ground, which is the most solid thing existing.

Stable, v. Constancy.

That is *firm* which is not easily shaken; that is *fixed* which is fastened to something else, and not easily torn; that is *solid* which is able to bear, and does not easily give way; that is *stable* which is able to make a stand against resistance, or the effects of time. A pillar which is *firm* on its base, *fixed* to a wall in the side of solid oak, is likely to be *stable*. A man stands *firm* in battle who does not flinch from the attack: he is *fixed* to a spot by the order of his commander. An army of *firm* men form a *solid* mass, and by their heroism may deserve the most *stable* monument that can be erected.

In the moral sense, *firmness* is used only for the purpose, or such actions as depend on the purpose; *fixed* is used either for the mind, or for outward circumstances; *solid* is applicable to things in general, in an absolute sense; *stable* is applicable to things in a relative sense. Decrees are more or less *firm*, according to the source from which they spring; none are *firm*, compared with those which arise from the will of the Almighty: laws are *fixed* in proportion as they are connected with a constitution in which it is difficult to innovate. That which is *solid* is so of its own nature, but does not admit of degrees: a *solid* reason has within itself an independent property, which cannot be increased or diminished. That which is *stable* is so by comparison with that which is of less duration; the characters of some men are more *stable* than those of others; youth will not have so *stable* a character as manhood.

A friendship is *firm* when it does not depend upon the opinion of others; it is *fixed* when the choice is made and grounded in the mind; it is *solid* when it rests on the only *solid* basis of accordancy in virtue and religion; it is *stable* when it is not liable to decrease or die away with time.

In one *firm* orb the bands were rang'd around.
A cloud of heroes blacken'd all the ground.—POPE.
Unmov'd and silent, the whole was they wait,
Serenely dreadful, and as *fixed* as fate.—POPE.
But these fantastic errors of our dream
Lead us to *solid* wrong.—COWLEY.

The prosperity of no man on earth is *stable* and *assured*.—BLAIR.

Firm, v. Hard.

Firmness, v. Constancy.

Fit, v. Becoming.

Fit, Apt, Meet.

Fit (*v. Becoming*) is either an acquired or a natural property; *Apt*, in Latin *aptus*, from the Greek *απρω* to connect, is a natural property; *Meet*, from *to meet* or *measure*, signifying measured, is a moral quality. A house is *fit* for the accommodation of the family according to the plan of the builder; the young mind is *apt* to receive either good or bad impressions. *Meet* is a term of rare use, except in spiritual matters or in poetry: it is *meet* to offer our prayers to the supreme disposer of all things.

Nor holy rapture wanted they to praise
Their maker in *fit* strains pronounced or sung.
MILTON.

If you hear a wise sentence or an *apt* phrase commit it to your memory.—SIR HENRY SIDNEY.

My image, not imparted to the brute
Whose fellowship therefore not *unmeet* for thee,
Good reason was thou freely shouldst dislike.
MILTON.

Fit, v. Expedient.

To Fit, Equip, Prepare, Qualify.

To Fit (*v. Fit, becoming*) signifies to adopt means in order to make *fit*, and conveys the general sense of all the other terms; they differ principally in the means and circumstances of *fitting*: *To Equip* is to *fit out* by furnishing the necessary materials; *To Prepare*, from the Latin *præparo*, compounded of *præ* and *paro* to get before hand, is to take steps for the purpose of *fitting* in future; *To Qualify*, from the Latin *qualifico*, or *facio* and *qualis*, to make a thing as it should be, is to *fit* or furnish with the moral requisites.

To fit is employed for ordinary cases; *to equip* is employed only for expeditions; a house is *fitted up* for the residence of a family; a vessel is *equipped* with every thing requisite for a voyage; *to fit* is for an immediate purpose; *to prepare* is for a remote purpose. A person *fits* himself for taking orders when he is at the university; he *prepares* himself at school before he goes to the university. *To fit* is to adopt positive and decisive measures; *to prepare* is to use those which are only precarious: a scholar *fits* himself for reading Horace by reading Virgil with attention; he *prepares* for an examination by going over what he has already learnt. *To fit* is said of every thing, both in a natural and a moral sense: *to qualify* is used only in a moral sense.

Fit is employed mostly for acquisitions which are gained by labour; *qualify* for those which are gained by intellectual exertion: a youth *fits* himself for a mechanical business by working at it; a youth *qualifies* himself for a profession by following a particular course of studies.

With long resounding cries they urge the train,
To fit the ships and launch into the main.—POPE.

The religious man is *equipped* for the storm as well as the calm in this dubious navigation of life.—BLAIR.

Automedon and Alcimus *prepare*

Th' immortal coursers and the radiant car.—POPE.

"He that cannot live well to-day," says Martial, "will be less *qualified* to live well to-morrow."—JOHNSON.

To Fit, Suit, Adapt, Accommodate, Adjust.

Fit signifies to make or be *fit* (*v. Becoming*).

Suit signifies to make or be *suitable* (*v. To agree*).

Adapt, from *aptus fit*, signifies to make *fit* for a specific purpose.

Accommodate signifies to make commodious (*v. Commodious*).

Adjust signifies to make a thing just as it is desired to be.

To fit is to provide one's self with the requisite qualification; *to suit* is to provide the thing with the *suitable* or agreeable qualities; we *fit* ourselves for the thing; we *suit* the thing to ourselves. A good education *fits* a person for any office or station; an easy and contented mind is easily *suit*ed with the things that offer. *To fit*, in the intransitive sense, is said of things in general as they respect each other; *suit* is mostly of things as they respect the moral agent. In the mechanical and literal sense, things *fit* each other, as the shoe *fits* the foot, or the coat the body; and also in the moral sense, there is a manifest *fitness* in all things which we term right and just; things, whether of a corporeal or spiritual nature, are said to *suit* the taste of a person; thus, a particular house, situation, company, and the like, may *suit* one person more than another.

To adapt is a species of *fitting*; *to accommodate* is a species of *suiting*; both applied to the moral actions of conscious beings. *Adaptation* is an act of the judgement; *accommodation* is an act of the will: we *adapt* by an exercise of discretion; we *accommodate* by a management of the humours: an adaptation does not interfere with our interests; but an accommodation always supposes a sacrifice: we *adapt* our language to the understandings of our hearers; we *accommodate* ourselves to the humours of others. The mind of an infinitely wise Creator is clearly evinced in the world, by the universal adaptation of means to their ends: a spirit of accommodation is not merely a characteristic of politeness: it is of sufficient importance to be ranked among the Christian duties.

Then meditates the mark: and couching low,
Fits the sharp arrow to the well-strung bow.—POPE.

Ill *suits* it now the joys of love to know,
Too deep my anguish, and too wild my woe.—POPE.

It may not be a useless enquiry, in what respects the love of novelty is peculiarly *adapted* to the present state.—GROVE.

It is in his power so *to adapt* one thing to another, as to fulfil his promise of making all things work together for good to those who love him.—BLAIR.

It is an old observation which has been made of politicians, who would rather ingratiate themselves with their sovereigns, than promote his real service, that they *accommodate* their counsels to his inclinations.—ADDISON.

Accommodate and *adjust* are both applied to the affairs of men which require to be kept, or put, in right order: but the former implies the keeping as well as putting in order; the

latter simply the putting in order. Men accommodate each other, that is, make things commodious for each other; but they adjust things either for themselves or for others. Thus they accommodate each other in pecuniary matters; or they adjust the ceremonial of a visit. On this ground we may say that a difference is either accommodated or adjusted: for it is accommodated, inasmuch as the parties yield to each other; it is adjusted, inasmuch as that which was wrong is set right.

When things were thus far adjusted towards a peace, all other differences were soon accommodated.—ADDISON.

Fitted, v. Competent.

To Fix, Fasten, Stick.

Fix, v. To fix, settle.

Fasten is to make fast.

Stick is to make stick (*v. Stice*).

Fix is a generic term; *fasten* and *stick* are but modes of *fixing*: we *fix* whatever we make to remain in a given situation; we *fasten* if we *fix* it firmly: we *stick* when we *fix* a thing by means of *sticking*. A post is *fixed* in the ground; it is *fastened* to a wall by a nail; it is *stuck* to another board by means of glue. Shelves are *fixed*: a horse is *fastened* to a gate: bills are *stuck*. What is *fixed* may be removed in various ways: what is *fastened* is removed by main force: what is *stuck* must be separated by contrivance.

On mules and dogs the infection first began,
And last the veneful arrows *fix'd* in man.—POPE.

As the bold hound that gives the lion chase,
With beating bosom, and with eager pace,
Hangs on his haunch, or *fastens* on his heels,
Guards as he turns, and circles as he wheels.

POPE.

Some lines more moving than the rest,
Stick to the point that pierc'd her breast.—SWIFT.

To Fix, Settle, Establish.

Fix, in Latin *fixi* perfect of *figo*, and in Greek *ῥηγω*, signifies simply to make to keep its place.

Settle, which is a frequentative of *set*, signifies to make to sit or be at rest.

Establish, from the Latin *stabilis*, signifies to make stable or keep its ground.

Fix is the general and indefinite term: to *settle* and *establish* are to *fix* strongly. *Fix* and *settle* are applied either to material or spiritual objects, *establish* only to moral objects. A post may be *fixed* in the ground in any manner, but it requires time for it to *settle*. A person may either *fix* himself, *settle* himself, or *establish* himself: the first case refers simply to his taking up his abode, or choosing a certain spot; the second refers to his permanency of stay; and the third to the business which he raises or renders permanent.

The same distinction exists between these words in their further application to the conduct of men. We may *fix* one or many points, important or unimportant,—it is a mere act of the will; we *settle* many points of importance; it is an act of deliberation; thus we *fix* the day and hour of doing a thing; we *settle* the affairs of our family; so likewise to *fix* is properly the act of one; to *settle* may be the joint

act of many: thus a parent *fixes* on a business for his child, or he *settles* the marriage contract with another parent. To *fix* and *settle* are personal acts, and the objects are mostly of a private nature: but *establish* is an indirect action, and the object mostly of a public nature: thus we *fix* our opinions; we *settle* our minds; or we are instrumental in *establishing* laws, institutions, and the like. It is much to be lamented that any one should remain *unsettled* in his faith; and still more so, that the best form of faith is not universally *established*.

While wavering councils thus his mind engage,
Fluctuates in doubtful thought the Pylian sage,
To join the host or to the gen'ral haste,
Debating long, he *fixes* on the last.—POPE.

Warm'd in the brain the brazen weapon lies,
And shades eternal *settle* o'er his eyes.—POPE.

I would *establish* but one general rule to be observed in all conversation, which is this, that "men should not talk to please themselves, but those that hear them."—STERLIE.

To Fix, Determine, Settle, Limit.

To **Fix** (*v. To fix, settle*) is here the general term; to **Determine** (*v. To decide*); to **Settle** (*v. To fix*); to **Limit** (*v. To bound*); are here modes of *fixing*. They all denote the acts of conscious agents, but differ in the object and circumstances of the action: we may *fix* any object by any means, and to any point, we may *fix* material objects or spiritual objects, we may *fix* either by means of our senses, or our thoughts; but we can *determine* only by means of our thoughts. To *fix*, in distinction from the rest, is said in regard to a single point or a line; but to *determine* is always said of one or more points, or a whole: we *fix* where a thing shall begin; but we *determine* where it shall begin, and where it shall end, which way, and how far it shall go, and the like: thus, we may *fix* our eye upon a star, or we *fix* our minds upon a particular branch of astronomy; but we *determine* the distance of the heavenly bodies, or the specific gravity of bodies, and the like, upon philosophical principles. So in morals we may *fix* the day and hour; but we *determine* the mode of doing.

Determine is to *settle* as a means to the end; we commonly *determine* all subordinate matters, in order to *settle* a matter finally: thus, the *determination* of a single cause will serve to *settle* all other differences. The *determination* respects the act of the individual who *fixes* certain points and brings them to a term; the *settlement* respects simply the conclusion of the affair, or the termination of all dispute and question.

To *determine* and *limit* both signify to *fix* boundaries; but the former respects only such boundaries as are drawn by the mind within itself, as we *determine* the height, length, or breadth of an object, or we *determine* a question; but *limit* is employed upon visible objects, and the process of the action itself is rendered visible, as when we *limit* a price, or *limit* our time.

In a rotund, whether it be a building or a plantation, you can no where *fix* a boundary.—BURKE.

Your first care must be to acquire the power of *fixing* your thoughts.—BLAIR.

One had better *settle* on a way of life that is not the

very best we might have chosen, than grow old without determining our choice.—ADDISON.

Religion settles the pretensions and otherwise interfering interests of mortal men.—ADDISON.

How can we bind or limit his decree

By what our ear has heard or eye may see?—PRIOR.

Fixed, *v. Firm.*

To Flag, Droop, Languish, Pine.

To Flag is to hang down loose like a flag.

Droop, *v. To fall.*

To Languish is to become or continue languid (*v. Farnt*).

To Pine, from the German *pein*, pain, is to be or continue in pain.

In the proper application, nothing flags but that which can be distended and made to flutter by the wind as the leaves of plants when they are in want of water or in a weakly condition; hence figuratively the spirits are said to flag: nothing is said to droop but that the head of which flags or drops; the snow-drop droops, and flowers will generally droop from excess of drought or heat: the spirits in the same manner are said to droop, which expresses more than to flag; the human body also droops when the strength fails: languish is a still stronger expression than droop, and is applicable principally to persons; some languish in sickness, some in prison, and some in a state of distress: to pine is to be in a state of wearing pain which is mostly of a mental nature; a child may pine when absent from all its friends, and supposing itself deserted.

It is variety which keeps alive desire, which would otherwise flag.—SOUTH.

Shrunk with dry famine, and with toils declin'd.

The drooping body will desert the mind.—POPE.

How finely has the poet told us that the sick persons languished under lingering and incurable distempers.—ADDISON.

From beds of raging fire to stave in ice
Their soft ethereal warmth, there to pine,
Immoveably infix'd.—MILTON.

Flagitious, *v. Heinous.*

Flame, Blaze, Flash, Flare, Glare.

Flame, in Latin *flamma*, from the Greek *φλεω* to burn, signifies the luminous exhalation emitted from fire.

Blaze, from the German *blasen* to blow, signifies a flame blown up, that is, an extended flame: Flash and Flare, which are but variations of flame, denote different species of flame, the former a sudden flame, the second a dazzling, unsteady flame. Glare, which is a variation of glow, denotes a glowing, that is a strong flame, that emits a strong light: a candle burns only by flame, paper commonly by a blaze, gunpowder by a flash, a torch by a flare, and a conflagration by a glare.

His lightning your rebellion shall confound,
And hurl ye headlong flaming to the ground.

POPE.

Swift as a flood of fire when storms arise
Floats the wide field, and blazes to the skies.

POPE.

Full fifty guards each flaming pile attend,
Whose umber'd arms, by fits, thick flashes send.

POPE.

Have we not seen round Britain's peopled shore,
Her useful sons exchange'd for useless ore,
Seen all her triumphs but destruction haste,
Like flaring tapers brightening as they waste.

GOLDSMITH.

Ev'n in the height of noon oppress'd, the sun
Sueds weak and blunt, his wide refracted ray,
Whence glaring off, with many a broaden'd orb
He frights the nations.—THOMSON.

Flare, *v. Flame.*

Flash, *v. Flame.*

Flat, Level.

Flat, in German *flach*, is connected with *platt*, broad, and that with the Latin *latus*, and Greek *πλατυς*.

Level, in all probability from *libella* and *libra* a balance, signifies the evenness of a balance.

Flat is said of a thing with regard to itself; it is opposed to the round or protuberant; level as it respects another; the former is opposed to the uneven; a country is flat which has no elevation; a wall is level with the roof of a house when it rises to the height of the roof.

A flat can hardly look well on paper.

COUNTRESS OF HERTFORD.

At that black hour, which gen'ral horror sheds
On the low level of the inglorious throng.—YOUNG.

Flat, *v. Inspid.*

To Flatter, *v. To adulate.*

Flatterer, Sycophant, Parasite.

Flatterer, *v. To adulate.*

Sycophant, in Greek *συκοφαντης*, signified originally an informer on the matter of figs, but has now acquired the meaning of an obsequious and servile person.

Parasite, in Greek *παρσιτος*, from *παρα* and *σιτος* corn or meat, originally referred to the priests who attended feasts, but it is now applied to a hanger-on at the tables of the great.

The flatterer is one who flatters by words; the sycophant and parasite is therefore always a flatterer, and something more, for the sycophant adopts every mean artifice by which he can ingratiate himself, and the parasite submits to every degradation and servile compliance by which he can obtain his base purpose. These terms differ more in the object than in the means: the former having general purposes of favour; and the latter particular and still lower purposes to answer. Courtiers may be sycophants in order to be well with their prince, and obtain preferment; but they are seldom parasites, who are generally poor and in want of a meal.

Flatterers are the bosom enemies of princes.—SOUTH.

By a revolution in the state, the fawning sycophant of yesterday is converted into the austere critic of the present hour.—BURKE.

The first of pleasures
Were to be rich myself; but next to this
I hold it best to be a parasite,
And feed upon the rich.—CUMBERLAND.

Flavour, *v. Taste.*

Flaw, *v. Blemish.*

Fleeting, *v. Temporary.*

Fleetness, *v. Swiftness.*

Flexible, Pliable, Pliant, Supple.

Flexible, in Latin *flexibilis*, from *flecto* to bend, signifies able to be bent.

Pliable signifies able to be *plied* or folded : **Pliant** signifies literally *plying*, bending, or folding.

Supple, in French *souple*, from the intensive syllable *sub* and *ply*, signifies very *pliable*.

* *Flexible* is used in a natural or moral sense ; *pliable* in the familiar and natural sense only ; *pliant* in the higher and moral application only : what can be bent in any degree as a stick is *flexible* ; what can be bent as wax, or folded like cloth, is *pliable*. *Supple*, whether in a proper or a figurative sense, is an excess of *pliability* : what can be bent backward and forward, like ozier twig, is *supple*.

In the moral application, *flexible* is indefinite both in degree and application ; it may be greater or less in point of degree : whereas *pliant* supposes a great degree of *pliability* ; and *suppleness*, a great degree of *pliancy* or *pliability* ; it applies likewise to the outward actions, to the temper, the resolution, or the principles ; but *pliancy* is applied to the principles, or the conduct dependant upon those principles ; *suppleness* to the outward actions and behaviour only. A temper is *flexible* which yields to the entreaties of others ; the person or character is *pliant* when it is formed or moulded easily at the will of another ; a person is *supple* who makes his actions and his manners bend according to the varying humours of another : the first belongs to one in a superior station who yields to the wishes of the appellant ; the latter two belong to equals or inferiors who yield to the influence of others.

Flexibility may be either good or bad according to circumstances ; when it shortens the duration of resentments it produces a happy effect ; but *flexibility* is not a respectable trait in a master or a judge, who ought to be guided by higher motives than what the momentary impulse of feeling suggests : *pliancy* is very commendable in youth, when it leads them to yield to the councils of the aged and experienced ; but it may sometimes make young men the more easy victims to the seductions of the artful and vicious : *suppleness* is in no case good, for it is *flexibility* either in indifferent matters, or such as are expressly bad. A good-natured man is *flexible* ; a weak and thoughtless man is *pliant* ; a parasite is *supple*.

Flexibility is frequently a weakness, but never a vice ; it always consults the taste of others, sometimes to its own inconvenience, and often in opposition to its judgement : *pliancy* is often both a weakness and a vice ; it always yields for its own pleasure, though not always in opposition to its sense of right and wrong : *suppleness* is always a vice, but never a weakness ; it seeks its gratification to the injury of another by flattering his passions. *Flexibility* is opposed to firmness ; *pliancy* to steadiness ; *suppleness* to rigidity.

Forty-four is an age at which the mind begins less easily to admit new confidence, and the will to grow less *flexible*.—JOHNSON.

As for the bending and forming the mind, we should doubtless do our utmost to render it *pliable*, and by no means stiff and refractory.—BACON.

The future is *pliant* and ductile.—JOHNSON.

Charles I. wanted *suppleness* and dexterity to give way to the encroachments of a popular assembly.—HUME.

Flightiness, *v.* *Lightness*.

Flimsy, *v.* *Superficial*.

To Flourish, Thrive, Prosper.

Flourish, in French *fleurir*, *florissant*, Latin *floresco* or *floreo*, from *flos* a flower, is a figure of speech borrowed from the action of flowers which grow in full vigour and health.

Thrive signifies properly to drive on.

Prosper, in Latin *prosper*, *prosperus*, compounded of *pro* and *spero*, to hope, signifies to be agreeable to the hopes.

To *flourish* expresses the state of being that which is desirable : to *thrive*, the process of becoming so.

In the proper sense, *flourish* and *thrive* are applied to vegetation : the former to that which is full grown ; the latter to that which is in the act of growing : the oldest trees are said to *flourish*, which put forth their leaves and fruits in full vigour ; young trees *thrive* when they increase rapidly towards their full growth.

Flourish and *thrive* are taken likewise in the moral sense ; *prosper* is employed only in this sense : *flourish* is said either of individuals or communities of men ; *thrive* and *prosper* only of individuals. To *flourish* is to be in full possession of one's powers, physical, intellectual, and incidental ; an author *flourishes* at a certain period ; an institution *flourishes* ; literature or trade *flourishes* ; a nation *flourishes*. To *thrive* is to carry on one's concerns to the advantage of one's circumstances ; it is a term of familiar use for those who gain by positive labour : the industrious tradesman *thrives*. To *prosper* is to be already in advantageous circumstances : men *prosper* who accumulate wealth agreeably to their wishes, and beyond their expectations.

Flourish and *thrive* are always taken in the good sense : nothing *flourishes* but what ought to *flourish* ; the word bespeaks the possession of that which ought to be possessed : when a poet *flourishes* he is the ornament of his country, the pride of human nature, the boast of literature : when a city *flourishes* it attains all the ends of civil association ; it is advantageous not only to its own members, but to the world at large. No one *thrives* without merit : what is gained by the *thriving* man is gained by those qualities which entitle him to all he has. To *prosper* admits of a different view : one may *prosper* by that which is bad, or *prosper* in that which is bad, or become bad by *prospering* ; the attainment of one's ends, be they what they may, constitutes *prosperity* ; a man may *prosper* by means of fraud and injustice ; he may *prosper* in the attainment of inordinate wealth or power : and he may become proud, unfeeling, and selfish, by his *prosperity* ; so great an enemy has *prosperity* been considered to the virtue of man, that every good man has trembled to be in that condition.

* Vide Roubaud : "Flexible, souple, docile."

There have been times in which no power has been brought so low as France. Few have ever *flourished* in greater glory.—BURKE.

Every *thriving* grazer can think himself but ill-dealt with, if within his own country he is not courted.—BOOTH.

Betimes inure yourself to examine how your estate prospers.—WENTWORTH.

To Flow, *v.* To arise.

To Flow, Stream, Gush.

Flow, in Latin *fluo*, and Greek *βλῶω* or *φλῶω* to be in a ferment, in all probability connected with *peo*, which signifies literally to *flow*.

Stream, in German *strömen*, from *riemen* a thong, signifies to run in a line.

Gush comes from the German *giessen*, &c., to pour out with force.

Flow is here the generic term ; the two others are specific terms expressing different modes : water may *flow* either in a large body or in a long but narrow course ; the *stream* in a long narrow course only : thus, waters *flow* in seas, rivers, rivulets, or in a small pond ; they *stream* only out of spouts, or small channels : they *flow* gently or otherwise ; they *stream* gently ; but they *gush* with violence : thus, the blood *flows* from a wound which comes from it in any manner ; it *streams* from a wound when it runs as it were in a channel : it *gushes* from a wound when it runs with impetuosity, and in as large quantities as the cavity admits.

Down his wan cheek a briny torrent *flows*.—POPE.

Fires *stream* in lightning from his sanguine eyes.
POPE.

Sunk in his sad companions' arms he lay,
And in short pantings sobb'd his soul away
(Like some vile worm extended on the ground),
While life's torrent *gush'd* from out the wound.
POPE.

Fluctuate, Waver.

Fluctuate, in Latin *fluctuatus* participle of *fluctuo*, from *fluctus* a wave, signifies to rise in waves.

To **Waver** is a frequentative of to *wave*, which is formed from the substantive *wave*, signifying to move like a *wave*.

To *fluctuate* conveys the idea of strong agitation ; to *waver*, that of constant motion backward and forward : when applied in the moral sense, to *fluctuate* designates the action of the spirits or the opinions ; to *waver* is said only of the will or opinions : he who is alternately merry and sad in quick succession is said to be *fluctuating* ; or he who has many opinions in quick succession is said to *fluctuate* ; but he who cannot form an opinion, or come to a resolution, is said to *waver*.

Fluctuations and *waverings* are both opposed to a manly character : but the former evinces the uncontrolled influence of the passions, the total want of that equanimity which characterizes the Christian ; the latter denotes the want of fixed principle, or the necessary degeneration of character : we can never have occasion to *fluctuate*, if we never raise our hopes and wishes beyond what is attainable : we can never have occasion to *waver*, if we know and feel what is right, and resolve never to swerve from it.

The tempter, but with show of zeal and love
To man, and indignation at his wrong,
New parts puts on, and as to passion mov'd
Fluctuates disturbed.—MILTON.

Let a man, without trepidation or *wavering*, proceed in discharging his duty.—BLAIR.

Fluid, Liquid.

Fluid, from *fluo* to flow, signifies that which from its nature flows ; **Liquid**, from *liquesco* to melt, signifies that which is melted. These words may be employed as epithets to the same objects ; but they have a distinct office which they derive from their original meaning : when we wish to represent a thing as capable of passing along in a stream or current, we should denominate it a *fluid* ; when we wish to represent it as passing from a congealed to a dissolved state, we should name it a *liquid* : water and air are both represented as *fluids* from their general property of flowing through certain spaces ; but ice when thawed becomes a *liquid* and melts ; lead is also termed a *liquid* : the humours of the animal body, and the juices of trees, are *fluids* ; what we drink is a *liquid* as opposed to what we eat, which is solid.

As when the fig's prest juice, infus'd in cream,
To curds coagulates the *liquid* stream,
Sudden the *fluids* fix, the parts combine.—POPE.

Then thrice the raven rends the *liquid* air,
Its croaking notes proclaim the settled fair.
DRYDEN.

To Flutter, *v.* To palpitate.

Foe, *v.* Enemy.

Fœtus, *v.* Embryo.

Foible, *v.* Imperfection.

To Foil, *v.* To defeat.

Folks, *v.* People.

To Follow, Succeed, Ensue.

Follow comes probably through the medium of the northern languages from the Greek *ολκος* a trace or *ελκω* to draw.

Succeed, in Latin *succedo* compounded of *sub* and *cedo* to walk after.

Ensue, in French *ensuivre*. Latin *insequor*, signifies to follow close upon the back or at the heels.

Follow and *succeed* is said of persons and things ; *ensue* of things only : *follow* denotes the going in order, in a trace or line ; *succeed* denotes the going or being in the same place immediately after another : many persons may *follow* each other at the same time ; but only one individual properly *succeeds* another. *Follow* is taken literally for the motion of the physical body in relation to another ; *succeed* is taken in the moral sense for taking the situation or office of another : people *follow* each other in a procession, or one *follows* another to the grave ; a king *succeeds* to a throne, or a son *succeeds* to the inheritance of his father.

To *follow* in relation to things is said either simply of the order in which they go, or of such as go by a connection between them ; to *succeed* implies simply to take the place after another ; to *ensue* is to *follow* by a necessary

connection; people who die quickly one after the other are said to *follow* each other to the grave; a youth of debauchery is *followed* by a diseased old age; as in a natural tempest one wave of the sea *follows* another in rapid succession, so in the moral tempest of political revolutions one mad convulsion is quickly *succeeded* by another; nothing can *ensue* from popular commotions but bloodshed and misery. *Follow* is used in abstract propositions; *ensue* is used in specific cases: sin and misery *follow* each other as cause and effect; quarrels too often *ensue* from the conversations of violent men who differ either in religion or politics.

If a man of a good genius for fable were to represent the nature of pleasure and pain in that way of writing, he would probably join them together after such a manner that it would be impossible for the one to come into any place without being *followed* by the other.—ADDISON.

Illness hastens with a trembling heart,
Before him steps, and bending draws the dart;
Forth flows the blood; an eager pang succeeds;
Tydides mounts, and to the navy speeds.—POPE.

Nor deem this day, this battle, all you lose;
A day more black, a fate more vile *ensues*;
Impetuous Hector thunders at the wall,
The hour, the spot, to conquer, or to fall.—POPE.

To Follow, Pursue.

Follow, v. To follow.

Pursue, v. To continue.

The idea of going after any thing in order to reach or obtain it is common to these terms, but under different circumstances: one *follows* a person mostly with a friendly intention; one *pursues* with a hostile intention; a person *follows* his fellow traveller whom he wishes to overtake; the officers of justice *pursue* the criminal whom they wish to apprehend; so likewise the huntsmen and hunters *follow* the dogs in the chase; the dogs *pursue* the hare. In application to things, *follow* is taken more in the passive, and *pursue* more in the active sense: a man *follows* the plan of another, and *pursues* his own plan; he *follows* his inclinations, and *pursues* an object.

"Now, now," said he, "my son, no more delay,
I yield, I *follow* where Heav'n shows the way."
—DRYDEN.

Still close they *follow*, close the rear engage,
Æneas storms, and Hector foams with rage.—POPE.
The same Rutilians who with arms *pursue*
The Trojan race are equal foes to you.—DRYDEN.

The felicity in which any one is so happy as to find out and *follow* what is the proper bent of his genius.—STEELE.

Look round the habitual world, how few
Know their own good, or knowing it *pursue*.
—DRYDEN.

To Follow, Imitate.

Follow, v. To follow, succeed.

Imitate, in Latin *imitatus* participle of *imito*, from the Greek *μιμνω* to mimic and *μοιος* alike, signifies to do or make alike.

Both these terms denote the regulating our actions by something that offers i self to us, or is set before us; but we *follow* that which is either internal or external; we *imitate* that only which is external; we either *follow* the dictates of our own minds or the suggestions of others; but we *imitate* the conduct of others: in regard to external objects we *follow* either

a rule or an example; but we *imitate* an example only: we *follow* the footsteps of our forefathers; we *imitate* their virtues and their perfections; it is advisable for young persons as closely as possible to *follow* the good example of those who are older and wiser than themselves; it is the bounden duty of every Christian to *imitate* the example of our blessed Saviour to the utmost of his power.

To *follow* and *imitate* may both be applied to that which is good or bad: the former to any action; but the latter only to the behaviour or the external manners: we may *follow* a person in his career of virtue or vice; we *imitate* his gestures, tone of voice, and the like. Parents should be guarded in all their words and actions; for whatever may be their example, whether virtuous or vicious, it will in all probability be *followed* by their children: those who have the charge of young people should be particularly careful to avoid all bad habits of gesture, voice, or speech; as there is a much greater propensity to *imitate* what is ridiculous than what is becoming.

And I with the same greediness did seek,
As water when I thirst, to swallow Greek;
Which I did only learn that I might know
Those great examples which I *follow* now.
—DENHAM.

The imitators of Milton seem to place all the excellency of that sort of writing in the use of uncouth or antique words.—JOHNSON.

Follower, Adherent, Partisan.

A *Follower* is one who *follows* a person generally; an *Adherent* is one who *adheres* to his cause; a *Partisan* is the follower of a party; the *follower* follows either the person, the interests, or the principles of any one; thus the retinue of a nobleman, or the friends of a statesman, or the friends of any man's opinions, may be styled his *followers*; but the *adherent* is that kind of *follower* who espouses the interests of another, as the *adherents* of Charles I.: a *follower* follows near or at a distance; but the *adherent* is always near at hand; the *partisan* hangs on or keeps at a certain distance; the *follower* follows from various motives; the *adherent* adheres from a personal motive; the *partisan*, from a partial motive: Charles I. had as many *adherents* as he had *followers*; the rebels had as many *partisans* as they had *adherents*.

The mournful *followers*, with assistant care,
The groaning hero to his chariot bear.—POPE.

The religion in which Pope lived and died was that of the church of Rome, to which in his correspondence with Racine he professes himself a sincere *adherent*.—JOHNSON.

With Addison, the wits, his *adherents* and *followers*, were certain to concur.—JOHNSON.

They (the Jacobins) then proceed in argument as if all those who disapprove of their new abuses must of course be *partisans* of the old.—BURKE.

Folly, Foolery.

Folly is the abstract of foolish, and characterizes the thing; *Foolery* the abstract of fool, and characterizes the person: we may commit an act of *folly* without being chargeable with weakness or *folly*; but none are guilty of *fooleries* who are not themselves fools, either habitually or temporarily; young

people are perpetually committing *follies* if not under proper control; fashionable people only lay aside one *foolery* to take up another.

This peculiar ill property has *folly*, that it enlarges men's desires while it lessens their capacities.—SOUTH.

If you are so much transported with the sight of beautiful persons, to what ecstasy would it raise you to behold the original beauty, not filled up with flesh and blood, or varnished with a fading mixture of colours, and the rest of mortal trifles and *fooleries*.—WALSH.

Fond, *v. Affectionate.*

Fond, *v. Amorous.*

Fond, *v. Indulgent.*

To Fondle, *v. To caress.*

Food, Diet, Regimen.

Food signifies the thing which one feeds upon, in Saxon *jode*, low German *jöde* or *jöder*, Greek *βρωσιμ*.

Diet, from *διαίτα* to live medicinally, signifies any particular mode of living.

Regimen, in Latin *regimen* from *rego*, signifies a system or practice by rule.

All these terms refer to our living, or that by which we live: *food* is here the general term; the others are specific. *Food* specifies no circumstance; whatever is taken to maintain life is *food*: *diet* is properly prescribed or regular *food*: it is the hard lot of some among the poor to obtain with difficulty *food* and clothing for themselves and their families; an attention to the *diet* of children is an important branch of their early education; their *diet* can scarcely be too simple: no one can be expected to enjoy his *food* who is not in a good state of health; we cannot expect to find a healthy population where there is a spare and unwholesome *diet* attended with hard labour.

Food is a term applicable to all living creatures; *diet* is employed only with regard to human beings who make choice of their *food*: corn is as much the natural *food* of some animals as of men; the *diet* of the peasantry consists mostly of bread, milk and vegetables.

The poison of other states (that is, bankruptcy) is the *food* of the new republic.—BURKE.

The *diet* of men in a state of nature must have been confined almost wholly to the vegetable kind.—BURKE.

Diet and *regimen* are both particular modes of living; but the former respects the quality of *food*; the latter the quantity as well as quality: *diet* is confined to modes of taking nourishment; *regimen* often respects the abstinence from *food*, bodily exercise, and whatever may conduce to health: *diet* is generally the consequence of an immediate prescription from a physician, and during the period of sickness; *regimen* commonly forms a regular part of a man's system of living: *diet* is in certain cases of such importance for the restoration of a patient that a single deviation may defeat the best medicine; it is the misfortune of some people to be troubled with diseases, from which they cannot get any exemption but by observing a strict *regimen*.

Prolongation of life is rather to be expected from stated *diets* than from any common *regimen*.—BACON.

I shall always be able to entertain a friend of a philosophical *regimen*.—SHENSTONE.

Fool, Idiot, Buffoon.

Fool is doubtless connected with our word *foul*, in German *faul*, which is either nasty or lazy, and the Greek *φῶλος*, which signifies worthless or good for nothing.

Idiot comes from the Greek *ἰδιωτης*, signifying either a private person, or one that is rude and unskilled in the ways of the world.

Buffoon, in French *bouffon*, is in all probability connected with our word beef, buffalo, and bull, signifying a senseless fellow.

The *fool* is either naturally or artificially a *fool*; the *idiot* is a natural *fool*; the *buffoon* is an artificial *fool*: whoever violates common sense in his actions is a *fool*: whoever is unable to act according to common sense is an *idiot*: whoever intentionally violates common sense is a *buffoon*.

Thought's the slave of life, and life's time's *fool*.

SHAKESPEARE.

Idiots are still in request in most of the courts of Germany where there is not a prince of any great magnificence who has not two or three dressed, distinguished, undisputed *fools* in his retinue.—ADDISON.

Homer has described a Vulcan that is a *buffoon* among his gods, and a Therastis among his mortals.—ADDISON.

Foolery, *v. Folly.*

Foolhardy, Adventurous, Rash.

Foolhardy signifies having the hardhood of a *fool*.

Adventurous signifies ready to venture.

Rash, in German *rasch*, which signifies swift, comes from the Arabic *ruaschen* to go swiftly.

Foolhardy expresses more than the *adventurous*; and *adventurous* than *rash*.

The *foolhardy* man ventures in defiance of consequences: the *adventurous* man ventures from a love of the arduous and the bold; the *rash* man ventures for want of thought; courage and boldness become *foolhardiness* when they lead a person to run a fruitless risk; an *adventurous* spirit sometimes leads a man into unnecessary difficulties; but it is a necessary accompaniment of greatness. There is not so much design, but there is more violence and impetuosity in *rashness* than in *foolhardiness*: the former is the consequence of an ardent temper which will admit of correction by the influence of the judgment; but the latter comprehends the perversion of both the will and the judgment.

An *idiot* is *foolhardy*, who risks his future salvation for the mere gratification of his pride; Alexander was an *adventurous* prince, who delighted in enterprizes in proportion as they presented difficulties; he was likewise a *rash* prince, as was evinced by his jumping into the river Cydnus while he was hot, and by his leaping over the wall of Oxydrace and exposing himself singly to the attack of the enemy.

If any yet be so *foolhardy*,

T' expose themselves to vain jeopardy,

If they come wounded off and lame,

No honour's got by such a maim.—BUTLER.

'Twas an old way of recreating,

Which learned butchers called *beurbaiting*,

A bold *adventurous* exercise.—BUTLER.

Why wilt thou, then, renew the vain pursuit,

And *rashly* catch at the forbidden fruit.—PRIOR.

Foolish, *v. Irrational.*

Foolish, *v. Simple.*

Footstep, *v. Mark.*

Foppish, *v. Fincical.*

To Forbear, *v. To abstain.*

To Forbid, Prohibit, Interdict.

The *for* in **Forbid**, from the German *ver*, is negative, signifying to bid not to do.

The *pro* in **Prohibit**, and *inter* in **Interdict**, have both a similarly negative sense; the former verb, from *habeo* to have, signifies to have or hold that a thing shall not be done, to restrain from doing; the latter, from *dico* to say, signifies to say that a thing shall not be done.

Forbid is the ordinary term; **prohibit** is the judicial term; **interdict** the moral term.

To **forbid** is a direct and personal act; to **prohibit** is an indirect action that operates by means of extended influence: both imply the exercise of power or authority of an individual; but the former is more applicable to the power of an individual, and the latter to the authority of government. A parent **forbids** his child marrying when he thinks proper; the government **prohibits** the use of spirituous liquors. **Interdict** is a species of **forbidding** applied to more serious concerns; we may be **interdicted** the use of wine by a physician.

A thing is **forbidden** by a word; it is **prohibited** by a law; hence that which is immoral is **forbidden** by the express word of God; that which is illegal is **prohibited** by the laws of man. We are **forbidden** in the Scripture from even indulging a thought of committing evil; it is the policy of every government to **prohibit** the importation and exportation of such commodities as are likely to affect the internal trade of the country.* To **forbid** or **interdict** are opposed to command: to **prohibit**, to allow. As nothing is **forbidden** to Christians which is good and just in itself, so nothing is commanded that is hurtful and unjust; the same cannot be said of the Mahometan or any other religion. As no one is **prohibited** in our own country from writing that which can tend to the improvement of mankind; so on the other hand he is not allowed to indulge his private malignity by the publication of injurious personalities.

The father of Constantia was so incensed at the father of Theodosius that he **forbade** the son his house.—ADDISON.

I think that all persons (that is, quacks) should be **prohibited** from curing their incurable patients, by act of parliament.—HAWKESWORTH.

It is not to be desired that morality should be considered as **interdicted** to all future writers.—JOHNSON.

Forbid and **interdict** as personal acts, are properly applicable to persons only, but by an improper application are extended to things; **prohibit**, however, in the general sense of restraining, is applied with equal propriety to things as to persons: shame **forbids** us doing a thing; law, authority, and the like, **prohibit**.

Life's span **forbids** us to extend our cares, And stretch our hopes beyond our years.—CREECH.
Other ambition nature **interdicts**.—YOUNG.

Fear **prohibits** endeavours by infusing despair of success.—JOHNSON.

To Force, *v. To compel.*

Force, *v. Energy.*

Force, Violence.

Force, *v. To compel.*

Violence, in Latin *violentia*, from *vis*, and the Greek *βία* strength.

Both these terms imply an exertion of strength; but the former in a much less degree than the latter. **Force** is ordinarily employed to supply the want of a proper will, **violence** is used to counteract an opposing will. The arm of justice must exercise **force** in order to bring offenders to a proper account; one nation exercises **violence** against another in the act of carrying on war. **Force** is mostly conformable to reason and equity; **violence** is always resorted to for the attainment of that which is unattainable by law. All who are invested with authority have occasion to use **force** at certain times to subdue the unruly will of those who should submit: **violence** and rapine are inseparable companions; a robber could not subsist by the latter without exercising the former.

In an extended and figurative application to things, these terms convey the same general idea of exerting strength. That is said to have **force** that acts with **force**; and that to have **violence** that acts with **violence**. A word, an expression, or a remark, has **force** or is **forcible**, a disorder, a passion, a sentiment, has **violence** or is **violent**. **Force** is always something desirable; **violence** is always something hurtful. We ought to listen to arguments which have **force** in them; we endeavour to correct the **violence** of all angry passions.

Our host expelled, what farther **force** can stay
The victor troops from universal sway?—DRYDEN.

He sees his distress to be the immediate effect of human **violence** or oppression; and is obliged at the same time to consider it as a Divine judgement.—BLAIR.

Force, *v. Strain.*

Forcible, *v. Cogent.*

To Forebode, *v. To augur.*

Forecast, *v. Foresight.*

Forefathers, Progenitors, Ancestors.

Forefathers, signifies our *fathers* before us, and includes our immediate parents.

Progenitors, from *pro* and *gigno*, signifies those begotten before us, exclusive of our immediate parents.

Ancestors, contracted from *antecessors* or those going before, is said of those from whom we are remotely descended. **Forefathers** is a partial and familiar term for the preceding branches of any family; **progenitors** is a higher term in the same sense, applied to families of distinction: we speak of the **forefathers** of a peasant, but the **progenitors** of a nobleman. **Forefathers** and **progenitors**, but particularly the latter, are said mostly of individuals, and respect the regular line of succession in a family; **ancestors** is employed collectively as well as indi-

* Vide Trusler: "To forbid, prohibit,"

vidually and regards simply the order of succession: we may speak of the *ancestors* of a nation as well as of any particular person.

We passed slightly over three or four of our immediate *forefathers* whom we knew by tradition.—ADDISON.

Each in his narrow cell for ever laid,

The rude *forefathers* of the hamlet sleep.—GRAY.

Suppose a gentleman, full of his illustrious family, should see the whole line of his *progenitors* pass in review before him; with how many varying passions would he behold shepherds, soldiers, princess, and beggars walk in the procession of five thousand years.—ADDISON.

O majestic night!

Nature's great ancestor!—YOUNG.

It is highly laudable to pay respect to men who are descended from worthy *ancestors*.—ADDISON.

To Forego, *v.* To give up.

Foregoing, *v.* Antecedent.

Foreign, *v.* Extraneous.

Foreigner, *v.* Stranger.

Forerunner, Precursor, Messenger, Harbinger.

Forerunner and Precursor signify literally the same thing, namely, one *running before*; but the term *forerunner* is properly applied only to one who runs before to any spot to communicate intelligence; and it is figuratively applied to things which in their nature, or from a natural connexion, precede others; *precursor* is only employed in this figurative sense: thus imprudent speculations are said to be the *forerunners* of a man's ruin; the ferment which took place in men's minds was the *precursor* of the revolution.

Messenger signifies literally one bearing messages: and Harbinger, from the Teutonic *herbinger*, signifies a provider of a *herberge* or inn for princes.

Both terms are employed for persons; but the *messenger* states what has been or is; the *harbinger* announces what is to be. Our Saviour was the *messenger* of glad tidings to all mankind; the prophets were the *harbingers* of the Messiah. A *messenger* may be employed on different offices; a *harbinger* is a *messenger* who acts in a specific office. The angels are represented as *messengers* on different occasions. John the Baptist was the *harbinger* of our Saviour, who prepared the way of the Lord.

Loss of sight is the misery of life, and usually the *forerunner* of death.—SOUTH.

Gospel was a name of contempt given by the papists to the Lollards, the puritans of early times, and the *precursors* of protestantism.—JOHNSON.

His words are bonds, his oaths are oracles.

His tears pure *messengers* sent from his heart.

SHAKESPEARE.

Sin, and her shadow death; and misery,

Death's *harbinger*.—MILTON.

Foresight, Forethought, Forecast, Premeditation.

Foresight from seeing before, and Forethought, from thinking beforehand, denote the simple act of the mind in seeing a thing before it happens: Forecast, from casting the thoughts onward, signifies coming at the

knowledge of a thing beforehand by means of calculation. Premeditation, from *meditare*, signifies obtaining the same knowledge by force of meditating or reflecting deeply. Foresight and forethought are general and indefinite terms; we employ them either on ordinary or extraordinary occasions; but forethought is of the two the most familiar term; forecast and premeditation mostly in the latter case; all business requires foresight; state concerns require forecast: foresight and forecast respect what is to happen; they are the operations of the mind in calculating futurity: premeditation respects what is to be said or done; it is a preparation of the thoughts and designs for action: by foresight and forecast we guard against evils and provide for contingencies; by premeditation we guard against errors of conduct. A man betrays his want of foresight who does not provide against losses in trade; he shows his want of forecast who does not provide against old age; he shows his want of premeditation who acts or speaks on the impulse of the moment; the man therefore who does a wicked act without premeditation lessens his guilt.

The wary crane foresees it first, and sails

Above the storm, and leaves the lowly vales.

DRYDEN.

Let him forecast his work with timely care.

Which else is huddled, when the skies are fair.

DRYDEN.

The tongue may fail and falter in her sudden extemporal expressions, but the pen having a greater advantage of premeditation is not so subject to error.—HOWELL.

Forest, Chace, Park,

* Are all habitations for animals of venery; but the Forest is of the first magnitude and importance, it being a franchise and the property of the king; the Chace and Park may be either public or private property. The forest is so formed of wood, and covers such an extent of ground, that it may be the haunt of wild beasts; of this description are the forests in Germany: the chace is an indefinite and open space that is allotted expressly for the chace of particular animals, such as deer; the park is an inclosed space that serves for the preservation of domestic animals.

To Foretel, Predict, Prophesy, Prognosticate.

To Foretel compounded of *fore* and *tell*; Predict from *præ* and *dico*; Prophesy, in French *prophetiser*, Latin *prophetiso*, Greek *προφητεια*, all signify to tell, expound, or declare what is to happen, and convey the idea of a verbal communication of futurity to others: Prognosticate, from the Greek *προγινωσκω* to know beforehand, to bode or imagine to one's self beforehand, denotes the action of feeling or knowing, rather than speaking of things to come.

Foretel is the most general in its sense, and familiar in its application; we may foretel common events, although we cannot predict or prophesy anything important: to foretel is an ordinary gift; one foretels by a simple calculation or guess: to predict and prophesy are

* Vide Trusler: "Forest, chace, park."

extraordinary gifts; one *predicts* by a supernatural power real or supposed; one *propheesies* by means of inspiration. Men of discernment and experience easily *foretell* the events of undertakings which fall under their notice. The priests among the heathens, like the astrologers and conjurers of more modern times, pretended to *predict* events that affected nations and empires. The gift of *prophecy* was one among the number of the supernatural gifts communicated to the primitive Christians by the Holy Ghost.

Prediction as a noun is employed for both the verbs *foretell* and *predict*; it is therefore a term of less value than *prophecy*. We speak of a *prediction* being verified, and a *prophecy* fulfilled: the *predictions* of Almanac-makers respecting the weather are as seldom verified as the *prophecies* of visionaries and enthusiasts are fulfilled respecting the death of princes or the affairs of governments. To *prognosticate* is an act of the understanding; it is guided by outward symptoms as a rule; it is only stimulated and not guided by outward objects; a physician *prognosticates* the crisis of a disorder by the symptoms discoverable in the patient.

Above the rest, the sun who never lies,
Foretells the change of weather in the skies.
DRYDEN.

The consequences of suffering the French to establish themselves in Scotland, are *predicted* with great accuracy and discernment.—ROBERTSON.

An ancient augur *propheesied* from hence,
"Behold on Latian shores a foreign prince!"
DRYDEN.

Who that should view the small beginnings of some persons could imagine or *prognosticate* those vast increases of fortune that have afterwards followed them.—SOUTH.

Forethought, *v.* Forecast.

Forefeiture, *v.* Fine.

Forgetfulness, Oblivion.

Forgetfulness characterizes the person, or that which is personal; Oblivion the state of the thing: the former refers to him who *forgets*; the latter to that which is *forgotten*: we blame a person for his *forgetfulness*; but we sometimes bury things in *oblivion*.

I have read in ancient authors invitations to lay aside care and anxiety, and give a loose to that pleasing *forgetfulness* wherein men put off their characters of business.—STEELE.

O'er all the rest, an undistinguished crew,
Her wing of deepest shade *oblivion* drew.
FALCONER.

To Forgive, Pardon, Absolve, Remit.

Forgive, compounded of the privative *for* and *give*; and *Pardon*, in French *par-donner*, compounded likewise of the privative *par* or *per* and *donner* to give, both signify not to give the punishment that is due, to relax from the rigour of justice in demanding retribution. *Forgive* is the familiar term; *pardon* is adapted to the serious style. Individuals *forgive* each other personal offences; they *pardon* offences against law and morals: the former is an act of Christian charity: the latter an act of clemency: the former is an

act that is confined to no condition; the latter is peculiarly the act of a superior. He who has the right of being offended has an opportunity of *forgiving* the offender; he who has the authority of punishing the offence may *pardon*. Next to the principle of not taking offence easily, that of *forgiving* real injuries should be instilled into the infant mind: it is the happy prerogative of the monarch that he can extend his *pardon* to all criminals, except to those whose crimes have rendered them unworthy to live: they may be both used in relation to our Maker, but with a similar distinction in sense. God *forgives* the sins of his creatures as a father pitying his children; he *pardons* their sins as a judge extending mercy to criminals, as far as is consistent with justice.

* *Pardon*, when compared with *Remission*, is the consequence of offence; it respects principally the person offending; it depends upon him who is offended; it produces reconciliation when it is sincerely granted and sincerely demanded. *Remission* is the consequence of the crime; it has more particular regard to the punishment; it is granted either by the prince or magistrates; it arrests the execution of justice. *Remission*, like *pardon*, is peculiarly applicable to the sinner with regard to his Maker. *Absolution* is taken in no other sense: it is the consequence of the fault or the sin, and properly concerns the state of the culprit; it properly loosens him from the tie with which he is bound; it is pronounced either by the civil judge or the ecclesiastical minister; and it re-establishes the accused or the penitent in the rights of innocence.

The *pardon* of sin obliterates that which is past, and restores the sinner to the Divine favour; it is promised throughout Scripture to all men on the condition of faith and repentance; *remission* of sin alone averts the Divine vengeance, which otherwise would fall upon those who are guilty of it; and it is granted peculiarly to Christians upon the ground of Christ's expiatory sacrifice, which satisfies Divine justice for all offences: *absolution* of sin is the work of God's grace on the heart; it acts for the future as well as the past, by lessening the dominion of sin, and making those free who were before in bondage. The Roman Catholics look upon *absolution* as the immediate act of the Pope, by virtue of his sacred relationship to Christ; but the Protestants look to Christ only as the dispenser of this blessing to men, and his ministers simply as messengers to declare the divine will to men.

No more Achilles draws
His conqu'ring sword in any woman's cause.
The gods command me to *forgive* the past.
But let this first invasion be the last.—POPE.

A being who has nothing to *pardon* in himself may reward every man according to his works, but he whose very best actions must be seen with a grain of allowance, cannot be too mild, moderate, and *forgiving*.—ADDISON.

Round in his urn the blended balls he rolls,
Absolves the just, and dooms the guilty souls.
DRYDEN.

The soft Neapen race will soon repent
Their anger, and *remit* the punishment.—DRYDEN.

Forlorn, *v.* Forsaken.

* Vide Girard; "Absolution, pardon, remission."

Form, Figure, Conformation.

Form, in French *forme*, Latin *forma*, most probably from *φορμα* and *φορεω* to bear, signifies properly the image borne or stamped.

Figure (*v. Figure*) signifies the image feigned or conceived.

Conformation, in French *conformation*, in Latin *conformatio*, from *conform*, signifies the image disposed or put together.

* *Form* is the generic term; *figure* and *conformation* are special terms. The *form* is the work either of nature or art; it results from the arrangement of the parts: the *figure* is the work of design: it includes the general contour or outline: the *conformation* includes such a disposition of the parts of a body as is adapted for performing certain functions. *Form* is the property of every substance; and the artificial *form* approaches nearest to perfection, as it is most natural: the *figure* is the fruit of the imagination; it is the representation of the actual *form* that belongs to things; it is more or less just as it approaches to the *form* of the thing itself: *conformation* is said only with regard to animal bodies; nature renders it more or less suitable according to the accidental concurrence of physical causes.

The erect *form* of man is one of the distinguishing marks of his superiority over every other terrestrial being: the human *figure* when well painted is an object of admiration: the turn of the mind is doubtless influenced by the *conformation* of the organs. A person's *form* is said to be handsome or ugly, common or uncommon; his *figure* to be correct or incorrect; a *conformation* to be good or bad. Heathens have worshipped the Deity under various *forms*: mathematical *figures* are the only true *figures* with which we are acquainted: the craniologist affects to judge of characters by the *conformation* of the skull.

Form and *figure* are used in a moral application, although *conformation* is not.

We speak of adopting a *form* of faith, a *form* of words, a *form* of godliness; cutting a showy, a dismal, or ridiculous *figure*.

O ceremony! show me but thy worth,
Art thou aught else but place, degree, and form,
Creating fear and awe in other men?—SHAKESPEARE.

Lo, in the deep recesses of the wood,
Before my eyes a beautiful *form* appears:
A virgin's dress, and modest looks, she wears.
WYNN.

When Cæsar was one of the masters of the Roman mint, he placed the *figure* of an elephant upon the reverse of the public money; the word Cæsar signifying an elephant in the Punic language.—ADDISON.

Those who make the greatest *figure* in most arts and sciences are universally allowed to be of the British nation.—ADDISON.

As the *conformation* of their organs are nearly the same in all men, so the manner of perceiving external objects is in all men the same.—BURKE.

To Form, Fashion, Mould, Shape.

To **Form** is to put into a *form*, which is here as before (*v. Form*) the generic term: to **Fashion** is to put into a particular or distinct *form*: to **Mould** is to put into a set *form*: to **Shape** is to *form* simply as it re-

spects the exterior. As every thing receives a *form* when it receives existence, to *form* conveys the idea of producing. When we wish to represent a thing as *formed* in any distinct or remarkable way, we may speak of it as *fashioned*. God *formed* man out of the dust of the ground; he *fashioned* him after his own image. When we wish to represent a thing as *formed* according to a precise rule, we should say it was *moulded*; thus the habits of a man are *moulded* at the will of a superior. When we wish to represent a thing as receiving the accidental qualities which distinguish it from others, we talk of *shaping* it: the potter *shapes* the clay; the milliner *shapes* the bonnet; a man *shapes* his actions to the humours of another.

Nature has *formed* all animated beings with an instinctive desire of self-preservation. Creatures *fashioned* like ourselves with flesh and blood cannot attain to the perfection of spiritual beings. It is supposed by some that the human mind may be *moulded* upon the principles of art at the will of the instructor, with the same ease that wax may be *shaped* into the figure of a bird, a beast, or a man, at the pleasure of the artist. This is however true only in part.

Horace was intimate with a prince of the greatest goodness and humanity imaginable; and his court was *formed* after his example.—STEELE.

By the best information that I could get of this matter, I am apt to think that this prodigious pile was *fashioned* into the *shape* it now bears by several tools and instruments, of which they have a wonderful variety in this country.—ADDISON.

How dare you, mother, endless date demand,
For vessels *moulded* by a mortal hand?—DRYDEN.

To Form, Compose, Constitute.

Form (*v. Form, figure*) signifies to give a *form*.

Compose, *v. To compose*.

Constitute, *v. To constitute*.

Form is a generic and indefinite term. To *compose* and *constitute* are modes of forming. These words may be employed either to designate modes of action, or to characterize things. Things may be *formed* either by persons or things; they are *composed* and *constituted* only by conscious agents: thus persons *form* things, or things *form* one another: thus we *form* a circle, or the reflection of the light after rain *forms* a rainbow. Persons *compose* and *constitute*: thus a musician *composes* a piece of music, or men *constitute* laws. *Form* in regard to persons is the act of the will and determination; *compose* is a work of the intellect; *constitute* is an act of power. We *form* a party, we *form* a plan; we *compose* a book; men *constitute* governments, offices, &c.

When employed to characterize things, *form* signifies simply to have a *form*, be it either simple or complex; *compose* and *constitute* are said only of those things which have complex *forms*; the former as respecting the material, the latter the essential parts of an object: thus we may say that an object *forms* a circle, or a semicircle, or the segment of a circle: a society is *composed* of individuals; but law and order *constitute* the essence of society: so letters and syllables *compose* a word; but sense is essential to *constitute* a word.

* Vide Girard: "Façon, figure, forme, conformation,"

All animals of the same kind which form a society are more knowing than others.—ADDISON.

Nor did Israel scape
Th' infection, when their borrow'd gold compos'd
The calf in Oriel.—MILTON.

To receive and to communicate assistance constitutes the happiness of human life.—JOHNSON.

Form, Ceremony, Rite, Observance.

Form, v. Form, figure.

Ceremony, in Latin *ceremonia*, is supposed to signify the rites of Ceres.

Rite, in Latin *ritus*, is probably changed from *ratu*s, signifying a custom that is esteemed.

Observance signifies the thing observed.

All these terms are employed with regard to particular modes of action in civil society. *Form* is here, as in the preceding sections, the most general in its sense and application; *ceremony*, *rite*, and *observance*, are particular kinds of *form*, suited to particular occasions. *Form*, in its distinct application, respects all deliberate modes of acting and speaking, that are adopted by society at large, in every transaction of life; *ceremony* respects those *forms* of outward behaviour which are made the expressions of respect and deference; *rite* and *observance* are applied to national *ceremonies* in matters of religion. A certain *form* is requisite for the sake of order, method, and decorum, in every social matter, whether in affairs of state, in a court of law, in a place of worship, or in the private intercourse of friends. So long as distinctions are admitted in society, and men are agreed to express their sentiments of regard and respect to each other; it will be necessary to preserve the *ceremonies* of politeness which have been established. Every country has adopted certain *rites* founded upon its peculiar religious faith, and prescribed certain *observances* by which individuals could make a public profession of their faith. Administering oaths by the magistrate is a necessary *form* in law; kissing the king's hand is a *ceremony* practised at court; baptism is one *rite* of initiation into the Christian church, and confirmation another; prayer, reading the Scriptures, and preaching, are different religious *observances*.

As far as *ceremonies*, *rites*, and *observances*, respect religion, the first may be said either of an individual or a community; the second only of a community; and the last, more properly of an individual either in public or private. The *ceremony* of kneeling during the time of prayer is the most becoming posture for a suppliant, whether in public or private. The discipline of a Christian church consists in its *rites*, to which every member, either as a layman or a priest, is obliged to conform. Public worship is an *observance* which no Christian thinks himself at liberty to neglect.

It betrays either gross ignorance or wilful impertinence, to set at naught any of the established *forms* of society. When *ceremonies* are too numerous, they destroy the ease of social intercourse; but the absence of *ceremony* destroys all decency. In public worship the excess of *ceremony* is apt to extinguish the warmth and spirit of devotion; but the want of it deprives religious service of all solemnity,

You may discover tribes of men without policy, or laws, or cities, or any of the arts of life; but nowhere will you find them without some *form* of religion.—BLAIR.

And what have kings that privates have not too,
Save *ceremony*?—SHAKESPEARE.

Live thou to mourn thy love's unhappy fate,
To bear my mangled body from the foe,
Or buy it back, and fun'ral *rites* bestow.—DRYDEN.

Incorporated minds will always feel some inclination towards exterior acts and ritual *observances*.—JOHNSON.

To Form, v. To make.

Formal, Ceremonious.

Formal and **Ceremonious**, from *form* and *ceremony* (*v. Form, ceremony*), are either taken in an indifferent sense with respect to what contains *form* and *ceremony*, or in a bad sense, as expressing the excess of *form* and *ceremony*. A person expects to have a *formal* dismissal before he considers himself as dismissed; people of fashion pay each other *ceremonious* visits, by way of keeping up a distant intercourse. Whatever communications are made from one government to another must be made in a *formal* manner. It is the business of the church to regulate the *ceremonious* part of religion.

Formal in the bad sense, is opposed to easy: *ceremonious* to the cordial. A *formal* carriage prevents a person from indulging himself in the innocent familiarities of friendly intercourse; a *ceremonious* carriage puts a stop to all hospitality and kindness. Princes, in their *formal* intercourse with each other, know nothing of the pleasures of society; *ceremonious* visitants give and receive entertainments, without tasting any of the enjoyments which flow from the reciprocity of kind offices.

I have not thought fit to return them any *formal* answer.—ADDISON.

From the moment one sets up for an author, one must be treated as *ceremoniously*, that is, as unfaithfully, "as a king's favourite, or as a king."—POPE.

Former, v. Antecedent.

Formerly, In Times Past, Or Old Times, Days of Yore, Anciently, Or Ancient Times.

Formerly supposes a less remote period than **In Times Past**; and that less remote than **In Days of Yore** and **Anciently**. The two first may be said of what happens within the age of man; the last two are extended to many generations and ages. Any individual may use the word *formerly* with regard to himself: thus we enjoyed our health better *formerly* than now. An old man may speak of *times past*, as when he says he does not enjoy himself as he did in *times past*. **Old Times**, *days of yore*, and *anciently*, are more applicable to nations than to individuals; and all these express different degrees of remoteness. With respect to our present period, the age of Queen Elizabeth may be called *old times*; the days of Alfred, and still later, the *days of yore*: the earliest period in which Britain is mentioned may be termed **Ancient Times**.

Men were *formerly* disputed out of their doubts.
ADDISON.

In times of old, when time was young,
And poets their own verses sung,
A verse could draw a stone or beam.—SWIFT.
Thus Edgar proud, in days of yore,
Held monarchs labouring at the oar.—SWIFT.
In ancient times the sacred plough employ'd
The kings and awful fathers of mankind.
THOMSON.

Formidable, Dreadful, Terrible, Shocking.

Formidable is applied to that which is apt to excite fear (*v. To apprehend*); **Dreadful** (*v. To apprehend*) to what is calculated to excite dread; **Terrible** (*v. Alarm*) to that which excites terror; and **Shocking** (from *shake*) is applied to that which violently shakes or agitates (*v. To agitate*). The *formidable* acts neither suddenly nor violently; the *dreadful* may act violently, but not suddenly; thus the appearance of an army may be *formidable*; that of a field of battle is *dreadful*. The *terrible* and *shocking* act both suddenly and violently; but the former acts both on the senses and the imagination, the latter on the moral feelings: thus the glare of a tiger's eye is *terrible*; the unexpected news of a friend's death is *shocking*.

France continued not only powerful but *formidable* to the hour of the ruin of the monarchy.—BURKE.

Think, timely think, on the last *dreadful* day.
DRYDEN.

When men are arrived at thinking of their very dissolution with pleasure, how few things are there that can be *terrible* to them.—STEELE.

Nothing could be more *shocking* to a generous nobility than the entrusting to mercenary hands the defence of those territories which had been acquired or preserved by the blood of their ancestors.—ROBERTSON.

To Forsake, *v. To abandon*.

Forsaken, Forlorn, Destitute.

To be **Forsaken** (*v. To abandon*) is to be deprived of the company and assistance of others; to be **Forlorn**, from the German *verloren* lost, is to be *forsaken* in time of difficulty, to be without a guide in an unknown road; to be **Destitute**, from the Latin *destitutus*, is to be deprived of the first necessities of life.

To be *forsaken* is a partial situation; to be *forlorn* and *destitute* is a permanent condition. We may be *forsaken* by a fellow traveller on the road; we are *forlorn* when we get into a deserted path, with no one to direct us; we are *destitute* when we have no means of subsistence, nor the prospect of obtaining the means. It is particularly painful to be *forsaken* by the friend of our youth, and the sharer of our fortunes; the orphan, who is left to travel the road of life without counsellor or friend, is of all others in the most *forlorn* condition; if to this be added poverty, his misery is aggravated by his becoming *destitute*.

But fearful for themselves, my countrymen
Left me *forsaken* in the Cyclops' den.—DRYDEN.
Conscience made them (Joseph's brethren) recollect
that they who had once been deaf to the supplications
of a brother were now left friendless and *forlorn*.—BLAIR.

Friendless and *destitute* Dr. Goldsmith was exposed to all the miseries of indigence in a foreign country.—JOHNSON.

To Forswear, Perjure, Suborn.

Forswear is Saxon; **Perjure** is Latin; the preposition *for* and *per* are both privative, and the words signify literally to swear contrary to the truth; this is, however, not their only distinction: to *forswear* is applied to all kinds of oaths; to *perjure* is employed only for such oaths as have been administered by the civil magistrate.

A soldier *forswears* himself who breaks his oath of allegiance by desertion; and a subject *forswears* himself who takes an oath of allegiance to his Majesty which he afterwards violates: a man *perjures* himself in a court of law who swears to the truth of that which he knows to be false. *Forswear* is used only in the proper sense: *perjure* may be used figuratively with regard to lovers' vows; he who deserts his mistress to whom he has pledged his affection is a *perjured* man.

Forswear and *perjure* are the acts of individuals; **Suborn**, from the Latin *subornare*, signifies to make to *forswear*: a *perjured* man has all the guilt upon himself; but he who is *suborned* shares his guilt with the *suborner*.

False as thou art, and more than false, *forsworn*!
Not sprung from noble blood, nor goddess-born;
Why should I own? what worse have I to fear?
DRYDEN.

Be gone, for ever leave this happy sphere;
For *perjur'd* lovers have no mansions here.—LEE.

They were *suborn'd*;
Malcolm, and Donalbain, the king's two sons,
Are stole away and fled.—SHAKESPEARE.

To Fortify, *v. To strengthen*.

Fortitude, *v. Courage*.

Fortunate, Lucky, Prosperous, Successful.

Fortunate signifies having *fortune* (*v. Chance, fortune*).

Lucky signifies having *luck*, which is in German *gluck*, and in all probability comes from *gelingen* to succeed.

Prosperous, *v. To flourish*.

Successful signifies full of *success*, enabled to *succeed*.

The *fortunate* and *lucky* are both applied to that which happens without the control of man; but the latter, which is a collateral term, describes the capricious goddess *Fortune* in her most freakish humours, while *fortunate* represents her in her more sober mood: in other words, the *fortunate* is more according to the ordinary course of things; the *lucky* is something sudden, unaccountable, and singular: a circumstance is said to be *fortunate* which turns up suitably to our purpose; it is said to be *lucky* when it comes upon us unexpectedly, at the moment that it is wanted: hence we speak of a man as *fortunate* in his business, and the ordinary concerns of life; but *lucky* in the lottery or in games of chance: a *fortunate* year will make up for the losses of the past year; a *lucky* hit may repair the ruined spendthrift's *fortune* only to tempt him to still greater extravagances.

Prosperous and *successful* seem to exclude

the idea of what is *fortuitous*, although *prosperity* and *success* are both greatly aided by good *fortune*. *Fortunate* and *lucky* are applied as much to the removal of evil as to the attainment of good; *prosperous* and *successful* are concerned only in what is good, or esteemed as such: we may be *fortunate* in making our escape; we are *prosperous* in the acquirement of wealth. *Fortunate* is employed for single circumstances; *prosperous* only for a train of circumstances; a man may be *fortunate* in meeting with the approbation of a superior; he is *prosperous* in his business. *Prosperity* is extended to whatever is the object of our wishes in this world; *success* is that degree of *prosperity* which immediately attends our endeavours; wealth, honours, children, and all outward circumstances, constitute *prosperity*: the attainment of any object constitutes *success*: the *fortunate* and *lucky* man can lay no claim to merit, because they preclude the idea of exertion; *prosperous* and *successful* may claim a share of merit proportioned to the exertion.

Several of the Roman emperors, as is still to be seen upon their medals, among their other titles, gave themselves that of *Felix* or *fortunati*.—ADDISON.

This lucky moment the sly traitor chose,

Then starting from his ambush up he rose.

DRYDEN.

O fortunate old man, whose farm remains

For you sufficient, and requires your pains.

DRYDEN.

Riches are oft by guilt or baseness earn'd,

Or dealt by chance to shield a lucky knave.

ARMSTRONG.

Prosperous people (for happy there are none) are hurried away with a fond sense of their present condition, and thoughtless of the mutability of fortune.—STEELE.

Ye gods, presiding over lands and seas,

And you who raging winds and waves appease,

Breathe on our swelling sails a *prosperous* wind.

DRYDEN.

The Count d'Olivares was disgraced at the court of Madrid, because it was alleged against him that he had never *success* in his undertakings.—ADDISON.

Fortunate, v. Happy.

Fortune, v. Chance.

Forward, v. Onward.

To Forward, v. To encourage.

To Foster, Cherish, Harbour, Indulge.

To Foster is probably connected with father, in the natural sense, to bring up with a parent's care; to **Cherish**, from the Latin *carus* dear, is to feed with affection; to **Harbour**, from a *harbour* or *haven*, is to provide with a shelter and protection; to **Indulge**, from the Latin *dulcis* sweet, is to render sweet and agreeable. These terms are all employed here in the moral acceptation, to express the idea of giving nourishment to an object.

To foster in the mind is to keep with care and positive endeavours; as when one *fosters* prejudices by encouraging every thing which favours them: to *cherish* in the mind is to hold dear or set a value upon; as when one *cherishes* good sentiments, by dwelling upon them with inward satisfaction: to *harbour* is to allow room in the mind, and is generally

taken in the worst sense, for giving admission to that which ought to be excluded; as when one *harbours* resentment by permitting it to have a resting-place in the heart: to *indulge* in the mind, is to give the whole mind to, to make it the chief source of pleasure; as when one *indulges* an affection, by making the will and the outward conduct bend to its gratifications.

He who *fosters* pride in his breast lays up for himself a store of mortification in his intercourse with the world; it is the duty of a man to *cherish* sentiments of tenderness and kindness towards the woman whom he has made the object of his choice; nothing evinces the innate depravity of the human heart more forcibly than the spirit of malice, which some men *harbour* for years together; any affection of the mind, if *indulged* beyond the bounds of discretion, will become a hurtful passion, that may endanger the peace of society as much as that of the individual.

The greater part of those who live but to infuse malignity, and multiply enemies, have no hopes to *foster*, no designs to promote, nor any expectations of attaining power by insulence.—JOHNSON.

As social inclinations are absolutely necessary to the well-being of the world, it is the duty and interest of every individual to *cherish* and improve them to the benefit of mankind.—BERKELEY.

This is scorn,

Which the fair soul of gentle Athenais

Would ne'er have *harbour'd*.—LEX.

The king (Charles I.) would *indulge* no refinements of casuistry, however plausible, in such delicate subjects, and was resolved, that what depredations soever fortune should commit upon him, she never should bereave him of his honour.—DUME.

Foul, v. Nasty.

To Found, Ground, Rest, Build.

Found, in French *fonder*, Latin *fundo*, comes from *fundus* the ground, and, like the verb **Ground**, properly signifies to make firm in the ground, to make the ground the support.

To found implies the exercise of art and contrivance in making a support; to *ground* signifies to lay a thing so deep that it may not totter; it is merely in the moral sense that they are here considered, as the verb to *ground* with this signification is never used otherwise. **Found** is applied to outward circumstances; *ground* is to what passes inwardly: a man *found*s his charge against another upon certain facts that are come to his knowledge; he *grounds* his belief upon the most substantial evidence: a man should be cautious not to make any accusations which are not well *found*ed; nor to *indulge* any expectations which are not well *ground*ed: monarchs commonly *found* their claims to a throne upon the right of primogeniture; Christians *ground* their hopes of immortality on the word of God.

To found and *ground* are said of things which demand the full exercise of the mental powers; to **Rest** is an action of less importance: whatever is *found*ed requires and has the utmost support; whatever is *rest*ed is more by the will of the individual: a man *found*s his reasoning upon some unequivocal fact, he *rest*s his assertion upon mere hearsay.

The words *found*, *ground*, and *rest*, have always an immediate reference to the thing that supports; to *Build* has an especial reference to that which is supported, to the superstructure that is raised: we should not say that a person *found*s an hypothesis, without adding something, as observations, experiments, and the like, upon which it was *founded*; but we may speak of his simply *building* systems, supposing them to be the mere fruit of his distempered imagination; or we may say that a system of astronomy has been *built* upon the discovery of Copernicus respecting the motion of the earth.

The only sure principles we can lay down for regulating our conduct must be *founded* on the Christian religion.—BLAIR.

I know there are persons who look upon these wonders of art (in ancient history) as fabulous; but I cannot find any *ground* for such a suspicion.—ADDISON.

Our distinction must *rest* upon a steady adherence to rational religion, when the multitude are deviating into heinous and criminal conduct.—BLAIR.

They who from a mistaken zeal for the honour of Divine revelation, either deny the existence, or vilify the authority of natural religion, are not aware, that by disallowing the sense of obligation they undermine the foundation on which revelation *builds* its power of commanding the heart.—BLAIR.

To Found, v. To institute.

Foundation, Ground, Basis.

Foundation and *Ground* derive their meaning and application from the preceding article; a report is said to be without any *foundation*, which has taken its rise in mere conjecture, or in some arbitrary cause independent of all fact; a man's suspicion is said to be without *ground*, which is not supported by the shadow of external evidence; *unfounded* clamours are frequently raised against the measures of government; *groundless* jealousies frequently arise between families, to disturb the harmony of their intercourse.

Foundation and *Basis* may be compared with each other, either in the proper or the improper signification: both *foundation* and *basis* are the lowest parts of any structure; but the former lies under *ground*, the latter stands above: the *foundation* supports some large and artificially erected pile; the *basis* supports a simple pillar: hence we speak of the *foundation* of St. Paul's, and the *base* or *basis* of the monument: this distinction is likewise preserved in the moral application of the terms: disputes have too often their *foundation* in frivolous circumstances; treaties have commonly their *basis* in acknowledged general principle; with governments that are at war pacific negotiations may be commenced on the *basis* of the *uti possidetis*.

If the *foundation* of an high name be virtue and service, all that is offered against it is but rumour, which is too short lived to stand up in competition with glory, which is everlasting.—STEELE.

Every subject of the British government has good *grounds* for loving and respecting his country.—BLAIR.

It is certain that the *basis* of all lasting reputation is laid in moral worth.—BLAIR.

Fountain, v. Spring.

Fraction, v. Rupture.

Fracture, v. Rupture.

Fragile, Frail, Brittle.

Fragile and *Frail*, in French *frêle*, both come from the Latin *fragilis*, signifying breakable; but the former is used in the proper sense only, and the latter more generally in the improper sense: man, corporeally considered, is a *fragile* creature, his frame is composed of *fragile* materials; mentally considered, he is a *frail* creature, for he is liable to every sort of *frailty*.

Brittle comes from the Saxon *brittan* to break, and by the termination *le* or *lis*, denotes likewise a capacity to break, that is, properly breakable; but it conveys a stronger idea of this quality than *fragile*: the latter applies to whatever will break from the effects of time; *brittle* to that which will not bear a temporary violence: in this sense all the works of men are *fragile*, and in fact all sublunary things; but glass stone, and ice, are peculiarly denominated *brittle*.

An appearance of delicacy, and even of *fragility*, is almost essential to beauty.—BURKE.

What joys, alas! could this *frail* being give,
That I have been so covetous to live.—DRYDEN.

The brittle chain of this world's friendships is as effectually broken when one is 'oblitus meum,' as when one is 'obliviscendus et illis.'—CROFT.

FrAGRANCE, v. Smell.

FRail, v. FRAGILE.

FRailty, v. IMPERFECTION.

Frame, Temper, Temperament, Constitution.

Frame in its natural sense is that which forms the exterior edging of any thing, and consequently determines its form; it is applied to man physically or mentally, as denoting that constituent portion of him which seems to hold the rest together; which by an extension of the metaphor is likewise put for the whole contents, the whole body, or the whole mind.

Temper and *Temperament*, in Latin *temperamentum* from *tempero* to govern or dispose, signify the particular modes of being disposed or organized.

Constitution, from *constitute* or appoint, signifies the particular mode of being constituted or formed.

Frame, when applied to the body, is taken in its most universal sense; as when we speak of the *frame* being violently agitated, or the human *frame* being wonderfully constructed; when applied to the mind it will admit either of a general or restricted signification. *Temper*, which is applicable only to the mind, is taken in the general or particular state of the individual. The *frame* comprehends either the whole body of mental powers, or the particular disposition of those powers in individuals; the *temper* comprehends the general or particular state of feeling as well as thinking in the individual. The mental *frame* which receives any violent concussion is liable to derangement; it is necessary for those who govern to be well acquainted with the *temper* of those whom they govern. By reflection on

the various attributes of the Divine Being, a man may easily bring his mind into a *frame* of devotion: by the indulgence of a fretful repining temper, a man destroys his own peace of mind, and offends his Maker.

Temperament and constitution mark the general state of the individual; the former comprehends a mixture of the physical and mental; the latter has a purely physical application. A man with a warm *temperament* owes his warmth of character to the rapid impetus of the blood; a man with a delicate *constitution* is exposed to great fluctuations in his health; the whole *frame* of a new-born infant is peculiarly tender. Men of fierce *tempers* are to be found in all nations; men of sanguine *tempers* are more frequent in warm climates; the *constitutions* of females are more tender than those of the male, and their *frames* are altogether more susceptible.

The soul
Contemplates what she is, and whence she came,
And almost comprehends her own amazing frame.
JENYNS.

Tis he
Sets superstition high on virtue's throne,
Then thinks his Maker's temper like his own.
JENYNS.

There is a great tendency to cheerfulness in religion; and such a *frame* of mind is not only the most lovely, but the most commendable in a virtuous person.—ADDISON.

The sole strength of the sound from the shouting of multitudes so amazes and confounds the imagination, that the best established *tempers* can scarcely forbear being borne down.—BURKE.

I have always more need of a laugh than a cry, being somewhat disposed to melancholy by my *temperament*.—COWPER.

How little our *constitution* is able to bear a remove into parts of this air, not much higher than that we commonly breathe in.—LOCKE.

To Frame, v. To invent.

Frank, Candid, Ingenuous, Free,
Open, Plain.

Frank, in French *franc*, German, &c., *frank*, is connected with the word *frech* bold, and *frei* free.

Candid, v. *Candid*.

Ingenuous comes from the Latin *ingenuus*, which signifies literally free-born, as distinguished from the *liberti* who were afterwards made *free*: hence the term has been employed by a figure of speech to denote nobleness of birth or character. According to Girard, *ingenu* in French is taken in a bad sense; and Dr. Trusler, in translating his article *sincerité*, *franchise*, *naïveté*, *ingénuité*, has erroneously assigned the same office to our word *ingenuous*; but this has kept true to the original, by being always an epithet of commendation.

Free is to be found in most of the northern languages under different forms, and is supposed by Adelung to be connected with the preposition *from*, which denotes a separation or enlargement.

Open, v. *Candid*.

Plain, v. *Apparent*, also *evident*.

All these terms convey the idea of a readiness to communicate and be communicated

with; they are all opposed to concealment, but under different circumstances. The *frank* man is under no constraint; his thoughts and feelings are both set at ease, and his lips are ever ready to give utterance to the dictates of his heart; he has no reserve: the *candid* man has nothing to conceal; he speaks without regard to self-interest or any partial motive; he speaks nothing but the truth: the *ingenuous* man throws off all disguise; he scorns all artifice, and brings everything to light; he speaks the whole truth. *Frankness* is acceptable in the general transactions of society; it inspires confidence, and invites communication: *candour* is of peculiar use in matters of dispute: it serves the purposes of equity, and invites to conciliation: *ingenuousness* is most wanted where there is most to conceal; it courts favour and kindness by an acknowledgment of that which is against itself.

Frankness is associated with unpolished manners, and frequently appears in men of no rank or education; sailors have commonly a deal of *frankness* about them: *candour* is the companion of uprightness; it must be accompanied with some refinement, as it acts in cases where nice discriminations are made: *ingenuousness* is the companion of a noble and elevated spirit: it exists most frequently in the unsophisticated period of youth.

Frankness displays itself in the outward behaviour; we speak of a *frank* air and *frank* manner: *candour* displays itself in the language which we adopt, and the sentiments we express; we speak of a *candid* statement, a *candid* reply: *ingenuousness* shows itself in all the words, looks, or actions: we speak of an *ingenuous* countenance, an *ingenuous* acknowledgement, an *ingenuous* answer. *Frankness* and *candour* may be either habitual or occasional; *ingenuousness* is a permanent character: a disposition may be *frank*, or an air of *frankness* and *candour* may be assumed for the time; but an *ingenuous* character remains one and the same.

Frankness is a voluntary effusion of the mind between equals; a man *frankly* confesses to his friend the state of his affections or circumstances: *candour* is a debt paid to justice from one independent being to another; he who is *candid* is so from the necessity of the case; when a *candid* man feels himself to have been in an error which affects another, he is impelled to make the only reparation in his power by acknowledging it: *ingenuousness* is the offering of an uncorrupted mind at the shrine of truth; it presupposes an inferiority in outward circumstances, and a motive, if not a direct necessity, for communication; the lad who does not wish to screen himself from punishment by a lie will *ingenuously* confess his offence; he who does not wish to obtain false applause will *ingenuously* disclaim his share in the performance which has obtained the applause.

Free, *open*, and *plain*, have not so high an office as the first three: *free* and *open* may be taken either in a good, bad, or indifferent sense; but seldom in the first than in the two last senses.

The *frank*, *free*, and *open* man all speak without constraint; but the *frank* man is not impertinent like the *free* man, nor indiscreet like

the open man. The *frank* man speaks only of what concerns himself; the *free* man speaks of what concerns others: a *frank* man may confess his own faults or inadvertencies; the *free* man corrects those which he sees in another: the *frank* man opens his heart from the warmth of his nature; the *free* man opens his mind from the conceit of his temper; and the *open* man says all he knows and thinks, from the inconsiderate levity of his temper.

A *frank* man is not *frank* to all, nor on all occasions; he is *frank* to his friends, or he is *frank* in his dealings with others: but the *open* man lets himself out like a running stream to all who choose to listen, and communicates trivial or important matters with equal eagerness: on the other hand, it is sometimes becoming in one to be *free* where counsel can be given with advantage and pleasure to the receiver; and it is pleasant to see an *open* behaviour, particularly in young persons, when contrasted with the odious trait of cunning and reserve.

Plainness, the last quality to be here noticed, is a virtue which, though of the humbler order, is not to be despised: it is sometimes employed like *freedom* in the task of giving counsel; but it does not convey the idea of any thing unauthorized either in matter or manner. A *free* counsellor is more ready to display his own superiority than to direct the wanderer in his way; he rather aggravates faults than instructs how to amend them; he seems more like a supercilious enemy than a friendly monitor: the *plain* man is *free* from these faults: he speaks *plainly* but truly; he gives no false colouring to his speech; it is not calculated to offend, and it may serve for improvement: it is the part of a true friend to be *plain* with another whom he sees in imminent danger. A *free* speaker is in danger of being hated; a *plain* dealer must at least be respected.

My own private opinion with regard to such recreations (as poetry and music) I have given with all the *frankness* imaginable.—STEELE.

If you have made any better remarks of your own, communicate them with *candour*; if not, make use of those I present you with.—ADDISON.

We see an *ingenuous* kind of behaviour not only make up for faults committed, but in a manner expiate them in the very commission.—STEELE.

We cheer the youth to make his own defence,

And *freely* tell us what he was and whence. DRYDEN.

If I have abused your goodness by too much *freedom*, I hope you will attribute it to the *openness* of my temper.—POPE.

Pope hardly drank tea without a stratagem: if at the house of his friends he wanted any accommodation, he was not willing to ask for it in *plain* terms, but would mention it remotely as something convenient.—JOHNSON.

Fraud, v. Deceit.

Fraudulent, v. Fallacious.

Freak, Whim.

Freak most probably comes from the German *freak* bold and petulant. *Whim* from Teutonic *wimmen* to whine or whimper: but they have at present somewhat deviated from their original meaning; for a *freak* has more of childishness and humour than boldness in it, a *whim* more of eccentricity than of childishness. Fancy and fortune are both said to have

their *freaks*, as they both deviate most widely in their movements from all rule; but *whims* are at most but singular deviations of the mind from its ordinary and even course. Females are most liable to be seized with *freaks*, which are in their nature sudden and not to be calculated upon: men are apt to indulge themselves in *whims* which are in their nature strange and often laughable. We should call it a *freak* for a female to put on the habit of a male, and so accoutred to sally forth into the streets: we term it a *whim* in a man who takes a resolution never to shave himself any more.

But the long pomp, the midnight masquerade,
With all the *freaks* of wanton wealth array'd,
In these, ere trifles half their wish obtain,
The toiling pleasure sickens into pain.

GOLDSMITH.

'Tis all bequeath'd to public uses,
To public uses! There's a *whim*!

What had the public done for him?—SWIFT.

Free, v. Communicative.

Free, v. Frank.

Free, Liberal.

In the former section (*v. Frank*) *Free* is considered only as it respects communication by words, in the present case it respects actions and sentiments. In all its acceptations *free* is a term of dispraise, and *Liberal* that of commendation. To be *free* signifies to act or think at will; to be *liberal* is to act according to the dictates of an enlarged heart and an enlightened mind. A clown or a fool may be *free* with his money, and may squander it away to please his humour, or gratify his appetite; but the nobleman and the wise man will be *liberal* in rewarding merit, in encouraging industry, and in promoting whatever can contribute to the ornament, the prosperity, and improvement of his country. A man who is *free* in his sentiments thinks as he pleases; the man who is *liberal* thinks according to the extent of his knowledge. The *free*-thinking man is wise in his own conceit, he despises the opinions of others; the *liberal*-minded thinks modestly on his own personal attainments, and builds upon the wisdom of others.

The *freethinker* circumscribes all knowledge within the conceptions of a few superlatively wise heads; the *liberal*-minded is anxious to enlarge the boundaries of science by making all the thinking world in all ages to contribute to the advancement of knowledge. With the *freethinker* nothing is good that is old or established; with the *liberal* man nothing is good because it is new, nothing bad because it is old. Men of the least knowledge and understanding are the most *free* in their opinions, in which description of men this age abounds above all others; such men are exceedingly anxious to usurp the epithet *liberal* to themselves; but the good sense of mankind will prevail against partial endeavours, and assign this title to none but men of comprehensive talents, sound judgements, extensive experience, and deep erudition.

It seems as if *freedom* of thought was that aberration of the mind which is opposed to the two extremes of superstition and bigotry; and that *liberality* is the happy medium. The *freethinker* holds nothing sacred, and is attached

to nothing but his own conceits; the superstitious man holds too many things sacred, and is attached to every thing that favours this bent of his mind. A *freethinker* accommodates his duties to his inclinations; he denies his obligation to any thing which comes across the peculiar fashion of his sentiment. A man of *free* sentiments rejects the spirit of Christianity, with the letter or outward formality; the superstitious man loses the spirit of Christianity in his extravagant devotion to its outward formalities.

On the other hand, bigotry and *liberality* are opposed to each other, not in regard to what they believe, so much as in regard to the nature of their belief. The bigoted man so narrows his mind to the compass of his belief as to exclude every other object; the *liberal* man directs his views to every object which does not directly interfere with his belief. It is possible for the bigoted and the *liberal* man to have the same faith, but the former mistakes its true object and tendency, namely, the improvement of his rational powers, which the latter pursues.

It is evident, therefore, from the above, that *freethinking*, *superstition*, and *bigotry*, are alike the offspring of ignorance; and that *liberality* is the handmaid of science, and the daughter of truth. Of all mental aberrations *freedom* of thinking is the most obnoxious, as it is fostered by the pride of the heart, and the vanity of the imagination. In *superstition* we sometimes see the anxiety of a well-disposed mind to discharge its conscience: with *bigotry* we often see associated the mild virtues which are taught by Christianity; but in the *freethinker* we only see the bad passions and the unruly will set *free* from all the restraints of outward authority, and disengaged from the control of reason and judgement: in such a man the amiable qualities of the natural disposition become corrupted, and the evil humours triumph.

The *freethinkers* plead very hard to think *freely*: they have it; but what use do they make of it? Do their writings show a greater depth of design, or more just and correct reasoning, than those of other men?—BERKELEY.

Their pretensions to be *freethinkers* is no other than rakes have to be *freelivers*, and savages to be *freemen*.—ADDISON.

For me, for whose well-being
So amply, and with hands so *liberal*,
Thou hast provided all things.—MILTON.

The desire of knowledge discovers a *liberal* mind.—BLAIR.

To Free, Set Free, Deliver, Liberate.

To *Free* is properly to make *free*, in distinction from *Set Free*; the first is employed in what concerns ourselves, and the second in that which concerns another. A man *frees* himself from an engagement; he *sets* another *free* from his engagement; we *free*, or *set* ourselves *free*, from that which has been imposed upon us by ourselves or by circumstances; we are *Delivered* or *Liberated* from that which others have imposed upon us; the former from evils in general, the latter from the evil of confinement. I *free* myself from a burden; I *set* my own slave *free* from his slavery; I *deliver* another man's slave from a state of bondage; I *liberate* a man from

prison. A man *frees* an estate from rent, service, taxes, and all incumbrances; a king *sets* his subjects *free* from certain imposts or tributes, he *delivers* them from a foreign yoke, or he *liberates* those who have been taken in war. We *free* either by an act of the will or by contrivance and method; we *set* *free* by an act of authority; we *deliver* or *liberate* by active measures and physical strength. A man *frees* himself from impertinence by escaping the company of the impertinent; he *sets* others *free* from all apprehensions by assuring them of his protection; he *delivers* them out of a perilous situation by his presence of mind. A country is *freed* from the horrors of a revolution by the vigorous counsels of a determined statesman; in this manner was England *freed* from a counterpart of the French revolution by the vigour of the government; a country is *set* *free* from the exactions and hardships of usurpation and tyranny by the mild influence of established government; in this manner is Europe *set* *free* from the iron yoke of the French usurper by its ancient rulers. A country is *delivered* from the grasp and oppression of the invader; in this manner has Spain been *delivered*, by the wisdom and valour of an illustrious British general at the head of a band of British heroes.

When applied in a spiritual sense *free* is applied to sin; *set* *free* is employed for obligation and responsibility; *deliver* is employed for external circumstances. God, as our Redeemer, *frees* us from the bondage and consequences of sin, by the dispensations of his atoning grace; but he does not *set* us *free* from any of our moral obligations or moral responsibility as *free* agents; as our Preserver He *delivers* us from dangers and misfortunes, trials and temptations.

She then
Sent Iris down to *free* her from the strife
Of labouring nature, and dissolve her life.
DRYDEN.

When heav'n would kindly *set* us *free*,
And earth's enchantment end;
It takes the most effectual means,
And robs us of a friend.—YOUNG.

However desirous Mary was of obtaining *deliverance* from Darnley's caprices, she had good reasons for rejecting the method by which they proposed to accomplish it.—ROBERTSON.

The inquisitor rang a bell, and ordered Nicolas to be forthwith *liberated*.—CUMBERLAND.

Free, Familiar.

Free has already been considered as it respects words, actions, and sentiments (*v. Free*); in the present case it is coupled with *Familiarity*, inasmuch as they respect the outward behaviour or conduct in general of men one to another.

To be *free* is to be disengaged from all the constraints which the ceremonies of social intercourse impose; to be *familiar* is to be upon the footing of a *familiar*, of a relative, or one of the same family. Neither of these terms can be admitted as unexceptionable; but *freedom* is that which is in general totally unauthorized; *familiarity* sometimes shelters itself under the sanction of long, close, and friendly intercourse.

Free is a term of much more extensive import than *familiar*; a man may be *free* towards

another in a thousand ways; but he is *familiar* towards him only in his manners and address. A man who is *free* looks upon everything as his which he chooses to make use of; a *familiar* man only wants to share with another and to stand upon an equal footing. A man who is *free* will take possession of another man's house or room in his absence, and will make use of his name or his property as it suits his convenience; his *freedom* always turns upon that which contributes to his own indulgence; a man who is *familiar* will smile upon you, take hold of your arm, call you by some friendly name, and seek to enjoy with you all the pleasures of social intercourse; his *familiarity* always turns upon that which will increase his own importance. There cannot be two greater enemies to the harmony of society than *freedom* and *familiarity*; both of which it is the whole business of politeness to destroy; for no man can be *free* without being in danger of infringing upon what belongs to another, nor *familiar* without being in danger of obtruding himself to the annoyance of others.

Upon equality depends the *freedom* of discourse, and consequently the ease and good humour of every society. —TYRREWHITT.

Familiar converse improved general civilities into an unfeigned passion on both sides. —STEELE.

Free, Exempt.

Free v. Free, liberal.

Exempt in Latin *exemptus*, participle of *eximo*, signifies set out or disengaged from anything.

The condition and not the conduct of men is here considered. *Freedom* is either accidental or intentional; the *exemption* is always intentional: we may be *free* from disorders, or *free* from troubles; we are *exempt*, that is *exempted* by government, from serving in the militia. *Free* is applied to everything from which any one may wish to be *free*; but *exempt*, on the contrary, to those burdens which we should share with others; we may be *free* from imperfections, *free* from inconveniences, *free* from the interruptions of others; but *exempt* from any office or tax. We may likewise be said to be *exempt* from troubles when speaking of these as the dispensations of Providence to others.

O happy, if he knew his happy state.

The swain who, *free* from business and debate,

Receives his easy food from nature's hand. —DRYDEN.

To be *exempt* from the passions with which others are tormented is the only pleasing solitude. —ADDISON.

Freedom, Liberty.

Freedom, the abstract noun of *free*, is taken in all the senses of the primitive. **Liberty**, from the Latin *liber free*, is only taken in the sense of *free* from external constraint, from the action of power.

Freedom is personal and private; *liberty* is public. The *freedom* of the city is the privilege granted by the city to individuals; the *liberties* of the city are the immunities enjoyed by the city. By the same rule of distinction we speak of the *freedom* of the will, the *freedom* of manners, the *freedom* of conversation, or the *freedom* of debate; but the *liberty* of con-

science, the *liberty* of the press, the *liberty* of the subject. A slave obtains his *freedom*; a captive obtains his *liberty*.

Freedom serves moreover to qualify the action; *liberty* is applied only to the agent; hence we say, to speak or think with *freedom*; but to have the *liberty* of speaking, thinking, or acting. *Freedom* and *liberty* are likewise employed for the private conduct of individuals towards each other; but the former is used in a qualified good sense, the latter in an unqualified bad sense. A *freedom* may sometimes be licensed or allowed; a *liberty* is always taken in a bad sense. A *freedom* may be innocent and even pleasant; a *liberty* always does more or less violence to the decencies of life, or the feelings of individuals. There are little *freedoms* which may pass between youth of different sexes, so as to heighten the pleasures of society; but a modest woman will be careful to guard against any *freedoms* which may admit of misinterpretation, and resent every *liberty* offered to her as an insult.

The ends for which men unite in society, and submit to government, are to enjoy security to their property and *freedom* to their persons, from all injustice or violence. —BLAIR.

I would not venture into the world under the character of a man who pretends to talk like other people, until I had arrived at a full *freedom* of speech. —ADDISON.

The *liberty* of the press is a blessing when we are inclined to write against others, and a calamity when we find ourselves overborne by the multitude of our assailants. —JOHNSON.

Freight, Cargo, Lading, Load, Burden.

Freight, through the Northern languages in all probability comes from the Latin *fero* to bring, signifying the thing brought.

Cargo, in French *cargaison*, probably a variation from *carriage*, is employed for all the contents of a vessel, with the exception of the persons that it carries.

Lading and Load (in German *laden* to load), come most probably from the word *last* a *burden*, signifying the *burden* or weight imposed upon any carriage.

Burden, which through the medium of the Northern languages, comes from the Greek *φορτος*, and *φερω* to carry, conveys the idea of weight which is borne by the vessel.

A captain speaks of the *freight* of his ship as that which is the object of his voyage, by which all who are interested in it are to make their profit; the value and nature of the *freight* are the first objects of consideration: he speaks of the *lading* as the thing which is to fill the ship; the quantity and weight of the *lading* are to be taken into the consideration: he speaks of the *cargo* as that which goes with the ship, and belongs as it were to the ship; the amount of the *cargo* is that which is first thought of: he speaks of the *burden* as that which his vessel will bear; it is the property of the ship which is to be estimated.

The ship-broker regulates the *freight*: the captain and the crew dispose the *lading*: the agent sees to the disposal of the *cargo*: the ship-builder determines the *burden*: the carrier looks to the *load* which he has to carry. The *freight* must consist of such merchandize

as will pay for the transport and risk: the lading must consist of such things as can be most conveniently stowed: the value of a cargo depends not only on the nature of the commodity, but the market to which it is carried: the burden of a vessel is estimated by the number of tons which it can carry.

Haste, my dear father (tis no time to wait),
And load my shoulders with a willing freight.
—DRYDEN.

The surging air ceases
Its plummy burden.—THOMSON.

To Frequent, Resort To, Haunt.

Frequent comes from *frequent*, in Latin *frequens* crowded, signifying to come in numbers or come often to the same place.

Resort, in French *ressortir*, compounded of *re* and *sortir*, signifies to go backward and forward.

Haunt, from the French *hanter* to frequent.

Frequent is more commonly used of an individual who goes often to a place; *resort* and *haunt* of a number of individuals. A man is said to *frequent* a public place; but several persons may *resort* to a private place: men who are not fond of home *frequent* taverns; in the first ages of Christianity, while persecution raged, its professors used to *resort* to private places for purposes of worship.

Frequent and *resort* are indifferent actions; but *haunt* is always used in a bad sense. A man may *frequent* a theatre, a club, or any other social meeting, innocent or otherwise; people from different quarters may *resort* to a fair, a church, or any other place where they wish to meet for a common purpose; but those who *haunt* any place go to it in privacy for some bad purpose. Our Saviour *frequented* the synagogues: the followers of the prophet Mahomet *resort* to his tomb at Mecca: thieves *haunt* the darkest and most retired parts of a city in order to concert their measures for obtaining plunder.

For my own part, I have ever regarded our inns of court as nurseries of statesmen and lawgivers, which makes me often *frequent* that part of the town.—BUDGE.

Home is the *resort*
Of love, of joy, of peace, and plenty, where
Supporting and supported, polish'd friends
And dear relations mingle into bliss.—THOMSON.

But harden'd by affronts, and still the same,
Lost to all sense of honour and of fame,
Thou yet canst love to *haunt* the great man's board,
And think no supper good but with a lord.—LEWIS.

Frequently, *v. Commonly*.

Frequently, *v. Often*.

Fresh, New, Recent.

Adelung supposes the German word *frisch* to be derived from *frieren* to freeze, as the idea of coolness is prevalent in its application to the air; it is therefore figuratively applied to that which is in its first pure and best state.

New, in German *neu*, comes from the Latin *novus*, and the Greek *neos*.

Recent, in Latin *recens*, is supposed to come from *re* and *candeo* to whiten or give a

fair colour to, because what is *new* looks so much fairer than what is old.

The *fresh* is properly opposed to the stale, as the *new* is to the old: the *fresh* has undergone no change; the *new* has not been long in being. Meat, beer, and provisions in general, are said to be *fresh*; but that which is substantial and durable, as houses, clothes, books, and the like, are said to be *new*.

Recent is taken only in the improper application; the other two admit of both applications in this case: the *fresh* is said in relation to what has lately preceded; *new* is said in relation to what has not long subsisted; *recent* is used for what has just passed in distinction from that which has long gone by. A person gives *fresh* cause of offence who has already offended; a thing receives a *new* name in lieu of the one which it has long had; a *recent* transaction excites an interest which cannot be excited by one of earlier date. *Fresh* intelligence arrives every day; it quickly succeeds the events: that intelligence which is *recent* to a person at a distance is already old to one who is on the spot. *Fresh* circumstances continually arise to confirm reports; *new* changes continually take place to supersede the things that were established.

Lo! great Æneas rushes to the fight,
Sprung from a god, and more than mortal bold;
He *fresh* in youth, and I in arms grown old.—POPE.

Seasons but change *new* pleasures to produce,
And elements contend to serve our use.—JENYNS.

The courage of the Parliament was increased by two recent events which had happened in their favour.—HUME.

To Fret, *v. To rub*.

Fretful, *v. Captious*.

Friendly, *v. Amicable*.

Friendship, *v. Love*.

Frigid, *v. Cool*.

Fright, *v. Alarm*.

To Frighten, Intimidate.

Between **Frighten** and **Intimidate** there is the same difference as between *fright* (*v. Alarm*) and *fear* (*v. To apprehend*): the danger that is near or before the eyes *frightens*; that which is seen at a distance *intimidates*: hence females are oftener *frightened*, and men are oftener *intimidated*: nises will *frighten*; threats may *intimidate*; we may run away when we are *frightened*; we waver in our resolution when we are *intimidated*: we fear immediate bodily harm when we are *frightened*; we fear harm to our property as well as our persons when we are *intimidated*: *frighten*, therefore, is always applied to animals, but *intimidate* never.

And perch, a horror! on his sacred crown,
If that such profanation were permitted
Of the by-standers, who with reverend care
Fright them away.—CUMBERLAND.

Cortes, unwilling to employ force, endeavoured alternately to soothe and *intimidate* Montezuma.—ROBERTSON.

Frightful, *v. Fearful*.

Frivolous, *v. Trifling*.

Frolic, Gambol, Prank.

Frolic, in German, &c., *fröhlich* cheerful, comes from *froh* merry, and *freude* joy.

Gambol signifies literally leaping into the air, from *gamb*, in French *jamb* the leg.

Prank is changed from *prance*, which literally signifies to throw up the hind feet after the manner of a horse, and is most probably connected with the German *prangen* to make a parade or fuss, and the Hebrew *parang* to set free, because the freedom indicated by the word *prank* is more or less discoverable in the sense of all these terms. The *frolic* is a merry, joyous entertainment; the *gambol* is a dancing, light entertainment; the *prank* is a freakish, wild entertainment. Laughing, singing, noise, and feasting, constitute the *frolic* of the careless mind; it belongs to a company: conceit, levity, and trick, in movement, gesture, and contrivance, constitute the *gambol*; it belongs to the individual: adventure, eccentricity, and humour, constitute the *prank*; it belongs to one or many. One has a *frolic*; one plays a *gambol*, or a *prank*. *Frolic* is the mirth rather of vulgar minds; servants have their *frolics* in the kitchen while their masters have pleasures abroad: *gambols* are the diversions of youth; the Christmas season has given rise to a variety of *gambols* for the entertainment of both sexes: *pranks* are the diversions of the undisciplined; the rude schoolboy broke loose from school spends his time in molesting a neighbourhood with his mischievous *pranks*. *Frolic* is the diversion of human beings only; *gambol* and *prank* is likewise applicable to brutes; a kitten *gambols*; a horse, a monkey, and a squirrel, will play *pranks*.

I have heard of some very merry fellows, among whom the *frolic* was started and passed by a great majority, that every man should immediately draw a tooth.—STEEL.

What are those crested locks

That make such wanton *gambols* with the wind?
SHAKESPEARE.

Some time afterwards (1756), some young men of the college, whose chambers were near his (Gray's), diverted themselves by frequent and troublesome noises, and, as is said, by *pranks* yet more offensive and contemptuous.—JOHNSON.

To Front, *v. To face.*

Frontier, *v. Border.*

Froward, *v. Aukward.*

Frugality, *v. Economy.*

Fruitful, *v. Fertile.*

Fruition, *v. Enjoyment.*

Fruitless, *v. Vain.*

To Frustrate, *v. To defeat.*

To Fulfil, *v. To execute.*

To Fulfil, Accomplish, Realize.

To Fulfil is literally to fill quite full, that is, to bring about *full* to the wishes of a person; **Accomplish** (*v. To accomplish*) is to bring to perfection, but without reference to the wishes of any one; to **Realize** is to make *real*, namely, whatever has been aimed

at. The application of these terms is evident from their explanations: the wishes, the expectations, the intentions, and promises, of an individual, are appropriately said to be *fulfilled*; national projects, or undertakings, prophecies, and whatever is of general interest, are said to be *accomplished*: the fortune, or the prospects of an individual, or whatever results successfully from specific efforts, is said to be *realized*: the *fulfilment* of our wishes may be as much the effect of good fortune as of design; the *accomplishment* of projects mostly results from extraordinary exertion, as the *accomplishment* of prophecies results from a miraculous exertion of power; the *realization* of hopes results more commonly from the slow process of moderate, well combined efforts than from anything extraordinary.

The palsied dotard looks round him, perceives himself to be alone; he has survived his friends, and he wishes to follow them: his wish is *fulfilled*; he drops torpid and insensible into that gulf which is deeper than the grave.—HAWKSWORTH.

After my fancy had been busied in attempting to realize the scenes that Shakspeare drew, I regretted that the labour was ineffectual.—HAWKSWORTH.

To Fulfil, *v. To keep.*

Fully, *v. Largely.*

Fulness, Plenitude.

Although **Plenitude** is no more than a derivative from the Latin for **Fulness**, yet the latter is used either in the proper sense to express the state of objects that are *full*, or in the improper sense to express great quantity, which is the accompaniment of *fulness*; the former only in the higher style and in the improper sense: hence we say in the *fulness* of one's heart, in the *fulness* of one's joy, or the *fulness* of the Godhead bodily; but the *plenitude* of glory, the *plenitude* of power.

All mankind

Must have been lost, adjudg'd to death and hell,

By doom severe, had not the Son of God.

In whom the *fulness* dwells of love divine,

His dearest meditation thus renew'd.—MILTON.

The most beneficent Being is he who hath an absolute *fulness* of perfection in himself, who gave existence to the universe, and so cannot be supposed to want that which he communicated without diminishing from the *plenitude* of his own power and happiness.—GROVE.

Function, *v. Office.*

Funeral, Obsequies.

Funeral, in Latin *funus*, is derived from *funis* a cord, because lighted cords, or torches, were carried before bodies which were interred by night; the term *funeral*, therefore, denotes the ordinary solemnity which attends the consignment of a body to the grave.

Obsequies, in Latin *exæquie*, are both derived from *sequor*, which, in its compound sense, signifies to perform or execute; they comprehend, therefore, *funerals* attended with more than ordinary solemnity.

We speak of the *funeral* as the last sad office which we perform for a friend; it is accompanied by nothing but by mourning and sorrow: we speak of *obsequies* as the greatest tribute of respect which can be paid to the person of one who was high in station or

public esteem : the *funeral*, by its frequency, becomes so familiar an object that it passes by unheeded ; *obsequies* which are performed over the remains of the great, attract our notice from the pomp and grandeur with which they are conducted.

That pluck'd my nerves, those tender strings of life,
Which, pluck'd a little more, will toll the bell
That calls my few friends to my *funeral*.—YOUNG.
Some in the flow'r-strown grave the corpse have lay'd,
And annual *obsequies* around it paid.—JENYNS.

Furious, v. Violent.

To Furnish, v. To provide.

Furniture, v. Goods.

Fury, v. Anger.

Fury, v. Madness.

Futile, v. Trifling.

G.

Gain, v. To acquire.

Gain, Profit, Emolument, Lucre.

Gain signifies in general what is gained (*v. To acquire*).

Profit, v. Advantage.

Emolument, from *emolior*, signifies to work out or get by working.

Lucre is in Latin *lucrum* gain, which probably comes from *luc* to pay, signifying that which comes to a man's purse.

Gain is here a general term, the other terms are specific : the *gain* is that which comes to a man ; it is the fruit of his exertions, or agreeable to his wish : the *profit* is that which accrues from the thing. Thus when applied to riches, that which increases a man's estate are his *gains* ; that which flows out of his trade are his *profits* ; that is, they are his *gains* upon dealing. **Emolument** is a species of *gain* from labour, or a collateral *gain* ; of this description are a man's *emoluments* from an office : a man estimates his *gains* by what he receives in the year ; he estimates his *profits* by what he receives on every article ; he estimates his *emoluments* according to the nature of the service which he has to perform : the merchant talks of his *gains* ; the retail dealer of his *profits* ; the piece-man of his *emoluments*.

Gain and **profit** are also taken in an abstract sense ; **lucre** is never used otherwise ; but the latter always conveys a bad meaning ; it is, strictly speaking, unhallowed *gain* : an immoderate thirst for *gain* is the vice of men who are always calculating *profit* and loss ; a thirst for *lucre* deadens every generous feeling of the mind.

Gain and **profit** may be extended to other objects, and sometimes opposed to each other ; for as that which we *gain* is what we wish only, it is often the reverse of *profitable* : hence the force of that important question in Scripture, What shall it *profit* a man if he *gain* the whole world and lose his own soul ?

The *gains* of ordinary trades and vocations are honest and furthered by two things, chiefly by diligence, and by a good name.—BACON.

Why may not a whole estate, thrown into a kind of garden, turn as much to the *profit* as the pleasure of the owner.—ADDISON

Except the salary of the Laureate, to which King James added the office of Historiographer, perhaps with some additional *emoluments*. Dryden's whole revenue seems to have been casual.—JOHNSON.

O sacred hunger of pernicious gold !
What bands of faith can impious *lucre* hold ?
DRYDEN.

To Gain, v. To get.

Gait, v. Carriage.

Gale, v. Breeze.

To Gall, v. To rub.

Gallant, v. Brave.

Gallant, Beau, Spark.

These words convey nothing respectful of the person to whom they are applied ; but the first, as is evident from its derivation, has something in it to recommend it to attention above the other : as true valour is ever associated with a regard for the fair sex, a **Gallant** man will always be a *gallant* when he can render the female any service ; sometimes, however, his *gallantries* may be such as to do them harm rather than good ; insignificance and effeminacy characterize the **Beau** or fine gentleman ; he is the woman's man—the humble servant to supply the place of a lacquey : the **Spark** has but a *spark* of that fire which shows itself in impetuous puerilities ; it is applicable to youth who are just broke loose from school or college, and eager to display their manhood.

The god of wit, and light, and arts,
With all acquir'd and natural parts,
Was an unfortunate *gallant*.—SWIFT.

His pride began to interpose,
Prefer'd before a crowd of *beaus*.—SWIFT.

Off it has been my lot to mark
A proud, conceited, talking *spark*.—MERRICK.

Gambol, v. Frolic.

Game, v. Play.

Gang, v. Band.

Gap, v. Breach.

To Gape, Stare, Gaze.

To **Gape**, in German *gaffen*, Saxon *geopnian* to make open or wide, is to look with an open or wide mouth.

Stare, from the German *starr* fixed, signifies to look with a fixed eye.

Gaze comes very probably from the Greek *αἰνέσθαι* to admire, because it signifies to look steadily from a sentiment of admiration.

Gape and *stare* are taken in a bad sense; the former indicating the astonishment of gross ignorance; the latter not only ignorance but impertinence: *gaze* is taken always in a good sense, as indicating laudable feeling of astonishment, pleasure, or curiosity: a clown *gapes* at the pictures of wild beasts which he sees at a fair; an impertinent fellow *stares* at every woman he looks at, and stares a modest woman out of countenance: a lover of the fine arts will *gaze* with admiration and delight at the productions of Raphael or Titian; when a person is stupefied by affright, he gives a vacant *stare*: those who are filled with transport *gaze* on the object of their ecstasy.

It was now a miserable spectacle to see us nodding and gaping at one another, every man talking and no man heard.—SIR JOHN MANDEVILLE.

Astonish'd Anus just arrives by chance
To see his fall, nor farther dares advance;
But, fixing on the maid his horrid eye,
He stares and shakes, and finds it vain to fly.
DRYDEN.

For, while expecting there the queen, he rais'd
His wond'ring eyes, and round the temple gaz'd,
Admir'd the fortune of the rising town.
The striving artists, and their art's renown.
DRYDEN.

Garrulous, *v. Talkative.*

To Gasp, *v. To palpitate.*

To Gather, Collect.

To **Gather**, in Saxon *gatharian* probably contracted from *get here*, signifies simply to bring to one spot. To **Collect** (*v. To assemble, collect*) annexes also the idea of binding or forming into a whole; we *gather* that which is scattered in different parts: thus stones are *gathered* into a heap; vessels are *collected* so as to form a fleet. *Gathering* is a mere act of necessity or convenience; *collecting* is an act of design or choice: we *gather* apples from a tree or a servant *gathers* books from off a table; the antiquarian *collects* coins, and the bibliomaniac *collects* rare books.

As the small ant (for she instructs the man,
And preaches labour) *gathers* all she can.—CREECH.
The royal bee, queen of the rosy bower,
Collects her precious sweets from every flower.
C. JOHNSON.

Grudy, *v. Showy.*

Gay, *v. Cheerful.*

Gay, *v. Showy.*

To Gaze, *v. To gape.*

Gender, Sex.

Gender, in Latin *genus* signifies properly a genus or kind. **Sex**, in French *sexe*, Latin *sexis*, comes from the Greek *ἑξίς*, signifying the habit or nature. The *gender* is that distinction in words which marks the distinction

of sex in things: there are therefore three genders, but only two sexes. By the inflections of words are denoted whether things are of this or that sex, or of no sex. The genders therefore are divided in grammar into masculine, feminine, and neuter; and animals are divided into male and female sex.

General, Universal.

The **General** is to the **Universal** what the part is to the whole. What is *general* includes the greater part or number; what is *universal* includes every individual or part. The *general* rule admits of many exceptions; the *universal* rule admits of none. Human government has the *general* good for its object: the government of Providence is directed to *universal* good. *General* is opposed to particular, and *universal* to individual. A scientific writer will not content himself with *general* remarks, when he has it in his power to enter into particulars; the *universal* complaint which we hear against men for their pride shows that in every individual it exists to a greater or less degree. It is a *general* opinion that women are not qualified for scientific pursuits, but Madame Dacier, the Marchioness of Chatelet, and Madame de Gragny, each in her way, form exceptions no less honourable to their whole sex than to themselves in particular: it is a *universal* principle, that children ought to honour their parents; the intention of the Creator in this respect is manifested in such a variety of forms as to admit of no question. *General* philosophy considers the properties common to all bodies, and regards the distinct properties of particular bodies, only in as much as they confirm abstract *general* views. *Universal* philosophy depends on *universal* science or knowledge, which belongs only to the infinite mind of the Creator. *General* grammar embraces in it all principles that are supposed to be applicable to all languages: *universal* grammar is a thing scarcely attainable by the stretch of human power. What man can become so thoroughly acquainted with all existing languages, as to reduce all their particular idioms to any system?

Generally, *v. Commonly.*

Generation, Age.

Generation is said of the persons who live during any particular period; and **Age** is said of the period itself.

Those who are born at the same time constitute the *generation*; that period of time which comprehends the age of man is the *age*; there may therefore be many *generations* spring up in the course of an *age*; a fresh *generation* is springing up every day, which in the course of an age pass away, and are succeeded by fresh *generations*.

We consider man in his *generation* as to the part which he has to perform. We consider the *age* in which we live as to the manners of men and the events of nations.

I often lamented that I was not one of that happy *generation* who demolished the convents.—JOHNSON.

Throughout every age, God hath pointed his peculiar displeasure against the confidence of presumption, and the arrogance of prosperity.—BLAIR.

Generation, *v.* Race.

Generous, *v.* Beneficent.

Genius, *v.* Intellect.

Genius, *v.* Taste.

Genteel, Polite.

Genteel, in French *gentil*, Latin *gentilis*, signifies literally one belonging to the same family, or the next akin to whom the estate would fall, if there were no children: hence by an extended application it denoted to be of family.

Polite, *v.* Civil.

Gentility respects rank in life; *politeness* the refinement of the mind and outward behaviour.

A genteel education is suited to the station of a gentleman; a polite education fits for polished society and conversation, and raises the individual among his equals.

There may be *gentility* without *politeness*; and *vice-versa*. A person may have genteel manners, a genteel carriage, a genteel mode of living as far as respects his general relation with society, but a polite behaviour and a polite address, which qualify him for every relation in society, and enable him to shine in connection with all orders of men, is independent of either birth or wealth; it is in part a gift of nature, although it is to be acquired by art.

His equipage, servants, house, and furniture may be such as to entitle a man to the name of genteel, although he is wanting in all the forms of real good-breeding: while fortune may sometimes frown upon the polished gentleman, whose politeness is a recommendation to him wherever he goes.

A lady of genius will give a genteel air to her whole dress by a well-fancied suit of knots, as a judicious writer gives a spirit to a whole sentence by a single expression.—GAY.

In this isle remote,
Our painted ancestors were slow to learn,
To arms devote, in the polite arts.
Nor skilled, nor studious.—SOMERVILLE.

Gentile, Heathen, Pagan.

* The Jews comprehended all strangers under the name of Goin, nations or Gentiles: among the Greeks and Romans they were designated by the name of barbarians. By the name *Gentile* was understood especially those who were not of the Jewish religion, including, in the end, even the Christians; for as Fleury remarks, there were some among these uncircumcised Gentiles who worshipped the true God, and were permitted to dwell in the holy land provided they observed the law of nature and abstinence.

Some learned men pretend that the Gentiles were so named from their having only a natural law, and such as they imposed on themselves, in opposition to the Jews and Christians, who have a positive revealed law to which they are obliged to submit.

Frisch and others derive the word *Heathen* from the Greek *εθνη*, *εθνικος*, which is corroborated by the translation in the Anglo Saxon

law of the word *heathne* by the Greek *εθνη*. Adeling, however, thinks it to be more probably derived from the word *heide* a field, for the same reason as *Pagan* is derived from *pagus* a village, because when Constantine banished idolators from the towns, they repaired to the villages, and secretly adhered to their religious worship, whence they were termed by the Christians of the fourth century *Pagani*, which, as he supposes, was translated literally into the German *heidener*, a villager or worshipper in the field. Be this as it may, it is evident that the word *Heathen* is in our language more applicable than *Pagan* to the Greeks, the Romans, and the cultivated nations who practised idolatry; and, on the other hand, *Pagan* is more properly employed for rude and uncivilized people who worship false Gods.

The *Gentile* does not expressly believe in a Divine Revelation; but he either admits of the truth in part, or is ready to receive it: the *Heathen* adopts a positively false system that is opposed to the true faith: the *Pagan* is a species of *Heathen* who obstinately persists in a worship which is merely the fruit of his own imagination. The *Heathens* or *Pagans* are *Gentiles*; but the *Gentiles* are not all either *Heathens* or *Pagans*. Confucius and Socrates, who rejected the plurality of Gods, and the followers of Mahomet, who adore the true God, are, properly speaking, *Gentiles*. The worshippers of Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, and all the deities of the ancients, are termed *Heathens*. The worshippers of Po, Brama, Xaca, and all the deities of savage nations, are termed *Pagans*.

The *Gentiles* were called to the true faith, and obeyed the call: many of the illustrious *Heathens* would have doubtless done the same had they enjoyed the same privilege: there are to this day many *Pagans* who reject this advantage, to pursue their own blind imaginations.

There might be several among the *Gentiles* in the same condition that Cornelius was before he became a Christian.—TILLOTSON.

Not that I believe that all virtues of the *Heathens* were counterfeit, and destitute of an inward principle of goodness. God forbid we should pass so hard a judgement upon those excellent men, Socrates, and Epictetus, and Antoninus.—TILLOTSON.

And nations laid in blood; dread sacrifice
To Christian pride! which had with horror shock'd
The darkest Pagans, offered to their gods.—YOUNG.

Gentle, Tame.

Gentleness lies rather in the natural disposition; Tameless is the effect either of art or circumstances. Any unbroken horse may be gentle, but not tame: a horse that is broken in will be tame, but not always gentle.

Gentle, as before observed (*v.* *Genteel*), signifies literally well-born, and is opposed either to the fierce or the rude: *tame*, in German *zähm*, from *zähm* a bride, signifies literally curbed or kept under, and is opposed either to the wild or the spirited.

Animals are in general said to be gentle who show a disposition to associate with man, and conform to his will; they are said to be tame, if either by compulsion or habit they are brought to mix with human society. Of the first description there are individuals in almost

* Vide Roubaud: "Gentils, païens."

every species which are more or less entitled to the name of *gentle*; of the latter description are many species, as the dog, the sheep, the hen, and the like.

In the moral application *gentle* is always employed in the good, and *tame* in the bad, sense: a *gentle* spirit needs no control; it amalgamates freely with the will of another; a *tame* spirit is without any will of its own; it is alive to nothing but submission; it is perfectly consistent with our natural liberty to have *gentleness*, but *tameness* is the accompaniment of slavery. The same distinction marks the use of these words when applied to the outward conduct or the language: *gentle* bespeaks something positively good; *tame* bespeaks the want of an essential good: the former is allied to the kind—the latter to the abject and mean qualities which naturally flow from the compression or destruction of energy and will in the agent. A *gentle* expression is devoid of all acrimony, and serves to turn away wrath: a *tame* expression is devoid of all force or energy, and ill-calculated to inspire the mind with any feeling whatever. In giving counsel to an irritable and conceited temper, it is necessary to be *gentle*: *tame* expressions are nowhere such striking deformities as in a poem or an oration.

This said, the hoary king no longer staid,
But on his car the slaughter'd victims laid;
Then seized the reins, his *gentle* steeds to guide,
And drove to Troy, Antenor at his side.—POPE.
For Orpheus' lute could soften steel and stone,
Make tigers *tame*, and huge Leviathans.

SHAKESPEARE.

Gentleness stands opposed, not to the most determined regard to virtue and truth, but to harshness and severity, to pride and arrogance.—BLAIR.

Though all wanton provocations, and contemptuous insolence, are to be diligently avoided, there is no less danger in timid compliance and *tame* resignation.—JOHNSON.

Gentle, *v. Soft*.

Genuine, *v. Intrinsic*.

Gesticulation, *v. Action*.

Gesture, *v. Action*.

To Get, Gain, Obtain, Procure.

To *Get* signifies simply to cause to have or possess; it is generic, and the rest specific: to *Gain* (*v. To acquire*) is to get the thing one wishes, or that is for one's advantage: to *Obtain* is to get the thing aimed at or striven after: to *Procure*, from *pro* and *curo* to care for, is to get the thing wanted or sought for.

Get is not only the most general in its sense, but its application; it may be substituted in almost every case for the other terms, for we may say to get or gain a prize, to get or obtain a reward, to get or procure a book; and it is also employed in numberless familiar cases, where the other terms would be less suitable, for what this word gains in familiarity, it loses in dignity: hence we may with propriety talk of a servant's getting some water, or a person getting a book off a shelf, or getting meat from the butcher, with numberless similar cases in which the other terms could not be employed without losing their dignity. Moreover, *get* is promiscuously used for whatever comes to the hand, whether good or bad,

desirable or not desirable, sought for or not; but *gain*, *obtain*, and *procure*, always include either the wishes or the instrumentality of the agent, or both together. Thus a person is said to get a cold, or a fever, a good or an ill name, without specifying any of the circumstances of the action; but he is said to gain that approbation which is gratifying to his feelings; to obtain a recompense which is the object of his exertions; to procure a situation which is the end of his endeavours.

The word *gain* is peculiarly applicable to whatever comes to us fortuitously; what we gain constitutes our good fortune; we gain a victory, or we gain a cause; the result in both cases may be independent of our exertions. To obtain and procure exclude the idea of chance, and suppose exertions directed to a specific end: but the former may include the exertions of others; the latter is particularly employed for one's own personal exertions. A person obtains a situation through the recommendation of a friend: he procures a situation by applying for it. Obtain is likewise employed only in that which requires particular efforts, that which is not immediately within our reach; procure is applicable to that which is to be got with ease, by the simple exertion of a walk, or of asking for.

The miser is more industrious than the saint: the pains of getting, the fears of losing, and the inability of enjoying his wealth, have been the mark of avarice in all ages.—SPECTATOR.

Neither Virgil nor Horace would have gained so great reputation in the world had they not been the friends and admirers of each other.—ADDISON.

All things are blended, changeable, and vain!

No hope, no wish, we perfectly obtain.—JENYNS.

Ambition pushes the soul to such actions as are apt to procure honour and reputation to the actor.—ADDISON.

Ghastly, *v. Hideous*.

Ghost, *v. Vision*.

To Gibe, *v. To scoff*.

Giddiness, *v. Lightness*.

Gift, Present, Donation.

Gift is derived from to give, in the sense of what is communicated to another gratuitously of one's property.

Present is derived from to present, signifying the thing presented to another.

Donation, from the French *donation*, and the Latin *dono* to present or give, is a species of gift.

The gift is an act of generosity or condescension; it contributes to the benefit of the receiver: the present is an act of kindness, courtesy, or respect; it contributes to the pleasure of the receiver. The gift passes from the rich to the poor, from the high to the low, and creates an obligation; the present passes either between equals or from the inferior to the superior. Whatever we receive from God, through the bounty of his Providence, we entitle a gift; whatever we receive from our friends, or whatever princes receive from their subjects, are entitled presents. We are told by all travellers that it is a custom in the East never to approach a great man without a present; the value of a gift is often heightened by being given opportunely. The value of a

present often depends upon the value we have for the giver; the smallest present from an esteemed friend is of more worth in our eyes than the costliest *presents* that monarchs receive.

The *gifts* of heav'n my following song pursues,
Aerial honey and ambrosial dews.—DRYDEN.

Have what you ask, your *presents* I receive;
Land, where and when you please, with ample leave.
DRYDEN.

The *gift* is private, and benefits the individual; the *donation* is public, and serves some general purpose: what is given to relieve the necessities of any poor person is a *gift*; what is given to support an institution is a *donation*. The clergy are indebted to their patrons for the livings which are in their *gift*: it has been the custom of the pious and charitable, in all ages, to make *donations* for the support of alms-houses, hospitals, infirmaries, and such institutions as serve to diminish the sum of human misery.

And she shall have them, if again she sues,
Since you the giver and the *gift* refuse.—DRYDEN.

The ecclesiastics were not content with the *donations* made them by the Saxon princes and nobles.—HUME.

Gift, Endowment, Talent.

Gift, v. Gift.

Endowment signifies the thing with which one is endowed.

Talent, v. Faculty.

Gift and *endowment* both refer to the act of *giving* and *endowing*, and of course include the idea of something given, and something received: the word *talent* conveys no such collateral idea. When we speak of a *gift*, we refer in our minds to a *giver*; when we speak of an *endowment*, we refer in our minds to the receiver; when we speak of a *talent*, we only think of its intrinsic quality.

A *gift* is either supernatural or natural; an *endowment* is only natural. The primitive Christians received various *gifts* through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, as the *gift* of tongues, the *gift* of healing, &c. There are some men who have a peculiar *gift* of utterance; beauty of person, and corporeal agility, are *endowments* with which some are peculiarly invested.

The word *gift* excludes the idea of anything acquired by exertion; it is that which is communicated to us altogether independently of ourselves, and enables us to arrive at that perfection in any art which could not be attained any other way. Speech is denominated a general *gift*, inasmuch as it is given to the whole human race, in distinction from the brutes; but the *gift* of eloquence is a peculiar *gift* granted to a few individuals, in distinction from others, and one which may be exerted for the benefit of mankind. *Endowments*, though inherent in us, are not independent of our exertions; they are qualities which admit of improvement by being used; they are in fact the *gifts* of nature, which serve to adorn and elevate the possessor, when employed for a good purpose. *Talents* are either natural or acquired, or in some measure of a mixed nature; they denote powers without

specifying the source from which they proceed; a man may have a *talent* for music, for drawing, for mimicry, and the like; but this *talent* may be the fruit of practice and experience, as much as of nature.

It is clear from the above that an *endowment* is a *gift*, but a *gift* is not always an *endowment*; and that a *talent* may also be either a *gift* or an *endowment*, but that it is frequently distinct from both. The terms *gift* and *talent* are applicable to corporeal as well as spiritual actions; *endowment* to corporeal or mental qualities. To write a superior hand is a *gift*, inasmuch as it is supposed to be unattainable by any force of application and instruction; it is a *talent* inasmuch as it is a power or property worth our possession, but it is never an *endowment*. On the other hand, courage, discernment, a strong imagination, and the like, are both *gifts* and *endowments*; and when the intellectual *endowment* displays itself in any creative form, as in the case of poetry, music, or any art, so as to produce that which is valued and esteemed, it becomes a *talent* to the possessor.

But Heaven its *gifts* not all at once bestows,
These years with wisdom crowns, with action those.

POPE.

A brute arrives at a point of perfection that he can never pass; in a few years he has all the *endowments* he is capable of.—ADDISON.

Mr. Locke has an admirable reflection upon the difference of wit and judgement, whereby he endeavours to show the reason why they are not always the *talents* of the same person.—ADDISON.

To Give, Grant, Bestow.

Give, in Saxon, *gifan*, German *geben*, &c. is derived by Adelung from the old word *gaf* the hollow of the hand.

Grant and Bestow, v. To allow.

The idea of communicating to another what is our own, or in our power, is common to these terms: this is the whole signification of *give*; but *grant* and *bestow* include accessory ideas in their meaning. To *grant* is to *give* at one's pleasure; to *bestow* is to *give* with a certain degree of necessity. *Giving* is confined to no object; whatever property we transfer into the hands of another, that we *give*; we *give* money, clothes, food, or whatever is transferable; *granting* is confined to such objects as afford pleasure or convenience; they may consist of transferable property or not; *bestowing* is applied to such objects only as are necessary to supply wants, which always consist of that which is transferable. We *give* what is liked or not liked, asked for or unasked for; we *grant* that only which is wished for and requested. One may *give* poison or medicine; one may *give* to a beggar, or to a friend; one *grants* a sum of money by way of loan; we *give* what is wanted or not wanted; we *bestow* that only which is expressly wanted; we *give* with an idea of a return or otherwise; we *grant* voluntarily, without any prospect of a return; we *give* for a permanency or otherwise; we *bestow* only in particular cases which require immediate notice. Many *give* things to the rich only to increase the number of their superfluities, and they *give* to the poor to relieve their necessities; they *bestow* their alms on an indigent sufferer.

To *give* has no respect to the circumstances of the action or the agent; it is applicable to persons of all conditions: to *grant* bespeaks not only the will, but the power and influence of the *granter*: to *bestow* bespeaks the necessitous condition of the receiver. Children may *give* to their parents and parents to their children, kings to their subjects or subjects to their kings; but monarchs only *grant* to their subjects, or parents to their children: and superiors in general *bestow* upon their dependants that which they cannot provide for themselves.

In an extended application of the terms to moral objects or circumstances, they strictly adhere to the same line of distinction. We *give* our consent; we *give* our promise; we *give* our word; we *give* credit; we *give* in all cases that which may be simply transferred from one to another. Liberties, rights, privileges, favours, indulgences, permissions, and all things are *granted* which are in the hands only of a few, but are acceptable to many. Blessings, care, concern, and the like, are *bestowed* upon those who are dependent upon others for whatever they have.

Happy when both to the same centre move,
When kings *give* liberty, and subjects love.
DENHAM.

The gods will grant
What their unerring wisdom sees they want.
DRYDEN.

Give and *bestow* are likewise said of things as well as of persons; *grant* is said only of persons. *Give* is here equally general and indefinite; *bestow* conveys the idea of *giving* under circumstances of necessity and urgency. One *gives* a preference to a particular situation; one *gives* a thought to a subject that is proposed; one *gives* time and labour to any matter that engages one's attention: but one *bestows* pains on that which demands particular attention; one *bestows* a moment's thought on one particular subject out of the number which engage attention.

Milton afterwards *gives* us a description of the morning, which is wonderfully suitable to a divine poem.—ADDISON.

After having thus treated at large of *Paradise Lost*, I could not think it sufficient to have celebrated this poem, in the whole, without descending to particulars: I have therefore *bestowed* a paper on each book.—ADDISON.

To Give, Afford.

Give (*v. To give, grant*) and *Afford* (*v. To afford*), are allied to each other in the sense of sending forth: but the former denotes an unqualified and unconditional action, as in the preceding article; the latter bears a relation to the circumstances of the agent. A person is said to *give* money without any regard to the state of his finances: he is said to *afford* what he *gives* when one wishes to define his pecuniary condition. The same idea runs through the application of these terms to all other cases in which inanimate things are made the agents. When we say a thing *gives* satisfaction, we simply designate the action; when we say it *affords* pleasure, we refer to the nature and properties of the thing thus specified; the former is employed only to declare the fact, the latter to characterize the object. Hence, in certain cases, we should

say, this or that posture of the body *gives* ease to a sick person; but, as a moral sentiment, we should say, nothing *affords* such ease to the mind as a clear conscience. Upon the same grounds the use of these terms is justified in the following cases: to *give* rise; to *give* birth; or *give* occasion: to *afford* an opportunity; to *afford* a plea or a pretext; to *afford* ground, and the like.

Are these our great pursuits? Is this to live?
These all the hopes this much-lov'd world can give!
JENYNS.

Our paper manufacture takes into use several mean materials, which could be put to no other use, and *affords* work for several hands in the collection of them, which are incapable of any other employment.—ADDISON.

To Give, Present, Offer, Exhibit.

These terms have a common signification, inasmuch as they designate the manual act of transferring something from one's self to another. The first is here as elsewhere (*v. To give, grant*) the most definite and extensive in its meaning; it denotes the complete act: the two latter refer rather to the preliminaries of *Giving* than to the act itself. What is *given* is actually transferred: what is *Presented*, that is, made a *present* to any one; or *Offered*, that is, brought in his way, is put in the way of being transferred: we *present* in *giving*, and *offer* in order to *give*; but we may *give* without presenting or offering; and on the other hand, we may *present* or *offer* without *giving*.

To give is the familiar term which designates the ordinary transfer of property: to *present* is a term of respect; it includes in it the formality and ceremony of setting before another that which we wish to *give*: to *offer* is an act of humility or solemnity; it bespeaks the movement of the heart, which impels to the making a transfer or *gift*. We *give* to our domestics; we *present* to princes; we *offer* to God; we *give* to a person what we wish to be received; we *present* to a person what we think agreeable; we *offer* what we think acceptable: what is *given* is supposed to be ours; what we *offer* is supposed to be at our command; what we *present* need not be either our own or at our command; we *give* a person not only our external property, but our esteem, our confidence, our company, and the like; an ambassador *presents* his credentials at court; a subject *offers* his services to his king.

Of seven smooth joints a mellow pipe I have,
Which with his dying breath *Dametas gave*.
DRYDEN.

It fell out at the same time, that a very fine colt, which promised great strength and speed, was *presented* to Octavius: Virgil assured them that he would prove a jade: upon trial, it was found as he had said.—WALSH.

Alexis will thy homely gifts disdain;
Nor, shouldst thou *offer* all thy little store,
Will rich Iolas yield, but *offer* more.—DRYDEN.

They bear the same relation to each other when applied to words or actions, instead of property; we speak of *giving* a person an assurance, or a contradiction; of *presenting* an address, and *offering* an apology: of *giving* a reception, *presenting* a figure, or *offering* an insult. They may likewise be extended in

* Vide Girard: "Donner, presenter, offrir."

their application, not only to personal and individual actions, but also to such as respect the public at large : we *give* a description in writing, as well as by word of mouth ; one *presents* the public with the fruit of one's labours ; we *offer* remarks on such things as attract notice, and call for animadversion.

These terms may also be employed to designate the actions of unconscious agents, by which they are characterized ; in this sense, they come very near to the word **Exhibit**, which, from *exhibeo*, signifies to hold or put forth. Here the word *give* is equally indefinite and general, denoting simply to send from one's self, and applies mostly to what proceeds from another, by a natural cause : thus, a thing is said to *give* pain, or to *give* pleasure. Things are said to *present* or *offer* : thus, a town is said to *present* a fine view, or an idea *presents* itself to the mind ; an opportunity *offers*, that is, *offers* itself to our notice. To *exhibit* is properly applied in this sense of setting forth to view ; but expresses, likewise, the idea of attracting notice also ; that which is *exhibited* is more striking than what is *presented* or *offered* ; thus a poem is said to *exhibit* marks of genius.

The apprehension of the good
Gives but the greater feeling to the worse.
SHAKESPEARE.

Its pearl the rock *presents*, its gold the mine.
JENYNS.

True genuine dulness move'd his pity,
Unless it *offer'd* to be witty.—SWIFT.

The recollection of the past becomes dreadful to a guilty man. It *exhibits* to him a life thrown away on vanities and follies.—BLAIR.

To Give Up, Deliver, Surrender, Yield, Cede, Concede.

We **Give Up** (*v. To give, grant*) that which we wish to retain ; we **Deliver** that which we wish not to retain. *Delivery* does not include the idea of a transfer ; but *give up* implies both the *giving* from and the *giving* to : we *give up* our house to the accommodation of our friends ; we *deliver* property into the hands of the owner. To *give up* is a colloquial substitute for either **Surrender** or **Yield**, as it designates no circumstance of the action ; it may be employed in familiar discourse, in almost every case for the other terms : where the action is compulsory, we may either say an officer *gives up* or *surrenders* his sword ; when the action is discretionary, we may either say he *gives up* or *yields* a point of discussion : *give up* has, however, an extensiveness of application which *gives* it an office distinct from either *surrender* or *yield*. When we speak of familiar and personal subjects, *give up* is more suitable than *surrender*, which is confined to matters of public interest or great moment : a man *gives up* his place, his right, his claim, and the like ; he *surrenders* a fortress, a vessel, or his property to his creditors. When *give up* is compared with *yield*, they both respect personal matters ; but the former expresses a much stronger action than the latter : a man *gives up* his whole judgment to another ; he *yields* to the opinion of another in particular cases : he *gives* himself up to sensual indulgences ; he *yields* to the force of temptation.

Cede, from the Latin *cedo* to *give*, is properly to *surrender* by virtue of a treaty : we may *surrender* a town as an act of necessity ; but the *cession* of a country is purely a political transaction : thus, generals frequently *surrender* such towns as they are not able to defend ; and governments *cede* such countries as they find it not convenient to retain. To **Concede**, which is but a variation of *cede*, is a mode of *yielding* which may be either an act of discretion or courtesy ; as when a government *concedes* to the demands of the people certain privileges, or when an individual *concedes* any point in dispute for the sake of peace.

The peaceable man will *give up* his favourite schemes : he will *yield* to an opponent rather than become the cause of violent embroilments.—BLAIR.

On my experience, Adam, freely taste,
And fear of death deliver to the winds.—MILTON.

The young, half-seduced by persuasion, and half-compelled by ridicule, *surrender* their convictions, and consent to live as they see others around them living.—BLAIR.

As to the magic power which the devil imparts for these concessions of his votaries, theologians have different opinions.—CUMBERLAND.

To Give Up, Abandon, Resign, Forego.

These terms differ from the preceding (*v. To give up*) inasmuch as they designate actions entirely free from foreign influence. A man **Gives Up**, **Abandons** (*v. To abandon*), and **Resigns** (*v. To abandon*) from the dictates of his own mind, independently of all control from others. To *give up* and *abandon* both denote a positive decision of the mind ; but the former may be the act of the understanding or the will, the latter is more commonly the act of the will and the passions : to *give up* is applied to familiar cases ; *abandon* to matters of importance : one *gives up* an idea, an intention, a plan, and the like ; one *abandons* a project, a scheme, a measure of government.

To *give up* and *resign* are applied either to outward actions or merely to inward movements : but the former is active, and determinately fixes the conduct ; the latter seems to be rather passive, it is the leaning of the mind to the circumstances : a man *gives up* his situation by a positive act of his choice : he *resigns* his office when he feels it inconvenient to hold it : so, likewise, we *give up* expectations, and *resign* hopes. In this sense, **Forego**, which signifies to let go, is comparable with *resign*, inasmuch as it expresses a passive action ; but we *resign* that which we have, and we *forego* that which we might have : thus, we *resign* the claims which we have already made ; we *forego* the claims which we might make : the former may be a matter of prudence ; the latter is always an act of virtue and forbearance. When applied reflectively, to *give up* is used either in a good, bad, or indifferent sense ; *abandon* always in a bad sense ; *resign* always in a good sense : a man may *give* himself up, either to studious pursuits, to idle vagaries, or vicious indulgences ; he *abandons* himself to gross vices ; he *resigns* himself to the will of Providence, or to the circumstances of his condition : a man

is said to be *given up* to his lusts who is without any principle to control him in their gratification; he is said to be *abandoned* when his outrageous conduct bespeaks an entire insensibility to every honest principle; he is said to be *resigned* when he discovers composure and tranquillity in the hour of affliction.

Upon his friend telling him, he wondered he gave up the question, when he had visibly the better of the dispute; I am never ashamed, says he, to be confuted by one who is master of fifty legions.—ADDISON.

For Greece we grieve, abandoned by her fate,
To drink the dregs of thy unmeasur'd hate.—POPE.

The praise of artful numbers I resign,
And hang my pipe upon the sacred pine.—DRYDEN.

Then, pilgrim, turn, thy cares forego;
All earth-born cares are wrong.—GOLDSMITH.

Glad, Pleased, Joyful, Cheerful.

Glad is obviously a variation of *glee* and *glow* (*v. Fire*).

Pleased, from to *please*, marks the state of being *pleased*.

Joyful bespeaks its own meaning, either as full of *joy* or productive of great *joy*.

Cheerful, *v. Cheerful*.

Glad denotes either a partial state or a permanent and habitual sentiment: in the former sense it is most nearly allied to *pleased*; in the latter sense to *joyful* and *merry*.

Glad and *pleased* are both applied to the ordinary occurrences of the day; but the former denotes rather a lively and momentary sentiment, the latter a gentle but rather more lasting feeling; we are *glad* to see a friend who has been long absent; we are *glad* to have good intelligence from our friends and relatives; we are *glad* to get rid of a troublesome companion; we are *pleased* to have the approbation of those we esteem; we are *pleased* to hear our friends well spoken of; we are *pleased* with the company of an intelligent and communicative person.

Glad, *joyful*, and *cheerful* all express more or less lively sentiments; but *glad* is less vivid than *joyful*, and more so than *cheerful*. **Gladness** seems to arise as much from physical as mental causes; wine is said to make the heart *glad*: *joy* has its source in the mind, as it is influenced by external circumstances; instances of good fortune, either for ourselves, our friends, or our country, excite *joy*: *cheerfulness* is an even tenor of the mind, which it may preserve of itself independently of all external circumstances; religious contemplation produces habitual *cheerfulness*.

A comfortable meal to an indigent person, *gladdens* his heart: a nation rejoices at the return of peace after a long-protracted war: a traveller is *cheered* in a solitary desert by the sight of a human being, or the sound of a voice; or a sufferer is *cheered* by his trust in Divine Providence.

Glad is seldom employed as an epithet to qualify things, except in the scriptural or solemn style, as, *glad tidings of great joy*: *joyful* is seldom used to qualify persons than things; hence we speak of *joyful* news, a *joyful* occurrence, *joyful* faces, *joyful* sounds, and the like: *cheerful* is employed either to designate the state of the mind or the property of the

thing; we either speak of a *cheerful* disposition, a *cheerful* person, a *cheerful* society, or a *cheerful* face, a *cheerful* sound, a *cheerful* aspect, and the like.

When used to qualify one's actions they all bespeak the temper of the mind: *gladly* denotes a high degree of willingness as opposed to aversion; one who is suffering under excruciating pains *gladly* submits to anything which promises relief: *joyfully* denotes unqualified pleasure, unmixed with any alloy or restrictive consideration; a convert to Christianity *joyfully* goes through all the initiatory ceremonies which entitle him to all its privileges, spiritual and temporal: *cheerfully* denotes the absence of unwillingness, it is opposed to reluctantly; the zealous Christian *cheerfully* submits to every hardship to which he is exposed in the course of his religious profession.

O sole, in whom my thoughts find all repose,
My glory, my perfection! *glad* I see
Thy face, and morn return'd.—MILTON.

Man superior walks
Amid the *glad* creation, inusing praise.—THOMSON.
The soul has many different faculties, or, in other words many different ways of acting, and can be intensely *pleased* or made happy by all these different faculties or ways of acting.—ADDISON.

Thus *joyful* Troy maintain'd the watch of night,
While fear, pale comrade of inglorious flight,
And heaven-bred horror, on the Grecian part,
Sat on each face, and sadden'd every heart.—POPE.
No sun e'er gilds the gloomy horrors there,
No *cheerful* gales refresh the lazy air.—POPE.

Gladness, *v. Joy*.

To Glance At, Allude To.

Glance probably from the German *glänzen* to shine, signifies to make appear to the eye.

Allude, *v. To allude*.

These terms are nearly allied in the sense of indirectly referring to any object, either in written or verbal discourse: but *glance* expresses a cursory and latent action; *allude*, simply an indirect but undisguised action: ill-natured satirists are perpetually *glancing* at the follies and infirmities of individuals; the Scriptures are full of *allusions* to the manners and customs of the Easterns: he who attempts to write an epitome of universal history must take but a hasty *glance* at the most important events.

Entering upon his discourse, Socrates says, he does not believe any the most comic genius can censure him for talking upon such a subject (the immortality of the soul) at such a time (that of death). This passage, I think, evidently *glances* upon Aristophanes, who writ a comedy on purpose to ridicule the discourses of that divine philosopher.—ADDISON.

The author, in the whole course of his poem, has infinite *allusions* to places of Scripture.—ADDISON.

Glance, *v. Look*.

Glance, *v. Glimpse*.

Glare, *v. Flame*.

To Glare, *v. To shine*.

Glaring, Barefaced.

Glaring is here used in the figurative sense, drawn from its natural signification of broad light, which strikes powerfully upon the senses.

Barefaced signifies literally having a *bare* or *uncovered face*, which denotes the absence of all disguise or all shame.

Glaring designates the thing; *barefaced* characterizes the person: a *glaring* falsehood is that which strikes the observer in an instant to be falsehood; a *barefaced* lie or falsehood betrays the effrontery of him who utters it. A *glaring* absurdity will be seen instantly without the aid of reflection; a *barefaced* piece of impudence characterizes the agent as more than ordinarily lost to all sense of decorum.

The *glaring* side is that of enmity.—BURKE.

The animosities increased, and the parties appeared *barefaced* against each other.—CLARENDON.

Gleam, Glimmer, Ray, Beam.

Gleam is in Saxon *gleomen*, German *glimmen*, &c. **Glimmer** is a variation of the same.

Ray is connected with the word *row*.

Beam comes from the German *baum*, a tree.

Certain portions of light are designated by all these terms, but *gleam* and *glimmer* are indefinite; *ray* and *beam* are definite. A *gleam* is properly the commencement of light, or that portion of opening light which interrupts the darkness: a *glimmer* is an unsteady *gleam*; *ray* and *beam* are portions of light which emanate from some luminous body; the former from all luminous bodies in general, the latter more particularly from the sun: the former is, as its derivation denotes, a row of light issuing in a greater or less degree from any body; the latter is a great row of light, like a pole issuing from a body. There may be a *gleam* of light visible on the wall of a dark room, or a *glimmer* if it be moveable; there may be *rays* of light visible at night on the back of a glow-worm, or *rays* of light may break through the shutters of a closed room; the sun in the height of its splendour sends forth its *beams*. *Gleam* and *ray* may be applied figuratively; *beam* only in the natural sense; a *gleam* of light may break in on the benighted understanding; but a *glimmer* of light rather confuses; *rays* of light may dart into the mind of the most ignorant savage who is taught the principles of Christianity by the pure practice of its professors.

A dreadful *gleam* from his bright armour came,
And from his eye-balls flashed the living flame.

POPE.

The *glimmering* light which shot into the chaos from the utmost verge of the creation is wonderfully beautiful and poetic.—ADDISON.

A sudden *ray* shot beaming o'er the plain,
And show'd the shores, the navy, and the main.

POPE.

The stars shine smarter; and the moon adorns.
As with unborrow'd beams, her horns.—DRYDEN.

To Glide, v. To slip.

Glimmer, v. Gleam.

Glimpse, Glance.

A **Glimpse** is the action of the object appearing to the eye; a **Glance** is the action of the eye seeking the object; one catches a *glimpse* of an object; one casts a *glance* at an object; the latter therefore is properly the

means for obtaining the former, which is the end: we get a *glimpse* by means of a *glance*. The *glimpse* is the hasty, imperfect, and sudden view which we get of an object; the *glance* is the hasty and imperfect view which we take of an object: the former may depend upon a variety of circumstances; the latter depends upon the will of the agent. We can seldom do more than get a *glimpse* of objects in a carriage that is going with rapidity: when we do not wish to be observed to look we take but a *glance* at an object.

Of the state with which practice has not acquainted us, we snatch a *glimpse*, we discern a point, and regulate the rest by passion and by fancy.—JOHNSON.

Here passion first I felt,
Commotion strange! In all enjoyments else
Superior, unmov'd; here only weak
Against the charm of beauty's powerful glance.

MILTON.

To Glitter, v. To shine.

Globe, v. Circle.

Globe, Ball.

Globe, in Latin *globus*, comes probably from the Greek *γλοφος*, a hillock of earth.

Ball, in Teutonic *ball*, is doubtless connected with the words *bowl*, *bow*, *bend*, and the like, signifying that which is turned or round.

Globe is to *ball* as the species to the genus; a *globe* is a *ball*, but every *ball* is not a *globe*. The *globe* does not in its strict sense require to be of an equal rotundity in all its parts; it is properly an irregularly round body: a *ball* on the other hand is generally any round body, but particularly one that is entirely regularly round: the earth itself is therefore properly denominated a *globe* from its unequal rotundity; and for the same reason the mechanical body which is made to represent the earth is also denominated a *globe*; but in the higher style of writing the earth is frequently denominated a *ball*, and in familiar discourse every solid body which assumes a circular form is entitled a *ball*.

It is said by modern philosophers, that not only the great *globes* of matter are thinly scattered through the universe, but the hardest bodies are so porous, that if all matter were compressed to perfect solidity, it might be contained in a cube of a few feet.—JOHNSON.

What though in solemn silence all
Move round the dark terrestrial ball,
In reason's ear they all rejoice,
And utter forth a glorious voice.—ADDISON.

Gloom, Heaviness.

Gloom has its source internally, and is often independent of outward circumstances; **Heaviness** is a weight upon the spirits, produced by a foreign cause: the former belongs to the constitution; the latter is occasional. People of a melancholy habit have a particular *gloom* hang over their minds which pervades all their thoughts; those who suffer under severe disappointments for the present, and have *gloomy* prospects for the future, may be expected to be *heavy* at heart; we may sometimes dispel the *gloom* of the mind by the force of reflection, particularly by the force of religious contemplation: *heaviness* of spirits is itself a temporary thing, and may be suc-

ceeded by vivacity or lightness of mind when the pressure of the moment has subsided.

If we consider the frequent reliefs we receive from laughter, and how often it breaks the gloom which is apt to depress the mind, one would take care not to grow too wise for so great a pleasure of life.—ADDISON.

Worldly prosperity flattens as life descends. He who lately overhauled with cheerful spirits and high hopes, begins to look back with heaviness on the days of former years.—BLAIR.

Gloomy, v. Dull.

Gloomy, Sullen, Morose, Splenetic.

All these terms denote a temper of mind the reverse of easy or happy: **Gloomy** lies either in the general constitution or the particular frame of the mind; **Sullen** lies in the temper: a man of a gloomy disposition is an involuntary agent; it is his misfortune, and renders him in some measure pitiable: the sullen man yields to his evil humours; sullenness is his fault, and renders him offensive. The gloomy man distresses himself most; his pangs are all his own: the sullen man has a great share of discontent in his composition; he charges his sufferings upon others, and makes them suffer in common with himself. A man may be rendered gloomy for a time by the influence of particular circumstances; but sullenness creates pains for itself when all external circumstances of a painful nature are wanting.

Sullenness and **Moroseness** are both the inherent properties of the temper; but the former discovers itself in those who have to submit, and the latter in those who have to command: sullenness therefore betrays itself mostly in early life; moroseness is the peculiar characteristic of age. The sullen person has many fancied hardships to endure from the control of others; the morose person causes others to endure many real hardships, by keeping them under too severe a control. Sullenness shows itself mostly by an unseemly reserve; moroseness shows itself by the hardness of the speech, and the roughness of the voice. Sullenness is altogether a sluggish principle, that leads more or less to inaction; moroseness is a harsh feeling, that is not contented with exacting obedience unless it inflicts pain.

Moroseness is a defect of the temper; but **Spleen**, from the Latin *splen*, is a defect in the heart: the one betrays itself in behaviour, the other more in conduct. A morose man is an unpleasant companion; a splenetic man is a bad member of society: the former is ill-natured to those about him, the latter is ill-humoured with all the world. Moroseness vents itself in temporary expressions, spleen indulges itself in perpetual bitterness of expression.

Th' unwilling heralds act their lord's commands,
Pensive they walk along the barren sands,
Arriv'd, the hero in his tent they find
With gloomy aspect, on his arm reclin'd.—POPE.

At this they ceased; the stern debate expired
The chiefs in sullen majesty retir'd.—POPE.

The morose philosopher is so much affected by these and some other authorities, that he becomes a convert to his friend, and desires he would take him with him when he went to his next bell.—BUDGELL.

Whilst in that *splenetic* mood, we amused ourselves in a sour critical speculation of which we ourselves were the objects, a few months effected a total change in our variable minds.—BURKE.

Glory, Honour.

Glory is something dazzling and widely diffused. The Latin word *gloria*, anciently written *glosia*, is in all probability connected with our words *gloss*, *glaze*, *glitter*, *glow*, through the medium of the northern words *gleissen*, *glotzen*, *glänzen*, *glühen*, all which come from the Hebrew *gehel*, a live coal. That the moral idea of *glory* is best represented by light is evident from the *glory* which is painted round the head of our Saviour.

Honour is something less splendid, but more solid, and probably comes from the Hebrew *hon* wealth or substance.

Glory impels to extraordinary efforts and to great undertakings. *Honour* induces to a discharge of one's duty. Excellence in the attainment, and success in the exploit, bring *glory*; a faithful exercise of one's talents reflects *honour*. *Glory* is connected with everything which has a peculiar public interest; *honour* is more properly obtained within a private circle. *Glory* is not confined to the nation or life of the individual by whom it is sought; it spreads over all the earth, and descends to the latest posterity: *honour* is limited to those who are connected with the subject of it, and eye-witnesses to his actions. *Glory* is attainable but by few, and may be an object of indifference to any one; *honour* is more or less within the reach of all, and must be disregarded by no one. A general at the head of an army goes in pursuit of *glory*; the humble citizen who acts his part in society so as to obtain the approbation of his fellow-citizens is on the road for *honour*. A nation acquires *glory* by the splendour of its victories, and its superiority in arts as well as arms; it obtains *honour* by its strict adherence to equity and good faith in all its dealings with other nations. Our own nation has acquired *glory* by the help of its brave warriors; it has gained *honour* by the justice and generosity of its government. The military career of Alexander was *glorious*; his humane treatment of the Persian princesses who were his prisoners was an *honourable* trait in his character. The abolition of the slave trade by the English government was a *glorious* triumph of Christianity over the worst principles of human nature; the national conduct of England during the revolutionary period reflects *honour* on the English name.

Glory is a sentiment, selfish in its nature, but salutary or pernicious in its effect, according as it is directed; *honour* is a principle disinterested in its nature, and beneficial in its operations. A thirst for *glory* is seldom indulged but at the expense of others, as it is not attainable in the straight path of duty; there are but few opportunities of acquiring it by elevated acts of goodness, and still fewer who have the virtue to embrace the opportunities that offer: a love of *honour* can never be indulged but to the advantage of others; it is restricted by fixed laws; it requires a sacrifice

of every selfish consideration, and a due regard to the rights of others; it is associated with nothing but virtue.

Hence is our love of fame; a love so strong,
We think no dangers great nor labours long,
By which we hope our beings to extend,
And to remotest times in glory to descend.

JENYNS.

If glory cannot move a mind so mean,
Nor future praise from fading pleasures wean,
Yet why should he defraud his son of fame,
And grudge the Romans their immortal name?

DREYDEN.

As virtue is the most reasonable and genuine source of honour, we generally find in titles an intimation of some particular merit that should recommend men to the high stations which they possess.—ADDISON.

Sir Francis Bacon, for greatness of genius and compass of knowledge, did honour to his age and country.—ADDISON.

To Glory, Boast.

To Glory is to hold as one's *glory*. To Boast is to set forth to one's advantage. Both words denote the value which the individual sets upon that which belongs to himself. To *glory* is more particularly the act of the mind, the indulgence of the internal sentiment; to *boast* denotes rather the expression of the sentiment. To *glory* is applied only to matters of moment; *boast* is rather suitable to trifling points. A Christian martyr *glories* in the cross of Christ; a soldier *boasts* of his courage and his feats in battle.

Glory is but seldom used in a bad sense, and *boast* still seldomer in a good sense. A royalist *glories* in the idea of supporting his prince and the legitimate rights of a sovereign; but there are republicans and traitors who *glory* in their shame, and *boast* of the converts they make to their lawless cause. It is an unbecoming action for an individual to *boast* of any thing in himself; but a nation, in its collective capacity, may *boast* of its superiority without doing violence to decorum. An Englishman *glories* in the reflection of belonging to such a distinguished nation, although he would do very idly to *boast* of it as a personal quality; no nation can *boast* of so many public institutions for the relief of distress as England.

All the laymen who have exerted a more than ordinary genius in their writings, and were the *glory* of their times, were men whose hopes were filled with immortality.—ADDISON.

If a man looks upon himself in an abstracted light, he has not much to *boast* of; but if he considers himself with regard to others, he may find occasion of *glorying*, if not in his own virtues, at least in the absence of another's imperfections.—ADDISON.

To Gloss, Varnish, Palliate.

Gloss and Varnish are figurative terms, which borrow their signification from the act of rendering the outer surface of any physical object shining. To *gloss*, which is connected with to glaze, is to give a gloss or brightness to any thing by means of friction, as in the case of japan or mahogany: to *varnish* is to give an artificial gloss, by means of applying a foreign substance. Hence in the figurative use of the terms, to *gloss* is to put the best face upon any thing by various artifices; but to *varnish* is to do the same thing by means of direct falsehood; to *palliate*, which likewise signifies to give the best possible outside to a thing (*v. To extenuate*), requires still less artifice than

either. One *glosses* over that which is bad, by giving it a soft name; as when a man's vices are *glossed* over with the name of indiscretion, or a man's mistress is termed his friend: one *varnishes* a bad character by ascribing good motives to his bad actions, by withholding many facts that are to his discredit, and fabricating other circumstances in his favour; an *unvarnished* tale contains nothing but the simple truth; the *varnished* tale on the other hand contains a great mixture of falsehood; the French accounts of their victories are mostly *varnished*: to *palliate* is to diminish the magnitude of an offence, by making an excuse in favour of the offender: as when an act of theft is *palliated* by considering the starving condition of the thief.

If a jealous man once finds a false *gloss* put upon any single action, he quickly suspects all the rest.—ADDISON.

The waiting tears stood ready for command,
And now they flow to *varnish* the false tale.—ROWE.

A man's bodily defects should give him occasion to exert a noble spirit, and to *palliate* those imperfections which are not in his power, by those perfections which are.—ADDISON.

Glossary, v. Dictionary.

Glow, v. Fire.

To Glut, v. To satisfy.

Godlike, Divine, Heavenly.

Godlike bespeaks its own meaning, as like God, or after the manner of God.

Divine, in Latin *divinus* from *divus* or *Deus*, signifies appertaining to God.

Heavenly, or Heavenlike, signifies like or appertaining to heaven.

Godlike is a more expressive but less common term than *divine*: the former is used only as an epithet of peculiar praise for an individual; *divine* is generally employed for that which appertains to a superior being, in distinction from that which is human. Benevolence is a *godlike* property: the *Divine* image is stamped on the features of man, whence the face is called by Milton "the human face *Divine*." As *divine* is opposed to human, so is *heavenly* to earthly: the term *Divine* Being distinguishes the Creator from all other beings; but a *heavenly* being denotes the angels or inhabitants of heaven, in distinction from earthly beings or the inhabitants of earth. A *divine* influence is to be sought for only by prayer to the Giver of all good things; but a *heavenly* temper may be acquired by a steady contemplation of *heavenly* things and an abstraction from those which are earthly: the *Divine* will is the foundation of all moral law and obligation; *heavenly* joys are the fruit of all our labours in this earthly course.

Sure he that made us with such large discourse,
Looking before and after, gave us not
That capability and godlike reason
To rust in us unused.—SHAKESPEARE.

Of all that see or read thy comedies,
Whoever in those glasses looks may find
The spots return'd, or graces of his mind;
And by the help of so *divine* an art,
At leisure view and dress his nobler part.

WALLER.

Reason, alas! It does not know itself;
But man, vain man! would with his short-lin'd plummet
Fathom the vast abyss of *heavenly* justice.—DREYDEN

Godly, Righteous.

Godly is a contraction of *godlike* (v. *Godlike*).

Righteous signifies conformable to *right* or truth.

These epithets are both used in a spiritual sense, and cannot, without an indecorous affectation of religion, be introduced into any other discourse than that which is properly spiritual. *Godliness*, in the strict sense, is that outward deportment which characterizes a heavenly temper; prayer, reading of the Scriptures, public worship, and every religious act, enters into the signification of *godliness*, which at the same time supposes a temper of mind, not only to delight in, but to profit by such exercises; *righteousness* on the other hand comprehends Christian morality; in distinction from that of the heathen or unbeliever; a *righteous* man does *right*, not only because it is *right*, but because it is agreeable to the will of his Maker, and the example of his Redeemer: *righteousness* is therefore to *godliness* as the effect to the cause. The *godly* man goes to the sanctuary, and by converse with his Maker assimilates all his affections to the character of that Being whom he worships; when he leaves the sanctuary he proves the efficacy of his *godliness* by his *righteous* converse with his fellow-creatures. It is easy however for men to mistake the means for the end, and to rest content with *godliness* without *righteousness*, as too many are apt to do who seem to make their whole duty to consist in an attention to religious observances, and in the indulgence of extravagant feelings.

It hath been the great design of the devil and his instruments in all ages to undermine religion, by making an unhappy separation and divorce between *godliness* and morality. But let us not deceive ourselves; this was always religion, and the condition of our acceptance with God, to endeavour to be like God in purity and holiness, in justice and *righteousness*.—TILLOTSON.

Gold, Golden.

These terms are both employed as epithets, but **Gold** is the substantive used in composition, and **Golden** the adjective, in ordinary use. The former is strictly applied to the metal of which the thing is made, as a *gold* cup, or a *gold* coin; but the latter to whatever appertains to *gold*, whether properly or figuratively: as the *golden* lion, the *golden* crown, the *gold'en* age, or a *golden* harvest.

Good, Goodness.

Good, which under different forms runs through all the northern languages, and has a great affinity to the Greek *ayabos*, is supposed by Adelung to be derived from the Latin *gaudeo*, Greek *γαύω*, and Hebrew *chada* to rejoice.

Good and **Goodness** are abstract terms, drawn from the same word; the former to denote the thing that is *good*, the latter the inherent *good* property of a thing. All *good* comes from God, whose *goodness* towards his creatures is unbounded.

The *good* we do is determined by the tendency of the action; but our *goodness* in doing it is determined by the motive of our actions.

Good is of a twofold nature, physical and moral, and is opposed to evil; *goodness* is applicable either to the disposition of moral agents or the qualities of inanimate objects; it is opposed to badness. By the order of Providence the most horrible convulsions are made to bring about *good*: the *goodness* or badness of any fruit depends upon its fitness to be enjoyed.

Each form'd for all, promotes through private care
The public *good*, and justly takes its share.—JENYNS.

The reigning error of his life was, that Savage mistook the love for the practice of virtue, and was indeed not so much a *good* man as the friend of *goodness*.—JOHNSON.

Good, Benefit, Advantage.

Good is an abstract universal term, which in its unlimited sense comprehends everything that can be conceived of, as suited in all its parts to the end proposed. In this sense **Benefit** and **Advantage**, as well as utility, service, profit, &c. are all modifications of *good*; but the term *good* has likewise a limited application, which brings it to a just point of comparison with the other terms here chosen; the common idea which allies these words to each other is that of *good* as it respects a particular object. *Good* is here employed indefinitely; *benefit* and *advantage* are specified by some collateral circumstances. *Good* is done without regard to the person who does it, or him to whom it is done; but *benefit* has always respect to the relative condition of the giver and receiver, who must be both specified. Hence we say of a charitable man, that he does much *good*, or that he bestows *benefits* upon this or that individual. In like manner, when speaking of particular communities or society at large we may, say that it is for the *good* of society or for the *good* of mankind that every one submits to the sacrifice of some portion of his natural liberty; but it is for the *benefit* of the poorer orders that the charitably disposed employ so much time and money in giving them instruction.

Good is limited to no mode or manner, no condition of the person or the thing; it is applied indiscriminately: *benefit* is more particularly applicable to the external circumstances of a person, as to his health, his improvement, his pecuniary condition and the like; it is also confined in its application to persons only: we may counsel another for his *good*, although we do not counsel him for his *benefit*: but we labour for the *benefit* of another when we set apart for him the fruits of our labour: exercise is always attended with some *good* to all persons; it is of particular *benefit* to those who are of a lethargic habit: an indiscreet zeal does more harm than *good* to the cause of religion; a patient cannot expect to derive *benefit* from a medicine when he counteracts its effects.

Good is mostly employed for some positive and direct *good*: *advantage* for an *adventitious* and indirect *good*: a *good* is that which would be *good* to all; an *advantage* is that which is partially *good*, or *good* only in particular cases: it is *good* for a man to exert his talents; it is an *advantage* to him if in addition to his own efforts he has the support of friends: it may,

however, frequently happen that he who has the most *advantages* derives the least *good* from them: talents, person, voice, powerful interest, a pleasing address, are all *advantages*; but they may produce evil instead of *good* if they are not directed to right purposes.

Our present *good* the easy task is made
To earn superior bliss when this shall fade.—JENYNS.

Unless men were endowed by nature with some sense of duty or moral obligation, they could reap no benefit from revelation.—BLAIR.

The true art of memory is the art of attention. No man will read with much *advantage* who is not able at pleasure to evacuate his mind.—JOHNSON.

Goodhumour, v. Goodnature.

Goodnature, Goodhumour.

Goodnature and **Goodhumour** both imply the disposition to please and be pleased; but the former is habitual and permanent, the latter is temporary and partial; the former lies in the nature and frame of the mind; the latter in the state of the humours or spirits. A *goodnatured* man recommends himself at all times for his *goodnature*; a *goodhumoured* man recommends himself particularly as a companion: *goodnature* displays itself by a readiness in doing kind offices; *goodhumour* is confined mostly to the ease and cheerfulness of one's outward deportment in social converse: *goodnature* is apt to be guilty of weak compliances: *goodhumour* is apt to be succeeded by fits of peevishness and depression. *Goodnature* is applicable only to the character of the individual: *goodhumour* may be said of a whole company. It is a mark of *goodnature* in a man not to disturb the *goodhumour* of the company he is in by resenting the affront that is offered him by another.

I concluded, however unaccountable the assertion might appear at first sight, that *goodnature* was an essential quality in a satirist.—ADDISON.

When Virgil said, "He that did not hate Bavius might love Mævius," he was in perfect *goodhumour*.—ADDISON.

Good-office, v. Benefit.

Goods, v. Commodity.

Goods, Furniture, Chattels, Moveables, Effects.

All these terms are applied to such things as belong to an individual: the first term is the most general, both in sense and application; all the rest are species.

Furniture comprehends all household goods; wherefore in regard to an individual, supposing the house to contain all he has, the general is put for the specific term, as when one speaks of a person's moving his **Goods** for his *furniture*: but in the strict sense *goods* comprehends more than *furniture*, including not only that which is adapted for the domestic purposes of a family, but also every thing which is of value to a person: the chairs and tables are a part of *furniture*. papers, books, and money, are included among his *goods*: it is obvious therefore that *goods*, even in its most limited sense, is of wider import than *furniture*.

Chattels, which is probably changed from *cattle*, is a term not in ordinary use, but still sufficiently employed to deserve notice. It comprehends that species of *goods* which is in a special manner separated from one's person and house; a man's *cattle*, his implements of husbandry, the alienable rights which he has in land or buildings, are all comprehended under *chattels*: hence the propriety of the expression to seize a man's *goods* and *chattels* as denoting the disposable property which he has about his person or at a distance. **Moveables** comprehends all the other terms in the limited application to property; as far as it admits of being removed from one place to the other; it is opposed either to fixtures, when speaking of *furniture*, or to land as contrasted to *goods* and *chattels*.

Effects is a term of nearly as extensive a signification as *goods*, but not so extensive an application: whatever a man has that is of any supposed value, or convertible into money, is entitled his *goods*; whatever a man has that can effect, produce, or bring forth money by sale, is entitled his *effects*: *goods* therefore is applied only to that which a man has at his own disposal; *effects* more properly to that which is left at the disposal of others. A man makes a sale of his *goods* on his removal from any place; his creditors or executors take care of his *effects* either on his bankruptcy or decease: *goods*, in this case, is seldom employed but in the limited sense of what is removeable; but *effects* includes everything personal, freehold, and copyhold.

Now I give up my shop and dispose of all my poetical *goods* at once; I must therefore desire that the public would please to take them in the gross, and that everybody would turn over what he does not like.—PRIOR.

Considering that your houses, your place and *furniture*, are not suitable to your quality, I conceive that your expense ought to be reduced to two-thirds of your estate.—WENTWORTH.

There can be no doubt but that *moveables* of every kind become sooner appropriated than the permanent substantial soil.—BLACKSTONE.

The laws of bankruptcy compel the bankrupt to give up all his *effects* to the use of the creditors without any concealment.—BLACKSTONE.

Goods, Possessions, Property.

All these terms are applicable to such things as are the means of enjoyment; but the former term respects the direct quality of producing enjoyment, the latter two have regard to the subject of the enjoyment: we consider **Goods** as they are real or imaginary, adapted or not adapted for the producing of real happiness; those who abound in the *goods* of this world are not always the happiest: **Possessions** must be regarded as they are lasting or temporary; he who is anxious for earthly *possessions* forgets that they are but transitory and dependent upon a thousand contingencies: **Property** is to be considered as it is legal or illegal, just or unjust; those who are anxious for great *property* are not always scrupulous about the means by which it is to be obtained.

The purity of a man's Christian character is in danger from an overweening attachment to earthly *goods*; no wise man will boast the

multitude of his *possessions*, when he reflects that if they do not leave him, the time is not far distant when he must leave them; the validity of one's claim to *property* which comes by inheritance is better founded than any other.

The worldling attaches himself wholly to what he reckons the only solid *goods*, the *possession* of riches and influence.—BLAIR.

While worldly men enlarge their *possessions*, and extend their connections, they imagine they are strengthening themselves.—BLAIR.

To Govern, Rule, Regulate.

Govern, in French *gouverner*, Latin *gubernare*, Greek *κυβερναι*.

Rule and *Regulate* signify to bring under a *rule*, or make by *rule*.

The exercise of authority enters more or less into the signification of these terms; but to *govern* implies the exercise likewise of judgment and knowledge.

To *rule* implies rather the unqualified exercise of power, the making the will the *rule*; a king *governs* his people by means of wise laws and an upright administration: a despot *rules* over a nation according to his arbitrary decision; if he have no principle his *rule* becomes an oppressive tyranny: of Robespierre, it has been said, that if he did not know how to *govern*, he aimed at least at *ruling*.

These terms are applied either to persons or things: persons *govern* or *rule* others; or they *govern*, *rule*, or *regulate* things.

In regard to persons, *govern* is always in a good sense, but *rule* is sometimes taken in a bad sense; it is naturally associated with an abuse of power: to *govern* is so perfectly discretionary that we speak of *governing* ourselves; but we speak only of *ruling* others: nothing can be more lamentable than to be *ruled* by one who does not know how to *govern* himself: it is the business of a man to *rule* his house by keeping all its members in due subjection to his authority; it is the duty of a person to *rule* those who are under him in all matters wherein they are incompetent to *govern* themselves.

To *govern* necessarily supposes the adoption of judicious means; but *ruling* is confined to no means but such as will obtain the end of subjecting the will of one to that of another; a woman is said to *rule* by obeying; an artful and imperious woman will have recourse to various stratagems to elude the power to which she ought to submit, and render it subservient to her own purposes.

In application to things, *govern* and *rule* admit of a similar distinction: a minister *governs* the state, and a pilot *governs* the vessel; the movements of the machine are in both cases directed by the exercise of the judgment; a person *rules* the time, seasons, fashions, and the like; it is an act of the individual will. *Regulate* is a species of *governing* simply by judgment; the word is applicable to things of minor moment, where the force of authority is not so requisite: one *governs* the affairs of a nation, or a large body where great interests are involved; we *regulate* the concerns of an individual, or we *regulate* in cases where good order or convenience only is consulted: so

likewise in regard to ourselves, we *govern* our passions, but we *regulate* our affections. They are all properly used to denote the acts of conscious agents, but by a figure of personification that may be applied to inanimate or moral objects: the price of one market *governs* the price of another, or *governs* the seller in his demand; fashion and caprice *rule* the majority, or particular fashions *rule* them; the time of one clock *regulates* that of many others.

Whence can this very motion take its birth,
Not sure from matter, from dull clods of earth?
But from a living spirit lodg'd within,
Which *governs* all the bodily machine.—JENYNS.

When I behold a factious band agree
To call it freedom when themselves are free;
Each wanton judge new penal statutes draw;
Laws grind the poor, and rich men *rule* the law;
I fly from petty tyrants to the throne.—GOLDSMITH.

Distracting thoughts by turns his bosom *ru'd*,
Now fir'd by wrath, and now by reason cool'd.—POPE.

Though a sense of moral good and evil be deeply impressed on the heart of man, it is not of sufficient power to *regulate* his life.—BLAIR.

Government, Administration.

Both these terms may be employed either to designate the act of *Governing* and *Administering* or the persons *governing* and *administering*. In both cases *government* has a more extensive meaning than *administration*: the former includes every exercise of authority; the *administration* implies only that exercise of authority which consists in putting the laws or will of another in force: hence, when we speak of the *government*, as it respects the persons, it implies the whole body of constituted authorities; and the *administration*, only that part which puts in execution the intentions of the whole: the *government* of a country therefore may remain unaltered, while the *administration* undergoes many changes: it is the business of the *government* to make treaties of peace and war; and without a *government* it is impossible for any people to negotiate: it is the business of the *administration* to administer justice, to regulate the finances, and to direct all the complicated concerns of a nation; without an *administration* all public business would be at a stand.

Government is an art above the attainment of an ordinary genius.—SOUTH.

What are we to do if the *government* and the whole community is of the same description?—BUCKE.

In treating of an invisible world, and the *administration* of *government* there carried on by the Father of spirits, particulars occur which appear incomprehensible.—BLAIR.

Government, Constitution.

Government is here as in the former article (*v. Government*) the generic term; *Constitution* the specific. *Government* implies generally the act of *governing* or exercising authority under any form whatever; *constitution* implies any *constituted* or fixed form of *government*: we may have a *government* without a *constitution*; we cannot have a *constitution* without a *government*. In the first formation of society *government* was placed in the hands of individuals who exercised authority according to discretion rather than any fixed rule or law; here then was *government* without a *constitution*: as time and experience proved

the necessity of some established form, and the wisdom of enlightened men discovered the advantages and disadvantages of different forms, *government* in every country assumed a more definite shape, and became the *constitution* of the country; hence then the union of *government* and *constitution*. Governments are divided by political writers into three classes, monarchical, aristocratic, and republican: but these three general forms have been adopted with such variations and modifications as to impart to the *constitution* of every country something peculiar.

Political squabblers have always chosen to consider *government* in its limited sense as including only the supreme or executive authority, and the *constitution* as that which is set up by the authority of the people; but this is only a forced application of a general term to serve the purposes of party. According to its real signification, *constitution* does not convey the idea of the source of power any more than *government*; the *constitution* may with as much propriety be formed or constituted by the monarch as *government* is exercised by the monarch; and of this we may be assured, that what is to be formed specifically by any person or persons so as to become *constituted* must be framed by something more authoritative than a rabble. The *constitution* may, as I have before observed, be the work of time, for most of the *constitutions* in Europe, whether republican or monarchical, are indebted to time and the natural course of events for their establishment; but in our own country the case has been so far different that by the wisdom and humanity of those in *government* or power, a *constitution* has been expressly formed which distinguishes the English nation from all others. Hence the word *constitution* is applied by distinction to the English form of *government*; and since this *constitution* has happily secured the rights and liberties of the people by salutary laws, a vulgar error has arisen that the *constitution* is the work of the people, and by a natural consequence it is maintained that the people, if they are not satisfied with their *constitution*, have the right of introducing changes; a dangerous error which cannot be combated with too much steadfastness. It must be obvious to all who reflect on this subject that the *constitution*, as far as it is assignable to the efforts of any man or set of men, was never the work of the people, but of the *government* or those who held the supreme power.

This view of the matter is calculated to lessen the jealousies of the people towards their *government*, and to abate that overweening complacency with which they are apt to look upon themselves and their own imaginary work; for it is impossible but that they must regard with a more dispassionate eye the possessors of power when they see themselves indebted to those in power for the most admirable *constitution* ever framed.

"The *constitution* is in danger," is the watchword of a party who want to increase the power of the people; but every one who is acquainted with history, and remembers that before the *constitution* was fully formed it was the people who overturned the *government*, will perceive that much more is to be apprehended by throwing any weight into the scale

of the popular side of *government* than by strengthening the hands of the executive *government*. The *constitution* of England has arrived at the acme of human perfection; it ensures to every man as much as he can wish; it deprives no man of what he can consistently with the public peace expect; it has within itself adequate powers for correcting every evil and abuse as it may arise, and is fully competent to make such modifications of its own powers as circumstances may require. Every good citizen therefore will be contented to leave the *government* of the country in the hands of those constituted authorities as they at present exist, fully assured that if they have not the wisdom and the power to meet every exigency, the evil will not be diminished by making the people our legislators.

Free governments have committed more flagrant acts of tyranny than the most perfect despotic governments which we have ever known.—BURKE.

The physician of the state who, not satisfied with the cure of distempers, undertakes to regenerate *constitutions*, ought to show uncommon powers.—BURKE.

Grace, Favour.

Grace, in French *grace*, Latin *gratia*, comes from *gratus* kind, because a *grace* results from pure kindness independently of the merit of the receiver; but **Favour** is that which is granted voluntarily and without hope of recompense independently of all obligation.

Grace is never used but in regard to those who have offended and made themselves liable to punishment; *favour* is employed for actual good. An act of *grace* is employed to denote that act of the government by which insolvent debtors are released; but otherwise the term is in most frequent use among Christians to denote that merciful influence which God exerts over his most unworthy creatures from the infinite goodness of his Divine nature; it is to His special *grace* that we attribute every good feeling by which we are prevented from committing sin: the term *favour* is employed indiscriminately with regard to man or his Maker; those who are in power have the greatest opportunity of conferring *favours*; but all we receive at the hands of our Maker must be acknowledged as a *favour*. The Divine *grace* is absolutely indispensable for men as sinners; the Divine *favour* is perpetually necessary for men as his creatures dependent upon him for every thing.

But say I could repent and could obtain,
By act of *grace*, my former state, how soon
Would height recall high thoughts?—MILTON.

A bad man is wholly the creature of the world. He hangs upon its *favour*.—BLAIR.

Grace, Charm.

Grace is altogether corporeal; **Charm** is either corporeal or mental: the *grace* qualifies the action of the body; the *charm* is an inherent quality in the body itself. A lady moves, dances, and walks with *grace*; the *charms* of her person are equal to those of her mind.

Savage's method of life particularly qualified him for conversation, of which he knew how to practise all the *graces*.—JOHNSON.

Music has *charms* to soothe the savage breast.—OGBURN.

Graceful, Comely, Elegant.

A *Graceful* figure is rendered so by the deportment of the body. A *Comely* figure has that in itself which pleases the eye. *Gracefulness* results from nature, improved by art; *comeliness* is mostly the work of nature. It is possible to acquire *gracefulness* by the aid of the dancing-master, but for a *comely* form we are indebted to nature aided by circumstances. *Grace* is a quality pleasing to the eye; but *Elegance*, from the Latin *eligo, electus*, select and choice, is a quality of a higher nature, that inspires admiration; *elegant* is applicable, like *graceful*, to the motion of the body, or like *comely*, to the person, and is extended in its meaning also to language and even to dress. A person's step is *graceful*; his air or his movements are *elegant*; the *grace* of an action lies chiefly in its adaptation to the occasion.

Grace is in some degree a relative quality; the *gracefulness* of an action depends on its suitability to the occasion: *elegance* is a positive quality; it is, properly speaking, beauty in regard to the exterior of the person; an *elegance* of air and manner is the consequence not only of superior birth and station, but also of superior natural endowments.

The first who approached her was a youth of *graceful* presence and courtly air, but dressed in a richer habit than had ever been seen in Arcadia.—STEELE.

Teidas the son of Phœbias was at this time in the bloom of his youth, and very remarkable for the *comeliness* of his person.—ADDISON.

The natural progress of the works of men is from rudeness to convenience, from convenience to *elegance*, and from *elegance* to nicety.—JOHNSON.

Graceful, v. *Becoming*.

Gracious, Merciful, Kind.

Gracious, when compared to *Merciful*, is used only in the spiritual sense; the latter is applicable to the conduct of man as well as of the Deity.

Grace is exerted in doing good to an object that has merited the contrary; *mercy* is exerted in withholding the evil which has been merited. God is *gracious* to his creatures in affording them not only an opportunity to address Him, but every encouragement to lay open their wants to Him; their unworthiness and sinfulness are not made impediments of access to Him. God is *merciful* to the vilest of sinners, and lends an ear to the smallest breath of repentance; in the moment of executing vengeance He stops His arm at the voice of supplication: He expects the same *mercy* to be extended by man toward his offending brother.

Grace, in the lofty sense in which it is here admitted, cannot with propriety be made the attribute of any human being, however elevated his rank: nothing short of infinite wisdom as well as goodness can be supposed capable of doing good to offenders without producing ultimate evil. Were a king to attempt any display of *grace* by bestowing favours on criminals, his conduct would be highly injurious to individuals as well as the public at large, and call down upon him the just censure of all good men; but when we speak of the Almighty as dispensing His goods to sinners, and even courting them by every

act of endearment to lay aside their sins, we clearly perceive that this difference arises from the infinite disparity between Him and us; which makes that "His ways are not our ways, nor are His thoughts our thoughts." I am inclined therefore to think that in our language we have made a peculiarly just distinction between *grace* and *mercy*, by confining the former to the acts of the Almighty, and applying the latter indiscriminately to both; for it is obvious that *mercy*, as far as it respects the suspension of punishment, lies altogether within the reach of human discretion.

Gracious, when compared with *Kind*, differs principally as to the station of the persons to whom it is applied. *Gracious* is altogether confined to superiors; *kind* is indiscriminately employed for superiors and equals: a king gives a *gracious* reception to the nobles who are presented to him; one friend gives a *kind* reception to another by whom he is visited. *Gracious* is a term in peculiar use at court, and among princes; it necessarily supposes a voluntary descent from a lofty station, to put one's self, for the time being, upon a level with those to whom one speaks: it comprehends, therefore, condescension in manner, and affability in address. *Kindness* is a domestic virtue; it is found mostly among those who have not so much ceremonial to dispense with; it is the display of our goodwill not only in the manner, but in the action itself; it is not confined to the tone of the voice, the gesture of the body, or the mode of expression; but extends to actual services in the closest relations of society; a master is *kind* to his servants in the time of their sickness; friends who are *kind* to one another have perpetual opportunities of displaying their *kindness* in various little offices.

He heard my vows, and *graciously* decreed
My grounds to be restored, my former flocks to feed.
DRYDEN.

So *gracious* hath God been to us, that he hath made those things to be our duty which naturally tend to our felicity.—TILLOTSON.

He that's *merciful*
Unto the bad is cruel to the good.—RANDOLPH.

Love? that would all men just and temperate make,
Kind to themselves and others for his sake.—WALLER.

Grand, v. *Great*.Grand, v. *Noble*.

Grandeur, Magnificence.

Grandeur, from *grand*, in French *grande*, great, Latin *grandis*, probably from *γρᾶνος* ancient, because the term in Latin is applied mostly to great age, and afterwards extended in its application to greatness in general, but particularly that greatness which is taken in the good sense.

Magnificence, in Latin *magnificentia*, from *magnus* and *facio*, signifies making or acting on a large scale.

An extensive assemblage of striking qualities in the exterior constitutes the common signification of these terms, of which *grandeur* is the genus, and *magnificence* the species. *Magnificence* cannot exist without *grandeur*, but *grandeur* exists without *magnificence*: the former is distinguished from the latter both

in degree and in application. When applied to the same objects they differ in degree; *magnificence* being the highest degree of *grandeur*. As it respects the style of living, *grandeur* is within the reach of subjects; *magnificence* is mostly confined to princes. A person is said to live in a style of *grandeur*, who rises above the common level, in the number of his servants, the quality of his equipage, and the size of his establishment: no one is said to live in a style of *magnificence* who does not surpass the *grandeur* of his contemporaries. Wealth, such as falls to the lot of many, may enable them to display *grandeur*: but nothing short of a princely fortune gives either a title or a capacity to aim at *magnificence*. *Grandeur* admits of degrees and modifications: it may display itself in various ways, according to the taste of the individual; but *magnificence* is that which has already reached the highest degree of superiority in every particular.

Those who are ambitious for earthly *grandeur* are rarely in a temper of mind to take a just view of themselves and of all things that surround them; they forget that there is any thing above this, in comparison with which it sinks into insignificance and meanness. The *grandeur* of European courts is lost in a comparison with the *magnificence* of Eastern princes.

Grandeur is applicable to the works of nature as well as art, of mind as well as matter; *magnificence* is altogether the creature of art. A structure, a spectacle, an entertainment, and the like, may be *grand* or *magnificent*; but a scene, a prospect, a conception, and the like, is *grand*, but not *magnificent*.

There is a kind of *grandeur* and respect, which the meanest and most insignificant part of mankind endeavour to procure in the little circle of their friends and acquaintance.—ADDISON.

The wall of China is one of those Eastern pieces of *magnificence* which makes a figure even in the map of the world, although an account of it would have been thought fabulous were not the wall itself extant.—ADDISON.

To Grant, v. To admit.

To Grant, v. To allow.

To Grant, v. To give.

To Grasp, v. To lay hold.

Grateful, v. Acceptable.

Gratification, v. Enjoyment.

To Gratify, Indulge, Humour.

To Gratify, make *grateful* or *pleasant* (v. Acceptable), is a positive act of the choice. To Indulge, from the Latin *indulgeo* and *dulcis* to sweeten or make palatable, is a negative act of the will, a yielding of the mind to circumstances. One *gratifies* his appetites; and *indulges* his humours. To *gratify* and *indulge*, as individual acts, may be both allowable; but to *gratify* is unrestricted by any moral consideration; *indulging* always involves the sacrifice of some general rule of conduct or principle of action. We may sometimes *gratify* a laudable curiosity, and *indulge* ourselves in a salutary recreation; but *gratifying* as a habit becomes a vice, and *indulging* as a habit is a weakness. A person who is in search of

pleasure *gratifies* his desires as they rise; he lives for the *gratification*, and depends upon it for his happiness. He who has higher objects in view than the momentary *gratification* will be careful not to *indulge* himself too much in such things as will wear him from his purpose.

To *gratify* is a selfish act; we *gratify* ourselves only, but not others: to *indulge* is often a kind action; we *indulge* others as well as ourselves: to Humour is to *indulge* or fall in with the *humour*; it may be selfish or prudent. The sensualist *gratifies* his passions, and sacrifices not only his own substantial happiness, but the peace of others to the *gratification*. a good parent *indulges* his child in whatever he knows is not hurtful: it is sometimes necessary to *humour* the temper in some measure, the better to correct it. Things *gratify*: persons only *indulge*: we are *gratified* with any spectacle which we witness; we are *indulged* with the opportunity of witnessing this spectacle through the kindness of a friend.

It is certainly a very important lesson to learn how to enjoy ordinary things, and to be able to relish your being, without the transport of some passion, or *gratification* of some appetite.—STEELE.

Still in short intervals of pleasing woe,

Regardful of the friendly dues I owe;

I to the glorious dead for ever dear,

Indulge the tribute of a grateful tear.—POPE.

A skillful manager of the rabble, with two or three popular empty words, such as "right of the subject and liberty of conscience," well tuned and *humoured*, may whistle them backwards and forwards till he is weary.—SOUTH.

To Gratify, v. To satisfy.

Gratitude, v. Thankfulness.

Gratuitous, Voluntary.

Gratuitous is opposed to that which is obligatory. Voluntary is opposed to that which is compulsory, or involuntary. A gift is *gratuitous* when it flows entirely from the free will of the giver, independently of right: an offer is *voluntary* which flows from the free will, independently of all external constraint. *Gratuitous* is therefore to *voluntary* as a species to the genus. What is *gratuitous* is *voluntary*, although what is *voluntary* is not always *gratuitous*. The *gratuitous* is properly the *voluntary* in regard to the disposal of one's property: and the *voluntary* is applicable to all other actions.

The heroic band of cashierers of monarchs were in haste to make a generous diffusion of the knowledge which they had thus *gratuitously* received.—BURKE.

Their privileges relative to contribution were *voluntarily* surrendered.—BURKE.

Gratuity, Recompense.

The distinction between these terms is very similar to the above (v. *Gratuitous*). They both imply a gift, and a gift by way of return for some supposed service; but the *gratuity* is independent of all expectation as well as right: the *recompense* is founded upon some admissible claim. Those who wish to confer a favour in a delicate manner will sometimes do it under the shape of a *gratuity*: those who overrate their services, will in all probability be disappointed in the *recompense* they receive.

If there be one or two scholars more, that will be no great addition to his trouble, considering that, perhaps, their parents may recompense him by their *gratuities*.—MOLYNEUX.

What could be less than to afford him praise,
The easiest recompense!—MILTON.

Grave, Serious, Solemn.

Grave, in Latin *gravis* heavy, denotes the weight which keeps the mind or person down, and prevents buoyancy; it is opposed to the light.

Serious, in Latin *serus* late or slow, marks the quality of slowness or consideration, either in the mind or that which occupies the mind: it is opposed to the jocose.

Grave expresses more than *serious*; it does not merely bespeak the absence of mirth, but that heaviness of mind which is displayed in all the movements of the body; *seriousness*, on the other hand, bespeaks no depression, but simply steadiness of action, and a restraint from all that is jocular. A man may be *grave* in his walk, in his tone, in his gesture, in his looks, and all his exterior; he is *serious* only in his general air, his countenance, and demeanour. *Gravity* is produced by some external circumstance; *seriousness* springs from the operation of the mind itself, or from circumstances. Misfortunes or age will produce *gravity*: *seriousness* is the fruit of reflection. *Gravity* is, in the proper sense, confined to the person, as a characteristic of his temper; *serious*, on the other hand, is a characteristic either of persons or things: hence we should speak of a *grave* assembly, not a *serious* assembly, of old men; *grave* senators, not *serious* senators; of a *grave* speaker, not a *serious* speaker: but a *serious*, not a *grave* sermon; a *serious*, not a *grave* writer; a *serious*, not a *grave* sentiment; a *serious*, not properly a *grave* objection: *grave* is, however, sometimes extended to things in the sense of weighty, as when we speak of *grave* matters of deliberation. *Gravity* is peculiarly ascribed to a judge, from the double cause, that much depends upon his deportment, in which there ought to be *gravity*, and that the weighty concerns which press on his mind are most apt to produce *gravity*: on the other hand, both *gravity* and *seriousness* may be applied to the preacher; the former only as it respects the manner of delivery; the latter as it respects especially the matter of his discourse: the person may be *grave* or *serious*; the discourse is only *serious*.

Solemn expresses more than either *grave* or *serious*, from the Latin *solemnis* yearly. As applied to the stated religious festivals of the Romans, it has acquired the collateral meaning of religious *gravity*: like *serious*, it is employed not so much to characterize either the person or the thing: a judge pronounces the *solemn* sentence of condemnation in a *solemn* manner; a preacher delivers many *solemn* warnings to his hearers. *Gravity* may be the effect of corporeal habit, and *seriousness* of mental habit; but *solemnity* is something occasional and extraordinary. Some children discover a remarkable *gravity* as soon as they begin to observe; a regular attention to religious worship will induce a habit of *seriousness*;

the admonitions of a parent on his death-bed will have peculiar *solemnity*.

If then some *grave* and pious man appear,
They hush their noise, and lend a listening ear.
DRYDEN.

In our retirements everything disposes us to be *serious*.
—ADDISON.

In most of our long words which are derived from the Latin, we contract the length of the syllables, that gives them a *grave* and *solemn* air in their own language.—ADDISON.

Grave, Tomb, Sepulchre.

All these terms denote the place where bodies are deposited. **Grave**, from the German *graben*, &c., has a reference to the hollow made in the earth. **Tomb**, from *tumulus* and *tumeo* to swell, has a reference to the rising that is made above it. **Sepulchre**, from *sepelio* to bury, has a reference to the use for which it is employed. From this explanation it is evident that these terms have a certain propriety of application: "to sink into the *grave*" is an expression that carries the thoughts where the body must rest in death; "to inscribe on the *tomb*, or to encircle the *tomb* with flowers," carries our thoughts to the external of that place in which the body is interred. To enter in a *sepulchre*, or to visit or enter a *sepulchre*, reminds us of a place in which bodies are deposited.

The path of glory leads but to the *grave*.—GRAY.

Nor you, ye proud, impute to these the fault,
If memory o'er their *tombs* no trophies raise.—GRAY.

The Lay itself is either lost or buried, perhaps for ever, in one of those *sepulchres* of MSS. which by courtesy are called libraries.—TYRWHITT.

Grave, v. Sober.

Gravity, v. Weight.

Great, Large, Big.

Great, derived through the medium of the northern languages from the Latin *crassus* thick, and *creresco* to grow, is applied to all kinds of dimensions in which things can grow or increase. **Large**, in Latin *largus* wide, is probably derived from the Greek *λα* and *πειν* to flow plentifully; for *largior* signifies to give freely, and *large* has in English a similar sense: it is properly applied to space, extent, and quantity. **Big**, from the German *bauch* belly, and the English *bulk*, denotes *great* as to expansion or capacity. A house, a room, a heap, a pile, an army, &c., is *great* or *large*; an animal or a mountain is *great* or *big*; a road, a city, a street, and the like, is termed rather *great* than *large*. *Great* is used generally in the improper sense; *large* and *big* are used only occasionally: a noise, a distance, a multitude, a number, a power, and the like, is termed *great*, but not *large*: we may, however, speak of a *large* portion, a *large* share, a *large* quantity; or of a mind *big* with conception, or of an event *big* with the fate of nations.

At one's first entrance into the Pantheon at Rome, how the imagination is filled with something *great* and amazing; and at the same time how little in proportion one is affected with the inside of a Gothic cathedral, although it be five times *larger* than the other.—ADDISON.

We are not a little pleased to find every green leaf swarm with millions of animals, that at their *largest* growth are not visible to the naked eye.—ADDISON.

An animal no *bigger* than a mite cannot appear perfect to the eye, because the sight takes it in at once.—ADDISON.

Among all the figures of architecture, there are none that have a *greater* air than the concave and the convex.—ADDISON.

Sure He that made us with such *large* discourse,
Looking before and after, gave us not
That capability and godlike reason
To rust in us unused.—SHAKESPEARE.

Amazing clouds on clouds continual heap'd,
Or whirl'd tempestuous by the gusty wind,
Or silent borne along heavy and slow,
With the *big* stores of streaming oceans charg'd.
THOMSON.

Great, Grand, Sublime.

These terms are synonymous only in their moral application. *Great* simply designates extent; *Grand* includes likewise the idea of excellence and superiority. A *great* undertaking characterizes only the extent of the undertaking; a *grand* undertaking bespeaks its superior excellence: *great* objects are seen with facility; *grand* objects are viewed with admiration. It is a *great* point to make a person sensible of his faults; it should be the *grand* aim of all to aspire after moral and religious improvement.

Grand and *Sublime* are both superior to *great*; but the former marks the dimensions of *greatness*; the latter, from the Latin *sublimis*, designates that of height. A scene may be either *grand* or *sublime*: it is *grand* as it fills the imagination with its immensity; it is *sublime* as it elevates the imagination beyond the surrounding and less important objects. There is something *grand* in the sight of a vast army moving forward as it were by one impulse; there is something peculiarly *sublime* in the sight of huge mountains and craggy cliffs of ice, shaped into various fantastic forms. *Grand* may be said either of the works of art or nature; *sublime* is applicable only to the works of nature. The Egyptian pyramids, or the ocean, are both *grand* objects; a tempestuous ocean is a *sublime* object. *Grand* is sometimes applied to the mind; *sublime* is applied both to the thoughts and the expressions. There is a *grandeur* of conception in the writings of Milton; there is a *sublimity* in the Inspired Writings, which far surpasses all human productions.

There is nothing in this whole art of architecture which pleases the imagination, but as it is *great*, uncommon, or beautiful.—ADDISON.

There is generally in nature something more *grand* and august than what we meet with in the curiosities of art.—ADDISON.

Homer fills his readers with *sublime* ideas.—ADDISON.

Greatness, v. Size.

Greediness, v. Avidity.

Grief, v. Affliction.

Grievance, Hardship.

Grievance, from the Latin *gravis* heavy or burdensome, implies that which lies heavy at heart. *Hardship*, from the adjective *hard*, denotes that which *presses* or bears violently on the person,

Grievance is in general taken for that which is done by another to *grieve* or distress: *hardship* is a particular kind of *grievance* that presses upon individuals. There are national *grievances*, though not national *hardships*.

An infraction of one's rights, an act of violence or oppression, are *grievances* to those who are exposed to them, whether as individuals or bodies of men: an unequal distribution of labour, a partial indulgence of one to the detriment of another, constitutes the *hardship*. A weight of taxes levied by a despotic prince in order to support an unjust war, will be esteemed a *grievance*: the partiality and caprice of the collector in making it fall with unequal weight upon particular persons will be regarded as a peculiar *hardship*. Men seek a redress of their *grievances* from some higher power than that by which they are inflicted: they endure their *hardships* until an opportunity offers of getting them removed.

It is better private men should have some injustice done them than a public *grievance* should not be redressed. This is usually pleaded in defence of all those *hardships* which fall on particular persons, in particular occasions which could not be foreseen when the law was made.—SPECTATOR.

To Grieve, Mourn, Lament.

Grieve, v. Affliction.

Mourn, like *moan* and *murmur*, is probably but an imitation of the sound which is produced by pain.

To *grieve* is the general term; *mourn* the particular term. To *grieve*, in its limited sense, is an inward act; to *mourn* is an outward act: the *grief* lies altogether in the mind; the *mourning* displays itself by some outward mark. A man *grieves* for his sins; he *mourns* for the loss of his friends. One *grieves* for that which immediately concerns one's self; one *mourns* for that which concerns others: one *grieves* over the loss of property; one *mourns* the fate of a deceased relative.

Grieve is the act of an individual; *mourn* may be the common act of many: a nation *mourns* though it does not *grieve*, for a public calamity. To *grieve* is applicable to domestic troubles; *mourn* may refer to public or private ills. Every good Frenchman has had occasion to *grieve* for the loss of that which is immediately dear to himself, and to *mourn* over the misfortunes which have overwhelmed his country.

Grieve and *mourn* are permanent sentiments; *Lament* (v. *To bewail*) is a transitory feeling; the former are produced by substantial causes, which come home to the feelings; the latter respects things of a more partial, oftentimes of a more remote and indifferent, nature. A real widow *mourns* all the remainder of her days for the loss of her husband; we *lament* a thing to-day which we may forget to-morrow. *Mourn* and *lament* are both expressed by some outward sign; but the former is composed and free from all noise; the latter displays itself either in cries or simple words. In the moment of trouble, when the distress of the mind is at its height, it may break out into loud *lamentations*; but commonly *grieving* and *mourning* commence when *lamentation* ceases.

As epithets, *grievous*, *mournful*, and *lament-*

able have a similar distinction. What presses hard on persons, their property, connections, and circumstances, is *grievous*; what touches the tender feelings, and tears asunder the ties of kindred and friendship, is *mournful*; whatever excites a painful sensation in our minds is *lamentable*. Famine is a *grievous* calamity for a nation; the violent separation of friends by death is a *mournful* event at all times, but particularly so for those who are in the prime of life and the fulness of expectation; the ignorance which some persons discover even in the present cultivated state of society is truly *lamentable*. *Grievous* misfortunes come but seldom, although they sometimes fall thickly on an individual; a *mournful* tale excites our pity from the persuasion of its veracity; but *lamentable* stories are often fabricated for sinister purposes.

Achates, the companion of his breast,
Goes *grieving* by his side, with equal cares oppress'd.
DRYDEN.

My brother's friends and daughter left behind,
False to them all, to Paris only kind,
For this I *mourn*, till grief or dire disease
Shall waste the form whose crime it was to please.
POPE.

So close in poplar shades, her children gone.
The mother nightingale *laments* alone.—DRYDEN.

Grieved, *v. Sorry*.

Grim, *v. Hideous*.

To Gripe, *v. To lay hold*.

To Gripe, *v. To press*.

Grisly, *v. Hideous*.

To Groan, Moan.

Groan and Moan are both an onomatopoeia, from the sounds which they express. *Groan* is a deep sound produced by hard breathing; *moan* is a plaintive long-drawn sound produced by the organs of utterance. The *groan* proceeds involuntarily as an expression of severe pain, either of body or mind; the *moan* proceeds often from the desire of awakening attention or exciting compassion. Dying *groans* are uttered in the agonies of death; the *moans* of a wounded sufferer are sometimes the only resource he has left to make his destitute case known.

The plain ox, whose toil,
Patient and ever ready, clothes the land
With all the pomp of harvest, shall be blest,
And struggling *groan* beneath the cruel hands
Ben of the clown be feeds.—THOMSON.

The fair Alexis lov'd, but lov'd in vain,
And underneath the beechen shade, alone,
Thus to the woods and mountains made his *moan*.
DRYDEN.

Gross, Coarse.

Gross derives its meaning in this application from the Latin *crassus* thick from fat, or that which is of common materials.

Coarse, *v. Coarse*.

These terms are synonymous in the moral application. *Grossness* of habit is opposed to delicacy; *coarseness* to softness and refinement. A person becomes *gross* by an unrestrained indulgence of his sensual appetites; particularly in eating and drinking; he is *coarse* from

the want of polish either as to his mind or manners. A *gross* sensualist approximates very nearly to the brute; he sets aside all moral considerations; he indulges himself in the open face of day in defiance of all decency: a *coarse* person approaches nearest to the savage whose roughnesses of humour and inclination have not been refined down by habits of restraining his own will, and complying with the will of another. A *gross* expression conveys the idea of that which should be kept from the view of the mind, which shocks the moral feeling; a *coarse* expression conveys the idea of an unseemly sentiment in the mind of the speaker. The representations of the Deity by any sensible image is *gross*, because it gives us a low and grovelling idea of a Superior Being; the doing a kindness, and making the receiver at the same time sensible of your superiority and his dependence, indicates great *coarseness* in the character of the favourer.

A certain preparation is requisite for the enjoyment of devotion in its whole extent; not only must the life be reformed from *gross* enormities, but the heart must have undergone that change which the Gospel demands.—BLAIR.

The refined pleasures of a pious mind are, in many respects, superior to the *coarse* gratifications of sense.—BLAIR.

Gross, Total.

Gross is connected with the word great: from the idea of size which enters into the original meaning of this term is derived that of quantity: *Total*, from the Latin *totus*, signifies literally the whole: the *gross* implies that from which nothing has been taken: the *total* signifies that to which nothing need be added: the *gross* sum includes everything without regard to what it may be; the *total* includes everything which one wishes to include; we may, therefore, deduct from the *gross* that which does not immediately belong to it; but the *total* is that which admits of no deduction. The *gross* weight in trade is applicable to any article, the whole of which, good or bad, pure or dross, is included in opposition to the nett weight; the *total* amount supposes all to be included which ought to form a part, in opposition to any smaller amounts or subdivisions; when employed in the improper sense, they preserve the same distinction: things are said to be taken or considered in the *gross*, that is, in the large and comprehensive way, one with another; things are said to undergo a *total* change.

I have more than once found fault with those general reflections which strike at kingdoms or commonwealths in the *gross*.—ADDISON.

Nature is either collected into one *total* or diffused and distributed.—BACON.

To Ground, *v. To found*.

Ground, *v. Foundation*.

Group, *v. Assembly*.

To Grow, *v. To be*.

To Grow, *v. To increase*.

Grudge, *v. Malice*.

To Guarantee, Be Security, Be Responsible, Warrant.

Guarantee and Warrant are both derived from the Teutonic *währan* to defend or make safe and binding; **Security**, from *secure* (v. *Certain*), has the same original meaning; **Responsible** (v. *Amenable*).

Guarantee is a term of higher import than the others: one *guarantees* for others in matters of contract and stipulation; *security* is employed in matters of right and justice; one may be *security* for another, or give *security* for one's self: *responsibility* is employed in moral concerns; we take *responsibility* upon ourselves; *warrant* is employed in civil and commercial concerns; we *warrant* for that which concerns ourselves.

We *guarantee* by virtue of our power and the confidence of those who accept the *guarantee*; it is given by means of a word, which is accepted as a pledge for the future performance of a contract. Governments, in order to make peace, frequently *guarantee* for the performance of certain stipulations by powers of minor importance. We are *security* by virtue of our wealth and credit; the *security* is not confined to a simple word, it is always accompanied with some legitimate act that binds, it regards the payment of money for another; tradesmen are frequently *security* for others who are not supposed sufficiently wealthy to answer for themselves: a person is *responsible* by virtue of his office and relation; *responsibility* binds for the reparation of injuries; masters are *responsible* for the good conduct of the children entrusted to their care: one *warrants* by virtue of one's knowledge and situation: the *warrant* binds to make restitution; the seller *warrants* his articles on sale to be such as are worth the purchase, or in case of defectiveness to be returned. A king *guarantees* for the transfer of the lands of one prince, on his decease, into the possession of another; when men have neither honour nor money, they must get others to be *security* for them, if any can be found sufficiently credulous; in England masters are *responsible* for all the mischiefs done by their servants; a tradesman who stands upon his reputation will be careful not to *warrant* anything which he is not assured will stand the trial.

The people of England, then, are willing to trust to the sympathy of regicides, the *guarantee* of the British monarchy.—BURKE.

Richard Cromwell desired only *security* for the debts he had contracted.—BURNET.

What a dreadful thing is a standing army, for the conduct of the whole, or any part of which, no one is *responsible*.—BURKE.

No man's mistake will be able to *warrant* an unjust sentence, much less justify a false censure.—SOUTH.

Guard, v. Fence.

To Guard, Defend, Watch.

Guard is but a variation of *ward*, which comes from the German *wahren* to look to.

Defend, v. Apology, and to defend.

Watch and Wake, through the medium of the northern languages, are derived from the Latin *vigil* watchful, *vigeo* to flourish, and the Greek *αγυαλλω* to exult or be in spirits,

Guard seems to include in it the idea of both *defend* and *watch*, inasmuch as one aims to keep off danger by personal efforts; *guard* comprehends the signification of *defend*, inasmuch as one employs one's eyes and attention to detect the danger. *Guard* comprehends the idea of *watch*: one *defends* and *watches*, therefore, when one *guards*; but one does not always *guard* when one *defends* or *watches*.

To *defend* is employed in a case of actual attack; to *guard* is to *defend*, by preventing the attack: the soldier *guards* the palace of the king in time of peace; he *defends* the power and kingdom of his prince in time of war, or the person of the king in the field of battle: one *guards* in cases where resistance is requisite, and attack is threatened; one *watches* in cases where an unresisting enemy is apprehended: soldiers or armed men are employed to *guard* those who are in custody; children are set to *watch* the corn which is threatened by the birds; hence it is that those are termed *guards* who surround the person of the monarch, and those are termed *watchmen* who are employed by night to *watch* for thieves and give the alarm, rather than make any attack.

In the improper application they have a similar sense: modesty *guards* female honour; it enables her to present a bold front to the daring violator: clothing *defends* against the inclemency of the weather: a person who wants to escape *watches* his opportunity to slip out unobserved. The love of his subjects is the king's greatest safeguard: walls are no defence against an enraged multitude; it is necessary for every man to set a *watch* upon his lips, lest he suffer that to escape from him of which he may afterwards repent.

Modesty is not only an ornament, but also a *guard* to virtue.—ADDISON.

Forthwith on all sides to his aid was run,
By angels many and strong, who interposed
Defence.—MILTON.

But see the well-plum'd hearse comes nodding on,
Stately and slow, and properly attended
By the whole sable tribe, that painful watch
The sick man's door, and live upon the dead.
BLAIR.

Guard, Sentinel.

These terms are all employed to designate those who are employed for the protection of either persons or things.

Guard has been explained above (v. *To guard*); **Sentinel**, in French *sentinelle*, is properly a species of *guard*, namely, a military *guard* in the time of a campaign; anyone may be set as *guard* over property who is empowered to keep off every intruder by force; but the *sentinel* acts in the army as the *watch* (v. *To guard*) in the police, rather to observe the motions of the enemy than to repel any force.

Fast as he could, he sighing quits the walls,
And thus descending, on the *guards* he calls.—POPE.

One of the *sentinels*, who stood on the stage to prevent disorder, burst into tears.—STEELE.

Conscience is the *sentinel* of virtue.—JOHNSON.

Guard, Guardian.

These words are derived from the verb *guard* (v. *To guard*); but they have acquired a distinct office.

Guard is used either in the literal or figurative sense; **Guardian** only in the improper sense. *Guard* is applied either to persons or things; *guardian* only to persons. In application to persons, the *guard* is temporary; the *guardian* is fixed and permanent: the *guard* only guards against external evils; the *guardian* takes upon him the office of parent, counselor, and director: when a house is in danger of being attacked, a person may sit up as a *guard*: when a parent is dead, a *guardian* supplies his place: we expect from a *guard* nothing but human assistance; but from our *guardian* angel we may expect supernatural assistance.

Him Hermes to Achilles shall convey,
Guard of his life, and partner of his way.—POPE.

Ye guides and guardians of our Argive race!
Come all! let generous rage your arms employ,
And save Patroclus from the dogs of Troy.—POPE.

To Guard Against, Take Heed.

Both these terms imply express care on the part of the agent; but the former is used with regard to external or internal evils, the latter only with regard to internal or mental evils: in an enemy's country it is essential to be particularly on one's *guard* for fear of a surprise; in difficult matters, where we are liable to err, it is of importance to *take heed* lest we run from one extreme to another: young men, on their entrance into life, cannot be too much on their *guard* against associating with those who would lead them into expensive pleasures; in slippery paths, whether physically or morally understood, it is necessary to *take heed* how we go.

One would take more than ordinary care to *guard* one's self against this particular imperfection (changeableness), because it is that which our nature very strongly inclines us to.—ADDISON.

Take heed of that dreadful tribunal where it will not be enough to say that I thought this or I heard that.—SOUTH.

Guardian, v. Guard.

To Guess, Conjecture, Divine.

Guess, in Saxon and Low German *gissen*, is connected with the word *ghost*, and the German *geist*, &c., spirit, signifying the action of a spirit.

Conjecture, v. Conjecture.

Divine, from the Latin *divinus* and *Deus* a god, signifies to think and know as a god.

We *guess* that a thing actually is; we *conjecture* that which may be: we *guess* that it is a certain hour; we *conjecture* at the meaning of a person's actions. *Guessing* is opposed to the certain knowledge of a thing; *conjecturing* is opposed to the full conviction of a thing: a child *guesses* at that portion of his lesson which he has not properly learned; a fanciful person employs *conjecture* where he cannot draw any positive conclusion.

To *guess* and to *conjecture* are natural acts of the mind: to *divine*, in its proper sense, is a supernatural act; in this sense the heathens affected to *divine* that which was known only to an Omniscient Being; and impostors in our time presume to *divine* in matters that are set above the reach of human comprehension.

The term is, however, employed to denote a species of *guessing* in different matters, as to *divine* the meaning of a mystery.

And these discoveries make us all confess
That sublimary science is but *guess*.—DENHAM.

Now hear the Grecian fraud, and from this one
Conjecture all the rest.—DENHAM.

Walking they talk'd, and fruitlessly *divin'd*
What friend the priestess by those words design'd.
—DRYDEN.

Guest, Visitor, or Visitant.

Guest, from the northern languages, signifies one who is entertained; **Visitor** or **Visitant** is the one who pays the visit. The *guest* is to the *visitor* as the species to the genus; every *guest* is a *visitor*, but every *visitor* is not a *guest*; the *visitor* simply comes to see the person, and enjoy social intercourse; but the *guest* also partakes of hospitality: we are *visitors* at the tea-table, at the card-table, and round the fire; we are *guests* at the festive board.

Some great behest from heav'n
To us perhaps he brings, and will vouchsafe
This day to be our *guest*.—MILTON.

No palace with a lofty gate he wants
To admit the tides of early *visitants*.—DRYDEN.

To Guide, v. To conduct.

Guide, Rule.

Guide is to **Rule** as the genus to the species: every *rule* is a *guide* to a certain extent; but the *guide* is often that which exceeds the *rule*. The *guide*, in the moral sense, as in the proper sense, goes with us, and points out the exact path; it does not permit us to err either to the right or left: the *rule* marks out a line, beyond which we may not go; but it leaves us to trace the line, and consequently to fall either on the one side or other.

The Bible is our best *guide* for moral practice; its doctrines as interpreted in the articles of the established church are the best *rule* of faith for every Christian.

You must first apply to religion as the *guide* of life, before you can have recourse to it as the refuge of sorrow.—BLAIR.

There is something so wild, and yet so solemn, in Shakespeare's speeches of his ghosts and fairies, and the like imaginary persons, that we cannot forbear thinking them natural, though we have no *rule* by which to judge them.—ADDISON.

Guile, v. Deceit.

Guiltless, Innocent, Harmless.

Guiltless, without *guilt*, is more than **Innocent**: *innocence*, from *noco* to hurt, extends no farther than the quality of not hurting by any direct act; *guiltless* comprehends the quality of not intending to hurt: it is possible, therefore, to be *innocent* without being *guiltless*, though not *vice versa*; he who wishes for the death of another is not *guiltless*, though he may be *innocent* of the crime of murder. *Guiltless* seems to regard a man's general condition; *innocent* his particular condition; no man is *guiltless* in the sight of God, for no man is exempt from the guilt of sin;

but he may be *innocent* in the sight of men, or *innocent* of all such intentional offences as render him obnoxious to his fellow creatures. *Guiltless* was that happy state of perfection which men lost at the Fall; *innocence* is that relative or comparative state of perfection which is attainable here on earth: the highest state of *innocence* is an ignorance of evil.

Ah! why should all mankind
For one man's fault thus *guiltless* be condemn'd,
If *guiltless*? But from me what can proceed
But all corrupt?—MILTON.

When Adam sees the several changes of nature about him, he appears in a disorder of mind suitable to one who had forfeited both his *innocence* and his *happiness*.—ADDISON.

Guiltless is in the proper sense applicable only to the condition of man; and when applied to things, it still has a reference to the person: *innocent* is equally applicable to persons or things; a person is *innocent* who has not committed any injury, or has not any direct purpose to commit any injury; or a conversation is *innocent* which is free from what is hurtful. *Innocent* and *Harmless* both recommend themselves as qualities negatively good; they designate a freedom either in the person or thing to injure, and differ only in regard to the nature of the injury: *innocence* respects moral injury, and *harmless* physical injury; a person is *innocent* who is free from moral impurity and wicked purposes; he is *harmless* if he have not the power or disposition to commit any violence; a diversion is *innocent* which has nothing in it likely to corrupt the morals; a game is *harmless* which is not likely to inflict any wound, or endanger the health.

But from the mountain's grassy side,
A *guiltless* feast I bring;
A scrip with fruits and herbs supplied,
And water from the spring.—GOLDSMITH.

A man should endeavour to make the sphere of his *innocent* pleasures as wide as possible, that he may retire into them with safety.—ADDISON.

Full on his breast the Trojan arrow fell,
But *harmless* bounded from the plated steel.
ADDISON.

Guilty, *v.* Criminal.

Guise, Habit.

Guise and *wise* are both derived from the northern languages, and denote the manner; but the former is employed for a particular or distinguished manner of dress.

Habit, from the Latin *habitus* a habit, fashion, or form, is taken for a settled or permanent mode of dress.

The *guise* is that which is unusual, and often only occasional; the *habit* is that which is

usual amongst particular classes: a person sometimes assumes the *guise* of a peasant, in order the better to conceal himself; he who devotes himself to the clerical profession puts on the *habit* of a clergyman.

Anubis, Sphinx,
Idols of antique *guise*, and horned Pan,
Terrific monstrous shapes!—DYER.

For 'tis the mind that makes the body rich.
And as the sun breaks through the darkest cloud
So honour appeareth in the meanest *habit*.
SHAKESPEARE.

Gulf, Abyss.

Gulf, in Greek *κολπος* from *κολος* hollow, is applied literally in the sense of a deep concave receptacle for water, as the *gulf* of Venice.

Abyss, in Greek *αβυσσος*, compounded of *α* privative and *βυσσος* a bottom, signifies literally a bottomless pit.

One is overwhelmed in a *gulf*; it carries with it the idea of liquidity and profundity, into which one inevitably sinks never to rise; one is lost in an *abyss*; it carries with it the idea of immense profundity, into which he who is cast never reaches a bottom, nor is able to return to the top; an insatiable voracity is the characteristic idea in the signification of this term.

A *gulf* is a capacious bosom, which holds within itself and buries all objects that suffer themselves to sink into it, without allowing them the possibility of escape; hell is represented as a fiery *gulf*, into which evil spirits are plunged, and remain perpetually overwhelmed: a guilty mind may be said, figuratively, to be plunged into a *gulf* of woe or despair, when filled with the horrid sense of its enormities. An *abyss* presents nothing but an interminable space which has neither beginning nor end; he does wisely who does not venture in, or who retreats before he has plunged too deep to retrace his footsteps: as the ocean, in the natural sense, is a great *abyss*, so are metaphysics an immense *abyss*, into which the human mind precipitates itself only to be bewildered.

Sin and death amain
Following his track, such was the will of heav'n,
Pav'd after him a broad and beaten way
Over the dark *abyss*, whose boiling *gulf*
Tamely endur'd a bridge of wondrous length
From hell continu'd.—MILTON.

Hi broad wing'd vessel drinks the whelming tide,
Hid in the bosom of the black *abyss*.—THOMSON.

To Gush, *v.* To flow.

Gust, *v.* Breeze.

H.

Habit, *v.* Custom.

Habit, *v.* Guise.

To Hallow, *v.* To dedicate.

Handsome, *v.* Beautiful.

To Hanker After, *v.* To desire.

To Happen, Chance.

To Happen that is, to fall out by a *hap*, is to Chance (*v.* Chance, *fortune*) as the genus to the species; whatever *chances* happens, but not *vice-versa*. *Happen* respects all events without including any collateral idea; chance

comprehends, likewise, the idea of the cause and order of events : whatever comes to pass, *happens*, whether regularly in the course of things or particularly, and out of the order ; whatever *chances happens* altogether without concert, intention, and often without relation to any other thing. Accidents *happen* daily, which no human foresight could prevent ; the newspapers contain an account of all that *happens* in the course of the day or week : listeners and busybodies are ready to catch every word that *chances* to fall in their hearing.

With equal mind what *happens* let us bear,
Nor joy, nor grieve too much for things beyond our
care.—DRYDEN.

An idiot *chancing* to live within the sound of a clock, always amused himself with counting the hour of the day whenever the clock struck ; but the clock being spoiled by accident, the idiot continued to count the hour without the help of it.—ADDISON.

Happiness, Felicity, Bliss, Blessedness, Beatitude.

Happiness signifies the state of being *happy*.

Felicity, in Latin *felicitas*, from *felix* happy, most probably comes from the Greek *ηλις* youthful, youth being the age of purest enjoyment.

Bliss, *Blessedness*, signifies the state or property of being *blessed*.

Beatitude, from the Latin *beatus* signifies the property of being *happy* in a superior degree.

Happiness comprehends that aggregate of pleasurable sensations which we derive from external objects ; it is the ordinary term which is employed alike in the colloquial or the philosophical style : *felicity* is a higher expression, comprehending inward enjoyment, or an aggregate of inward pleasure, without regard to the source whence they are derived : *bliss* is a still higher term, expressing more than either *happiness* or *felicity*, both as to the degree and nature of the enjoyment. *Happiness* is the thing adapted to our present condition, and to the nature of our being, as a compound of body and soul ; it is impure in its nature, and variable in degree ; it is sought for by various means and with great eagerness, but it often lies much more within our reach than we are apt to imagine : it is not to be found in the possession of great wealth, of great power, of great dominions, of great splendour, or the unbounded indulgence of any one appetite or desire ; but in moderate possessions, with a heart tempered by religion and virtue, for the enjoyment of that which God has bestowed upon us : it is therefore not so unequally distributed as some have been led to conclude.

Happiness admits of degrees, since every individual is placed in different circumstances either of body or mind, which fit him to be more or less *happy*. *Felicity* is not regarded in the same light ; it is that which is positive and independent of all circumstances : domestic *felicity* and conjugal *felicity* are regarded as moral enjoyments, abstracted from everything which can serve as an alloy. *Bliss* is that which is purely spiritual ; it has its

source in the imagination, and rises above the ordinary level of human enjoyments : of earthly *bliss* little is known but in poetry ; of heavenly *bliss* we form but an imperfect conception from the utmost stretch of our powers. *Blessedness* is a term of spiritual import, which refers to the happy condition of those who enjoy the Divine favour, and are permitted to have a foretaste of heavenly *bliss*, by the exaltation of their minds above earthly *happiness*. *Beatitude* denotes the quality of *happiness* only which is most exalted ; namely, heavenly *happiness*.

Ah ! whither now are fled
Those dreams of greatness ? those unsolid hopes
Of *happiness* !—THOMSON.

No greater *felicity* can genius attain than that of having purified intellectual pleasure, separated mirth from indecency, and wit from licentiousness.—JOHNSON.

The fond soul,
Wrapt in gay visions of unreal *bliss*,
Still paints th' illusive form.—THOMSON.

In the description of heaven and hell we are surely interested, as we are all to reside hereafter either in the regions of horror or of *bliss*.—JOHNSON.

So solid a comfort to men, under all the troubles and afflictions of this world, is that firm assurance which the Christian religion gives us of a future *happiness* as to bring even the greatest miseries which in this life we are liable to, in some sense, under the notion of *blessedness*.—TILLOTSON.

As in the next world, so in this, the only solid blessings are owing to the goodness of the mind, not the extent of the capacity ; friendship here is an emanation from the same source as *beatitude* there.—POPE.

Happiness, v. Well-being.

Happy, Fortunate.

Happy and *Fortunate* are both applied to the external circumstances of a man ; but the former conveys the idea of that which is abstractedly good, the latter implies rather what is agreeable to one's wishes. A man is *happy* in his marriage, in his children, in his connections, and the like ; he is *fortunate* in his trading concerns. *Happy* excludes the idea of chance : *fortunate* excludes the idea of personal effort : a man is *happy* in the possession of what he gets ; he is *fortunate* in getting it.

In the improper sense they bear a similar analogy. A *happy* thought, a *happy* expression, a *happy* turn, a *happy* event, and the like denotes a degree of positive excellence ; a *fortunate* idea, a *fortunate* circumstance, a *fortunate* event, are all relatively considered with regard to the wishes and views of the individual.

O *happy*, if he knew his *happy* state,
The swain who, free from business and debate,
Receives his easy food from nature's hand,
And just returns of cultivated land.—DRYDEN.

Visit the gayest and most *fortunate* on earth only with sleepless nights, disorder any single organ of the senses, and you shall (will) presently see his gaiety vanish.—BLAIR.

Harangue, v. Address.

To Harass, v. To distress.

To Harass, v. To weary.

Harbinger, v. Forerunner.

Harbour, Haven, Port.

The idea of a resting-place for vessels is common to these terms, of which **Harbour**

is general, and the two others specific in their signification.

Harbour, from the Teutonic *herbergen* to shelter, carries with it little more than the common idea of affording a resting or anchoring place. *Haven*, from the Teutonic *haben* to have or hold, conveys the idea of security. *Port*, from the Latin *portus* and *porta* a gate, conveys the idea of an inclosure. A *haven* is a natural harbour; a *port* is an artificial harbour. We characterize an harbour as commodious; a *haven* as snug and secure; a *port* as safe and easy of access. A commercial country profits by the excellence and number of its harbours; it values itself on the security of its havens, and increases the number of its ports accordingly. A vessel goes into a harbour only for a season; it remains in a haven for a permanence; it seeks a port as the destination of its voyage. Merchantmen are perpetually going in and out of a harbour; a distressed vessel, at a distance from home, seeks some haven in which it may winter; the weary mariner looks to the port not as the termination of his labour, but as the commencement of all his enjoyments.

But here she comes,
In the calm harbour of whose gentle breast
My tempest-beaten soul may safely rest.—DRYDEN.
Safe thro' the war her course the vessel steers,
The haven gain'd, the pilot drops his fears.
SHIRLEY.

What though our passage through this world be never
so stormy and tempestuous, we shall arrive at a safe port.
—TILLOTSON.

To Harbour, Shelter, Lodge.

The idea of giving a resting-place is common to these terms: but *Harbour* (*v. To foster*) is used always in a bad sense; *Shelter* (*v. Asylum*) is in an indefinite sense; *Lodge* in French *loge*, from the German *liegen* to lie, in an indifferent sense. One harbours that which ought not to find room anywhere; one shelters that which cannot find security elsewhere; one lodges that which wants a resting-place. Thieves, traitors, or conspirators are harboured by those who have an interest in securing them from detection; either the wicked or the unfortunate may be sheltered from the evil with which they are threatened; travellers are lodged as occasion may require.

In the moral sense, a man harbours resentment, ill-will, evil thoughts, and the like; he shelters himself from a charge by retorting it upon his adversary; he lodges a complaint or information against any one with a magistrate. *Harbour* and *shelter* are said of things as well as of persons, in the active sense; *lodge* is said of things in the neuter sense. Beds and bed-furniture harbour vermin: trees, as well as houses, shelter from a storm; a ball from a gun lodges in the human body, or any other solid substance.

She harbours in her breast a furious hate
(And thou shalt find the dire effects too late)
Fla'd on revenge, and obstinate to die.—DRYDEN.

The hen shelters her first brood of chickens with all
the prudence that she ever attains.—JOHNSON.

They too are tempered like,
With hunger stung, and wild necessity,
Nor lodges pity in their shaggy breast.

—THOMSON.

To Harbour, *v. To foster*,

Hard, Firm, Solid.

The close adherence of the component parts of a body constitutes *Hardness*. The close adherence of different bodies to each other constitutes *Firmness* (*v. Fixed*). That is *hard* which will not yield to a closer compression; that is *firm* which will not yield so as to produce a separation. Ice is *hard*, as far as it respects itself, when it resists every pressure; it is *firm*, with regard to the water which it covers, when it is so closely bound as to resist every weight without breaking.

Hard and *Solid* respects the internal constitution of bodies, and the adherence of the component parts; but *hard* denotes a much closer degree of adherence than *solid*: the *hard* is opposed to the soft; the *solid* to the fluid: every *hard* body is by nature *solid*; although every *solid* body is not *hard*. Wood is always a *solid* body, but it is sometimes *hard*, and sometimes soft; water when congealed is a *solid* body, and admits of different degrees of hardness.

In the improper application, *hardness* is allied to insensibility; *firmness* to fixedness; *solidity* to substantiality: a *hard* man is not to be acted upon by any tender motives; a *firm* man is not to be turned from his purpose; a *solid* man holds no purposes that are not well founded. A man is *hardened* in that which is bad, by being made insensible to that which is good: a man is *confirmed* in anything good or bad by being rendered less disposed to lay it aside; his mind is *consolidated* by acquiring fresh motives for action.

I see you labouring through all your inconveniences
of the rough roads, the *hard* saddle, the trotting horse,
and what not.—POPE.

The loosen'd ice
Rustles no more; but to the sedgey bank
Fast grows, or gathers round the pointed stone,
A crystal pavement, by the breath of heaven
Cemented firm.—THOMSON.

A copious manner of expression gives strength and weight to our ideas, which frequently makes impressions upon the mind, as iron does upon *solid* bodies, rather by repeated strokes than a single blow.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF FLINNY.

Hard, Callous, Hardened, Obdurate.

Hard is here, as in the former case (*v. Hard*), the general term, and the rest particular: *hard*, in its most extensive physical sense, denotes the property of resisting the action of external force, so as not to undergo any change in its form, or separation in its parts: *Callous* is that species of the *hard*, in application to the skin, which arises from its dryness, and the absence of all nervous susceptibility. *Hard* and *callous* are likewise applied in the moral sense; but *hard* denotes the absence of tender feeling, or the property of resisting any impression which tender objects are apt to produce; *callous* denotes the property of not yielding to the force of motives to action. A *hard* heart cannot be moved by the sight of misery, let it be presented in ever so affecting a form: a *callous* mind is not to be touched by any persuasions however powerful.

Hard does not designate any circumstance of its existence or origin: we may be *hard* from a variety of causes; but *callousness* arises from the indulgence of vices, passions, and the pursuit of vicious practices. When we speak

of a person as *hard*, it simply determines what he is; if we speak of him as *callous*, it refers also to what he was, and from what he is become so.

Callous, *Hardened*, and *Obdurate*, are all employed to designate a morally depraved character: but *callousness* belongs properly to the heart and affections; *hardened* to both the heart and the understanding; *obdurate* more particularly to the will. *Callousness* is the first stage of *hardness* in moral depravity; it may exist in the infant mind, on its first tasting the poisonous pleasures of vice, without being acquainted with its remote consequences. A *hardened* state is the work of time; it arises from a continued course of vice, which becomes as it were habitual, and wholly unfits a person for admitting of any other impressions: *obduracy* is the last stage of moral *hardness*, which supposes the whole mind to be obstinately bent on vice. A child discovers himself to be *callous* when the tears and entreaties of a parent cannot awake in him a single sentiment of contrition; a youth discovers himself to be *hardened* when he begins to take a pride and a pleasure in a vicious career; a man shows himself to be *obdurate* when he betrays a settled and confirmed purpose to pursue his abandoned course, without regard to consequences.

Such woes
Not e'en the *hardest* of our foes could bear.
Nor stern Ulysses tell without a tear.—DRYDEN.

By degrees the sense grows *callous*, and loses that exquisite relish of trifles.—BERKELEY.

His *hardened* heart, nor prayers, nor threatenings move;
Fate and the gods had stopp'd his ears to love.—DRYDEN.

Round he throws his baleful eyes,
That witness'd huge affliction and dismay,
Mix'd with *obdurate* pride and steadfast hate.
MILTON.

Hard, Hardy, Insensible, Unfeeling.

Hard (*v. Hard*) may either be applied to that which makes resistance to external impressions or that which presses with a force upon other objects: *Hardy*, which is only a variation of *hard*, is applicable only in the first case: thus, a person's skin may be *hard*, which is not easily acted upon; but the person is said to be *hardy* who can withstand the elements: on the other hand, *hard*, when employed as an active principle, is only applied to the moral character; hence, the difference between a *hardy* man who endures everything and a *hard* man who makes others endure. *Insensible* and *Unfeeling* are but modes of the *hard*; that is, they designate the negative quality of *hardness*, or its incapacity to receive impression: *hard*, therefore, is always the strongest term of the three; and of the two others, *unfeeling* is stronger than *insensible*. *Hard* and *insensible* are applied physically and morally; *unfeeling* is employed only as a moral characteristic. A horse's mouth is *hard* when it is insensible to the action of the bit; a man's heart is *hard* which is insensible to the miseries of others; a man is *unfeeling* who does not regard the feelings of others. The heart may be *hard* by nature, or rendered so by the influence of some passion; but a person is commonly *unfeeling* from circumstances. Shylock is depicted by

Shakspeare as *hard*, from his strong antipathy to the Christians: people who enjoy an uninterrupted state of good health are often *unfeeling* in cases of sickness.

As that which is *hard* mostly hurts or pains when it comes in contact with the soft, the term *hard* is peculiarly applicable to superiors, or such as have power to inflict pain: a creditor may be *hard* towards a debtor. As *insensible* signifies a want of sense, it may be sometimes necessary: a surgeon, when performing an operation, must be *insensible* to the present pain which he inflicts. As *unfeeling* signifies a want of feeling, it is always taken for a want of good feeling: where the removal of pain is required, the surgeon shows himself to be *unfeeling* who does not do everything in his power to lessen the pain of the sufferer.

To be inaccessible, contemptuous, and *hard* of heart, is to revolt against our own nature.—BLAIR.

Ocnus was next, who led his native train
Of *hardy* warriors through the watery plain.
DRYDEN.

It is both reproachful and criminal to have an *insensible* heart.—BLAIR.

The father too a sordid man,
Who love nor pity knew,
Was all *unfeeling* as the rock
From whence his riches grew.—MALLET.

Hard, Difficult.

Hard is here taken in the improper sense of trouble caused, and pains taken, in which sense it is a much stronger term than *Difficult*, which, from the Latin *difficilis*, compounded of the privative *dis* and *facilis*, signifies merely not easy. *Hard* is therefore positive, and *difficult* negative. A *difficult* task cannot be got through without exertion, but a *hard* task requires great exertion. *Difficult* is applicable to all trivial matters which call for a more than usual portion either of labour or thought; *hard* is applicable to those which are of the highest importance, and accompanied with circumstances that call for the utmost stretch of every power. It is a *difficult* matter to get admitted into some circles of society; it is a *hard* matter to find societies that are select: it is *difficult* to decide between two fine paintings which is the finest; it is a *hard* matter to come at any conclusion on metaphysical subjects. A child mostly finds it *difficult* to learn his letters: there are many passages in classical writers which are *hard* to be understood by the learned.

Antigones, with kisses, often tried
To beg this present in his beauty's pride,
When youth and love are *hard* to be denied.
DRYDEN.

As Swift's years increased, his fits of giddiness and deafness grew more frequent, and his deafness made conversation *difficult*.—JOHNSON.

Hardened, *v. Hard*.

Hardhearted, Cruel, Unmerciful, Merciless.

Hardhearted is here, as the word *hard* (*v. Hard*), the strongest of these terms: in regard to *Cruel*, it bespeaks a settled character; whereas that may be frequently a temporary disposition, or even extend no farther than

the action. A *hardhearted* man must always be *cruel*; but it is possible to be *cruel* and yet not *hardhearted*. A *hardhearted* parent is a monster who spurns from him the being that owes his existence to him, and depends upon him for support. A child is often *cruel* to animals from the mistaken conception that they are not liable to the same sufferings as himself.

The *Unmerciful* and *Merciless* are both modes or characteristics of the *hardhearted*. An *unmerciful* man is *hardhearted* inasmuch as he is unwilling to extend his compassion or mercy to one who is in his power; a *merciless* man, which is more than an *unmerciful* man, is *hardhearted* inasmuch as he is restrained by no compunctious feelings from inflicting pain on those who are in his power. Avarice makes a man *hardhearted* even to those who are bound to him by the closest ties; it makes him *unmerciful* to those who are in his debt. There are many *merciless* tyrants in domestic life, who show their disposition by their *merciless* treatment of their poor brutes.

Single men, though they be many times more charitable, on the other side, are more *cruel* and *hardhearted*, because their tenderness is not so oft called upon.—BACON.

Relentless love the *cruel* mother led
The blood of her unhappy babes to shed.—DRYDEN.

I saw how *unmerciful* you were to your eyes in your last letter to me.—TILLOTSON.

To crush a *merciless* and *cruel* victor.—DRYDEN.

Hardihood, v. Audacity.

Hardiness, v. Audacity.

Hardly, Scarcely.

What is *Hard* is not common, and in that respect *Scarcely*: hence the idea of unfrequency assimilates these terms both in signification and application. In many cases they may be used indifferently; but where the idea of practicability predominates, *hardly* seems most proper; and where the idea of frequency predominates *scarcely* seems preferable. One can *hardly* judge of a person's features by a single and partial glance; we *scarcely* ever see men lay aside their vices from a thorough conviction of their enormity: but it may with equal propriety be said in general sentences; *hardly* one in a thousand, or *scarcely* one in a thousand, would form such a conclusion.

I do not expect, as long as I stay in India, to be free from a bad digestion, the "morbus literatorum," for which there is *hardly* any remedy but abstinence from food, literary and culinary.—SIR WM. JONES.

In this assembly of princes and nobles [the Congress at the Hague] to which Europe has perhaps *scarcely* seen anything equal, was formed the grand alliance against Louis.—JOHNSON.

Hardship, v. Grievance.

Hardy, v. Hard.

Harm, v. Evil.

Harm, v. Injury.

Harmless, v. Guiltless.

Harmless, v. Unoffending.

Harmony, v. Concord.

Harmony, v. Melody.

Harsh, Rough, Severe, Rigorous.

Harsh, v. Acrimony.

Rough, v. Abrupt.

Severe, v. Austere.

Rigorous, from the Latin *rigor* and *rigere* to stiffen, designates unbending, flexible.

These terms mark different modes of treating those that are in one's power, all of which are the reverse of the kind.

Harsh and *rough* borrow their moral signification from the physical properties of the bodies to which they belong. The *harsh* and the *rough* both act painfully upon the taste, but the former with much more violence than the latter. An excess of the sour mingled with other unpleasant properties constitutes *harshness*: an excess of asstringency constitutes *roughness*. Cheese is said to be *harsh* when it is dry and biting: *roughness* is the peculiar quality of the damascene.

From this physical distinction between these terms we discover the ground of their moral application. *Harshness* in a person's conduct acts upon the feelings, and does violence to the affections: *roughness* acts only externally on the senses: we may be *rough* in the tone of the voice, in the mode of address, or in the manner of handling or touching an object: but we are *harsh* in the sentiment we convey, and according to the persons to whom it is conveyed: a stranger may be *rough* when he has it in his power to be so: only a friend, or one in the tenderest relation, can be *harsh*. An officer of justice deals *roughly* with the prisoner in his charge, to whom he denies every indulgence in a *rough* and forbidding tone: a parent deals *harshly* with a child who refuses every endearment, and only speaks to command or forbid. *Harsh* and *rough* are unamiable and always censurable epithets: they indicate the *harshness* and *roughness* of the humour: *severity* and *rigour* are not always to be condemned; they spring from principle, and are often resorted to by necessity. *Harshness* is always mingled with anger and personal feeling: *severity* and *rigour* characterize things more than the temper of persons.

A *harsh* master renders every burden which he imposes doubly *severe*, by the grating manner in which he communicates his will: a *severe* master simply imposes the burden in a manner to enforce obedience. The one seems to indulge himself in inflicting pain: the other seems to act from a motive that is independent of the pain inflicted. A *harsh* man is therefore always *severe*, but with injustice: a *severe* man, however, is not always *harsh*. *Rigour* is a high degree of *severity*. One is *severe* in the punishment of offences: one is *rigorous* in exacting compliance and obedience. *Severity* is always more or less necessary in the army, or in a school, for the preservation of good order: *rigour* is essential in dealing with the stubborn will and unruly passions of men. A general must be *severe* while lying in quarters, to prevent drunkenness and theft: but he must be *rigorous* when invading a foreign country, to prevent the ill-treatment of the inhabitants.

A measure is *severe* that threatens heavy consequences to those who do not comply: a line of conduct is *rigorous* that binds men down with great exactitude to a particular mode of proceeding. A judge is *severe* who is ready to punish and unwilling to pardon.

No complaint is more feelingly made than that of the *harsh* and rugged manners of persons with whom we have an intercourse.—BLAIR.

Know, gentle youth, in Libyan lands there are
A people rude in peace, and rough in war.
DRYDEN.

It is pride which fills the world with so much *harshness* and *severity*. We are *rigorous* to offences as if we had never offended.—BLAIR.

Harshness, *v.* Acrimony.

To Hasten, Accelerate, Speed, Expedite, Despatch.

Hasten, in French *hâter*, and in the northern languages *hasten*, &c., is most probably connected with *heiss*, expressing what is vivid and active.

Accelerate, from *celer* quick, signifies literally to quicken for a specific purpose.

Speed, from the Greek *σπουδή*, signifies to carry on diligently.

Expedite, *v.* Diligent.

Despatch, in French *dépêcher*, from *pes* a foot, signifies putting off or clearing.

Quickness in movement and action is the common idea in all these terms, which vary in the nature of the movement and the action. To *hasten* expresses little more than the general idea of quickness in moving towards a point; thus, he *hastens* who runs to get to the end of his journey: *accelerate* expresses moreover the idea of bringing something to a point; thus, every mechanical business is *accelerated* by the order and distribution of its several parts. It may be employed, like the word *hasten*, for corporeal and familiar actions; a tailor *accelerates* any particular work that he has in hand by putting on additional hands, or a compositor *accelerates* the printing of a work by doing his part with correctness. The word *speed* includes not only quick but forward movement. He who goes with *speed* goes effectually forward, and comes to his journey's end the soonest. This idea is excluded from the term *haste*, which may often be a planless unsuitable quickness. Hence the proverb, "The more *haste*, the worst *speed*."

Expedite and *despatch* are terms of higher import, in application to the most serious concerns in life; but to *expedite* expresses a process, a bringing forward towards an end: *despatch* implies a putting an end to, a making a clearance. We do everything in our power to *expedite* a business: we *despatch* a great deal of business within a given time. *Expedition* is requisite for one who executes; *despatch* is most important for one who determines and directs. An inferior officer must proceed with *expedition* to fulfil the orders, or execute the purposes of his commander; a general or minister of state *despatches* the concerns of planning, directing, and instructing. Hence it is we speak only of *expediting* a thing; but we may speak of *despatching* a person, as well as a thing.

Every man *hastens* to remove his property in case of fire. Those who are anxious to bring anything to an end will do everything in their power to *accelerate* its progress. Those who are sent on any pressing errand will do great service by using *speed*. The success of a military progress depends often on the *expedition* with which it is conducted. In the counting-house and the cabinet, *despatch* is equally important; as we cannot do more than one thing at a time, it is of importance to get that quickly concluded to make way for another.

Where with like *haste*, though several ways they run,
Some to undo, and some to be undone.—DENHAM.

Let the aged consider well, that by every intemperate indulgence they *accelerate* decay.—BLAIR.

The coachman was ordered to drive, and they hurried with the utmost *expedition* to Hyde Park Corner.—JOHNSON.

And as, in races, it is not the large stride, or high lift, that makes the *speed*; so, in business, the keeping close to the matter, and not taking of it too much at once, procureth *despatch*.—BACON.

To Hasten, Hurry.

Hasten, *v.* To hasten.

Hurry, in French *hârier*, probably comes from the Hebrew *charrer* or *harrer* to be inflamed, or be in a hurry.

To *hasten* and *hurry* both imply to move forward with quickness in any matter; but the former may proceed with some design and good order, but the latter always supposes perturbation and irregularity. We *hasten* in the communication of good news when we make efforts to convey it in the shortest time possible; we *hurry* to get to an end when we impatiently and inconsiderately press forward without making choice of our means. To *hasten* is opposed to delay or a dilatory mode of proceeding; it is frequently indispensable to *hasten* in the affairs of human life: to *hurry* is opposed to deliberate and cautious proceeding; it must always be prejudicial and unwise to *hurry*; men may *hasten*; children *hurry*.

As epithets, *hasty* and *hurried* are both employed in the bad sense; but *hasty* implies merely an overquickness of motion which outstrips consideration; *hurried* implies a disorderly motion which springs from a disordered state of mind. Irritable people use *hasty* expressions; they speak before they think: deranged people walk with *hurried* steps; they follow the blind impulse of undirected feeling.

Homer, to preserve the unity of action, *hastens* into the midst of things, as Horace has observed.—ADDISON.

Now 'tis nought
But restless *hurry* through the busy air,
Beats by unnumber'd wings.—THOMSON.

Hastiness, *v.* Rashness.

Hasty, *v.* Cursory.

Hasty, *v.* Angry.

To Hate, Detest.

Hate, *v.* Antipathy.

Detest, *v.* To abhor.

The alliance between these terms in signifi-

cation is sufficiently illustrated in the articles referred to. Their difference consists more in sense than application.

To *hate* is a personal feeling directed towards the object independently of its qualities; to *detest* is a feeling independent of the person, and altogether dependent upon the nature of the thing. What one *hates*, one *hates* commonly on one's own account; what one *detests*, one *detests* on account of the object; hence it is that one *hates*, but not *detests*, the person who has done an injury to one's self; and that one *detests*, rather than *hates*, the person who has done injuries to others. Joseph's brethren *hated* him because he was more beloved than they; we *detest* a traitor to his country because of the enormity of his offence.

In this connection, to *hate* is always a bad passion; to *detest* always laudable; but when both are applied to inanimate objects, to *hate* is bad or good according to circumstances; to *detest* always retains its good meaning. When men *hate* things because they interfere with their indulgences, as the wicked *hate* the light, it is a bad personal feeling, as in the former case; but when good men are said to *hate* that which is bad, it is a laudable feeling justified by the nature of the object. As this feeling is, however, so closely allied to *detest*, it is necessary farther to observe that *hate*, whether rightly or wrongly applied, seeks the injury or destruction of the object; but *detest* is confined simply to the shunning of the object, or thinking of it with very great pain. God *hates* sin, and on that account punishes sinners; conscientious men *detest* all fraud, and therefore cautiously avoid being concerned in it.

Spleen to mankind his envious heart possess'd,
And much he *hated* all, but most the best.—POPE.
Who dares think one thing, and another tell,
My heart *detests* him as the gates of hell.—POPE.

Hateful, Odious.

Hateful signifies literally full of that which is apt to excite *hatred*.

Odious, from the Latin *odi* to *hate*, has the same sense originally.

These epithets are employed in regard to such objects as produce strong aversion in the mind; but when employed as they commonly are upon familiar subjects, they indicate an unbecoming vehemence in the speaker. *Hateful* is properly applied to whatever violates general principles of morality; lying and swearing are *hateful* vices; *odious* is more commonly applied to such things as affect the interests of others, and bring *odium* upon the individual; a tax that bears particularly hard and unequally is termed *odious*; or a measure of government that is oppressive is denominated *odious*. There is something particularly *hateful* in the meanness of cringing sycophants: nothing was more *odious* than the attempts of James to introduce popery.

Let me be deemed the *hateful* cause of all,
And suffer, rather than my people fall.—POPE.

Oh! restless fate of pride,
That strives to learn what Heaven resolved to hide:
Vain is the search, presumptuous and abhor'd,
Anxious to thee, and *odious* to thy lord.—POPE.

Hatred, v. *Aversion*.

Hatred, *Enmity*, *Ill-Will*, *Rancour*.

Hatred, v. *Aversion*.

Enmity, v. *Enemy*.

Ill-Will signifies either an evil will or a willing of evil.

Rancour, in Latin *rancor* from *rancore* to grow stale, signifies staleness, mustiness.

These terms agree in this particular, that those who are under the influence of such feelings derive a pleasure from the misfortune of others; but *hatred* expresses more than *enmity*, and this more than *ill-will*. *Hatred* is not contented with merely wishing *ill* to others, but derives its whole happiness from their misery or destruction: *enmity*, on the contrary, is limited in its operations to particular circumstances: *hatred* on the other hand, is frequently confined to the feeling of the individual; but *enmity* consists as much in the action as the feeling. He who is possessed with *hatred* is happy when the object of his passion is miserable, and is miserable when he is happy; but the *hater* is not always instrumental in causing his misery or destroying his happiness: he who is inflamed with *enmity* is more active in disturbing the peace of his *enemy*; but oftener displays his temper in trifling than in important matters. *Ill-will*, as the word denotes, lies only in the mind, and is so indefinite in its signification that it admits of every conceivable degree. When the will is evilly directed towards another in ever so small a degree it constitutes *ill-will*. *Rancour* is a species of bitter deep-rooted *enmity*.

Hatred is opposed to love; the object in both cases occupies the thoughts: the former torments the possessor; the latter delights him. *Enmity* is opposed to friendship; the object in both cases interests the passions: the former the bad, and the latter the good passions or the affections: the possessor is in both cases busy either in injuring or forwarding the cause of him who is his *enemy* or friend. *Ill-will* is opposed to good will; it is either a general or a particular feeling; it embraces many or few, a single individual or the whole human race: he is least unhappy who bears least *ill-will* to others; he is most happy who bears true good will to all; he is neither happy or unhappy who is not possessed of the one or the other.

There is a farther distinction between these terms; that *hatred* and *ill-will* are oftener the fruit of a depraved mind than the consequence of any external provocation; *enmity* and *rancour*, on the contrary, are mostly produced by particular circumstances of offence or commission: the best of men are sometimes the objects of *hatred* on account of their very virtues which have been unwittingly to themselves the causes of producing this evil passion; good advice, however kindly given, may probably occasion *ill-will* in the mind of him who is not disposed to receive it kindly; an angry word or a party contest is frequently the cause of *enmity* between irritable people and of *rancour* betwixt resentful and imperious people.

Phœnician Dido rules the growing state,
Who fled from Tyre to shun her brother's hate.
DARYL.

That space the evil one abstracted stood
From his own evil, and for the time remain'd
Stupidly good, of *enmity* disarm'd.—MILTON.

For your servants neither use them so familiarly as to
lose your reverence at their hands, nor so disdainfully as to
purchase yourself their *ill-will*.—WENTWORTH.

Oh lasting *rancour*! oh insatiate *hate*,
To Phrygia's monarch, and the Phrygian state.
POPE.

To Have, Possess.

Have, in German, *haben*, Latin *habeo*, not improbably from the Hebrew *aba* to desire, because those who have most desire most.

Possess, in Latin *possessus*, participle of *possideo* compounded of *pos* or *potis* and *sedeo*, signifies to have the power of resting upon or keeping.

Have is the general, *possess* is the particular term: *have* designates no circumstance of the action; *possess* expresses a particular species of having.

To *have* is sometimes to *have* in one's hand or within one's reach; but to *possess* is to *have* as one's own: a clerk has the money which he has fetched for his employer; the latter *possesses* the money, which he *has* the power of turning to his use. To *have* is sometimes to *have* the right to, to belong; to *possess* is to *have* by one and at one's command: a debtor *has* the property which he has surrendered to his creditor; but he cannot be said to *possess* it, because he *has* it not within his reach, and at his disposal: * we are not necessarily masters of that which we *have*; although we always are of that which we *possess*: to *have* is sometimes only temporary; to *possess* is mostly permanent: we *have* money which we are perpetually disposing of; we *possess* lands which we keep for a permanency: a person *has* the good graces of those whom he pleases; he *possesses* the confidence of those who put every thing in his power: the stoutest heart may *have* occasional alarms, but will never lose its self-possession: a husband who is *possessed* by the demon of jealousy has continual torment: a miser has goods in his coffers, but he is not master of them; they *possess* his heart and affections: we *have* things by halves when we share them with others; we *possess* them only when they are exclusively ours and we enjoy them undividedly: a lover has the affections of his mistress by whom he is beloved; he *possesses* her whole heart when she loves him alone: one *has* an interest in a mercantile concern in which he is a partner; the lord of a manor *possesses* all the rights annexed to that manor.

That I spent, that I *had*;
That I gave, that I *have*;
That I left, that I lost.

EPITAPH ON A CHARITABLE MAN.

The various objects that compose the world were by nature formed to delight our senses; and as it is this alone that makes them desirable to an uncorrupted taste, a man may be said naturally to *possess* them when he *possesseth* those enjoyments which they are fitted by nature to yield.—BERKELEY.

Haven, *v. Harbour*.

Haughtiness, Disdain, Arrogance.

Haughtiness denotes the abstract quality

of *haughty*, which, contracted from *high-hearty*, in Dutch and low German *hooghartig*, signifies literally high-spirited. We have engrafted the French orthography of *au* on the original orthography of the northern languages, through the medium of which it may be traced to the Hebrew *agag* to be high.

Disdain, *v. To contemn*.

Arrogance, *v. Arrogance*.

Haughtiness (says Dr. Blair) is founded on the high opinion we entertain of ourselves; *disdain*, on the low opinion we have of others; *arrogance* is the result of both, but if any thing, more of the former than the latter. *Haughtiness* and *disdain* are properly sentiments of the mind, and *arrogance* a mode of acting resulting from a state of mind: there may therefore be *haughtiness* and *disdain* which have not betrayed themselves by any visible action; but *arrogance* is always accompanied with its corresponding action: the *haughty* man is known by the air of superiority which he assumes; the *disdainful* man by the contempt which he shows to others; the *arrogant* man by his lofty pretensions.

Haughtiness and *arrogance* are both vicious; they are built upon a false idea of ourselves: but *disdain* may be justifiable when provoked by what is infamous: a lady must treat with *disdain* the person who insults her honour.

The same *haughtiness* that prompts the act of injustice will more strongly incite its justification.—JOHNSON.

Didst thou not think such vengeance must await
The wretch that, with his crimes all fresh about him,
Rushes, irreverent, unprepared, uncalled,
Into his Maker's presence, throwing back
With insolent *disdain* his choicest gift?—PORTEUS.

Turbulent, discontented men of quality, in proportion as they are puffed up with personal pride and *arrogance*, generally despise their own order.—BURKE.

Haughtiness, *v. Pride*.

Haughty, High, High-Minded.

Haughty, *v. Haughtiness*.

High is derived from the same source as *haughty*.

Haughty characterizes mostly the outward behaviour; *high* respects both the external behaviour and the internal sentiment; **High-minded** marks the sentiment only, or the state of the mind.

With regard to the outward behaviour, *haughty* is a stronger term than *high*: a *haughty* carriage bespeaks not only a *high* opinion of one's self, but a strong mixture of contempt for others: a *high* carriage denotes simply a *high* opinion of one's self: *haughtiness* is therefore always offensive, as it is burdensome to others; but *height* may sometimes be laudable, inasmuch as it is justice to one's self: one can never give a command in a *haughty* tone without making others feel their inferiority in a painful degree; we may sometimes assume a *high* tone in order to shelter ourselves from insult.

With regard to the sentiment of the mind, *high* denotes either a particular or an habitual state; *high-minded* is most commonly understood to designate an habitual state; the former may be either good or bad according to circumstances; the latter is expressly in-

* Vide Abbé Girard; "Avoir, posséder."

consistent with Christian humility. He is *high* whom virtue ennobles; his height is independent of adventitious circumstances, it becomes the poor as well as the rich; he is properly *high* who is set above any mean condescension: *highmindedness*, on the contrary, includes in it a self-complacency that rests upon one's personal and incidental advantages rather than upon what is worthy of ourselves as rational agents. Superiors are apt to indulge a *haughty* temper which does but excite the scorn and hatred of those who are compelled to endure it: a *high* spirit is not always serviceable to one in dependent circumstances; but when regulated by discretion, it enhances the value of a man's character: no one can be *highminded* without thinking better of himself, and worse of others, than he ought to think.

Let gifts be to the mighty queen design'd,
And mollify with pray'rs her *haughty* mind.

DRYDEN.

Who knows whether indignation may not succeed to terror, and the revival of *high* sentiment, spurning away the illusion of safety purchased at the expense of glory, may not drive us to a generous despair.—BURKE.

The wise will determine from the gravity of the case; the irritable, from sensibility to oppression; the *highminded*, from disdain and indignation at abusive power in unworthy hands.—BURKE.

To Haul or Hale, *v.* To draw.

To Haunt, *v.* To frequent.

To Hazard, Risk, Venture.

Hazard, *v.* Chance.

Risk, *v.* Danger.

Venture is the same as adventure (*v.* Event).

All these terms denote actions performed under an uncertainty of the event: but *hazard* bespeaks a want of design and choice on the part of the agent; to *risk* implies a choice of alternatives; to *venture*, a calculation and balance of probabilities: one *hazards* and *risks* under the fear of an evil; one *ventures* with the hope of a good. He who hazards an opinion or an assertion does it from presumptuous feelings and upon slight grounds; chances are rather against him than for him that it may prove erroneous; he who *risks* a battle does it often from necessity; he who chooses the least of two evils, although the event is dubious, yet he fears less from a failure than from inaction: he who *ventures* on a mercantile speculation does it from a love of gain; he flatters himself with a favourable event, and acquires boldness from the prospect.

There are but very few circumstances to justify us in *hazarding*; there may be several occasions which render it necessary to *risk*, and very many cases in which it may be advantageous to *venture*.

They list with women each degen'rate name

Who dares not *hazard* life for future fame.

DRYDEN.

If the adventurer *risques* honour, he *risques* more than the knight.—HAWKESWORTH.

Socrates, in his discourse before his death, says, he did not know whether his body shall (would) remain after death, but he thought so, and had such hopes of it that he was very willing to *venture* his life upon these hopes.—TILLOTSON.

Hazard, *v.* Chance.

Head, *v.* Chief.

Headstrong, *v.* Obstinate.

Heady, *v.* Obstinate.

To Heal, *v.* To cure.

Healthy, Wholesome, Salubrious, Salutory.

Healthy signifies not only having health, but also causing health.

Wholesome, like the German *heilsam*, signifies making whole, keeping whole or sound.

Salubrious and Salutory, from the Latin *salus* safety or health, signify likewise contributive to health or good in general.

These epithets are all applicable to such objects as have a kindly influence on the bodily constitution: *healthy* is the most general and indefinite; it is applied to exercise, to air, situation, climate, and most other things, but food, for which *wholesome* is commonly substituted: the life of a farmer is reckoned the most *healthy*; and the simplest diet is the most *wholesome*. *Healthy* and *wholesome* are rather negative in their sense; *salubrious* and *salutory* are positive: that is *healthy* and *wholesome* which does no injury to the health; that is *salubrious* which serves to improve the health; and that is *salutory* which serves to remove a disorder: climates are *healthy* or *unhealthy*, according to the constitution of the person; water is a *wholesome* beverage for those who are not dropsical; bread is a *wholesome* diet for man; the air and climate of southern France has been long famed for its *salubrity*, and has induced many invalids to repair thither for the benefit of their health; the effects have not been equally *salutory* in all cases: it is the concern of government that the places destined for the public education of youth should be in *healthy* situations; that their diet should be *wholesome* rather than delicate; and that in all their disorders care should be taken to administer the most *salutory* remedies.

Wholesome and *salutory* have likewise an extended and moral application; *healthy* and *salubrious* are employed only in the proper sense: *wholesome* in this case seems to convey the idea of making whole again what has been unsound; but *salutory* retains the idea of improving the condition of those who stand in need of improvement: correction is *wholesome* which serves the purpose of amendment without doing any injury to the body; instruction or admonition is *salutory* when it serves the purpose of strengthening good principles and awakening a sense of guilt or impropriety: laws and punishments are *wholesome* to the body politic, as diet is to the physical body; restrictions are *salutory* in checking irregularities.

You are relaxing yourself with the *healthy* and manly exercise of the field.—SIR WM. JONES.

Here laid his scrip with *wholesome* viands fill'd;
There, listening every noise, his watchful dog.

THOMSON.

False decorations, fustices, and pigments deserve the imperfections that constantly attend them, being neither commodious in application nor *wholesome* in their use. —BACON.

If that fountain (the heart) be once poisoned, you can never expect that *salubrious* streams will flow from it. —BLAIR.

A sense of the Divine presence exerts this *salutary* influence of promoting temperance and restraining the disorders incident to a prosperous state. —BLAIR.

Healthy, v. Sound.

To Heap, Pile, Accumulate, Amass.

To **Heap** signifies to form into a *heap*, which through the medium of the northern languages is derivable from the Latin *copia* plenty: To **Pile** is to form into a *pile*, which, being a variation of pole, signifies a high-raised *heap*. To **Accumulate**, from the Latin *cumulus* a *heap*, signifies to put *heap* upon *heap*. To **Amass** is literally to form into a *mass*.

To *heap* is an indefinite action; it may be performed with or without order: to *pile* is a definite action done with design and order; thus we *heap* stones, or *pile* wood: to *heap* may be to make into large or small *heaps*: to *pile* is always to make something considerable: children may *heap* sticks together: men *pile* loads of wood together. To *heap* and *pile* are used mostly in the physical, *accumulate* and *amass* in the physical or moral acceptation; the former is a series of *heaping*, the latter of *piling*; we *accumulate* whatever is brought together in a loose manner; we *amass* that which can coalesce: thus a man *accumulates* guineas; and *amasses* wealth.

To *accumulate* and to *amass* are not always the acts of conscious agents: things may *accumulate* or *amass*: water or snow *accumulates* by the continual accession of fresh quantities; ice *amasses* in rivers until they are frozen over: so in the moral acceptation, evils, abuses, and the like, *accumulate*: corruption *amasses*: although overwhelmed with an *accumulation* of sorrows, the Christian believer is never left comfortless; the industrious inquirer may collect a *mass* of intelligence.

Within the circles arms and tripods lie,
Ingots of gold and silver *heap'd* on high. —DRYDEN.

This would I celebrate with annual games,
With gifts on altars *pil'd*, and holy flames. —DRYDEN.

These odes are marked by glittering *accumulations* of ungraceful ornaments. —JOHNSON.

Sir Francis Bacon, by an extraordinary force of nature, compass of thought, and indefatigable study, had *amassed* to himself such stores of knowledge as we cannot look upon without amazement. —HUGHES.

To Hear, Hearken, Overhear.

To **Hear** is properly the act of the ear; it is sometimes totally abstracted from the mind, when we *hear* and do not understand: to **Hearken** is an act of the ear, and the mind in conjunction; it implies an effort to *hear*, a tendency of the ear: to **Overhear** is to *hear* clandestinely, or unknown to the person who is heard, whether designedly or not. We *hear* sounds: we *hearken* for the sense; we *overhear* the words: a quick ear *hears* the smallest sound; a willing mind *hearkens* to what is said: a prying curiosity leads to *overhearing*.

I look'd, I listen'd, dreadful sounds I *hear*,
And the dire forms of hostile gods appear. —DRYDEN.

But aged Nereus *hearkens* to his love. —DRYDEN.

If he fail of that
He will have other means to cut you off;
I *overheard* him and his practices. —SHAKESPEARE.

To Hearken, v. To attend.

To Hearer, v. To hear.

Hearsay, v. Fame.

Hearty, Warm, Sincere, Cordial.

Hearty signifies having the heart in a thing.

Warm, v. Fire.

Sincere, v. Candid.

Cordial, from *cors* the heart, signifies according to the heart.

Hearty and *warm* express a stronger feeling than *sincere*; *cordial* is a mixture of the *warm* and *sincere*. There are cases in which it may be peculiarly proper to be *hearty*, as when we are supporting the cause of religion and virtue; there are other cases in which it is peculiarly proper to be *warm*, as when our affections ought to be roused in favour of our friends; in all cases we ought to be *sincere*, when we express either a sentiment or a feeling; it is peculiarly happy to be on terms of *cordial* regard with those who stand in any close relation to us. A man himself should be *hearty*: his heart should be *warm*; and professions *sincere*; a reception *cordial*.

Yet should some neighbour feel a pain
Just in the part where I complain,
How many a message would he send!
What *hearty* prayers that I should mend! —SWIFT.

Youth is the season of *warm* and generous emotions. —BLAIR.

I have not since we parted been at peace,
Nor known one joy *sincere*. —ROWE.

With a gratitude the most *cordial*, a good man looks up to that Almighty Benefactor who aims at no end but the happiness of those whom he blesses. —BLAIR.

Heat, v. Fire.

Heathen, v. Gentiles.

To Heave, v. To lift.

To Heave, Swell.

Heave is used either transitively or intransitively, as a reflective or a neuter verb; **Swell** is used only as a neuter verb. *Heave* implies raising, and *swell* implies distension; they differ, therefore, very widely in sense, but they sometimes agree in application. The bosom is said both to *heave* and to *swell*; because it happens that the bosom *swells* by *heaving*; the waves are likewise said to *heave* themselves or to *swell*, in which there is a similar correspondence between the actions: otherwise most things which *heave* do not *swell*, and those which *swell* do not *heave*.

He *heaves* for breath, he staggers to and fro,
And clouds of issuing smoke his nostrils loudly blow. —DRYDEN.

Meantime the mountain billows, to the clouds
In dreadful tumult *swell'd* surge above surge. —THOMSON.

Heavenly, *v. Celestial.*

Heavenly, *v. Godlike.*

Heaviness, *v. Weight.*

Heavy, Dull, Drowsy.

Heavy is allied to both **Dull** and **Drowsy**, but the latter have no close connection with each other.

Heavy and *dull* are employed as epithets both for persons and things; *heavy* characterizes the corporeal state of a person; *dull* qualifies the spirits or the understanding of the subject. A person has a *heavy* look whose temperament seems composed of gross and weighty materials which weigh him down and impede his movements; he has a *dull* countenance in whom the ordinary brightness and vivacity of the mind is wanting; *heavy* is either a characteristic of the constitution, or only a temporary state arising from external or internal causes; *dulness* as it respects the frame of the spirits is a partial state; as it respects the mental vigour, it is a characteristic of the individual. It is a misfortune frequently attached to those of a corpulent habit to be very *heavy*: there is no one who from the changes of the atmosphere may not be occasionally *heavy*. Those who have no resources in themselves are always *dull* in solitude; those who are not properly instructed, or have a deficiency of capacity, will appear *dull* in all matters of learning.

Heavy is either properly or improperly applied to things which are conceived to have an undue proportion of tendency to pressure or leaning downwards: *dull* is in like manner employed for whatever fails in the necessary degree of brightness or vivacity; the weather is *heavy* when the air is full of thick and weighty materials; it may be *dull* from the intervention of clouds.

Heavy and *drowsy* are both employed in the sense of sleep; but the former is only a particular state, the latter particular or general: all persons may be occasionally *heavy* or *drowsy*; some are habitually *drowsy* from disease; they likewise differ in degree; the latter being much the greater of the two; and occasionally they are applied to such things as produce sleepiness.

Heavy with age, Entellus stands his ground,
But with his warping body wards the wound. DRYDEN.

O thou *dull* god! Why liest thou with the vile
In loathsome beds; and leav'st the kingly couch,
A watch-case to a common larum bell? SHAKESPEARE.

And *drowsy* tinklings lull the distant fold.—GRAY.

Heavy, Burdensome, Weighty, Ponderous.

Heavy, from *heave*, signifies the causing to heave, or requiring to be lifted up with force.

Burdensome signifies having a *burden*.

Weighty signifies having a *weight*, and **Ponderous**, from the Latin *pondus* a weight, has the same original meaning.

Heavy is the natural property of some bodies; *burdensome* is incidental to some. In the vulgar sense, things are termed *heavy*

which are found difficult to lift in distinction from those which are light or easy to be lifted; but those things are *burdensome* which are too troublesome to be carried or borne: many things therefore are actually *heavy* that are never *burdensome*; and others are occasionally *burdensome* that are never *heavy*: that which is *heavy* is so whether lifted or not, but that which is *burdensome* must be *burdensome* to some one: hard substances are mostly *heavy*: but to a weak person the softest substance may sometimes be *burdensome* if he is obliged to bear it: things are *heavy* according to the difficulty with which they are lifted; but they are *weighty* according as they *weigh* other things down. The *heavy* is therefore indefinite; but the *weighty* is definite, and something positively great: what is *heavy* to one may be light to another; but that which is *weighty* exceeds the ordinary weight of other things: *ponderous* expresses more than *weighty*, for it includes also the idea of bulk; the *ponderous* therefore is that which is so *weighty* and large that it cannot easily be moved.

Though philosophy teaches that no element is *heavy* in its own place, yet experience shows that out of its own place it proves exceeding *burdensome*.—SOUTH.

The sable troops along the narrow tracks
Scarce bear the *weighty* burden on their backs. DRYDEN.

The diligence of an idler is rapid and impetuous, as *ponderous* bodies forced into velocity move with violence proportionate to their weight.—JOHNSON.

To Heed, *v. To attend to*

Heed, Care, Attention.

Heed, *v. To attend.*

Care, *v. Care, solicitude.*

Attention, *v. To attend.*

Heed applies to matters of importance to one's moral conduct; *care* to matters of minor import: a man is required to take *heed*: a child is required to take *care*: the former exercises his understanding in taking *heed*; the latter exercises his thoughts and his senses in taking *care*: the former looks to the remote and probable consequences of his actions, and endeavours to prevent the evil that may happen; the latter sees principally to the thing that is immediately before him. When a young man enters the world, he must take *heed* lest he be not ensnared by his companions into vicious practices; in a slippery path we must take *care* that we do not fall.

Heed has moreover the sense of thinking on what is proposed to our notice, in which it agrees with *attention*; hence we speak of giving *heed* and paying *attention*: but the former is applied only to that which is conveyed to us by another, in the shape of a direction, a caution, or an instruction; but the latter is said of everything which we are set to perform. A good child gives *heed* to his parents when they caution him against any dangerous or false step; he pays *attention* to the lesson which is set him to learn. He who gives no *heed* to the counsels of others is made to repent his folly by bitter experience; he who fails in paying *attention* will be deficient.

Next you, my servants, *heed* my strict commands,
Without the walls a ruin'd temple stands.—DRYDEN.
I believe the hiatus should be avoided with more care
in poetry than in oratory.—POPE.

All were *attentive* to the godlike man.—DRYDEN.

Heedless, v. Negligent.

To Heighten, Raise, Aggravate.

To Heighten is to make *higher* (v. *Haughty*). **To Raise** is to cause to *rise* (v. *To arise*). **To Aggravate** (v. *To aggravate*) is to make *heavy*. *Heighten* refers more to the result of the action of making *higher*; *raise* to the mode: we *heighten* a house by *raising* the roof; as *raising* converts the idea of setting up aloft, which is not included in the word *heighten*. On the same ground a head-dress may be said to be *heightened* which is made *higher* than it was before; and a chair or a table is *raised* that is set upon something else: but in speaking of a wall, we may say, that it is either *heightened* or *raised*, because the operation and result must in both cases be the same. In the improper sense of these terms they preserve a similar distinction: we *heighten* the value of a thing; we *raise* its price; we *heighten* the grandeur of an object; we *raise* a family.

Heighten and *aggravate* have connection with each other only in application to offences: the enormity of an offence is *heightened*, the guilt of the offender is *aggravated* by particular circumstances. The horrors of a murder are *heightened* by being committed in the dead of the night; the guilt of the perpetrator is *aggravated* by the addition of ingratitude to murder.

Purity and virtue *heighten* all the powers of fruition.
—BLAIR.

I would have our conceptions *raised* by the dignity of thought and sublimity of expression rather than by a train of robes or a plume of feathers.—ADDISON.

The counsels of pusillanimity very rarely put off, whilst they are always sure to *aggravate*, the evils from which they would fly.—BURKE.

Heinous, Flagrant, Flagitious, Atrocious.

Heinous, in French *heinous*, Greek *avos* or *deivos* terrible.

Flagrant, in Latin *flagrans* burning, is a figurative expression for what is excessive and violent in its nature.

Flagitious, in Latin *flagitiosus* from *flagitium* infamy, denotes that which is peculiarly infamous.

Atrocious, in Latin *atrox* cruel, from *ater* black, signifies exceedingly black in guilt.

These epithets, which are applied to crimes, seem to rise in degree. A crime is *heinous* which seriously offends against the laws of men; a sin is *heinous* which seriously offends against the will of God: an offence is *flagrant* which is in direct defiance of established opinions and practice: it is *flagitious* if a gross violation of the moral law, or coupled with any grossness; a crime is *atrocious* which is attended with any aggravating circumstances. Lying is a *heinous* sin; gaming and drunken-

ness are *flagrant* breaches of the Divine law; the murder of a whole family is in the fullest sense *atrocious*.

There are many authors who have shown wherein the malignity of a lie consists, and set forth in proper colours the *heinousness* of the offence.—ADDISON.

If any *flagrant* deed occur to smite a man's conscience, on this he cannot avoid resting with anxiety and terror.
—BLAIR.

It is recorded of Sir Matthew Hale, that he for a long time concealed the consecration of himself to the stricter duties of religion, lest by some *flagitious* action he should bring piety into disgrace.—JOHNSON.

The wickedness of a loose or profane author is more *atrocious* than that of the giddy libertine.—JOHNSON.

To Help, Assist, Aid, Succour, Relieve.

Help, in Saxon *helpan*, German *helfen*, probably from the Greek *οφελω* to do good to.

Assist, in Latin *assisto*, or *ad* and *sisto*, signifies to place one's self by another so as to give him our strength.

Aid, in Latin *adjuvo*, that is the intensive syllable *ad* and *juvo*, signifies to profit towards a specific end.

Succour, in Latin *succurro* to run to the help of any one.

Relieve, v. To alleviate.

The idea of communicating to the advantage of another is common to all these terms. *Help* is the generic term; the rest specific: *help* may be substituted for the others, and in many cases where they would not be applicable. The first three are employed either to produce a positive good or to remove an evil; the two latter only to remove an evil. We *help* a person to prosecute his work, or *help* him out of a difficulty; we *assist* in order to forward a scheme, or we *assist* a person in the time of his embarrassment; we *aid* a good cause, or we *aid* a person to make his escape; we *succour* a person who is in danger; we *relieve* him in time of distress. *To help* and *assist* respect personal service, the former by corporeal, the latter by corporeal or mental labour: one servant *helps* another by taking a part in his employment; one author *assists* another in the composition of his work. We *help* up a person's load, we *assist* him to rise when he has fallen: we speak of a *helper* or a *helpmate* in mechanical employments, of an *assistant* to a professional man.

To assist and *aid* are used for services directly or indirectly performed: but the former is said only of individuals, the latter may be said of bodies as well as individuals. One friend *assists* another with his purse, with his counsel, his interest, and the like: one person *aids* another in carrying on a scheme; or one king, or nation, *aids* another with arms and subsidies. We come to the *assistance* of a person when he has met with an accident; we come to his *aid* when contending against numbers. *Assistance* is given, *aid* is sent.

To succour is a species of immediate *assistance*, which is given on the spur of the occasion; the good Samaritan went to the *succour* of the man who had fallen among thieves: so in like manner we may *succour* one who calls us by his cries; or we may *succour* the poor whom we find in circumstances of distress. The

word *relieve* has nothing in common with *succour*, except that they both express the removal of pain; but the latter does not necessarily imply any mode by which this is done, and therefore excludes the idea of personal interference.

All these terms, except *succour*, may be applied to persons, as well as things: we may walk by the *help* of a stick; read with the *assistance* of glasses: learn a task quickly by the *aid* of a good memory; obtain relief from medicine. To *help* or *assist* is commonly an act of goodnature; to *aid*, frequently an act of policy; to *succour* or *relieve*, an act of generosity or humanity. *Help* is necessary for one who has not sufficient strength to perform his task; *assistance* is necessary when a person's time or talent is too much occupied to perform the whole of his office; *aid* is useful when it serves to give strength and efficacy to our operations; *succour* is timely when it serves to ward off some danger; *relief* is salutary when it serves to lessen pain or want. When a person meets with an accident he requires the *help* of the by-standers, the *assistance* of his friends, and the *aid* of a medical man; it is noble to *succour* an enemy; it is charitable to *relieve* the wretched.

Their strength united best may *help* to bear.—POPE.

'Tis the first sanction nature gave to man

Each other to *assist* in what they can.—DENHAM.

Wise, weighty counsels *aid* a state distressed.—POPE.

Patroclus on the shore,
Now pale and dead, shall *succour* Greece no more.
POPE.

An unbeliever feels the whole pressure of a present calamity, without being *relieved* by the memory of anything that is past, or the prospect of anything that is to come.—ADDISON.

Heresy, v. Heterodoxy.

Heretic, Schismatic, Sectarian or Sectary, Dissenter, Nonconformist.

A **Heretic** is the maintainer of *heresy* (v. *Heterodox*): the **Schismatic** is the author or promoter of *schism*; the **Sectarian** or **Sectary** is the member of a *sect*; the **Dissenter** is one who *dissents* from the establishment, and the **Nonconformist** one who does not *conform* to the establishment. A man is a *heretic* only for matters of faith and doctrine, but he is a *schismatic* in matters of discipline and practice. The *heretic* therefore is not always a *schismatic*, nor the *schismatic* a *heretic*. Whoever holds the doctrines that are common to the Roman Catholic and the Reformed Churches is not a *heretic* in the Protestant sense of the word: although he may in many outward formalities be a *schismatic*. Calvinists are not *heretics*, but many among them are *schismatics*; on the other hand there are many members of the establishment who hold though they do not avow *heretical* notions.

The *heretic* is considered as such with regard to the Catholic Church or the whole body of Christians, holding the same fundamental principles; but the *schismatic* and *sectarian* are considered as such with regard to particular established bodies of Christians. *Schism*, from the Greek *σχίσω* to split, denotes an action, and the *schismatic* is an agent who splits for himself in his own individual capacity: the *sectarian* does not expressly perform

a part, he merely holds a relation; he does not divide anything himself, but belongs to that which is already cut or divided. The *schismatic* therefore takes upon himself the whole moral responsibility of the *schism*; but the *sectarian* does not necessarily take an active part in the measures of his *sect*; whatever guilt attaches to *schism* attaches to the *schismatic*; he is a voluntary agent, acting from an erroneous principle, if not an unchristian temper: the *sectarian* is often an involuntary agent; he follows that to which he has been incidentally attached. It is possible therefore to be a *schismatic* and not a *sectarian*; as also to be a *sectarian* and not a *schismatic*. Those professed members of the establishment who affect the title of evangelical, and wish to palm upon the Church the peculiarities of the Calvinistic doctrine, and to engraft their own modes and forms into its discipline, are *schismatics*, but not *sectarians*; on the other hand, those who by birth and education are attached to a *sect*, are *sectarians*, but not always *schismatics*. Consequently, *schismatic* is a term of much greater reproach than *sectarian*.

The *schismatic* and *sectarian* have a reference to any established body of Christians of any country; but *dissenter* is a term applicable only to the inhabitants of Great Britain, and bearing relation only to the established Church of England: it includes not only those who have individually and personally renounced the doctrines of the Church, but those who are in a state of *dissent* or difference from it. *Dissenters* are not necessarily either *schismatics* or *sectarians*, for British Roman Catholics and the Presbyterians of Scotland are all *dissenters*, although they are the reverse of what is understood by *schismatic* and *sectarian*: it is equally clear that all *schismatics* and *sectarians* are not *dissenters*, because every established community of Christians, all over the world, have had individuals or smaller bodies of individuals setting themselves up against them: the term *dissenter* being in a great measure technical, it may be applied individually or generally without conveying any idea of reproach: the same may be said of *nonconformist*, which is a more special term, including only such as do not *conform* to some established or national religion: consequently, all members of the Romish Church, or of the Kirk of Scotland, are excluded from the number of *nonconformists*; whilst on the other hand, all British-born subjects not adhering to these two forms, and at the same time renouncing the established form of their country, are of this number, among whom may be reckoned Independents, Presbyterians, Baptists, Quakers, Methodists, and all other such *sects* as have been formed since the Reformation.

The *schismatics* disturb the sweet peace of our Church.—HOWEL.

In the house of Sir Samuel Luke, one of Cromwell's officers, Butler observed so much of the character of the *Sectaries* that he is said to have written or begun his poem at this time.—JOHNSON.

Of the *Dissenters*, Swift did not wish to infringe the toleration, but he opposed their encroachments.—JOHNSON.

Watts is at least one of the few poets with whom youth and ignorance may be safely pleased; and happy will that reader be whose mind is disposed, by his verses or

his prose, to imitate him in all but his *nonconformity*.—JOHNSON.

To Hesitate, *v.* To demur.

To Hesitate, Faulter, Stammer, Stutter.

Hesitate, *v.* To demur.

Falter or Faulter seems to signify to commit a *fault* or blunder, or it may be a frequentative of to fall, signifying to stumble.

Stammer, in the Teutonic *stammern*, comes most probably from the Hebrew *stalem* to obstruct.

Stutter is but a variation of *stammer*.

A defect in utterance is the idea which is common in the signification of all these terms: they differ either as to the cause or the mode of the action. With regard to the cause, a *hesitation* results from the state of the mind, and an interruption in the train of thoughts: *falter* arises from a perturbed state of feeling; *stammer* and *stutter* arise either from an incidental circumstance, or more commonly from a physical defect in the organs of utterance. A person who is not in the habit of public speaking, or of collecting his thoughts into a set form, will be apt to *hesitate* even in familiar conversation; he who first addresses a public assembly will be apt to *falter*. Children who first begin to read will *stammer* at hard words: and one who has an impediment in his speech will *stutter* when he attempts to speak in a hurry.

With regard to the mode or degree of the action, *hesitate* expresses less than *falter*; *stammer* less than *stutter*.

The slightest difficulty in uttering words constitutes a *hesitation*; a pause or the repetition of a word may be termed *hesitating*: but to *falter* supposes a failure in the voice as well as the lips when they refuse to do their office. *Stammering* and *stuttering* are confined principally to the useless moving of the mouth; he who *stammers* brings forth sounds, but not the right sounds, without trials and efforts; he who *stutters* remains for some time in a state of agitation without uttering a sound.

To look with solicitude and speak with *hesitation* is attainable at will; but the show of wisdom is ridiculous when there is nothing to cause doubt, as that of valour when there is nothing to be feared.—JOHNSON.

And yet was every *faultering* tongue of man,
Almighty Father! silent in thy praise,
Thy works themselves would raise a general voice.
THOMSON.

Lagane juice
Will *stamm*'ring tongues and *stagg*'ring feet produce.
DRYDEN.

To Hesitate, *v.* To scruple.

Hesitation, *v.* Demur.

Heterodoxy, Heresy.

Heterodoxy, from the Greek *εἰσός* and *δοξή*, signifies another or a different doctrine.

Heresy, from the Greek *αἵρεσις* a choice, signifies an opinion adopted by individual choice.

* To be of a different persuasion is *hetero-*

* Vide Roubaud: "Hérétique, hétérodoxe."

doxy; to have a faith of one's own is *heresy*; the *heterodoxy* characterizes the opinions formed; the *heresy* characterizes the individual forming the opinion; the *heterodoxy* exists independently and for itself; the *heresy* sets itself up against others. As all division supposes error either on one side or on both, the words *heterodoxy* and *heresy* are applied only to human opinions, and strictly in the sense of a false opinion, formed in distinction from that which is better founded; but the former respects any opinions, important or otherwise; the latter refers only to matters of importance: the *heresy* is therefore a fundamental error. There has been much *heterodoxy* in the Christian world at all times, and among these have been *heresies* denying the plainest and most serious truths which have been acknowledged by the great body of Christians since the Apostles.

All wrong notions in religion are ranked under the general name of *heterodox*.—GOLDING.

Those who have been present at public disputes in the University, know that it is usual to maintain *heresies* for argument's sake.—ADDISON.

Hidden, *v.* Secret.

To Hide, *v.* To conceal.

To Hide, *v.* To cover.

Hide, *v.* Skin.

Hideous, Ghastly, Grim, Grisly.

Hideous comes probably from *hide*, signifying fit only to be hidden from the view.

Ghastly signifies like a ghost.

Grim, in German *grimm*, signifies fierce.

Grisly, from *grizzle*, signifies *grizzled*, or motley coloured.

An unseemly exterior is characterized by these terms; but the *hideous* respects natural objects, and the *ghastly* more properly that which is supernatural or what resembles it. A mask with monstrous grinning features looks *hideous*: a human form with a visage of deathlike paleness is *ghastly*. The *grim* is applicable only to the countenance; dogs or wild beasts may look very *grim*: *grisly* refers to the whole form, but particularly to the colour; as blackness or darkness has always something terrific in it, a *grisly* figure having a monstrous assemblage of dark colour, is particularly calculated to strike terror. *Hideous* is applicable to objects of hearing also, as a *hideous* roar; but the rest to objects of sight only.

From the broad margin to the centre grew
Shelves, rocks, and whirlpools, *hideous* to the view.
FALCONER.

And death
Grinn'd horribly a *ghastly* smile.—MILTON.

Even hell's *grim* king Alcides' pow'r confest.—POPE.

All parts resound with tumults, plaints, and fears,
And *grisly* death in sundry shapes appears.—POPE.

High, *v.* Haughty.

High, Tall, Lofty.

High, in German *hoch*, comes from the Hebrew *agag* to be high.

To *II*, in Welsh *tal*, is derived by Davis from the Hebrew *talal* to elevate,

Lofty is doubtless derived from *lift*, and that from the Latin *levatus* raised.

High is the term in most general use, which seems likewise in the most unqualified manner to express the idea of extension upwards, which is common to them all. Whatever is *tall* and *lofty* is *high*, but everything is not *tall* or *lofty* which is *high*. *Tall* and *lofty* both designate a more than ordinary degree of *height*; but *tall* is peculiarly applicable to what shoots up or stands up in a perpendicular direction: while *lofty* is said of that which is extended in breadth as well as in *height*: that which is lifted up or raised by an accretion of matter or an expansion in the air. By this rule we say that a house is *high*, a chimney *tall*, a room *lofty*.

Trees are in general said to be *high* which exceed the ordinary standard of *height*; they are opposed to the low. A poplar is said to be *tall*, not only from its exceeding others in *height*, but from its perpendicular and spiral manner of growing: it is opposed to that which is bulky. A man and a horse are likewise said to be *tall*; but a hedge, a desk, and other common objects, are *high*. A hill is *high*, but a mountain is *lofty*; churches are in general *high*, but the steeples or the domes of cathedrals are *lofty*, and their spires are *tall*.

With the *high* is associated no idea of what is striking; but the *tall* is coupled with the aspiring or that which strives to out-top: the *lofty* is always coupled with the grand, and that which commands admiration.

High at their head he saw the chief appear,
And bold Merion to excite their rear.—POPE.

Prostrate on earth their beauteous bodies lay,
Like mountain fire, as *tall* and straight as they.
POPE.

E'en now, O king! 'tis giv'n thee to destroy
The *lofty* towers of wide-extended Troy.—POPE.

High and **lofty** have a moral acceptation, but **tall** is taken in the natural sense only: **high** and **lofty** are applied to persons or what is personal, with the same difference in degree as before: a **lofty** title or **lofty** pretension conveys more than a **high** title or a **high** pretension. Men of **high** rank should have **high** ideas of virtue and personal dignity, and keep themselves clear from every thing low and mean: a **lofty** ambition often soars too **high** to serve the purpose of its possessor; whose fall is the greater when he finds himself compelled to descend.

When you are tried in scandal's court,
Stand *high* in honour, wealth, or wit,
All others who inferior sit
Conceive themselves in conscience bound
To join and drag you to the ground.—SWIFT.

Without thee, nothing *lofty* can I sing;
Come then, and with thyself thy genius bring.
DRYDEN.

Highminded, *v.* **Haughty**.

Highsounding, *v.* **Noisy**.

Hilarity, *v.* **Mirth**.

To **Hinder**, **Prevent**, **Impede**,
Obstruct.

Hinder, from *hind*, or *behind*, signifies to *hinder* by going *behind*, and pulling a person back.

Prevent, from *præ* and *venio* to come before, signifies to *hinder* by coming before, or to cross another by the anticipation of his purpose.

Impede, from *in* and *pedes*, signifies to come between a person's feet, and entangle him in his progress.

Obstruct, from *ob* and *struo*, signifies to set up something in his way, to block the passage.

Hinder is the most general of these terms, as it conveys little more than the idea which is common to them all, namely, that of keeping one from his purpose. To *hinder* is commonly said of that which is rendered impossible for the time being, or merely delayed; *prevent* is said of that which is rendered altogether impracticable. A person is *hindered* by the weather and his various engagements from reaching a place at the time he intended; he is *prevented* but not *hindered* by ill health from going thither at all. If a friend calls, he *hinders* me from finishing the letter which I was writing; if I wish to *prevent* my son from reading any book, I keep it out of his way.

To *hinder* is an act of the moment, it supposes no design; *prevent* is a premeditated act, deliberated upon, and adopted for general purposes: the former is applied only to the movements of any particular individual, the latter to events and circumstances. I *hinder* a person who is running, if I lay hold of his arm and make him walk: it is the object of every good government to *prevent* offences rather than to punish offenders. In ordinary discourse these words fall very much into one another, when the circumstances of the case do not sufficiently define whether the action in hand be altogether suspended, or only suspended for a time; but the above explanation must make it very clear that to *hinder*, in its proper sense and application, is but a temporary act, and to *prevent* a decisive and permanent one.

To *impede* and *obstruct* are a species of *hinder*ing which is said rather of things than of persons; *hinder* is said of both; but *hinder* is commonly employed in regard to trifling matters, or such as retard a person's proceedings in the smallest degree; *impede* and *obstruct* are acts of greater importance, or produce a still greater degree of delay. A person is *hindered* in his work, although neither *impeded* nor *obstructed*; but the quantity of artillery and baggage which is attached to an army will greatly *impede* it in its march: and the trees which are thrown across the roads will *obstruct* its march.

Whatever causes a person to do a thing slower than he wishes is a *hindrance*; whatever binds him so that he cannot move freely forward is an *impediment*; whatever is in his path or passage so as to *prevent* him moving forward is an *obstruction*. Every *impediment* and *obstruction* is a *hindrance*, though not *vice versa*. A person is *hindered* in the thing he is about if he be called off to do something else; ill health *impedes* a person's progress in learning; any foreign body lodging in the vessels of the human body *obstructs* the course of the fluids, and consequently brings on serious diseases. *Hindrances* always suppose the agency of a person, either of the one who

hinders, or the one who is *hindered*: but *impediments* and *obstructions* may be employed with regard to the operations of nature on inanimate objects. Cold *impedes* the growth of plants; a dam *obstructs* the course of water.

It is much easier to keep ourselves void of resentment than to restrain it from excess when it has gained admission. To use the illustration of an excellent author, we can *prevent* the beginnings of some things, whose progress afterwards we cannot *hinder*.—HOLLAND.

Truth was provoked to see herself thus baffled and impeded by an enemy whom she looked on with contempt.—JOHNSON.

This path you say is hid in endless night.

This self-conceit alone *obstructs* your sight.—JENYNS.

To Hinder, Stop.

Hinder, v. To hinder.

Stop signifies to make to stand.

Hindering refers solely to the prosecution of an object: *stop* refers simply to the cessation of motion; we may be *hindered*, therefore, by being *stopped*; but we may also be *hindered* without being expressly *stopped*, and we may be *stopped* without being *hindered*. If the *stoppage* do not interfere with any other object in view, it is a *stoppage*, but not a *hindrance*; as when we are *stopped* by a friend whilst walking for pleasure: but if *stopped* by an idler in the midst of urgent business, so as not to be able to proceed according to our business, this is both a *stoppage* and a *hindrance*; on the other hand, if we are interrupted in the regular course of our proceeding, but not compelled to stand still or give up our business for any time, this may be a *hindrance*, but not a *stoppage*: in this manner, the conversation of others in the midst of our business, may considerably retard its progress, and so far *hinder*, but not expressly put a *stop* to the whole concern.

Is it not the height of wisdom and goodness too, to *hinder* the consummation of those soul-wounding sins, by obliging us to withstand them in their first infancy?—SOUTH.

A signal omen *stopp'd* the passing host,
Their martial fury in their wonder lost.—POPE.

To Hinder, v. To retard.

To Hint, v. To allude.

To Hint, Suggest, Intimate, Insinuate.

Hint, v. To allude.

Suggest, v. To allude.

To *Intimate* is to make one *intimate*, or specially acquainted with, to communicate one's most inward thoughts.

Insinuate, from the Latin *sinus* the bosom, is to introduce gently into the mind of another.

All these terms denote indirect expressions of what passes in one's own mind. We *hint* at a thing from fear and uncertainty: we *suggest* a thing from prudence and modesty; we *intimate* a thing from indecision; a thing is *insinuated* from artifice. A person who wants to get at the certain knowledge of any circumstance *hints* at it frequently in the presence of those who can give him the information; a man who will not offend others by an assumption of superior wisdom *suggests* his ideas on a

subject, instead of setting them forth with confidence; when a person's mind is not made up on any future action, he only *intimates* what may be done; he who has any thing ofensive to communicate to another, will choose to *insinuate* it, rather than declare it in express terms. *Hints* are thrown out; they are frequently characterized as broken: *suggestions* are offered; they are frequently termed idle or ill-grounded: *intimations* are given, and are either slight or broad: *insinuations* are thrown out; they are commonly designated as slanderous, malignant, and the like.

To *hint* is taken either in a bad or an indifferent sense; it is commonly resorted to by tale-bearers, mischief-makers, and all who want to talk of more than they know: it is rarely necessary to have recourse to *hints* in lieu of positive inquiries and declarations, unless the term be used in regard to matters of science or morals, when it designates loose thoughts, casually offered, in distinction from those which are systematized and formally presented: upon this ground, a distinguished female writer of the present day modestly entitles her book, '*Hints towards forming the Character of a Young Princess.*' To *suggest* is oftener used in the good than the bad sense: while one *suggests* doubts, queries, difficulties, or improvements in matters of opinion, it is truly laudable, particularly for young persons; but to *suggest* any thing to the disadvantage of another is even worse than to speak ill of him openly, for it bespeaks cowardice as well as ill-nature. To *intimate* is taken either in a good or an indifferent sense; it commonly passes between relatives or persons closely connected in the communication of their half-formed intentions or of doubtful intelligence; but to *insinuate* is always taken in a bad sense; it is the resource of an artful and malignant enemy to wound the reputation of another, whom he does not dare openly to accuse. A person is said to take a *hint*, to follow a *suggestion*, to receive an *intimation*, to disregard an *insinuation*.

Willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike,
Just *hint* a fault, and hesitate dislike.—POPE.
We must *suggest* to the people, in what hatred
He still hath held them.—SHAKESPEARE.

'Tis Heav'n itself that points out an hereafter,
And *intimates* eternity to man.—ADDISON.

Let it not be thought that what is here said *insinuates* anything to the discredit of Greek and Latin criticism.—WARBURTON.

Hire, v. Allowance.

Hireling, Mercenary.

Hireling from *hire*, and *Mercenary*, from *merx* wages, are applied to any one who follows a sordid employment; but *hireling* may sometimes be taken in its proper and less reproachful sense, for one who is *hired* as a servant to perform an allotted work; but in general they are both reproachful epithets: the former having particular reference to the meanness of the employment, and the latter to the sordid character of the person. *Hireling* prints are those which are in the pay of a party: a *mercenary* principle will sometimes actuate men in the highest station.

It was not his carrying the bag which made Judas a thief and an *hireling*.—SOUTH.

These soldiers were not citizens, but mercenary, sordid deserters.—BURKE.

To Hit, *v.* *To beat.*

To Hoard, *v.* *To treasure.*

To Hoist, *v.* *To lift.*

To Hold, *v.* *To contain.*

To Hold, Keep, Detain, Retain.

Hold, Saxon *healden*, Teutonic *holden*, &c.

Keep, in all probability comes from *capiō* to lay hold of.

Detain and Retain both come from the Latin *teneo* to hold; the first signifies, by virtue of the particle *de*, to hold from another; the second, by virtue of the particle *re*, signifies to hold back for oneself.

To hold is a physical act; it requires a degree of bodily strength, or at least the use of the limbs; but to keep is simply to have by one at one's pleasure. The mode of the action is the leading idea in the signification of *hold*; the durability of the action is the leading idea in the word *keep*: we may hold a thing only for a moment; but what we keep we keep for a time. On the other hand, we may keep a thing by holding, although we may keep it by various other means: we may therefore hold without keeping, and we may keep without holding. A servant holds a thing in his hand for it to be seen, but he does not keep it; he gives it to his master who puts it into his pocket, and consequently keeps, but does not hold it. A thing may be held in the hand, or kept in the hand; in the former case, the pressure of the hand is an essential part of the action, but in the latter case it is simply a contingent part of the action: the hand holds, but the person keeps it.

What is held is fixed in position, but what is kept is left loose, or otherwise, at the will of the individual. Things are held by men in their hands, by beasts in their claws or mouths, by birds in their beaks; things are kept by people either about their persons or in their houses, according to convenience.

Detain and retain are modes of *keeping*: the former signifies keeping back what belongs to another; the latter signifies keeping a long time for one's own purpose. A person may be either held, kept, detained, or retained: when he is held he is held contrary to his will by the hand of another; as suspected persons are held by the officers of justice, that they may not make their escape: he is kept, if he stops in any place, by the desire of another; as a man is kept in prison until his innocence is proved; or a child is kept at school, until he has finished his education: he is detained if he be kept away from any place to which he is going, or from any person to whom he belongs; as the servant of another is detained to take back a letter; or one is detained by business, so as to be prevented attending to an appointment: a person is retained, who is kept for a continuance in the service of another; as some servants are said to be retained, while others are dismissed.

Things are held in the improper sense: they are kept, detained, and retained, in the proper sense. A money-lender holds the property of

others in pledge; the idea of a temporary and partial action is here expressed by *hold*, in distinction from *keep*, which is used to express something definite and permanent: the money-lender keeps the property as his own, if the borrower forfeits it by breach of contract. When a person purchases anything, he is expected to keep it, or pay the value of the thing ordered, if the tradesman fulfil his part of the engagement. What is detained is kept either contrary to the will, or without the consent, of the possessor: when things are suspected to be stolen, the officers have the right of detaining them until inquiry be instituted. What is retained is continued to be kept: it supposes, however, some alteration in the terms or circumstances under which it is kept: a person retains his seat in a coach, notwithstanding he finds it disagreeable: or a lady retains some of the articles of millinery, which are sent for her choice, but she returns the rest.

All are used in a moral application except *detain*; in this case they are marked by a similar distinction. A person is said to hold an office, by which simple possession is implied; he may hold it for a long or a short time, at the will of others, or by his own will, which are not marked: he keeps a situation, or he keeps his post, by which his continuance in the situation, or at the post, are denoted; but to say he retains his office, signifies that he might have given it up or lost it, had he not been led to continue in it. In like manner, with regard to one's sentiments or feelings, a man is said to hold certain opinions, which are ascribed to him as a part of his creed; he keeps the opinions which no one can induce him to give up; he retains his old attachments, notwithstanding the lapse of years, and change of circumstances, which have intervened, and were naturally calculated to wean him from them.

It is a certain sign of a wise government, when it can hold men's hearts by hopes.—BACON.

The proof is best when men keep their authority towards their children, but not their purse.—BACON.

Haste! goddess, haste! the flying host detain.

Nor let one sail be hoisted on the main.—POPE.

Ideas are retained by renovation of that impression which time is always wearing away.—JOHNSON.

○ To Hold, Occupy, Possess.

Hold, *v.* *To hold.*

Occupy, in Latin *occupo*, or *oc* and *capiō* to hold or keep, so that it cannot be held by others.

Possess, in Latin *possideo*, or *potis* and *sedeo*, signifies to sit as master of.

We hold a thing for a long or a short time; we occupy it for a permanence: we hold it for ourselves or others; we occupy it only for ourselves: we hold it for various purposes; we occupy only for the purpose of converting it to our private use. Thus a person may hold an estate, or, which is the same thing, the title deeds to an estate pro tempore, for another person's benefit; but he occupies an estate if he enjoys the fruit of it. On the other hand, to occupy is only to hold under a certain compact; but to possess is to hold as one's own. The tenant occupies the farm when he holds it

by a certain lease, and cultivates it for his subsistence; but the landlord *possesses* the farm, *possessing* the right to let it, and to receive the rent. We may *hold* by force, or fraud, or right; we *occupy* either by force or right; we *possess* only by right. Hence we say figuratively, to *hold* a person in esteem or contempt, to *occupy* a person's attention, or to *possess* his affection.

He (the eagle) drives them from his fort, the towering seat,
For ages, of his empire, which in peace
Unstain'd he holds.—THOMSON.

In the Frogs of Aristophanes, three entire acts are occupied by a contest between *Æschylus* and *Euripides*.—CUMBERLAND.

But now the feather'd youth their former bounds
Ardent disdain, and weighing oft their wings,
Demand the free possession of the sky.—THOMSON.

To Hold, Support, Maintain.

Hold, v. To hold, keep.

Support, v. To countenance.

Maintain, v. To assist, maintain.

Hold is here, as in the former article, a term of very general import; he who *supports* and *maintains* must *hold*, though not *vice versa*.

Hold and *support* are employed in the proper sense, *maintain* in the improper sense. To *hold* is a term unqualified by any circumstance; we may *hold* a thing in any direction, *hold* it up or down, in a straight or oblique direction: *support* is a species of *holding* up; to *hold* up, however, is a personal act, or a direct effort of the individual; to *support* may be an indirect and a passive act, he who *holds* anything up keeps it in an upright posture, by the exertions of his strength; he who *supports* a thing only bears its weight, or suffers it to rest upon himself: persons or voluntary agents can *hold* up; inanimate objects may *support*. a servant *holds* up a child that it may see; a pillar *supports* a building.

Hold, *maintain*, and *support*, are likewise employed still farther in a moral application, as it respects different circumstances; opinions are *held* and *maintained* as one's own; they are *supported* when they are another's. We *hold* and *maintain* when we believe; we *support* the belief or doctrine of another, or what we ourselves have asserted and *maintained* at a former time. What is *held* is *held* by the act of the mind within one's self; what is *maintained* and *supported* is openly declared to be *held*. To *hold* marks simply the state of one's own mind; to *maintain* indicates the effort which one makes to inform others of this state; to *support* indicates the efforts which one makes to justify that state. We *hold* an opinion only as it regards ourselves; we *maintain* and *support* it as it regards others; that is, we *maintain* it either with others, for others, or against others: we *support* it in an especial manner against others: we *maintain* it by assertion; we *support* it by argument. Bad principles at first harm only the individual by whom they are *held*; but they will do harm to all over whom our influence extends when we *maintain* them; they may do harm to all the world, when we undertake to *support* them. Good principles need only be

held, or at most *maintained*, unless where adversaries set themselves up against them, and render it necessary to *support* them. Infidel principles have been *held* occasionally by individuals in all ages, but they were never *maintained* with so much openness and effrontery at any time, as at the close of the eighteenth century, when *supporters* of such principles were to be found in every tap-room.

Hold is applied not only to principles and opinions, but also to sentiments; *maintain* and *support* are confined either to abstract and speculative opinions, or to the whole mind: we *hold* a thing dear or cheap, we *hold* it in abhorrence, or we *hold* it sacred; but we *maintain* or *support* truth or error; we *maintain* an influence over ourselves; we *support* our resolution.

It was a notable observation of a wise father, that those which *held* and persuaded pressure of consciences were commonly interested therein themselves for their own ends.—BACON.

Nothing can *support* the minds of the guilty from drooping.—SOUTH.

Who then is free? The wise, who well maintains
An empire o'er himself.—FRANCIS.

Holiday, v. *Feast.*

Holiness, Sanctity.

Holiness, which comes from the northern languages, has altogether acquired a Christian signification: it respects the life and temper of a Christian.

Sanctity, which is derived from the Latin *sancus* and *sancio* to sanction, has merely a moral signification, which it derives from the sanction of human authority.

Holiness is to the mind of a man what *sanctity* is to his exterior; with this difference, that *holiness* to a certain degree ought to belong to every man professing Christianity; but *sanctity*, as it lies in the manners, the outward garb, and deportment, is becoming only to certain persons, and at certain times.

Holiness is a thing not to be affected; it is that genuine characteristic of Christianity which is altogether spiritual, and cannot be counterfeited: *sanctity*, on the other hand, is from its very nature exposed to falsehood, and the least to be trusted; when it displays itself in individuals, either by the sorrowfulness of their looks, or the singular cut of their garments, or other singularities of action and gesture, it is of the most questionable nature; but in one who performs the sacerdotal office it is a useful appendage to the solemnity of his character, exciting a reverential regard to the individual in the mind of the beholder, and the most exalted sentiments of that religion which he thus adorns by his outward profession.

Habitual preparation for the Sacrament consists in a permanent habit or principle of *holiness*.—SOUTH.

About an age ago, it was the fashion in England for every one that would be thought religious, to throw as much *sanctity* as possible into his face.—ADDISON.

Hollow, Empty.

Hollow, from *hole*, signifies being like a hole.

Empty, v. *Empty.*

Hollow respects the body itself; the absence of its own materials produces hollowness: *empty* respects foreign bodies; their absence in another body constitutes emptiness. *Hollowness* is therefore a preparative to emptiness, and may exist independently of it; but emptiness presupposes the existence of hollow-ness: what is *empty* must be *hollow*; but what is *hollow* need not be *empty*. *Hollowness* is often the natural property of a body; emptiness is a contingent property: that which is *hollow* is destined by nature to contain; but that which is *empty* is deprived of its contents by a casualty: a nut is *hollow* for the purpose of receiving the fruit; it is *empty* if it contain no fruit.

They are both employed in a moral acceptation, and in a bad sense; the *hollow*, in this case, is applied to what ought to be solid or sound; and *empty* to what ought to be filled: a person is *hollow* whose goodness lies only at the surface, whose fair words are without meaning; a truce is *hollow* which is only an external cessation from hostilities: a person is *empty* who is without a requisite portion of understanding and knowledge; an excuse is *empty* which is unsupported by fact and reason; a pleasure is *empty* which cannot afford satisfaction.

The shocks of an earthquake are much more dreadful than the highest and loudest blusters of a storm; for there may be some shelter against the violence of the one, but no security against the hollowness of the other.—SOUTH.

The creature man,
Condemn'd to sacrifice his childish years
To babbling ignorance and empty fears.—PRIOR.

Holy, Pious, Devout, Religious.

Holy, v. Holiness.

Pious, in Latin *pius*, which is most probably changed from *dios* or *deus*, signifies having a regard for the gods.

Devout, in Latin *devotus*, from *devo*eo to engage by a vow, signifies devoted or consecrated.

Religious, in Latin *religiosus*, comes from *religio* and *religio* to bind, because religion binds the mind, and produces in it a fixed principle.

A strong regard to the Supreme Being is expressed by all these epithets; but *holy* conveys the most comprehensive idea; *pious* and *devout* designate most fervour of mind; *religious* is the most general and abstract in its signification. A *holy* man is in all respects heavenly-minded; he is more fit for heaven than earth: *holiness* to whatever degree it is possessed, abstracts the thoughts from sub-lunary objects, and fixes them on things that are above; it is therefore a Christian quality, which is not to be attained in its full perfection by human beings, in their present imperfect state, and is attainable by some to a much greater degree than by others. Our Saviour was a perfect pattern of *holiness*; his apostles after him, and innumerable saints and good men, both in and out of the ministry, have striven to imitate his example, by the *holiness* of their life and conversation; in such, however, as have exclusively devoted themselves to his service, this *holiness* may

shine brighter than in those who are entangled with the affairs of the world.

Pious is a term more restricted in its signification, and consequently more extended in application than *holy*: *piety* is not a virtue peculiar to Christians, it is common to all believers in a Supreme Being; it is the homage of the heart and the affections to a superior Being: from a similarity in the relationship between a heavenly and an earthly parent, devotedness of the mind has in both cases been denominated *piety*. *Piety* towards God naturally produces *piety* towards parents; for the obedience of the heart, which gives rise to the virtue in the one case, seems instantly to dictate the exercise of it in the other. The difference between *holiness* and *piety* is obvious from this, that our Saviour and his apostles are characterized as *holy*, but not *pious*, because *piety* is swallowed up in *holiness*. On the other hand, Jew and Gentile, Christian and Heathen, are alike termed *pious*, when they cannot be called *holy*, because *piety* is not only a more practicable virtue, but because it is more universally applicable to the dependent condition of man.

Devotion is a species of *piety* peculiar to the worshipper; it bespeaks that devotedness of mind which displays itself in the temple when the individual seems by his outward services solemnly to devote himself, soul and body, to the service of his Maker. *Piety*, therefore, lies in the heart, and may appear externally; but *devotion* does not properly exist except in an external observance: a man *piously* resigns himself to the will of God, in the midst of his afflictions; he prays devoutly in the bosom of his family.

Religious is a term of less import than either of the other terms; it denotes little more than the simple existence of religion, or a sense of religion in the mind: the religious man is so, more in his principles than in his affections; he is *religious* in his sentiments, inasmuch as he directs all his views according to the will of his Maker; and he is *religious* in his conduct, inasmuch as he observes the outward formalities of homage that are due to his Maker. A *holy* man fits himself for a higher state of existence, after which he is always aspiring; a *pious* man has God in all his thoughts, and seeks to do His will; a *devout* man bends himself in humble adoration, and pays his vows of prayer and thanksgiving; a *religious* man conforms in all things to what the dictates of his conscience require from him, as a responsible being, and a member of society.

When applied to things, these terms preserve a similar distinction: we speak of the *holy* sacrament; of a *pious* discourse, a *pious* ejaculation; of a *devout* exercise, a *devout* air; a *religious* sentiment, a *religious* life, a *religious* education, and the like.

The holiest man, by conversing with the world, insensibly draws something of soil and taint from it.—SOUTH.

In every age the practice has prevailed of substituting certain appearances of *piety* in the place of the great duties of humanity and mercy.—BLAIR.

A state of temperance, sobriety, and justice, without devotion, is a lifeless, insipid condition of virtue.—ADDISON.

Devotion expresses not so much the performance of any particular duty, as the spirit which must animate all religious duties.—BLAIR.

Holy, Sacred, Divine.

Holy, *v. Holiness.*

Sacred, in Latin *sacer*, is derived either from the Greek *aios* *holy* or *saos* whole, perfect, and the Hebrew *zakah* pure.

Divine, *v. Godlike.*

Holy is here, as in the former article, a term of higher import than either *sacred* or *divine*: whatever is most intimately connected with religion and religious worship, in its purest state, is *holy*, is unalloyed by a mixture of inferior objects, is elevated in the greatest possible degree, so as to suit the nature of an infinitely perfect and exalted Being. Among the Jews, the *holy* of *holies* was that place which was intended to approach the nearest to the heavenly abode, consequently was preserved as much as possible from all contamination with that which is earthly: among the Christians, that religion or form of religion is termed *holy*, which is esteemed purest in its doctrine, discipline, and ceremonies; by the Roman Catholics this title is applied to their own form; by the Church of England it has been adopted to designate its religious system. Upon this ground we speak of the church as a *holy* place, of the sacrament as the *holy* sacrament, and the ordinances of the church as *holy*.

Sacred is less than *holy*: the *sacred* derives its sanction from human institutions, and is connected rather with our moral than our religious duties: what is *holy* is altogether spiritual, and abstracted from the earthly; what is *sacred* may be simply the human purified from what is gross and corrupt: what is *holy* must be regarded with awe, and treated with every possible mark of reverence; what is *sacred* must not be violated nor infringed upon. The laws are *sacred*, but not *holy*: a man's word should be *sacred*, though not *holy*. for neither of these things is to be revered, but both are to be kept free from injury or external violence. The *holy* is not so much opposed to, as it is set above, every thing else; the *sacred* is opposed to the profane: the Scriptures are properly denominated *holy*, because they are the word of God, and the fruit of his *Holy Spirit*; but other writings may be termed *sacred* which appertain to religion, in distinction from the profane, which appertain only to worldly matters.

Divine is a term of even less import than *sacred*: it signifies either belonging to a deity, or being like a deity; but from the looseness of its application it has lost in some respects the dignity of its meaning. The *divine* is often contrasted with the human: but there are many human things which are denominated *divine*: Milton's poem is entitled a *divine* poem, not merely on account of the subject, but from the exalted manner in which the poet has treated his subject: what is *divine*, therefore, may be so superlatively excellent as to be conceived of as having the stamp of inspiration from the Deity, which of course, as it respects human performances, is but an hyperbolical mode of speech.

From the above explanation of these terms, it is clear that there is a manifest difference between them, and yet that their resemblance is sufficiently great for them to be applied to the same objects. We speak of the *Holy Spirit*, and of *Divine* inspiration; by the first of which epithets is understood not only what is superhuman, but what is a constituent part of the Deity; by the second is represented merely in a general manner the source of the inspiration as coming from the Deity, and not from man. Subjects are denominated either *sacred* or *divine*, as when we speak of *sacred* poems or *divine* hymns; *sacred* here characterizes the subjects of the poems, as those which are to be held *sacred*: and *divine* designates the subject of the hymns as not being ordinary or merely human: it is clear, therefore, that what is *holy* is in its very nature *sacred*, but not *vice versa*: and that what is *holy* and *sacred* is in its very nature *divine*; but the *divine* is not always either *holy* or *sacred*.

To fit us for a due access to the *holy* Sacrament, we must add actual preparation to habitual.—SOUTH.

Religion properly consists in a reverential esteem of things *sacred*.—SOUTH.

When a man resteth and assureth himself upon *Divine* protection, he gathereth a force and faith which human nature in itself could not obtain.—BACON.

Holy-Day, *v. Feast.*

Homage, Fealty, Court.

Homage in French *hommage*, comes from *homme* a man, signifying a man's, that is, an inferior's, act of acknowledging superiority. *Homage*, in the technical sense, was an oath taken, or a service performed, by the tenant to his lord, on being admitted to his land; or by inferior princes to a sovereign, whereby they acknowledged his sovereignty, and promised fidelity: in its extended and figurative sense, it comprehends any solemn mark of deference, by which the superiority of another is acknowledged.

Fealty (from the French *féal*, loyal, trusty), is a lower species of *homage*, consisting only of an oath; it was made formerly by tenants, who were bound thereby to personal service under the feudal system; it is never taken otherwise than in the proper sense.

Court, which derives its meaning from the verb to *court*, woo, and seek favour, is a species of *homage*, complaisance, or deference, which is assumed for a specific purpose; it is not only voluntary, but depends upon the humour and convenience of the courtier.

Homage is paid or done to superior endowments; *court* is paid to the contingent, not the real, superiority of the individual. *Homage* consists in any form of respect which is admitted in civil society; the Romans did *homage* to the talent of Virgil, by always rising when he entered the theatre; men do *homage* to the wisdom of another, when they do not venture to contradict his assertions, or call in question his opinions. *Court* is every thing or nothing, as circumstances require; he who pays his *court* consults the will and humour of him to whom it is paid, while he is consulting his own interest.

We cannot avoid observing the *homage* which the world is constrained to pay to virtue.—BLAIR.

Man disobeying,
Disloyal breaks his *fealty*.—MILTON.

Virtue is the universal charm; even its shadow is courted.—BLAIR.

Honest, v. Fair.

Honest, v. Sincere.

Honesty, Uprightness, Integrity, Probity.

Honesty, v. Fair.

Uprightness, from *upright*, in German *aufrecht* or *aufgerichtet*, from *aufrichten* to set up, signifies in a straight direction, not deviating nor turning aside.

Honest is the most familiar and universal term, it is applied alike to actions and principles, to a mode of conduct or a temper of mind; *upright* is applied to the conduct, but always with reference to the moving principle. As it respects the conduct, *honesty* is a much more homely virtue than *uprightness*: a man is said to be *honest* who in his dealings with others does not violate the laws; thus a servant is *honest* who does not take any of the property of his master, or suffer it to be taken; a tradesman is *honest* who does not sell bad articles; and people in general are denominated *honest* who pay what they owe, and do not adopt any methods of defrauding others; *honesty* in this sense, therefore, consists in negatives; but *uprightness* is positive, and extends to all matters which are above the reach of the law, and comprehends not only every thing which is known to be hurtful, but also whatever may chance to be hurtful. To be *honest* requires nothing but a knowledge of the first principles of civil society; it is learned, and may be practised, by the youngest and most ignorant; but to be *upright* supposes a superiority of understanding or information, which qualifies a person to discriminate between that which may or may not injure another. An *honest* man is contented with not overcharging another for that which he sells to him; but an *upright* man seeks to provide him with that which shall fully answer his purpose: a man will not think himself *dishonest* who leaves another to find out defects which it is possible may escape his notice; but an *upright* man will rather suffer a loss himself than expose another to an error which may be detrimental to his interests. From this difference between *honesty* and *uprightness* arises another, namely, that the *honest* man may be *honest* only for his own convenience, out of regard to his character, or a fear of the laws; but the *upright* man is always *upright*, from his sense of what is right, and his concern for others.

Honest, in its extended sense, as it is applied to principles, or to the general character of a man, is of a higher cast than the common kind of *honesty* above-mentioned; *uprightness*, however, in this case, still preserves its superiority. An *honest* principle is the first and most universally applicable principle, which the mind forms of what is right and wrong; and the *honest* man, who is so denominated on account of his having this principle, is looked upon with respect, inasmuch as he possesses

the foundation of all moral virtue in his dealings with others. *Honest* is here the generic term, and *uprightness* the specific term; the former does not exclude the latter, but the latter includes the former. There may be many *honest* men and *honest* minds; but there are not so many *upright* men nor *upright* minds. The *honest* man is rather contrasted with the rogue, and an *honest* principle is opposed to the selfish or artful principle: but the *upright* man or the *upright* mind can be compared or contrasted with nothing but itself. An *honest* man will do no harm if he know it; but an *upright* man is careful not to do to another what he would not have another do to him.

Honesty is a feeling that actuates and directs by a spontaneous impulse; *uprightness* is a principle that regulates or puts every thing into an even course. **Honesty** can be dispensed with in no case; but *uprightness* is called into exercise only in certain cases. We characterize a servant or the lowest person as *honest*; but we do not entitle any one in so low a capacity as *upright*, since *uprightness* is exercised in matters of higher moment, and rests upon the evidence of a man's own mind; a judge, however, may with propriety be denominated *upright*, who scrupulously adheres to the dictates of an unbiassed conscience in the administration of justice.

Uprightness is applicable only to principles and actions; **Integrity** (from the Latin *integer* whole) is applicable to the whole man or his character; and **Probity** (from *probus* or *prohibus* restraining, that is, restraining from evil) is in like manner used only in the comprehensive sense. *Uprightness* is the straightness of rule by which actions and conduct in certain cases is measured; *integrity* is the wholeness or unbrokenness of a man's character throughout life in his various transactions; *probity* is the excellence and purity of a man's character in his various relations. When we call a man *upright*, we consider him in the detail: we bear in mind the uniformity and fixedness of the principle by which he is actuated: when we call him a man of *integrity*, we view him in the gross, not in this nor that circumstance of life, but in every circumstance in which the rights and interests of others are concerned. *Uprightness* may therefore be looked upon in some measure as a part of *integrity*; with this difference, that the acting principle is in the one case only kept in view, whereas in the other case the conduct and principle are both included. The distinction between these terms is farther evident by observing their different application. We do not talk of a man's *uprightness* being shaken, or of his preserving his *uprightness*; but of his *integrity* being shaken, and his preserving his *integrity*. We may, however, ascribe the particular conduct of any individual as properly to the *integrity* of his principles or mind, as to the *uprightness* of his principles. A man's *uprightness* displays itself in his dealings, be they ever so trifling; but the *integrity* of his character is seen in the most important concerns of life. A judge shows his *uprightness* in his daily administration of justice, when he remains uninfluenced by any partial motive; he shows his *integrity* when he resists the most powerful motives of

personal interest and advantage out of respect to right and justice.

Integrity and *probity* are both general and abstract terms; but the former is relative, the latter is positive: *integrity* refers to the external injuries by which it may be assailed or destroyed; it is goodness tried and preserved: *probity* is goodness existing of itself, without reference to anything else. There is no *integrity* where private interest is not in question; there is no *probity* wherever the interests of others are injured: *integrity* therefore includes *probity*, but *probity* does not necessarily suppose *integrity*. *Probity* is a free principle, that acts without any force; *integrity* is a defensive principle, that is obliged to maintain itself against external force. *Probity* excludes all injustice; *integrity* excludes in a particular manner that injustice which would favour one's self. *Probity* respects the rights of every man, and seeks to render to every one what is his due; it does not wait to be asked, it does not require any compulsion; it voluntarily enters into all the circumstances and conditions of men, and measures out to each his portion: *probity* therefore forbids a man being malignant, hard, cruel, ungenerous, unfair, or anything else which may press unequally and unjustly on his neighbour: *integrity* is disinterested; it sacrifices every personal consideration to the maintenance of what is right: a man of *integrity* will not be contented to abstain from selling himself for gold; he will keep himself aloof from all private partialities or resentments, all party cabals or intrigue, which are apt to violate the *integrity* of his mind. We look for *honesty* and *uprightness* in citizens; it sets every question at rest between man and man: we look for *integrity* and *probity* in statesmen, or such as have to adjust the rights of many; they contribute to the public as often as to the private good.

Were I to take an estimate of the comparative value of these four terms, I should denominate *honesty* a current coin which must be in every man's hands; he cannot dispense with it for his daily use: *uprightness* is fine silver: *probity* fine gold without any alloy; and *integrity* gold tried and purified: all which are in the hands of but comparatively few, yet carry a value with them independently of the use which is made of them.

The blunt, *honest* humour of the Germans sounds better in the roughness of the high Dutch than it would in a politer tongue.—ADDISON.

The steward, whose account is clear,
Demands his honour; may appear;
His actions never shun the light;
He is, and would be, prov'd upright.—GAY.

The violation of the petition of right, imputed to King Charles I., is more to be ascribed to the necessity of his situation than to any failure in the *integrity* of his principles.—HUME.

A compliment, as far as it deserves to be practised by a man of *probity*, is only the most civil and obliging way of saying what you mean.—ATTERBURY.

Honesty, Honour.

These terms both respect the principle which actuates men in the adjustment of their rights with each other. The words are both derived from the same source, namely, the Hebrew *hon* substance or wealth (*v. Honesty*), which, being the primitive source of esteem among

men, became at length put for the measure or standard of esteem, namely, what is good. Hence *Honesty* and *Honour* are both founded upon what is estimable; with this difference, that *honesty* is confined to the first principles or laws upon which civil society is founded, and *honour* is an independent principle that extends to everything which by usage has been admitted as estimable or entitled to esteem. An *honest* action, therefore, can never reflect so much credit on the agent as an *honourable* action, since in the performance of the one he may be guided by motives comparatively low, whereas in the other case he is actuated solely by a fair regard for the *honour* or the esteem of others. To a breach of *honesty* is attached punishment and personal inconvenience in various forms; but to a breach of *honour* is annexed only disgrace or the ill opinion of others: he, therefore, who sets more value or interest on the gratification of his passions than on the esteem of the world, may gain his petty purpose with the sacrifice of his *honour*; but he who strives to be *dishonest* is thwarted in his purpose by the intervention of the laws, which deprive him of his unworthy gains: consequently, men are compelled to be *honest* whether they will or not, but they are entirely free in the choice of being *honourable*.

On the other hand, since *honesty* is founded on the very first principles of human society, and *honour* on the incidental principles which have been annexed to them in the progress of time and culture, the former is positive and definite, and he who is actuated by this principle can never err; but the latter is indefinite and variable, and as it depends upon opinion it will easily mislead. We cannot have a false *honesty*, but we may have false *honour*. *Honesty* always keeps a man within the line of his duty; but a mistaken notion of what is *honourable* may carry a man very far from what is right, and may even lead him to run counter to common *honesty*.

Honesty, in the language of the Romans, as well as in French, rather signifies a composition of those qualities which generally acquire *honour* and esteem to those who possess them.—TEMPLE.

With breathing brass to kindle fierce alarms,
And rouse to dare their fate in honourable arms.
DRYDEN.

Honour, *v. Glory*.

Honour, *v. Honesty*.

To Honour, Reverence, Respect.

These terms agree in expressing the act of an inferior towards his superior; but *Honour* (*v. Glory*) expresses less than *Reverence* (*v. To adore*), and more than *Respect* (*v. To esteem*).

To *honour* is only an outward act; to *reverence* is either an act of the mind or the outward expression of a sentiment; to *respect* is only an act of the mind. We *honour* God by adoration and worship, as well as by the performance of his will; we *honour* our parents by obeying them and giving them our personal service: we *reverence* our Maker by cherishing in our minds a dread of offending Him, and making a fearful use of his holy name and word; we *reverence* our parents by holding a similar sentiment in a less degree.

To *honour* and *respect* are extended to other objects besides our Maker and our parents; but *reverence* is confined to objects of a religious description: "We *honour* the king and all that are put in authority under him," by rendering to them the tribute that is due to their station; we *respect* all who possess superior qualities: the former is an act of duty, it flows out of the constitution of civil society; the latter is a voluntary act flowing out of the temper of the mind towards others. To *respect*, as has been before observed, signifies merely to feel *respect*; but to show *respect*, or a mark of *respect*, supposes an outward action which brings it still nearer to *honour*. It is a mark of *honour* in subjects to keep the birthday of their Sovereign; it is a mark of *respect* to any individual to give him the upper seat in a room or at a table. Divine *honours* were formerly paid by the Romans to some of their emperors; *respect* is always paid to age in all Christian countries; among the heathens it differed according to the temper of the people.

Of learning, as of virtue, it may be affirmed that it is at once *honoured* and neglected.—JOHNSON.

The foundation of every proper disposition towards God must be laid in *reverence*, that is, admiration mixed with awe.—BLAIR.

Establish your character on the *respect* of the wise, not on the flattery of dependants.—BLAIR.

Honour, Dignity.

Honour (*v. Honour*) may be taken either for that which intrinsically belongs to a person or for that which is conferred on him.

Dignity, from the Latin *dignus* worthy, signifying worthiness, may be equally applied to what is extrinsic or intrinsic in a man.

In the first case *honour* has a reference to what is esteemed by others; *dignity* to that which is esteemed by ourselves: a sense of *honour* impels a man to do that which is esteemed *honourable* among men; a sense of *dignity* to do that which is consistent with the worth and greatness of his nature: the former strives to elevate himself as an individual; the latter to raise himself to the standard of his species: the former may lead a person astray; but the latter is an unerring guide. It is *honour* which makes a man draw his sword upon his friend: it is *dignity* which makes him despise every paltry affront from others, and apologize for every apparent affront on his own part. This distinction between the terms is kept up in their application to what is extraneous of a man: *honour* is that which is conferred on him by others; but *dignity* is the worth or value which is added to his condition: hence we always speak of *honours* as conferred or received; but *dignities* as possessed or maintained. *Honours* may sometimes be casual; but *dignities* are always permanent: an act of condescension from the sovereign is an *honour*; but the *dignity* lies in the elevation of the office. Hence it is that *honours* are mostly civil or political; *dignities* ecclesiastical.

When a proud, aspiring man meets with *honour* and preferments, these are the things which are ready to lay hold of his heart and affections.—SOUTH.

Him Tullus next in *dignity* succeeds.—DRYDEN.

Hope, Expectation, Trust, Confidence.

Hope, in German *hoffen*, probably comes from the Greek *προσχω* to look at with pleasure.

Expectation, *v. To await*.

Trust, *v. Belief*.

Confidence, *v. To confide*.

Anticipation of futurity is the common idea expressed by all these words. *Hope* is welcome; *expectation* is either welcome or unwelcome: we *hope* only for that which is good; we *expect* the bad as well as the good. In bad weather we *hope* it will soon be better; but in a bad season we *expect* a bad harvest, and in a good season a good harvest. *Hope* is simply a presentiment; it may vary in degree, more according to the temper of the mind than the nature of the circumstances; some *hope* where there is no ground for *hope*, and others despair where they might *hope*: *expectation* is a conviction that excludes doubt; * we *expect* in proportion as that conviction is positive: we *hope* that which may be or can possibly be; we *expect* that which must be or which ought to be. The young man *hopes* to live many years; the old man *expects* to die in a few years. *Hope* is a precious gift to man; it is denied to no one under any circumstances; it is a solace in affliction, and a support under adversity; it throws a ray of light over the darkest scene: *expectation* is an evil rather than a good; whether we *expect* the thing that is agreeable or otherwise, it is seldom attended with anything but pain. *Hope* is justified by the nature of our condition; since everything is changing, we have also reason to *hope* that a present evil, however great, may be succeeded by something less severe: *expectation* is often an act of presumption, in which the mind outsteps its own powers, and estimates the future as if it were present; since everything future is uncertain but death, there is but that one legitimate subject of *expectation*. *Hope* may be deferred, but never dies; it is a pleasure as lasting as it is great: *expectation* is swallowed up in certainty; it seldom leaves anything but disappointment.

Trust and *confidence* agree with *hope* in regard to the objects anticipated; they agree with *expectation* in regard to the certainty of the anticipation: *expectation*, *trust*, and *confidence*, when applied to some future good, differ principally in the grounds on which the certainty or positive conviction rests. *Expectation* springs either from the character of the individual or the nature of the event which is the subject of anticipation: in the former it is a decision; in the latter a rational conclusion: *trust* springs altogether from a view of the circumstances connected with the event, and is an inference or conclusion of the mind drawn from the whole: *confidence* arises more from the temper of the mind than from the nature of the object; it is rather an instantaneous decision than a rational conclusion. *Expectation* and *confidence* therefore are often erroneous, and mostly unwarrantable; the latter still more frequently than the former:

* See Eberhardt: "Hoffnung, Erwartung, Vertrauen, Zuversicht."

trust, like *hope*, is always warrantable, even though it may sometimes be deceived.

If we *expect* our friends to assist us in time of need, it may be a reasonable *expectation* founded upon their tried regard for us and promises of assistance; or it may be an extravagant *expectation* founded upon our self-love and selfishness: if we *trust* that an eminent physician will cure us, it is founded upon our knowledge of his skill, and of the nature of our case; if we indulge a *confident expectation* that our performances will meet with universal approbation, it is founded upon our vanity and ignorance of ourselves. The most modest man is permitted to *hope* that his endeavours to please will not fail of success; and to *trust* so far in his own powers as to be encouraged to proceed: a prudent man will never think himself authorized to *expect* success, and still less to be *confident* of it, when a thousand contingencies may intervene to defeat the proposed end.

Regions of sorrow, doleful shades, where peace
And rest can never dwell; *hope* never comes,
That comes to all.—MILTON.

All these within the dungeon's depth remain,
Despairing pardon, and *expecting* pain.—DRYDEN.

Our country's gods, in whom our *trust* we place.—
DRYDEN.

His pride
Humbled by such rebuke, so far beneath
His *confidence* to equal God in pow'r.—MILTON.

Hopeless, v. Desperate.

Horrible, v. Fearful.

Horrid, v. Fearful.

Host, v. Army.

Hostile, v. Averse.

Hostility, v. Enmity.

Hot, Fiery, Burning, Ardent.

Hot, in German *heiss*, Latin *æstus*, comes from the Hebrew *ash fire*.

Fiery signifies *having fire*.

Burning denotes the actual state of *burning*.

Ardent, v. Fervour.

These terms characterize either the presence of *heat* or the cause of *heat*: *hot* is the general term which marks simply the presence of *heat*; *fiery* goes farther, it denotes the presence of *fire* which is the cause of *heat*; *burning* denotes the action of *fire*, and consequently is more expressive than the two; *ardent*, which is literally the same in signification, is employed either in poetry or in application to moral objects: a room is *hot*; a furnace or the tail of a comet *fiery*; a coal *burning*; the sun *ardent*.

In the figurative application, a temper is said to be *hot* or *fiery*; *rage* is *burning*; the mind is *ardent* in pursuit of an object. Zeal may be *hot*, *fiery*, *burning*, and *ardent*; but in the first three cases, it denotes the intemperance of the mind when *heated* by religion or politics; the latter is admissible so long as it is confined to a good object.

Let loose the raging elements. Breath'd hot
From all the boundless furnace of the sky,
And the wide, glittering waste of *burning* sand,
A suffocating wind the pilgrim smites
With instant death.—THOMSON.

E'en the camel feels,
Shot through his wither'd heart, the *fiery* blast.
THOMSON.

The royal eagle draws his vigorous young,
Strong pounc'd, and *ardent* with paternal fire.
THOMSON.

House, v. Family.

However, Yet, Nevertheless, Notwithstanding.

These conjunctions are in grammar termed *adversative*, because they join sentences together that stand more or less in opposition to each other. **However** is the most general and indefinite; it serves as a conclusive deduction drawn from the whole.

"The truth is *however* not yet all come out;"—by this is understood that much of the truth has been told, and much *yet* remains to be told: so likewise in similar sentences: "I am not *however* of that opinion;" where it is implied either that many hold the opinion or much may be said of it, but be that as it may, I am not of that opinion: "*however*, you may rely on my assistance to that amount;" that is, at all events, let whatever happen, you may rely on so much of my assistance; *however*, as is obvious from the above example, connects not only one single proposition, but many propositions either expressed or understood. **Yet, Nevertheless, and Notwithstanding**, are mostly employed to set two specific propositions either in contrast or direct opposition to each other; the two latter are but species of the former, pointing out the opposition in a more specific manner.

There are cases in which *yet* is peculiarly proper; others in which *nevertheless*, and others in which *notwithstanding*, is preferable. *Yet* bespeaks a simple contrast; "Addison was not a good speaker, *yet* he was an admirable writer; Johnson was a man of uncouth manners, *yet* he had a good heart and a sound head:" *nevertheless* and *notwithstanding* could not in these cases have been substituted. *Nevertheless* and *notwithstanding* are mostly used to imply effects or consequences opposite to what might naturally be expected to result.

"He has acted an unworthy part; *nevertheless* I will be a friend to him as far as I can" that is, although he has acted an unworthy part, I will be no less his friend as far as lies in my power. "*Notwithstanding* all I have said, he still persists in his own imprudent conduct;" that is, all I have said *notwithstanding* or not restraining him from it, he still persists. "He is still rich *notwithstanding* his loss;" that is, his loss *notwithstanding*, or *not standing* in the way of it, he is still rich. From this resolution of the terms, more than from any specific rule, we may judge of their distinct applications, and clearly perceive that in such cases as those above cited the conjunctions *nevertheless* and *notwithstanding* could not be substituted for each other, nor *yet* for either: in other cases, *however*, where the objects are less definitely pointed out they may be used indifferently. "The Jesuits piqued themselves always upon their strict morality, and *yet* (*notwithstanding* or *nevertheless*) they admitted of many things not altogether consonant with moral principle: you know that

these are but tales, yet (*notwithstanding, nevertheless*) you believe them."

However, it is but just sometimes to give the world a representation of the bright side of human nature.—HUGHES.

He had not that reverence for the queen as might have been expected from a man of his wisdom and breeding; yet he was impertinently solicitous to know what her Majesty said of him in private.—CLARENDON.

There will always be something that we shall wish to have finished, and be nevertheless unwilling to begin.—JOHNSON.

Notwithstanding there is such infinite room between man and his Maker for the creative power to exert itself in, it is impossible that it should ever be filled up.—ADDISON.

Hue, *v.* Colour.

To Hug, *v.* To clasp.

Huge, *v.* Enormous.

Human, Humane.

Though both derived from *homo* a man, they are thus far distinguished that **Human** is said of the genus, and **Humane** of the species. The *human* race or *human* beings are opposed to the irrational part of the creation; a *humane* race or a *humane* individual is opposed to one that is cruel and fond of inflicting pain. He who is not *human* is divested of the first and distinguishing characteristics of his kind; he who is not *humane*, of the most important and elevated characteristic that belongs to his nature.

Christianity has rescued *human* nature from that ignominious yoke under which in former times the one half of mankind groined.—BLAIR.

Life, fill'd with grief's distressful train,
For ever asks the tear *humane*.—LANGHORNE.

Humanity, *v.* Benevolence.

To Humble, *v.* To abase.

Humble, Lowly, Low.

Humble (*v.* *Humble, modest*) is here compared with the other terms as it respects both persons and things. A person is said to be *humble* on account of the state of his mind: he is said to be **Lowly** and **Low** either on account of his mind or his outward circumstances. A *humble* person is so in his principles and in his conduct; a *lowly* person is so in the tone of his feelings, or in his station and walk of life; a *low* person is so either in his sentiments, in his actions, or in his rank and condition.

Humility should form a part of the character as it is opposed to arrogance and assumption; it is most consistent with the fallibility of our nature. *Lowliness* should form a part of our temper, as it is opposed to an aspiring and lofty mind; it is most consistent with the temper of our Saviour, who was meek and *lowly* of mind. The *humble* and *lowly* are always taken in a good sense: but the *low* either in a bad or an indifferent sense. A *lowly* man, whether as it respects his mind or his condition, is so without any moral debasement, but a man who is *low* in his condition is likewise conceived to be *low* in his habits and his sentiments, which is being near akin to the vicious. The same distinction is preserved in applying these terms to inanimate or spiritual objects. A *humble* roof, a *humble* office, a *humble* station, are associated with the highest moral worth: whilst a *low* office, a *low* situa-

tion, a *low* birth seem to exclude the idea of worth.

Sleep is a god too proud to wait in palaces,
And yet so *humble* too as not to scorn
The meanest country cottages.—COWLEY.

Where purple violets lurk
With all the *lowly* children of the shade.
THOMSON.

With reverence *low*,
And prostrate at his feet, the chiefs receive
His irreversible decrees.—SOMERVILLE.

Humble, Modest, Submissive.

Humble, in Latin *humilis* low, comes from *humus* the ground, which is the lowest position.

Modest, *v.* *Modest*.

Submissive, in Latin *submissus*, participle of *submitto*, signifies put under.

These terms designate a temper of mind the reverse of self-conceit or pride. The *humble* is so with regard to ourselves or others: *modesty* is that which respects ourselves only: *submissiveness* that which respects others. A man is *humble* from a sense of his comparative inferiority to others in point of station and outward circumstances; or he is *humble* from a sense of his imperfections, and a consciousness of not being what he ought to be: he is *modest* in as much as he sets but little value on his qualifications, acquisitions, and endowments. *Humility* is a painful sentiment: for when it respects others it is coupled with fear, when it respects our own unworthiness it is coupled with sorrow: *modesty* is a peaceful sentiment; it serves to keep the whole mind in due bounds.

When *humility* and *modesty* show themselves in the outward conduct, the former bows itself down, the latter shrinks: a *humble* man gives freely to others from a sense of their desert; a *modest* man demands nothing for himself, from an unconsciousness of desert in himself.

Between *humble* and *submissive* there is this prominent feature of distinction, that the former marks a temper of mind, the latter a mode of action: the former is therefore often the cause of the latter, but not so always: we may be *submissive* because we are *humble*; but we may likewise be *submissive* from fear, from interested motives, from necessity, from duty and the like; and on the other hand, we may be *humble* without being *submissive*, when we are not brought into connection with others. A man is *humble* in his closet when he takes a review of his sinfulness: he is *submissive* to a master whose displeasure he dreads.

As *humility* may display itself in the outward conduct, it approaches still nearer to *submissive* in application: hence we say a *humble* air, and a *submissive* air; the former to denote a man's sense of his own comparative littleness, the latter to indicate his readiness to submit to the will of another: a man therefore carries his *humble* air about with him to all his superiors, nay, indeed, to the world at large; but he puts on his *submissive* air only to the individual who has the power of controlling him. Upon the same principle, if I *humbly* ask a person's pardon, or *humbly* solicit any favour, I mean to express a sense of my own unworthi-

ness compared with the individual addressed : but when a counsellor *submissively* or with *submission* addresses a judge on the bench, it implies his willingness to *submit* to the decision of the bench ; or if a person *submissively* yields to the wishes of another, it is done with an air that bespeaks his readiness to conform his actions to a prescribed rule.

In God's holy house, I prostrate myself in the *humblest* and dectest way of genuflection I can imagine.—HOWEL.

Sedition itself is *modest* in the dawn, and only toleration may be petitioned where nothing less than empire is designed.—SOUTH.

And potent Rajahs, who themselves preside
O'er realms of wide extent ! But here *submissive*
Their homage pay ! alternate kings and slaves !
SOMERVILLE.

To Humble, Humiliate, Degrade.

Humble and Humiliate are both drawn from the same source (*v. Humble, modest*).

Degrade, v. To abase.

Humble is commonly used as the act either of persons or things : a person may *humble* himself or he may be *humbled* : *humiliate* is employed to characterize things ; a thing is *humiliating* or an *humiliation*. No man *humbles* himself by the acknowledgment of a fault ; but it is a great *humiliation* for a person to be dependent on another for a living when he has it in his power to obtain it for himself : to *humble* is to bring down to the ground : it supposes a certain eminence, either created by the mind or really existing in the outward circumstances : to *degrade* is to let down lower ; it supposes steps for ascending or descending. He who is most elevated in his own esteem may be most *humbled* : misfortunes may *humble* the proudest conqueror : he who is most elevated in the esteem of others may be the most *degraded* ; envy is ever on the alert to *degrade*. A lesson in the school of adversity is *humbling* to one who has known nothing but prosperity : terms of peace are *humiliating* ; low vices are peculiarly *degrading* to a man of rank.

Deep horror seizes ev'ry human breast,
Their pride is *humbled*, and their fear confess'd.
DRYDEN.

A long habit of *humiliation* does not seem a very good preparative to manly and vigorous sentiments.—BURKE.

Who but a tyrant (a name expressive of everything which can vitiate and *degrade* human nature) could think of seizing on the property of men unaccused and unheard.—BURKE.

To Humiliate, v. To humble.

Humour, v. Liquid.

Humour, Temper, Mood.

Humour literally signifies moisture or fluid, in which sense it is used for the fluids of the human body ; and as far as these *humours* or their particular state is connected with, or has its influence on, the animal spirits and the moral feelings, so far is *humour* applicable to moral agents.

Temper (*v. Disposition*) is less specific in its signification ; it may with equal propriety, under the changed form of temperament, be

applicable to the general state of the body or the mind.

Mood, which is but a change from *moods* of manner, has an original signification not less indefinite than the former ; it is applied, however, only to the mind. As the *humours* of the body are the most variable parts of the animal frame, *humour* in regard to the mind denotes but a partial and transitory state when compared with the *temper*, which is a general and habitual state. The *humour* is so fluctuating that it varies in the same mind perpetually ; but the *temper* is so far confined that it always shows itself to be the same whenever it shows itself at all : the *humour* makes a man different from himself ; the *temper* makes him different from others. Hence we speak of the *humour* of the moment ; of the *temper* of youth or of old age : so likewise we say, to accommodate one's self to the *humour* of a person ; to manage his *temper* : to put one into a certain *humour* : to correct or sour the *temper*. *Humour* is not less partial in its nature than in its duration ; it fixes itself often on only one object, or respects only one particular direction of the feelings : *temper* extends to all the actions and opinions as well as feelings of a man ; it gives a colouring to all he says, does, thinks, and feels. We may be in a *humour* for writing or reading ; for what is gay or what is serious ; for what is noisy or what is quiet : but our *temper* is discoverable in our daily conduct ; we may be in a good or ill *humour* in company, but in domestic life and in our closest relations we show whether we are good or ill *tempered*. A man shows his *humour* in different or trifling actions ; he shows his *temper* in the most important actions : it may be a man's *humour* to sit while others stand, or to go unshaven while others shave ; but he shows his *temper* as a Christian or otherwise in forgiving injuries or harbouring resentments ; in living peaceably, or indulging himself in contentions.

The same distinction is kept up between the terms when applied to bodies of men. A nation may have its *humour* and its *temper* as much as an individual : the former discovers itself in the manners and fashions ; the latter in its public spirit towards its government or other nations. It has been the unlucky *humour* of the present day to banish ceremony, and consequently decency, from all companies ; the *temper* of the times is somewhat more sober now than it was during the heat of the revolutionary mania.

Humour and *mood* agree in denoting a particular and temporary state of feeling ; but they differ in the cause : the former being attributable rather to the physical state of the body, and the latter to the moral frame of the mind : the former therefore is independent of all external circumstances, or at all events, of any that are reducible to system ; the latter is guided entirely by events, or the view which the mind takes of events. *Humour* is therefore generally taken in a bad sense, unless actually qualified by some epithet to the contrary : *mood* is always taken in an indifferent sense. There is no calculating on the *humour* of a man ; it depends upon his *mood* whether he performs ill or well : it is necessary to suppress *humour* in a child ; we discover by the melancholy *mood* of a man

that something distressing has happened to him.

True modesty is ashamed to do anything that is opposite to the *humour* of the company.—ADDISON.

There are three or four single men who suit my temper to a hair.—COWPER.

Strange as it may seem, the most ludicrous lines I ever wrote have been written in the saddest mood.—COWPER.

Humour, Caprice

Humour, v. Humour.

Caprice, v. Fantastical.

Humour is general; *caprice* is particular: *humour* may be good or bad; *caprice* is always taken in a bad sense. *Humour* is always independent of fixed principles; it is the feeling or impulse of the moment: *caprice* is always opposed to fixed principle, or rational motives of acting; it is the feeling of the individual setting at naught all rule, and defying all reason. The feeling only is perverted when the *humour* predominates; the judgment and will is perverted by *caprice*: a child shows its *humour* in fretfulness and impatience; a man betrays his *caprice* in his intercourse with others, in the management of his concerns, in the choice of his amusements.

Indulgence renders children and subordinate persons *humorsome*: prosperity or unlimited power is apt to render a man *capricious*: a *humorsome* person commonly objects to be pleased, or is easily displeased; a *capricious* person likes and dislikes, approves and disapproves the same thing in quick succession. *Humour*, when applied to things, has the sense of wit: whence the distinction between *humorsome* and *humorous*: the former implying the existence of *humour* or perverted feeling in the person: the latter implying the existence of *humour* or wit in the person or thing. *Caprice* is improperly applied to things to designate their total irregularity and planlessness of proceeding; as, in speaking of fashion, we notice its *caprice* when that which has been laid aside is again taken into use: diseases are termed *capricious* which act in direct opposition to all established rule.

You'll ask me, why I rather choose to have
A weight of carrion flesh than to receive
Three thousand ducats; I'll not answer that,
But say, it is my *humour*.—SHAKESPEARE.

Men will submit to any rule by which they may be exempted from the tyranny of *caprice* and chance.—JOHNSON.

Humour, v. Wit.

To Humour, v. To qualify.

Hunt, Chase.

The leading idea in the word **Hunt** is that of searching after; the leading idea in the word **Chase** is that of driving away, or before one. In a strict sense, *hunt* denotes a search for objects not within sight; *chase* is a pursuit after such objects only as are within sight: we may *hunt*, therefore, without *chasing*; we may *chase* without *hunting*: a person *hunts* after, but does not *chase* that which is lost: a boy *chases*, but does not *hunt* a butterfly. When applied to field sports, the *hunt* commences as soon as the huntsman begins to

look for the game; the *chase* commences as soon as it is found: on this ground, perhaps, it is, that *hunt* is used in familiar discourse to designate the specific act of taking this amusement; and *chase* is used only in particular cases where the peculiar idea is to be expressed: a fox *hunt*, or a stag *hunt*, is said to take place on a particular day; or that there has been no *hunting* this season, or that the *hunt* has been very bad: but we *speak*, on the other hand, of the pleasures of the *chase*: or that the *chase* lasted very long; the animal gave a long *chase*.

Come hither, boy! we'll *hunt* to-day
The bookworm, ravening beast of prey.—PARNELL.

Greatness of mind and fortune too
Th' Olympic trophies show;
Both their several parts must go
In the noble *chase* of fame.—COWLEY.

To Hurl, v. To cast.

Hurricane, v. Breeze.

To Hurry, v. To hasten.

Hurt, v. Injury.

Hurt, v. Sorry.

Hurtful, v. Disadvantage.

Hurtful, Pernicious, Noxious, Noisome.

Hurtful signifies full of *hurt*, or causing plenty of *hurt*.

Pernicious, v. Destructive.

Noxious and Noisome, from the Latin *noxius* and *noceo* to hurt, and the Italian *noioso*, signifies the same originally as *hurtful*.

Between *hurtful* and *pernicious* there is the same distinction as between *hurting* and *destroying*: that which is *hurtful* may *hurt* in various ways; but that which is *pernicious* necessarily tends to destruction: confinement is *hurtful* to the health: bad company is *pernicious* to the morals; or the doctrines of free-thinkers are *pernicious* to the well-being of society. *Noxious* and *noisome* are species of the *hurtful*: things may be *hurtful* both to body and mind; *noxious* and *noisome* only to the body: that which is *noxious* inflicts a direct injury; that which is *noisome* inflicts it indirectly: *noxious* insects are such as wound; *noisome* vapours are such as tend to create disorders: Ireland is said to be free from every *noxious* weed or animal; where filth is brought together, there will always be *noisome* smells.

The *hurtful* hazel in thy vineyard shun.—DRYDEN.

Of strength, *pernicious* to myself, I boast,
The powers I have were given me to my cost.
LEWIS.

The serpent, subtlest beast of all the field,
Of huge extent sometimes, with brazen eyes,
And hairy mane, terrific, though to thee
Not *noxious*, but obedient at thy call.—MILTON.

The only prison that enslaves the soul
As the dark habitation, where she dwells
Is in a *noisome* dungeon.—BELLER.

Husbandman, v. Farmer.

Husbandry, v. Cultivation.

Hypocrite, Dissembler.

Hypocrite, in Greek υποκριτης from υπο and κρινομαι, signifies one appearing under a mask.

Dissembler, from *dissemble*, in Latin *dis-simulo* or *dis* and *similis*, signifies one who makes himself appear unlike what he really is.

The *hypocrite* feigns to be what he is not; the *dissembler* conceals what he is: the former

takes to himself the credit of virtues which he has not; the latter conceals the vices that he has: every *hypocrite* is a *dissembler*; but every *dissembler* is not a *hypocrite*: the *hypocrite* makes truth serve the purpose of falsehood; the *dissembler* is content with making falsehood serve his own particular purpose.

In regard to others, *hypocrisy* is not so pernicious as barefaced irreligion.—ADDISON.

So spake the false *dissembler* unperceived.—MILTON.

I.

Idea, Thought, Imagination.

Idea, in Latin *idea*, Greek *eidea*, signifies the form or image of an object, from *ειδω* to see, that is, the thing seen in the mind.

Thought literally signifies the thing thought.

Imagination signifies the thing imagined.

The *idea* is the simple representation of an object; the *thought* is the reflection; and the *imagination* is the combination of *ideas*: we have *ideas* of the sun, the moon, and all material objects; we have *thoughts* on moral subjects; we have *imaginings* drawn from the *ideas* already existing in the mind. *Ideas* are formed; they are the rude materials with which the *thinking* faculty exerts itself: *thoughts* arise in the mind by means of association, or recur in the mind by the power of the memory; they are the materials with which the *thinking* faculty employs itself: *imaginings* are created by the mind's re-action on itself; they are the materials with which the understanding seeks to enrich itself.

The word *idea* is not only the most general in sense, but the most universal in application; *thought* and *imagination* are peculiar terms used only in connection with the agent *thinking* or *imagining*. All these words have therefore a distinct office, in which they cannot properly be confounded with each other. *Idea* is used in all cases for the mental representation, abstractedly from the agent that represents them: hence *ideas* are either clear or distinct; *ideas* are attached to words; *ideas* are analysed, confounded, and the like; in which cases the word *thought* could not be substituted. *Thought* belongs only to thinking and rational beings: the brutes may be said to have *ideas*, but not *thoughts*: hence *thoughts* are either mean, fine, grovelling, or sublime, according to the nature of the mind in which they exist: hence we say with more propriety, to indulge a *thought* than to indulge an *idea*; to express one's *thoughts*, rather than one's *ideas*, on any subject: although the latter term *idea*, on account of its comprehensive use, may without violation of any express rule be indifferently employed in general discourse for *thought*; but the former term does not on this account lose its characteristic meaning.

Imagination is not only the fruit of *thought*, but of peculiar *thought*: the *thought* may be another's; the *imagination* is one's own; the *thought* occurs and recurs; it comes and it goes; it is retained or rejected at the pleasure of the *thinking* being: the *imagination* is framed by special desire; it is cherished with the partiality of a parent for its offspring. *Thoughts* are busied with the surrounding objects; *imaginings* are employed on distant and strange objects: hence *thoughts* are denominated sober, chaste, and the like; *imaginings*, wild and extravagant. *Thoughts* engage the mind as circumstances give rise to them; they are always supposed to have a foundation in something: *imaginings*, on the other hand, are often the mere fruit of a disordered brain; they are always regarded as unsubstantial, if not unreal; they frequently owe their origin to the suggestions of the appetites and passions; whence they are termed the *imaginings* of the heart.

Every one finds that many of the *ideas* which he desired to retain have slipped away irretrievably.—JOHNSON.

O calm
The warring passions, and tumultuous *thoughts*
That rage within thee!—ROWE.

Different climates produce in men by a different mixture of the humours a different and unequal course of *imaginings* and passions.—TEMPLE.

Idea, v. *Perception*.

Ideal, Imaginary.

Ideal does not strictly adhere to the sense of its primitive *idea* (v. *Idea*): the *idea* is the representation of a real object in the mind; but *ideal* signifies belonging to the *idea* independently of the reality or the external object. **Imaginary** preserves the signification of its primitive *imagination* (v. *Fancy*, also v. *Idea*), as denoting what is created by the mind itself.

The *ideal* is not directly opposed to, but abstracted from, the real; the *imaginary*, on the other hand, is directly opposed to the real; it is the unreal thing formed by the *imagination*. *Ideal* happiness is the happiness which is formed in the mind, without having any direct and actual prototype in nature; but it may, nevertheless, be something possible to be

realised ; it may be above nature, but not in direct contradiction to it: the *imaginary* is that which is opposite to some positive existing reality; the pleasure which a lunatic derives from the conceit of being a king is altogether *imaginary*.

There is not, perhaps, in all the stores of *ideal* anguish a thought more painful than the consciousness of having propagated corruption.—JOHNSON.

Superior beings know well the vanity of those *imaginary* perfections that swell the heart of man.—ADDISON.

Idiom, *v. Language*.

Idiot, *v. Fool*.

Idle, Lazy, Indolent.

Idle is in German *etel* vain.

Lazy, in German *lässig*, comes from the Latin *lassus* weary, because weariness naturally engenders *laziness*.

Indolent, in Latin *indolens*, signifies without feeling, having apathy or unconcern.

A propensity to inaction is the common idea by which these words are connected; they differ in the cause and degree of the quality: *idle* expresses less than *lazy*, and *lazy* less than *indolent*: one is termed *idle* who will do nothing useful; one is *lazy* who will do nothing at all without great reluctance; one is *indolent* who does not care to do anything or set about anything. There is no direct inaction in the *idler*; for a child is *idle* who will not learn his lesson, but he is active enough in that which pleases himself: there is an aversion to corporeal action in a *lazy* man, but not always to mental action; he is *lazy* at work, *lazy* in walking, or *lazy* in sitting; but he may not object to any employment, such as reading or thinking, which leaves his body entirely at rest: an *indolent* man, on the contrary, fails in activity from a defect both in the mind and the body; he will not only not move, but he will not even think, if it give him trouble; and trifling exertions of any kind are sufficient, even in prospect, to deter him from attempting to move.

Idleness is common to the young and the thoughtless, to such as have not steadiness of mind to set a value on anything which may be acquired by exertion and regular employment; the *idle* man is opposed to one that is diligent: *laziness* is frequent among those who are compelled to work for others; it is a habit of body superinduced upon one's condition; those who should labour are often the most unwilling to move at all, and since the spring of the mind which should impel them to action is wanting, and as they are continually under the necessity of moving at the will of another, they acquire an habitual reluctance to any motion, and find their comfort in entire inaction: hence *laziness* is almost confined to servants and the labouring classes; *laziness* is opposed to industry: *indolence* is a physical property of the mind, a want of motive or purpose to action: the *indolent* man is not so fond of his bodily ease as the *lazy* man, but he shrinks from every species of exertion still more than the latter; *indolence* is a disease most observable in the higher classes, and even in persons of the highest intellectual endowments, in whom there should

be the most powerful motives to exertion; the *indolent* stands in direct opposition to nothing but the general term active.

The life of a common player is most apt to breed an habitual *idleness*; as they have no serious employment to occupy their hands or their heads, they grow averse to everything which would require the exercise of either: the life of a common soldier is apt to breed *laziness*; he who can sit or lie for twenty hours out of the twenty-four will soon acquire a disgust to any kind of labour, unless he be naturally of an active turn; the life of a rich man is most favourable to *indolence*; he who has everything provided at his hand, not only for the necessities, but the comforts of life, may soon become averse to everything that wears the face of exertion; he may become *indolent*, if he be not unfortunately so by nature.

As pride is sometimes hid under humility, *idleness* is often covered by turbulence and hurry.—JOHNSON.

The daw,
The rook, and magpie, to the grey-grown oaks,
That the calm village in their verdant arms
Sheltering embrace, direct their *lazy* flight.

THOMSON.

Nothing is so opposite to the true enjoyment of life as the relaxed and feeble state of an *indolent* mind.—BLAIR.

Idle, Leisure, Vacant.

Idle, *v. Idle*.

Leisure, otherwise spelt *leasure*, comes from *lease*, as in the compound *release*, and the Latin *laxo* to make lax or loose, that is, loosed or set free.

Vacant, *v. Free*.

Idle is opposed here to the busy; *leisure* simply to the employed: he therefore who is *idle*, instead of being busy, commits a fault; which is not always the case with him who is at *leisure* or free from his employment. *Idle* is always taken in a sense more or less unfavourable; *leisure* in a sense perfectly indifferent; if a man says of himself that he has spent an *idle* hour in this or that place, in amusement, company, and the like, he means to signify he would have spent it better if anything had offered; on the other hand, he would say that he spends his *leisure* moments in a suitable relaxation: he who values his time will take care to have as few *idle* hours as possible; but since no one can always be employed in severe labour, he will occupy his *leisure* hours in that which best suits his taste.

Idle and *leisure* are said in particular reference to the time that is employed; *vacant* is a more general term, that simply qualifies the thing: an *idle* hour is one without any proper employment; a *vacant* hour is in general one free from the employments with which it might be filled up; a person has *leisure* time according to his wishes; but he may have *vacant* time from necessity, that is, when he is in want of employment.

Life is sustained with so little labour that the tediousness of *idle* time cannot otherwise be supported (than by artificial desires).—JOHNSON.

) The plant that shoots from seed, a sullen tree
At *leisure* grows, for late posterity.—DRYDEN.

Idleness dictates expedients by which life may be passed unprofitably, without the tediousness of many *vacant* hours.—JOHNSON.

Idle, Vain.

Idle, *v. Idle, lazy.*

Vain, in Latin *vanus*, probably changed from *vacaneus*, signifies empty.

These epithets are both opposed to the solid or substantial; but *idle* has a more particular reference to what ought or ought not to engage the time or attention; *vain* seems to qualify the thing without any such reference. A pursuit may be termed either *idle* or *vain*: in the former case, it reflects immediately on the agent for not employing his time on something more serious; but in the latter case, it simply characterizes the pursuit as one that will be attended with no good consequences; when we consider ourselves as beings who have but a short time to live, and that every moment of that time ought to be thoroughly well-spent, we should be careful to avoid all *idle* concerns; when we consider ourselves as rational beings, who are responsible for the use of those powers with which we have been invested by our Almighty Maker, we shall be careful to reject all *vain* concerns: an *idle* effort is made by one who does not care to exert himself for any useful purpose, who works only to please himself; a *vain* effort may be made by one who is in a state of desperation.

And let no spot of *idle* earth be found,

But cultivate the genius of the ground.—DRYDEN.

Deluded by *vain* opinions, we look to the advantages of fortune as our ultimate goods.—BLAIR.

Ignominy, *v. Infamy.*

Ignorant, Illiterate, Unlearned, Unlettered.

Ignorant, in Latin *ignorans*, from the privative *ig* or *in* and *noro*, or the Greek *ἴgnorō*, signifies not knowing things in general, or not knowing any particular circumstance.

Unlearned, Illiterate, and Unlettered, are compared with *ignorant* in the general sense.

Ignorant is a comprehensive term; it includes any degree from the highest to the lowest, and consequently includes the other terms, *illiterate*, *unlearned*, and *unlettered*, which express different forms of ignorance. *Ignorance* is not always to one's disgrace, since it is not always one's fault; the term is not therefore directly reproachful: the poor ignorant savage is an object of pity rather than condemnation; but when *ignorance* is coupled with self-conceit and presumption, it is a perfect deformity: hence the word *illiterate*, which is used only in such cases has become a term of reproach: an ignorant man who sets up to teach others is termed an *illiterate* preacher; and quacks, whether in religion or medicine, from the very nature of their calling, are altogether an *illiterate* race of men. The words *unlearned* and *unlettered* are disengaged from any unfavourable associations. A modest man, who makes no pretensions to learning, may suitably apologize for his supposed deficiencies by saying he is an *unlearned* or *unlettered* man; the former is, however, a

term of more familiar use than the latter. A man may be described either as generally *unlearned* or as *unlearned* in particular sciences or arts; as *unlearned* in history; *unlearned* in philosophy; *unlearned* in the ways of the world: a poet may describe his muse as *unlettered*.

He said, and sent Cyllenius with command

To free the ports, and ope the Punic land

To Trojan guests; lest, *ignorant* of fate,

The queen might force them from her town and state.

—DRYDEN.

Because this doctrine may have appeared to the *unlearned* light and whimsical, I must take leave to unfold the wisdom and antiquity of my first proposition in these my essays, to wit, that "every worthless man is a dead man."—ADDISON.

Ajax, the haughty chief, the *unlettered* soldier, had no way of making his anger known but by gloomy sullenness.—JOHNSON.

Ill, *v. Badly.*

Illness, *v. Sickness.*

Illiterate, *v. Ignorant.*

To Illuminate, Illumine, Enlighten.

Illuminate, in Latin *illuminatus*, participle of *illuminare*, and **Enlighten**, from the noun *light*, both denote the communication of light; the former in the natural, the latter in the moral sense. We *illuminate* by means of artificial lights; the sun *illuminates* the world by its own light: preaching and instruction *enlighten* the minds of men. *Illumine* is but a poetic variation of *illuminate*; as, the Sun of Righteousness *illuminated* the benighted world: *illuminations* are employed as public demonstrations of joy: no nation is now termed *enlightened* but such as have received the light of the Gospel.

Reason our guide, what can she more reply,

Thou that the sun *illuminates* the sky?—PRIOR.

But if neither you nor I can gather so much from these places, they will tell us it is because we are not inwardly *enlightened*.—SOUTH.

What in me is dark

Illumine; what is low, raise and support.—MILTON.

To *Illumine*, *v. To illuminate.*

To *Illustrate*, *v. To explain.*

Illustrious, *v. Distinguished.*

Illustrious, *v. Famous.*

Ill Will, *v. Hatred.*

Image, *v. Likeness.*

Imaginary, *v. Ideal.*

Imagination, *v. Fancy.*

Imagination, *v. Idea.*

To *Imagine*, *v. To conceive.*

To *Imagine*, *v. To think.*

Imbecility, *v. Debility.*

To *Imitate*, *v. To follow.*

To *Imitate*, *Copy, Counterfeit.*

To *Imitate*, *v. To follow.*

Copy, *v. Copy.*

Counterfeit, from the Latin *contra* and *facio*, signifies to make in opposition to the reality.

The idea of taking a likeness of some object is common to all these terms; but *imitate* is the generic; *copy* and *counterfeit* the specific terms: to *imitate* is to take a general likeness; to *copy*, to take an exact likeness; to *counterfeit*, to take a false likeness: to *imitate* is, therefore, almost always used in a good or an indifferent sense; to *copy* mostly, and to *counterfeit* always, in a bad sense; to *imitate* an author's style is at all times allowable for one who cannot form a style for himself; but to *copy* an author's style would be a too slavish adherence even for the dullest writer. To *imitate* is applicable to every object, for every external object is susceptible of *imitation*; and in man the *imitative* faculty displays itself alike in the highest and the lowest matters, in works of art and moral conduct; to *copy* is applicable only to certain objects which will admit of a minute likeness being taken; thus, an artist may be said to *copy* from nature, which is almost the only circumstance in which *copying* is justifiable, except when it is a mere manual act; to *copy* anything in others, whether it be their voice, their manners, their language, or their works, is inconsistent with the independence which belongs to every rational agent: to *counterfeit* is applicable but to few objects, and happily practicable but in few cases; we may *counterfeit* coin, or we may *counterfeit* the person, the character, the voice, or the hand-writing, of any one for whom we would wish to pass; but if the likeness be not very exact, the falsehood is easily detected.

Poetry and music have the power of *imitating* the manners of men.—SIR WM. JONES.

The mind, impassible and soft, with ease
Imbibes and copies what she hears and sees.
COWPER.

I can *counterfeit* the deep tragedian,
Speak and look big, and pry on every side.
SHAKESPEARE.

To Imitate, Mimick, Mock, Ape.

Imitate, v. To follow.

Mimick, from the Greek *μιμος*, has the same origin as *imitate*.

Mock, in French *moquer*, Greek *μωκω* to laugh at.

To *Ape* signifies to *imitate* like an *ape*.

To *imitate* is here the general term: to *mimic* and to *ape* are both species of vicious *imitation*.

One *imitates* that which is deserving of *imitation*, or the contrary: one *mimicks* either that which is not an authorized subject of *imitation* or which is imitated so as to excite laughter. A person wishes to make that his own which he *imitates*, but he *mimicks* for the entertainment of others.

The force of example is illustrated by the readiness with which people *imitate* each other's actions when they are in close intercourse: the trick of *mimickry* is sometimes carried to such an extravagant pitch that no man, however sacred his character, or exalted his virtue, can screen himself from being the object of this species of buffoonery; to *ape* is a serious though an absurd act of *imitation*; to *mimick* is a jocular act of *imitation*; to *mock* is an ill-natured and vulgar act of *imitation*. The *ape imitates* to please himself, but the *mimic imitates* to please others. The *ape seri-*

ously tries to come as near the original as he can; the *mimic* tries to render the *imitation* as ridiculous as possible: the former *apes* out of deference to the person *aped*; the latter *mimicks* out of contempt or disregard.

Mimickry belongs to the merry-andrew or buffoon; *aping* to the weakling who has no originality in himself. Show-people display their talents in *mimicking* the cries of birds or beasts, for the entertainment of the gaping crowd; weak and vain people, who wish to be admired for that which they have not in themselves, *ape* the dress, the manners, the voice, the mode of speech, and the like, of some one who is above them. *Mimickry* excites laughter from that which is burlesque in it; *aping* excites laughter from that which is absurd and unsuitable in it; *mockery* excites laughter from the malicious temper of those who enjoy it.

Because we sometimes walk on two!
I hate the *imitating* crew.—GAY.

Nor will it less delight th' attentive sage
To observe that instinct which unerring guides
The brutal race which *mimicks* reason's love.
SOMERVILLE.

A courtier any *ape* surpasses;
Behold him humbly cringing wait
Upon the minister of state,
View him soon after to inferiors
Aping the conduct of superiors.—SWIFT.

Immaterial, v. Incorporeal.

Immaterial, v. Unimportant.

Immediately, v. Directly.

Immense, v. Enormous.

Imminent, Impending, Threatening.

Imminent, in Latin *imminens*, from *maneo* to remain, signifies resting or coming upon.

Impending, from the Latin *pendeo* to hang, signifies hanging.

Threatening is used in the sense of the verb to threaten.

All these terms are used in regard to some evil that is exceedingly near: *imminent* conveys no idea of duration; *impending* excludes the idea of what is momentary. A person may be in *imminent* danger of losing his life in one instant, and the danger may be over the next instant: but an *impending* danger is that which has been long in existence, and gradually approaching; we can seldom escape *imminent* danger by any efforts of one's own; but we may be successfully warned to escape from an *impending* danger. *Imminent* and *impending* are said of dangers that are not discoverable; but a *threatening* evil gives intimations of its own approach; we perceive the *threatening* tempest in the blackness of the sky; we hear the *threatening* sounds of the enemy's clashing swords.

The *threatening* voice and fierce gestures with which these words were uttered struck Montezuma. He saw his own danger was *imminent*, the necessity unavoidable.
—ROBERTSON.

There was an opinion, if we may believe the Spanish historians, almost universal among the Americans, that some dreadful calamity was *impending* over their heads.
—ROBERTSON.

Immoderate, v. Excessive.

Immodest, v. Indecent.

Immodest, Impudent, Shameless.

Immodest signifies the want of *modesty*: **Impudent** and **Shameless** signify without *shame*.

Immodest is less than either *impudent* or *shameless*: an *immodest* girl lays aside the ornament of her sex, and puts on another garb that is less becoming; but her heart need not be corrupt until she becomes *impudent*: she wants a good quality when she is *immodest*; she is possessed of a positively bad quality when she is *impudent*. There is always hope that an *immodest* woman may be sensible of her error, and amend; but of an *impudent* woman there is no such chance, she is radically corrupt.

Impudent may characterize the person or the thing: *shameless* characterizes the person. A person's air, look, and words are *impudent* when contrary to all modesty: the person himself is *shameless* who is devoid of all sense of *shame*.

Musie diffuses a calm all around us, and makes us drop all those *immodest* thoughts which would be an hindrance to us in the performance of the great duty of thanksgiving.—SPECTATOR.

I am at once equally fearful of sparing you and of being too *impudent* a corrector.—POPE.

The sole remorse his greedy heart can feel,
Is if one life escapes his murdering steel;
Shameless by force or fraud to work his way,
And no less prompt to flatter than betray.

CUMBERLAND.

To Impair, Injure.

Impair comes from the Latin *im* and *pejoro* or *pejor* worse, signifying to make worse.

Injure, from *in* and *jus* against right, signifies to make otherwise than it ought to be.

Impair seems to be in regard to *injure* as the species to the genus; what is *impaired* is *injured*, but what is *injured* is not necessarily *impaired*. To *impair* is a progressive mode of *injuring*: an *injury* may take place either by degrees or by an instantaneous act: straining of the eyes *impairs* the sight, but a blow *injures* rather than *impairs* the eye. A man's health may be *impaired* or *injured* by his vices, but his limbs are *injured* rather than *impaired* by a fall. A person's circumstances are *impaired* by a succession of misfortunes; they are *injured* by a sudden turn of fortune.

It is painful to consider that this sublime enjoyment of friendship may be *impaired* by innumerable causes.—JOHNSON.

Who lives to nature rarely can be poor,
O what a patrimony this! a being
Of such inherent strength and majesty,
Not words possess can raise it; worlds destroy'd can't
injure.—YOUNG.

To Impart, v. *To communicate.*

Impassable, v. *Impervious.*

To Impeach, v. *To accuse.*

To Impede, v. *To hinder.*

Impediment, v. *Difficulty*

To Impel, v. *To actuate.*

To Impel, v. *To encourage,*

Impending, v. *Imminent.*

Imperative, v. *Commanding*

Imperfection, Defect, Fault, Vice.

Imperfection denotes either the abstract quality of *imperfect*, or the thing which constitutes it *imperfect*.

Defect, v. *Blemish.*

Fault, v. *Fault.*

Vice, v. *Crime.*

These terms are applied either to persons or things. An *imperfection* in a person arises from his want of *perfection*, and the infirmity of his nature; there is no one without some point of *imperfection* which is obvious to others, if not to himself: he may strive to diminish it, although he cannot expect to get altogether rid of it: a *defect* is a deviation from the general constitution of man; it is what may be natural to the man as an individual, but not natural to man as a species; in this manner we may speak of a *defect* in the speech, or a *defect* in temper. The *fault* and *vice* rise in degree and character above either of the former terms; they both reflect disgrace more or less on the person possessing them; but the *fault* always characterizes the agent, and is said in relation to an individual; the *vice* characterizes the action, and may be considered abstractedly: hence we speak of a man's *faults* as the things we may condemn in him; but we may speak of the *vices* of drunkenness, lying, and the like, without any immediate reference to any one who practises these *vices*. When they are both employed for an individual, their distinction is obvious: the *fault* may lessen the amiability or excellence of the character; the *vice* is a stain; a single act destroys its purity, an habitual practice is a pollution.

In regard to things the distinction depends upon the preceding explanation in a great measure, for we can scarcely use these words without thinking on man as a moral agent, who was made the most perfect of all creatures, and became the most *imperfect*; and from our *imperfection* has arisen, also, a general *imperfection* throughout all the works of creation. The word *imperfection* is therefore the most unqualified term of all: there may be *imperfection* in regard to our Maker; or there may be *imperfection* in regard to what we conceive of *perfection*: and in this case, the term simply and generally implies whatever falls short in any degree or manner of *perfection*. *Defect* is a positive degree of *imperfection*; it is contrary both to our ideas of *perfection* or our particular intention: thus, there may be a *defect* in the materials of which a thing is made; or a *defect* in the mode of making it: the term *defect*, however, whether said of persons or things, characterizes rather the object than the agent. *Fault*, on the other hand, when said of things, always refers to the agent: thus we may say there is a *defect* in the glass, or a *defect* in the spring; but there is a *fault* in the workmanship, or a *fault* in the putting together, and the like. *Vice*, with regard to things, is properly a serious or radical *defect*: the former lies in the

constitution of the whole, the latter may lie in the parts ; the former lies in essentials, the latter lies in the accidents : there may be a defect in the shape or make of a horse ; but the vice is said in regard to his soundness or unsoundness, his docility or indocility.

It is a pleasant story that we forsooth who are the only imperfect creatures in the universe are the only beings that will not allow of *imperfection*.—STEELE.

The low race of men take a secret pleasure in finding an eminent character levelled to their condition by a report of its defects, and keep themselves in countenance, though they are excelled in a thousand virtues, if they believe that they have in common with a great person any one fault.—ADDISON.

I did myself the honour this day to make a visit to a lady of quality, who is one of those that are ever railing at the vices of the age.—STEELE.

Imperfection, Weakness, Frailty, Failing, Foible.

Imperfection (v. *Imperfection*) has already been considered as that which in the most extended sense abridges the moral perfection of man ; the rest are but modes of *imperfection* varying in degree and circumstances. **Weakness** is a positive and strong degree of *imperfection* which is opposed to strength ; it is what we do not so necessarily look for, and therefore distinguishes the individual who is liable to it. **Frailty** is another strong mode of *imperfection* which characterizes the fragility of man, but not of all men ; it differs from *weakness* in respect to the object. A *weakness* lies more in the judgement or in the sentiment ; *frailty* lies more in the moral features of an action. It is a *weakness* in a man to yield to the persuasions of any one against his better judgement ; it is a *frailty* to yield to intemperance or illicit indulgences. **Failings and Foibles** are the smallest degrees of *imperfection* to which the human character is liable : we have all our *failings* in temper, and our *foibles* in our habits and our prepossessions ; and he, as Horace observes, is the best who has the fewest. For our *imperfections* we must seek superior aid : we must be most on our guard against those *weaknesses* to which the softness or susceptibility of our minds may most expose us, and against those *frailties* into which the violence of our evil passions may bring us : towards the *failings* and *foibles* of others we may be indulgent, but should be ambitious to correct them in ourselves.

You live in a reign of human infirmity where every one has *imperfections*.—BLAIR.

The folly of allowing ourselves to delay what we know cannot finally be escaped is one of the general *weaknesses* which, to a greater or less degree, prevail in every mind.—JOHNSON.

There are circumstances which every man must know will prove the occasions of calling forth his latent *frailties*.—BLAIR.

Never allow small *failings* to dwell on your attention so much as to deface the whole of an amiable character.—BLAIR.

Imperious, v. Commanding.

Imperious, Lordly, Domineering, Overbearing.

All these epithets imply an unseemly exercise or affectation of power or superiority,

Imperious, from *impero* to command, characterizes either the disposition to command without adequate authority, or to convey one's commands in an offensive manner : **Lordly**, signifying like a *lord*, characterizes the manner of acting the *lord* ; and **Domineering**, from *dominus* a *lord*, denotes the manner of ruling like a *lord*, or rather of attempting to rule : hence a person's temper or his tone is denominated *imperious* ; his air or deportment is *lordly* ; his tone is *domineering*. A woman of an *imperious* temper commands in order to be obeyed ; she commands with an *imperious* tone in order to enforce obedience. A person assumes a *lordly* air in order to display his own importance : he gives orders in a *domineering* tone in order to make others feel their inferiority. There is always something offensive in *imperiousness* ; there is frequently something ludicrous in that which is *lordly* : and a mixture of the ludicrous and offensive in that which is *domineering* : the *lordly* is an affectation of grandeur where there are the fewest pretensions ; and the *domineering* is an affectation of authority where it least exists : *lordly* is applied even to the brutes who set themselves up above those of their kind ; *domineering* is applied to servants and ignorant people, who have the opportunity, of commanding without knowing how to command. A turkey cock struts about the yard in a *lordly* style : an upper servant *domineers* over all that are under him.

The first three of these terms are employed for such as are invested with some sort of power, or endowed with some sort of superiority, however trifling ; but **Overbearing** is employed for men in the general relations of society, whether superiors or equals. A man of an *imperious* temper and some talent will frequently be so *overbearing* in the assemblies of his equals as to awe the rest into silence, and carry every measure of his own without contradiction. As the petty airs of superiority here described are most common among the uncultivated part of mankind, we may say that the *imperious* temper shows itself peculiarly in the domestic circle ; that the *lordly* air shows itself in public ; that the *domineering* tone is most remarkable in the kitchen ; and the *overbearing* behaviour in villages.

I reflected within myself how much society would suffer if such insolent *overbearing* characters as Leontine were not held in restraint.—CUMBERLAND.

Thy willing victim, Carthage, bursting loose
From all that pleading nature could oppose ;
From a whole city's tears, by rigid faith
Imperious call'd, and honour's dire command.

THOMSON.

He who has sunk so far below himself as to have given up his assent to a *domineering* error is fit for nothing but to be trampled on.—SOUTH.

Impertinent, Rude, Saucy, Impudent, Insolent.

Impertinent, in Latin *in* and *pertinens* not belonging to one, signifies being or wanting to do what it does not belong to one to be or do.

Rude, in Latin *rudus* rude, and *raudus* a ragged stone, in the Greek *παῖος* a rough

stick, signifies literally unpolished; and in an extended sense, wanting all culture.

Saucy comes from *saucé*, and the Latin *salsus*, signifying literally salt; and in an extended sense, stinging like salt.

Impudent, *v. Assurance*.

Insolent, from the Latin *in* and *solens*, contrary to custom, signifies being or wanting to be contrary to custom.

Impertinent is allied to *rude*, as respects one's general relations in society, without regard to station; it is allied to *saucy*, *impudent*, and *insolent* as respects the conduct of inferiors.

He who does not respect the laws of civil society in his intercourse with individuals, and wants to assume to himself what belongs to another, is *impertinent*: if he carry this *impertinence* so far as to commit any violent breach of decorum in his behaviour, he is *rude*. *Impertinence* seems to spring from a too high regard of one's self: *rudeness* from an ignorance of what is due to others. An *impertinent* man will ask questions for the mere gratification of curiosity; a *rude* man will stare in one's face in order to please himself. An *impertinent* man will take possession of the best seat without regard to the right or convenience of another: a *rude* man will burst into the room of another, or push against his person, in violation of all ceremony.

Impertinent, in comparison with the other terms, *saucy*, *impudent*, and *insolent*, is the most general and indefinite: whatever one does or says that is not compatible with our humble station is *impertinent*, *saucy* is a sharp kind of *impertinence*: *impudent* an unblushing kind of *impertinence*; *insolence* is an outrageous kind of *impertinence*, it runs counter to all established order: thus, the terms seem to rise in sense. A person may be *impertinent* in words or actions: he is *saucy* in words or looks: he is *impudent* or *insolent* in words, tones, gesture, looks, and every species of action. A person's *impertinence* discovers itself in not giving the respect which is due to his superiors in general, strangers, or otherwise; as when a common person sits down in the presence of a man of rank: *sauciness* discovers itself towards particular individuals, in certain relations; as in the case of servants who are *saucy* to their masters, or children who are *saucy* to their teachers: *impudence* and *insolence* are the strongest degrees of *impertinence*; but the former is more particularly said of such things as reflect disgrace upon the offender, and spring from a low depravity of mind, such as the abuse of one's superiors, and a vulgar defiance of those to whom one owes obedience and respect: *insolence*, on the contrary, originates from a haughtiness of spirit, and a misplaced pride, which breaks out into a contemptuous disregard of the station of those by whom one is offended; as in the case of a servant who should offer to strike his master, or of a criminal who sets a magistrate at defiance.

Self-conceit is the grand source of *impertinence*, it makes persons forget themselves; the young thereby forget their youth; the servant forgets his relationship to his master; the poor and ignorant man forgets the distance between himself and those who are elevated

by education, rank, power, or wealth: *impertinent* persons, therefore, act towards their equals as if they were inferiors, and towards their superiors as if they were their equals: an angry pride that is offended with reproof commonly provokes *sauciness*: an insensibility to shame, or an unconsciousness of what is honourable either in one's-self or others, gives birth to *impudence*: uncontrolled passions and bloated pride are the ordinary stimulants to *insolence*.

It is publicly whispered as a piece of *impertinent* pride in me, that I have hitherto been *saucily* civil to everybody, as if I thought nobody good enough to quarrel with.—LADY M. W. MONTAGU.

My house should no such *rude* disorders know
As from high drinking consequently flow. PONTRE.

Whether he knew the thing or no,
His tongue eternally would go;
For he had *impudence* at will.—GAY.

He claims the bull with lawless *insolence*,
And having seiz'd his horns, accosts the prince. DRYDEN.

Impervious, Impassable, Inaccessible.

Impervious, from the Latin *in*, *per*, and *via*, signifies not having a way through; **Impassable**, not to be passed through; **Inaccessible**, not to be approached. A wood is *impervious* when the trees, branches, and leaves are entangled to such a degree as to admit of no passage at all: a river is *impassable* that is so deep that it cannot be forded: a rock or a mountain is *inaccessible* the summit of which is not to be reached by any path whatever. What is *impervious* is for a permanency; what is *impassable* is commonly so only for a time: roads are frequently *impassable* in the winter that are *passable* in the summer, while a thicket is *impervious* during the whole of the year: *impassable* is likewise said only of that which is to be passed by living creatures, but *impervious* may be extended to inanimate objects; a wood may be *impervious* to the rays of the sun.

The monster, Cacus, more than half a beast,
This hold *impervious* to the sun possessed. DRYDEN.

But lest the difficulty of passing back
Stay his return perhaps over this gulf,
Impassable, impervious, let us try
Adventurous work.—MILTON.

At least our envious foe hath fail'd who thought
All like himself rebellious, by whose aid
This *inaccessible* high strength, the seat
Of Deity Supreme, we dispos'd of.
He trusted to have seiz'd.—MILTON.

Impetuous, *v. Violent*.

Impious, *v. Irreligious*.

Implacable, Unrelenting, Relentless, Inexorable.

Implacable, unappeasable, signifies not to be allayed nor softened.

Unrelenting or **Relentless**, from the Latin *lenio* to soften, or to make pliant, signifies not rendered soft.

Inexorable, from *oro* to pray, signifies not to be turned by prayers.

Inflexibility is the idea expressed in common by these terms, but they differ in the causes and circumstance with which it is attended.

Animosities are *implacable* when no misery which we occasion can diminish their force, and no concessions on the part of the offender can lessen the spirit of revenge: the mind or character of a man is *unrelenting* when it is not to be turned from its purpose by a view of the pain which it inflicts: a man is *inexorable* who turns a deaf ear to every solicitation or entreaty that is made to induce him to lessen the rigour of his sentence. A man's angry passions render him *implacable*; it is not the magnitude of the offence, but the temper of the offended that is here in question; by *implacability* he is rendered insensible to the misery he occasions, and to every satisfaction which the offender may offer him: fixedness of purpose renders a man *unrelenting* or *relentless*; an *unrelenting* temper is not less callous to the misery produced than an *implacable* temper; but it is not grounded always on resentment for personal injuries, but sometimes on a certain principle of right and a sense of necessity: the *inexorable* man adheres to his rule, as the *unrelenting* man does to his purpose; the former is insensible to any workings of his heart which might shake his purpose, the latter turns a deaf ear to all the solicitations of others which would go to alter his decrees: savages are mostly *implacable* in their animosities; Titus Manlius Torquatus displayed an instance of *unrelenting* severity towards his son; Minos, Æacus, and Rhadamanthus were the *inexorable* judges of hell.

Implacable and *unrelenting* are said only of animate beings in whom is wanting an ordinary portion of the tender affections; *inexorable* may be improperly applied to inanimate objects; justice and death are both represented as *inexorable*.

Implacable as the enmity of the Mexicans was, they were so unacquainted with the science of war that they knew not how to take the proper measures for the destruction of the Spaniards.—ROBERTSON.

These are the realms of *unrelenting* fate.—DRYDEN.

Acca, 'tis past, he swims before my sight,
Inexorable death, and claims his right.—DRYDEN.

To Implant, Ingraft, Inculcate, Instil, Infuse.

To *plant* is properly to fix plants in the ground; to *implant* is, in the improper sense, to fix principles in the mind. *Graft* is to make one plant grow on the stock of another; to *ingraft* is to make particular principles flourish in the mind, and form a part of the character. *Calco* is in Latin to tread; and *Inculcate*, to stamp into the mind. *Stillo*, in Latin, is literally to fall dropwise: *instillo*, to *instil*, is, in the improper sense, to make sentiments as it were drop into the mind. *Fundo*, in Latin, is literally to pour in a stream; *infundo*, to *infuse*, is in the improper sense to pour principles or feelings into the mind.

To *implant*, *ingraft*, and *inculcate* are said of abstract opinions, or the rules of right and wrong; *instil* and *infuse* of such principles that influence the heart, the affections, and the passions. It is the business of the parent in early life to *implant* sentiments of virtue in his child; it is the business of the teacher to *ingraft* them. The belief of a Deity, and

all the truths of Divine Revelation, ought to be *implanted* in the mind of the child as soon as it can understand anything; if it have not enjoyed this privilege in its earliest infancy, the task of *ingrafting* these principles afterwards into the mind is attended with considerable difficulty and uncertainty of success. *Instil* is a corresponding act with *implant*: we *implant* belief; we *instil* the feeling which is connected with this belief. It is not enough to have an abstract belief of a God *implanted* into the mind: we must likewise have a love and a fear of Him, and reverence for His Holy Name and Word, *instilled* into the mind.

To *instil* is a gradual process which is the natural work of education; to *infuse* is a more arbitrary and immediate act. Sentiments are *instilled* into the mind, not altogether by the personal efforts of any individual, but likewise by collateral endeavours; they are however *infused* at the express will and with the express endeavour of some person. By the reading of the Scriptures, an attendance on public worship, and the influence of example, combined with the instructions of a parent, religious sentiments are *instilled* into the mind; by the counsel and conversation of an intimate friend, an even current of the feeling becomes *infused* into the mind. *Instil* is applicable only to permanent sentiments; *infuse* may be said of any partial feeling: hence we speak of *infusing* a poison into the mind by means of insidious and mischievous publications; or *infusing* a jealousy by means of crafty insinuations, or *infusing* an ardour into the minds of soldiers by means of spirited addresses coupled with military successes.

With various seeds of art deep in the mind
Implanted.—THOMSON.

The reciprocal attraction in the minds of men is a principle *ingrafted* in the very first formation of the soul by the Author of our nature.—BERKELEY.

To preach practical sermons, as they are called, that is, sermons upon virtues and vices, without *inculcating* the great Scripture truths of redemption, grace, &c., which alone can enable and incite us to forsake sin and follow after righteousness, what is it but to put together the wheels and set the hands of a watch, forgetting the spring which is to make them all go?—BISHOP HORNE.

The apostle often makes mention of sound doctrine in opposition to the extravagant and corrupt opinions which false teachers, even in those days, *instilled* into the minds of their ignorant and unwary disciples.—BEVERIDGE.

No sooner grows
The soft *infusion* prevalent and wide,
Then all alive, at once their joy o'erflows
In music unconfin'd.—THOMSON.

To Implicate, Involve.

Implicate, from *plico* to fold, denotes to fold into a thing; and *Involve*, from *volvo* to roll, signifies to roll into a thing; by which explanation we perceive that to *implicate* marks something less entangled than to *involve*: for that which is folded may be folded only once, but that which is rolled is rolled many times. In application therefore to human affairs, people are said to be *implicated* who have taken ever so small a share in a transaction; but they are *involved* only when they are deeply concerned: the former is likewise especially applied to criminal transactions, the latter to those things which are in themselves troublesome: thus a man is *implicated* in the guilt of robbery who should

stand by and see it done, without interfering for its prevention; as law-suits are of all things the most intricate and harassing, he who is engaged in one is properly *involved* in it, or he who is in debt in every direction is strictly said to be *involved* in debt.

That which can exalt a wife only by degrading a husband will appear on the whole not worth the acquisition, even though it could be made without provoking jealousy by the *implication* of contempt.—HAWKESWORTH.

Those who cultivate the memory of our Revolution will take care how they are *involved* with persons who, under pretext of zeal towards the Revolution and constitution, frequently wander from their true principles.—BURKE.

To Implore, *v.* To beseech.

To Imply, *v.* To signify.

To Import, *v.* To signify.

Importance, Consequence, Weight, Moment.

Importance, from *porto* to carry, signifies the carrying or bearing with, or in itself.

Consequence, from *consequor* to follow, or result, signifies the following, or resulting from a thing.

Weight signifies the *quantum* that the thing weighs.

Moment, from *momentum*, signifies the force that puts in motion.

Importance is what things have in themselves; they may be of more or less *importance*, according to the value which is set upon them: this may be real or unreal; it may be estimated by the experience of their past utility, or from the presumption of their utility for the future: the idea of *importance*, therefore, enters into the meaning of the other terms more or less. *Consequence* is the *importance* of a thing from its *consequence*. This term therefore is peculiarly applicable to such things, the *consequences* of which may be more immediately discerned either from the neglect or the attention: it is of *consequence* for a letter to go off on a certain day, for the affairs of an individual may be more or less affected by it; an hour's delay sometimes in the departure of a military expedition may be of such *consequence* as to determine the fate of a battle. The term *weight* implies a positively great degree of *importance*: it is that *importance* which a thing has intrinsically in itself, and which makes it *weigh* in the mind: it is applied therefore to such things as offer themselves to deliberation; hence the counsels of a nation are always *weighty*, because they involve the interests of so many. *Moment* is that *importance* which a thing has from the power in itself to produce effects, or to determine interests: it is applicable, therefore, only to such things as are connected with our prosperity or happiness: when used without any adjunct, it implies a great degree of *importance*, but may be modified in various ways: as a thing of no *moment*, or small *moment*, or great *moment*; but we cannot say with the same propriety, a thing of small *weight*, and still less a thing of great *weight*: it is a matter of no small *moment* for every one to choose that course of conduct which will stand the test of a death-bed reflection.

He that considers how soon he must close his life, will find nothing of so much *importance* as to close it well.—JOHNSON.

The corruption of our taste is not of equal *consequence* with the deprivation of our virtue.—WARTON.

The finest works of invention are of very little *weight* when put in the balance with what refines and exalts the rational mind.—SPECTATOR.

Whoever shall review his life will find that the whole tenor of his conduct has been determined by some accident of no apparent *moment*.—JOHNSON.

Importunate, v. Pressing.

Importunate, v. Solicitous.

To Impose Upon, v. To deceive.

Impost, v. Tax.

Impostor, v. Deceiver.

Imprecation, v. Malediction.

To Impress, v. To imprint.

Impression, v. Mark.

To Imprint, Impress, Engrave.

Print and **Press** are both derived from *pressus*, participle of *primō*, signifying in the literal sense to press, or to make a mark by pressing: to **Impress** and **Imprint** are morally employed in the same sense. Things are *impressed* on the mind so as to produce a conviction: they are *imprinted* on it so as to produce recollection. If the truths of Christianity be *impressed* on the mind, they will show themselves in a corresponding conduct: whatever is *imprinted* on the mind in early life, or by any particular circumstance, is not readily forgotten. **Engrave**, from *grave* and the German *graben* to dig, expresses more in the proper sense than either, and the same in its moral application: for we may truly say that if the truths of Christianity be *engraven* in the minds of youth, they can never be eradicated.

Whence this disdain of life in ev'ry breast
But from a motion on their minds *impress*
That all who for their country die, are blest!
JENYNS.

Such a strange, sacred, and inviolable majesty has God *imprinted* upon this faculty (the conscience), that it can never be deposed.—SOUTH.

Deep on his front *engraven*,
Deliberation sat, and public care.—MILTON.

Imprisonment, v. Confinement.

Impropritation, v. Appropriation.

To Improve, v. To amend.

Improvement, v. Progress.

Impudence, v. Assurance.

Impudent, v. Immodest.

Impudent, v. Impertinent.

To Impugn, Attack.

Impugn, in Latin *in* and *pugno*, signifies to fight against.

Attack, v. To attack.

These terms are employed synonymously only in regard to doctrines or opinions; in which case, to *impugn* signifies to call in question, or bring arguments against; to *attack* is to oppose with warmth. Sceptics *impugn* every opinion, however self-evident or well-

grounded they may be: infidels make the most indecent attacks upon the Bible and all that is held sacred by the rest of the world.

He who *impugns* may sometimes proceed insidiously and circuitously to undermine the faith of others: he who *attacks* always proceeds with more or less violence. To *impugn* is not necessarily taken in a bad sense; we may sometimes *impugn* absurd doctrines by a fair train of reasoning: to *attack* is always objectionable, either in the mode of the action or its object, or in both: it is a mode of proceeding oftener employed in the cause of falsehood than truth: when there are no arguments wherewith to *impugn* a doctrine, it is easy to *attack* it with ridicule and scurrility.

To *Impute*, *v.* To *Ascribe*.

Inability, Disability.

Inability denotes the absence of *ability* in the most general and abstract sense. *Disability* implies the absence of *ability* only in particular cases: the *inability* lies in the nature of the thing, and is irremediable; the *disability* lies in the circumstances, and may sometimes be removed: weakness, whether physical or mental, will occasion an *inability* to perform a task; there is a total *inability* in an infant to walk and act like an adult: a want of knowledge or of the requisite qualifications may be a *disability*; in this manner minority of age or an objection to take certain oaths may be a *disability* for filling a public office.

It is not from *inability* to discover what they ought to do that men err in practice.—BLAIR.

Want of age is a legal *disability* to contract a marriage.—BLACKSTONE.

Inaccessible, *v.* *Impervious*.

Inactive, Inert, Lazy, Slothful, Sluggish.

A reluctance to bodily exertion is common to all these terms. *Inactive* is the most general and unqualified term of all: it expresses simply the want of a stimulus to exertion: *Inert* is something more positive, from the Latin *iners* or *sine arte* without art or mind; it denotes a specific deficiency either in body or mind.

Lazy (*v.* *Idle*). *Slothful* from *slow*, that is, full of slowness; and *Sluggish* from *slug*, that is, like a *slug*, drowsy and heavy: all rise upon one another to denote an expressly defective temperament of the body which directly impedes action.

To be *inactive* is to be indisposed to action; that is, to the performance of any office, to the doing any specific business: to be *inert* is somewhat more; it is to be indisposed to movement: to be *lazy* is to move with pain to one's self: to be *slothful* is never to move otherwise than slowly: to be *sluggish* is to move in a sleepy and heavy manner.

A person may be *inactive* from a variety of incidental causes, as timidity, ignorance, modesty, and the like, which combine to make him averse to enter upon any business or take any serious step; a person may be *inert* from temporary indisposition; but *laziness*, *slothfulness*, and *sluggishness* are inherent physical defects: *laziness* is, however, not altogether inde-

pendent of the mind or the will; but *slothfulness* and *sluggishness* are purely the offspring of nature, or, which is the same thing, habit superinduced upon nature. A man of a mild character is frequently *inactive*; he wants that ardour which impels perpetually to action; he wishes for nothing with sufficient warmth to make action agreeable; he is therefore *inactive* by a natural consequence: some diseases, particularly of the melancholy kind, are accompanied with a strong degree of *inertness*; since they seem to deprive the frame of its ordinary powers to action, and to produce a certain degree of torpor: *lazy* people move as if their bodies were a burden to themselves; they are fond of rest, and particularly averse to be put in action; but they will sometimes move quickly, and perform much when once impelled to move: *slothful* people never vary their pace; they have a physical impediment in themselves to quick motion: *sluggish* people are with difficulty brought into action; it is their nature to be in a state of stupor.

What laws are these? instruct us if you can:

There's one design'd for brutes. And one for man,

Another guides *inactive* matter's course.—JENYNS.

Informers of the planetary train.

Without whose quickening glance their cumbrous orbs
Were brute, unlovely mass, inert and dead.—THOMSON.

The first canto (in Thomson's *Castle of Indolence*) opens a scene of *lazy* luxury that fills the imagination.—JOHN'SON.

Falsely luxurious. will not man awake,

And, springing from the bed of *sloth*, enjoy

The cool, the fragrant, and the silent hour?

THOMSON.

Conversation would become dull and vapid if negligence were not sometimes roused, and *sluggishness* quickened, by due severity of reprehension.—JOHNSON.

Inadequate, *v.* *Incapable*.

Inadvertency, Inattention, Oversight.

Inadvertency, from *advert* to turn the mind to, is allied to *Inattention* (*v.* *Attentive*), when the act of the mind is signified in general terms; and to *Oversight* when any particular instance of *inadvertency* occurs. *Inadvertency* never designates a habit, but *inattention* does; the former term, therefore, is unqualified by the reproachful sense which attaches to the latter; any one may be guilty of *inadvertencies*, since the mind that is occupied with many subjects equally serious may be turned so steadily towards some that others may escape notice; but *inattention*, which designates a direct want of *attention*, is always a fault, and belongs only to the young, or such as are thoughtless by nature: since *inadvertency* is an occasional act, it must not be too often repeated, or it becomes *inattention*. An *oversight* is properly a species of *inadvertency* which arises from looking over, or passing by, a thing. *Inadvertency* seems to refer rather to the cause of the mistake, namely, the particular abstraction of the mind from the object; the term *oversight* seems to refer to the mistake itself, namely the missing something which ought to have been taken: it is an *inadvertency* in a person to omit speaking to one of the company; it is an *oversight* in a tradesman who omits to include certain articles in his reckoning: we pardon an *inad-*

vertency in another, since the consequences are never serious; we must be guarded against oversights in business, as their consequences may be serious.

Ignorance or inadvertency will admit of some extenuation.—SOUTH.

The expense of attending (the Scottish Parliament), the frustration of the age to any legal or regular system of government, but above all the exorbitant authority of the nobles, made this privilege of so little value as to be almost neglected.—ROBERTSON.

The ancient critics discover beauties which escape the observation of the vulgar and very often find reasons for palliating such little slips and oversights in the writings of eminent authors.—ADDISON.

Inanimate, *v.* Lifeless.

Inanity, *v.* Vacancy.

Inattention, *v.* Inadvertency.

Inattentive, *v.* Negligent.

Inborn, *v.* Inherent.

Inbred, *v.* Inherent.

Incapable, Insufficient, Incompetent, Inadequate.

Incapable, that is, *not* having capacity (*v.* Ability); Insufficient, or *not* sufficient, or *not* having what is sufficient; Incompetent or *not* competent (*v.* Competent): are employed either for persons or things: the first in a general, the last two in a specific sense; Inadequate, or *not* adequate or equalled, is applied most generally to things.

When a man is said to be *incapable*, it characterizes his whole mind; if he be said to have *insufficiency* and *incompetency*, it respects the particular objects to which he has applied his powers: he may be *insufficient* or *incompetent* for certain things; but he may have a *capacity* for other things: the term *incapacity*, therefore, implies a direct charge upon the understanding, which is *not* implied by *insufficiency* and *incompetency*. An *incapacity* consists altogether of a physical defect; an *insufficiency* and *incompetency* are incidental defects: the former depending upon the age, the condition, the acquisitions, moral qualities and the like, of the individual; the latter on the extent of his knowledge, and the nature of his studies; where there is direct *incapacity* a person has no chance of making himself fit for any office or employment; youth is naturally accompanied with *insufficiency* to fill stations which belong to mature age, and to perform offices which require the exercise of judgement: a young person is, therefore, still more *incompetent* to form a fixed opinion on any one subject, because he can have made himself master of none.

Incapable is applied sometimes to the moral character, to signify the absence of that which is bad; *insufficient* and *incompetent* always convey the idea of a deficiency in that which is at least desirable: it is an honour to a person to be *incapable* of falsehood, or *incapable* of doing an ungenerous action; but to be *insufficient* and *incompetent* are, at all events, qualities not to be boasted of, although they may not be expressly disgraceful. These terms are likewise applicable to things, in which they preserve a similar distinction: infidelity is *incap-*

able of affording a man any comfort; when the means are *insufficient* for obtaining the ends it is madness to expect success; it is a sad condition of humanity when a man's resources are *incompetent* to supply him with the first necessities of life.

Inadequate is relative in its signification, like *insufficient* and *incompetent*; but the relation is different. A thing is *insufficient* which does not suffice either for the wishes, the purposes, or necessities of any one, in particular or in general cases; thus, a quantity of materials may be *insufficient* for a particular building: *incompetency* is an *insufficiency* for general purposes, in things of the first necessity; thus, an income may be *incompetent* to support a family: *inadequacy* is still more particular, for it denotes any deficiency which is measured by comparison with the object to which it refers; thus, the strength of an animal may be *inadequate* to the labour which is required, or a reward may be *inadequate* to the service.

Were a human soul *incapable* of farther enlargements, I could imagine it might fall away insensibly.—ADDISON.

When God withdraws his hand, and lets nature sink into its original weakness and *insufficiency*, all a man's delights fail him.—SOUTH.

All the attainments possible in our present state are evidently *inadequate* to our capacities of enjoyment.—JOHNSON.

Incessantly, Unceasingly, Uninterruptedly, Without Intermission.

Incessantly and Unceasingly are but variations from the same word, *cease*.

Uninterruptedly, *v.* To disturb.

Intermission, *v.* To subside.

Continuity, but not duration, is denoted by these terms: *incessantly* is the most general and indefinite of all; it signifies without ceasing, but may be applied to things which admit of certain intervals; *unceasingly* is definite, and signifies never ceasing; it cannot therefore be applied to what has any cessation. In familiar discourse, *incessantly* is an extravagant mode of speech, by which one means to denote the absence of those ordinary intervals which are to be expected; as when one says a person is *incessantly* talking; by which is understood that he does not allow himself the ordinary intervals of rest from talking: *unceasingly*, on the other hand, is more literally employed for a positive want of cessation; a noise is said to be *unceasing* which literally never ceases; or complaints are *unceasing* which are made without any pauses or intervals. *Incessantly* and *unceasingly* are said of things which act of themselves; *uninterruptedly* is said of that which depends upon other things: it rains *incessantly* marks a continued operation of nature, independent of everything; but to be *uninterruptedly* happy marks one's freedom from every foreign influence which is unfriendly to one's happiness.

Incessantly and the other two words are employed either for persons or things; *without intermission* is however mostly employed for persons: things act and re act *incessantly*

upon one another; a man of a persevering temper goes on labouring *without intermission* until he has effected his purpose.

Surfeit, misdiet, and unthrifty waste,
Vaine feastes, and ydle superfluitie,
All those this sence's fort assayle *incessantly*.
SPENSER.

Impell'd, with steps *unceasing*, to pursue
Some fleeting good that mocks me with the view.
GOLDSMITH.

She draws a close, incumbent cloud of death,
Uninterrupted by the living winds.—THOMSON.

For any one to be always in a laborious, hazardous posture of defence, *without intermission*, must needs be intolerable.—SOUTH.

Incident, v. Circumstance.

Incident, v. Event.

Incidental, v. Accidental.

To Incite, v. To encourage.

To Incite, v. To excite.

Inclination, v. Attachment.

Inclination, v. Bent.

Inclination, v. Disposition.

Inclination, Tendency, Propensity, Proneness.

All these terms are employed to designate the state of the will towards an object: **Inclination** (*v. Attachment*) denotes its first movement towards an object; **Tendency** (from *to tend*) is a continued *inclination*; **Propensity**, from the Latin *propensus* and *propendeo* to hang forward, denotes a still stronger leaning of the will; and **Proneness**, from the Latin *pronus* downward, characterizes an habitual and fixed state of the will towards an object. The *inclination* expresses the leaning but not the direction of that leaning; it may be to the right or to the left, upwards or downwards; consequently we may have an *inclination* to that which is good or bad, high or low; *tendency* does not specify any particular direction; but from the idea of pressing, which it conveys, it is appropriately applied to those things which degenerate or lead to what is bad; excessive strictness in the treatment of children has a *tendency* to damp the spirit: *propensity* and *proneness* both designate a downward direction, and consequently refer only to that which is bad and low; a person has a *propensity* to drinking, and a *proneness* to lying.

Inclination is always at the command of the understanding; it is our duty therefore to suppress the first risings of any *inclination* to extravagance, intemperance, or any irregularity: as *tendency* refers to the thing rather than the person, it is our business to avoid that which has a *tendency* to evil: the *propensity* will soon get the mastery of the best principles and the firmest resolution; it is our duty therefore to seek all the aids which religion affords to subdue every *propensity*: *proneness* to evil is inherent in our nature which we derive from our first parents; it is the grace of God alone which can lift us up above this grovelling part of ourselves.

Partiality is properly the understanding's judging according to the *inclination* of the will.—SOUTH.

The *inclinations* of men should frequently be thwarted.
—BURKE.

Such is the *propensity* of our nature to vice that stronger restraints than those of mere reason are necessary to be imposed on man.—BLAIR.

Every commission of sin imprints upon the soul a further disposition and *proneness* to sin.—SOUTH.

Every immoral act, in the direct *tendency* of it, is certainly a step downwards.—SOUTH.

To Incline, v. To lean.

To Inclose, Include.

From the Latin *include* and its participle *inclusus*, are derived **Inclose** and **Include**; the former to express the proper and the latter the improper signification: a yard is *inclosed* by a wall; particular goods are *included* in a reckoning; the kernel of a nut is *inclosed* in a shell; morality as well as faith is *included* in Christian perfection.

With whom she marched straight against her foes,
And them unawares beside the Severne did *inclose*.
SPENSER.

The idea of being once present is *included* in the idea of its being past.—GROVE.

To Include, v. To comprise.

To Include, v. To inclose.

Incoherent, v. Inconsistent.

Incompetent, v. Incapable.

Incongruous, v. Inconsistent.

Inconsiderable, v. Unimportant.

Inconsistent, Incongruous, Incoherent.

Inconsistent, from *sisto* to place, marks the unfitness of being placed together.

Incongruous, from *congruo* to suit, marks the unsuitableness of one thing to another.

Incoherent, from *haereo* to stick, marks the incapacity of two things to coalesce or be united to each other.

Inconsistency attaches either to the actions or sentiments of men; *incongruity* attaches to the modes and qualities of things; *incoherency* to words or thoughts: things are made *inconsistent* by an act of the will; a man acts or thinks *inconsistently*, according to his own pleasure: *incongruity* depends upon the nature of the thing; there is something very *incongruous* in blending the solemn and decent service of the church with the extravagant rant of Methodism: *incoherence* marks the want of coherence in that which ought to follow in a train; extemporary effusions from the pulpit are often distinguished most by their *incoherence*.

Every individual is so unequal to himself that man seems to be the most wavering and *inconsistent* being in the universe.—HUGHES.

The solemn introduction of the Phoenix in the last scene of Samson Agonistes is *incongruous* to the personage to whom it is ascribed.—JOHNSON.

Be but a person in credit with the multitude, he shall be able to make rambling *incoherent* stuff pass for high rhetoric.—SOUTH.

Inconstant, *v.* Changeable.

Incontrovertible, *v.* Indubitable.

To Inconvenience, Annoy, Molest.

To **Inconvenience** is to make not convenient (*v.* Convenient).

To **Annoy**, from the Latin *noco* to hurt, is to do some hurt to. To **Molest**, from the Latin *mole* a mass or weight, signifies to press with a weight.

We *inconvenience* in small matters, or by omitting such things as might be *convenient*; we *annoy* or *molest* by doing that which is positively painful: we are *inconvenienced* by a person's absence; we are *annoyed* by his presence if he renders himself offensive; we are *inconvenienced* by what is temporary; we are *annoyed* by that which is either temporary or durable; we are *molested* by that which is weighty and oppressive: we are *inconvenienced* simply in regard to our circumstances; we are *annoyed* mostly in regard to our corporeal feelings; we are *molested* mostly in regard to our minds: the removal of a seat or a book may *inconvenience* one who is engaged in business; the buzzing of a fly, or the stinging of a gnat, may *annoy*; the impertinent freedom, or the rude insults of ill-disposed persons, may *molest*.

I have often been tempted to inquire what happiness is to be gained, or what *inconvenience* to be avoided, by this stated recession from the town in the summer season.—JOHNSON.

Against the capitol I met a lion,
Who glar'd upon me, and went surly by,
Without *annoying* me.—SHAKESPEARE.

See all with skill acquire their daily food,
Produce their tender progeny and feed,
With care parental, whilst that care they need,
In these lov'd offices completely blest,
No hopes beyond them, nor vain fears *molest*.
JENYNS.

Incorporeal, Unbodied, Immaterial, Spiritual.

Incorporeal, from *corpus* a body, marks the quality of not belonging to the body, or having any properties in common with it; **Unbodied** denotes the state of being without the body, or not inclosed in a body: a thing may therefore be *incorporeal* without being *unbodied*; but not *vice versâ*: the soul of man is *incorporeal*, but not *unbodied*, during his natural life.

Incorporeal is always used in regard to living things, particularly by way of comparison, with *corporeal* or human beings: hence we speak of *incorporeal* agency, or *incorporeal* agents, in reference to such beings as are supposed to act in this world without the help of the body; but **Immaterial** is applied to inanimate objects; men are *corporeal* as men, spirits are *incorporeal*; the body is the *material* part of man, the soul his *immaterial* part: whatever external object acts upon the senses is *material*; but the action of the mind on itself and its results are all *immaterial*: the earth, sun, moon, &c., are termed *material*: but the impressions which they make on the mind, that is, our ideas of them, are *immaterial*.

The *incorporeal* and *immaterial* have always a relative sense; the **Spiritual** is that which is positive: God is a *spiritual*, not properly an *incorporeal* nor *immaterial* being: the angels are likewise designated, in general, as the *spiritual* inhabitants of Heaven; although, when spoken of in regard to men, they may be denominated *incorporeal*.

Of sense, whereby they hear, see, smell, touch, taste,
Tasting, concoct, digest, assimilate,
And *corporeal* to *incorporeal* turn.—MILTON.

Th' *unbodied* spirit flies
And lodges where it lights, in man or beast.
DEYDEN.

O thou great arbiter of life and death,
Nature's immortal, *immaterial* sun!
Thy call I follow to the land unknown.—YOUNG.

In Course, *v.* Naturally.

To **Increase**, *v.* To enlarge.

To Increase, Grow.

Increase, from the Latin *in* and *cresco*, signifies to grow upon or grow to a thing, to become one with it.

Grow, in Saxon *growan*, very properly comes from, or is connected with, the Latin *crevi*, perfect of *cresco*.

The idea of becoming larger is common to both these terms: but the former expresses the idea of unqualified manner: and the latter annexes to this general idea also that of the mode or process by which this is effected. To *increase* is either a gradual or an instantaneous act; to *grow* is a gradual process: a stream *increases* by the addition of other waters; it may come suddenly or in course of time, by means of gentle showers or the rushing in of other streams; but if we say that the river or stream *grows*, it is supposed to *grow* by some regular and continual process of receiving fresh water, as from the running in of different rivulets or smaller streams. To *increase* is either a natural or an artificial process; to *grow* is always natural: money *increases* but does not *grow*, because it *increases* by artificial means; corn may either *increase* or *grow*: in the former case we speak of it in the sense of becoming larger or *increasing* in bulk; in the latter case we consider the mode of its *increasing*, namely, by the natural process of vegetation. On this ground we say that a child *grows* when we wish to denote the natural process by which his body arrives at its proper size; but we may speak of his *increasing* in stature, in size, and the like. For this reason likewise *increase* is used in a transitive as well as intransitive sense; but *grow* always in an intransitive sense: we can *increase* a thing, though not properly *grow* a thing, because we can make it larger by whatever means we please; but when it *grows* it makes itself larger.

In their improper acceptance these words preserve the same distinction: "trade *increases*" bespeaks the simple fact of its becoming larger; but "trade *grows*" implies that gradual *increase* which flows from the natural concurrence of circumstances. The affections which are awakened in infancy *grow* with one's growth; here is a natural and

moral process combined. The fear of death sometimes *increases* as one *grows* old; the courage of a truly brave man *increases* with the sight of danger: here is a moral process which is both gradual and immediate, but in both cases produced by some foreign cause.

I have enlarged on these two words the more because they appear to have been involved in some considerable perplexity by the French writers, Girard and Roubaud, who have entered very diffusely into the distinction between the words *croître* and *augmenter*, corresponding to *increase* and *grow*; but I trust that from the above explanation, the distinction is clearly to be observed.

Then, as her strength with years *increases*, began
To pierce aloft in air the soaring swan.—DRYDEN.

Some trees their birth to bounteous nature owe,
For some without the pains of planting grow.
DRYDEN.

Increase, Addition, Accession, Augmentation.

Increase is here as in the former article the generic term (*v. To increase*): there will always be *increase* where there is **Augmentation, Addition, and Accession**, though not vice versâ.

Addition is to *increase* as the means to the end: the *addition* is the artificial mode of making two things into one; the *increase* is the result: when the value of one figure is added to another, the sum is *increased*; hence a man's treasures experience an *increase* by the addition of other parts to the main stock. *Addition* is an intentional mode of *increasing*; *accession* is an accidental mode: one thing is added to another, and thereby *increased*: but an *accession* takes place of itself; it is the coming or joining of one thing to another so as to *increase* the whole. A merchant *increases* his property by *adding* his gains in trade every year to the mass; but he receives an *accession* of property either by inheritance or any other contingency. In the same manner a monarch *increases* his dominions by *adding* one territory to another, or by various *accessions* of territory which fall to his lot.

When we speak of an *increase*, we think of the whole and its relative magnitude at different times; when we speak of an *addition*, we think only of the part and the agency by which this part is joined; when we speak of an *accession*, we think only of the circumstance by which one thing becomes thus joined to another. *Increase* of happiness does not depend upon *increase* of wealth; the miser makes daily *additions* to the latter without making any to the former: sudden *accessions* of wealth are seldom attended with any good consequences, as they turn the thoughts too violently out of their sober channel and bend them too strongly on present possessions and good fortune.

Augmentation is another term for *increase*, which differs less in sense than in application: the latter is generally applied to all objects that admit such a change: but the former is applied only to objects of higher import or cases of a less familiar nature. We may say that a person experiences an *increase* or an *augmentation* in his family; or that he has had

an *increase* or an *augmentation* of his salary, or that there is an *increase* or *augmentation* of the number: in all which cases the former term is most adapted to the colloquial, and the latter to the grave style.

At will I crop the year's *increase*,
My latter life is rest and peace.—DRYDEN.

The ill state of health into which Tullia is fallen is a very severe *addition* to the many and great disquietudes that afflict my mind.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

There is nothing in my opinion more pleasing in religion than to consider that the soul is to shine for ever with new *accessions* of glory.—ADDISON.

Ambitious Turnus in the press appears.
And aggravating crimes, *augments* their fears.
DRYDEN.

Incredulity, v. Unbelief.

Incursion, v. Invasion.

Indebted, Obligated.

Indebted is more binding and positive than **Obligated**: we are *indebted* to whoever confers an essential service: we are *obliged* to him who does us any service. A man is *indebted* to another for the preservation of his life; he is *obliged* to him for an ordinary act of civility: a *debt* whether of legal or moral right must in justice be paid; an *obligation* which is only moral ought in reason to be returned. Whether we be *indebted* to another expressly for a certain sum of money, or whether we be *indebted* to him for our natural existence, or for the main comfort of our lives, we are bound to make him a suitable compensation as far as lies in our power; but when we are simply *obliged*, we owe another particular good will. According to an old proverb in this case, one good turn deserves another. We may be *indebted* to things; we are *obliged* to persons only: we are *indebted* to Christianity, not only for a superior faith, but also for a superior system of morality; we ought to be *obliged* to our friends who admonish us of our faults with a friendly temper. A nation may be *indebted* to an individual, but men are *obliged* to each other only as individuals: the English nation is *indebted* to Alfred for the groundwork of its free constitution; the little courtesies which pass between friends in their social intercourse with each other lay them under *obligations* which it is equally agreeable to receive and to pay.

A grateful mind
By owing owes not, but still pays at once
Indebted and discharged.—MILTON.

We are each of us so civil and *obliging* that neither thinks he is *obliged*.—POPE.

Indecent, Immodest, Indelicate.

Indecent is the contrary of *decent* (*v. Becoming*), **Immodest** the contrary of *modest* (*v. Modest*), **Indelicate** the contrary of *delicate* (*v. Fine*).

Indecency and *immodesty* violate the fundamental principles of morality: the former however in external matters, as dress, words, and looks; the latter in conduct and disposition. A person may be *indecent* for want of either knowing or thinking better; but a female cannot be *immodest* without radical cor-

ruption of principle. *Indecency* may be a partial, — *immodesty* is a positive and entire breach of the moral law. *Indecency* belongs to both sexes; *immodesty* is peculiarly applicable to the misconduct of females.

Indecency is less than *immodesty*, but more than *indelicacy*: they both respect the outward behaviour; but the former springs from illicit or uncourbed desire; *indelicacy* from the want of education. It is a great *indecency* for a man to marry again very quickly after the death of his wife; but a still greater *indecency* for a woman to put such an affront on her deceased husband: it is a great *indelicacy* in any one to break in upon the retirement of such as are in sorrow and mourning. It is *indecent* for females to expose their persons as many do whom we cannot call *immodest* women; it is *indelicate* for females to engage in masculine exercises.

The Dubistan contains more ingenuity and wit, more *indecency* and blasphemy, than I ever saw collected in one single volume.—SIR WM. JONES.

Immodest words admit of no defence,
For want of decency is want of sense.—ROSCOMMON.

Your papers would be chargeable with something worse than *indelicacy* did you treat the detestable sin of uncleanness in the same manner as you rally self-love.—SPECTATOR.

Indelicate, v. *Indecent*.

To Indicate, v. *To show*.

Indication, v. *Mark*.

Indifference, Insensibility, Apathy.

Indifference signifies *no difference*; that is, having *no difference* of feeling for one thing more than another.

Insensibility, from *sense* and *able*, signifies incapable of feeling.

Apathy, from the Greek privative *a* and *pathos* feeling, implies without feeling.

Indifference is a partial state of the mind; *apathy* and *insensibility* are general states of the mind; he who has *indifference* is not to be awakened to feeling by some objects, though he may by others; but he who has not *sensibility* is incapable of feeling: and he who has *apathy* is without any feeling. *Indifference* is mostly a temporary state; *insensibility* is either a temporary or a permanent state; *apathy* is always a permanent state; *indifference* is either acquired or accidental; *insensibility* is either produced or natural; *apathy* is natural. A person may be in a state of *indifference* about a thing the value of which he is not aware of, or acquire an *indifference* for that which he knows to be of comparatively little value; he may be in a state of *insensibility* from some lethargic torpor which has seized his mind; or he may have an habitual *insensibility* arising either from the contractedness of his powers, or the physical bluntness of his understanding, and deadness of his passions; his *apathy* is born with him, and forms a prominent feature in the constitution of his mind.

Indifference is often the consequence of *insensibility*; for he who is not *sensible* or alive to any feeling must naturally be without choice or preference: but *indifference* is not always *insensibility*, since we may be *indifferent*

to one thing, because we have an equal liking to another. In like manner *insensibility* may spring from *apathy*, for he who has no feeling is naturally not to be awakened to feeling, that is, he is *unfeeling* or *insensible* by constitution; but since his *insensibility* may spring from other causes besides those that are natural, he may be *insensible* without having *apathy*. Moreover it is observable that between *insensibility* and *apathy* there is this farther distinction, that the former refers only to our capacity for being moved by the outward objects that surround us; whereas *apathy* denotes an entire internal deadness of all the feelings; but we may be *insensible* to the present external objects from the total absorption of all the powers and feelings in one distant object.

I could never prevail with myself to exchange joy and sorrow for a state of constant tasteless *indifference*.—HOADLY.

I look upon Iseus not only as the most eloquent but the most happy of men; as I shall esteem you the most *unreasonable* if you appear to slight his acquaintance.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF FLINT.

The Stoics affected an entire *apathy*.—ENCYCLOP. BRIT.

Indifferent, Unconcerned, Regardless.

Indifferent (v. *Indifference*) marks the want of inclination: *Unconcerned*, that is, having *no concern* (v. *Care*); and *Regardless*, that is, without *regard* (v. *Care*); mark the want of serious consideration. *Indifferent* respects only the will, *unconcerned* either the will or the understanding, *regardless* the understanding only; we are *indifferent* about matters of minor consideration: we are *unconcerned* or *regardless* about serious matters that have remote consequences; an author will seldom be *indifferent* about the success of his work; he ought not to be *unconcerned* about the influence which his writings may have on the public, or *regardless* of the estimation in which his own character as a man may be held. To be *indifferent* is sometimes an act of wisdom or virtue; to be *unconcerned* or *regardless* is mostly an act of folly or a breach of duty. When the object is purely of a personal nature, it is but treating it as it deserves if we are *indifferent* about it; hence a wise man is *indifferent* about the applause of the multitude: as religion should be the object of our concern, if we are *unconcerned* about any thing connected with it, the fault is in ourselves; a good parent will never be *unconcerned* about the religious education of his children: whatever tends to increase our knowledge or to add to the comfort of others ought to excite our regard; if therefore we are *regardless* of these things, we betray a culpable want of feeling; a good child will never be *regardless* of the admonition of a parent.

As an author I am perfectly *indifferent* to the judgement of all except the few who are really judicious.—COWPER.

Not the most cruel of our conquering foes,
So unconcern'dly can relate our woes.—DENHAM.

Regardless of my words, he no reply
Returns.—DRYDEN.

Indigence, *v. Poverty.*

Indigenous, *v. Natal.*

Indignation, *v. Anger.*

Indignity, Insult.

Indignity, from the Latin *dignus* worthy, signifies unworthy treatment.

Insult, *v. Affront.*

Indignity respects the feeling and condition of the person offended: *insult* respects the temper of the offending party. We measure the *indignity* in our own mind; it depends upon the consciousness we have of our own worth: we measure the *insult* by the disposition which is discovered in another to degrade us. Persons in high stations are peculiarly exposed to *indignities*: persons in every station may be exposed to *insults*. The royal family of France suffered every *indignity* which vulgar rage could devise; whenever people harbour animosities towards each other, they are apt to discover them by offering *insults* when they have the opportunity. *Indignities* may, however, be offered to persons of all ranks; but in this case it always consists of more violence than a simple *insult*; it would be an *indignity* to a person of any rank to be compelled to do any office which belongs only to a beast of burden.

It would be an *indignity* to a female of any station to be compelled to expose her person; on the other hand, an *insult* does not extend beyond an abusive expression, a triumphant contemptuous look, or any breach of courtesy.

The two caziques made Montezuma's officers, prisoners, and treated them with great *indignity*.—ROBERTSON.

Narvaez having learned that Cortez was now advanced with a small body of men, considered this as an *insult* which merited immediate chastisement.—ROBERTSON.

Indiscriminate, *v. Promiscuous.*

Indisposition, *v. Sickness.*

Indisputable, *v. Indubitable.*

Indistinct, Confused.

Indistinct is negative; it marks simply the want of *distinctness*: **Confused** is positive; it marks a positive degree of *indistinctness*. A thing may be *indistinct* without being *confused*; but it cannot be *confused* without being *indistinct*: two things may be *indistinct*, or not easily distinguished from each other; but many things, or parts of the same things, are *confused*: two letters in a word may be *indistinct*; but the whole of a writing or many words are *confused*: sounds are *indistinct* which reach our ears only in part; but they are *confused* if they come in great numbers and out of all order. We see objects *indistinctly*; we cannot see all the features by which they would be distinguished from all objects: we see them *confusedly* when every part is so blended with the other that no one feature can be distinguished: by means of great distance objects become *indistinct*; from a defect in sight objects become more *confused*.

When a volume of travels is opened, nothing is found but such general accounts as leave no *distinct* idea behind them.—JOHNSON.

He that enters a town at night and surveys it in the morning, then hastens to another place, may please himself for a time with a hasty change of scene and a *confused* remembrance of palaces and churches.—JOHNSON.

Individual, *v. Particular.*

Indolent, *v. Idle.*

Indolent, Supine, Listless, Careless.

Indolent, *v. Idle, lazy.*

Supine, in Latin *supinus*, from *super* above, signifies lying on one's back, or with one's face upwards, which, as it is the action of a lazy or idle person, has been made to represent the qualities themselves.

Listless, without *list*, in German *lust* desire, signifies without desire.

Careless signifies without care or concern.

These terms represent a diseased or unnatural state of the mind, when its desires, which are the springs of action, are in a relaxed and torpid state, so as to prevent the necessary degree of exertion. *Indolence* has a more comprehensive meaning than *supineness*, and this signifies more than *listlessness* or *carelessness*: *indolence* is a general indisposition of a person to exert either his mind or his body; *supineness* is a similar indisposition that shows itself on particular occasions: there is a corporeal as well as a mental cause for *indolence*: but *supineness* lies principally in the mind: corpulent and large-made people are apt to be *indolent*; but timid and gentle dispositions are apt to be *supine*. An *indolent* person sets all labour, both corporeal and mental, at a distance from him; it is irksome to him; a *supine* person objects to undertake anything which threatens to give him trouble: the *indolent* person is so for a permanency; he always seeks to be waited upon rather than wait on himself: and as far as is possible he is glad for another to think for him, rather than to burden himself with thought: the *supine* person is so only in matters that require more than an ordinary portion of his exertion; he will defer such business, and sacrifice his interest to his ease. The *indolent* and *supine* are not, however, like the *listless*, expressly without desire: an *indolent* or *supine* man has desire enough to enjoy what is within his reach, although not always sufficient desire to surmount the aversion to labour in trying to obtain it; the *listless* man, on the contrary, is altogether without the desire, and is in fact in a state of moral torpor, which is, however, but a temporary or partial state arising from particular circumstances; after the mind has been wrought up to the highest pitch, it will sometimes sink into a state of relaxation in which it ceases to have apparently any active principle within itself. *Indolence* is a habit of both body and mind; *supineness* is sometimes only a mode of inaction flowing out of a particular frame of mind; *listlessness* is only a certain frame of mind: an active person may sometimes be *supine* in setting about a business which runs counter to his feelings; a *listless* person, on the other hand, if he be habitually so, will never be active in anything, because he will have no impulse to action.

Carelessness expresses less than any of the above; for though a man who is *indolent*, *supine*, and *listless* is naturally *careless*, yet *carelessness* is properly applicable to such as have no such positive disease of mind or body. The *careless* person is neither averse to labour or thought, nor devoid of desire, but wants in reality that *care* or thought which is requisite for his state or condition. *Carelessness* is rather an error of the understanding, or of the conduct, than the will; since the *careless* would *care*, be concerned for, or interested about things, if he could be brought to reflect on their importance, or if he did not for a time forget himself.

Hence reasoners more refin'd but not more wise,
Their whole existence fabulous suspect,
And truth and falsehood in a lump reject;
Too *indolent* to learn what may be known,
Or else too proud that ignorance to own.—JENYNS.

With what unequal tempers we fram'd!
One day the soul *supine* with ease and fulness,
Revels secure.—ROWE.

Sullen, methinks, and slow the morning breaks,
As if the sun were *listless* to appear.—DRYDEN.

Pert love with her by joint commission rules,
Who by false arts and popular deceptions
The *careless*, fond, unthinking mortal cheats.
POMFRET.

Indubitable, Unquestionable, Indisputable, Undeniable, Incontrovertible, Irrefragable.

Indubitable signifies admitting of no doubt (*v. Doubt*); *Unquestionable*, admitting of no question (*v. Doubt*); *Indisputable*, admitting of no dispute (*v. To controvert*); *Undeniable*, not to be denied (*v. To deny*, *disown*); *Incontrovertible*, not to be controverted (*v. To controvert*); *Irrefragable*, from *frango* to break, signifies not to be broken, destroyed, or done away. These terms are all opposed to uncertainty; but they do not imply absolute certainty, for they all express the strong persuasion of a person's mind rather than the absolute nature of the thing: when a fact is supported by such evidence as admits of no kind of doubt, it is termed *indubitable*; when the truth of an assertion rests on the authority of a man whose character for integrity stands unimpeached, it is termed *unquestionable* authority; when a thing is believed to exist on the evidence of every man's senses, it is termed *undeniable*; when a sentiment has always been held as either true or false without dispute, it is termed *indisputable*; when arguments have never been controverted, they are termed *incontrovertible*; and when they have never been satisfactorily answered, they are termed *irrefragable*.

A full or a thin house will *indubitably* express the sense of a majority.—HAWKESWORTH.

From the *unquestionable* documents and dictates of the law of nature, I shall evince the obligation lying upon every man to show gratitude.—SOUTH.

Truth, knowing the *indisputable* claim she has to all that is called reason, thinks it below her to ask that upon courtesy in which she can plead a property.—SOUTH.

So *undeniable* is the truth of this (*viz.*, the hardness of our duty, that the scene of virtue is laid in our natural averseness to things excellent.—SOUTH.

Our distinction must rest upon a steady adherence to the *incontrovertible* rules of virtue.—BLAIR.

There is none who walks so surely, and upon such *irrefragable* grounds of prudence, as he who is religious.—SOUTH.

To Indue, *v. To invest.*

To Induce, *v. To actuate.*

To Induce, *v. To encourage, animate.*

To Indulge, *v. To foster.*

To Indulge, *v. To gratify.*

Indulgent, Fond.

Indulgent, *v. To gratify.*

Fond, *v. Amorous.*

Indulgence lies more in forbearing from the exercise of authority; *fondness* in the outward behaviour and endearments: they may both arise from an excess of kindness or love; but the former is of a less objectionable character than the latter. *Indulgence* may be sometimes wrong; but *fondness* is seldom right: an *indulgent* parent is seldom a prudent parent; but a *fond* parent does not rise above a fool: all who have the care of young people should occasionally relax from the strictness of the disciplinarian, and show an *indulgence* where a suitable opportunity offers; a *fond* mother takes away from the value of *indulgences* by an invariable compliance with the humours of her children: however, when applied generally or abstractedly, they are both taken in a good sense.

God then thro' all creation gives, we find,
Sufficient marks of an *indulgent* mind.—JENYNS.

While, for a while, his *fond* paternal care
Feasts us with ev'ry joy our state can bear.—JENYNS.

Industrious, *v. Active.*

Ineffable, *v. Unspeakable.*

Ineffectual, *v. Vain.*

Inequality, *v. Disparity.*

Inert, *v. Inactive.*

Inexorable, *v. Implacable.*

Inexpressible, *v. Unspeakable.*

Infamous, Scandalous.

Infamous, like *infamy* (*v. Infamy*), is applied to both persons and things; *Scandalous*, only to things: a character is *infamous*, or a transaction is *infamous*; but a transaction only is *scandalous*. *Infamous* and *scandalous* are both said of that which is calculated to excite great displeasure in the minds of all who hear it, and to degrade the offenders in the general estimation; but the *infamous* seems to be that which produces greater publicity, and more general reprehension, than the *scandalous*, consequently is that which is more serious in its nature, and a greater violation of good morals. Many of the leaders in the French revolution rendered themselves *infamous* by their violence, their rapine, and their murders; the trick which was played upon the subscribers to the South Sea Company was a *scandalous* fraud.

There is no crime more *infamous* than the violation of truth.—JOHNSON.

It is a very great, though sad and *scandalous* truth, that rich men are esteemed and honoured, while the ways by which they grow rich are abhorred.—SOUTH.

Infamy, Ignominy, Opprobrium.

Infamy is the opposite to good *fame*; it consists in an evil report.

Ignominy, from the privative *in* and *no-*men a name, signifies an ill-name, a stained name.

Opprobrium, a Latin word, compounded of *op* or *ob* and *probrum*, signifies the highest degree of reproach or stain.

The idea of discredit or disgrace in the highest possible degree is common to all these terms: but *infamy* is that which attaches more to the thing than to the person; *ignominy* is thrown upon the person; and *opprobrium* is thrown upon the agent rather than the action.

Infamy causes either the person or thing to be ill spoken of by all; abhorrence of both is expressed by every mouth, and the ill report spreads from mouth to mouth: *ignominy* causes the name and the person to be held in contempt; it becomes debased in the eyes of others: *opprobrium* causes the person to be spoken of in severe terms of reproach, and to be shunned as something polluted. The *infamy* of a traitorous proceeding is increased by the addition of ingratitude; the *ignominy* of a public punishment is increased by the wickedness of the offender; *opprobrium* sometimes falls upon the innocent, when circumstances seem to convict them of guilt.

Infamy is bestowed by the public voice; it does not belong to one nation or one age, but to every age: the *infamy* of a base transaction, as the massacre of the Danes in England, or of the Huguenots in France, will be handed down to the latest posterity. *Ignominy* is brought on a person by the act of the magistrate: the public sentence of the law, and the infliction of that sentence, exposes the name to public scorn: the *ignominy*, however, seldom extends beyond the individuals who are immediately concerned in it: every honest man, however humble his station and narrow his sphere, would fain preserve his name from being branded with the *ignominy* of his having suffered himself, or any of his family, death by the gallows. *Opprobrium* is the judgement passed by the public; it is more silent and even more confined than the *infamy* and the *ignominy*: individuals are exposed to it according to the nature of the imputations under which they lie: every good man would be anxious to escape the *opprobrium* of having forfeited his integrity.

The share of *infamy* that is likely to fall to the lot of each individual in public acts is small indeed.—BURKE.

For strength from truth divided, and from just,
Illaudable nought merits but dispraise
And *ignominy*.—MILTON.

Nor be their outward only with the skins
Of beasts, but inward nakedness much more
Opprobrious, with his robe of righteousness
Arraying, cover'd from his father's sight.—MILTON.

Infantine, v. Childish.

Infatuation, v. *Intoxication*.

Infection, v. *Contagion*.

Inference, v. *Conclusion*.

Inferior, v. *Second*.

Inferior, v. *Subject*.

Infidelity, v. *Unbelief*.

Infinite, v. *Boundless*.

Infirm, v. *Weak*.

Infirmity, v. *Debility*.

Influence, v. *Credit*.

Influence, Authority, Ascendancy, Sway.

Influence, v. *Credit*.

Authority, in Latin *auctoritas*, from *auctor* the author or prime mover of a thing, signifies that power which is vested in the prime mover of any business.

Ascendancy, from *ascend*, signifies having the upper hand.

Sway, like our word *swing* and the German word *schweben*, comes from the Hebrew *zu* to move.

These terms imply power, under different circumstances: *influence* is altogether unconnected with any right to direct; *authority* includes the idea of right necessarily; superiority of rank, talent, or property, personal attachment, and a variety of circumstances give *influence*; it commonly acts by persuasion, and employs engaging manners, so as to determine in favour of what is proposed: superior wisdom, age, office, and relation give *authority*; it determines of itself, it requires no collateral aid: *ascendancy* and *sway* are modes of *influence*, differing only in degree; they both imply an excessive and improper degree of *influence* over the mind, independent of reason: the former is, however, more gradual in its process, and consequently more confirmed in its nature the latter may be only temporary, but may be more violent. A person employs many arts, and for a length of time, to gain the *ascendancy*; but he exerts a *sway* by a violent stretch of power. It is of great importance for those who have *influence*, to conduct themselves consistently with their rank and station: men are apt to regard the warnings and admonitions of a true friend as an odious assumption of *authority*, while they voluntarily give themselves up to the *ascendancy* which a valet or a mistress has gained over them, who exert the most unwarrantable *sway* to serve their own interested and vicious purposes.

Influence and *ascendancy* are said likewise of things as well as persons: true religion will have an *influence* not only on the outward conduct of a man, but on the inward affections of his heart; and that man is truly happy in whose mind it has the *ascendancy* over every other principle.

The *influence* of France as a republic is equal to a war.—BURKE.

Without the force of *authority* the power of soldiers grows pernicious to their master.—FEMPLE.

France, since her revolution, is under the *sway* of a sect, whose leaders, at one stroke, have demolished the whole body of jurisprudence.—BURKE.

If you allow any passion, even though it be esteemed innocent, to acquire an absolute *ascendant*, your inward peace will be impaired.—BLAIR.

To Inform, Make Known, Acquaint, Apprise.

The idea of bringing to the knowledge of one or more persons is common to all these terms. *Inform*, from the Latin *informo* to fashion the mind, comprehends this general idea only, without the addition of any collateral idea; it is therefore the generic term, and the rest specific: to *inform* is to communicate what has lately happened, or the contrary; but to **Make Known** is to bring to light what has long been *known* and purposely concealed; to *inform* is to communicate directly or indirectly to one or many; to *make known* is mostly to communicate indirectly to many: one *informs* the public of one's intentions, by means of an advertisement in one's own name; one *makes known* a fact through a circuitous channel, and without any name. To *inform* may be either a personal address or otherwise; to **Acquaint** and **Apprise** are immediate and personal communications. One *informs* the government, or any public body, or one *informs* one's friends; one *acquaints* or *apprizes* only one's friends, or particular individuals: one is *informed* of that which either concerns the informant or the person informed; one *acquaints* a person with or *apprizes* him of such things as peculiarly concern himself, but the latter in more specific circumstances than the former; one *informs* a correspondent by letter of the day on which he may expect to receive his order, or of one's own wishes with regard to an order; one *acquaints* a father with all the circumstances that respect his son's conduct; one *apprizes* a friend of a bequest that has been made to him; one *informs* the magistrate of any irregularity that passes; one *acquaints* the master of a family with the misconduct of his servants: one *apprizes* a person of the time when he will be obliged to appear.

Religion *enforms* us that misery and sin were produced together.—JOHNSON.

But fools, to talking ever prone,
Are sure to *make* their follies known.—GAY.

If any man lives under a minister that doth not act according to the rules of the gospel, it is his own fault in that he doth not *acquaint* the bishop with it.—BEVERIDGE.

You know, without my telling you, with what zeal I have recommended you to Cæsar, although you may not be *apprized* that I have frequently written to him upon that subject.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

To Inform, Instruct, Teach.

The communication of knowledge in general is the common idea by which these words are connected with each other. *Inform* is here, as in the preceding article (v. *To inform, make known*), the general term; the other two are specific terms. To *inform* is the act of persons in all conditions; to **Instruct** and **Teach** are the acts of superiors, either on one ground

or another: one *informs* by virtue of an accidental superiority or priority of knowledge; one *instructs* by virtue of superior knowledge or superior station; one *teaches* by virtue of superior knowledge rather than of station: diplomatic agents *inform* their governments of the political transactions in which they have been concerned: government *instructs* its different functionaries and officers in regard to their mode of proceeding: professors and preceptors *teach* those who attend public schools to learn.

To *inform* is applicable to matters of general interest: we may *inform* ourselves or others on anything which is a subject of inquiry or curiosity; and the *information* serves either to amuse or to improve the mind: to *instruct* is applicable to matters of serious concern, or to that which is practically useful; it serves to set us right in the path of life; a parent *instructs* the child in the course of conduct he should pursue; a good child profits by the *instruction* of a good parent to make him wiser and better for the time to come: to *teach* respects matters of art and science; the learner depends upon the teacher for the formation of his mind, and the establishment of his principles. Every one ought to be properly *informed* before he pretends to give an opinion; the young and inexperienced must be *instructed* before they can act; the ignorant must be taught, in order to guard them against error. Truth and sincerity are all that is necessary for an informant; general experience and a perfect knowledge of the subject in question are requisite for the instructor; fundamental knowledge is requisite for a teacher. Those who give *information* upon the authority of others are liable to mislead; those who *instruct* others in doing that which is bad, scandalously abuse the authority that is reposed in them; those who pretend to *teach* what they themselves do not understand, mostly betray their ignorance sooner or later.

To *inform* and to *teach* are employed for things as well as persons; to *instruct* only for persons: books and reading *inform* the mind; history or experience *teaches* mankind.

While we only desire to have our ignorance *informed*, we are most delighted with the plainest diction.—JOHNSON.

Not Thraëan Orpheus should transcend my lays,
Nor LINUS, crown'd with never-fading bays;
Though each his heav'nly parent should inspire,
The Muse *instruct* the voice, and Phœbus tune the lyre.
DRYDEN.

He that *teaches* us anything which we knew not before is undoubtedly to be revered as a master.—JOHNSON.

Informant, Informer.

These two epithets, from the verb to inform, have acquired by their application an important distinction. The **Informant** being he who informs for the benefit of others, and the **Informer** to the molestation of others. What the informant communicates is for the benefit of the individual, and what the informer communicates is for the benefit of the whole. The informant is thanked for his civility in making the communication; the informer undergoes a great deal of odium, but is thanked by not one, not even by those who

employ him. We may all be *informants* in our turn, if we know of anything of which another may be informed; but none are *informers* who do not inform against the transgressors of any law.

Every member of society feels and acknowledges the necessity of detecting crimes, yet scarce any degree of virtue or reputation is able to secure an *informor* from public hatred.—JOHNSON.

Aye (says our Artist's *informant*), but at the same time he declared you (Hogarth) were as good a portrait painter as Vandyke.—PILKINGTON.

Information, Intelligence, Notice, Advice.

Information (*v. To inform*) signifies the thing of which one is informed; **Intelligence**, from the Latin *intelligo* to understand signifies that by which one is made to understand; **Notice** from the Latin *notitia*, is that which brings a circumstance to our knowledge; **Advice** (*v. Advice*) signifies that which is made known. These terms come very near to each other in signification, but differ in application: *information* is the most general and indefinite of all; the three others are but modes of *information*. Whatever is communicated to us is *information*, be it public or private, open or concealed; *notice*, *intelligence*, and *advice* are mostly public, but particularly the former. *Information* and *notice* may be communicated by word of mouth or by writing; *intelligence* is mostly communicated by writing or printing; *advices* are mostly sent by letter: *information* is mostly an informal mode of communication; *notice*, *intelligence*, and *advice* are mostly formal communications. A servant gives his master *information*, or one friend sends another *information* from the country; magistrates or officers give *notice* of such things as it concerns the public to know and to observe; spies give *intelligence* of all that passes under their notice; or *intelligence* is given in the public prints of all that passes worthy of notice; a military commander sends *advice* to his government of the operations which are going forward under his direction; or one merchant gives *advice* to another of the state of the market.

Information, as calculated to influence men's actions, ought to be correct: those who are too eager to know what is passing are often misled by false *information*. *Notice*, as it serves either to warn or direct, ought to be timely; no law of general interest is carried into effect without timely *notice* being given. *Intelligence*, as the first intimation of an interesting event, ought to be early; *advices*, as entering into details, ought to be clear and particular; official *advices* often arrive to contradict non-official *intelligence*.

Information and *intelligence*, when applied as characteristics of men, have a farther distinction: the man of *information* is so denominated only on account of his knowledge; but a man of *intelligence* is so denominated on account of his understanding as well as experience and information. It is not possible to be *intelligent* without *information*; but we may be well *informed* without being remarkable for *intelligence*: a man of *information* may be an agreeable companion, and fitted to maintain conversation; but an *intelligent* man

will be an instructive companion, and most fitted for conducting business.

There, centering in a focus round and neat.
Let all your rays of *information* meet.—COWPER.

My lion, whose jaws are at all hours open to *intelligence*, informs me that there are a few enormous weapons still in being.—STEEL.

At his years
Death gives short notice.—THOMSON.

As he was dictating to his hearers with great authority, there came in a gentleman from Garraway's, who told us that there were several letters from France just come in, with *advice* that the king was in good health.—ADDISON.

Informor, v. Informant.

Infraction, v. Infringement.

To Infringe, v. To encroach.

To Infringe, Violate, Transgress.

Infringe, from *frango* to break, signifies to use force into.

Violate, from the Latin *vis* force, signifies to use force towards.

Transgress, from *trans* and *gredior*, signifies to go beyond, or farther than we ought.

Civil and moral laws are *infringed* by those who act in opposition to them: treaties and engagements are *violated* by those who do not hold them sacred: the bounds which are prescribed by the moral law are *transgressed* by those who are guilty of any excess. It is the business of government to see that the rights and privileges of individuals or particular bodies be not *infringed*; policy but too frequently runs counter to equity; where the particular interests of princes are more regarded than the dictates of conscience; treaties and compacts are first *violated* and then justified: the passions, when not kept under proper control, will ever hurry men on to *transgress* the limits of right reason.

I hold friendship to be a very holy league, and no less than a piacle to *infringe* it.—HOWEL.

No violated leagues with sharp remorse
Shall sting the conscious victor.—SOMERVILLE.

Why hast thou, Satan, broke the bounds prescrib'd
To thy transgressions!—MILTON.

Infringement, Infraction.

Infringement and **Infraction**, which are both derived from the Latin verb *infringo* or *frango* (*v. To infringe*), are employed according to the different senses of the verb *infringe*: the former being applied to the rights of individuals, either in their domestic or public capacity; and the latter rather to national transactions. Politeness, which teaches us what is due to every man in the smallest concerns, considers any unasked for interference in the private affairs of another as an *infringement*. Equity, which enjoins on nations as well as individuals an attentive consideration to the interests of the whole, forbids the *infraction* of a treaty in any case.

We see with Orestes (or rather with Sophocles), that "it is fit that such gross *infringements* of the moral law (as parricide) should be punished with death,"—MACKENZIE.

No people can without the *infraction* of the universal league of social beings, incite those practices in another dominion which they would themselves punish in their own.—JOHNSON.

To Infuse, *v.* To implant.

Ingenious, *v.* Ingenuous.

Ingenuity, Wit.

Ingenuity, *v.* Ingenuous.

Wit, from the German *wissen* to know, signifies knowledge or understanding.

Both these terms imply acuteness of understanding, and differ mostly in the mode of displaying themselves. *Ingenuity* comprehends invention; *wit* comprehends knowledge. One is *ingenious* in matters either of art or science; one is *witty* only in matters of sentiment: things may, therefore, be *ingenious*, but not *witty*; *witty*, but not *ingenious*; or both *witty* and *ingenious*. A mechanical invention, or an ordinary contrivance, is *ingenious*, but not *witty*: we say, an *ingenious*, not a *witty* solution of a difficulty: a flash of *wit*, not a flash of *ingenuity*: a *witty* humour, a *witty* conversation; not an *ingenious* humour or conversation; on the other hand, a conceit is *ingenious*, as it is the fruit of one's own mind; it is *witty*, as it contains point, and strikes on the understanding of others.

Men were formerly won over to opinions by the candour, sense, and *ingenuity* of those who had the right on their side.—ADDISON.

When I broke loose from that great body of writers who have employed their *wit* and *parts* in propagating vice and irreligion, I did not question but I should be treated as an odd kind of fellow.—ADDISON.

Ingenuous, *v.* Frank.

Ingenuous, Ingenious.

It would not have been necessary to point out the distinction between these two words if they had not been confounded in writing, as well as in speaking. *Ingenuous*, in Latin *ingenuus*, and *Ingenious*, in Latin *ingeniosus*, are, either immediately or remotely, both derived from *ingigno* to be in-born; but the former respects the freedom of the station and consequent nobleness of the character which is in-born: the latter respects the genius or mental powers which are in-born. Truth is coupled with freedom or nobility of birth; the *ingenuous*, therefore, bespeaks the in-born freedom, by asserting the noblest right, and following the noblest impulse, of human nature, namely, that of speaking the truth; *genius* is altogether a natural endowment, that is born with us, independent of external circumstances; the *ingenious* man, therefore, displays his powers as occasion may offer. We love the *ingenuous* character, on account of the qualities of his heart; we admire the *ingenious* man on account of the endowments of his mind. One is *ingenuous* as a man; or *ingenious* as an author: a man confesses an action *ingenuously*; he defends it *ingeniously*.

Compare the *ingenuous* pliability to virtuous counsels which is in youth, to the confirmed obstinacy in an old sinner.—SOUTH.

Ingenuous to their ruin, every age
Improves the arts and instruments of rage.—WALLER.

To Ingraft, *v.* To implant.

To Ingratiate, *v.* To insinuate.

To Ingulf, *v.* To absorb.

To Inhabit, *v.* To abide.

Inherent, Inbred, Inborn, Innate.

The *Inherent*, from *hæreo* to stick, denotes a permanent quality or property as opposed to that which is adventitious and transitory. *Inbred* denotes that which is derived principally from habit or by a gradual process, as opposed to what is acquired by actual efforts. *Inborn* denotes that which is purely natural, in opposition to the artificial. *Inherent* is the most general in its sense; for what is *inbred* and *inborn* is naturally *inherent*; but all is not *inbred* and *inborn* which is *inherent*. Inanimate objects have *inherent* properties; but the *inbred* and *inborn* exists only in that which receives life; solidity is an *inherent*, but not an *inbred* or *inborn*, property of matter: a love of truth is an *innate* property of the human mind; it is consequently *inherent*, inasmuch as nothing can totally destroy it. That which is *inbred* is bred or nurtured in us from our birth; that which is *inborn* is simply born in us: a property may be *inborn*, but not *inbred*: it cannot, however, be *inbred* and not *inborn*. Habits which are ingrafted into the natural disposition are properly *inbred*: whence the vulgar proverb that "what is *bred* in the bone will never be out of the flesh," to denote the influence which parents have on the characters of their children, both physically and morally. Propensities, on the other hand, which are totally independent of education or external circumstances, are properly *inborn*, as an *inborn* love of freedom; hence, likewise, the properties of animals are *inbred* in them, inasmuch as they are derived through the medium of the breed of which the parent partakes.

Inborn and *Innate*, from the Latin *natus* born, are precisely the same in meaning, yet they differ somewhat in application. Poetry and the grave style have adopted *inborn*; philosophy has adopted *innate*: *genius* is *inborn* in some men; nobleness is *inborn* in others: there is an *inborn* talent in some men to command, and an *inborn* fitness in others to obey. Mr. Locke and his followers are pleased to say there is no such thing as *innate* ideas: and if they only mean that there are no sensible impressions on the soul, until it is acted upon by external objects, they may be right: but if they mean to say that there are no *inborn* characters or powers in the soul which predispose it for the reception of certain impressions, they contradict the experience of the learned and the unlearned in all ages, who believe, and that from close observation on themselves and others, that man has, from his birth, not only the general character which belongs to him in common with his species, but also those peculiar characteristics which distinguish individuals from their earliest infancy: all these characters or characteristics are, therefore, not supposed to be produced, but elicited, by circumstances; and ideas, which are but the sensible forms that the soul assumes in its connection with the body, are, on that account, in vulgar language termed *innate*.

When my new mind had no infusion known,
Thou gav'st so deep a tincture of thine own,
That ever since I vainly try
To wash away th' *inherent* dye.—COWLEY.

But he, my *inbred* enemy,
Forth issu'd, brandishing his fatal dart,
Made to destroy; I fled, and cry'd out death!
MILTON.

Despair, and secret shame, and conscious thought
Of *inborn* worth, his lab'ring soul oppress'd.
DRYDEN.

Grant these inventions of the crafty priest,
Yet such inventions never could subsist
Unless some glimmerings of a future state
Were with the mind coeval and *innate*.—JENYNS.

Inhuman, v. Cruel.

Inimical, v. Adverse.

Iniquitous, v. Wicked.

Injunction, v. Command.

To Injure, v. To impair.

Injury, v. Disadvantage.

**Injury, Damage, Hurt, Harm,
Mischief.**

Injury, v. Disadvantage.

Damage, from the Latin *damnum*, signifies literally a loss.

Hurt, v. Disadvantage.

Harm, v. Evil.

Mischief, v. Evil.

The idea of making a thing otherwise than it ought to be is common to these terms. *Injury* is the most general term, simply implying what happens contrary to right; the rest are but modes of *injury*; *damage* is that *injury* which takes away from the value of a thing; *hurt* is the *injury* which destroys the soundness or wholeness of a thing; *harm* is *injury* which is attended with trouble and inconvenience; *mischief* is *injury* which interrupts the order and consistency of things. *Injury* is applicable to all bodies, physical and moral; *damage* is applicable only to physical bodies. Trade may suffer an *injury*; a building may suffer an *injury*; but a building, a vessel, or merchandize, suffer a *damage*. When applied to physical bodies, *injury* comprehends everything which makes an object otherwise than it ought to be; that is to say, all collateral circumstances which are connected with the end and purpose of things; but *damage* implies that actual *injury* which affects the structure and materials of the object: the situation of some buildings is an *injury* to them; the falling of a chimney, or the breaking of a roof, is a *damage*: an *injury*, is not easily removed; a *damage* is easily repaired.

Injury and *hurt* are both applied to persons; but *injury* may either affect their bodies, their circumstances, or their minds; *hurt* in its proper sense affects only their bodies. We may receive an *injury* or a *hurt* by a fall; but the former term is employed when the health or spirits of a person suffer, the latter when any fracture or wound is produced. A person sometimes sustains an *injury* (from a fall, either by losing the use of a limb or by the deprivation of his senses) which descends

with him to the grave; a sprain, a cut, or a bruise, are little *hurts* which are easily cured. The term *hurt* is sometimes figuratively employed as it respects the circumstances of a man, where the idea of inflicting a wound or a pain is implied; as in *hurting* a man's good name, *hurting* his reputation, *hurting* his morals, and other such cases, in which the specific term *hurt* may be substituted for the general term *injury*.

The terms *injury*, *harm*, and *mischief* are all employed for the circumstances of either things or men; but *injury* comprehends cause and effect; *harm* and *mischief* respect the evil as it is. If we say that an *injury* is done, we always think of either the agent by which it is done or the object to which it is done, or both; but when we speak of a *harm* or a *mischief*, we only think of the nature and measure of the one or the other. It is an *injury* to society to let public offenders go free; young people do not always consider the *harm* which there may be in some of their most imprudent actions; the *mischief* of disseminating free principles among the young and the ignorant, has been found to exceed all the good which might result from the superior cultivation of the human mind, and the more extended diffusion of knowledge.

The distant Trojans never *injured* me.—POPE.

No plough shall *hurt* the glebe, no pruning hook the vine.
DRYDEN.

With *harmless* play amidst the bowls he pass'd.—
DRYDEN.

But furious Dido, with dark thoughts involv'd,
Shook at the mighty *mischief* she resolv'd.—DRYDEN.

Injury, v. Injustice.

Injustice, Injury, Wrong.

Injustice (*v. Justice*), **Injury** (*v. Disadvantage*), and **Wrong**, signifying the thing that is *wrong*, are all opposed to the right; but the *injustice* lies in the principle, the *injury* in the action that *injures*. There may, therefore, be *injustice* where there is no specific *injury*; and, on the other hand, there may be *injury* where there is no *injustice*. When we think worse of a person than we ought to think, we do him an act of *injustice*; but we do not, in the strict sense of the word, do him an *injury*: on the other hand, if we say anything to the discredit of another, it will be an *injury* to his reputation if it be believed; but it may not be an *injustice* if it be strictly conformable to truth, and that which one is compelled to say.

The violation of justice, or a breach of the rule of right, constitutes the *injustice*; but the quantum of ill which falls on the person constitutes the *injury*. Sometimes a person is dispossessed of his property by fraud or violence, this is an act of *injustice*; but it is not an *injury* if, in consequence of this act, he obtains friends who make it good to him beyond what he has lost: on the other hand, a person suffers very much through the inadvertence of another, which to him is a serious *injury*, although the offender has not been guilty of *injustice*.

A *wrong* partakes both of *injustice* and

injury: it is in fact an *injury* done by one person to another, in express violation of justice. The man who seduces a woman from the path of virtue does her the greatest of all wrongs. One repents of *injustice*, repairs *injuries*, and redresses wrongs.

A lie is properly a species of *injustice*, and a violation of the right of that person to whom the false speech is directed.—SOUTH.

Law-suits I'd shun with as much studious care
As I would dens where hungry lions are;
And rather put up injuries than be
A plague to him who'd be a plague to me.

POMFREY.

The humble man, when he receives a *wrong*,
Refers revenge to whom it doth belong.—WALLER.

Innate, v. Inherent.

Inner, v. Inward.

Innocent, v. Guiltless.

Inoffensive, v. Unoffending.

Inordinate, v. Irregular.

To Inquire, v. To ask.

Inquiry, v. Examination.

Inquisitive, v. Curious.

Inroad, v. Invasion.

Insanity, v. Derangement.

Inscrutable, v. Unsearchable.

Insensibility, v. Indifference.

Insensible, v. Hard

Inside, Interior.

The term *Inside* may be applied to bodies of any magnitude, small or large; *Interior* is peculiarly appropriate to bodies of great magnitude. We may speak of the *inside* of a nut-shell, but not of its *interior*: on the other hand, we speak of the *interior* of St. Paul's, or the *interior* of a palace. This difference of application is not altogether arbitrary: for *inside* literally signifies the side that is inward; but *interior* signifies the space which is more inward than the rest, which is inclosed in an inclosure: consequently cannot be applied to anything but a large space that is inclosed.

As for the *inside* of their nest, none but themselves were concerned in it, according to the inviolable laws established among those animals (the ants).—ADDISON.

The gates are drawn back, and the *interior* of the fane is discovered.—CUMBERLAND.

Insidious, Treacherous.

Insidious, in Latin *insidiosus*, from *insidie* stratagem or ambush, from *insideo* to lie in wait or ambush.

Treacherous is changed from *traitorous*, and derived from *trado* to betray, signifying in general the disposition to betray.

The *insidious* man is not so bad as the *treacherous* man; for the former only lies in wait to ensnare us when we are off our guard; but the latter throws us off our guard by lulling us into a state of security, in order the more effectually to get us into his power: an

enemy is, therefore, denominated *insidious*, but a friend is *treacherous*. The *insidious* man has recourse to various little artifices by which he wishes to effect his purpose, and gain an advantage over his opponent; the *treacherous* man pursues a system of direct falsehood in order to ruin his friend: the *insidious* man objects to a fair and open contest; but the *treacherous* man assails in the dark him whom he should support. The opponents to Christianity are fond of *insidious* attacks upon its sublime truths, because they have not always courage to proclaim their own shame; the *treachery* of some men depends for its success on the credulity of others; as in the case of the Trojans who listened to the tale of Sinon, the Grecian spy.

Deceit, that friendship's mask *insidious* wears.
JENYNS.

The world must think him in the wrong,
Would say he made a *treach'rous* use
Of wit, to flatter and seduce.—SWIFT.

Insight, Inspection.

The **Insight** as to anything is what we receive: the **Inspection** is what we give: one gets a view into a thing by an *insight*; one takes a view over a thing by an *inspection*. An *insight* serves to increase our own knowledge: *inspection* enables us to instruct others. An inquisitive traveller tries to get an *insight* into the manners, customs, laws, and government of the countries which he visits; by *inspection* a master discovers the errors which are committed by his scholars, and sets them right.

Angels both good and bad have a full *insight* into the activity and force of natural causes.—SOUTH.

Something no doubt is designed; but what that is, I will not presume to determine from an *inspection* of men's hearts.—SOUTH.

Insignificant, v. Unimportant.

To Insinuate, v. To hint.

To Insinuate, Ingratiate.

Insinuate (*v. To hint*), and **Ingratiate**, from *gratus* grateful or acceptable, are employed to express an endeavour to gain favour; but they differ in the circumstances of the action. A person who *insinuates* adopts every art to steal into the good-will of another; but he who *ingratiates* adopts unartificial means to conciliate good will. A person of *insinuating* manners wins upon another imperceptibly, even so as to convert dislike into attachment; a person with *ingratiating* manners procures good-will by a permanent intercourse. *Insinuate* and *ingratiate* differ in the motive, as well as the mode, of the action: the motive is, in both cases, self-interest; but the former is unlawful, and the latter allowable. In proportion as the object to be attained by another's favour is base, so is it necessary to have recourse to *insinuation*; whilst the object to be obtained is that which may be avowed, *ingratiating* will serve the purpose. Low persons *insinuate* themselves into the favour of their superiors in order to obtain an influence over them: it is commendable in a

young person to wish to *ingratiate* himself with those who are entitled to his esteem and respect.

Insinuate may be used in the improper sense for unconscious agents; *ingratiate* is always the act of a conscious agent. Water will *insinuate* itself into every body that is in the smallest degree porous; there are few persons of so much apathy that it may not be possible, one way or another, to *ingratiate* one's self into their favour.

The same character of despotism *insinuated* itself into every court of Europe.—BURKE.

My resolution was now to *ingratiate* myself with men whose reputation was established.—JOHNSON.

Insinuation, Reflection.

These both imply personal remarks, or such remarks as are directed towards an individual; but the former is less direct and more covert than the latter. An *Insinuation* always deals in half words; a *Reflection* is commonly open. They are both levelled at the individual with no good intent: but the *insinuation* is general, and may be employed to convey any unfavourable sentiment; the *reflection* is particular, and commonly passes between intimates and persons in close connexion.

The *insinuation* respects the honour, the moral character, or the intellectual endowments of the person: the *reflection* respects his particular conduct or feelings towards another. Envious people throw out *insinuations* to the disparagement of those whose merits they dare not openly question; when friends quarrel, they deal largely in *reflections* on the past.

The prejudiced admirers of the ancients are very angry at the least *insinuation* that they had any idea of our barbarous tragi-comedy.—TWINING.

The ill-natured man gives utterance to *reflections* which a good-natured man stifles.—ADDISON.

Insipid, Dull, Flat.

Insipid, in Latin *insipidus* from *in* and *sapio*, to taste, signifies without savour.

Dull, *v. Dull*.

Flat, *v. Flat*.

A want of spirit in the moral sense is designated by these epithets, which borrow their figurative meaning from different properties in nature: the taste is referred to in the word *insipid*; the properties of colours are considered under the word *dull*; the property of surface is referred to by the word *flat*. As the want of flavour in any meat constitutes it *insipid*, and renders it worthless, so does the want of mind or character in a man render him equally *insipid*, and devoid of the distinguishing characteristic of his nature: as the beauty and perfection of colours consist in their brightness, the absence of this essential property, which constitutes *dulness*, renders them uninteresting objects to the eye; so the want of spirit in a moral composition, which constitutes its *dulness*, deprives it at the same time of that ingredient which should awaken attention: as in the natural world objects are either elevated or *flat*, so in the moral world the spirits are either raised or depressed, and

such moral representations as are calculated to raise the spirits are termed spirited, whilst those which fail in this object are termed *flat*. An *insipid* writer is without sentiment of any kind or degree; a *dull* writer fails in vivacity and vigour of sentiment; a *flat* performance is wanting in the property of provoking mirth, which should be its peculiar ingredient.

To a covetous man all other things but wealth are *insipid*.—SOUTH.

But yet beware of councils when too full,
Number makes long disputes and graveness *dull*.
DENHAM.

The senses are disgusted with their old entertainments, and existence turns *flat* and *insipid*.—GROVE.

To Insist, Persist.

Both these terms being derived from the Latin *sisto* to stand, express the idea of resting or keeping to a thing; but *Insist* signifies to rest on a point, and *Persist*, from *per* through or by and *sisto* (*v. To continue*), signifies to keep on with a thing, to carry it through. We *insist* on a matter by maintaining it; we *persist* in a thing by continuing to do it; we *insist* by the force of authority or argument; we *persist* by the mere act of the will. A person *insists* on that which he conceives to be his right: or he *insists* on that which he conceives to be right: but he *persists* in that which he has no will to give up. To *insist* is therefore an act of discretion; to *persist* is mostly an act of folly or caprice: the former is always taken in a good or indifferent sense; the latter mostly in a bad sense. A parent ought to *insist* on all matters that are of essential importance to his children; a spoiled child *persists* in its follies from perversity of humour.

This natural tendency of despotic power to ignorance and barbarity, though not *insisted* upon by others, is, I think, no inconsiderable argument against that form of government.—ADDISON.

To Insnare, Entrap, Entangle, Enveigle.

The idea of getting any object artfully into one's power is common to all these terms: To *Insnare* is to take in or by means of a *snare*; to *Entrap* is to take in a *trap* or by means of a *trap*; to *Entangle* is to take in a *tangle*, or by means of tangled thread; to *Enveigle* is to take by means of making blind, from the French *aveugle* blind.

Insnare and *entangle* are used either in the natural or moral sense; *entrap* mostly in the natural, *enveigle* only in the moral sense. In the natural sense birds are *insnares* by means of bird-lime, nooses, or whatever else may deprive them of their liberty: men and beasts are *entrapped* in whatever serves as a *trap* or an inclosure; they may be *entrapped* by being lured into a house or any place of confinement; all creatures are *entangled* by nets, or that which confines the limbs and prevents them from moving forward.

In the moral sense, men are said to be *insnares* by their own passions and the allurements of pleasure into a course of vice which deprives them of the use of their faculties, and makes them virtually captives; they are *entangled* by their errors and imprudencies in difficulties which interfere with their moral freedom, and prevent them from acting. They

are *enveigled* by the artifices of others, when the consequences of their own actions are shut out from their view, and they are made to walk like blind men. Insidious freethinkers make no scruple of *insnaring* the immature understanding by the proposal of such doubts and difficulties as shall shake their faith. When a man is *entangled* in the toils of a wicked woman, the more he plunges to get his liberty, the faster she binds him in her toils. The practice of *enveigling* young persons of either sex into houses of ill-fame is not so frequent at present as it was in former times.

This lion (the literary lion) has a particular way of imitating the sound of the creature he would *insnare*.—ADDISON.

Though the new-dawning year in its advance
With hope's gay promise lark *entrap* the mind,
Let memory give one retrospective glance.
CUMBERLAND.

Some men weave their sophistry till their own reason is *entangled*.—JOHNSON.

Why the *enveigling* of a woman before she is come to years of discretion should not be as criminal as the seducing her before she is ten years old, I am at a loss to comprehend.—ADDISON.

Insolent, v. Impertinent.

Insolvency, Failure, Bankruptcy.

Insolvency, from *insolve* not to pay, signifies the state of not paying, or not being able to pay.

Failure, v. Failure.

Bankruptcy, from the two words *banca rupta*, signifies a broken bank.

All these terms are in particular use in the mercantile world, but are not excluded also from general application. *Insolvency* is a state; *failure*, an act flowing out of that state; and *bankruptcy* an effect of that act. *Insolvency* is a condition of not being able to pay one's debts; *failure* is a cessation of business, from the want of means to carry it on; and *bankruptcy* is a legal surrender of all one's remaining goods into the hands of one's creditors, in consequence of a real or supposed *insolvency*. These terms are seldom confined to one person, or description of persons. As an incapacity to pay debts is very frequent among others besides men of business, *insolvency* is said of any such persons; a gentleman may die in a state of *insolvency* who does not leave effects sufficient to cover all demands. Although *failure* is here specifically taken for a *failure* in business, yet there may be a *failure* in one particular undertaking without any direct *insolvency*: a *failure* may likewise only imply a temporary *failure* in payment, or it may imply an entire *failure* of the concern. As a *bankruptcy* is a legal transaction, which entirely dissolves the firm under which any business is conducted, it necessarily implies a *failure* in the full extent of the term; yet it does not necessarily imply an *insolvency*; for some men may in consequence of a temporary *failure* be led to commit an act of *bankruptcy* who are afterwards enabled to give a full dividend to all their creditors.

By an act of *insolvency* all persons who are in too low a way of dealing to be bankrupts, or not in a mercantile state of life, are discharged from all suits and imprison-

ments, by delivering up all their estate and effects.—BLACKSTONE.

The greater the whole quantity of trade, the greater of course must be the positive number of *failures*, while the aggregate success is still in the same proportion.—BURKE.

That *bankruptcy*, the very apprehension of which is one of the causes assigned for the fall of the monarchy, was the capital on which the French republic opened her traffic with the world.—BURKE.

Inspection, v. Insight.

Inspection, Superintendency, Oversight.

The office of looking into the conduct of others is expressed by both these terms; but the former comprehends little more than the preservation of good order; the latter includes the arrangement of the whole.

The monitor of a school has the **Inspection** of the conduct of his schoolfellows, but the master has the **Superintendency** of the school. The officers of an army *inspect* the men, to see that they observe all the rules that have been laid down to them; a general or superior officer has the *superintendency* of any military operation. Fidelity is peculiarly wanted in an *inspector*, judgment and experience in a *superintendent*. *Inspection* is said of things as well as persons; **Oversight** only of persons: one has the *inspection* of books in order to ascertain their accuracy; one has the *oversight* of persons to prevent irregularity: there is an *inspector* of the customs, and an *overseer* of the poor.

This author proposes that there should be examiners appointed to *inspect* the genius of every particular boy.—BUDGELL.

When female minds are embittered by age or solitude, their malignity is generally exerted in a spiteful *superintendency* of trifles.—JOHNSON.

To Inspire, v. To animate.

Instance, v. Example.

Instant, Moment.

Instant, from *insto* to stand over, signifies the point of time that stands over us, or as it were over our heads.

Moment, from the Latin *momentum*, is any small particle, particularly a small particle of time.

Instant is always taken for the time present: *moment* is taken generally for either past, present, or future. A dutiful child comes the *instant* he is called; a prudent person embraces the favourable *moment*. When they are both taken for the present time, *instant* expresses a much shorter space than *moment*; when we desire a person to do a thing this *instant*, it requires haste: if we desire him to do it this *moment*, it only admits of no delay. *Instantaneous* relief is necessary on some occasions to preserve life; a *moment's* thought will furnish a ready wit with a suitable reply.

Some circumstances of misery are so powerfully ridiculous that neither kindness nor duty can withstand them; they force the friend, the dependant, or the child, to give way to *instantaneous* motions of merriment.—JOHNSON.

I can easily overlook any present *momentary* sorrow when I reflect that it is in my power to be happy a thousand years hence.—BEEKELEY.

Instantaneously, *v. Directly.*

Instantly, *v. Directly.*

To Instigate, *v. To encourage.*

To Instil, *v. To implant.*

To Institute, Establish, Found,
Erect.

Institute, in Latin *institutus*, participle of *instituo*, from *in* and *statuo* to place or appoint, signifies to dispose or fix a specific end.

Establish, *v. To fix.*

Found, *v. To found.*

Erect, *v. To build.*

To *institute* is to form according to a certain plan; to *establish* is to fix in a certain position what has been formed; to *found* is to lay the foundation of anything; to *erect* is to make erect. Laws, communities, and particular orders are *instituted*: schools, colleges, and various societies are *established*; in the former case something new is supposed to be framed; in the latter case it is supposed only to have a certain situation assigned to it. The Order of the Jesuits was *instituted* by Ignatius de Loyola; schools were *established* by Alfred the Great, in various parts of his dominions. The act of *instituting* comprehends design and method; that of *establishing* includes the idea of authority. The Inquisition was *instituted* in the time of Ferdinand; the Church of England is *established* by authority. To *institute* is always the immediate act of some agent; to *establish* is sometimes the effect of circumstances. Men of public spirit *institute* that which is for the public good; a communication or trade between certain places becomes *established* in course of time. An *institution* is properly of a public nature, but *establishments* are as often private: there are charitable and literary *institutions*, but domestic *establishments*. To *found* is a species of *instituting* which borrows its figurative meaning from the nature of buildings, and is applicable to that which is formed after the manner of a building; a public school is *founded* when its pecuniary resources are formed into a fund or *foundation*. To *erect* is a species of *founding*, for it expresses in fact a leading particular in the act of *founding*: nothing can be *founded* without being *erected*; although some things may be *erected* without being expressly *founded* in the natural sense; a house is both *founded* and *erected*; a monument is *erected* but not *founded*; so in the figurative sense a college is *founded* and consequently *erected*: but a tribunal is *erected*, but not *founded*.

The leap years were fixed to their due times according to Julius Caesar's *institution*.—PRIDEAUX.

The French have outdone us in these particulars by the *establishment* of a society for the invention of proper inscriptions (for their medals).—ADDISON.

After the flood which depopulated Attica, it is generally supposed no king reigned over it till the time of Cecrops, the *founder* of Athens.—CUMBERLAND.

Princes as well as private persons have *erected* colleges, and assigned liberal endowments to students and professors.—BERKELEY.

To Instruct, *v. To inform.*

Instruction, *v. Advice.*

Instrument, Tool.

Instrument, in Latin *instrumentum*, from *instruo*, signifies the thing by which an effect is produced.

Tool comes probably from *toil*, signifying the thing with which one toils. These terms are both employed to express the means of producing an end; they differ principally in this, that the former is used mostly in a good sense, the latter only in a bad sense, for persons. Individuals in high stations are often the *instruments* in bringing about great changes in nations; spies and informers are the worthless tools of government.

Devotion has often been found a powerful *instrument* in humanizing the manners of men.—BLAIR.

Poor York! the harmless tool of others' hate.
He sues for pardon, and repents too late.—SWIFT.

Insufficient, *v. Incapable.*

Insult, *v. Affront.*

Insult, *v. Indignity.*

Insuperable, *v. Invincible.*

Insurmountable, *v. Invincible.*

Insurrection, Sedition, Rebellion,
Revolt.

Insurrection, from *surgo* to rise up, signifies rising up against any power that is.

Sedition, in Latin *seditio*, compounded of *se* and *itio*, signifies a going apart, that is, the people going apart from the government.

Rebellion, in Latin *rebellio*, from *rebello*, signifies turning upon or against in a hostile manner.

Revolt, in French *revolter*, is most probably compounded of *re* and *volver*, from *volvo* to roll, signifying to roll or turn back from, to turn against.

The term *insurrection* is general: it is used in a good or bad sense, according to the nature of the power against which one rises up; *sedition* and *rebellion* are more specific: they are always taken in the bad sense of unallowed opposition to lawful authority. There may be an *insurrection* against usurped power, which is always justifiable; but *sedition* and *rebellion* are levelled against power universally acknowledged to be legitimate. *Insurrection* is always open; it is a rising up of many in a mass; but it does not imply any concerted or any specifically active measure; a united spirit of opposition as the moving cause is all that is comprehended in the meaning of the term: *sedition* is either secret or open, according to circumstances; in popular governments it will be open and determined; in monarchical governments it is secretly organized: *rebellion* is the consummation of *sedition*; the scheme of opposition which has been digested in secrecy breaks out into open hostilities, and becomes *rebellion*. The *insurrection* which was headed by Wat Tyler, in the time of Richard II., was an unhappy instance of widely extended delusion among the common people; the *insurrection* in Madrid, in the year 1808, against the infamous usurpation of

Bonaparte, has led to the most important results that ever sprung from any commotion. Rome was the grand theatre of *seditions*, which were set on foot by the Tribunes; England has been disgraced by one *rebellion*, which ended in the death of its king.

Sedition is common to all forms of government, but flourishes most in republics, since there it can scarcely be regarded as a political or moral offence: *rebellion* exists properly in none but monarchical states; in which the allegiance that men owe to their sovereign requires to be broken with the utmost violence in order to be shaken off. *Insurrections* may be made by nations against a foreign dominion, or by subjects against their government: *sedition* and *rebellion* are carried on by subjects only against their government: *revolt* is carried on only by nations against a foreign dominion; upon the death of Alexander the Great most of his conquered countries *revolted* from his successors.

Elizabeth enjoyed a wonderful calm (excepting some short gusts of *insurrection* at the beginning) for near upon forty-five years together.—HOWELLS.

When the Roman people began to bridle the plebeians to the office of chiefest power and dignity, then began those *seditions* which so long distempered, and at length ruined, the state.—TEMPLE.

If that *rebellion*
Came like itself, in base and abject roots,
You, reverend father, and these noble lords,
Had not been here to dress the ugly forms
Of base and bloody *insurrection*.—SHAKESPEARE.

Our self-love is ever ready to *revolt* from our better judgment, and join the enemy within.—STEELE.

Integrity, v. Honesty.

Intellect, Genius, Talent.

Intellect, in Latin *intellectus* from *intelligo* to understand, signifies the gift of understanding, as opposed to mere instinct or impulse.

Genius, in Latin *genius*, from *gigno* to be born, signifies that which is peculiarly born with us.

Talent, v. Faculty.

Intellect is here the generic term, as it includes in its own meaning that of the two others: there cannot be *genius* or *talent* without *intellect*; but there may be *intellect* without *genius* or *talent*: a man of *intellect* distinguishes himself from the common herd of mankind by the acuteness of his observation, the accuracy of his judgment, the originality of his conceptions, and other peculiar attributes of mental power; *genius* is a particular bent of the *intellect*, which distinguishes a man from every other individual; *talent* is a particular modus or modification of the *intellect*, which is of practical utility to the possessor. **Intellect** sometimes runs through a family, and becomes as it were an hereditary portion: *genius* is not of so communicable a nature; it is that tone of the thinking faculty which is altogether individual in its character; it is opposed to everything artificial, acquired, circumstantial, or incidental; it is a pure spark of the Divine flame, which raises the possessor above all his fellow mortals; it is not expanded like *intellect*, to many objects; for in its very nature it is contracted within a

very short space; and, like the rays of the sun, when concentrated within a focus, it gains in strength what it loses in expansion.

We consider *intellect* as it generally respects speculation and abstraction; but *genius* as it respects the operations of the imagination; *talent* as it respects the exercise or acquirements of the mind. A man of *intellect* may be a good writer; but it requires a *genius* for poetry to be a poet, a *genius* for painting to be a painter, a good *genius* for sculpture to be a statuary, and the like: it requires a *talent* to learn languages; it requires a *talent* for the stage to be a good actor; some have a *talent* for imitation, others a *talent* for humour. **Intellect**, in its strict sense, is seen only in a mature state; *genius* or *talent* may be discovered in its earliest dawn: we speak in general of the *intellect* of a man only; but we may speak of the *genius* or *talent* of a youth: *intellect* qualifies a person for conversation, and affords him great enjoyment: *genius* qualifies a person for the most exalted efforts of the human mind; *talent* qualifies a person for the active duties and employments of life.

There was a select set, supposed to be distinguished by superiority of *intellects*, who always passed the evening together.—JOHNSON.

Thomson thinks in a peculiar train, and always thinks as a man of *genius*.—JOHNSON.

It is commonly thought that the sagacity of these fathers (the Jesuits) in discovering the *talent* of a young student has not a little contributed to the figure which their order has made in the world.—BUDGE.

Intellect, v. Understanding.

Intellectual, v. Mental.

Intelligence, v. Information.

Intelligence, v. Understanding.

Intemperate, v. Excessive.

Intemperate, v. Irregular.

To Intend, v. To design.

Intent, Intense.

Intent and **Intense** are both derived from the verb to *intend*, signifying to stretch towards a point, or to a great degree: the former is said only of the person or mind; the latter qualifies things in general: a person is *intent* when his mind is on the stretch towards an object; his application is *intense* when his mind is for a continuance closely fixed on certain objects; cold is *intense* when it seems to be wound up to its highest pitch.

There is an evil spirit continually active and *intent* to seduce.—SOUTH.

Mutual favours naturally beget an *intense* affection in generous minds.—SPECTATOR.

Intense, v. Intent.

To Intercede, Interpose, Mediate.

Interfere, Intermeddle.

Intercede signifies literally going between; **Interpose**, placing one's self between; **Mediate**, coming in the middle; **Interfere**, setting one's self between; a d **Intermeddle**, meddling or mixing among.

One *intercedes* between parties that are unequal; one *interposes* between parties that are equal: one *intercedes* in favour of that party which is threatened with punishment; one *interposes* between parties that threaten each other with evil; we *intercede* with the parent in favour of the child who has offended, in order to obtain pardon for him; one *interposes* between two friends who are disputing, to prevent them from going to extremities. One *intercedes* by means of persuasion; it is an act of courtesy or kindness in the *interceded* party to comply: one *interposes* by an exercise of authority; it is a matter of propriety or necessity in the parties to conform. The favourite of a monarch *intercedes* in behalf of some criminal, that his punishment may be mitigated; the magistrates *interpose* with their authority, to prevent the broils of the disorderly from coming to serious acts of violence.

To *mediate* and *intercede* are both conciliatory acts; the *intercessor* and *mediator* are equals or even inferiors; to *interpose* is an act of authority, and belongs most commonly to a superior: one *intercedes* or *interposes* for the removal of evil; one *mediates* for the attainment of good: Christ is our *Intercessor*, to avert from us the consequences of our guilt; he is our *Mediator*, to obtain for us the blessings of grace and salvation. An *intercessor* only pleads: a *mediator* guarantees; he takes upon himself a responsibility. Christ is our *Intercessor*, by virtue of his relationship with the Father: he is our *Mediator*, by virtue of his atonement; by which act He takes upon himself the sins of all who are truly penitent.

To *intercede* and *interpose* are employed on the highest and lowest occasions; to *mediate* is never employed but in matters of the greatest moment. As earthly offenders we require the *intercession* of a fellow mortal; as offenders against the God of Heaven, we require the *intercession* of a Divine Being: without the timely *interposition* of a superior, trifling disputes may grow into bloody quarrels; without the *interposition* of Divine Providence, we cannot conceive of anything important as taking place: to settle the affairs of nations, *mediators* may afford a salutary assistance; to bring about the redemption of a lost world, the Son of God condescended to be *Mediator*.

All these acts are performed for the good of others; but *interfere* and *intermeddle* are of a different description: one may *interfere* for the good of others, or to gratify one's self; one never *intermeddles* but for selfish purposes: the first three terms are, therefore, always used in a good sense; the fourth in a good or bad sense, according to circumstances; the last always in a bad sense.

To *interfere* has nothing conciliating in it like *intercede*, nothing authoritative in it like *interpose*, nothing responsible in it like *mediate*; it may be useful or it may be injurious; it may be authorized or unauthorized; it may be necessary or altogether impertinent: when we *interfere* so as to make peace between men, it is useful; but when we *interfere* unreasonably, it often occasions differences rather than removes them.

Intercede, and the others, are said in cases

where two or more parties are concerned; but *interfere* and *intermeddle* are said of what concerns only one individual: one *interferes* and *intermeddles* rather in the concern than between the persons; and, on that account, it becomes a question of some importance to decide when we ought to *interfere* in the affairs of another: with regard to *intermeddle*, it always is the unauthorized act of one who is busy in things that ought not to concern him.

Virgil recovered his estate by Mæcenas's *intercession*.—DRYDEN.

Those few you see escap'd the storm, and fear,
Unless you *interpose*, a shipwreck here.—DRYDEN.

It is generally better (in negotiating) to deal by speech than by letter, and by the *mediation* of a third than by a man's self.—BACON.

Religion *interferes* not with any rational pleasure.—SOUTH.

The sight *intermeddles* not with that which affects the smell.—SOUTH.

Interchange, Exchange, Reciprocity.

Interchange is a frequent and mutual exchange (*v. Change*): *Exchange* consists of one act only; an *interchange* consists of many acts: an *interchange* is used only in the moral sense; *exchange* is used mostly in the proper sense: an *interchange* of civilities keeps alive good will; an *exchange* of commodities is a convenient mode of trade.

Interchange is an act; *Reciprocity* is an abstract property: by an *interchange* of sentiment, friendships are engendered; the *reciprocity* of good services is what renders them doubly acceptable to those who do them and to those who receive them.

Kindness is preserved by a constant *interchange* of pleasures.—JOHNSON.

The whole course of nature is a great *exchange*.—SOUTH.

The services of the poor and the protection of the rich, become *reciprocally* necessary.—BLAIR.

Intercourse, Communication, Connection, Commerce.

Intercourse, in Latin *intercursum*, signifies literally a running between.

Communication, *v. To communicate*.

Connection, *v. To connect*.

Commerce, from *com* and *merces* merchandise, signifies literally an exchange of merchandise, and generally an interchange.

Intercourse and *commerce* subsist only between persons; *communication* and *connection* between persons and things. An *intercourse* with persons may be carried on in various forms; either by an interchange of civilities, which is a friendly *intercourse*; an exchange of commodities, which is a commercial *intercourse*; or an exchange of words, which is a verbal and partial *intercourse*: a *communication* in this sense is a species of *intercourse*; namely, that which consists in the communication of one's thoughts to another: a *connection* consists of a permanent *intercourse*; since one who has a regular *intercourse* for purposes of trade with another is said to have a *connection* with him, or to stand in *connection* with him. There may, therefore,

be a partial *intercourse* or *communication* where there is no *connection*, nothing to bind or link the parties to each other: but there cannot be a *connection* which is not kept up by continual *intercourse*.

The *commerce* is a species of general but close *intercourse*; it may consist either of frequent meeting and regular co-operation or in cohabitation: in this sense we speak of the *commerce* of men one with another, or the *commerce* of man and wife, of parents and children, and the like.

As it respects things, *communication* is said of places in the proper sense; *connection* is used for things in the proper or improper sense: there is said to be a *communication* between two rooms when there is a passage open from one to the other; one house has a *connection* with another when there is a common passage or thoroughfare to them; a *communication* is kept up between two countries by means of regular or irregular conveyances; a *connection* subsists between two towns when the inhabitants trade with each other, intermarry, and the like.

The world is maintained by *intercourse*.—SOUTH.

How happy is an intellectual being who, by prayer and meditation, opens this *communication* between God and his own soul.—ADDISON.

A very material part of our happiness or misery arises from the *connections* we have with those around us.—BLAIR.

I should venture to call politeness benevolence in trifles, or the preference of others to ourselves, in little, daily, and hourly occurrences in the *commerce* of life.—CHATHAM.

Interest, Concern.

The *Interest* (from the Latin *interest* to be amongst, or have a part or a share in a thing), is more comprehensive than *Concern* (*v. Affair*). We have an *interest* in whatever touches or comes near to our feelings or our external circumstances; we have a *concern* in that which respects our external circumstances. *Interest* is that which is agreeable; it consists of either profit, advantage, gain, or amusement; it binds us to an object, and makes us think of it: *concern*, on the other hand, is something involuntary or painful; we have a *concern* in that which we are obliged to look to, which we are bound to from the fear of losing or of suffering. It is the *interest* of every man to cultivate a religious temper; it is the *concern* of all to be on their guard against temptation.

Their *interest* no priest nor sorcerer
Forgets.—DENHAM.

And could the marble rocks but know,
They'd strive to find some secret way unknown,
Maugre the senseless nature of the stone,
Their pity and *concern* to show.—POMFRET

To Interfere, *v. To intercede*.

Interior, *v. Inside*.

Interior, *v. Inward*.

Interloper, *v. Intruder*.

To Intermeddle, *v. To intercede*.

Intermediate, Intervening.

Intermediate signifies being in the midst, between two objects; *Intervening* signifies coming between: the former is applicable to space and time; the latter either to time or circumstances.

The *intermediate* time between the commencement and the termination of a truce is occupied with preparations for the renewal of hostilities; *intervening* circumstances sometimes change the views of the belligerent parties, and dispose their minds to peace.

A right opinion is that which connects truth by the shortest train of *intermediate* propositions.—JOHNSON.

Hardly would any transient gleams of *intervening* joy be able to force its way through the clouds if the successive scenes of distress through which we were to pass were laid before our view.—BLAIR.

Interment, *v. Burial*.

To Intermingle, *v. To mix*.

Intermission, *v. Cessation*.

To Intermix, *v. To subside*.

To Intermix, *v. To mix*.

Internal, *v. Inward*.

To Interpose, *v. To intercede*.

Interposition, *v. Intervention*.

To Interpret, *v. To explain*.

To Interrogate, *v. To ask*.

To Interrupt, *v. To disturb*.

Interval, Respite.

Interval, in Latin *intervallum*, signifies literally the space between the stakes which formed a Roman entrenchment; and, by an extended application, it signifies any space.

Respite, probably contracted from *respirat*, a breathing again.

Every *respite* requires an *interval*; but there are many *intervals* where there is no *respite*. The term *interval* respects time only; *respite* includes the idea of action within that time which may be more or less agreeable; *intervals* of ease are a *respite* to one who is oppressed with labour; the *interval* which is sometimes granted to a criminal before his execution is in the properest sense a *respite*.

Any uncommon exertion of strength, or perseverance in labour, is succeeded by a long *interval* of languor.—JOHNSON.

Give me leave to allow myself no *respite* from labour.—SPECTATOR.

Intervening, *v. Intermediate*.

Intervention, Interposition.

The *Intervention*, from *inter* between, and *venio* to come, is said of inanimate objects; the *Interposition*, from *inter* between, and *pono* to place, is said only of rational agents. The light of the moon is obstructed by the *intervention* of the clouds; the life of an individual is preserved by the *interposition* of a superior: human life is so full of contingencies, that when we have formed our projects we

can never say what may *intervene* to prevent their execution; when a man is engaged in an unequal combat, he has no chance of escaping but by the timely *interposition* of one who is able to rescue him.

Reflect also on the calamitous *intervention* of picture-cleaners (to originals).—BARRY.

Death ready stands to *interpose* his dart.—MILTON.

Interview, *v. Meeting.*

Intimacy, *v. Acquaintance.*

Intimate, *v. To hint.*

Intimidate, *v. To frighten.*

Intoxication, Drunkenness, Infatuation.

Intoxication, from the Latin *toxicum* a poison, signifies the state of being imbued with a poison.

Drunkenness signifies the state of having drunk over-much.

Infatuation, from *fatuus* foolish, signifies making foolish.

Intoxication and *drunkenness* are used either in the proper or the improper sense; *infatuation* in the improper sense only; *intoxication* is a general state; *drunkenness* a particular state: *intoxication* may be produced by various causes; *drunkenness* is produced only by an immoderate indulgence in some *intoxicating* liquor: a person may be *intoxicated* by the smell of strong liquors, or by vapours which produce a similar effect; he becomes *drunken* by the drinking of wine or other spirits. In the improper sense a deprivation of one's reasoning faculties is the common idea in the signification of all these terms: *intoxication* and *drunkenness* spring from the intemperate state of the feelings; *infatuation* springs from the ascendancy of the passions over the reasoning powers; a person is *intoxicated* with success, *drunk* with joy, and *infatuated* by an excess of vanity or an impetuosity of character.

A person who is naturally *intoxicated* reels and is giddy; he who is in the moral sense *intoxicated* is disorderly and unsteady in his conduct: a *drunken* man is deprived of the use of all his senses, and in the moral sense he is bewildered and unable to collect himself: an *infatuated* man is not merely foolish but wild; he carries his folly to the most extravagant pitch.

This plan of empire was not taken up in the first *intoxication* of unexpected success.—BURKE.

Passion is the *drunkenness* of the mind.—SOUTH.

A sure destruction impends over those *infatuated* princes who, in the conflict with this new and unheard-of power, proceed as if they were engaged in a war that bore a resemblance to their former contests.—BURKE.

To Intrench, *v. To encroach.*

Intrepid, *v. Bold.*

Intricacy, *v. Complexity.*

Intrinsic, Real, Genuine, Native.

Intrinsic, in Latin *intrinsecus*, signifies on the inside, that is, lying in the thing itself.

Real, from the Latin *res*, signifies belonging to the very thing.

Genuine, in Latin *genuinus* from *geno* or *gigno* to bring forth, signifies actually brought forth, or springing out of a thing.

Native, in Latin *nativus* and *natus* born, signifies actually born, or arising from a thing.

The value of a thing is either *intrinsic* or *real*: but the *intrinsic* value is said in regard to its extrinsic value; the *real* value in regard to the artificial: the *intrinsic* value of a book is that which it will fetch when sold in a regular way, in opposition to the extrinsic value, as being the gift of a friend; a particular edition, or a particular type: the *real* value of a book, in the proper sense, lies in the fineness of the paper and the costliness of its binding; and, in the improper sense, it lies in the excellence of its contents, in opposition to the artificial value which it acquires in the minds of bibliomaniacs from being a scarce edition.

The worth of a man is either *genuine* or *native*: the *genuine* worth of a man lies in the excellence of his moral character, as opposed to his adventitious worth, which he acquires from the possession of wealth, power, and dignity: his *native* worth is that which is inborn in him, and natural, in opposition to the meretricious and borrowed worth which he may derive from his situation, his talent, or his efforts to please.

An accurate observer will always discriminate between the *intrinsic* and extrinsic value of everything; a wise man will always appreciate things according to their *real* value; the most depraved man will sometimes be sensible of *genuine* worth when it displays itself; it is always pleasant to meet with those unsophisticated characters whose *native* excellence shines forth in all their words, looks, and actions.

Men, however distinguished by external accidents or *intrinsic* qualities, have all the same wants, the same pains, and, as far as the senses are consulted, the same pleasures.—JOHNSON.

You have settled, by an economy as perverted as the policy, two establishments of government, one *real*, the other fictitious.—BURKE.

His *genuine* and less guilty wealth t' explore,

Search not his bottom, but survey his shore.

DENHAM.

How lovely does the human mind appear in its *native* purity.—EARL OF CHATHAM.

To Introduce, Present.

To Introduce, from the Latin *introduco*, signifies literally to bring within or into any place; to **Present** (*v. To give*) signifies to bring into the presence of. As they respect persons, the former passes between equals, the latter only among persons of rank and power: one literary man is *introduced* to another by means of a common friend; he is *presented* at court by means of a nobleman.

As these terms respect things, we say that subjects are *introduced* in the course of conversation; men's particular views upon certain subjects are *presented* to the notice of others through the medium of publication.

The endeavours of freethinkers tend only to introduce slavery and error among men.—BERKELEY.

Now every leaf, and every moving breath,¹
Presents a foe, and every foe a death.—DENHAM.

Introductory, v. Previous.

To Intrude, v. To encroach.

To Intrude, Obtrude.

To Intrude is to thrust one's self into a place; to **Obtrude** is to thrust one's self in the way. It is *intrusion* to go into any society unasked and undesired; it is *obtruding* to join any company and take a part in the conversation without invitation or consent. We violate the rights of another when we *intrude*; we set up ourselves by *obtruding*: one *intrudes* with one's person in the place which does not belong to one's self; one *obtrudes* with one's person, remarks, &c., upon another: a person *intrudes* out of curiosity or any other personal gratification; he *obtrudes* out of vanity.

Politeness denominates it *intrusion* to pass the threshold of another without having first ascertained that we are perfectly welcome; modesty denominates it *obtruding* to offer an opinion in the presence of another, unless we are expressly invited or authorized by our relationship and situation. There is no thinking man who does not feel the value of having some place of retirement which is free from the *intrusion* of all impertinent visitants; it is the fault of young persons, who have formed any opinions for themselves, to *obtrude* them upon every one who will give them a hearing.

In the moral acceptation they preserve the same distinction. In moments of devotion, the serious man endeavours to prevent the *intrusion* of improper ideas in his mind. The stings of conscience *obtrude* themselves upon the guilty even in the season of their greatest merriment.

The *intrusion* of scruples, and the recollection of better notions, will not suffer some to live contented with their own conduct.—JOHNSON.

Artists are sometimes ready to talk to an incidental inquirer as they do to one another, and to make their knowledge ridiculous by injudicious *obtrusion*.—JOHNSON.

Intruder, Interloper.

An **Intruder** (*v. To intrude*) thrusts himself in: an **Interloper**, from the German *laufen* to run, runs in between and takes his station. The *intruder* therefore is only for a short space of time, and in an unimportant degree; but the *interloper* abridges another of his essential rights and for a permanency. A man is an *intruder* who is an unbidden guest at the table of another; he is an *interloper* when he joins any society in such manner as to obtain its privileges without sharing its burdens. *Intruders* are always offensive in the domestic circle: *interlopers* in trade are always regarded with an evil eye.

I would not have you to offer it to the doctor, as eminent physicians do not love *intruders*.—JOHNSON.

Some proposed to vest the trade to America in exclusive companies, which interest would render the most vigilant

guardians of the Spanish commerce against the encroachments of *interlopers*.—ROBERTSON.

To Invade, v. To encroach.

Invalid, Patient.

Invalid, in Latin *invalidus*, signifies literally one not strong or in good health; **Patient**, from the Latin *patiens* suffering, signifies one suffering under disease. *Invalid* is a general, and *patient* a particular term: a person may be an *invalid* without being a *patient*: he may be a *patient* without being an *invalid*. An *invalid* is so denominated from his wanting his ordinary share of health and strength; but the *patient* is one who is labouring under some bodily suffering. Old soldiers are called *invalids* who are no longer able to bear the fatigues of warfare; but they are not necessarily *patients*. He who is under the surgeon's hands for a broken limb is a *patient*, but not necessarily an *invalid*.

To Invalidate, v. To weaken.

Invasion, Incursion, Irruption, Inroad.

The idea of making a forcible entrance into a foreign territory is common to all these terms. **Invasion**, from *vado* to go, expresses merely this general idea, without any particular qualification: **Incursion**, from *curro* to run, signifies a hasty and sudden *invasion*:

Irruption, from *rumpo* to break, signifies a particularly violent *invasion*: **Inroad**, from *in* and *road*, signifies a making a road or way for one's self, which includes *invasion* and occupation. *Invasion* is said of that which passes in distant lands; Alexander *invaded* India; Hannibal crossed the Alps, and made an *invasion* into Italy; *incursion* is said of neighbouring states; the borderers on each side the Tweed used to make frequent *incursions* into England or Scotland. *Invasion* is the act of a regular army; it is a systematic military movement: *irruption* is the irregular and impetuous movement of undisciplined troops. The *invasion* of France by the Allies is one of the grandest military movements that the world has ever witnessed; the *irruption* of the Goths and Vandals into Europe has been acted over again by the late revolutionary armies of France.

Invasion may be partial and temporary; one *invades* from various causes, but not always from hostility to the inhabitants: an *inroad* is made by a conqueror who determines to dispossess the existing occupier of the land: *invasion* is therefore to *inroad* only as a means to an end. He who *invades* a country, and gets possession of its strong places so as to have an entire command of the land, is said to make *inroads* into that country; but since it is possible to get forcible possession of a country by other means beside that of a military entry, there may be an *inroad* where there is no express *invasion*. Alexander made such *inroads* into Persia as to become master of the whole country; but the French republic, and all its usurped authorities, made *inroads* into different countries by means of

spies and revolutionary incendiaries, who effected more than the sword in subjecting them to the power of Franco.

These terms bear a similar distinction in the improper sense. In this case *invasion* is figuratively employed to express a violent seizure, in general of what belongs to individuals, particularly that which they enjoy by civil compact, namely, their rights and privileges: when these are forcibly broken in upon, or anyone is dispossessed of them by an unlawful exercise of power, they are said to be *invaded*. It is the peculiar excellence of the English constitution to guard against and remedy such *invasions* without disturbing the public peace.

In like manner we speak of the *inroads* which disease makes on the constitution; of the *incursion* or *irruption* of unpleasant thoughts in the mind.

Far off we hear the waves, which surly sound,
Invade the rocks; the rocks their groans respond.
DRYDEN.

Britain by its situation was removed from the fury of these barbarous *incursions*.—HUME.

The study of ancient literature was interrupted in Europe by the *irruption* of the northern nations.—JOHNSON.

Rest and labour equally perceive their reign of short duration and uncertain tenure, and their empire liable to *inroads* from those who are alike enemies to both.—JOHNSON.

Invective, v. Abuse.

To Inveigh, v. To declaim.

To Inveigle, v. To entrap.

To Invent, v. To contrive.

To Invent, v. To find.

To Invent, Feign, Frame, Fabricate, Forge.

Invent, v. To contrive.

Feign, v. To feign.

Frame signifies to make according to a frame.

Fabricate, in Latin *fabricatus* from *faber* a workman, is changed from *facio*, signifying to make according to a frame.

Forge, from the noun *forge*, signifies to make in a forge.

All these terms are employed to express the production of something out of the mind, by means of its own efforts. *To invent* is the general term; the other terms imply modes of *invention* under different circumstances. *To invent*, as distinguished from the rest, is busied in creating new forms, either by means of the imagination or the reflective powers, it forms combinations either purely spiritual or those which are mechanical and physical: the poet *invents* imagery; the philosopher *invents* mathematical problems or mechanical instruments.

Invent is used for the production of new forms to real objects, or for the creation of unreal objects; *to feign* is used for the creation of unreal objects, or such as have no existence but in the mind: a play or a story is *invented* from what passes in the world: Mahomet's religion consists of nothing but *inventions*:

the Heathen poets *feigned* all the tales and fables which constitute the mythology, or history of their deities. *To frame* is a species of *invention* which consists in the disposition as well as the combination of objects. Thespis was the *inventor* of tragedy; Psalmanazar *framed* an entirely new language, which he pretended to be spoken on the island of Formosa; Solon *framed* a new set of laws for the city of Athens. *To invent, feign, and frame*, are all occasionally employed in the ordinary concerns of life, and in a bad sense; *fabricate* and *forge* are never used any other-wise. *Invent* is employed as to that which is the fruit of one's own mind; *to feign* is employed as to that which is unreal; *to frame* is employed as to that which requires deliberation and arrangement; *to fabricate* and *forge* are employed as to that which is absolutely false, and requiring more or less exercise of the *inventive* power. A person *invents* a lie, and *feigns* sorrow; *invents* an excuse, and *feigns* an attachment. A story is *invented* inasmuch as it is new, and not before conceived by others, or occasioned by the suggestions of others; it is *framed* inasmuch as it requires to be duly disposed in all its parts, so as to be consistent; it is *fabricated* inasmuch as it runs in direct opposition to actual circumstances, and therefore has required the skill and labour of a workman; it is *forged* inasmuch as it seems by its utter falsehood and extravagance to have caused as much severe action in the brain as what is produced by the fire in a furnace or forge.

Pythagoras *invented* the forty-seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid.—BARTELET.

Their savage eyes turn'd to a modest gaze
By the sweet power of music; therefore the poet
Did *feign* that Orpheus drew trees, stones, and floods.
SHAKESPEARE.

Nature hath *fram'd* strange fellows in her time.
SHAKESPEARE.

The very idea of the *fabrication* of a new government is enough to fill us with horror.—BURKE.

As chymists gold from brass by fire would draw,
Pretends are into treason *forg'd* by law.—DENHAM.

To Invent, v. To overturn.

To Invest, Endue or Endow.

To Invest, from *vestio*, signifies to clothe in anything.

Endue or Endow, from the Latin *induo*, signifies to put on anything. One is *invested* with that which is external: one is *endued* with that which is internal. We *invest* a person with an office or a dignity: a person is *endued* with good qualities. *To invest* is a real external action; but *to endue* may be merely fictitious or mental. The king is *invested* with supreme authority; a lover *endues* his mistress with every earthly perfection. *Endow* is but a variation of *endue*, and yet it seems to have acquired a distinct office: we may say that a person is *endued* or *endowed* with a good understanding; but as an act of the imagination *endow* is not to be substituted for *endue*: for we do not say that it *endows* but *endues* things with properties.

A strict and efficacious constitution, indeed, which *invests* the church with no power at all but where men will be so civil as to obey it.—SOUTH.

As in the natural body, the eye does not speak, nor the tongue see; so neither in the spiritual is everyone *endued* also with the gift and spirit of government.—SOUTH.

Investigation, v. Examination.

Invidious, v. Envious.

Invidious, in Latin *invidiosus*, from *invidia* and *invideo* not to look at, signifies looking at with an evil eye: **Envious** is literally only a variation of *invidious*. *Invidious* in its common acceptation signifies causing ill-will; *envious* signifies having ill-will.

A task is *invidious* that puts one in the way of giving offence; a look is *envious* that is full of *envy*. *Invidious* qualifies the thing; *envious* qualifies the temper of the mind. It is *invidious* for one author to be judged against another who has written on the same subject: a man is *envious* when the prospect of another's happiness gives him pain.

For I must speak what wisdom would conceal,
And truths *invidious* to the great reveal.—POPE.

They that desire to excel in too many matters out of levity and vain glory are ever *envious*.—BACON.

To Invigorate, v. To strengthen.

Invincible, Unconquerable, Insuperable, Insurmountable.

Invincible signifies not to be vanquished (*v. To conquer*): **Unconquerable** not to be conquered: **Insuperable** not to be overcome: **Insurmountable** not to be surmounted. Persons or things are in the strict sense *invincible* which can withstand all force: but as in this sense nothing created can be termed *invincible*, the term is employed to express strongly whatever can withstand human force in general: on this ground the Spaniards termed their Armada *invincible*. The qualities of the mind are termed *unconquerable* when they are not to be gained over or brought under the control of one's own reason, or the judgment of another: hence obstinacy is with propriety denominated *unconquerable* which will yield to no foreign influence. The particular disposition of the mind or turn of thinking is termed *insuperable*, inasmuch as it baffles our resolution or wishes to have it altered: an aversion is *insuperable* which no reasoning or endeavour on our own part can overcome. Things are denominated *insurmountable* inasmuch as they baffle one's skill or efforts to get over them, or put them out of one's way: an obstacle is *insurmountable* which in the nature of things is irremovable. Some people have an *insuperable* antipathy to certain animals; some persons are of so modest and timid a character that the necessity of addressing strangers is with them an *insuperable* objection to using any endeavours for their own advancement; the difficulties which Columbus had to encounter in his discovery of the New World would have appeared *insurmountable* to any mind less determined and persevering.

The Americans believed at first, that while cherished by the parental beams of the sun, the Spaniards were *invincible*.—ROBERTSON.

The mind of an ungrateful person is *unconquerable*

by that which conquers all things else, even by love itself.—SOUTH.

To this literary word (metaphysics) I have an *insuperable* aversion.—BEATTIE.

It is a melancholy reflection, that while one is plagued with acquaintances at the corner of every street, real friends should be separated from each other by *insurmountable* bars.—GIBBON.

To Invite, v. To attract.

To Invite, v. To call.

To Inundate, v. To overflow.

To Involve, v. To implicate.

Inward, Internal, Inner, Interior.

Inward signifies towards the side that is not absolutely within: **Internal** signifies positively within: **Inner**, as the comparative of *inward*, signifies more *inward*; and **Interior**, as the comparative of *internal*, signifies more *internal*. *Inward* is employed more frequently to express a state than to qualify an object; *internal* to qualify the objects: a thing is said to be turned *inward* which forms a part of the inside: it is said to be *internal* as one of its characteristics; *inward*, as denoting the position, is indefinite; anything that is *in* in the smallest degree is *inward*; thus what we take in the mouth is *inward* in distinction from that which may be applied to the lips: but that is properly *internal* which lies in the very frame and system of the body; *inner*, which rises in degree on *inward*, is applicable to such bodies as admit of specific degrees of enclosure: thus the *inner* shell of a nut is that which is enclosed in the *inward*: so likewise *interior* is applicable to that which is capacious, and has many involutions, as the *interior* coat of the intestines.

If we accurately observe the *inward* movings and actings of the heart, we shall find that temptation wins upon it by very small gradations.—SOUTH.

It is not probable that the sons of *Æsculapius* could be ignorant of anything which had at that time been discovered with respect to *internal* medicine.—JAMES.

And now against th' gate
Of th' *inner* court their growing force they bring.
DENHAM.

Spain has not been inattentive to the *interior* government of her colonies.—ROBERTSON.

Involuntary, v. Unwilling.

Ire, v. Anger.

Irksome, v. Troublesome.

Irony, v. Ridicule.

Irony, v. Wit.

Irrational, Foolish, Absurd, Preposterous.

Irrational, compounded of *ir* or *in* and *ratio*, signifies contrary to reason, and is employed to express the want of the faculty itself, or a deficiency in the exercise of this faculty.

Foolish (*v. Folly*) signifies the perversion of this faculty.

Absurd, from *surdus* deaf, signifies that to which one would turn a deaf ear.

Preposterous, from *præ* before and *post*

behind, signifies literally that side foremost which is unnatural and contrary to common sense.

Irrational is not so strong a term as *foolish*: it is applicable more frequently to the thing than to the person, to the principle than to the practice; *foolish* on the contrary is commonly applicable to the person as well as the thing; to the practice rather than the principle. Scepticism is the most *irrational* thing that exists; the human mind is formed to believe but not to doubt: he is of all men most *foolish* who stakes his eternal salvation on his own fancied superiority of intelligence and illumination. *Foolish, absurd, and preposterous*, rise in degree: a violation of common sense is implied by them all, but they vary according to the degree of violence which is done to the understanding: *foolish* is applied to anything, however trivial, which in the smallest degree offends our understandings: the conduct of children is therefore often *foolish*, but not *absurd* and *preposterous*, which are said only of serious things that are opposed to our judgments: it is *absurd* for a man to persuade another to do that which he in like circumstances would object to do himself; it is *preposterous* for a man to expose himself to the ridicule of others, and then be angry with those who will not treat him respectfully.

The schemes of freethinkers are altogether *irrational* and require the most extravagant *credulity* to embrace them.—ADDISON.

The same well-meaning gentleman took occasion at another time to bring together such of his friends as were addicted to a *foolish* habitual custom of swearing, in order to show them the *absurdity* of the practice.—ADDISON.

By a *preposterous* desire of things in themselves indifferent, men forego the enjoyment of that happiness which those things are instrumental to obtain.—BERKELEY.

Irrefragable, v. Indubitable.

Irregular, Disorderly, Inordinate, Intemperate.

Irregular, that is literally *not regular*, marks merely the absence of a good quality: *Disorderly*, that is literally out of order, marks the presence of a positively bad quality. What is *irregular* may be so from the nature of the thing; what is *disorderly* is rendered so by some external circumstance. Things are planted *irregularly* for want of design: the best troops are apt to be *disorderly* in a long march. *Irregular* and *disorderly* are taken in a moral as well as a natural sense: *Inordinate*, which signifies also put out of order, is employed only in the moral sense. What is *irregular* is contrary to the rule that is established, or ought to be; what is *disorderly* is contrary to the order that has existed; what is *inordinate* is contrary to the order that is prescribed; what is *Intemperate* is contrary to the temper or spirit that ought to be encouraged. Our habits will be *regular* which are not conformable to the laws of social society; our practices will be *disorderly* when we follow the blind impulse of passion. Our desires will be *inordinate* when they are not under the control of reason guided by religion; our indulgences will be *intemperate* when we

consult nothing but our appetites. Young people are apt to contract *irregular* habits if not placed under the care of discreet and sober people, and made to conform to the regulations of domestic life: children are naturally prone to become *disorderly*, if not perpetually under the eye of a master; it is the lot of human beings in all ages and stations to have *inordinate* desires, which require a constant check so as to prevent *intemperate* conduct of any kind.

In youth there is a certain *irregularity* and agitation by no means unbecoming.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF FLINCY.

The minds of bad men are *disorderly*.—BLAIR.

Inordinate passions are the great disturbers of life.

Irreligious, Profane, Impious.

As epithets to designate the character of the person, they seem to rise in degree: *Irreligious* is negative; *Profane* and *Impious* are positive; the latter being much stronger than the former. All men who are not positively actuated by principles of religion are *irreligious*; who, if we include all such as show a disregard to the outward observances of religion, form a too numerous class: *profanity* and *impiety* are however of a still more heinous nature; they consist not in the mere absence of regard for religion but in a positive contempt of it and open outrage against its laws; the *profane* man treats what is sacred as if it were *profane*; what a believer holds in reverence, and utters with awe, is pronounced with an air of indifference or levity, and as a matter of common discourse, by a *profane* man; he knows no difference between sacred and *profane*; but as the former may be converted into a source of scandal towards others, the *impious* man is directly opposed to the *pious* man; the former is filled with defiance and rebellion against his Maker, as the latter is with love and fear; the former curses while the latter prays: the former is bloated with pride and conceit; the latter is full of humility and self-abasement: we have a picture of the former in the devils, and of the latter in the saints. When applied to things the term *irreligious* seems to be somewhat more positively opposed to religion: an *irreligious* book is not merely one in which there is no religion, but that also which is detrimental to religion, such as sceptical or licentious writings: the epithet *profane* in this case is not always a term of reproach, but is employed to distinguish what is temporal from that which is expressly spiritual in its nature; the history of nations is *profane* as distinguished from the sacred history contained in the Bible: the writings of the heathens are altogether *profane* as distinguished from the moral writings of Christians, or the believers in Divine Revelation. On the other hand, when we speak of a *profane* sentiment, or a *profane* joke, *profane* lips, and the like, the sense is personal and reproachful; *impious* is never implied but to what is personal, and in the very worst sense; an *impious* thought, an *impious* wish, or an *impious* vow, are the fruits of an *impious* mind.

An officer of the army in a Roman Catholic country would be afraid to pass for an *irreligious* man if he should

be seen to go to bed without offering up his devotion, *ADDISON.*

Fly, ye *profane*; if not, draw near with awe.—YOUNG.
Love's great divinity rashly maintains
Weak *impious* war with an immortal God.
CUMBERLAND.

Irreproachable, *v. Blameless.*

To Irritate, *v. To aggravate.*

Irruption, *v. Invasion.*

To Issue, *v. To arise.*

To Issue, *v. To rise.*

Issue, *v. Event.*

Issue, *v. Offspring.*

J.

To Jade, *v. To weary.*

To Jangle, Jar, Wrangle.

A verbal contention is expressed by all these terms, but with various modifications: *Jangle* seems to be an onomatopoeia, for it conveys by its own discordant sound an idea of the discordance which accompanies this kind of war of words; *Jar* and war are in all probability but variations of each other, as also *jangle* and *Wrangle*. There is in *jangling* more of cross-questions and perverse replies than direct differences of opinion; those *jangle* who are out of humour with each other; there is more of discordant feeling and opposition of opinion in *jarring*; those who have no goodwill to each other will be sure to *jar* when they come in collision; and those who indulge themselves in *jarring* will soon convert affection into ill-will. Married people may destroy the good humour of the company by *jangling*, but they destroy their domestic peace and felicity by *jarring*. To *wrangle* is technically what to *jangle* is morally: those who dispute by a verbal opposition only are said to *wrangle*; and the disputers who engage in this scholastic exercise are termed *wranglers*; most disputations amount to little more than *wrangling*.

Where the indicators of the church were near an equality of the men on both sides, there were perpetual *jangleings* on both sides.—BURNET.

There is no *jar* or contest between the different gifts of the spirit.—SOUTH.

Peace, factious monster! born to vex the state,
With *wrangling* talents form'd for foul debate.
POPE.

To Jar, *v. To jangle.*

Jaunt, *v. Excursion.*

Jealousy, Envy.

Jealousy, in French *jalousie*, Latin *zelotypia*, Greek *ζηλοντια* compounded of *ζηλος* and *τυπω* to strike or fill, signifies properly filled with a burning desire.

Envy, in French *envie*, Latin *invidia* from *invidere*, compounded of *in* privative and *video* to see, signifies not looking at, or looking at in a contrary direction.

We are *jealous* of what is our own; we are *envious* of what is another's. *Jealousy* fears to lose what it has; *envy* is pained at seeing another have. Princes are *jealous* of their

authority; subjects are *jealous* of their rights; courtiers are *envious* of those in favour; women are *envious* of superior beauty.

The *jealous* man has an object of desire, something to get and something to retain; he does not look beyond the object that interferes with his enjoyment; a *jealous* husband may therefore be appeased by the declaration of his wife's animosity against the object of his *jealousy*. The *envious* man sickens at the sight of enjoyment; he is easy only in the misery of others: all endeavours, therefore, to satisfy an *envious* man are fruitless. *Jealousy* is a noble or an ignoble passion, according to the object; in the former case it is emulation sharpened by fear; in the latter case it is greediness stimulated by fear; *envy* is always a base passion, having the worst passions in its train.

Jealous is applicable to bodies of men as well as individuals; *envious* to the individuals only. Nations are *jealous* of any interference on the part of any other Power in their commerce, government, or territory; individuals are *envious* of the rank, wealth, and honours of each other.

Every man is more *jealous* of his natural than his moral qualities.—HAWKESWORTH.

The *envious* man is in pain upon all occasions which should give him pleasure.—ADDISON.

To Jeer, *v. To scoff.*

To Jest, Joke, Make Game, Sport.

Jest is in all probability abridged from *gesticulate*, because the ancient mimics used much *gesticulation* in breaking their *jest*s on the company.

Joke, in Latin *jocus*, comes in all probability from the Hebrew *teschek* to laugh.

To *Make Game* signifies here to make the subject of game or play (*v. Play*).

To *Sport* signifies here to *sport* with, or convert into a subject of amusement.

One *jest*s in order to make others laugh; one *jokes* in order to please one's self. The *jest* is directed at the object; the *joke* is practised with the person or on the person. One attempts to make a thing laughable or ridiculous by *jesting* about it, or treating it in a *jesting* manner; one attempts to excite good humour in others, or indulge it in one's self by *joking* with them. *Jests* are therefore seldom harmless: *jokes* are frequently allowable.

The most serious subject may be degraded by being turned into a *jest*; but melancholy or dejection of the mind may be conveniently dispelled by a *joke*. Court fools and buffoons used formerly to break their *jest*s upon every subject by which they thought to entertain their employers: those who know how to *joke* with good-nature and discretion may contribute to the mirth of the company: to *make game* of is applicable only to persons: to *make a sport* of or *sport* with is applied to objects in general, whether persons or things; both are employed like *jest* in the bad sense of treating a thing more lightly than it deserves.

To *jest* consists of words or corresponding signs; it is peculiarly appropriate to one who acts a part: to *joke* consists not only of words but of simple actions, which are calculated to produce mirth; it is peculiarly applicable to the social intercourse of friends: to *make game* of consists more of laughter than any; it has not the ingenuity of the *jest*, nor the good-nature of the *joke*; it is the part of the fool who wishes to make others appear what he himself really is: to *sport* with, or to *make sport* of, consists not only of simple actions, but of conduct; it is the error of a weak mind that does not know how to set a due value on any thing; the fool *sports* with his reputation when he risks the loss of it for a bauble.

But those who aim at ridicule
Should fix upon some certain rule
Which fairly hints they are in *jest*.—SWIFT.

How fond are men of rule and place,
Who court it from the mean and base,
They love the cellar's vulgar *joke*,
And lose their hours in ale and smoke.—GAY.

When Samson's eyes were out, of a public magistrate he was made a public *sport*.—SOUTH.

Jilt, *v. Coquet*.

Jocose, *v. Facetious*.

Jocular, *v. Facetious*.

Jocund, *v. Lively*.

To Join, *v. To add*.

To Joke, *v. To jest*.

Journey, Travel, Voyage.

Journey, from the French *journée* a day's work, and Latin *diurnus* daily, signifies the course that is taken in the space of a day, or in general any comparatively short passage from one place to another.

Travel, from the French *travailler* to labour, signifies such a course or passage as requires labour, and causes fatigue; in general any long course.

Voyage is most probably changed from the Latin *via* a way, and originally signified any course or passage to a distance, but is now confined to passages by sea.

We take *journeys* in different counties in England: we make a *voyage* to the Indies, and *travel* over Germany.

Journeys are taken for domestic business; *travels* are made for amusement or information: *voyages* are made by captains or merchants for purposes of commerce.

We estimate *journeys* by the day, as one or two days' *journey*: we estimate *travels* and

voyages by the months and years that are employed.

The Israelites are said to have *journeyed* in the wilderness forty years, because they went but short distances at a time. It is a part of polite education for young men of fortune to *travel* into those countries of Europe which comprehend the grand tour as it is termed. A *voyage* round the world, which was at first a formidable undertaking, is now become familiar to the mind by its frequency.

To Paradise, the happy seat of man,
His *journey's* end, and our beginning woe.—MILTON.

Cease mourners; cease complaint and weep no more,
Your lost friends are not dead, but gone before,
Advanced a stage or two upon that road,
Which you must *travel* in the steps they trode.
CUMBERLAND.

Calm and serene, he sees approaching death,
As the safe port, th' peaceful silent shore,
Where he may rest, life's tedious *voyage* o'er.—JENYNS.

Joy, Gladness, Mirth.

Joy, in French *joie*, comes from the Latin *jocundus* or *jucundus* pleasant.

Gladness, *v. Glad*.

Mirth, *v. Festivity*.

The happy condition of the soul is designated by all these terms; but *joy* and *gladness* lie more internally; *mirth* is the more immediate result of external circumstances. What creates *joy* and *gladness* is of a permanent nature; that which creates *mirth* is temporary: *joy* is the most vivid sensation in the soul; *gladness* is the same in quality, but inferior in degree: *joy* is awakened in the mind by the most important events in life; *gladness* springs up in the mind on ordinary occasions: the return of the prodigal son awakened *joy* in the heart of his father; a man feels *gladness* at being relieved from some distress, or trouble: public events of a gratifying nature produce universal *joy*; relief from either sickness or want brings *gladness* to an oppressed heart; he who is absorbed in his private distresses is ill prepared to partake of the *mirth* with which he is surrounded at the festive board.

Joy is depicted on the countenance, or expresses itself by various demonstrations; *gladness* is a more tranquil feeling which is enjoyed in secret, and seeks no outward expression: *mirth* displays itself in laughter, singing, and noise.

His thoughts triumphant, heav'n alone employs,
And hope anticipates his future *joys*.—JENYNS.

None of the poets have observed so well as Milton these secret overflowings of *gladness* which diffuse themselves through the mind of the beholder upon surveying the gay scenes of nature.—ADDISON.

Th' unwieldy elephant
To make them *mirth* us'd all his might.—MILTON.

Joyful, *v. Glad*.

Judge, Umpire, Arbiter, Arbitrator.

Judge, in Latin *judico* and *judex* from *jus* right, signifies one pronouncing the law or determining right.

Umpire is most probably a corruption from empire, signifying one who has authority.

Arbiter and Arbitrator, from *arbitror* to think, signify one who decides.

Judge is the generic term, the others are only species of *judge*. The *judge* determines in all matters disputed or undisputed; he pronounces what is law now as well as what will be law for the future: the *umpire* and *arbitrer* are only *judges* in particular cases that admit of dispute: there may be *judges* in literature, in arts, and civil matters; *umpires* and *arbiters* are only *judges* in civil matters. The *judge* pronounces, in matters of dispute, according to a written law or a prescribed rule; the *umpire* decides in all matters of contest; and the *arbitrer* or *arbitrator* in all matters of litigation, according to his own judgment. The *judge* acts under the appointment of government; the *umpire* and *arbitrator* are appointed by individuals: the former is chosen for his skill; he adjudges the palm to the victor according to the merits of the case: the latter is chosen for his impartiality; he consults the interests of both by equalizing their claims.

The office of an English *judge* is one of the most honourable in the state; he is the voice of the legislator, and the organ for dispensing justice; he holds the balance between the king and the subject: the characters of those who have filled this office have been every way fitted to raise it in the estimation of all the world. An *umpire* has no particular moral duty to discharge, nor important office; but he is of use in deciding the contested merits of individuals; among the Romans and Greeks, the *umpire* at their games was held in high estimation. The office of an *arbitrer*, although not so elevated as a *judge* in its literal sense, has often the important duty of a Christian peace-maker; and as the determinations of an *arbitrer* are controlled by no external circumstances, the term is applied to monarchs, and even to the Creator as the sovereign *Arbiter* of the world.

Palæmon shall be *judge* how ill you rhyme.—DRYDEN.

To pray'r, repentance, and obedience due
Mine ear shall not be slow, mine eye not shut,
And I will place within them as a guide,
My *umpire* conscience.—MILTON.

You once have known me,
Twixt warring monarchs and contending states,
The glorious *arbitrer*.—LEWIS.

I am not out of the reach of people who oblige me to act as their *judge* or their *arbitrator*.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF PLINY.

Judgment, Discretion, Prudence.

These terms are all employed to express the various modes of practical wisdom which serve to regulate the conduct of men in ordinary life. **Judgment** is that faculty which enables a person to distinguish right and wrong in general: **Discretion** and **Prudence** serve the same purpose in particular cases. *Judgment* is conclusive; it decides by positive inference; it enables a person to discover the truth: *discretion* is intuitive (*v. Discernment*); it discerns or perceives what is in all probability right. *Judgment* acts by a fixed rule; it admits of no question or variation: *discretion* acts according to circumstances, and is its own rule. *Judgment* determines in the choice of what is good: *discretion*

sometimes only guards against error or direct mistakes; it chooses what is nearest to the truth. *Judgment* requires knowledge and actual experience; *discretion* requires reflection and consideration: a general exercises his *judgment* in the disposition of his army, and in the mode of attack; whilst he is following the rules of military art he exercises his *discretion* in the choice of officers for different posts, in the treatment of his men, in his negotiations with the enemy, and various other measures which depend upon contingencies.

Discretion looks to the present; *prudence*, which is the same as providence or foresight, calculates on the future: *discretion* takes a wide survey of the case that offers; it looks to the moral fitness of things, as well as the consequences which may follow from them; it determines according to the real propriety of anything, as well as the ultimate advantages which it may produce; *prudence* looks only to the good or evil which may result from things; it is, therefore, but a mode or accompaniment of *discretion*: we must have *prudence* when we have *discretion*, but we may have *prudence* where there is no occasion for *discretion*. Those who have the conduct or direction of others require *discretion*; those who have the management of their own concerns require *prudence*. For want of *discretion* the master of a school, or the general of an army, may lose his authority; for want of *prudence* the merchant may involve himself in ruin; or the man of fortune may be brought to beggary.

As epithets, *judicious* is applied to things oftener than to persons; *discreet* is applied to persons rather than to things; *prudent* is applied to both: a remark, or a military movement, is *judicious*; it displays the judgment of the individual from whom they emanate; a matron is *discreet* who by dint of years, experience, and long reflection is enabled to determine on what is befitting the case; a person is *prudent* who does not inconsiderately expose himself to danger; a measure is *prudent* that guards against the chances of evil. Counsels will be *injudicious* which are given by those who are ignorant of the subject: it is dangerous to entrust a secret to one who is *indiscreet*: the impetuosity of youth naturally impels them to be *imprudent*; an *imprudent* marriage is seldom followed by *prudent* conduct in the parties that have involved themselves in it.

If a man have that penetration of *judgment* as he can discern what things are to be laid open, and what to be secreted, to him a habit of dissimulation is a hindrance and a poorness.—BACON.

Let your own

Discretion be your tutor. Suit the action
To the words.—SHAKESPEARE.

The ignorance in which we are left concerning good and evil is not such as to supersede *prudence* in conduct.—BLAIR.

Judgment, v. Sense.

Juice, v. Liquid.

Justice, Equity.

* **Justice**, from *jus* right, is founded on the laws of society: **Equity**, from *æquitas* fair-

• Vide Roubaud; "Justice, équité."

ness, rightness, and equality, is founded on the laws of nature.

Justice is a written or prescribed law, to which one is bound to conform and make it the rule of one's decisions: *equity* is a law in our hearts; it conforms to no rule but to circumstances, and decides by the consciousness of right and wrong. The proper object of *justice* is to secure property; the proper object of *equity* is to secure the rights of humanity. *Justice* is exclusive, it assigns to every one his own: it preserves the subsisting inequality between men: *equity* is communicative; it seeks to *equalize* the condition of men by a fair distribution.

Justice forbids us doing wrong to any one; and requires us to repair the wrongs we have done to others: *equity* forbids us doing to others what we would not have them do to us; it requires us to do to others what in similar circumstances we would expect from them.

The obligations to *justice* are imperative; the observance of its laws is enforced by the civil power, and the breach of them is exposed to punishment; the obligations to *equity* are altogether moral; we are impelled to it by the dictates of conscience; we cannot violate it without exposing ourselves to the Divine displeasure. *Justice* is inflexible, it follows one invariable rule, which can seldom be deviated from consistently with the general good; *equity*, on the other hand, varies with the circumstances of the case, and is guided by discretion: *justice* may, therefore, sometimes run counter to *equity*, when the interests of the individual must be sacrificed to those of the community; and *equity* sometimes tempers the rigour of *justice*, by admitting of reasonable deviations from the literal interpretations of its laws. The tranquillity of society, and the security of the individual, are ensured by *justice*: the harmony and good-will of one man towards another are cherished by *equity*: when *justice* requires any sacrifices which are not absolutely necessary for the preservation of this tranquillity and security, it is a useless breach of *equity*: on the other hand, when a regard to *equity* leads to the direct violation of any law, it ceases to be either *equity* or *justice*. The rights of property are alike to be preserved by both *justice* and *equity*: but the former respects only those general and fundamental principles which are universally admitted in the social compact, and comprehended under the laws; the latter respects those particular principles which belong to the case of individuals: *justice* is, therefore, properly a virtue belonging only to a large and organized society: *equity* must exist wherever two individuals come in connection with each other. When a father disinherits his son, he does not violate *justice*, although he does not act consistently with *equity*; the dis-

posal of his property is a right which is guaranteed to him by the established laws of civil society; but the claims which a child has by nature over the property of his parent become the claims of *equity*, which the latter is not at liberty to set at naught without the most substantial reasons. On the other hand, when Cyrus adjudged the coat to each boy as it fitted him, without regard to the will of the younger from whom the large coat had been taken, it is evident that he committed an act of *injustice*, without performing an act of *equity*; since all violence is positively *unjust*, and what is positively *unjust* can never be *equitable*: whence it is clear that *justice*, which respects the absolute and unalienable rights of mankind, can at no time be superseded by what is supposed to be *equity*; although *equity* may be conveniently made to interpose where the laws of *justice* are either too severe or altogether silent. On this ground, supposing I have received an injury, *justice* demands reparation; it listens to no palliation, excuse, or exception: but supposing the reparation which I have a right to demand involves the ruin of him who is more unfortunate than guilty, can I in *equity* insist on the demand? *Justice* is that which public law requires; *equity* is that which private law or the law of every man's conscience requires.

They who supplicate for mercy from others can never hope for *justice* through themselves.—BURKE.

Every rule of *equity* demands
That vice and virtue from the Almighty's hands
Should due rewards and punishments receive.
JENYNS.

To Justify, v. To apologize.

Justness, Correctness.

Justness, from *jus* law (*v. Justice*), is the conformity to established principle: **Correctness**, from *rectus* right or straight (*v. Correct*), is the conformity to a certain mark or line: the former is used in the moral or improper sense only; the latter is used in the proper or improper sense. We estimate the value of remarks by their *justness*, that is, their accordance to certain admitted principles. *Correctness* of outline is of the first importance in drawing; *correctness* of dates enhances the value of a history. It has been *justly* observed by the moralists of antiquity that money is the root of all evil; partisans seldom state *correctly* what they see and hear.

Few men, possessed of the most perfect sight, can describe visual objects with more spirit and *justness* than Mr. Blacklock the poet born blind.—BURKE.

I do not mean the popular eloquence which cannot be tolerated at the bar, but that *correctness* of style and elegance of method which at once *pleases* and *persuades* the hearer.—SIR WM. JONES.

Juvenile, v. Youthful.

K.

Keen, *v. Acute.*

Keen, *v. Sharp.*

To Keep, *v. To hold.*

To Keep, Preserve, Save.

Keep, *v. To hold, keep.*

Preserve, compounded of *pre* and the Latin *servo* to keep, signifies to keep away from all mischief.

Save signifies to keep safe.

The idea of having in one's possession is common to all these terms; which is, however, the simple meaning of *keep*: to preserve is to keep with care, and free from all injury; to save is to keep laid up in a safe place, and free from destruction. Things are kept at all times, and under all circumstances; they are preserved in circumstances of peculiar difficulty and danger; they are saved in the moment in which they are threatened with destruction: things are kept at pleasure; they are preserved by an exertion of power; they are saved by the use of extraordinary means: the shepherd keeps his flock by simply watching over them; children are sometimes wonderfully preserved in the midst of the greatest dangers; things are frequently saved in the midst of fire by the exertions of those present.

We are resolved to keep an established church, an established monarchy, an established aristocracy, and an established democracy, each in the degree in which it exists and no greater.—BURKE.

A war to preserve national independence, property, and liberty from certain, universal havoc, is a war just and necessary.—BURKE.

If anything defensive can possibly save us from the disasters of a regicide peace, Mr. Pitt is the man to save us.—BURKE.

To Keep, Observe, Fulfil.

Keep, *v. To hold, keep.*

Observe, in Latin *observo* compounded of *ob* and *servo*, signifies to keep in one's view, to fix one's attention.

Fulfil, *v. To accomplish.*

These terms are synonymous in the moral sense of abiding by and carrying into execution what is prescribed or set before one for his rule of conduct: to keep is simply to have by one in such manner that it shall not depart; to observe is to keep with a steady attention; to fulfil is to keep to the end or to the full intent. A day is either kept or observed: yet the former is not only a more familiar term, but it likewise implies a much less solemn act than the latter; one must add, therefore, the mode in which it is kept, by saying that it is kept holy, kept sacred, or kept as a day of pleasure; the term observe, however, implies always that it is kept religiously:

we may keep but we do not observe a birthday; we keep or observe the Sabbath.

To keep marks simply perseverance or continuance in a thing; a man keeps his word if he do not depart from it; to observe marks fidelity and consideration; we observe a rule when we are careful to be guided by it: to fulfil marks the perfection and consummation of that which one has kept; we fulfil a promise by acting in strict conformity to it.

A person is said to keep the law when he does not commit any violent breach of it; he observes every minutia in the law if he is anxious to show himself a good citizen; by this conduct he fulfils the intentions of the legislator: St. Paul recommends Christians to keep the faith, which they can never do effectually unless they observe all the precepts of our Saviour, and thereby fulfil the law: children may keep silence when they are desired; but it is seldom in their power to observe it as a rule, because they have not sufficient understanding.

It is great sin to swear unto a sin,
But greater sin to keep a sinful oath.—SHAKESPEARE.

I doubt whether any of our authors have yet been able for twenty lines together nicely to observe the true definition of easy poetry.—JOHNSON.

You might have seen this poor child arrived at an age to fulfil all your hopes, and then you might have lost him.—GRAY.

Keeping, Custody.

Keeping, *v. To keep, hold.*

Custody, in Latin *custodia* and *custos*, in all probability from *cura* care, because care is particularly required in keeping: the first of these terms is, as before, the most general in its signification; the latter is more frequent in its use. The keeping amounts to little more than having purposely in one's possession; but custody is a particular kind of keeping, for the purpose of preventing an escape: inanimate objects may be in one's keeping; but a prisoner, or that which is in danger of getting away, is placed in custody a person has in his keeping that which he values as the property of an absent friend; the officers of justice get into their custody those who have offended against the laws, or such property as has been stolen.

Life and all its enjoyments would be scarce worth the keeping, if it were under a perpetual dread of losing them.—SPECTATOR.

Prior was suffered to live in his own house under the custody of a messenger, until he was examined before a committee of the Privy Council.—JOHNSON.

To Kill, Murder, Assassinate, Slay, or Slaughter.

Kill, in Saxon *cyelan*, Dutch, *kelan*.

Murder, in German *mord*, &c., is connected with the Latin *mors* death.

Assassinate signifies to kill after the

manner of an *assassin*; which word probably comes from the *Levant*, where a prince of the Arsacides, or *assassins*, who was called the old man of the mountains, lived in a castle between Antioch and Damascus, and brought up young men to lie in wait for passengers.

Slay or Slaughter, in German *schlagen*, &c., probably from *liegen* to lie, signifying to lay low.

To *kill* is the general and the indefinite term, signifying simply to take away life; to *murder* is to *kill* with open violence and injustice; to *assassinate* is to *murder* by surprise, or by means of lying in wait; to *slay* is to *kill* in battle; to *kill* is applicable to men, animals, and also vegetables; to *murder* and *assassinate* to men only; to *slay* mostly to men, but sometimes to animals; to *slaughter* only to animals in the proper sense, but it may be applied to men in the improper sense, when they are *killed* like brutes, either as to the numbers or to the manner of *killing* them.

The fierce young hero who had overcome the Curiatii, being upbraided by his sister for having slain her lover, in the height of his resentment *kills* her.—ADDISON.

Murders and executions are always transacted behind the scenes in the French theatre.—ADDISON.

The women interposed with so many prayers and entreaties, that they prevented the mutual *slaughter* which threatened the Romans and the Sabines.—ADDISON.

On this vain hope, adulterers, thieves rely,
And to this altar vile *assassins* fly.—JENYNS.

Kind, v. Affectionate.

Kind, v. Gracious.

Kind, Species, Sort.

Kind, most probably from the Teutonic *kind* a child, signifying related, or of the same family.

Species, in Latin *species*, from *specio* to behold, signifies literally the form or appearance, and in an extended sense that which comes under a particular form.

Sort, in Latin *sors* a lot, signifies that which constitutes a particular lot or parcel.

Kind and *species* are both employed in their proper sense; *sort* has been diverted from its original meaning by colloquial use: *kind* is properly employed for animate objects, particularly for mankind, and improperly for moral objects; *species* is a term used by philosophers, classing things according to their external or internal properties. *Kind*, as a term in vulgar use has a less definite meaning than *species*, which serves to form the groundwork of science; we discriminate things in a loose or general manner by saying that they are of the animal or vegetable *kind*; of the canine or feline *kind*; but we discriminate them precisely if we say that they are a *species* of the arbutus, of the pomegranate, of the dog, the horse, and the like. By the same rule we may speak of a *species* of madness, a *species* of fever, and the like; because diseases have been brought under a systematic arrangement; but, on the other hand, we should speak of a *kind* of language, a *kind* of feeling, a *kind* of influence; and in similar cases where a general resemblance is to be expressed.

Sort may be used for either *kind* or *species*;

it does not necessarily imply any affinity, or common property in the objects, but simple assemblage, produced as it were by *sors*, chance: hence we speak of such *sort* of folks or people; such *sort* of practices; different *sorts* of grain; the various *sorts* of merchandizes; and in similar cases where things are *sorted* or brought together, rather at the option of the person than according to the nature of the thing.

An ungrateful person is a *kind* of thoroughfare or common shore for the good things of the world to pass into.—SOUTH.

If the French should succeed in what they propose, and establish a democracy in a country circumstanced like France, they will establish a very bad government, a very bad *species* of tyranny.—BURKE.

The French made and recorded a *sort* of institute, and digest of anarchy, called the rights of man.—BURKE.

Kindness, v. Benefit.

Kindness, v. Benevolence.

Kindred, Relationship, Affinity, Consanguinity.

The idea of a state in which persons are placed with regard to each other is common to all these terms, which differ principally in the nature of this state. **Kindred** signifies that of being of the same *kind* (v. *Kind*). **Relationship** signifies that of holding a nearer relation than others (v. *To connect*). **Affinity** (v. *Affinity*) signifies that of being affined or coming close to each other's boundaries. **Consanguinity**, from *sanguis* the blood, signifies that of having the same blood.

The *kindred* is the most general state here expressed: it may embrace all mankind, or refer to particular families or communities; it depends upon possessing the common property of humanity: the philanthropist claims *kindred* with all who are unfortunate when it is in his power to relieve them. *Relationship* is a state less general than *kindred*, but more extended than either *affinity* or *consanguinity*; it applies to particular families only, but it applies to all of the same family, whether remotely or distantly related. *Affinity* denotes a close *relationship*, whether of an artificial or a natural *kind*: there is an *affinity* between the husband and the wife in consequence of the marriage tie; and there is an *affinity* between those who descend from the same parents or relations in a direct line. *Consanguinity* is, strictly speaking, this latter *species* of descent; and the term is mostly employed in all questions of law respecting descent and inheritance.

Though separated from my *kindred* by little more than half a century of miles, I know as little of their concerns as if oceans and continents were between us.—COWPER.

The wisdom of our Creator hath linked us by the ties of natural affection; first, to our families and children; next, to our brothers, relations, and friends.—BLACKSTONE.

Consanguinity or relation by blood, and *affinity* or relation by marriage, are canonical disabilities (to contract a marriage).—BLACKSTONE.

Kindred, v. Relation.

Kingdom, v. Empire.

Kingly, v. Royal.

Kinsman, *v. Relation.*

Knavish, *v. Dishonest.*

To Know, Be Acquainted With.

To *Know* is a general term; to *Be Acquainted with* is particular (*v. Acquaintance*). We may know things or persons in various ways; we may *know* them by name only; or we may *know* their internal properties or characters; or we may simply *know* their figure; we may *know* them by report; or we may *know* them by a direct intercourse; one is *acquainted with* either a person or a thing, only in a direct manner, and by an immediate intercourse in one's own person. We *know* a man to be good or bad, virtuous or vicious, by being a witness to his actions; we become *acquainted with* him by frequently being in his company.

Is there no temperate region can be *known*,
Betwixt their frigid and our torrid zone?
Could we not wake from that lethargic dream,
But to be restless in a worse extreme?—DENHAM.

But how shall I express my anguish for my little boy,
who became *acquainted with* sorrow as soon as he was
capable of reflection.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

Knowledge, Science, Learning, Erudition.

Knowledge, from *know*, in all probability comes from the Latin *nosco*, and the Greek γινωσκω.

Science, in Latin *scientia*, from *scio*, Greek *σκημι* to know, and *seca* to see or perceive.

Learning, from *learn*, signifies the thing learned.

Erudition, in Latin *eruditio*, comes from *erudio* to bring out of a state of rudeness or ignorance.

Knowledge is a general term which simply implies the thing known: *science*, *learning*, and *erudition* are modes of *knowledge* qualified by some collateral idea: *science* is a systematic species of *knowledge* which consists of rule and order; *learning* is that species of *knowledge* which one derives from schools, or through the medium of personal instruction; *erudition* is scholastic *knowledge* obtained by profound research; *knowledge* admits of every possible degree, and is expressly opposed to ignorance; *science*, *learning*, and *erudition* are positively high degrees of *knowledge*.

The attainment of *knowledge* is, of itself, a pleasure, independent of the many extrinsic advantages which it brings to every individual, according to the station of life in which he is placed; the pursuits of *science* have a peculiar interest for men of a peculiar turn: those who thirst after general *knowledge* may not have a reach of intellect to take the comprehensive survey of nature which is requisite for a *scientific* man. *Learning* is less dependent on the genius, than on the will of the individual; men of moderate talents have overcome the deficiencies of nature, by labour and perseverance, and have acquired such stores of *learning* as have raised them to a respectable station in the republic of letters. Profound *erudition* is obtained but by few; a retentive memory, a patient industry, and deep penetration are requisite for one who aspires to the title of an *erudite* man.

Knowledge, in the unqualified and universal sense, is not always a good: Pope says, "A little *knowledge* is a dangerous thing;" it is certain we may have a *knowledge* of evil as well as good, and as our passions are ever ready to serve us an ill turn, they will call in our imperfect or superficial *knowledge* to their aid. *Science* is more exempt from this danger; but the *scientific* man who forgets to make experience his guide, as many are apt to do in the present day, will wander in the regions of idle speculation, and sink in the quicksands of scepticism. *Learning* is more generally and practically useful to the morals of men than *science*; while it makes us acquainted with the language, the sentiments, and manners of former ages: it serves to purify the sentiments, to enlarge the understanding, and exert the powers; but the pursuit of that *learning* which consists merely in the *knowledge* of words, or in the study of editions, is even worse than a useless employment of the time. *Erudition* is always good, it does not merely serve to ennoble the possessor, but it adds to the stock of important *knowledge*; it serves the cause of religion and morality, and elevates the views of men to the grandest objects of inquiry.

Can *knowledge* have no bound, but must advance
So far, to make us wish for ignorance?—DENHAM.

O sacred poesy, thou spirit of Roman arts,
The soul of *science*, and the queen of souls.
B. JONSON.

As *learning* advanced, new works were adopted into our language, but I think with little improvement of the art of translation.—JOHNSON.

Two of the French clergy with whom I passed my evenings were men of deep *erudition*.—BURKE.

L.

Labour, *v. Work.*

To Labour, Take Pains or Trouble,
Use Endeavour.

Labour, in Latin *labor*, comes, in all probability, from *labo* to falter or faint, because *labour* causes faintness.

To Take Pains is to expose one's self to pains; and to Take the Trouble is to impose trouble on one's self.

Endeavour (*v. To endeavour*).

The first three terms suppose the necessity for a painful exertion; but to *labour* expresses more than to take pains, and this more than to

trouble ; to use *endeavour* excludes every idea of pain or inconvenience ; great difficulties must be conquered ; great perfection or correctness requires *pains* : a concern to please will give *trouble* ; but we use *endeavours* wherever any object is to be obtained, or any duty to be performed. To *labour* is either a corporeal or a mental action ; to *take pains* is principally an effort of the mind or the attention ; to *take trouble* is an effort either of the body or mind : a faithful minister of the Gospel labours to instil Christian principles into the minds of his audience, and to heal all the breaches which the angry passions make between them : when a child is properly sensible of the value of improvement, he will take the utmost *pains* to profit by the instruction of the master : he who is too indolent to *take the trouble* to make his wishes known to those who would comply with them, cannot expect others to *trouble* themselves with inquiring into their necessities : a good name is of such value to every man that he ought to use his best *endeavours* to preserve it unblemished.

They (the Jews) were fain to *take pains* to rid themselves of their happiness, and it cost them *labour* and violence to become miserable.—SOUTH.

A good conscience hath always enough to reward itself, though the success fall not out according to the merit of the *endeavour*.—HOWELL.

Laborious, v. Active.

Labyrinth, Maze.

Intricacy is common to both the objects expressed by these terms ; but the term *Labyrinth* has it to a much greater extent than *Maze* : the *labyrinth*, from the Greek *λαβυρινθος*, was a work of antiquity which surpassed the *maze* in the same proportion as the ancients surpassed the moderns in all other works of art ; it was constructed on so prodigious a scale, and with so many windings, that when a person was once entered, he could not find his way out without the assistance of a clue or thread. *Maze*, probably from the Saxon *mase* a gulf, is a modern term for a similar structure on a smaller scale, which is frequently made by way of ornament in large gardens. From the proper meaning of the two words we may easily see the ground of their metaphorical application : political and polemical discussions are compared to a *labyrinth* ; because the mind that is once entangled in them is unable to extricate itself by any efforts of its own : on the other hand, that perplexity and confusion into which the mind is thrown by unexpected or inexplicable events is termed a *maze* ; because, for the time, it is bereft of its power to pursue its ordinary functions of recollection and combination.

From the slow mistress of this school, Experience,
And her assistant, pausing, pale Distrust,
Purchase a dear-bought clue to lead his youth
Through serpentine obliquities of human life,
And the dark *labyrinth* of human hearts.—YOUNG.

To measure'd notes whilst they advance,
He in wild *maze* shall lead the dance.—CUMBERLAND.

Lack, v. Want.

Lading, v. Freight.

To Lag, v. To linger.

To Lament, v. To bewail.

To Lament, v. To complain.

To Lament, v. To deplore.

To Lament, v. To grieve.

Land, Country.

Land, in German *land*, &c., from *lean* and *line*, signifies an open, even space, and refers strictly to the earth. **Country**, in French *contrée*, from *con* and *terra*, signifies *lands* adjoining so as to form one portion. The term *land*, therefore, properly excludes the idea of habitation ; the term *country* excludes that of the earth, or the parts of which it is composed : hence we speak of the *land* as rich or poor, according to what it yields : of a *country* as rich or poor, according to what its inhabitants possess : so, in like manner, we say, the *land* is ploughed or prepared for receiving the grain : but the *country* is cultivated ; the *country* is under a good government ; or, a man's *country* is dear to him. In an extended application, however, these words may be put for one another : the word *land* may sometimes be put for any portion of *land* that is under a government, as the *land* of liberty ; and *country* may be put for the soil, as a rich *country*.

You are still in the *land* of the living, and have all the means that can be desired, whereby to prevent your falling into condemnation.—BEVERIDGE.

We love our *country* as the seat of religion, liberty, and laws.—BLAIR.

Landscape, v. View.

Language, Tongue, Speech, Idiom, Dialect.

Language, from the Latin *lingua* a **Tongue**, signifies, like the word *tongue*, that which is spoken by the *tongue*.

Speech is the act of speaking or the thing spoken.

Idiom, in Latin *idioma*, Greek *ιδιωμα*, from *ιδιος* proprius, proper, or peculiar, signifies a peculiar mode of speaking.

Dialect, in Latin *dialectica*, Greek *διαλεκτικη*, from *διαλεγομαι* to speak in a distinct manner, signifies a distinct mode of speech.

All these terms mark the manner of expressing our thoughts, but under different circumstances. *Language* is the most general term in its meaning and application : it conveys the general idea without any modification, and is applied to other modes of expression besides that of words, and to other objects besides persons ; the *language* of the eyes frequently supplies the place of that of the *tongue* ; the deaf and dumb use the *language* of signs ; birds and beasts are supposed to have their peculiar *language* : *tongue*, *speech*, and the other terms are applicable only to human beings. *Language* is either written or spoken ; but a *tongue* is conceived of mostly as something to be spoken : and *speech* is, in the strict sense, that only which is spoken or uttered. A *tongue* is a totality, or an entire assemblage, of all that is necessary for the expression of thought ; it comprehends not only words, but modifications of meaning, changes of termi-

nation, modes and forms of words, with the whole scheme of syntactical rules; a *tongue* therefore comprehended, in the first instance, only those *languages* which were originally formed: the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin are in the proper sense *tongues*; but those which are spoken by Europeans, and owe their origin to the former, commonly bear the general denomination of *languages*.

Speech is an abstract term, implying either the power of uttering articulate sounds: as when we speak of the gift of *speech*, which is denied to those who are dumb, or the words themselves which are spoken; as when we speak of the parts of *speech*, or the particular mode of expressing one's self; or that a man is known by his *speech*. *Idiom* and *dialect* are not properly a *language*, but the properties of *language*: *idiom* is the peculiar construction and turn of a *language*, which distinguishes it altogether from others; it is that which enters into the composition of the *language*, and cannot be separated from it. A *dialect* is that which is engrafted on a *language* by the inhabitants of particular parts of a country, and admitted by its writers and learned men to form an incidental part of the *language*; as the *dialects* which originated with the Ionians, the Athenians, the Æolians, and were afterwards amalgamated into the Greek tongue; as also the *dialects* of the high and low German which are distinguished by similar peculiarities.

Languages simply serve to convey our thoughts: *tongues* consist of words, written or spoken: *speech* consists of words spoken: *idioms* are the expression of national manners, customs, and turns of sentiment, which are the most difficult to be transferred from one language to another: *dialects* do not vary so much in the words themselves as in the forms of words; they are prejudicial to the perspicuity of a *language*, but add to its harmony.

Nor do they trust their tongue alone,
But speak a *language* of their own.—SWIFT.

What if we could discourse with people of all the nations upon the earth in their own mother tongue? Unless we know Jesus Christ, also, we should be lost for ever.—BEVERIDGE.

When *speech* is employed only as the vehicle of falsehood, every man must disunite himself from others.—JOHNSON.

The *language* of this great poet is sometimes obscured by old words, transpositions, and foreign *idioms*.—ADDISON.

Every art has its *dialect*, uncouth and ungrateful to all whom custom has not reconciled to its sound.—JOHNSON.

Languid, *v. Faint.*

To Languish, *v. To flag.*

Large, *v. Great.*

Large, Wide, Broad.

Large (*v. Great*) is applied in a general way to express every dimension; it implies not only abundance in solid matter, but also freedom in the space, or extent of a plane superficies.

Wide, in German *weit*, is most probably connected with the French *vide*, and the Latin *viduus* empty, signifying properly an empty

or open space unencumbered by any obstructions.

Broad, in German *breit*, probably comes from the noun *bret*, a board; because it is the peculiar property of a board, that is to say, it is the *width* of what is particularly long. Many things are *large*, but not *wide*; as a *large* town, a *large* circle, a *large* ball, a *large* nut: other things are both *large* and *wide*: as a *large* field, or a *wide* field: a *large* house, or a *wide* house: but the field is said to be *large* from the quantity of ground it contains; it is said to be *wide* both from its figure or the extent of its space in the cross directions; in like manner, a house is *large* from its extent in all directions; it is said to be *wide* from the extent which it runs in front: some things are said to be *wide* which are not denominated *large*; that is, either such things as have less bulk and quantity than extent of plane surface; as *ell-wide* cloth, a *wide* opening, a *wide* entrance, and the like; or such as have an extent of space only one way; as a *wide* road, a *wide* path, a *wide* passage, and the like. What is *broad* is in sense, and mostly in application, *wide*, but not *vice versa*: a ribbon is *broad*; a ledge is *broad*; a ditch is *broad*; a plank is *broad*; the brim of a hat is *broad*; or the border of anything is *broad*: on the other hand, a mouth is *wide*, but not *broad*; apertures in general are *wide*, but not *broad*. *Large* is opposed to small; *wide* to close; *broad* to narrow. In the moral application, we speak of *largeness* in regard to liberality; *wide* and *broad* only in the figurative sense of space or size: as a *wide* difference; or a *broad* line of distinction.

Shall grief contract the largeness of that heart
In which nor fear nor anger has a part?—WALLER.

Wide was the wound,
But suddenly with flesh fill'd up and heal'd.—MILTON.

The wider a man's comforts extend, the *broad*er is the mark which he spreads to the arrows of misfortune.—BLAIR.

Largely, Copiously, Fully.

Largely (*v. Great*) is here taken in the moral sense, and, if the derivation given of it be true, in the most proper sense.

Copiously comes from the Latin *copia* plenty, signifying in a plentiful degree.

Fully signifies in a full degree; to the full extent, as far as it can reach.

Quantity is the idea expressed in common by all these terms; but *largely* has always a reference to the freedom of the will in the agent; *copiously* qualifies actions that are done by inanimate objects; *fully* qualifies the actions of a rational agent, but it denotes a degree or extent which cannot be surpassed.

A person deals *largely* in things, or he *drinks* large draughts; rivers are *copiously* supplied in rainy seasons; a person is *fully* satisfied, or *fully* prepared. A bountiful Providence has distributed his gifts *largely* among his creatures: blood flows *copiously* from a deep wound when it is first made; when a man is not *fully* convinced of his own insufficiency, he is not prepared to listen to the counsel of others.

There is one very faulty method of drawing up the laws, that is, when the case is *largely* set forth in the preamble.—BACON.

The youths with wine the *copious* goblets crown'd,
And pleas'd dispense the flowing bowls around.—POPE.

Every word (in the Bible) is so weighty that it ought to be carefully considered by all that desire *fully* to understand the sense.—BEVERIDGE.

Lassitude, v. Fatigue.

Last, Latest, Final, Ultimate.

Last and **Latest**, both from *late*, in German *letzte*, come from the Greek *λοισθος* and *λεινω* to leave, signifying left or remaining.

Final, v. Final.

Ultimate comes from *ultimus* the last.

Last and *ultimate* respect the order of succession: *latest* respects the order of time; *final* respects the completion of an object. What is *last* or *ultimate* is succeeded by nothing else: what is *latest* is not succeeded by any great interval of time; what is *final* requires to be succeeded by nothing else. The *last* is opposed to the first; the *ultimate* is distinguished from that which might follow; the *latest* is opposed to the earliest; the *final* is opposed to the introductory or beginning. A person's *last* words are those by which one is guided; his *ultimate* object is distinguished from that more remote one which may possibly be in his mind; a conscientious man remains firm to his principles to his *latest* breath; the *final* determination of difficult matters requires caution. Jealous people strive to be not the *last* in anything; the *latest* intelligence which a man gets of his country is acceptable to one who is in distant quarters of the globe; it requires resolution to take a *final* leave of those whom one holds near and dear.

The supreme Author of our being has so formed the soul of man that nothing but himself can be its *last*, adequate, and proper happiness.—ADDISON.

A pleasant comedy which paints the manners of the age is a durable work, and is transmitted to the *latest* posterity.—HUME.

Final causes lie more bare and open to our observation, as there are often a greater variety that belong to the same effect.—ADDISON.

The *ultimate* end of man is the enjoyment of God, beyond which he cannot form a wish.—GROVE.

Lasting, v. Durable.

Lastly, At Last, At Length.

Lastly, like *last* (*v. Last*), respects the order of succession: **At Last** or **At Length** refer to what has preceded. When a sermon is divided into many heads, the term *lastly* comprehends the *last* division. When an affair is settled after much difficulty it is said to be *at last* settled; and if it be settled after a protracted continuance, it is said to be settled *at length*.

Lastly, opportunities do sometimes offer in which a man may wickedly make his fortune without fear of temporal damage. In such cases what restraint do they lie under who have no regard beyond the grave?

At last being satisfied they had nothing to fear they brought out all their corn every day.—ADDISON.

A neighbouring king had made war upon this female re-

public several years with various success, and at length overthrew them in a very great battle.—ADDISON.

Latent, v. Secret.

Latest, v. Last.

Laudable, Praiseworthy, Commendable.

Laudable, from the Latin *laudo* to praise, is in sense literally **Praiseworthy**, that is *worthy of praise*, or to be praised (*v. To praise*).

Commendable signifies entitled to commendation.

Laudable is used in a general application; *praiseworthy* and *commendable* are applied to individuals: things are *laudable* in themselves; they are *praiseworthy* or *commendable* in this or that person.

That which is *laudable* is entitled to encouragement and general approbation; an honest endeavour to be useful to one's family or one's self is at all times *laudable*, and will ensure the support of all good people. What is *praiseworthy* obtains the respect of all men: as all have temptations to do that which is wrong, the performance of one's duty is in all cases *praiseworthy*; but particularly so in those cases where it opposes one's interests and interferes with one's pleasures. What is *commendable* is not equally important with the two former; it entitles a person only to a temporary or partial expression of good will and approbation; the performance of those minor and particular duties which belong to children and subordinate persons is in the proper sense *commendable*.

It is a *laudable* ambition to wish to excel in that which is good; it is very *praiseworthy* in a child to assist its parent as occasion may require; silence is *commendable* in a young person when he is reproved.

Nothing is more *laudable* than an inquiry after truth.—ADDISON.

Ridicule is generally made use of to laugh men out of virtue and good sense, by attacking everything *praiseworthy* in human life.—ADDISON.

Edmund Waller was born to a very fair estate by the parsimony or frugality of a wise father and mother, and he thought it so *commendable* an advantage that he resolved to improve it with his utmost care.—CLARENDON.

To Laugh At, Ridicule.

Laugh, through the medium of the Saxon, *hlahan*, old German *lahan*, Greek *γελω*, comes from the Hebrew *lahak*, with no variation in the meaning.

Ridicule, from the Latin *rideo*, has the same original meaning.

Both these verbs are used here in the improper sense for *laughter*, blended with more or less of contempt: but the former displays itself by the natural expression of *laughter*: the latter shows itself by a verbal expression: the former is produced by a feeling of mirth, on observing the real or supposed weakness of another; the latter is produced by a strong sense of the absurd or irrational in another: the former is more immediately directed to the person who has excited the feeling; the latter is more commonly produced by things than by persons. We *laugh* at a person to his

face; but we *ridicule* his notions by writing or in the course of conversation: we *laugh* at the individual; we *ridicule* that which is maintained by him. It is better to *laugh* at the fears of a child than to attempt to restrain them by violence, but it is still better to overcome them if possible by the force of reason: *ridicule* is not the test of truth; he therefore who attempts to misuse it against the cause of truth, will bring upon himself the contempt of all mankind; but folly can be assailed with no weapon so effectual as *ridicule*. The philosopher Democritus preferred to *laugh* at the follies of men rather than weep for them like Heraclitus; infidels have always employed *ridicule* against Christianity, by which they have betrayed not only their want of argument, but their personal depravity in *laughing* where they ought to be most serious.

Men *laugh* at one another's cost.—SWIFT.

It is easy for a man who sits idle at home and has nobody to please but himself, to *ridicule* or censure the common practices of mankind.—JOHNSON.

Laughable, Ludicrous, Ridiculous, Comical, or Comic, Droll.

Laughable signifies exciting or fit to excite *laughter*.

Ludicrous, in Latin *ludicæ* or *ludicus* from *ludus* a game, signifies belonging to a game or sport.

Ridiculous exciting or fit to excite *ridicule*.

Either the direct action of *laughter* or a corresponding sentiment is included in the signification of all these terms; they differ principally in the cause which produces the feeling; the *laughable* consists of objects in general, whether personal or otherwise; the *ludicrous* and *ridiculous* have more or less reference to that which is personal. What is *laughable* may excite simple merriment independently of all personal reference, unless we admit what Mr. Hobbes, and after him Addison, have maintained of all *laughter*, that it springs from pride. But without entering into this nice question, I am inclined to distinguish between the *laughable* which arises from the reflection of what is to our own advantage or pleasure, and that which arises from reflecting on what is to the disadvantage of another. The *Droll* tricks of a monkey, or the humorous stories of wit, are *laughable* from the nature of the things themselves; without any apparent allusion, however remote, to any individual but the one whose senses or mind is gratified. The *ludicrous* and *ridiculous* are, however, species of the *laughable* which arises altogether from reflecting on that which is to the disadvantage of another. The *ludicrous* lies mostly in the outward circumstances of the individual, or such as are exposed to view and serve as a show; the *ridiculous* applies to everything personal, whether external or internal. The *ludicrous* does not comprehend that which is so much to the disparagement of the individual as the *ridiculous*; whatever there is in ourselves which excites *laughter* in others is accompanied in their minds with a sense of our inferiority: and consequently the *ludicrous*

always produces this feeling; but only in a slight degree compared with the *ridiculous*, which awakens a positive sense of contempt. Whoever is in a *ludicrous* situation is, let it be in ever so small a degree, placed in an inferior station, with regard to those by whom he is thus viewed; but he who is rendered *ridiculous* is positively degraded. It is possible, therefore, for a person to be in a *ludicrous* situation without any kind of moral demerit, or the slightest depreciation of his moral character: since that which renders his situation *ludicrous* is altogether independent of himself; or it becomes *ludicrous* only in the eyes of incompetent judges, "Let an ambassador," says Mr. Pope, "speak the best sense in the world, and deport himself in the most graceful manner before a prince, yet if the tail of his shirt happen, as I have known it happen to a very wise man, to hang out behind, more people will *laugh* at that than attend to the other." This is the *ludicrous*. The same can seldom be said of the *ridiculous*; for as this springs from positive moral causes, it reflects on the person to whom it attaches in a less questionable shape, and produces positive disgrace. Persons very rarely appear *ridiculous* without being really so; and he who is really *ridiculous* justly excites contempt.

Droll and **Comical** are in the proper sense applied to things which cause *laughter*, as when we speak of a *droll* story, or a *comical* incident, or a *Comic* song. They may be applied to the person; but not so as to reflect disadvantageously on the individual, as in the former terms.

They'll not show their teeth in way of smile,
Though Nestor swear the jest be *laughable*.

SHAKESPEARE.

The action of the theatre, though modern states esteem it but *ludicrous* unless it be satirical and biting, was carefully watched by the ancients that it might improve mankind in virtue.—BACON.

Infelix paupertas has nothing in it more intolerable than this, that it renders men *ridiculous*.—SOUTH.

A *comic* subject loves an humble verse,
Thyestes scorns a low and *comic* style.

ROSCOMMON.

In the Augustan age itself, notwithstanding the censure of Horace, they preferred the low buffoonery and *drollery* of Plautus to the delicacy of Terence.—WARTON.

Lavish, *v.* Extravagant.

Law, *v.* Maxim.

Lawful, Legal, Legitimate, Licit.

Lawful, from *law*, and the French *loi*, comes from the Latin *lex*, in the same manner as **Legal** or **Legitimate**, all signifying in the proper sense belonging to *law*. They differ therefore according to the sense of the word *law*: *lawful* respects the *law* in general defined or undefined; *legal* respects only the civil *law* which is defined; and *legitimate* respects the laws or rules of science as well as civil matters in general. **Licit**, from the Latin *licet* to be allowed, is used only to characterize the moral quality of actions; the *lawful* properly implies conformable to or enjoined by *law*; the *legal* what is in the form or after the manner of *law*, or binding by *law*:

it is not *lawful* to coin money with the king's stamp; a marriage is not *legal* in England which is not solemnized according to the rites of the established church; men's passions impel them to do many things which are *unlawful* or *illicit*; their ignorance leads them into many things which are *illegal* or *illegitimate*. As a good citizen and a true Christian, every man will be anxious to avoid everything which is *unlawful*: it is the business of the lawyer to define what is *legal* or *illegal*: it is the business of the critic to define what is *legitimate* verse in poetry; it is the business of the linguist to define the *legitimate* use of words: it is the business of the moralist to point out what is *illicit*. As usurpers have no *lawful* authority, no one is under any obligation to obey them: when a claim to property cannot be made out according to the established *laws* of the country it is not *legal*: the cause of *legitimate* sovereigns is at length brought to a happy issue: it is to be hoped that men will never be so unwise as ever to revive the question; the first inclination to an *illicit* indulgence should be carefully suppressed.

According to this spiritual doctor of politics, if his Majesty does not owe his crown to the choice of his people, he is no *lawful* king.—BURKE.

Swift's mental powers declined till (1741) it was found necessary that *legal* guardians should be appointed to his person and fortune.—JOHNSON.

Upon the whole I have sent this my offspring into the world in as decent a dress as I was able; a *legitimate* one I am sure it is.—MOORE.

The King of Prussia charged some of the officers, his prisoners, with maintaining an *illicit* correspondence.—SMOLLETT.

Lax, v. Loose.

To Lay, v. To put.

To Lay or Take Hold Of, Catch, Seize, Snatch, Grasp, Gripe.

To Lay or Take Hold Of is here the generic expression: it denotes simply getting into one's possession, which is the common idea in the signification of all these terms, which differ in regard to the motion in which the action is performed. To *Catch* is to *lay hold* of with an effort. To *Seize* is to *lay hold* of by violence. To *Snatch* is to *lay hold* of by a sudden effort. One is said to *lay hold* of that on which one places his hand; he *takes hold* of that which he secures in his hand. We *lay hold* of anything when we see it falling: we *take hold* of anything when we wish to lift it up; we *catch* what attempts to escape; we *seize* it when it makes resistance; we *snatch* that which we are particularly afraid of not getting otherwise. A person who is fainting *lays hold* of the first thing which comes in his way; a sick person or one who wants support *takes hold* of another's arm in walking; various artifices are employed to *catch* animals; the wild beasts of the forest *seize* their prey the moment they come within their reach; it is the rude sport of a schoolboy to *snatch* out of the hand of another that which he is not willing to let go.

To *lay hold* of is to get in the possession. To *Grasp* and to *Gripe* signify to have or keep in the possession; an eagerness to keep or not

to let go is expressed by that of *grasping*; a fearful anxiety of losing and an earnest desire of keeping is expressed by the act of *gripping*. When a famished man *lays hold* of food he *grasps* it, from a convulsive kind of fear lest it should leave him: when a miser *lays hold* of money he *gripes* it from the love he bears to it; and the fear he has that it will be taken from him.

Sometimes it happens that a corn slips out of their paws when they (the ants) are climbing up; they *take hold* of it again when they can find it, otherwise they look for another.—ADDISON.

One great genius often catches the flame from another.—ADDISON.

Furious he said, and tow'rd the Grecian crew,
(Seiz'd by the crest) th' unhappy warrior drew.
POPE

The hungry harpies fly,
They snatch the meat defiling all they find.
DRYDEN.

Like a miser midst his store,
Who grasps and grasps till he can hold no more.
DRYDEN.

They gripe their oaks; and every panting breast
Is rais'd by turns with hope, by turns with fear
depress'd.—DRYDEN.

To Lay, v. To lie.

Lazy, v. Idle.

Lazy, v. Inactive.

To Lead, v. To conduct.

Leader, v. Chief.

League, v. Alliance.

Lean, Meagre.

Lean is in all probability connected with line, link, and long, signifying that which is simply long without any other dimension.

Meagre, in Latin *macer*, Greek μικρος small.

Lean denotes want of fat; meagre want of flesh: what is lean is not always meagre; but nothing can be meagre without being lean. Brutes as well as men are lean, but men only are said to be meagre: leanness is frequently connected with the temperament; meagreness is the consequence of starvation and disease. There are some animals by nature inclined to be lean: a meagre pale visage is to be seen perpetually in the haunts of vice and poverty.

Who ambles time withal,
With a priest the lacks Latin,
And with a rich man that hath not the gout,
The one lacking the burthen of lean and
Wasteful learning; the other knowing more
Burthen of heavy tedious penury.
SHAKESPEARE.

So thin, so ghastly meagre, and so wan,
So bare of flesh, he scarce resembled man.
DRYDEN.

To Lean, Incline, Bend.

Lean and Incline both come from the Latin *clino*, and Greek κλινω to bow or bend.

Bend, v. Bend.

In the proper sense lean and incline are both said of the position of bodies; bend is said of the shape of bodies: that which leans rests on one side, or in a sideward direction; that which inclines, leans or turns only in a slight degree: that which bends forms a curvature;

it does not all *lean* the same way : a house *leans* when the foundation gives way ; a tree may grow so as to *incline* to the right or the left, or a road may *incline* this or that way ; a tree or a road *bends* when it turns out of the straight course.

In the improper sense the judgment *leans*, the will *inclines*, the will or conduct *bends*, in consequence of some outward action. A person *leans* to this or that side of a question which he favours ; he *inclines* or is *inclined* to this or that mode of conduct ; he *bends* to the will of another. It is the duty of a judge to *lean* to the side of mercy as far as is consistent with justice : whoever *inclines* too readily to listen to the tales of distress which are continually told to excite compassion will find himself in general deceived ; an *unbending* temper is the bane of domestic felicity.

Like you a courtier born and bred,
Kings *lean'd* their ear to what I said.—GAY.

Say what you want ; the Latins you shall find
Not fore'd to goodness, but by will *inclined*.
DRYDEN.

And as on corn when western gusts descend,
Before the blast the lofty harvest *bend*.—POPE.

Learning, v. Knowledge.

Learning, v. Letters.

To Leave, v. To let.

To Leave, Quit, Relinquish.

Leave, in Saxon *leafve*, in old German *laube*, Latin *lingua*, Greek *λεω*, signifies either to *leave* or to be wanting, because one is wanting in the place which one *leaves*.

Quit, in French *quitter*, from the Latin *quietus* rest, signifies to rest or remain, to give up the hold of.

Relinquish, v. To abandon.

We *leave* that to which we may intend to return ; we *quit* that to which we return no more ; we may *leave* a place voluntarily or otherwise ; but we *relinquish* it unwillingly. We *leave* persons or things ; we *quit* and *relinquish* things only. I *leave* one person in order to speak to another ; I *leave* my house for a short time ; I *quit* it not to return to it.

Leave and *quit* may be used in the improper as well as the proper sense. A prudent man *leaves* all questions about minor matters in religion and politics to men of busy, restless tempers : it is a source of great pleasure to a contemplative mind to revisit the scenes of early childhood, which have been long *quitted* for the busy scenes of active life : a miser is loath to *relinquish* the gain which has added so greatly to his stores and his pleasures. It is the privilege of the true Christian to be able to *leave* all the enjoyments of this life, not only with composure, but with satisfaction ; dogs have sometimes evinced their fidelity, even to the remains of their masters, by not *quitting* the spot where they are laid ; pre-judices, particularly in matters of religion, acquire so deep a root in the mind that they cannot be made to *relinquish* their hold by the most persuasive eloquence and forcible reasoning.

Why *leave* we not the fatal Trojan shore,
And measure back the seas we cross'd before?—POPE.

The sacred wrestler, till a blessing giv'n,
Quits not his hold, but halting conquers heav'n.

WALLER.

Although Charles *relinquish'd* almost every power of the crown, he would neither give up his friends to punishment nor desert what he esteemed his religious duty.—HUME.

To Leave, Take Leave, Bid Farewell, or Adieu.

Leave is here general as before (*v. To leave*) ; it expresses simply the idea of separating one's self from an object, whether for a time or otherwise ; to **Take Leave** and **Bid Farewell** imply a separation for a perpetuity.

To *leave* is an unqualified action, it is applied to objects of indifference, or otherwise, but supposes in general no exercise of one's feelings. We *leave* persons as convenience requires ; we *leave* them on the road, in the field, in the house, or wherever circumstances direct ; we *leave* them with or without speaking ; but to *take leave* is a parting ceremony between friends on their parting for a considerable time ; to *bid farewell* or *Adieu* is a still more solemn ceremony, when the parting is expected to be final. When applied to things we *leave* such as we do not wish to meddle with ; we *take leave* of those things which were agreeable to us, but which we find it prudent to give up ; and we *bid farewell* to those for which we still retain a great attachment. It is better to *leave* a question undecided than to attempt to decide it by altercation or violence ; it is greater virtue in a man to *take leave* of his vices than to let them *take leave* of him, when a man engages in schemes of ambition, he must *bid adieu* to all the enjoyments of domestic life.

Self alone, in nature rooted fast,
Attends us first and *leaves* us last.—SWIFT.

Now I am to *take leave* of my readers, I am under greater anxiety than I have known for the work of any day since I undertook this province.—STEELE.

Anticipate the awful moment of your bidding the world an eternal *farewell*.—BLAIR.

Leave, Liberty, Permission, Licence.

Leave has here the sense of freedom granted, because what is left to itself is left free.

Liberty, v. Freedom.

Permission signifies the act of *permitting* (*v. To allow*), or the thing *permitted*.

Licence, in Latin *licentia* from *licet* to be lawful, signifies the state of being *permitted* by law.

Leave and *liberty* are either given or taken ; *permission* is taken only ; *licence* is granted, and that in a special manner : *leave* is employed only on familiar occasions ; *liberty* is given in more important matters : the master gives *leave* to his servant to go out for his pleasure ; a gentleman gives his friends the *liberty* of shooting on his grounds : *leave* is taken in indifferent matters, particularly as it respects *leave* of absence : *liberty* is taken by a greater, and in general an unauthorized, stretch of one's powers, and is, therefore, an *infringe-*

ment on the rights of another. What is done without the *leave* may be done without the knowledge, though not contrary to the will of another; but *liberties* which are taken without offering an apology are always calculated to give offence.

Leave is granted by private individuals, but *licence* is granted by public authority: a parent gives *leave* to a child to take a walk; the government grants *licences* for selling different commodities.

Leave and *permission* are said to be asked for, but not *liberty*: we beg *leave* to offer our opinions; we request *permission* but not *liberty* to speak; *licences* are obtained upon application by such persons as are proper to receive them.

I must have *leave* to be grateful to any one who serves me, let him be ever so obnoxious to any party.—POPE.

I am for the full *liberty* of diversion (for children) as much as you can be.—LOCKE.

The repeated *permissions* you give me of dealing freely with you will, I hope, excuse what I have done.—POPE.

Leaving the wits the spacious air,
With *licence* to build castles there.—SWIFT.

To Leave Off, *v.* To cease.

To Leave Off, *v.* To desist.

Leavings, Remains.

Leavings are the consequence of a voluntary act: they signify what is left: **Remains** are what follows in the course of things; they are what *remains*; the former is therefore taken in the bad sense to signify what has been left as worthless; the latter is never taken in this bad sense. When many persons of good taste have the liberty of choosing, it is fair to expect that the *leavings* will be worth little or nothing after all have made their choice. By the *remains* of beauty which are discoverable in the face of a female, we may be enabled to estimate what her personal gifts were.

Scale, fins, and bones, the *leavings* of the feast.
SOMERVILLE.

So midnight tapers waste their last *remains*.
SOMERVILLE.

Legal, *v.* Lawful.

Legitimate, *v.* Lawful.

Leisure, *v.* Idle.

To Lessen, *v.* To abate.

To Let, Leave, Suffer.

Let, through the medium of the Gothic *letan*, and other changes in the French *laisser*, German *lassen*, &c., comes in all probability from the Latin *laxo*, to loosen, or set loose, free.

Leave, *v.* To leave.

Suffer, from the Latin *suffero* to bear with, signifies not to put a stop to.

The removal of hindrance or constraint on the actions of others is implied by all these terms; but *let* is a less formal action than *leave*, and this than *suffer*. I *let* a person pass in the road by getting out of his way: I *leave* a person to decide on a matter according to his own

discretion, by declining to interfere: I *suffer* a person to go his own way, over whom I am expected to exercise a control. It is in general most prudent to *let* things take their own course: in the education of youth, the greatest art lies in *leaving* them to follow the natural bent of their minds and turn of the disposition, and at the same time not *suffering* them to do anything prejudicial to their character or future interests.

Then to invoke
The Goddess, and let in the fatal horse,
We all consent.—DENHAM.

This crime I could not *leave* unpunished.—DENHAM.

If Pope had *suffered* his heart to be alienated from her, he could have found nothing that might fill her place.—JOHNSON.

Lethargic, *v.* Sleepy.

Letter, *v.* Character.

Letter, Epistle.

According to the origin of these words, **Letter**, in Latin *littera*, signifies any document composed of written *letters*; and **Epistle**, in Greek *επιστολη* from *επιστελλω* to send, signifies a *letter* sent or addressed to any one; consequently the former is the generic, the latter the specific term. *Letter* is a term altogether familiar, it may be used for whatever is written by one friend to another in domestic life, or for the public documents of this description, which have emanated from the pen of writers, as the *letters* of Madame de Sévigné, the *letters* of Pope or of Swift; and even those which were written by the ancients, as the *letters* of Cicero, Pliny, and Seneca; but in strict propriety those are entitled *epistles* as a term most adapted to whatever has received the sanction of ages, and by the same rule, likewise, whatever is peculiarly solemn in its contents has acquired the same epithet, as the *epistles* of St. Paul, St. Peter, St. John, St. Jude; and by an analogous rule, whatever poetry is written in the *epistolary* form is denominated an *epistle* rather than a *letter*, whether of ancient or modern date, as the *epistles* of Horace, or the *epistles* of Boileau; and finally, whatever is addressed by way of dedication is denominated a *dedicatory epistle*. Ease and a friendly familiarity should characterize the *letter*: sentiment and instruction are always conveyed by an *epistle*.

Letters, Literature, Learning.

Letters and **Literature** signify knowledge, derived through the medium of written *letters* or books, that is, information: **Learning** (*v.* *Knowledge*) is confined to that which is communicated, that is, scholastic knowledge. The term men of *letters*, or the republic of *letters*, comprehends all who devote themselves to the cultivation of their minds: *literary* societies have for their object the diffusion of general information: *learned* societies propose to themselves the higher object of extending the bounds of science, and increasing the sum of human knowledge. Men of *letters* have a passport for admittance into the highest circles; *literary* men can always find resources for themselves in their own society: *learned*

men, or men of *learning*, are more the objects of respect and admiration than of imitation.

To the greater part of mankind the duties of life are inconsistent with much study; and the hours which they would spend upon *letters* must be stolen from their occupations and families.—JOHNSON.

He that recalls the attention of mankind to any part of *learning* which time has left behind it, may be truly said to advance the *literature* of his own age.—JOHNSON.

To Level, *v.* To aim.

Level, *v.* Even.

Level, *v.* Flat.

Levity, *v.* Lightness.

Lexicon, *v.* Dictionary.

Liable, *v.* Subject.

Liberal, *v.* Beneficent.

Liberal, *v.* Free.

To Liberate, *v.* To free.

Liberty, *v.* Freedom.

Liberty, *v.* Leave.

Licence, *v.* Leave.

Licentious, *v.* Loose.

Lie, *v.* Untruth.

To Lie, Lay.

By a vulgar error these verbs have been so confounded as to deserve some notice. To **Lie** is neuter, and designates a state: to **Lay** is active, and denotes an action on an object; it is properly to cause to *lie*: a thing *lies* on the table; some one *lays* it on the table; he *lies* with his fathers; they *laid* him with his fathers. In the same manner, when used idiomatically, we say, a thing *lies* by us until we bring it into use; we *lay* it by for some future purpose: we *lie* down in order to repose ourselves; we *lay* money down by way of deposit: the disorder *lies* in the constitution; we *lay* a burden upon our friends.

Ants bite off all the buds before they *lay* it up, and therefore the corn that has *lain* in their nests will produce nothing.—ADDISON.

The church admits none to holy orders without *laying* upon them the highest obligations imaginable.—BEVERIDGE.

Life, *v.* Animation.

Lifeless, Dead, Inanimate.

Lifeless and **Dead** suppose the absence of life where it has once been; **Inanimate** supposes its absence where it has never been; a person is said to be *lifeless* or *dead* from whom life has departed; the material world consists of objects which are by nature *inanimate*. *Lifeless* is negative: it signifies simply without life, or the vital spark: *dead* is positive; it denotes an actual and perfect change in the object. We may speak of a *lifeless* corpse, when speaking of a body which sinks from a state of *animation* into that of *inanimation*: we speak of *dead* bodies to designate such as have undergone an entire change. A person, therefore, in whom *animation* is suspended, is,

for the time being, *lifeless*, in appearance at least, although we should not say *dead*.

In the moral acceptation, *lifeless* and *inanimate* respect the spirits; *dead* respects the moral feeling. A person is said to be *lifeless* who has lost the spirits which he once had; he is said to be *inanimate* when he is naturally wanting in spirits: a person who is *lifeless* is unfitted for enjoyment; he who is *dead* to moral sentiment is totally bereft of the essential properties of his nature.

Nor can his *lifeless* nostril please
With the once ravishing smell.—COWLEY.

How *dead* the vegetable kingdom lies!—THOMSON.

We may in some sort be said to have a society even with the *inanimate* world.—BURKE.

To Lift, Heave, Hoist.

Lift is in all probability contracted from *levatus*, participle of *levo* to lift, which comes from *levis* light, because what is light is easily borne up.

Heave, in Saxon *heavan*, German *heben*, &c., comes from the absolute particle *ha*, signifying high, because to *heave* is to set up on high.

Hoist, in French *hausser*, Low German *hissen*, is a variation from the same source as *heave*.

The idea of making high is common to all these words, but they differ in the objects and the circumstances of the action; we *lift* with or without an effort: we *heave* and *hoist* always with an effort; we *lift* a child up to let it see anything more distinctly; workmen *heave* the stones or beams which are used in a building; sailors *hoist* the long boat into the water. To *lift* and *hoist* are transitive verbs: they require an agent and an object: *heave* is intransitive, it may have an inanimate object for an agent: a person *lifts* his hand to his head; when whales are killed, they are *hoisted* into vessels: the bosom *heaves* when it is oppressed with sorrow, the waves of the sea *heave* when they are agitated by the wind.

What god so daring in your aid to move,
Or *lift* his hand against the force of Jove?—POPE.

Murm'ring they move, as when Old Ocean roars,
And *heaves* huge surges to the trembling shores.
POPE.

The reef unwrapt, th' inserted knittles tied,
To *hoist* the shorten'd sail again they tried.
FALCONER.

To Lift, Raise, Erect, Elevate, Exalt.

Lift, *v.* To lift.

Raise, signifies to cause to *rise*.

Erect, in Latin *erectus*, participle of *erigo* or *e* and *rego*, probably from the Greek *ορεω*, signifies literally to extend or set forth in the height.

Elevate is a variation from the same source as *lift*.

Exalt comes from the Latin *altus* high, and the Hebrew *olah* to ascend, and signifies to cause to be high (*v.* High).

The idea of making one thing higher than another is common to these verbs, which differ

in the circumstances of the action. To *lift* is to take off from the ground; to *raise* and *erect* are to place in a higher position while in contact with the ground: we *lift* up a stool; we *raise* a chair by giving it longer legs; we *erect* a monument by heaping one stone on another.

Whatever is to be carried is *lifted*; whatever is to be situated higher is to be *raised*; whatever is to be constructed above other objects is *erected*. A ladder is *lifted* upon the shoulders to be conveyed from one place to another; a standard ladder is *raised* against a building; a scaffolding is *erected*.

These terms are likewise employed in a moral acceptance; *exalt* and *elevate* are used in no other sense. *Lift* expresses figuratively the artificial action of setting aloft; as in the case of *lifting* a person into notice: to *raise* preserves the idea of making higher by the accession of wealth, honour, or power: as in the case of persons who are *raised* from beggary to a state of affluence: to *erect* retains its idea of artificially constructing, so as to produce a solid as well as lofty mass; as in the case of *erecting* a tribunal, *erecting* a system of spiritual dominion. A person cannot *lift* himself, but he may *raise* himself; individuals *lift* or *raise* up each other; but communities, or those only who are invested with power, have the opportunity of *erecting*.

To *lift* is seldom used in a good sense; to *raise* is used in a good or an indifferent sense; to *elevate* and *exalt* are always used in the best sense. A person is seldom *lifted* up for any good purpose, or from any merit in himself; it is commonly to suit the ends of party that people are *lifted* into notice, or *lifted* into office; a person may be *raised* for his merits, or *raise* himself by his industry, in both which cases he is entitled to esteem: one is *elevated* by circumstances, but still more so by one's character and moral qualities; one is rarely *exalted* but by means of superior endowments. To *elevate* may be the act of individuals for themselves; to *exalt* must be the act of others. There are some to whom *elevation* of rank is due, and others who require no adventitious circumstances to *elevate* them; the world has always agreed to *exalt* great power, great wisdom, and great genius.

Now rosy morn ascends the court of Jove,
Lifts up her light, and opens day above.—POPE.

Rais'd in his mind the Trojan hero stood,
And long'd to break from out his ambient cloud.
DRYDEN.

From their assistance, happier walls expect,
Which, wand'ring long, at last thou shalt erect.
DRYDEN.

Prudence operates on life in the same manner as rules on composition; it produces vigilance rather than *elevation*.—JOHNSON.

A creature of a more *exalted* kind
Was wanting yet, and then was man design'd.
DRYDEN.

Lightness, v. Ease.

**Lightness, Levity, Flightiness,
Volatility, Giddiness.**

Lightness, from *light*, signifies the abstract quality.

Levity, in Latin *levitas*, from *levis* light, signifies the same.

Flightiness, from *flighty* and *fly*, signifies a readiness to fly.

Volatility, in Latin *volatilitas*, from *volo* to fly, signifies fitting; or ready to fly swiftly on.

Giddiness is from *giddy*, in Saxon *giddig*.

Lightness and *giddiness* are taken either in the natural or metaphorical sense; the rest only in the moral sense: *lightness* is said of the outward carriage, or the inward temper; *levity* is said only of the outward carriage: a light-minded man treats everything *lightly*, be it ever so serious; the *lightness* of his mind is evident by the *lightness* of his motions. *Lightness* is common to both sexes: *levity* is peculiarly striking in females; and in respect to them, they are both exceptionable qualities in the highest degree: when a woman has *lightness* of mind, she verges very near towards direct vice; when there is *levity* in her conduct she exposes herself to the imputation of criminality. *Volatility*, *flightiness*, and *giddiness*, are degrees of *lightness* which rise in signification on one another; *volatility* being more than *lightness*, and the others more than *volatility*: *lightness* and *volatility* are defects as they relate to age; those only who ought to be serious or grave are said to be *light* or *volatile*. When we treat that as *light* which is weighty, when we suffer nothing to sink into the mind, or make any impression, this is a defective *lightness* of character; when the spirits are of a buoyant nature, and the thoughts fly from one object to another, without resting on any for a moment, this *lightness* becomes *volatility*: a light-minded person sets care at a distance; a *volatile* person catches pleasure from every passing object. *Flightiness* and *giddiness* are the defects of youth; they bespeak that entire want of command over one's feelings and animal spirits which is inseparable from a state of childhood: a *flighty* child, however, only falls from a want of attention; but a *giddy* child, like one whose head is in the natural sense *giddy*, is unable to collect itself so as to have any consciousness of what passes: a *flighty* child makes mistakes; a *giddy* child commits extravagances.

Innocence gives a *lightness* to the spirits, ill-imitated and ill-supplied by that forced *levity* of the vicious.—BLAIR.

If we see people dancing, even in wooden shoes, and a fiddle always at their heels, we are soon convinced of the *volatile* spirits of those merry slaves.—SOMERVILLE.

Remembering many *lightnesses* in her writing, I know not how to behave myself to her.—RICHARDSON.

The *giddy* vulgar, as their fancies guide,
With noise, say nothing, and in parts divide.
DRYDEN.

Like, v. Equal.

**Likeness, Resemblance, Similarity,
or Similitude.**

Likeness denotes the quality of being *alike* (v. *Equal*).

Resemblance, from *resemble*, compounded of *re* and *semble*, in French *sembler*, Latin *similis* signifies putting on the form of another thing.

Similarity, in Latin *similaritas* from *similis*, in Greek *ὁμοιος* like, from the Hebrew *semel* an image, denotes the abstract property of likeness.

Likeness is the most general, and at the same time the most familiar, term of the three; it respects either external or internal properties: *resemblance* respects only the external properties; *similarity* only the internal properties: we speak of a *likeness* between two persons; of a *resemblance* in the cast of the eye, a *resemblance* in the form or figure; of a *similarity* in age and disposition.

Likeness is said only of that which is actual: *resemblance* may be said of that which is apparent: a *likeness* consists of something specific; a *resemblance* may be only partial and contingent. A thing is said to be, but not to appear like another it may, however, have the shadow of a *resemblance*: whatever things are *alike* are *alike* in their essential properties; but they may *resemble* each other in a partial degree or in certain particulars, but are otherwise essentially different. We are most *like* the Divine Being in the act of doing good; there is nothing existing in nature which has not certain points of *resemblance* with something else.

Similarity, or **Similitude**, which is a higher term, is in the moral application, in regard to *likeness*, what *resemblance* is in the physical sense: what is *alike* has the same nature: what is *similar* has certain features of *similarity*: in this sense feelings are *alike*, sentiments are *alike*, persons are *alike*; but cases are *similar*, circumstances are *similar*, conditions are *similar*. *Likeness* excludes the idea of difference; *similarity* includes only the idea of casual likeness.

With friendly hand I hold the glass
To all promiscuous as they pass;
Should folly there her likeness view.
I fret not that the mirror's true.—MOORE.

So, faint resemblance! on the marble tomb
The well-dissembled lover swooning stands.
For ever silent, and for ever sad.—THOMSON.

Rochefoucauld frequently makes use of the antithesis, a mode of speaking the most tiresome of any, by the *similarity* of the periods.—WARTON.

As it addeth deformity to an ape to be so like a man, so the *similitude* of superstition to religion makes it the more deformed.—BACON

Likeness, Picture, Image, Effigy.

In the former article **Likeness** is considered as an abstract term, but in connection with the words *picture* and *image* it signifies the representation of likeness.

Picture, in Latin *pictura*, from *pingo* to paint, signifies the thing painted.

Image, in Latin *imago*, contracted from *imitago*, comes from *imitor* to imitate, signifying an imitation.

Effigy, in Latin *effigies* from *effingo*, signifies that which is formed after another thing.

Likeness is a general and indefinite term; *picture* and *image* express something positively like. A *likeness* is the work of art; it is sketched by the pencil, and is more or less real: a *picture* is either the work of art or nature; it may be drawn by the pencil or the pen, or it may

be found in the incidental resemblances of things; it is more or less exact: the *image* lies in the nature of things, and is more or less striking. It is the peculiar excellence of the painter to produce a *likeness*: the withering and falling off of the leaves from the trees in autumn is a *picture* of human nature in its decline; children are frequently the very *image* of their parents.

A *likeness* is that which is to represent the actual *likeness*; but an *effigy* is an artificial or arbitrary *likeness*; it may be represented on paper, or in the figure of a person. Artists produce *likenesses*; boys attempt to produce *effigies*.

God, Moses first, then David, did inspire,
To compose anthems for his heav'nly quire;
To th' one the style of friend he did impart,
On th' other stamp'd the *likeness* of his heart.
DENHAM.

Or else the comic muse
Holds to the world a *picture* of itself.—THOMSON.

The mind of man is an *image*, not only of God's spirituality, but of his infinity.—SOUTH.

I have read somewhere that one of the popes refused to accept an edition of a saint's works, which were presented to him, because the saint, in his *effigies* before the book, was drawn without a beard.—ADDISON.

Likewise, v. *Also*.

Limb, v. *Member*.

To Limit, v. *To bound*.

To Limit, v. *To fix*.

Limit, Extent.

Limit is a more specific and definite term than **Extent**: by the former we are directed to the point where anything ends; by the latter we are led to no particular point, but to the whole space included: *limits* are in their nature something finite; *extent* is either finite or infinite: we therefore speak of that which exceeds the *limits*, or comes within the *limits*; and of that which comprehends the *extent*, or is according to the *extent*: a plenipotentiary or minister must not exceed the *limits* of his instructions; when we think of the immense *extent* of this globe, and that it is among the smallest of an infinite number of worlds, the mind is lost in admiration and amazement: it does not fall within the *limits* of a periodical work to enter into historical details; a complete history of any country is a work of great *extent*.

Whatever a man accounts his treasure answers all his capacities of pleasure. It is the utmost *limit* of enjoyment.—SOUTH.

It is observable that, either by nature or habit, our faculties are fitted to images of a certain *extent*.—JOHNSON.

Limit, v. *Term*.

Limited, v. *Finite*.

To Linger, **Tarry**, **Loiter**, **Lag**,
Saunter.

Linger, from *longer*, signifies to make the time long in doing a thing.

Tarry, from *tardus* slow, is to be slow.

Loiter may probably come from *lentus* slow.

Lag, from *lie*, signifies to lie back.

Saunter, from *sancta terra* the Holy Land; because, in the time of the Crusades, many idle persons were going backwards and forwards: hence idle, planless going, comes to be so denominated.

Suspension of action or slow movement enters into the meaning of all these terms: to *linger* is to stop altogether, or to move but slowly forward; to *tarry* is properly to suspend one's movement: the former proceeds from reluctance to leave the spot on which we stand; the latter from motives of discretion: he will naturally *linger* who is going to leave the place of his nativity for an indefinite period; those who have much business to transact will be led to *tarry* long in a place: to *loiter* is to move slowly and reluctantly; but, from a bad cause, a child *loiters* who is unwilling to go to school: to *lag* is to move slower than others; to stop while they are going on; this is seldom done for a good purpose; those who *lag* have generally some sinister and private end to answer: to *saunter* is altogether the act of an idler; those who have no object in moving either backward or forward will *saunter* if they move at all.

'Tis long since I, for my celestial wife,
Loath'd by the Gods, have dragg'd a *ling'ring* life.
DRYDEN.

Rapid wits *loiter*, or faint, and suffer themselves to be surpass'd by the even and regular perseverance of slower understandings.—JOHNSON.

I shall not *lag* behind, nor err
The way, thou leading.—MILTON.

Herod having *tarried* only seven days at Rome for the despatch of his business, returned to his ships at Brundisium.—PRIDEAUX.

She walks all the morning *sauntering* about the shop, with her arms through her pocket-holes.—JOHNSON.

Liquid, *v. Fluid*.

Liquid, **Liquor**, **Juice**, **Humour**.

Liquid (*v. Fluid*) is the generic term: **Liquor**, which is but a variation from the same Latin verb, *liquesco*, whence *liquid* is derived, is a *liquid* which is made to be drunk: **Juice**, in French *jus*, is a *liquid* that issues from bodies: and **Humour**, in Latin *humor*, probably from the Greek *peyma* and *peo* to flow or pour out, is a species of *liquid* which flows in bodies and forms a constituent part of them. All natural bodies consist of *liquids* or solids, or a combination of both: *liquor* serves to quench the thirst as food satisfies the hunger; the *juices* of bodies are frequently their richest parts; and the *humours* are commonly the most important parts; the former of these two belong peculiarly to vegetable, and the latter to animal bodies: water is the simplest of all *liquids*; wine is the most inviting of all *liquors*; the orange produces the most agreeable *juice*; the *humours* of both men and brutes are most liable to corruption.

How the bee
Sits on the bloom, extracting *liquid* sweets.—MILTON.

They who Minerva from Jove's head derive,
Might make old Homer's skull the muse's hive,
And from his brain that Helicon distil
Whose racy *liquor* did his offspring fill.—DENHAM.

Give me to drain the cocoa's milky bowl,
And from the palm to draw its freshening wine,
More bounteous far than all the frantic *juice*
Which Bacchus pours.—THOMSON.

The perspicuity of the *humours* of the eye transmits the rays of light.—STEELE.

Liquor, *v. Liquid*.

List, **Roll**, **Catalogue**, **Register**.

List, in French *liste*, and German *liste*, comes from the German *leiste* a last, signifying in general any long and narrow body.

Roll signifies in general anything rolled up, particularly paper with its written contents.

Catalogue, in Latin *catalogus*, Greek *καταλογος* from *καταλεγω* to write down, signifies a written enumeration.

Register, from the verb *rego* to govern, signifies what is done or inserted by order of government.

A collection of objects brought into some kind of order is the common idea included in the signification of these terms. The contents and disposition of a *list* is the most simple: it consists of little more than names arranged under one another in a long narrow line, as a *list* of words, a *list* of plants and flowers, a *list* of voters, a *list* of visits, a *list* of deaths, of births, of marriages: a *roll*, which is figuratively put for the contents of a *roll*, is a *list* rolled up for convenience, as a long *roll* of saints: *catalogue* involves more details than a simple *list*; it specifies not only names, but dates, qualities, and circumstances. A *list* of books contains their titles: a *catalogue* of books contains an enumeration of their size, price, number of volumes, edition, &c.: a *roll* of saints simply specifies their names; a *catalogue* of saints enters into particulars of their ages, deaths, &c.: a *register* contains more than either; for it contains events, with dates, actors, &c., in all matters of public interest.

After I had read over the *list* of the persons elected into the Tiers Etat, nothing which they afterwards did could appear astonishing.—BURKE.

It appears from the ancient *rolls* of parliament, and from the manner of choosing the lords of articles, that the proceedings of that high court must have been in a great measure under their direction.—ROBERTSON.

Aye! in the *catalogue* ye go for men,
As hounds, and greyhounds, mongrels, spaniels, curs,
All by the name of dogs.—SHAKESPEARE.

I am credibly informed by an antiquary, who has searched the *registers*, that the maids of honour, in Queen Elizabeth's time, were allowed three ramps of beef for their breakfast.—ADDISON.

To Listen, *v. To attend*.

Listless, *v. Indolent*.

Literature, *v. Letters*.

Little, **Small**, **Diminutive**.

Little, in Low German *litje*, Dutch *littel*, is, in all probability, connected with light, in Saxon *leoht*, old German *lichto*, Sweden *lätt*, &c.

Small is, with some variations, to be found in most of the northern dialects, in which it signifies, as in English, a contracted space or quantity.

Diminutive, in Latin *diminutivus*, signifies made small.

Little is properly opposed to the great (*v. Great*), *small* to the large, and *diminutive* is a species of the *small*, which is made so contrary to the course of things: a child is said to be *little* as respects its age as well as its size; it is said to be *small* as respects its size only; it is said to be *diminutive* when it is exceedingly *small* considering its age: *little* children cannot be left to themselves with safety; *small* children are pleasanter to be nursed than large ones; if we look down from any very great height the largest men will look *diminutive*.

The talent of turning men into ridicule, and exposing to laughter those one converses with, is the qualification of *little*, ungenerous tempers.—ADDISON.

He whose knowledge is at best but limited, and whose intellect proceeds by a *small*, *diminutive* light, cannot but receive an additional light by the conceptions of another man.—SOUTH.

To Live, *v. To exist*.

Livelihood, Living, Subsistence, Maintenance, Support, Sustenance.

The means of *living* or supporting life is the idea common to all these terms, which vary according to the circumstances of the individual and the nature of the object which constitutes the means: a **Livelihood** is that which is sought after by the day; a labourer earns a *livelihood* by the sweat of his brow: a **Subsistence** is obtained by irregular efforts of various descriptions; beggars meet with so much that they obtain something better than a precarious and scanty *subsistence*: **Living** is obtained by more respectable and less severe efforts than the two former; tradesmen obtain a good *living* by keeping shop; artists procure a *living* by the exercise of their talents: **Maintenance, Support, and Sustenance** differ from the other three inasmuch as they do not comprehend what one gains by one's own efforts, but by the efforts of others: *maintenance* is that which is permanent; it supplies the place of *living*: *support* may be casual, and vary in degree; the object of most public charities is to afford a *maintenance* to such as cannot obtain a *livelihood* or *living* for themselves; it is the business of the parish to give *support*, in time of sickness and distress, to all who are legal parishioners. *Maintenance* and *support* are always granted; but *sustenance* is that which is taken or received: the former comprehends the means of obtaining food; *sustenance* comprehends that which sustains the body which supplies the place of food.

A man may as easily know where to find one to teach to debauch, whore, game, and blasphemy, as to teach him to write or cast accounts; 'tis the very profession and *livelihood* of such people, getting their *living* by those practices for which they deserve to forfeit their lives.—SOUTH.

Just the necessities of a bare *subsistence* are not to be the only measure of a parent's care for his children.—SOUTH.

The Jews in Babylonia honoured Hyrcanus their king, and supplied him with a *maintenance* suitable thereto.—PRIDEAUX.

If it be a curse to be forced to toil for the necessary *support* of life, how does he heighten the curse who toils for superfluities?—SOUTH.

Besides, man has a claim also to a promise for his *support* and *sustenance* which none have ever missed of who come up to the conditions of it.—SOUTH.

Lively, Sprightly, Vivacious, Sportive, Merry, Jocund.

Lively signifies having life, or the animal spirits which accompany the vital spark.

Sprightly, contracted from *sprightlyfully* or *spriffully*, signifies full of spirits.

Vivacious, in Latin *vivax*, from *vivo* to live, has the same original meaning as *lively*.

Sportive, fond of or ready for sport.

Merry, *v. Cheerful*.

Jocund, in Latin *jocundus*, from *jucundus* and *juvo* to delight or please, signifies delighted or pleased.

The activity of the heart when it beats high with a sentiment of gaiety is strongly depicted by all these terms: the *lively* is the most general and literal in its signification; *life*, as a moving or active principle, is supposed to be inherent in spiritual as well as material bodies; the feeling, as well as the body which has within a power of moving arbitrarily of itself, is said to have *life*, and in whatever object this is wanting, this object is said to be dead: in like manner, according to the degree or circumstances under which this moving principle displays itself, the object is denominated *lively*, *sprightly*, *vivacious*, and the like. *Liveliness* is the property of childhood, youth, or even maturer age; *sprightliness* is the peculiar property of youth; *vivacity* is a quality compatible with the sobriety of years: an infant shows itself to be *lively* or otherwise in a few months after its birth; a female, particularly in her early years, affords often a pleasing picture of *sprightliness*; a *vivacious* companion recommends himself wherever he goes. *Sportiveness* is an accompaniment of *liveliness* or *sprightliness*: a *sprightly* child will show its *sprightliness* by its *sportive* humour: mirth and *jocundity* are the forms of *liveliness* which display themselves in social life; the former is a familiar quality, more frequently to be discovered in vulgar than in polished society: *jocundity* is a form of *liveliness* which poets have ascribed to nymphs and goddesses, and other aerial creatures of the imagination.

The terms preserve the same sense when applied to the characteristics or actions of persons as when applied to the persons themselves: imagination, wit, conception, representation, and the like, are *lively*; a person's air, manner, look, tune, dance, are *sprightly*; a conversation, a turn of mind, a society, is *vivacious*; the muse, the pen, the imagination, is *sportive*; the meeting, the laugh, the song, the conceit, is *merry*; the train, the dance, is *jocund*.

One study is inconsistent with a *lively* imagination, another with a solid judgment.—JOHNSON.

His *sportive* lambs,
This way and that convolv'd, in friskful glee
Their frolics play. And now the *sprightly* race
Invites them forth.—THOMSON.

By every victory over appetite or passion, the mind gains new strength to refuse those solicitations by which the young and *vivacious* are most assaulted.—JOHNSON.

Thus *focund* fleets with them the winter night.—THOMSON.

Warm'd by the streaming light and merry lark,
Forth rush the jolly clans.—SOMERVILLE.

Living, Benefice.

Living signifies literally the pecuniary resources by which one lives.

Benefice, from *benefacio*, signifies whatever one obtains as a benefit: the former is applicable to any situation of life, but particularly to that resource which a parish affords to the clergyman; the latter is applicable to no other object: we speak of a *living* as a resource immediately derived from the parish, in distinction from a curacy, which is derived from an individual; we speak of a *benefice* in respect to the terms by which it is held, according to the ecclesiastical law: there are many *livings* which are not *benefices*, although not *vice versa*.

In consequence of the Pope's interference, the best *livings* were filled by Italian, and other foreign, clergy.—BLACKSTONE.

Estates held by feudal tenure, being originally gratuitous donations, were at that time denominated *beneficia*; their very name, as well as constitution, was borrowed, and the care of the souls of a parish thence came to be denominated a *benefice*.—BLACKSTONE.

Living, *v. Livelihood.*

Load, *v. Freight.*

To Load, *v. To clog.*

Load, *v. Weight.*

To Loath, *v. To abhor.*

Loath, *v. Averse.*

Loathing, *v. Disgusting.*

Lodge, *v. Harbour.*

Lodgings, Apartments.

A **Lodging**, or a place to *lodge* or dwell in, comprehend single rooms or many rooms, or in fact any place which can be made to serve the purpose; **Apartments** respect only suites of rooms: *apartments*, therefore, are, in the strict sense, *lodgings*; but all *lodgings* are not *apartments*: on the other hand, the word *lodgings* is mostly used for rooms that are let out to hire, or that serve a temporary purpose: but the word *apartments* may be applied to the suites of rooms in any large house: hence the word *lodging* becomes on one ground restricted in its use, and *apartments* on the other all *apartments* to let out for hire are *lodgings*: but *apartments* not to let out for hire are not *lodgings*.

Loftiness, *v. Pride.*

Lofty, *v. High.*

To Loiter, *v. To linger.*

Lonely, *v. Alone.*

To Long For, *v. To desire.*

Look, *v. Air.*

Look, Glance.

Look, *v. Air.*

Glance, *v. To glance at.*

Look is the generic and *glance* the specific term; that is to say, a casual or momentary *look*: a *look* may be characterized as severe or mild, fierce or gentle, angry or kind; a *glance* as hasty or sudden, imperfect or slight: so likewise we speak of taking a *look*, or catching a *glance*.

Here the soft flocks, with the same harmless *look*
They were alive.—THOMSON.

The tyger, darting fierce
Impetuous on his prey, the *glance* has doom'd.
THOMSON.

To Look, See, Behold. View, Eye.

Look, in Saxon *locan*, upper German *lugen*, comes from *lux* light, and the Greek *laō* to see.

See, in German *sehen*, probably a variation from the Latin *video* to see.

Behold, compounded of the intensive *be* and *hold*, signifies to *hold* or *fix* the eye on an object.

View, from the French *voir*, and the Latin *video*, signifies simply to *see*.

To Eye, from the noun *eye*, naturally signifies to rathom with the *eye*.

We *look* voluntarily; we *see* involuntarily: the *eye sees*; the person *looks*; absent people often *see* things before they are fully conscious that they are at hand; we may *look* without *seeing*, and we may *see* without *looking*: near-sighted people often *look* at that which is too distant to strike the visual organ. To *behold* is to *look* at for a continuance; to *view* is to *look* at in all directions; to *eye* is to *look* at earnestly, and by side glances: that which is *seen* may disappear in an instant; it may strike the *eye* and be gone; but what is *looked* at must make some stay; consequently *lightning*, and things equally fugitive and rapid in their flight, may be *seen*, but cannot be *looked* at.

To *look* at is the familiar, as well as the general, term, in regard to the others: we *look* at things in general, which we wish to *see*, that is, to *see* clearly, fully, and in all their parts; but we *behold* that which excites a moral or intellectual interest; we *view* that which demands intellectual attention; we *eye* that which gratifies any particular passion; an inquisitive child *looks* at things which are new to it, but does not *behold* them; we *look* at plants, or finery, or whatever gratifies the senses, but we do not *behold* them: on the other hand, we *behold* any spectacle which excites our admiration, our astonishment, our pity, or our love: we *look* at objects in order to observe their external properties; but we *view* them in order to find out their component parts, their internal properties, their powers of motion and action, &c.: we *look* at things to gratify the curiosity of the moment, or for mere amusement; but the jealous man *eyes* his rival, in order to mark his movements, his designs, and his successes; the envious man *eyes* him who is in prosperity with a malignant desire to *see* him humbled.

To *look* is an indifferent, to *behold* and *view* are good and honourable actions; to *eye*, as the act of persons, is commonly a mean, and even base, action.

They climb the next ascent, and, looking down,
Now at a nearer distance view the town;
The prince with wonder sees the stately towers
(Which late were huts and shepherds' bow'rs).
DRYDEN.

The most unpardonable malefactor in the world going to his death, and bearing it with composure, would win the pity of those who should behold him.—STEELE.

Half afraid, he first
Against the window beats, then brisk alights
On the warm hearth; then, hopping o'er the floor,
Eyes all the smiling family astance.—THOMSON.

To Look, Appear.

Look is here taken in the neuter and improper sense: in the preceding article (*v. To look*) it denotes the action of persons striving to see; in the present case it denotes the action of things figuratively striving to be seen.

Appear, from the Latin *appareo* or *pareo*, Greek *παρεμναι*, signifies to be present or at hand, within sight.

The *look* of a thing respects the impressions which it makes on the senses, that is, the manner in which it *looks*; its *appearance* implies the simple act of its coming into sight: the *look* of anything is therefore characterized as good or bad, mean or handsome, ugly or beautiful; the *appearance* is characterized as early or late, sudden or unexpected: there is something very *unseemly* in the *look* of a clergyman affecting the airs of a fine gentleman; the *appearance* of the stars in an evening presents an interesting view even to the ordinary beholder. As what *appears* must *appear* in some form, the signification of the term has been extended to the manner of the *appearance*, and brought still nearer to *look* in its application; in this case the term *look* is rather more familiar than that of *appearance*: we may speak either of regarding the *look* or the *appearance* of a thing, as far as it may impress others; but the latter is less colloquial than the former: a man's conduct is said to *look* rather than to *appear* ill; but on the other hand, we say a thing assumes an *appearance*, or has a certain *appearance*.

Look is always employed for what is real; what a thing *looks* is that which it really is; *appear*, however, sometimes refers not only to what is external, but to what is superficial. If we say a person *looks* ill, it supposes some positive and unequivocal evidence of illness: if we say he *appears* to be ill, it is a less positive assertion than the former; it leaves room for doubt, and allows the possibility of a mistake. We are at liberty to judge of things by their *looks*, without being chargeable with want of judgment; but as *appearances* are said to be deceitful, it becomes necessary to admit them with caution as the rule of our judgment. *Look* is employed mostly in regard to objects of sense; *appearance* respects natural and moral objects indifferently: the sky *looks* lowering; an object *appears* through a microscope greater than it really is; a person's conduct *appears* in a more culpable light when seen through the representation of an enemy.

Distressful nature pants;
The very streams *look* languid from afar.—THOMSON.

Never does liberty *appear* more amiable than under the government of a pious and good prince.—ADDISON.

Looker-on, Spectator, Beholder, Observer.

The **Looker-on** and the **Spectator** are both opposed to the agents or actors in any scene; but the former is still more abstracted from the objects he sees than the latter.

A *looker-on* (*v. To look at*) is careless; he has no part and takes no part in what he sees; he *looks on*, because the thing is before him, and he has nothing else to do: a *spectator* may likewise be unconcerned, but in general he derives amusement, if nothing else, from what he sees. A clown may be a *looker-on*, who with open mouth gapes at all that is before him, without understanding any part of it; but he who *looks on* to draw a moral lesson from the whole is in the moral sense not an uninterested *spectator*.

The **Beholder** has a nearer interest than the *spectator*; and the **Observer** has an interest not less near than that of the *beholder*, but somewhat different: the *beholder* has his affections roused by what he sees; the *observer* has his understanding employed in that which passes before him: the *beholder* indulges himself in contemplation; the *observer* is busy in making it subservient to some proposed object: every *beholder* of our Saviour's sufferings and patience was struck with the conviction of his Divine character, not excepting even some of those who were his most prejudiced adversaries; every calm *observer* of our Saviour's words and actions was convinced of his Divine mission.

Lookers on many times see more than gamblers.
BACON.

But high in heaven they sit, and gaze from far,
The mute spectators of his deeds of war.—POPE.

Objects imperfectly discerned take forms from the hope or fear of the *beholder*.—JOHNSON.

Swift was an exact *observer* of life.—JOHNSON.

To Look for, v. To await.

Loose, Vague, Lax, Dissolute, Licentious.

Loose is in German *los*, &c., Latin *laxus*, Greek *αλασσευ*, and Hebrew *chalatz*, to make free.

Vague, in Latin *vagus*, signifies wandering.

Lax, in Latin *laxus*, has a similar origin with *loose*.

Dissolute, in Latin *dissolutus* participle of *dissolvere*, signifies dissolved or set free.

Licentious signifies having the licence or power to do as one pleases (*v. Leave, liberty*).

Loose is the generic, the rest are specific terms; they are all opposed to that which is bound or adheres closely: *loose* is employed either for moral or intellectual subjects; *vague* only for intellectual objects: *lax* sometimes for what is intellectual, but oftener for the moral; *dissolute* and *licentious* only for moral matters: whatever wants a proper connection, or linking together of the parts, is *loose*; whatever is scattered and remotely separated is *vague*: a style is *loose* where the words and sentences are not made to coalesce.

so as to form a regularly connected series; assertions are *vague* which have but a remote connection with the subject referred to: by the same rule, *loose* hints thrown out at random may give rise to speculation and conjecture, but cannot serve as the ground of any conclusion; ignorant people are apt to credit every *vague* rumour, and to communicate it as a certainty.

Opinions are *loose*, either inasmuch as they want logical precision or as they fail in moral strictness; suggestions and surmises are in their nature *vague*, as they spring from a very remote channel, or are produced by the wanderings of the imagination; opinions are *lax*, inasmuch as they have a tendency to lessen the moral obligation, or to *loosen* moral ties: *loose* notions arise from the unrestrained state of the will, from the influence of the unruly passions; *lax* notions from the error of the judgment: *loose* principles affect the moral conduct of individuals; *lax* principles affect the speculative opinions of men, either as individuals or in society: one is *loose* in practice, and *lax* in speculation or in discipline: the loose man sins against his conscience; he sets himself free from that to which he knows that he ought to submit; the *lax* man errs, but he affects to defend his error. A *loose* man injures himself, but a *lax* man injures society at large. *Dissoluteness* is the excess of *looseness*; *licentiousness* is the consequence of *luxury*, or the freedom from external constraint.

Looseness of character, if indulged, soon sinks into *dissoluteness* of morals; and *luxury* of discipline is quickly followed by *licentiousness* of manners.

A young man of *loose* character makes light of moral obligations in general; but one of *dissolute* character commits every excess, and totally disregards every restraint; in proportion as a commander is *lax* in the punishment of offences, an army will become *licentious*.

The most voluptuous and *loose* person breathing, were he but tied to follow his dice and his courtships every day, would find it the greatest torment that could befall him.—SOUTH.

That action which is *vague* and indeterminate will at last settle into habit, and habitual peculiarities are quickly ridiculous.—JOHNSON.

In this general depravity of manners and *luxury* of principles, pure religion is nowhere more strongly inculcated (than in our universities).—JOHNSON.

As the life of Petronius Arbitor was altogether *dissolute*, the indifference which he showed at the close of it is to be looked upon as a piece of natural carelessness rather than fortitude.—ADDISON.

Moral philosophy is very agreeable to the paradoxical and *licentious* spirit of the age.—BEATTIE.

Loquacious, v. Talkative.

Lordly, v. Imperious.

Lord's Supper, Eucharist, Communion, Sacrament.

The Lord's Supper is a term of familiar and general use among Christians, as designating in literal terms the supper of our Lord; that is, either the last solemn supper which he took with his disciples previous to his crucifixion, or the commemoration of that event

which conformably to his commands has been observed by the professors of Christianity. **Eucharist** is a term of peculiar use among the Roman Catholics, from the Greek *ευχαριστω* to give thanks, because personal adoration, by way of returning thanks, constitutes in their estimation the chief part of the ceremony. As the social affections are kept alive mostly by the common participation of meals, so is brotherly love, the essence of Christian fellowship, cherished and warmed in the highest degree by the common participation in this holy festival: hence, by distinction, it has been denominated the **Communion**. As the vows which are made at the altar of our Lord are the most solemn which a Christian can make, comprehending in them the entire devotion of himself to Christ, the general term **Sacrament**, signifying an oath, has been employed by way of emphasis for this ordinance. The Roman Catholics have employed the same term for six other ordinances, but the Protestants, who attach a similar degree of sacredness to no other than baptism, annex this appellation only to these two.

To the worthy participation of the *Lord's supper*, there is indispensably required a suitable preparation.—SOUTH.

This ceremony of feasting belongs most properly both to marriage and to the *eucharist*, as both of them have the nature of a covenant.—SOUTH.

One woman he could not bring to the *communion*, and when he reproved or exhorted her, she only answered that she was no scholar.—JOHNSON.

I could not have the consent of the physicians to go to church yesterday. I therefore received the holy *sacrament* at home.—JOHNSON.

To Lose, Miss.

Lose, in all probability, is but a variation of *loose*, because what gets *loose* or away from a person is *lost* to him.

To Miss, probably from the participle *mis* wrong, signifies to lose by mistake. What is *lost* is not at hand: what is *missing* is not to be seen: it does not depend upon ourselves to recover what is lost, it is supposed to be irrevocably gone; what we *miss* one time, we may by diligence and care recover at another time. A person *loses* his health and strength by a decay of nature, and must submit patiently to the *loss* which cannot be repaired: if a person *misses* the opportunity of improvement in his youth, he will never have another opportunity that is equally good.

Some ants are so unfortunate as to fall down with their load when they almost come home; when this happens they seldom *lose* their corn, but carry it up again.—ADDISON.

By hope and faith secure of future bliss,
Gladly the joys of present life we *miss*.—LEWIS.

Loss, Damage, Detriment.

Loss signifies the act of *losing* or the thing *lost*.

Damage, in French *dommage*, Latin *damnum* from *demo* to take away, signifies the thing taken away.

Detriment, v. Disadvantageous.

Loss is here the generic term; *damage* and *detriment* are species or modes of *loss*. The

person sustains the *loss*, the thing suffers the *damage* or *detriment*. Whatever is gone from us which we wish to retain is a *loss*; hence we may sustain a *loss* in our property, in our reputation, in our influence, in our intellect, and every other object of possession: whatever renders an object less serviceable or valuable, by any external violence, is a *damage*; as a vessel suffers a *damage* in a storm: whatever is calculated to cross a man's purpose is a *detriment*; the bare want of a good name may be a *detriment* to a young tradesman; the want of prudence is always a great *detriment* to the prosperity of a family.

What trader would purchase such airy satisfaction (as the charms of conversation) by the *loss* of solid gain.—JOHNSON.

The ants were still troubled with the rain, and the next day they took a world of pains to repair the *damage*.—ADDISON.

The expenditure should be with the least possible *detriment* to the morals of those who expend.—BURKE.

Loud, Noisy, High-Sounding, Clamorous.

Loud is doubtless connected through the medium of the German *laut* a sound, and *lauschen* to listen, with the Greek *akoe* to hear, because sounds are the object of hearing.

Noisy, having a *noise*, like *noisome* and *noxious*, comes from the Latin *noceo* to hurt, signifying in general offensive, that is, to the sense of hearing, of smelling, and the like.

High-Sounding signifies the same as pitched upon an elevated key, so as to make a great noise, to be heard at a distance.

Clamorous, from the Latin *clamo* to cry, signifies crying with a loud voice.

Loud is here the generic term, since it signifies a great sound, which is the idea common to them all. As an epithet for persons, **loud** is mostly taken in an indifferent sense; all the others are taken for being **loud** beyond measure: **noisy** is to be lawlessly and unseasonably **loud**; **high-sounding** is only to be **loud** from the bigness of one's words; **clamorous** is to be disagreeably and painfully **loud**. We must speak **loudly** to a deaf person in order to make ourselves heard: children will be **noisy** at all times if not kept under control: flatterers are always **high-sounding** in their eulogiums of princes: children will be **clamorous** for what they want if they expect to get it by dint of **noise**: they will be turbulent in case of refusal, if not under proper discipline. In the improper application, **loud** is taken in as had a sense as the rest; the **loudest** praise is the least to be regarded: the applause of a mob is always **noisy**: **high-sounding** titles serve only to excite contempt where there is not some corresponding sense: it is the business of an opposition party to be **clamorous**, as that serves the purpose of exciting turbulence among the ignorant.

The clowns, a boisterous, rude, ungovern'd crew,
With furious haste to the **loud** summons flew.
DRYDEN.

O leave the **noisy** town.—DRYDEN.

I am touched with sorrow at the conduct of some few men, who have lent the authority of their **high-sounding**

names to the designs of men with whom they could not be acquainted.—BURKE.

Clam'rous around the royal hawk they fly.—DRYDEN.

Love, v. Affection.

Love, Friendship.

Love (*v. Affection*) is a term of very extensive import: it may be either taken in the most general sense for every strong and passionate attachment, or only for such as subsist between the sexes; in either of which cases it has features by which it is easily distinguished from **Friendship**.

Love subsists between members of the same family; it springs out of their natural relationship, and is kept alive by their close intercourse and constant interchange of kindnesses: **friendship** excludes the idea of any tender and natural relationship; nor is it, like **love**, to be found in children, but is confined to mature years; it is formed by time, by circumstances, by congruity of character, and sympathy of sentiment. **Love** always operates with ardour; **friendship** is remarkable for firmness and constancy. **Love** is peculiar to no station; it is to be found equally among the high and the low, the learned and the unlearned: **friendship** is of nobler growth; it finds admittance only into minds of a loftier make: it cannot be felt by men of an ordinary stamp.

Both **love** and **friendship** are gratified by seeking the good of the object: but **love** is more selfish in its nature than **friendship**: in indulging another it seeks its own gratification, and when this is not to be obtained, it will change into the contrary passion of hatred; **friendship**, on the other hand, is altogether disinterested, it makes sacrifices of every description, and knows no limits to its sacrifice. As **love** is a passion, it has all the errors attendant upon passion; but **friendship**, which is an affection tempered by reason, is exempt from every such exceptionable quality. **Love** is blind to the faults of the object of its devotion; it adores, it idolizes, it is fond, it is foolish: **friendship** sees faults, and strives to correct them; it aims to render the object more worthy of esteem and regard. **Love** is capricious, humoursome, and changeable; it will not bear contradiction, disappointment, nor any cross or untoward circumstance: **friendship** is stable; it withstands the rudest blasts, and is unchanged by the severest shocks of adversity; neither the smiles nor frowns of fortune can change its form; its serene and placid countenance is unruffled by the rude blasts of adversity; it rejoices and sympathizes in prosperity; it cheers, consoles, and assists in adversity. **Love** is exclusive in its nature; it insists upon a devotion to a single object; it is jealous of any intrusion from others: **friendship** is liberal and communicative; it is bounded by nothing but rules of prudence; it is not confined as to the number but as to the nature of the objects.

When **love** is not produced by any social relation, it has its groundwork in sexuality, and subsists only between persons of different sexes; in this case it has all the former faults with which it is chargeable to a still greater degree, and others peculiar to itself: it is

even more selfish, more capricious, more changeable, and more exclusive, than when subsisting between persons of the same kindred. *Love* is in this case as unreasonable in its choice of an object as it is extravagant in its regard of the object; it is formed without examination; it is the effect of a sudden glance, the work of a moment, in which the heart is taken by surprise, and the understanding is discarded; *friendship*, on the other hand, is the entire work of the understanding; it does not admit the senses or the heart to have any undue influence in the choice. A fine eye, a fair hand, a graceful step, are the authors of *love*; talent, virtue, fine sentiment, a good heart, and a sound head, are the promoters of *friendship*: *love* wants no excitement from personal merit; *friendship* cannot be produced without merit. Time, which is the consolator of *friendship*, is the destroyer of *love*; an object imprudently chosen is as carelessly thrown aside; and that which was not chosen for its merits is seldom rejected for its demerits, the fault lying rather in the humour of *love*, which can abate of its ardour as the novelty of the thing ceases, and transfer itself to other objects: *friendship*, on the other hand, is slow and cautious in choosing, and still more gradual in the confirmation, as it rests on virtue and excellence; it grows only with the growth of one's acquaintance, and ripens with the maturity of esteem. *Love*, while it lasts, subsists even by those very means which may seem rather calculated to extinguish it; namely, caprice, disdain, cruelty, absence, jealousy, and the like: but *friendship* is supported by nothing artificial; it depends upon reciprocity of esteem, which nothing but solid qualities can ensure or render durable.

In the last place, *love* when misdirected is dangerous and mischievous; in ordinary cases it awakens flattering hopes and delusive dreams, which end in disappointment and mortification; and in some cases it is the origin of the most frightful evils; there is nothing more atrocious than what has owed its origin to slighted *love*: but *friendship*, even if mistaken, will awaken no other feeling than that of pity; when a friend proves faithless or wicked, he is lamented as one who has fallen from the high estate to which we thought him entitled.

So every passion but fond *love*
Unto its own redress does move.—WALLER.

For natural affection soon doth cease,
And quenched is with Cupid's greater flame,
But faithful *friendship* doth them both suppress,
And them with mastering discipline doth tame.
SPENSER.

Lovely, *v. Amiable*.

Lover, Suitor, Wooer.

Lover signifies literally one who *loves*, and is applicable to any object: there are *lovers* of money, and *lovers* of wine, *lovers* of things individually, and things collectively, that is, *lovers* of particular women in the good sense or *lovers* of women in the bad sense. The **Suitor** is one who *sues* and strives after a thing; it is equally undefined as to the object, but may be employed for such as *sue* for favours from their superiors, or *sue* for the affections and person

of a female. The **Wooer** is only a species of the term *lover*, who *wooes* or solicits the kind regards of a female. When applied to the same object, namely, the female sex, the term *lover* is employed for persons of all ranks, who are equally alive to the tender passion of *love*: *suitors* is a title adapted to that class of life where all the genuine affections of human nature are adulterated by a false refinement, or entirely lost in other passions of a guilty nature. *Wooer* is a tender and passionate title, which is adapted to that class of beings that live only in poetry and romance. There is most sincerity in the *lover*, he simply professes his *love*; there is most ceremony in the *suitors*, he prefers his *suit*; there is most ardour in the *wooer*, he makes his vows.

It is very natural for a young friend and a young *lover* to think the persons they *love* have nothing to do but to please them.—POPE.

What pleasure can it be to be thronged with petitioners, and those perhaps *suitors* for the same thing?—SOUTH.

I am glad this parcel of *woosers* are so reasonable, for there is not one of them but I dote on his very absence.—SHAKESPEARE.

Loving, *v. Amorous*.

Low, *v. Humble*.

Low, Mean, Abject.

Low, *v. Humble*.

Mean, in German *gemein*, &c., comes from the Latin *communis* common (*v. Common*).

Abject, in French *abject*, Latin *abjectus*, participle of *abjicio* to cast down, signifies literally brought low.

Low is a much stronger term than *mean*; for what is *low* stands more directly opposed to what is high, but what is *mean* is intermediate; the *low* is applied only to a certain number or description; but *mean*, like common, is applicable to the great bulk of mankind. A man of *low* extraction falls below the ordinary level; he is opposed to a nobleman: a man of *mean* birth does not rise above the ordinary level; he is upon a level with the majority. When employed to designate character, they preserve the same distinction; the *low* is that which is positively sunk in itself; but the *mean* is that which is comparatively *low*, in regard to the outward circumstances and relative condition of the individual. Swearing and drunkenness are *low* vices; boxing, cudgelling, and wrestling are *low* games; a misplaced economy in people of property is *mean*; a condescension to those who are beneath us for our own petty advantages is *meanness*. A man is commonly *low* by birth, education, or habits; but *meanness* is a defect of nature which sinks a person in spite of every external advantage.

The *low* and *mean* are qualities whether of the condition or the character: but *abject* is a peculiar state into which a man is thrown: a man is in the course of things *low*; he is voluntarily *mean*, and involuntarily *abject*. *Lowness* discovers itself in one's actions and sentiments; the *mean* and *abject* in one's spirit; the latter being much more powerful and oppressive than the former: the *mean* man stoops in order to get; the *abject* man crawls in order to submit: the *lowest* man will sometimes have

a consciousness of what is due to himself; he will even rise above his condition: the *mean* man sacrifices his dignity to his convenience; he is always below himself; the *abject* man altogether forgets that he has any dignity; he is kept down by the pressure of adverse circumstances. The condition of a servant is *low*; his manners, his words, and his habits, will be *low*; but by good conduct he elevates himself in his sphere of life: a nobleman is in station the reverse of *low*; but if he will stoop to the artifices practised by the vulgar in order to carry a point, we denominate it *mean*, if it be but trifling; otherwise it deserves a stronger epithet. The slave is, in every sense of the word, *abject*; as he is bereft of that quality which sets man above the brute, so, in his actions, he evinces no higher impulse than what guides brutes: whether a man be a slave to another's will or to any passion, such as fear or superstition, he is equally said to be *abject*.

Had I been born a servant, my *low* life
Had steady stood from all these miseries.
RANDOLPH.

For 'tis the mind that makes the body rich;
And as the sun breaks through the darkest clouds,
So honour 'pearls in the meanest habit.
SHAKESPEARE.

There needs no more be said to extol the excellence and power of his (Waller's) wit, than that it was of magnitude enough to cover a world of very great faults, that is, a narrowness in his nature to the *lowest* degree, an *abjectness* and want of courage, an insinuating and servile flatterer, &c.—CLARENDON.

To Lower, *v.* To reduce.

Lowly, *v.* Humble.

Lucky, *v.* Fortunate.

Lucre, *v.* Gain.

Ludicrous, *v.* Laughable.

Lunacy, *v.* Derangement.

Lustre, *v.* Brightness.

Lusty, *v.* Corpulent.

Luxuriant, *v.* Exuberant.

M.

Madness, *v.* Derangement.

Madness, Phrenzy, Rage, Fury.

Madness, *v.* Derangement.

Phrenzy. In Latin *phrenesis*, Greek *φρενις* from *φρεν* the mind, signifies a disordered mind.

Rage, in French *rage*, Latin *rabies*.

Fury, in Latin *furor*, comes in all probability from *feror*, to be carried, because *fury* carries a person away.

Madness and *phrenzy* are used in the physical and moral sense; *rage* and *fury* only in the moral sense: in the first case, *madness* is a confirmed derangement in the organ of thought; *phrenzy* is only a temporary derangement from the violence of fever: the former lies in the system, and is, in general, incurable; the latter is only occasional, and yields to the power of medicine.

In the moral sense of these terms the cause is put for the effect, that is, *madness* and *phrenzy* are put for that excessive violence of passion by which they are caused; and as *rage* and *fury* are species of this passion, namely, the angry passion, they are therefore to *madness* and *phrenzy* sometimes as the cause is to the effect: the former, however, are so much more violent than the latter, as they altogether destroy the reasoning faculty, which is not expressly implied in the signification of the latter terms. Moral *madness* differs both in degree and duration from *phrenzy*: if it spring from the extravagance of *rage*, it bursts out into every conceivable extravagance, but is only transitory; if it spring from disappointed love, or any other disappointed passion, it is as permanent as direct physical *madness*;

phrenzy is always temporary, but even more impetuous than *madness*; in the *phrenzy* of despair men commit acts of suicide: in the *phrenzy* of distress and grief, people are hurried into many actions fatal to themselves or others.

Rage refers more immediately to the agitation that exists within the mind; *fury* refers to that which shows itself outwardly: a person contains or stifles his *rage*; but his *fury* breaks out into some external mark of violence: *rage* will subside of itself; *fury* spends itself: a person may be choked with *rage*; but his *fury* finds a vent: an *enraged* man may be pacified; a *furious* one is deaf to every remonstrance. *Rage*, when applied to persons, commonly signifies highly inflamed anger; but it may be employed for inflamed passion towards any object which is specified: as a *rage* for music, a *rage* for theatrical performances, a fashionable *rage* for any whim of the day. *Fury*, though commonly signifying *rage* bursting out, yet it may be any impetuous feeling displaying itself in extravagant action: as the divine *fury* supposed to be produced upon the priestess of Apollo, by the inspiration of the god, and the Bacchanalian *fury*, which expression depicts the influence of wine upon the body and mind.

In the improper application, to inanimate objects, the words *rage* and *fury* preserve a similar distinction: the *rage* of the heat denotes the excessive height to which it is risen; the *fury* of the winds indicates their violent commotion and turbulence: so in like manner the *raging* of the tempest characterizes figuratively its burning anger; and the *fury* of the flames marks their impetuous movements, their wild and rapid spread.

'Twas no false heraldry when *madness* drew
Her pedigree from those who too much knew.
DENHAM

What *phrenzy*, shepherd, has thy soul possess'd?
 DRYDEN.

First Socrates
 Against the *rage* of tyrants single stood,
 Invincible!—THOMSON.

Confin'd their *fury* to those dark abodes.—DRYDEN.

Magisterial, Majestic, Stately, Pompous, August, Dignified.

Magisterial, from *magister* a master, and **Majestic**, from *majestas*, are both derived from *magis* more, or *major* greater, that is, more or greater than others; but they differ in this respect, that the *magisterial* is something assumed, and is therefore often false; the *majestic* is natural, and consequently always real: an upstart, or an intruder into any high station or office, may put on a *magisterial* air, in order to impose on the multitude; but it will not be in his power to be *majestic*, which never shows itself in a borrowed shape; none but those who have a superiority of character, of birth, or outward station, can be *majestic*: a petty magistrate in the country may be *magisterial*; a king or queen cannot uphold their station without a *majestic* deportment.

Stately and **Pompous** are most nearly allied to *magisterial*; **August** and **Dignified** to *majestic*: the former being merely extrinsic and assumed; the latter intrinsic and inherent. *Magisterial* respects the authority which is assumed; *stately* regards splendour and rank; *pompous* regards personal importance, with all the appendages of greatness and power: a person is *magisterial* in the exercise of his office, and the distribution of his commands; he is *stately* in his ordinary intercourse with his inferiors and equals; he is *pompous* on particular occasions of appearing in public: a person demands silence in a *magisterial* tone; he marches forward with a *stately* air; he comes forward in a *pompous* manner, so as to strike others with a sense of his importance.

Majestic is an epithet that characterizes the exterior of an object; *august* is that which marks an essential characteristic in the object; *dignified* serves to characterize a person's action: the form of a female is termed *majestic*, when it has something imposing in it, suited to the condition of majesty, or the most elevated station in society; a monarch is entitled *august* in order to describe the extent of his empire; a public assembly is denominated *august* to bespeak its high character, and its weighty influence in the scale of society; a reply is termed *dignified* when it upholds the individual and personal character of a man as well as his relative character in the community to which he belongs; the two former of these terms are associated only with grandeur of outward circumstances: the last is applicable to men of all stations, who have each in his sphere a *dignity* to maintain which belongs to man as an independent moral agent.

Government being the noblest and most mysterious of all arts, is very unfit for those to talk *magisterially* of who never bore any share in it.—SOUTH.

Then Aristides lifts his honest front,
 In pure *majestic* poverty rever'd.—THOMSON.

Such seems thy gentle height, made only proud
 To be the basis of that *pompous* load.—DENHAM.

There is for the most part as much real enjoyment under the meanest outage as within the walls of the stateliest palace.—SOUTH.

Nor can I think that God, creator wise,
 Though threatening, will in earnest so destroy
 Us, his prime creatures, *dignified* so high.—MILTON.

How poor, how rich, how abject, how *august*,
 How complicate, how wonderful, is man!—YOUNG.

Magnificence, Splendour, Pomp.

Magnificence, from *magnus* and *facio*, signifies doing largely, or on a large scale.

Splendour, in Latin *splendor*, from *splendeo* to shine, signifies brightness in the external.

Pomp, in Latin *pompa*, Greek *πομπή* a procession, *πέμπω* to send, signifies in general formality and ceremony.

Magnificence lies not only in the number and extent of the objects presented, but in their degree of richness as to their colouring and quality; *splendour* is but a characteristic of *magnificence*, attached to such objects as dazzle the eye by the quantity of light, or the beauty and strength of colouring: the entertainments of the eastern monarchs and princes are remarkable for their *magnificence*, from the immense number of their attendants, the crowd of equipages, the size of their palaces, the multitude of costly utensils, and the profusion of viands which constitute the arrangements for the banquet; the entertainments of Europeans present much *splendour* from the richness, the variety, and the brilliancy of dress, of furniture, and all the apparatus of a feast, which the refinements of art have brought to perfection. *Magnificence* is seldomer unaccompanied with *splendour* than *splendour* with *magnificence*; since quantity, as well as quality, is essential to the one; but quality more than quantity is an essential to the other: a large army drawn up in battle array is a *magnificent* spectacle, from the immensity of their numbers and the order of their disposition; it will in all probability be a *splendid* scene if there be much richness in the dresses; the *pomp* will here consist in such large bodies of men acting by one impulse, and directed by one will: hence military *pomp*; it is the appendage of power, when displayed to public view; on particular occasions, a monarch seated on his throne, surrounded by his courtiers, and attended by his guards, is said to appear with *pomp*.

Not Babylon,
 Nor great Alcaïro, such *magnificence*
 Equal'd in all their glories.—MILTON.

Vain transitory *splendours* could not all
 Reprive the tottering mansion from its fall.
 GOLDSMITH.

Was all that *pomp* of woe for this prepar'd?
 These fires, his funeral pile, these altars rear'd!
 DRYDEN.

Magnitude, v. Size.

Majestic, v. Magisterial.

To Maim, v. To mutilate.

Main, v. Chief.

To Maintain, v. To assert.

To Maintain, v. To hold.

To Maintain, *v. To sustain.*

Maintenance, *v. Livelihood.*

To Make, Do.

Make, in Dutch *maken*, Saxon *macan*, &c., comes from the Greek *μακάνη* art, signifying to put together with art.

Do, *v. To act.*

We cannot *make* without *doing*, but we may do without *making*. *to do* is simply to move for a certain end; *to make* is to *do*, so as to bring something into being, which was not before: we *make* a thing what it was not before; we *do* a thing in the same manner as we *did* it before: what is *made* is either better or worse, or the same as another; what is *done*, is *done* either wisely or unwisely.

Empire! thou poor and despicable thing!
When such as these *make* and *unmake* a king.
DRYDEN.

What shall I do to be for ever known,
And *make* the age to come my own?—COWLEY.

To Make, Form, Produce, Create.

Make, *v. To make.*

Form, *v. To form.*

Produce, *v. To afford.*

Create, *v. To cause.*

The idea of giving birth to a thing is common to all these terms, which vary in the circumstances of the action: *to make* is the most general and unqualified term; *to form* signifies to give a *form* to a thing, that is, *to make* it after a given *form*; *to produce* is to bring forth into the light, to call into existence; *to create* is to bring into existence by an absolute exercise of power: *to make* is the simplest action of all, and comprehends a simple combination by the smallest efforts; *to form* requires care and attention, and greater efforts; *to produce* requires time, and also labour: whatever is put together so as to become another thing, is *made*; a chair or a table is *made*: whatever is put into any distinct *form* is *formed*; the potter *forms* the clay into an earthen vessel: whatever emanates from a thing, so as to become a distinct object is *produced*; fire is often *produced* by the violent friction of two pieces of wood with each other. The process of *making* is always performed by some conscious agent, who employs either mechanical means, or the simple exercise of power: a bird *makes* its nest; man *makes* various things, by the exercise of his understanding and his limbs; the Almighty Maker has *made* everything by his word. The process of *forming* does not always require a conscious agent; things are likewise *formed* of themselves; or they are *formed* by the active operations of other bodies; melted lead, when thrown into water, will *form* itself into various little bodies; hard substances are *formed* in the human body which give rise to the disease termed the gravel. What is *produced* is oftener *produced* by the process of nature, than by any express design; the earth *produces* all kinds of vegetables from seed; animals, by a similar process, *produce* their young. *Create*, in this natural sense of the term, is employed as the

act of an intelligent being, and that of the Supreme Being only; it is the act of *making* by a simple effort of power, without the use of materials, and without any process.

They are all employed in the moral sense, and with a similar distinction: *make* is indefinite; we may *make* a thing that is difficult or easy, simple or complex; we may *make* a letter, or *make* a poem; we may *make* a word, or *make* a sentence. *To form* is the work either of intelligence or of circumstances: education has much to do in *forming* the habits, but nature has more to do in *forming* the disposition and the mind altogether; sentiments are frequently *formed* by young people before they have sufficient maturity of thought and knowledge to justify them in coming to any decision. *To produce* is the effect of great mental exertion; or it is the natural operation of things: no industry could ever *produce* a poem or a work of the imagination; but a history or a work of science may be *produced* by the force of mere labour. All things, both in the moral and intellectual world, are linked together upon the simple principle of cause and effect, by which one thing is the *producer*, and the other the thing *produced*: quarrels *produce* hatred, and kindness *produces* love; as heat *produces* inflammation and fever, or disease *produces* death. Since genius is a spark of the Divine power that acts by its own independent agency, the property of *creation* has been figuratively ascribed to it: the *creative* power of the human mind is a faint emblem of that power which brought everything into existence out of nothing.

In every treaty those concessions which he (Charles I.) thought he could not maintain; he never could by any motive or persuasion be induced to *make*.—HUME.

Homer's and Virgil's heroes do not *form* a resolution without the conduct and direction of some deity.—ADDISON.

A supernatural effect is that which is above any natural power, that we know of, *to produce*.—TILLOTSON.

A wondrous hieroglyphic robe she wore,
In which all colours and all figures were,
That nature or that fancy can *create*.—COWLEY.

To Make known, *v. To inform.*

Malady, *v. Disorder.*

Malediction, Curse, Imprecation, Execration, Anathema.

Malediction, from *male* and *dico*, signifies a saying ill, that is, declaring an evil wish against a person.

Curse, in Saxon *kursiad*, comes in all probability from the Greek *κωπο* to sanction or ratify, signifying a bad wish declared upon oath, or in a solemn manner.

Imprecation, from *im* and *precor*, signifies a praying down evil upon a person.

Execration, from the Latin *execror*, that is, *è sacris excludere*, signifies the same as to excommunicate, with every form of solemn *imprecation*.

Anathema, in Greek *αναθημα*, signifies a setting out, that is, a putting out of a religious community as a penance.

The *malediction* is the most indefinite and general term, signifying simply the declara-

tion of evil; *curse* is a solemn denunciation of evil: the former is employed mostly by men; the latter by God or man; the rest are species of the *curse* pronounced only by man. The *malediction* is caused by simple anger; the *curse* is occasioned by some grievous offence: men, in the heat of their passion, will utter *maledictions* against any object that offends them; God pronounced a *curse* upon Adam, and all his posterity, after the fall.

The term *curse* differs in the degree of evil pronounced or wished; *imprecation* and *execration* always imply some positive great evil, and, in fact, as much evil as can be conceived by man in his anger; the *anathema* respects the evil which is pronounced according to the canon law, by which a man is not only put out of the church, but held up as an object of offence. The *malediction* is altogether an unallowed expression of private resentment; the *curse* was admitted, in some cases, according to the Mosaic law; and that, as well as the *anathema*, at one time formed a part of the ecclesiastical discipline of the Christian church; the *imprecation* formed a part of the heathenish ceremony of religion; but the *execration* is always the informal expression of the most violent personal anger.

With many praises of his good play, and many *maledictions* on the power of chance, he took up the cards and threw them in the fire.—MACKENZIE.

But know, that ere your promis'd walls you build,
My *curse*s shall severely be fulfill'd.—DRYDEN.

Thus either host their *imprecations* join'd.—POPE.

I have seen in Bedlam a man that has held up his face in a posture of adoration towards heaven to utter *execrations* and blasphemies.—STEELE.

The bare *anathemas* of the church fall like so many *truta fulmina* upon the obstinate and schismatical.—BOUT.

Malefactor, v. Criminal.

Malevolent, Malicious, Malignant.

These words have all their derivation from *malus* bad; that is **Malevolent**, wishing ill; **Malicious** (v. *Malice*), having an evil disposition; and **Malignant**, having an evil tendency.

Malevolence has a deep root in the heart, and is a settled part of the character; we denominate the person *malevolent*, to designate the ruling temper of his mind: *maliciousness* may be applied as an epithet to particular parts of a man's character or conduct; one may have a *malicious* joy or pleasure in seeing the distresses of another: *malignity* is not employed to characterize the person, but the thing; the *malignity* of a design is estimated by the degree of mischief which was intended to be done. Whenever *malevolence* has taken possession of the heart, all the sources of goodwill are dried up; a stream of evil runs through the whole frame, and contaminates every moral feeling; the being who is under such an unhappy influence neither thinks nor does anything but what is evil: a *malicious* disposition is that branch of *malevolence* which is the next to it in the blackness of its character; it differs, however, in this, that *malice* will, in general, lie dormant, until it is provoked; but *malevolence* is as active and un-

ceasing in its operations for mischief, as its opposite, benevolence, is in wishing and doing good.

Malicious and *malignant* are both applied to things; but the former is applied to those which are of a personal nature, the latter to objects purely inanimate: a story or tale is termed *malicious*, which emanated from a *malicious disposition*; a star is termed *malignant*, which is supposed to have a bad or *malignant* influence.

I have often known very lasting *malevolence* excited by unlucky censures.—JOHNSON.

Greatness, the earnest of *malicious* Fate
For future woe, was never meant a good.
SOUTHERN.

Still horror reigns, a dreary twilight round,
Of struggling night and day *malignant* mix'd.
THOMSON.

Malice, Rancour, Spite, Grudge, Pique.

Malice, in Latin *malitia*, from *malus* bad, signifies the very essence of badness lying in the heart; **Rancour** (v. *Hatred*) is only continued *hatred*: the former requires no external cause to provoke it, it is inherent in the mind; the latter must be caused by some personal offence. *Malice* is properly the love of evil for evil's sake, and is, therefore, confined to no number or quality of objects, and limited by no circumstance; *rancour*, as it depends upon external objects for its existence, so it is confined to such objects only as are liable to cause displeasure or anger: *malice* will impel a man to do mischief to those who have not injured him, and are perhaps strangers to him; *rancour* can subsist only between those who have had sufficient connection to be at variance.

Spite, from the Italian *dispetto* and the French *despit*, denotes a petty kind of *malice*, or disposition to offend another in trifling matters; it may be in the temper of the person, or it may have its source in some external provocation: children often show their *spite* to each other.

Grudge, connected with *grumble* and *growl*, and **Pique**, from *pique*, denoting the prick of a pointed instrument, are employed for that particular state of *rancorous* or *spiteful* feeling which is occasioned by personal offences, the *grudge* is that which has long existed; the *pique* is that which is of recent date: a person is said to owe another a *grudge* for having done him a disservice; or he is said to have a *pique* towards another, who has shown him an affront.

If any chance has hitherto brought the name
Of Palamedes, not unknown to fame,
Who suffer'd from the *malice* of the times.—DRYDEN.

Party spirit fills a nation with spleen and *rancour*.—ADDISON.

Can heav'nly minds such high resentment show,
Or exercise their *spite* in human woe.—DRYDEN.

The god of wit, to show his *grudge*,
Clapp'd asses' ears upon the judge.—SWIFT.

You may be sure the ladies are not wanting, on their side, in cherishing and improving these important *piques*, which divide the town almost into as many parties as there are families.—LADY M. W. MONTAGU.

Malicious, v. Malevolent.

Malignant, *v. Malevolent.*

To Manage, *v. To concert.*

To Manage, *v. To conduct.*

Management, *v. Care.*

Management, *v. Economy.*

Manful, *v. Manly.*

To Mangle, *v. To mutilate.*

Mania, *v. Derangement.*

Manifest, *v. Apparent.*

To Manifest, *v. To discover.*

To Manifest, *v. To prove.*

Manly, Manful.

Manly, or like a man, is opposed to juvenile, and of course applied only to youths; but **Manful**, or full of manhood, is opposed to effeminate, and is applicable more properly to grown persons: a premature *manliness* in young persons is hardly less unseemly than a want of *manfulness* in one who is called upon to display his courage.

I love a *manly* freedom as much as any of the band of cashierers of kings.—BURKE.

I opposed his whim *manfully*, which I think you will approve of.—CUMBERLAND.

Manner, *v. Air.*

Manner, *v. Custom.*

Manner, *v. Way.*

Manners, Morals.

Manners (*v. Air, Manner*) respect the minor forms of acting with others and towards others; **Morals** include the important duties of life: *manners* have, therefore, been denominated *minor morals*. By an attention to good *manners* we render ourselves good companions; by an observance of good *morals* we become good members of society: the former gains the good-will of others, the latter their esteem. The *manners* of a child are of more or less importance, according to his station in life; his *morals* cannot be attended to too early, let his station be what it may.

In the present corrupted state of human *manners*, always to assent and to comply is the very worst maxim we can adopt. It is impossible to support the purity and dignity of Christian *morals* without opposing the world on various occasions.—BLAIR.

Margin, *v. Border.*

Marine, *v. Maritime.*

Mariner, *v. Seaman.*

Maritime, Marine, Naval, Nautical.

Maritime and **Marine**, from the Latin *mare* a sea, signifies belonging to the sea; **Naval**, from *navis* a ship, signifies belonging to a ship; and **Nautical**, from *nauta* a sailor, signifies belonging to a sailor, or to navigation.

Countries and places are denominated *maritime* from their proximity to the sea, or their great intercourse by sea; hence England is called the most *maritime* nation in Europe.

Marine is a technical term, employed by persons in office, to denote that which is officially transacted with regard to the sea in distinction from what passes on land; hence we speak of the *marines* as a species of soldiers acting by sea, of the *marine* society, or *marine* stores.

Naval is another term of art as opposed to military, and used in regard to the arrangements of government or commerce; hence we speak of *naval* affairs, *naval* officers, *naval* tactics, and the like. *Nautical* is a scientific term, connected with the science of navigation or the management of vessels: hence we talk of *nautical* instruction, of *nautical* calculations. The *maritime* laws of England are essential for the preservation of the *naval* power which it has so justly acquired. The *marine* of England is one of its glories. The *naval* administration is one of the most important branches of our government in the time of war. *Nautical* tables and a *nautical* almanack have been expressly formed for the benefit of all who apply themselves to *nautical* subjects.

Octavianus reduced Lepidus to a necessity to beg his life, and be content to lead the remainder of it in a mean condition at Circesi, a small *maritime* town among the Latins.—PRIDEAUX.

A man of a very grave aspect required notice to be given of his intention to set out on a certain day on a *submarine* voyage.—JOHNSON.

Sextus Pompey having together such a *naval* force as made up 350, seized Sicily.—PRIDEAUX.

Mark, Print, Impression, Stamp.

Mark is the same in the northern languages, and in the Persian *marz*.

Print and **Impression**, both from the Latin *premo* to press, signify the visible effect produced by *printing* or *pressing*.

Stamp signifies the effect produced by *stamping*.

The word *mark* is the most general in sense: whatever alters the external face of an object is a *mark*; a *print* is some specific *mark*, or a figure drawn upon the surface of an object; an *impression* is the *mark* pressed either upon or into a body; a *stamp* is the *mark* that is *stamped* in or upon the body. The *mark* is confined to no size, shape, or form; the *print* is a *mark* that represents an object: the *mark* may consist of a spot, a line, a stain, or a smear; but a *print* describes a given object, as a house, a man, &c. A *mark* is either a protuberance or a depression; an *impression* is always a sinking in of the object: a hillock or a hole are both *marks*; but the latter is properly the *impression*: the *stamp* mostly resembles the *impression* unless in the case of the seal, which is *stamped* upon paper, and occasions an elevation with the wax.

The *mark* is occasioned by every sort of action, gentle or violent, artificial or natural; by the voluntary act of a person, or the unconscious act of inanimate bodies, by means of compression or friction; by a touch or a blow, and the like: all the others are occasioned by one or more of these modes. The *print* is occasioned by artificial means of compression, as when the *print* of letters or pictures is made on paper; or by accidental and natural compression, as when the *print* of the hand is made on the wall, or the *print* of the

foot is made on the ground. The *impression* is made by means more or less violent, as when an *impression* is made upon wood by the axe or hammer; or by gradual and natural means, as by the dripping of water on stone. The *stamp* is made by means of direct pressure with an artificial instrument.

Mark is of such universal application that it is confined to no objects whatever, either in the natural or moral world; *print* is mostly applied to material objects, the face of which undergoes a lasting change, as the *printing* made on paper or wood; *impression* is more commonly applied to such natural objects as are particularly solid; *stamp* is generally applied to paper, or still softer and more yielding bodies. *Impression* and *stamp* have both a moral application: events or speeches make an *impression* on the mind: things bear a certain *stamp* which bespeaks their origin. Where the passions have obtained an ascendancy, the occasional good *impressions* which are produced by religious observances but too frequently die away; the Christian religion carries with itself the *stamp* of truth.

De La Chambre asserts positively that from the *marks* on the body the configuration of the planets at a nativity may be gathered.—WALSH.

From hence *Astrea* took her flight, and here
The prints of her departing steps appear.
DRYDEN.

No man can offer at the change of the government established, without first gaining new authority, and in some degree debasing the old by appearance and *impressions* of contrary qualities in those who before enjoyed it.—TEMPLE.

Adultrate metals to the sterling *stamp*
Appear not meaner than mere human lines
Compar'd with those whose inspiration shines.
ROSCOMMON.

Mark, Sign, Note, Symptom, Token, Indication.

Mark, v. Mark, impression.

Sign, in Latin *signum*, Greek *σημα* from *σημα* to punctuate, signifies the thing that points out.

Symptom, in Latin *symptoma*, Greek *συμπτωμα* from *συμπίπτω* to fall out in accordance, signifies what presents itself to confirm one's opinion.

Token, v. To betoken.

Indication, in Latin *indicatio*, from *indico*, and the Greek *ενδεικω* to point out, signifies the thing which points out.

The idea of an external object, which serves to direct the observer, is common to all these terms: the difference consists in the objects that are employed. Anything may serve as a *mark*, a stroke, a dot, a stick set up, and the like; it serves simply to guide the senses; the *sign* is something more complex; it consists of a figure or representation of some object, as the twelve *signs* of the Zodiac, or the *signs* which are affixed to houses of entertainment, or to shops. *Marks* are arbitrary; every one chooses his *mark* at pleasure: *signs* have commonly a connection with the object that is to be observed: a house, a tree, a letter, or any external object may be chosen as a *mark*: but a tobacconist chooses the *sign* of a black man: the innkeeper chooses the head of the reigning

prince. *Marks* serve in general simply to aid the memory in distinguishing the situation of objects, or the particular circumstances of persons or things, as the *marks* which are set up in a garden to distinguish the ground that is occupied; they may, therefore, be private, and known only to the individual or individuals that make them, as the private *marks* by which a tradesman distinguishes his prices: they may likewise be changeable and fluctuating, according to the humour and convenience of the maker, as the private *marks* which are employed by the military on guard. *Signs*, on the contrary, serve to direct the understanding; they have either a natural or an artificial resemblance to the object to be represented: they are consequently chosen, not by the will of one, but by the universal consent of a body; they are not chosen for the moment, but for a permanency, as in the case of language, either oral or written, in the case of the Zodiacal *signs*, or the *sign* of the cross, the algebraical *signs*, and the like. It is clear, therefore, that many objects may be both a *mark* and a *sign*, according to the above illustration: the cross which is employed in books, by way of reference to notes, is a *mark* only, because it serves merely to guide the eye, or assist the memory; but the figure of the cross, when employed in reference to the cross of our Saviour, is a *sign*, inasmuch as it conveys a distinct idea of something else to the mind; so likewise little strokes over letters, or even letters themselves, may merely be *marks*, while they only point out a difference between this or that letter, this or that object; but this same stroke becomes a *sign* if, as in the first declension of Latin nouns it points out the ablative case, it is a *sign* of the ablative case; and a single letter affixed to different parcels is merely a *mark* so long as it simply serves this purpose; but the same letter, suppose it were a word, is a *sign* when it is used as a *sign*. It is, moreover, clear from the above that there are many objects which serve as *marks* which are never *signs*; and, on the other hand, although *signs* are mostly composed of *marks*, yet there are two sorts of *signs* which have nothing to do with *marks*; namely, those which we obtain by any other sense than that of sight; or those which are only figures in the mind. When words are spoken, and not written, they are *signs* and not *marks*; and in like manner the *sign* of the cross, when made on the forehead of children in baptism, is a *sign* but not a *mark*. This illustration of these two words, in their strict and proper sense, will serve to explain them in their extended and metaphorical sense. A *mark* stands for nothing but what is visible; the *sign* stands for that only which is real. A star on the breast of an officer or nobleman is a *mark* of distinction or honour, because it distinguishes one person from another, and in a way that is apt to reflect honour; but it is not a *sign* of honour, because it is not the indubitable test of a man's honourable feelings, since it may be conferred by favour or by mistake, or from some partial circumstance.

The *mark* and *sign* may both stand for the appearances of things, and in that case the former shows the cause by the effect, the latter the consequent by the antecedent. When a

thing is said to bear the *marks* of violence, the cause of the *mark* is judged of by the *mark* itself; but when we say that a louring sky is a *sign* of rain, the future or consequent event is judged of by the present appearance. So likewise we judge by the *marks* of a person's foot that some one has been walking there: when mariners meet with birds at sea, they consider them as a *sign* that land is near at hand.

It is here worthy of observation, however, that the term *mark* is only used for that which may be seen, but that *signs* may serve to direct our conclusions, even in that which affects the hearing, feeling, smell, or taste; thus hoarseness is a *sign* that a person has a cold; the effects which it produces on the head of the patient are to himself sensible *signs* that he labours under such an affection. The smell of fire is a *sign* that some place is on fire: one of the two travellers in La Mothe's fable considered the taste of the wine as a *sign* that there must be leather in the bottle, and the other that there must be iron; and it proved that they were both right, for a little key with a bit of leather tied to it was found at the bottom.

In this sense of the words they are applied to moral objects, with precisely the same distinction: the *mark* illustrates the spring of the action; the *sign* shows the state of the mind or sentiments; it is a *mark* of folly or weakness in a man to yield himself implicitly to the guidance of an interested friend; tears are not always a *sign* of repentance.

Note is rather a *sign* than a *mark*; but it is properly the *sign* which consists of *marks*, as a note of admiration (!), and likewise a *note* which consists of many letters and words.

Symptom is rather a *mark* than a *sign*; it explains the cause or origin of complaints, by the appearances they assume, and is employed as a technical term only in the science of medicine: as a foaming at the mouth and an abhorrence of drink are *symptoms* of canine madness; motion and respiration are *signs* of life; but it may likewise be used figuratively in application to moral objects.

Token is a species of *mark* in the moral sense, *indication* a species of *sign*: a *mark* shows what is, a *token* serves to keep in mind what has been: a gift to a friend is a *mark* of one's affection and esteem: if it be permanent in its nature it becomes a *token*; friends who are in close intercourse have perpetual opportunities of showing each other *marks* of their regard by reciprocal acts of courtesy and kindness; when they separate for any length of time they commonly leave some *token* of their tender sentiments in each other's hands, as a pledge of what shall be, as well as an evidence of what has been.

Sign, as it respects *indication*, is said in abstract and general propositions: *indication* itself is only employed for some particular individual referred to; it bespeaks the act of the persons: but the *sign* is only the face or appearance of the thing. When a man does not live consistently with the profession which he holds, it is a *sign* that his religion is built on a wrong foundation; parents are gratified when they observe the slightest *indication* of genius or goodness in their children.

The ceremonial laws of Moses were the *marks* to distinguish the people of God from the Gentiles.—BACON.

So plain the *signs*, such prophets are the skies.
—DRYDEN.

The sacring of the kings of France (as Loyal says) is the *sign* of their sovereign priesthood.—TEMPLE.

This fall of the French monarchy was far from being preceded by any exterior *symptoms* of decline.—BURKE.

The famous bull-feasts are an evident *token* of the Quixotism and romantic taste of the Spaniards.—SOMERVILLE.

It is certain Virgil's parents gave him a good education, to which they were inclined by the early *indications* he gave of a sweet disposition and excellent wit.—WALSH.

Mark, Trace, Vestige, Footstep, Track.

The word **Mark** has already been considered at large in the preceding article, but it will admit of farther illustration when taken in the sense of that which is visible, and serves to show the existing state of things; *mark* is here as before the most general and unqualified term; the other terms varying in the circumstances or manner of the *mark*.

Trace, in Italian *treccia*, Greek *τρεχειν* to run, and Hebrew *darek way*, signifies any continued *mark*.

Vestige, in Latin *vestigium*, not improbably contracted from *pedis* and *stigium* or *stigma*, from *στίγω* to imprint, signifies a print of the foot.

Footstep is taken for the place in which the foot has stepped, or the *mark* made by that step.

Track, derived from the same as *trace*, signifies the way run, or the *mark* produced by that running.

The *mark* is said of a fresh and uninterrupted line; the *trace* is said of that which is broken by time: a carriage in driving along the sand leaves *marks* of the wheels, but in a short time all *traces* of its having been there will be lost; a *mark* is produced by the action of bodies on one another in every possible form; the spilling of a liquid may leave a *mark* on the floor; the blow of a stick leaves a *mark* on the body; but the *trace* is a *mark* produced only by bodies making a progress or proceeding in a continued course: the ship that cuts the waves, and the bird that cuts the air, leaves no *trace* of their course behind; so men pass their lives, and after death leave no *traces* that they ever were. They are both applied to moral objects, but the *mark* is produced by objects of inferior importance; it excites a momentary observation, but does not carry us back to the past; its cause is either too obvious or too minute to awaken attention: a *trace* is generally a *mark* of something which we may wish to see. *Marks* of haste and imbecility in a common writer excite no surprise, and call forth no observation: in a writer of long-standing celebrity we look for *traces* of his former genius.

The *vestige* is a species of the *mark* caused literally by the foot of man, and consequently applied to such places as have been inhabited, where the active industry of man has left visible *marks*; it is a species of *trace*, inas-

much as it carries us back to that which was, but is not at present. We discover by *marks* that things have been; we discover by *traces* and *vestiges* what they have been: a hostile army always leaves sufficiently evident *marks* of its having passed through a country; there are *traces* of the Roman roads still visible in London and different parts of England: Rome contains many *vestiges* of its former greatness.

Mineralogists assert that there are many *marks* of a universal deluge discoverable in the fossils and strata of the earth; philological inquirers imagine that there are *traces* in the existing languages of the world sufficient to ascertain the progress by which the earth became populated after the deluge; the pyramids are *vestiges* of antiquity which raise our ideas of human greatness beyond anything which the modern state of the arts can present. *Vestige*, like the two former, may be applied to moral as well as natural objects with the same lire of distinction. A person betrays *marks* of levity in his conduct. Wherever we discover *traces* of the same customs or practices in one country which are prevalent in another, we suppose those countries to have had an intercourse or connection of some kind with one another at a certain remote period. There are customs still remaining in some parts of England which are *vestiges* of barbarism.

Footstep and *track* are sometimes employed as a *mark*, but oftener as a road or course: when we talk of following the *footsteps* of another, it may signify either to follow the *marks* of his *footsteps* as a guide for the course we should take or to walk in the very same steps as he has done: the former is the act of one who is in pursuit of another; the latter is the act of him who follows in a train. *Footsteps* is employed only for the steps of an individual: the *track* is made by the steps of many; it is the line which has been beaten out or made by stamping: the *footstep* can be employed only for men or brutes; but the *track* is applied to inanimate objects, as the wheel of a carriage. When Cacus took away the oxen of Hercules he dragged them backward that they might not be traced by their *footsteps*: a *track* of blood from the body of a murdered man may sometimes lead to detection of the murderer.

In the metaphorical application they do not signify a *mark*, but a course of conduct; the former respects one's moral feelings or mode of dealing: the latter one's mechanical and habitual manner of acting: the former is the consequence of having the same principles; the latter proceeds from imitation or constant repetition.

A good son will walk in the *footsteps* of a good father. In the management of business it is rarely wise in a young man to leave the *track* which has been marked out for him by his superiors in age and experience.

I have served him
In this old body; yet the *marks* remain
Of many wounds.—OTWAY.

The greatest favours to an ungrateful man are but like the motion of a ship upon the waves: they leave no trace, no sign behind them.—SOUTH.

Both Britain and Ireland had temples for the worship of the gods, the *vestiges* of which are now remaining.—FARNS.

Virtue alone ennobles human kind,
And power should on her glorious *footsteps* wait.
WYNNE.

Though all seems lost 'tis impious to despair,
The *tracks* of Providence like rivers wind.
HIGGONS.

Mark, Badge, Stigma.

Mark (*v. Mark, print*) is still the general, and the two others specific terms; they are employed for whatever serves to characterize persons externally, or betoken any part either of their character or circumstances: *mark* is employed either in a good, bad, or indifferent sense; **Badge** in an indifferent one; **Stigma** in a bad sense: a thing may either be a *mark* of honour, of disgrace, or of simple distinction: a *badge* is a *mark* simply of distinction; the *stigma* is a *mark* of disgrace. The *mark* is that which is conferred upon a person for his merits, as medals, stars, and ribbands are bestowed by princes upon meritorious officers and soldiers; or the *mark* attaches to a person, or is affixed to him, in consequence of his demerits; as a low situation in his class is a *mark* of disgrace to a scholar; or a fool's cap is a *mark* of ignominy affixed to idlers and dunces; or a brand in the forehead is a *mark* of ignominy for criminals: the *badge* is that which is voluntarily assumed by one's self according to established custom; it consists of dress by which the office, station, and even religion of a particular community is distinguished: as the gown and wig is the *badge* of gentlemen in the law; the gown and surplice that of clerical men; the uniform of charity children is the *badge* of their condition; the peculiar habit of the Quakers and Methodists is the *badge* of their religion: the *stigma* consists not so much in what is openly imposed upon a person as what falls upon him in the judgment of others; it is the black *mark* which is set upon a person by the public, and is consequently the strongest of all *marks*, and one which every one most dreads, and every good man seeks least to deserve.

A simple *mark* may sometimes be such only in our own imagination; as when one fancies that dress is a *mark* of superiority, or the contrary; that the courtesies which we receive from a superior are *marks* of his personal esteem and regard: but the *stigma* is not what an individual imagines for himself, but what is conceived towards him by others; the office of a spy and informer is so odious that every man of honest feeling holds the very name to be a *stigma*: although the *stigma* is in general the consequence of a man's real unworthiness, yet it is possible for particular prejudices and ruling passions to make that a *stigma* which is not so deservedly; thus the name of Nazarene was a *stigma* attached to the early disciples of our Saviour.

In these revolutionary meetings every counsel, in proportion as it is daring and violent and perfidious, is taken for the *mark* of superior genius.—BURKE.

The people of England look upon hereditary succession as a security for their liberty, not as a *badge* of servitude.—BURKE.

The cross which our Saviour's enemies thought was to stigmatize him with infamy became the ensign of his religion.—ELIOT.

Mark, Butt.

After all that has been said upon the word **Mark** (*v. Mark, print*), it has this additional meaning in common with the word **Butt**, that it implies an object aimed at; the *mark* is however literally a *mark* that is said to be shot at by the *marksman* with a gun or a bow; or it is metaphorically employed for the man who by his peculiar characteristics makes himself the object of notice; he is the *mark* at which every one's looks and thoughts are directed: the *butt*, from the French *bout* the end, is a species of *mark* in this metaphorical sense; but the former only calls forth general observation, the latter provokes the laughter and jokes of every one. Whoever renders himself conspicuous by his eccentricities either in his opinions or his actions, must not complain if he become a *mark* for the derision of the public: it is a man's misfortune rather than his fault; he become the *butt* of a company who are rude and unfeeling enough to draw their pleasures from another's pain.

A fluttering dove upon the top they tie,
The living *mark* at which their arrows fly.

DRYDEN.

I mean those honest gentlemen that are pelted by men, women, and children, by friends and foes, and in a word stand as *butts* in conversation.—ADDISON.

To Mark, Note, Notice.

Mark is here taken in the intellectual sense, fixing as it were a *mark* (*v. Mark*) upon a thing so as to keep it in mind, which is in fact to fix one's attention upon it in such a manner as to be able to distinguish it by its characteristic qualities; to *mark* is therefore altogether an intellectual act: to **Note** has the same end as that of *marking*; namely to aid the memory, but one *notes* a thing by making a written *note* of it; this is therefore a mechanical act: to **Notice**, on the other hand, is a sensible operation; from *notitia* knowledge, signifies to bring to one's knowledge, perception, or understanding by the use of our senses. We *mark* and *note* that which particularly interests us: the former is that which serves a present purpose; *notice* that which may be of use in future. The impatient lover *marks* the hours until the time arrives for meeting his mistress: travellers *note* whatever strikes them of importance to be remembered when they return home: to *notice* may serve either for the present or the future; we may *notice* things merely by way of amusement; as a child will notice the actions of animals, or we may *notice* a thing for the sake of bearing it in mind, as a person *notices* a particular road when he wishes to return.

Many who *mark* with such accuracy the course of time appear to have little sensibility of the decline of life.—JOHNSON.

O treach'rous conscience! while she seems to sleep,
Unnoted *notes* each moment misapply'd.—YOUNG.

An Englishman's *notice* of the weather is the natural consequence of changeable skies and uncertain seasons.—JOHNSON.

To Mark, *v. To Show*.

Marriage, Wedding, Nuptials.

Marriage, from to *marry*, denotes the act of *marrying*; **Wedding** and **Nuptials** denote the ceremony of being *married*. To *marry*, in French *mari*er, and Latin *marito* to be joined to a male; hence *marriage* comprehends the act of choosing and being legally bound to a man or a woman; *wedding*, from *wed* and the Teutonic *wetten* to promise or betroth, implies the ceremony of *marrying*, inasmuch as it is binding upon the parties. *Nuptials* comes from the Latin *nubo* to veil, because the Roman ladies were veiled at the time of *marriage*; hence it has been put for the whole ceremony itself. *Marriage* is an institution which, by those who have been blessed with the light of Divine Revelation, has always been considered as sacred; with some persons, particularly among the lower orders of society, the day of their *wedding* is converted into a day of riot and intemperance: among the Roman Catholics in England it is a practice for them to have their *nuptials* solemnized by a priest of their own persuasion as well as by the Protestant clergymen.

O fatal maid! thy *marriage* is endow'd
With Phrygian, Latian, and Rutulian blood.
DRYDEN.

Ask any one how he has been employed to-day; he will tell you, perhaps, I have been at the ceremony of taking the manly robe: this friend invited me to a *wedding*; that desired me to attend the hearing of his cause.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF PLINY.

Fir'd with disdain for Turnus disposess'd,
And the new *nuptials* of the Trojan guest.
DRYDEN.

Marriage, Matrimony, Wedlock.

Marriage (*v. Marriage*) is oftener an act than a state: **Matrimony** and **Wedlock** both describe states.

Marriage is taken in the sense of an act, when we speak of the laws of *marriage*, the day of one's *marriage*, the congratulations upon one's *marriage*, a happy or unhappy *marriage*, the fruits of one's *marriage* and the like; it is taken in the sense of a state when we speak of the pleasures or pains of *marriage*; but in this latter case *matrimony* which signifies a *married* life abstractedly from all agents or acting persons, is preferable; so likewise, to think of *matrimony*, and to enter into the holy state of *matrimony*, are expressions founded upon the signification of the term. As *matrimony* is derived from *mater* a mother, because *married* women are in general mothers, it has particular reference to the domestic state of the two parties; broils are but too frequently the fruits of *matrimony*, yet there are few cases in which they might not be obviated by the good sense of those who are engaged in them. Hasty *marriages* cannot be expected to produce happiness; young people who are eager for *matrimony* before they are fully aware of its consequences will purchase their experience at the expense of their peace.

Wedlock is the old-English word for *matrimony*, and is in consequence admitted in law, when one speaks of children born in *wedlock*; agreeably to its derivation it has a reference to the bond of union which follows the

marriage: hence one speaks of living happily in a state of *wedlock*, of being joined in holy *wedlock*.

Marriage is rewarded with some honourable distinctions which celibacy is forbidden to usurp.—JOHNSON.

As love generally produces *matrimony*, so it often happens that *matrimony* produces love.—SPECTATOR.

The men who would make good husbands, if they visit public places, are frightened at *wedlock* and resolve to live single.—JOHNSON.

Martial, Warlike, Military, Soldier-like.

Martial, from *Mars*, the god of war, is the Latin term for belonging to war: **Warlike** signifies literally like *war*, having the image of war. In sense these terms approach so near to each other that they may be easily admitted to supply each other's place; but custom, the lawgiver of language, has assigned an office to each that makes it not altogether indifferent how they are used. *Martial* is both a technical and a more comprehensive term than *warlike*; on the other hand, *warlike* designates the temper of the individual more than *martial*: we speak of *martial* array, *martial* preparations, *martial* law, a court *martial*; but of a *warlike* nation, meaning a nation who is fond of war; a *warlike* spirit or temper, also a *warlike* appearance, inasmuch as the temper is visible in the air and carriage of a man.

Military, from *miles*, signifies belonging to a soldier, and **Soldier-like** like a soldier. *Military* in comparison with *martial* is a term of particular import, *martial* having always a reference to war in general; and *military* to the proceedings consequent upon that: hence we speak of *military* in distinction from naval as *military* expeditions, *military* movements, and the like; but in characterizing the men we should say that they had a *martial* appearance; but of a particular place that it had a *military* appearance, if there were many soldiers. *Military*, compared with *soldier-like* is used for the body, and the latter for the individual. The whole army is termed the *military*: the conduct of an individual is *soldierlike* or otherwise.

An active prince, and prone to *martial* deeds.
DRYDEN.

Last from the Volscians fair Camilla came,
And led her *warlike* troops, a warrior dame.
DRYDEN.

The Tlascalans were like all unpolished nations, strangers to *military* order and discipline.—ROBERTSON.

The fears of the Spaniards led them to presumptuous and *unsoldierlike* discussions concerning the propriety of their general's measures.—ROBERTSON.

Marvel, *v. Wonder*.

Mask, *v. Cloak*.

Massacre, *v. Carnage*.

Massive, *v. Bulky*.

Master, *v. Possessor*.

Material, *v. Corporeal*.

Materials, *v. Matter*.

Matrimony, *v. Marriage*.

Matter, Materials, Subject.

Matter and **Materials** are both derived from the same source, namely, the Latin *materia*, which comes in all probability from *mater* a mother, because *matter*, from which everything is made, acts in the production of bodies like a mother.

Subject, in Latin *subjectum*, participle of *subjicio* to lie, signifies the thing lying under and forming the foundation.

Matter in the physical application is taken for all that composes the sensible world in distinction from that which is spiritual or discernible only by the thinking faculty; hence *matter* is always opposed to mind.

In regard to *materials* it is taken in an indivisible as well as a general sense; the whole universe is said to be composed of *matter*, though not of *materials*: on the other hand *materials* consist of those particular parts of *matter* which serve for the artificial production of objects; and *matter* is said of those things which are the natural parts of the universe: a house, a table, and a chair consist of *materials* because they are works of art; but a plant, a tree, an animal body, consist of *matter* because they are the productions of nature.

The distinction of these terms in their moral application is very similar: the *matter* which composes a moral discourse is what emanates from the author; but the *materials* are those with which one is furnished by others. The style of some writers is so indifferent that they disgrace the *matter* by the manner; periodical writers are furnished with *materials* for their productions out of the daily occurrences in the political and moral world. Writers of dictionaries endeavour to compress as much *matter* as possible into a small space; they draw their *materials* from every other writer.

Matter seems to bear the same relation to *subject* as the whole does to any particular part, as it respects moral objects: the *subject* is the groundwork of the *matter*; the *matter* is that which flows out of the subject: the *matter* is that which we get by the force of invention; the *subject* is that which offers itself to notice: many persons may therefore have a *subject* who have no *matter*, that is, nothing in their own minds which they can offer by way of illustrating this *subject*: but it is not possible to have *matter* without a *subject*: hence the word *matter* is taken for the substance, and for that which is substantial; the *subject* is taken for that which engages the attention: we speak of a *subject* of conversation and *matter* for deliberation; a *subject* of inquiry, a *matter* of curiosity. Nations in a barbarous state afford but little *matter* worthy to be recorded in history; people who live a secluded life and in a contracted sphere have but few *subjects* to occupy their attention.

When tumbled headlong from the height of life,
They furnished *matter* for the tragic muse.
THOMSON.

The principal *materials* of our comfort or uneasiness lie within ourselves.—BLAIR.

Love hath such a strong virtual force that when it fasteneth on a pleasing *subject* it sets the imagination at a strange fit of working.—HOWEL.

Mature, *v. Ripe.*

Maxim, *v. Axiom.*

Maxim, Precept, Rule, Law.

Maxim (*v. Axiom*) is a moral truth that carries its own weight with itself. **Precept** (*v. Command*), **Rule** (*v. Guide*), and **Law**, from *lex* and *lego*, signifying the thing specifically chosen or marked out, all borrow their weight from some external circumstance: the *precept* derives its authority from the individual delivering it; in this manner the *precepts* of our Saviour have a weight which gives them a decided superiority over everything else: the *rule* acquires a worth from its fitness for guiding us in our proceeding: the *law*, which is a species of *rule*, derives its weight from the sanction of power. *Maxims* are often *precepts* inasmuch as they are communicated to us by our parents; they are *rules* inasmuch as they serve as a *rule* for our conduct; they are *laws* inasmuch as they have the sanction of conscience. We respect the *maxims* of antiquity as containing the essence of human wisdom; we reverence the *precepts* of religion as the foundation of all happiness; we regard the *rules* of prudence as preserving us from errors and misfortunes; we respect the *laws* as they are the basis of civil society.

I think I may lay it down as a *maxim*, that every man of good common sense may, if he pleases, most certainly be rich.—BUDGELL.

Philosophy has accumulated *precept* upon *precept* to warn us against the anticipation of future calamities.—JOHNSON.

I know not whether any *rule* has yet been fixed by which it may be decided when poetry can properly be called easy.—JOHNSON.

God is thy *law*, thou mine.—MILTON.

May, *v. Can.*

Maze, *v. Labyrinth.*

Meagre, *v. Lean.*

Mean, *v. Base.*

Mean, *v. Common.*

Mean, *v. Design.*

Mean, *v. Low.*

Mean, Pitiful, Sordid.

The moral application of these terms to the characters of men, in their transactions with each other, is what constitutes their common signification. Whatever a man does in common with those below him is **Mean**; it evinces a temper that is prone to sink rather than to rise in the scale of society: whatever makes him an object of pity, and consequently of contempt for his sunken character, makes him **Pitiful**: whatever makes him grovel and crawl in the dust, licking up the dross and filth of the earth, is **Sordid**, from the Latin *sordeo* to be filthy and nasty. *Meanness* is in many cases only relatively bad as it respects the disposal of our property: for instance, what is *meanness* in one might be generosity or prudence in another: the due

estimate of circumstances is allowable in all, but it is *meanness* for any one to attempt to save at the expense of others that which he can conveniently afford either to give or pay: hence an undue spirit of seeking gain or advantage for one's self to the detriment of others is denominated a *mean* temper: of this temper the world affords such abundant examples that it may almost seem unnecessary to specify any particulars, or else I would say it is *mean* in those who keep servants to want to deprive them of any fair sources of emolument: it is *mean* for ladies in their carriages, and attended by their livery servants, to take up the time of a tradesman by bartering with him about sixpences or shillings in the price of his articles: it is *mean* for a gentleman to do that for himself which according to his circumstances he might get another to do for him. *Pitifulness* goes farther than *meanness*: it is not merely that which degrades, but unmans the person; it is that which is bad as well as low: when the fear of evil or the love of gain prompts a man to sacrifice his character and forfeit his veracity he becomes truly *pitiful*; Blifil in "Tom Jones" is the character whom all pronounce to be *pitiful*. *Sordidness* is peculiarly applicable to one's love of gain: although of a more corrupt, yet it is not of so degrading a nature as the two former: the *sordid* man does not deal in trifles like the *mean* man; and has nothing so low and vicious in him as the *pitiful* man. A continual habit of getting money will engender a sordid love of it in the human mind; but nothing short of a radically wicked character leads a man to be *pitiful*. We think lightly of a *mean* man: we hold a *pitiful* man in profound contempt: we hate a *sordid* man. *Meanness* descends to that which is insignificant and worthless: *pitifulness* sinks into that which is despicable: *sordidness* contaminates the mind with what is foul.

Nature, I thought, perform'd too *mean* a part,
Forming her movements to the rules of art.—SWIFT.

The Jews tell us of a two-fold Messiah, a vile and most *pitiful* fetch, invented only to evade what they cannot answer.—PRIDEAUX.

This, my assertion proves he may be old,
And yet not *sordid*, who refuses gold.—DENHAM.

Mean, Medium.

Mean is but a contraction of **Medium**, which signifies in Latin the middle path. The term *mean* is used abstractedly in all speculative matters: there is a *mean* in opinions between the two extremes: this *mean* is doubtless the point nearest to truth. *Medium* is employed in practical matters; computations are often erroneous from being too high or too low: the *medium* is in this case the one most to be preferred. The moralist will always recommend the *mean* in all opinions that widely differ from each other: our passions always recommend to us some extravagant conduct either of insolent resistance or *mean* compliance; but discretion recommends the *medium* or middle course in such matters.

The man within the golden *mean*,
Who can his boldest wish contain,

Securely views the ruin'd cell
Where sordid want and sorrow dwell.
FRANCS.

He who looks upon the soul through its outward
actions often sees it through a deceitful medium.—ADDI-
SON.

Meaning, v. Signification.

Means, v. Way.

Mechanic, v. Artist.

To Mediate, v. To intercede.

Mediocrity, v. Moderation.

To Meditate, v. To contemplate.

Medium, v. Mean.

Medley, v. Difference.

Medley, v. Mixture.

Meek, v. Soft.

Meet, v. Fit.

Meeting, v. Assembly.

Meeting, Interview.

Meeting, from to meet, is the act of meeting, or coming into the company of any one. **Interview**, compounded of *inter* between, and *view* to view, is a personal view of each other. A *meeting* is an ordinary concern, and its purpose familiar; *meetings* are daily taking place between friends: an *interview* is extraordinary and formal; its object is commonly business; an *interview* sometimes takes place between princes, or commanders of armies.

I have not joy'd an hour since you departed,
For public miseries and private fears,
But this bless'd meeting has o'erpaid them all.
DRYDEN.

I in my thoughts beheld his soul ascend,
Where his fix'd hopes our interview attend.
DENHAM.

Melancholy, v. Dejection.

Melody, Harmony, Accordance.

Melody, in Latin *melodus* from *melos*, in Greek *μελος* a verse, and the Hebrew *mela* a word or a verse.

Harmony, in Latin *harmonia*, Greek *αρμονια* concord, from *apw apto* to fit or suit, signifies the agreement of sounds.

Accordance denotes the act or state of according (*v. To agree*).

Melody signifies any measured or modulated sounds measured after the manner of verse into distinct members or parts; *harmony* signifies the suiting or adapting different modulated sounds to each other; *melody* is therefore to *harmony* as a part to the whole: we must first produce *melody* by the rules of art; the *harmony* which follows must be regulated by the ear: there may be *melody* without *harmony*, but there cannot be *harmony* without *melody*: we speak of simple *melody* where the modes of music are not very much diversified; but we cannot speak of *harmony* unless there be a variety of notes to fall in with each other.

A voice is *melodious* inasmuch as it is capable of producing a regularly modulated note; it

is *harmonious* inasmuch as it strikes agreeably on the ear, and produces no discordant sounds. The song of a bird is *melodious* or has *melody* in it, inasmuch as there is a concatenation of sounds in it which are admitted to be regular, and consequently agreeable to the musical ear; there is *harmony* in a concert of voices and instruments.

Accordance is strictly speaking the property on which both *melody* and *harmony* is founded: for the whole of music depends on an *accordance* of sounds. The same distinction marks *accordance* and *harmony* in the moral application. There may be occasional *accordance* of opinion or feeling; but *harmony* is an entire *accordance* in every point.

Lend me your song, ye nightingales! Oh pour
The mazy-running soul of melody
Into my varied verse.—THOMSON.

Now the distemper'd mind
Has lost that concord of harmonious powers
Which forms the soul of happiness.—THOMSON.

The music
Of man's fair composition best accords
When 'tis in concert.—SHAKESPEARE.

Member, Limb.

Member in Latin *membrum*, probably from the Greek *μερος* a part, because a *member* is properly a part.

Limb is connected with the word *lame*.

Member is a general term applied either to the animal body or to other bodies, as a *member* of a family, or a *member* of a community: *limb* is applicable to animal bodies; *limb* is therefore a species of *member*; for every *limb* is a *member*, but every *member* is not a *limb*.

The *members* of the body comprehend every part which is capable of performing a distinct office; but the *limbs* are those jointed *members* that are distinguished from the head and the body: the nose and the eyes are *members* but not *limbs*; the arms and legs are properly denominated *limbs*.

A man's *limbs* (by which for the present we only understand those *members* the loss of which alone amounts to mayhem by the common law) are the gift of the wise Creator, to enable him to protect himself from external injuries.—BLACKSTONE.

Memoirs, v. Anecdotes.

Memorable, v. Signal.

Memorial, v. Monument.

Memory, Remembrance, Recollection, Reminiscence.

Memory, in Latin *memoria* or *memor*, Greek *μνημων* and *μνασμαι*, comes in all probability from *μενος* the mind, because *memory* is the principal faculty of the mind.

Remembrance, from the verb *remember*, contracted from *re* and *memoro* to bring back to the mind, comes from *memor*, as before.

Recollection from *recollect*, compounded of *re* and *collect*, signifies collecting again.

Reminiscence, in Latin *reminiscentia* from *reminiscor* and *memor*, as before, signifies bringing back to the mind what was there before.

Memory is the power of recalling images once made on the mind; *remembrance*, *recollection*, and *reminiscence* are operations or exertions of this power, which vary in their mode.

The *memory* is a power which exerts itself either independently of the will or in conformity with the will; but all the other terms express the acts of conscious agents, and consequently are more or less connected with the will. In dreams the *memory* exerts itself, but we do not say that we have any *remembrance* or *recollection* of objects.

Remembrance is the exercise of *memory* in a conscious agent; it may be the effect of repetition or habit, as in the case of a child who *remembers* his lesson after having learnt it several times; or of a horse who *remembers* the road which he has been continually passing; or it may be the effect of association and circumstances, by which images are casually brought back to the mind, as happens to intelligent beings continually as they exercise their thinking faculties.

In these cases *remembrance* is an involuntary act; for things return to the mind before one is aware of it, as in the case of one who hears a particular name, and *remembers* that he has to call on a person of the same name; or of one who, on seeing a particular tree, *remembers* all the circumstances of his youth which were connected with a similar tree.

Remembrance is, however, likewise a voluntary act, and the consequence of a direct determination, as in the case of a child who strives to *remember* what it has been told by its parent; or of a friend who *remembers* the hour of meeting another friend in consequence of the interest which it has excited in his mind; nay, indeed, experience teaches us that scarcely anything in ordinary cases is more under the subservience of the will than the *memory*; for it has now become almost a maxim to say, that one may *remember* whatever one wishes.

The power of *memory*, and the simple exercise of that power in the act of *remembering*, are possessed in common, though in different degrees, by man and brute; but *recollection* and *reminiscence* are exercises of the *memory* that are connected with the higher faculties of man, his judgment and understanding. To *remember* is to call to mind that which has once been presented to the mind; but to *recollect* is to *remember* afresh, to *remember* what has been remembered before. *Remembrance* busies itself with objects that are at hand; *recollection* carries us back to distant periods; simple *remembrance* is engaged in things that have but just left the mind, which are more or less easily to be recalled, and more or less faithfully to be represented; but *recollection* tries to retrace the faint images of things that have been so long unthought of as to be almost obliterated from the *memory*. In this manner we are said to *remember* in one half-hour what was told us in the preceding half-hour, or to *remember* what passes from one day to another; but we *recollect* the incidents of childhood; we *recollect* what happened in our native place after many years' absence from it. *Remembrance* is that homely, every-day exercise of the *memory* which renders it of essential ser-

vise in the acquirement of knowledge, or in the performance of one's duties; *recollection* is that exalted exercise of the *memory* which affords us the purest of enjoyments and serves the noblest of purposes; the *recollection* of all the minute incidents of childhood is a more sincere pleasure than any which the present moment can afford.

Reminiscence, if it deserve any notice as a word of English use, is altogether an abstract exercise of the *memory*, which is employed on purely intellectual ideas in distinction from those which are awakened by sensible objects; the mathematician makes use of *reminiscence* in deducing unknown truths from those which he already knows. *Reminiscence* among the disciples of Socrates was the *reminiscence* of things purely intellectual, or of that natural knowledge which the souls had had before their union with the body; whilst the *memory* was exercised upon sensible things, or that knowledge which was acquired through the medium of the senses; therefore the Latins said that *reminiscence* belonged exclusively to man because it was purely intellectual, but that *memory* was common to all animals because it was merely the depôt of the senses; but this distinction, from what has been before observed, is only preserved as it respects the meaning of *reminiscence*.

Memory is a generic term, as has been already shown; it includes the common idea of reviving former impressions, but does not qualify the nature of the ideas revived: the term is, however, extended in its application to signify not merely a power, but also a seat or resting-place, as is likewise *remembrance* and *recollection*; but still with this difference, that the *memory* is spacious, and contains everything; the *remembrance* and *recollection* are partial, and comprehend only passing events; we treasure up knowledge in our *memory*; the occurrences of a preceding year are still fresh in our *remembrance* or *recollection*.

Remember thee!

Ay, thou poor ghost, while *memory* holds a seat
In this distracted globe.—SHAKESPEARE.

Forgetfulness is necessary to *remembrance*.

JOHNSON.

Memory may be assisted by method, and the decays of knowledge repaired by stated times of *recollection*.—JOHNSON.

Reminiscence is the retrieving a thing at present forgo'd, or confusedly remembered, by setting the mind to hunt over all its notions.—SOUTH.

Menace, v. Threat.

To Mend, v. To amend.

Menial, v. Servant.

Mental, Intellectual.

There is the same difference between **Mental** and **Intellectual** as between *mind* and *intellect*: the *mind* comprehends the thinking faculty in general, with all its operations; the *intellect* includes only that part of it which consists in understanding and judgment: *mental* is therefore opposed to corporeal; *intellectual* is opposed to sensual or physical: *mental* exertions are not to be expected from all; *intellectual* enjoyments fall to the lot of comparatively few.

Objects, pleasures, pains, operations, gifts,

&c., are denominated *mental*; subjects, conversation, pursuits, and the like, are entitled *intellectual*. It is not always easy to distinguish our *mental* pleasures from those corporeal pleasures which we enjoy in common with the brutes; the latter are, however, greatly heightened by the former in whatever degree they are blended: in a society of well-informed persons the conversation will turn principally on *intellectual* subjects.

To collect and reposit the various forms of things is far the most pleasing part of *mental* occupation.—JOHNSON.

Man's more divine, the master of all these,
Lord of the wide world, and wide wat'ry seas,
Endued with *intellectual* sense and soul.
SHAKESPEARE.

To Mention, Notice.

Mention from *mens* mind, signifies here to bring to mind.

Notice (*v. To mark*).

These terms are synonymous only inasmuch as they imply the act of calling things to another person's mind. We *mention* a thing in direct terms: we *notice* it indirectly or in a casual manner; we *mention* that which may serve as information; we *notice* that which may be merely of a personal or incidental nature. One friend *mentions* to another what has passed at a particular meeting: in the course of conversation he *notifies* or calls to the *notice* of his companion the badness of the road, the wideness of the street, or the like.

The great critic I have before *mentioned*, though an heathen, has taken *notice* of the sublime manner in which the lawgiver of the Jews has described the creation.—ADDISON.

Mercantile, Commercial.

Mercantile, from *merchandise*, respects the actual transaction of business or a transfer of *merchandise* by sale or purchase; **Commercial** comprehends the theory and practice of *commerce*: hence we speak in a peculiar manner of a *mercantile* house, a *mercantile* town, a *mercantile* situation, and the like; but of a *commercial* education, a *commercial* people, *commercial* speculations, and the like.

Such is the happiness, the hope of which seduced me from the duties and pleasures of a *mercantile* life.—JOHNSON.

The *commercial* world is very frequently put into confusion by the bankruptcy of merchants.—JOHNSON.

Mercenary, *v. Hiring*.

Mercenary, *v. Venial*.

Merchandise, *v. Commodity*.

Merciful, *v. Gracious*.

Merciless, *v. Hardhearted*.

Mercy, *v. Clemency*.

Mercy, *v. Pity*.

Mere, *v. Bare*.

Merit, *v. Desert*.

Merriment, *v. Mirth*.

Merry, *v. Cheerful*.

Merry, *v. Lively*.

Message, Errand.

Message, from the Latin *missus*, participle of *mitto* to send, signifies the thing sent.

Errand, from *erro* to wander or to go to a distance, signifies the thing for which one goes to a distance.

The *message* is properly any communication which is conveyed; the *errand* sent from one person to another is that which causes one to go: servants are the bearers of *messages*, and are sent on various *errands*. A *message* may be either verbal or written: an *errand* is limited to no form, and to no circumstance; one delivers the *message*, and goes the *errand*. Sometimes the *message* may be the *errand*, and the *errand* may include the *message*: when that which is sent consists of a notice or intimation to another, it is a *message*; and if that causes any one to go to a place, it is an *errand*: thus it is that the greater part of *errands* consist of sending *messages* from one person to another.

The scenes where ancient bards th' inspiring breath
Ecstatic felt, and from this world retir'd,
Convers'd with angels and immortal forms,
On gracious *errands* bent.—THOMSON.

Sometimes from her eyes
I did receive fair speechless *messages*.—SHAKESPEARE.

Messenger, *v. Harbinger*.

To Metamorphose, *v. To transfigure*.

Metaphorical, *v. Figurative*.

Method, *v. Order*.

Method, *v. System*.

Method, *v. Way*.

Mien, *v. Air*.

Mighty, *v. Powerful*.

Mild, *v. Soft*.

Military, *v. Martial*.

To Mimick, *v. To Imitate*.

To Mind, *v. To attend to*.

Mindful, Regardful, Observant.

Mindful (*v. To attend to*) respects that which we wish from others: **Regardful** (*v. To regard*) respects that which in itself demands *regard* or serious thought; **Observant** respects both that which is communicated by others or that which carries its own obligations with itself: a child should always be *mindful* of its parents' instructions; they should never be forgotten: every one should be *regardful* of his several duties and obligations; they ought never to be neglected: one ought to be *observant* of the religious duties which one's profession enjoins upon him; they cannot with propriety be passed over. By being *mindful* of what one hears from the wise and good, one learns to be wise and good; by being *regardful* of what is due to one's self, and to society at large, one learns to pass through the world with satisfaction to one's own mind and esteem from others; by being *observant* of all rule and order, we afford to others a salutary example for their imitation.

Be *mindful*, when thou hast entomb'd the shoot,
With store of earth around to feed the root.
DRYDEN.

No, there is none; no ruler of the stars
Regardful of my miseries.—HILL.

Observant of the right, religious of his word.
DRYDEN.

To Mingle, *v.* To mix.

Minister, *v.* Clergyman.

Minister, Agent.

Minister comes from *minus* less, as *magister* comes from *magis* more; the one being less, and the other more, than the rest of mankind: the *minister*, therefore, is literally one that acts in a subordinate capacity: and the **Agent** (from *ago* to act) is the one that takes the acting part: they both perform the will of another, but the *minister* performs a higher part than the *agent*: the *minister* gives his counsel, and exerts his intellectual powers in the service of another; but the *agent* executes the orders or commission given him: a *minister* is employed by government in political affairs; an *agent* is employed by individuals in commercial and pecuniary affairs, or by government in subordinate matters: a *minister* is received at court, and serves as a representative for his government; an *agent* generally acts under the directions of the *minister* or some officer of government: ambassadors or plenipotentiaries, or the first officers of the state, are *ministers*; but those who regulate the affairs respecting prisoners, the police, and the like, are termed *agents*. A *minister* always holds a public character, and is in the service of the state; the *agent* may be only acting for another individual, of which description all are commercial *agents*.

To Minister, Administer, Contribute.

To **Minister**, from the noun *minister*, in the sense of a servant (*v.* *Minister*), signifies to act in subservience to another in that which is wrong: we *minister* to the caprices and indulgences of another when we encourage them unnecessarily.

Administer, on the other hand, is taken in the good sense of serving another to his advantage: thus the good Samaritan *administered* to the comfort of the man who had fallen among thieves. **Contribute** (*v.* *To conduce*) is taken in either a good or bad sense; we may *contribute* to the relief of the indigent, or we may *contribute* to the follies and vices of others.

Princes are often placed in the unfortunate situation that those who should direct them in early life only *minister* to their vices by every means in their power: it is the part of the Christian to *administer* comfort to those who are in want, consolation to the afflicted, advice to those who ask for it, and require it; help to those who are feeble, and support to those who cannot uphold themselves: it is the part of all who are in high stations to *contribute* to the dissemination of religion and morality among their dependants; but there are, on the contrary, many who *contribute* to the spread of immorality, and a contempt of

all sacred things, by the most pernicious example of irreligion in themselves.

He flings the pregnant ashes through the air,
And speaks a mighty prayer.
Both which the *minist'ring* winds around all Egypt bear.
COWLEY.

Thus do our eyes, as do all common mirrors,
Successively reflect succeeding images;
Not what they would, but must! a star or load,
Just as the hand of chance *administers*.—CONGREVE.

May from my bones a new Achilles rise,
That shall infect the Trojan colonies
With fire, and sword, and famine, when, at length,
Time to our great attempts *contributes* strength.
DENHAM.

Minute, *v.* Circumstantial.

Miracle, *v.* Wonder.

Mirth, *v.* Festivity.

Mirth, *v.* Joy.

Mirth, Merriment, Joviality, Jollity, Hilarity.

These terms all express that species of gaiety or joy which belongs to company, or to men in their social intercourse.

Mirth refers to the feeling displayed in the outward conduct: **Merriment**, and the other terms, refer rather to the external expressions of the feeling, or the causes of the feeling, than to the feeling itself: *mirth* shows itself in laughter, in dancing, singing, and noise; *merriment* consists of such things as are apt to excite *mirth*: the more we are disposed to laugh, the greater is our *mirth*; the more there is to create laughter, the greater is the *merriment*: the tricks of Punch and his wife, or the jokes of a clown, cause much *mirth* among the gaping crowd of rustics; the amusements with the swing, or the roundabout, afford much *merriment* to the visitants of a fair. *Mirth* is confined to no age or station; but *merriment* belongs more particularly to young people, or those of the lower station; *mirth* may be provoked wherever any number of persons is assembled; *merriment* cannot go forward anywhere so properly as at fairs, or common and public places. **Joviality** or **Jollity**, and **Hilarity**, are species of *merriment* which belong to the convivial board, or to less refined indulgences: *joviality* or *jollity* is the unrefined, unlicensed indulgence in the pleasures of the table, or any social entertainments; *hilarity* is the same thing qualified by the cultivation and good sense of the company: we may expect to find much *joviality* and *jollity* at a public dinner of mechanics, watermen, or labourers: we may expect to find *hilarity* at a public dinner of noblemen: eating, drinking, and noise, constitute the *joviality*; the conversation, the songs, the toasts, and the public spirit of the company contribute to *hilarity*.

The highest gratification we receive here from company is *mirth*, which at the best is but a fluttering unequal motion.—POPE.

He who best knows our natures by such afflictions
recalls our wandering thoughts from idle *merriment*.—GRAY.

Now swarms the village o'er the *jovial* mead.
THOMSON.

With branches we the fanes adorn, and waste
In *jollity* the day ordain'd to be the last.—PARNES.

He that contributes to the *Miscary* of the vacant hour will be welcomed with ardour.—JOHNSON.

Miscarriage, v. Failure.

Miscellany, v. Mixture.

Mischance, v. Calamity.

Mischief, v. Evil.

Mischief, v. Injury.

To Misconstrue, Misinterpret.

Misconstrue and **Misinterpret** signify to explain in a wrong way; but the former respects the sense of one's words or the implication of one's actions: those who indulge themselves in a light mode of speech towards children are liable to be *misconstrued*; a too great tenderness to the criminal may be easily *misinterpreted* into favour of the crime.

These words may likewise be employed in speaking of language in general; but the former respects the literal transmission of foreign ideas into our native language; the latter respects the general sense which one affixes to any set of words, either in a native or foreign language: the learners of a language will unavoidably *misconstrue* it at times; in all languages there are ambiguous expressions, which are liable to *misinterpretation*. *Misconstruing* is the consequence of ignorance; *misinterpretation* of particular words is oftener the consequence of prejudice and voluntary blindness, particularly in the explanation of the law or of the Scriptures.

In ev'ry act and turn of life he feels
Public calamities or household ills;
The judge corrupt, the long depending cause,
And doubtful issue of *misconstrued* laws.

PRIOR.

Some purposely misrepresent or put a *wrong interpretation* on the virtues of others.—ADDISON.

Misdeed, v. Offence.

Misdemeanour, v. Crime.

Misdemeanour, v. Offence.

Miserable, v. Unhappy.

Miserly, v. Avaricious.

Misfortune, v. Calamity.

Misfortune, v. Evil.

Mishap, v. Calamity.

To Misinterpret, v. To misconstrue.

To Miss, v. To lose.

Mistake, v. Error.

Misuse, v. Abuse.

To Mix, Mingle, Blend, Confound.

Mix is in German *mischen*, Latin *misceo*, Greek *μίσγω*, Hebrew *mazeg*. **Mingle**, in Greek *μύνγωμι*, is but a variation of *mix*.

Blend, in German *blenden* to dazzle, comes from *blind*, signifying to see confusedly, or confused objects in a general way.

Confound, v. Confound.

Mix is here a general and indefinite term, signifying simply to put together: but we

may *mix* two or several things; we *minge* several objects: things are *mixed* so as to lose all distinction; but they may be *mingled* and yet retain a distinction: liquids *mix* so as to become one, and individuals *mix* in a crowd so as to be lost; things are *mingled* together of different sizes if they lie in the same spot, but they may still be distinguished. To *blend* is only partially to *mix*, as colours *blend* which fall into each other: to *confound* is to *mix* in a wrong way, as objects of sight are *confounded* when they are erroneously taken to be joined.

To *mix* and *mingle* are mostly applied to material objects, except in poetry; to *blend* and *confound* are mental operations, and principally employed on spiritual subjects: thus, events and circumstances are *blended* together in a narrative; the ideas of the ignorant are *confounded* in most cases, but particularly when they attempt to think for themselves.

Can imagination boast,
Amid its gay creation, hues like her's,
Or can it *mix* them with that matchless skill,
And lose them in each other?—THOMSON.

There as I pass'd with careless steps and slow,
The *mingling* notes came softened from below.
GOLDSMITH.

But happy they! the happiest of their kind,
Whom gentler stars unite, and in one fate
Their hearts, their fortunes, and their beings *blend*.
THOMSON.

And long the gods, we know,
Have grudg'd thee, Caesar, to the world below,
Where fraud and rapine, right and wrong *confound*.
DRYDEN.

Mixture, Medley, Miscellany.

Mixture is the thing *mized*. (v. *To mix*.)

Medley, from *meddle* or *middle*, signifies what comes between another.

Miscellany, in Latin *miscellaneous*, from *misceo* to *mix*, signifies also a *mixture*.

The term *mixture* is general; whatever objects can be *mixed* will form a *mixture*: a *medley* is a *mixture* of things not fit to be *mixed*: and a *miscellany* is a *mixture* of many different things. Flour, water, and eggs, may form a *mixture* in the proper sense; but if to these were added all sorts of spices, it would form a *medley*. *Miscellany* is a species applicable only to intellectual subjects: the *miscellaneous* is opposed to that which is systematically arranged; essays are *miscellaneous* in distinction from works on one particular subject.

In great villanies there is often such a *mixture* of the fool as quite spoils the whole project of the knave.—SOUTH.

More oft in fools' and madmen's hands than sages,
She seems a *medley* of all ages.—SWIFT.

A writer, whose design is so comprehensive and *miscellaneous* as that of an essayist may accommodate himself with a topic from every scene of life.—JOHNSON.

To Moan, v. To groan.

Mob, v. People.

Mobility, v. People.

Mode, v. Way.

Model, v. Copy.

Moderation, Mediocrity.

Moderation (*v. Modesty*) is the characteristic of persons; **Mediocrity** (that is, the mean or medium) characterizes their condition: *moderation* is a virtue of no small importance for beings who find excess in everything to be an evil; *mediocrity* in external circumstances is exempt from all the evils which attend either poverty or riches.

Such *moderation* with thy bounty join
That thou may'st nothing give that is not thine.
DORHAM.

Mediocrity only of enjoyment is allowed to man.—BLAINE.

Moderation, *v. Modesty*.

Modest, Bashful, Diffident.

Modest, in Latin *modestus*, from *modus* a measure, signifies setting measure to one's estimate of one's self.

Bashful signifies ready to be abashed.

Diffident, *v. Distrustful*.

Modesty is a habit or principle of the mind; *bashfulness* is a state of feeling: *modesty* is at all times becoming; *bashfulness* is only becoming in females, or very young persons, in the presence of their superiors: *modesty* discovers itself in the absence of everything assuming, whether in look, word, or action; *bashfulness* betrays itself by a downcast look, and a timid air: a *modest* deportment is always commendable; a *bashful* temper is not desirable.

Modesty is a proper distrust of ourselves; *diffidence* is a culpable distrust. *Modesty*, though opposed to assurance, is not incompatible with a confidence in ourselves; *diffidence* altogether unmans a person, and disqualifies him for his duty: a person is generally *modest* in the display of his talents to others; but a *diffident* man cannot turn his talents to his own use.

A man truly *modest* is as much so when he is alone as in company.—BUDGE.

Mere *bashfulness*, without merit, is awkwardness.—ADDISON.

Diffidence and presumption both arise from the want of knowing, or rather endeavouring to know, ourselves.—STEELE.

Modest, *v. Humble*.

Modesty, Moderation, Temperance, Sobriety.

Modesty, in French *modestie*, Latin *modestia*, and **Moderation**, in Latin *moderatio* and *moderor*, both come from *modus* a measure, limit, or boundary; that is, forming a measure or rule.

Temperance, in Latin *temperantia*, from *tempos* time, signifies fixing a time (*v. Abstinence*).

Sobriety, *v. Abstinence*.

Modesty lies in the mind, and in the tone of feeling; *moderation* respects the desires: *modesty* is a principle that acts discretely; *moderation* is a rule or line that acts as a restraint on the views and the outward conduct.

Modesty consists in a fair and medium esti-

mate of one's character and qualification; it guards a man against too high an estimate; it recommends to him an estimate below the reality: *moderation* consists in a suitable regulation of one's desires, demands, and expectations; it consequently depends very often on *modesty* as its groundwork: he who thinks *modestly* of his own acquirements, his own performances, and his own merits, will be *moderate* in his expectations of praise, reward, and recompense; he, on the other hand, who overrates his own abilities and qualifications, will equally overrate the use he makes of them, and consequently be *immoderate* in the price which he sets upon his services: in such cases, therefore, *modesty* and *moderation* are to each other as cause and effect; but there may be *modesty* without *moderation*, and *moderation* without *modesty*. *Modesty* is a sentiment confined to one's self as the object, and consisting solely of one's judgment of what one is, and what one does; but *moderation*, as is evident from the above, extends to objects that are external of ourselves: *modesty*, rather than *moderation*, belongs to an author; *moderation*, rather than *modesty*, belongs to a tradesman, or a man who has gains to make and purposes to answer.

Modesty shields a man from mortifications and disappointments, which assail the self-conceited man in every direction: a *modest* man conciliates the esteem even of an enemy and a rival; he disarms the resentments of those who feel themselves most injured by his superiority; he makes all pleased with him by making them at ease with themselves: the self-conceited man, on the contrary, sets the whole world against himself, because he sets himself against everybody; every one is out of humour with him, because he makes them ill at ease while in his company. *Moderation* protects a man equally from injustice on the one hand and imposition on the other: he who is *moderate* himself makes others so; for every one finds his advantage in keeping within those bounds which are as convenient to himself as to his neighbour; the world will always do this homage to real goodness, that they will admire it if they cannot practise it, and they will practise it to the utmost extent that their passions will allow them.

Moderation is the measure of one's desires, one's habits, one's actions, and one's words; *temperance* is the adaptation of the time or season for particular feelings, actions, or words: a man is said to be *moderate* in his principles, who adopts the medium or middle course of thinking; it rather qualifies the thing than the person: he is said to be *temperate* in his anger if he do not suffer it to break out into any excesses; *temperance* characterizes the person rather than the thing.

A *moderate* man in politics endeavours to steer clear of all party spirit, and is consequently so *temperate* in his language as to provoke no animosity. *Moderation* in the enjoyment of everything is essential in order to obtain the purest pleasure: *temperance* in one's indulgences is always attended with the happiest effects to the constitution; as, on the contrary, any deviation from *temperance*, even in a single instance, is always punished with bodily pain and sickness.

Temperance and sobriety have already been considered in their proper application, which will serve to illustrate their improper application (*v. Abstinence*). *Temperance* is an action; it is the *tempering* of our words and actions to the circumstances: *sobriety* is a state in which one is exempt from every stimulus to deviate from the right course; as a man who is intoxicated with wine runs into excesses, and loses that power of guiding himself which he has when he is *sober* or free from all intoxication, so is he who is intoxicated with any passion, in like manner, hurried away into irregularities which a man in his right senses will not be guilty of: *sobriety* is, therefore, the state of being in one's right or sober senses; and *sobriety* is with regard to *temperance* as a cause to the effect; *sobriety* of mind will not only produce *moderation* and *temperance*, but extends its influence to the whole conduct of a man in every relation and circumstance, to his internal sentiments and his external behaviour: hence we speak of *sobriety* in one's mien or deportment, *sobriety* in one's dress and manners, *sobriety* in one's religious opinions and observances.

There's a proud *modesty* in merit!—DRYDEN.

Few harangues from the pulpit, except in the days of your league in France, or in the days of our solemn league and covenant in England, have ever breathed less of the spirit of *moderation* than this lecture in the Old Jewry.—BURKE.

Temperate mirth is not extinguished by old age.

BLAIR.

Spread thy close curtains, love-performing night,
Thou *sober*-sulted matron, all in black.—SHAKESPEARE.

Moisture, Humidity, Dampness.

Moisture, from the French *moite* moist, is probably contracted from the Latin *humidus*, from which *Humidity* is immediately derived.

Dampness comes from the German *dampfs* a vapour.

Moisture is used in general to express any small degree of infusion of a liquid into a body; *humidity* is employed scientifically to describe the state of having any portion of such liquid: hence we speak of the *moisture* of a table, the *moisture* of paper, or the *moisture* of a floor that has been wetted; but of the *humidity* of the air, or of a wall that has contracted *moisture* of itself. *Dampness* is that species of *moisture* that arises from the gradual contraction of a liquid in bodies capable of retaining it; in this manner a cellar is *damp*, or linen that has lain long by may become *damp*.

The plummy people streak their wings with oil,
To throw the lucid *moisture* trickling off.—THOMSON.

Now from the town
Buried in smoke, and sleep, and noisome *damps*,
Oft let me wander.—THOMSON.

To *Molest*, *v. To trouble*.

Moment, *v. Importance*.

Moment, *v. Instant*.

Monarch, *v. Prince*.

Monastery, *v. Cloister*.

Money, Cash.

Money comes from the Latin *moneta*, which signifies stamped coin, from *monere* to advise, to inform of its value, by means of an inscription or stamp.

Cash, from the French *caisse* a chest, signifies that which is put in a chest.

* *Money* is applied to everything which serves as a circulating medium; *cash* is, in a strict sense, put for coin only; bank notes are *money*; guineas and shillings are *cash*: all *cash* is therefore *money*, but all *money* is not *cash*. The only *money* the Chinese have are square bits of metal, with a hole through the centre, by which they are strung upon a string: travellers on the Continent must always be provided with letters of credit, which may be turned into *cash*, as convenience requires.

Monster, *v. Wonder*.

Monstrous, *v. Enormous*.

Monument, Memorial, Remembrancer.

Monument, in Latin *monumentum* or *monimentum*, from *monere* to advise or remind, signifies that which puts us in mind of something.

Memorial, from *memory*, signifies the thing that helps the memory; and *Remembrancer*, from *remember* (*v. Memory*), the thing that causes to remember.

From the above it is clear that these terms have, in their original derivation, precisely the same signification, and differ in their collateral acceptations: *monument* is applied to that which is purposely set up to keep a thing in mind; *memorials* and *remembrancers* are any things which are calculated to call a thing to mind: a *monument* is used to preserve a public object of notice from being forgotten; a *memorial* serves to keep an individual in mind; the *monument* is commonly understood to be a species of building; as a tomb which preserves the *memory* of the dead, or a pillar which preserves the *memory* of some public event: the *memorial* always consists of something which was the property, or in the possession, of another; as his picture, his hand-writing, his hair, and the like. The *Monument* at London was built to commemorate the dreadful fire of the city in the year 1666: friends who are at a distance are happy to have some token of each other's regard, which they likewise keep as a *memorial* of their former intercourse.

The *monument*, in its proper sense, is always made of wood or stone for some specific purpose; but, in the improper sense, anything may be termed a *monument* when it serves the purpose of reminding the public of any circumstance: thus, the pyramids are *monuments* of antiquity; the actions of a good prince are more lasting *monuments* than either brass or marble.

Memorials are always of a private nature, and at the same time such as remind us

* Vide Trusler: "Money, cash."

naturally of the object to which they have belonged ; this object is generally some person, but it may likewise refer to some thing, if it be of a personal nature : our Saviour instituted the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper as a *memorial* of his death.

A *memorial* respects some object external of ourselves ; the *remembrancer* is said of that which directly concerns ourselves and our particular duty : a man leaves *memorials* of himself to whomsoever he leaves his property ; but the *remembrancer* is that which we acquire for ourselves : the *memorial* carries us back to another : the *remembrancer* brings us back to ourselves : the *memorial* revives in our minds what we owe to another ; the *remembrancer* puts us in mind of what we owe to ourselves, it is that which recalls us to a sense of our duty : a gift is the best *memorial* we can give of ourselves to another ; a sermon is often a good *remembrancer* of the duties which we have neglected to perform.

Any *memorial* of your good-nature and friendship is most welcome to me.—POPE.

If (in the Isle of Sky) the remembrance of papal superstition is obliterated, the *monuments* of papal piety are likewise effaced.—JOHNSON.

When God is forgotten, his judgments are his *remembrancers*.—COWPER.

Mod, *v. Humour.*

Morals, *v. Manners.*

Morbid, *v. Sick.*

Moreover, *v. Besides.*

Morose, *v. Gloomy.*

Mortal, *v. Deadly.*

Mortification, *v. Vexation.*

To Mortify, *v. To humble.*

Motion, Movement.

These are both abstract terms to denote the act of *moving*, but **Motion** is taken generally and abstractedly from the thing that *moves* : **Movement**, on the other hand, is taken in connection with the agent or thing that *moves* : hence we speak of a state of *motion* as opposed to a state of rest, of perpetual *motion*, the laws of *motion*, and the like ; on the other hand, we say, to make a *movement* when speaking of an army, a general *movement* when speaking of an assembly.

When *motion* is qualified by the thing that *moves*, it denotes continued *motion* ; but *movement* implies only a particular *motion* ; hence we say, the *motion* of the heavenly bodies, the *motion* of the earth ; a person is in continual *motion*, or an army is in *motion* ; but a person makes a *movement* who rises or sits down, or goes from one chair to another ; the different *movements* of the springs and wheels of any instrument.

It is not easy to a mind accustomed to the inroads of troublesome thoughts to expel them immediately by putting better images into *motion*.—JOHNSON.

Nature I thought perform'd too mean a part,
Forming her *movements* to the rules of art.—PRIOR.

Motive, *v. Cause.*

Motive, *v. Principle.*

To Mould, *v. To form.*

To Mount, *v. To arise.*

To Mourn, *v. To grieve.*

Mournful, Sad.

Mournful signifies full of what causes *mourning* ; **Sad** (*v. Dull*) signifies either a painful sentiment, or what causes this painful sentiment. The difference in the sentiment is what constitutes the difference between these epithets : the *mournful* awakens tender and sympathetic feelings : the *sad* oppresses the spirits and makes one heavy at heart ; a *mournful* tale contains an account of other's distresses ; a *sad* story contains an account of one's own distress ; a *mournful* event befalls our friends and relatives ; a *sad* misfortune befalls ourselves. Selfish people find nothing *mournful*, but many things *sad* : tender-hearted people are always affected by what is *mournful*, and are less troubled about what is *sad*.

Narcissa follows ere his tomb is closed,
Her death invades his *mournful* right and claims
The grief that started from my lids for him.—YOUNG.

How *sad* a sight is human happiness
To those whose thoughts can pierce beyond an hour !
YOUNG.

To Move, *v. To stir.*

Movables, *v. Goods.*

Movement, *v. Motion.*

Moving, Affecting, Pathetic.

The **Moving** is in general whatever moves the affections or the passions ; the **Affecting** and **Pathetic** are what move the *affections* in different degrees. The good or bad feelings may be *moved* : the tender feelings only are *affected*. A field of battle is a *moving* spectacle : the death of King Charles was an *affecting* spectacle. The *affecting* acts by means of the senses, as well as the understanding ; the *pathetic* applies only to what is addressed to the heart : hence, a sight or a description is *affecting* ; but an address is *pathetic*.

There is something so *moving* in the very image of weeping beauty.—STEELE.

I do not remember to have seen any ancient or modern story more *affecting* than a letter of Ann of Bouleyn.—ADDISON.

What think you of the bard's enchanting art,
Which whether he attempts to warm the heart
With fabled scenes, or charm the ear with rhyme,
Breathes all *pathetic*, lovely, and sublime ?
JENYNS.

Mulet, *v. Fine.*

Multitude, Crowd, Throng, Swarm.

The idea of many is common to all these terms, and peculiar to that of **Multitude**, from the Latin *multus* ; **Crowd**, from the verb to *crowd*, signifies the many that *crowd* together ; and **Throng**, from the German *drängen* to press, signifies the many that press together ; and **Swarm**, from the German *schwärmen* to fly about, signifies running together in numbers. These terms vary, either

in regard to the object or the circumstance: *multitude* is applicable to any object; *crowd*, *throng*, and *swarm* are in the proper sense applicable only to animate objects; the first two in regard to persons; the latter to animals in general, but particularly brutes. A *multitude* may be either in a stagnant or a moving state; all the rest denote a *multitude* in a moving state: a *crowd* is always pressing, generally eager and tumultuous; a *throng* may be busy and active, but not always pressing or inconvenient: it is always inconvenient, sometimes dangerous, to go into a *crowd*; it is amusing to see the *throng* that is perpetually passing in the streets of the city: the *swarm* is more active than either of the two others; it is commonly applied to bees which fly together in numbers, but sometimes to human beings, to denote their very great numbers when scattered about; thus the children of the poor in low neighbourhoods *swarm* in the streets.

A *multitude* is incapable of framing orders.—TEMPLE.

The *crowd* shall Caesar's Indian war behold.—DRYDEN.

I shone amid the heav'nly *throng*.—MASON.

Numberless nations, stretching far and wide,
Shall (I foresee it) soon with Gothic *swarms* come forth,
From ignorance's universal North.—SWIFT.

Munificent, v. Beneficent.

To Murder, v. To kill.

To Murmur, v. To complain.

To Muse, v. To contemplate.

To Muse, v. To think.

To Muster, v. To assemble.

Mutable, v. Changeable.

Mute, v. Silent.

To Mutilate, Maim, Mangle.

Mutilate, in Latin *mutilatus*, from *mutilo* and *mutilus*, Greek *μῦλος* without horns, signifies to take off any necessary part.

Maim and **Mangle** are in all probability derived from the Latin *mancus*, which comes from *manus*, signifying to deprive of a hand or to wound in general.

Mutilate has the most extended meaning; it implies the abridging of any limb: *mangle* is applied to irregular wounds in any part of the body: *maim* is confined to wounds in the hands. Men are exposed to be *mutilated* by means of cannon balls; they are in danger of being *mangled* when attacked promiscuously with the sword; they frequently get *maimed* when boarding vessels or storming places.

One is *mutilated* and *mangled* by active means; one becomes *maimed* by natural infirmity: *mutilate* and *mangle* are applicable to moral objects; *maim* is employed only in the natural sense. In this case *mangle* is a much stronger term than *mutilate*; the latter signifies to lop off an essential part; to *mangle* is to *mutilate* a thing to such a degree as to render it useless or worthless. Every sect of Christians is fond of *mutilating* the Bible by setting aside such parts as do not favour its own *schœm*, and amongst them all the sacred

Scriptures become literally *mangled*, and stripped of all its most important doctrines.

How Hales would have borne the *mutilations* which his *Plœa of the Crown* has suffered from the Editor, they who know his character will easily conceive.—JOHNSON.

I have shown the evil of *maiming* and splitting religion.—BLAIR.

What have they (the French nobility) done that they should be hunted about, *mangled*, and tortured.—BURKE.

Mutinous, v. Tumultuous.

Mutual, Reciprocal.

Mutual, in Latin *mutuus* from *muto* to change, signifies exchanged so as to be equal or the same on both sides.

Reciprocal, in Latin *reciprocus* from *recipio* to take back, signifies giving backward and forward by way of return. *Mutual* supposes a sameness in condition at the same time: *reciprocal* supposes an alternation or succession of returns. * Exchange is free and voluntary; we give in exchange, and this action is *mutual*: return is made either according to law or equity; it is obligatory, and when equally obligatory on each in turn it is *reciprocal*. Voluntary disinterested services rendered to each other are *mutual*: imposed or merited services, returned from one to the other, are *reciprocal*: friends render one another *mutual* services; the services between servants and masters are *reciprocal*. The husband and wife pledge their faith to each other *mutually*; they are *reciprocally* bound to keep their vow of fidelity. The sentiment is *mutual*, the tie is *reciprocal*. *Mutual* applies mostly to matters of will and opinion: a *mutual* affection, a *mutual* inclination to oblige, a *mutual* interest for each other's comfort, a *mutual* concern to avoid that which will displease the other—these are the sentiments which render the marriage state happy: *reciprocal* ties, *reciprocal* bonds, *reciprocal* rights, *reciprocal* duties—these are what every one ought to bear in mind as a member of society, that he may expect of no man more than what in equity he is disposed to return. *Mutual* applies to nothing but what is personal; *reciprocal* is applied to things remote from the idea of personality, as *reciprocal* verbs, *reciprocal* terms, *reciprocal* relations, and the like.

The soul and spirit that animates and keeps up society is *mutual* trust.—SOUTH.

Life cannot subsist in society but by *reciprocal* concessions.—JOHNSON.

Mysterious, v. Dark.

Mysterious, Mystic.

Mysterious (*v. Dark*) and **Mystic** are but variations of the same original; the former however is more commonly applied to that which is supernatural, or veiled in an impenetrable obscurity; the latter to that which is natural, but concealed by an artificial or far-

* Vide Roubaud: "Mutuel, réciproque."

tastical veil; hence we speak of the *mysterious* plans of Providence; *mystic* schemes of theology or *mystic* principles.

As soon as that *mysterious* veil, which now covers futurity, was lifted up, all the gaiety of life would disappear.—BLAIR.

And ye five other wand'ring fires that move
In *mystic* dance not without song
Resound his praise.—MILTON.

Mysterious, v. Secret.

Mystic, v. Mysterious.

N.

Naked, v. Bare.

To Name, Call.

Name, from the Latin *nomen*, Greek *ονομα*, Hebrew *nam*, is properly to pronounce a word, but is now employed for distinguishing or addressing one by *name*. To **Call** (*v. To call*) signifies properly to address loudly by *name*, consequently we may *name* without *calling*, when we only mention a *name* in conversation; but we cannot very well *call* without *naming*. The terms may, however, be employed in the sense of assigning a *name*. In this case a person is *named* by his *name*, whether proper, patronymic, or whatever is usual; he is *called* according to the characteristics by which he is distinguished. The emperor Tiberius was *named* Tiberius; he was *called* a monster. William the First of England is *named* William; he is *called* the Conqueror. Helen went three times round the wooden horse in order to discover the snare, and, with the hope of taking the Greeks by surprise, *called* their principal captains, *naming* them by their *names*, and counterfeiting the voices of their wives. Many ancient nations in *naming* any one, *called* him the son of some one, as Richardson, the son of Richard, and Robertson, the son of Robert.

Some haughty Greek who lives thy tears to see,
Embitters all thy woes, by *naming* me.—POPE.

I lay the deep foundations of a wall,
And *hence, nam'd* from me, the city *call*.—DRYDEN.

Name, Appellation, Title, Denomination.

Name, v. To name.

Appellation, in French *appellation*, Latin *appellatio* from *appello* to call, signifies that by which a person is called.

Title, in French *titre*, Latin *titulus*, from the Greek *τις* to honour, signifies that appellation which is assigned to any one for the purpose of honour.

Denomination signifies that which *denominates* or distinguishes.

Name is a generic term, the rest are specific. Whatever word is employed to distinguish one thing from another is a *name*; therefore, an *appellation* and a *title* is a *name*, but not vice versa. A *name* is either common or proper; an *appellation* is generally a common *name* given for some specific purpose as characteristic. Several kings of France had the *names* of Charles, Louis, Philip, but one was distinguished by the *appellation* of Stammerer, another by that of the Simple, and a third by that of

the Hardy, arising from particular characters or circumstances. A *title* is a species of *appellation*, not drawn from anything personal, but conferred as a ground of political distinction. An *appellation* may be often a term of reproach; but a *title* is always a mark of honour. An *appellation* is given to all objects, animate or inanimate; a *title* is given mostly to persons, sometimes to things. A particular house may have the *appellation* of "the cottage," or "the Hall;" as a particular person may have the *title* of Duke, Lord, or Marquis.

Denomination is to particular bodies, what *appellation* is to an individual; namely, a term of distinction, drawn from their peculiar characters and circumstances. The Christian world is split into a number of different bodies or communities, under the *denominations* of Catholics, Protestants, Calvinists, Presbyterians, &c., which have their origin in the peculiar form of faith and discipline adopted by these bodies.

Then on your *name* shall wretched mortals call,
And offer'd victims at your altars fall.—DRYDEN.

The *names* derived from the profession of the ministry in the language of the present age, are made but the *appellatives* of scorn.—SOUTH.

We generally find in *titles* an intimation of some particular merit, that should recommend men to the high stations which they possess.—ADDISON.

It has cost me much care and thought to marshal and fix the people under their proper *denominations*.—ADDISON.

To Name, Denominate, Style, Entitle, Designate, Characterize.

To Name (*v. To name, call*) signifies simply to give a *name* to, or to address or specify by the given *name*; to **Denominate** is to give a specific *name* upon specific ground, to distinguish by the *name*; to **Style**, from the noun *style* or manner (*v. Diction, style*), signifies to address by a specific *name*; to **Entitle** is to give the specific or appropriate *name*. Adam *named* everything; we *denominate* the man who drinks excessively "a drunkard;" subjects *style* their monarch "His Majesty;" books are *entitled* according to the judgment of the author. To *name, denominate, style, and entitle*, are the acts of conscious agents only.

To **Designate**, signifying to mark out, and **Characterize**, signifying to form a characteristic, are said only of things, and agree with the former only inasmuch as words may either *designate* or *characterize*: thus the word "capacity" is said to *designate* the power of holding; and "finesse" *characterizes* the people by whom it was adopted.

I could name some of our acquaintance who have been obliged to travel as far as Alexandria in pursuit of money.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

A fable in tragic or epic poetry is *denominated* simple, when the events it contains follow each in an unbroken tenour.—WARTON.

Happy those times
When lords were styl'd fathers of families.
SHAKESPEARE.

To Name, *v.* To nominate.

Name, Reputation, Repute, Credit.

Name is here taken in the improper sense for a name acquired in public by any peculiarity or quality in an object.

Reputation and Repute, from *reputo* or *re* and *puto* to think back, or in reference to some immediate object, signifies the state of being thought of by the public, or held in public estimation.

Credit (*v.* Credit) signifies the state of being believed or trusted in general.

Name implies something more specific than the reputation; and reputation something more substantial than name: a name may be acquired by some casualty or by some quality that has more show than worth; reputation is acquired only by time, and built only on merit: a name may be arbitrarily given, simply by way of distinction; reputation is not given, but acquired, or follows as a consequence of one's honourable exertions. A physician sometimes gets a name by a single instance of professional skill, which by a combination of favourable circumstances he may convert to his own advantage in forming an extensive practice; but unless he have a commensurate degree of talent, this name will never ripen into a solid reputation.

Inanimate objects get a name, but reputation is applied only to persons or that which is personal. Fashion is liberal in giving a name to certain shops, certain streets, certain commodities as well as to certain tradespeople, and the like. Universities, academies, and public institutions, acquire a reputation for their learning, their skill, their encouragement and promotion of the arts or sciences: name and reputation are of a more extended nature than repute and credit. Strangers and distant countries hear of the name and reputation of anything; but only neighbours and those who have the means of personal observation can take a part in its repute and credit. It is possible, therefore, to have a name and reputation without having repute and credit, and vice versa, for the objects which constitute the former are sometimes different from those which produce the latter. A manufacturer has a name for the excellence of a particular article of his own manufacture; a book has a name among wits and pretenders to literature: a good writer, however, seeks to establish his reputation for genius, learning, industry, or some praiseworthy characteristic: a preacher is in high repute among those who attend him: a master gains great credit from the good performances of his scholars.

Name and repute are taken either in a good or bad sense; reputation and credit are taken in the good sense only: a person or thing may get a good or an ill name; a person or thing

may be in good or ill repute: reputation may rise to different degrees of height, or it may sink again to nothing, but it never sinks into that which is bad; credit may likewise be high or low, but when it becomes bad it is discredited. Families get an ill name for their meanness; houses of entertainment get a good name for their accommodation; houses fall into bad repute when said to be haunted; a landlord comes into high repute among his tenants, if he be considerate and indulgent towards them.

Who fears not to do ill, yet fears the name,
And free from conscience, is a slave to fame.
DENHAM.

Splendour of reputation is not to be counted among the necessities of life.—JOHNSON.

Mutton has likewise been in great repute among our valiant countrymen.—ADDISON.

Would you true happiness attain,
Let honesty your passions rein,
So live in credit and esteem,
And the good name you lost, redeem.—GAY.

To Nap, *v.* To sleep.

Narration, *v.* Recital.

Narrative, *v.* Account.

Narrow, *v.* Contracted.

Narrow, *v.* Straight.

Nasty, Filthy, Foul.

Nasty is connected with *nauseous*.

Filthy and Foul are variations from the Greek *φαιλος*.

The idea of dirtiness is common to these terms, but in different degrees, and with different modifications. Whatever dirt is offensive to any of the senses, renders that thing nasty which is soiled with it: the filthy exceeds the nasty, not only in the quantity but in the offensive quality of the dirt; and the foul exceeds the filthy in the same proportion.

We look behind, then view his shaggy beard,
His clothes were tagg'd with thorns, and filth his limbs
besmeard.
DRYDEN.

Only our foe
Tempting affronts us with his foul esteem.—MILTON.

Natal, Native, Indigenous.

Natal, in Latin *natalis*, from *natus*, signifies belonging to one's birth, or the act of one's being born; but Native, in Latin *nativus*, likewise from *natus*, signifies having the origin or beginning.

Indigenous, in Latin *indigena*, from *inde* and *genitus*, signifies sprung from that place.

The epithet natal is applied only to the circumstance of a man's birth, as his natal day; his natal hour; a natal song; a natal star. Native has a more extensive meaning, as it comprehends the idea of one's relationship by origin to an object; as one's native country, one's native soil, native village, or native place, native language, and the like. Indigenous is the same with regard to plants, as native in regard to human beings or animals.

Safe in the hand of one disposing power,
Or in the natal, or the mortal hour.—POPE

Nor can the grow'ling mind
In the dark dungeon of the limbs confin'd,
Assert the *native* skies or own its heav'nly kind.
DRYDEN.

Nation, v. People.

Native, v. Intrinsic.

Native, v. Natal.

Native, Natural.

Native, (v. *Natal*) is to **Natural** as a species to the genus: everything *native* is according to its strict signification *natural*; but many things are *natural* which are not *native*. Of a person we may say that his worth is *native*, to designate that it is some valuable property which is born with him, not foreign to him, or ingrafted upon his character; but we say of his disposition, that it is *natural*, as opposed to that which is acquired by habit. The former is always employed in a good sense, in opposition to what is artful, assumed, and unreal; the other is used in an indifferent sense, as opposed to whatever is the effect of habit or circumstances. When children display themselves with all their *native* simplicity, they are interesting objects of notice: when they display their *natural* turn of mind, it is not always that which tends to raise human nature in our esteem.

In heaven we shall pass from the darkness of our *native* ignorance into the broad light of everlasting day.—SOUTH.

Scripture ought to be understood according to the familiar, *natural* way of construction.—SOUTH.

Natural, v. Native.

Naturally, In Course, Consequently, Of Course.

The connection between events, actions, and things, is expressed by all these terms. **Naturally** signifies according to the *nature* of things, and applies therefore to the connection which subsists between events according to the original constitution or inherent properties of things: **In Course** signifies in the *course* of things, that is, in the regular order that things ought to follow: **Consequently** signifies by a *consequence*, that is, by a necessary law of dependence, which makes one thing follow another: **Of Course** signifies on account of the *course* which things most commonly or even necessarily take. Whatever happens *naturally*, happens as we expect it; whatever happens *in course*, happens as we approve of it; whatever follows *consequently*, follows as we judge it right; whatever follows *of course*, follows as we see it necessarily. Children *naturally* imitate their parents: people *naturally* fall into the habits of those they associate with: both these circumstances result from the *nature* of things: whoever is made a peer of the realm, takes his seat in the upper house *in course*; he requires no other qualification to entitle him to this privilege, he goes thither according to the established *course* of things; *consequently*, as a peer, he is admitted without question; this is a decision of the judgment by which the question is at once determined: of *course*

none are admitted who are not peers; this flows necessarily out of the constituted law of the land.

Naturally and *in course* describe things as they are; *consequently* and *of course*, represent them as they must be; *naturally* and *in course* state facts or realities; *consequently* and *of course*, state the inferences drawn from those facts, or consequences resulting from them; a mob is *naturally* disposed to riot, and *consequently* it is dangerous to appeal to a mob for its judgment; the nobility attend at court *in course*, that is, by virtue of their rank; soldiers leave the town *of course* at assize or election times, that is, because the law forbids them to remain. *Naturally* is opposed to the artificial or forced; *in course* is opposed to the irregular: *naturally* excludes the idea of design or purpose; *in course* includes the idea of arrangement and social order: the former is applicable to everything that has an independent existence; the latter is applied to the constituted order of society: the former is, therefore, said of every object, animate or inanimate, having *natural* properties, and performing *natural* operations; the latter only of persons and their establishment. Plants that require much air *naturally* thrive most in an open country: members of a society, who do not forfeit their title by the breach of any rule or law, are re-admitted *in course*, after ever so long an absence.

Consequently is either a speculative or a practical inference; *of course* is always practical. We know that all men must die, and *consequently* we expect to share the common lot of humanity: we see that our friends are particularly engaged at a certain time; *consequently* we do not interrupt them by calling upon them: when a man does not fulfil his engagements, he cannot of *course* expect to be rewarded, as if he had done his duty. *In course* applies to what one does or may do; *of course* applies to what one must do or leave undone. Children take possession of their patrimony *in course* at the death of their parents: while the parents are living, children of *course* derive support or assistance from them.

Egotists are generally the vain and shallow part of mankind; people being *naturally* full of themselves when they have nothing else in them.—ADDISON.

The forty-seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid is the foundation of trigonometry, and *consequently* of navigation.—BARTLETT.

What do trust and confidence signify in a matter of *course* and formality?—STILLINGFLEET.

Our Lord foresaw, that all the Mosaeic orders would cease *in course* upon his death.—BEVERIDGE.

Naval, v. Maritime.

Nausea, v. Disgust.

Nautical, v. Maritime.

Near, v. Close.

Necessaries, v. Necessities.

Necessary, Expedient, Essential, Requisite.

Necessary (v. *Necessity*), from the Latin *necesse* and *ne cedo*, signifies not to be departed from.

Expedient signifies belonging to, or forming a part of, expedition.

Essential signifies containing that essence or property which cannot be omitted.

Requisite signifies literally required (*v. To demand*).

Necessary is a general and indefinite term; things may be *necessary* in the course of nature; it is *necessary* for all men once to die; they may be *necessary* according to the circumstances of the case, or our views of *necessity*; in this manner we conceive it *necessary* to call upon another.

Expedient, essential, and requisite, are modes of relative *necessity*: the *expedience* of a thing is a matter of discretion and calculation, and, therefore, not so self-evidently *necessary* as many things which we so denominate: it may be *expedient* for a person to consult another, or it may not, according as circumstances may present themselves. The *requisite* and the *essential* are more obviously *necessary* than the *expedient*; but the former is less so than the latter: what is *requisite* may be *requisite* only in part or entirely; it may be *requisite* to complete a thing when begun, but not to begin it; the *essential*, on the contrary, is that which constitutes the *essence*, and without which a thing cannot exist. It is *requisite* for one who will have a good library to select only the best authors; exercise is *essential* for the preservation of good health. In all matters of dispute it is *expedient* to be guided by some impartial judge; it is *requisite* for every member of the community to contribute his share to the public expenditure as far as he is able: it is *essential* to a teacher, particularly a spiritual teacher, to know more than those he teaches.

One tells me he thinks it absolutely *necessary* for women to have true notions of right and equity.—ADDISON.

It is highly *expedient* that men should, by some settled scheme of duties, be rescued from the tyranny of caprice.—JOHNSON.

The English do not consider their church establishment as convenient, but as *essential* to their state.—BURKE.

It is not enough to say that faith and piety, joined with active virtue, constitute the *requisite* preparation for heaven; they in truth begin the enjoyment of heaven.—BLAIR.

To Necessitate, v. To compel.

Necessities, Necessaries.

Necessity, in Latin *necessitas*, and **Necessary**, in Latin *necessarius*, from *necesse*, or *ne* and *cesso*, signify not to be yielded or given up. *Necessity* is the mode or state of circumstances, or the thing which circumstances render *necessary*; the *necessary* is that which is absolutely and unconditionally *necessary*.

Art has ever been busy in inventing things to supply the various *necessities* of our nature, and yet there are always numbers who want even the first *necessaries* of life. Habit and desire create *necessities*; nature only requires *necessaries*: a voluptuary has *necessities* which are unknown to a temperate man; the poor have in general little more than *necessaries*.

Those whose condition has always restrained them to the contemplation of their own *necessities* will scarcely

understand why nights and days should be spent in study.—JOHNSON.

To make a man happy, virtue must be accompanied with at least a moderate provision of all the *necessaries* of life, and not disturbed by bodily pains.—BUDGELL.

Necessity, Need.

Necessity, v. Necessary.

Need, in German *noth*, probably from the Greek *avaykn* *necessity*.

Necessity respects the thing wanted; *need* the person wanting. There would be no *necessity* for punishments, if there were not evil doers; he is peculiarly fortunate who finds a friend in time of *need*. *Necessity* is more pressing than *need*: the former places in a positive state of compulsion to act; it is said to have no law, it prescribes the law for itself; the latter yields to circumstances, and leaves in a state of deprivation. We are frequently under the *necessity* of going without that of which we stand most in *need*.

Where *necessity* ends, curiosity begins.—JOHNSON.

One of the many advantages of friendship is, that one can say to one's friend the things that stand in need of pardon.—POPE.

From these two nouns arise two epithets for each, which are worthy of observation, namely, *necessary* and *needful*, *necessitous* and *needy*. *Necessary* and *needful* are both applicable to the thing wanted; *necessitous* and *needy* to the person wanting: **Necessary** is applied to every object indiscriminately; **Needful** only to such objects as supply temporary or partial wants. Exercise is *necessary* to preserve the health of the body; restraint is *necessary* to preserve that of the mind; assistance is *needful* for one who has not sufficient resources in himself; it is *necessary* to go by water to the continent: money is *needful* for one who is travelling.

The dissemination of knowledge is *necessary* to dispel the ignorance which would otherwise prevail in the world; it is *needful* for a young person to attend to the instructions of his teacher, if he will improve.

Necessitous expresses more than *needy*; the former comprehends a general state of *necessity* or deficiency in the thing that is wanted or *needful*; **Needy** expresses only a particular condition. The poor are in a *necessitous* condition who are in want of the first *necessaries*, or who have not wherewithal to supply the most pressing *necessities*; adventurers are said to be *needy*, when their vices make them in *need* of that which they might otherwise obtain: it is charity to supply the wants of the *necessitous*, but those of the *needy* are sometimes not worthy of one's pity.

It seems to me most strange that men should fear, Seeing that death, a *necessary* end, Will come, when it will come.—SHAKESPEARE.

Time, long expected, ead's us of our load, And brought the *needful* presence of a god. DRYDEN.

Steele's imprudence of generosity, or vanity of profusion, kept him always incurably *necessitous*.—JOHNSON.

Charity is the work of heaven, which is always laying itself out on the *needy* and the impotent.—SOUTH.

Necessity, v. Occasion.

Need, *v. Necessity.*

Need, *v. Poverty.*

Need, *v. Want.*

Needful, *v. Necessity.*

Needy, *v. Necessity.*

Nefarious, *v. Wicked.*

To Neglect, *v. To disregard.*

To Neglect, Omit.

Neglect, *v. To disregard.*

Omit, in Latin *omitto*, or *ob* and *mitto*, signifies to put aside.

The idea of letting pass or slip, or of not using, is comprehended in the signification of both these terms; the former is, however, a culpable, the latter an indifferent, action. What we neglect ought not to be neglected; but what we omit may be omitted or otherwise, as convenience requires. These terms differ likewise in the objects to which they are applied: that is neglected which is practicable or serves for action; that is omitted which serves for intellectual purposes: we neglect an opportunity, we neglect the means, the time, the use, and the like; we omit a word, a sentence, a figure, a stroke, a circumstance, and the like.

It is the great excellence of learning, that it borrows very little from time or place; but this quality which constitutes much of its value is one occasion of neglect. What may be done at all times with equal propriety is deferred from day to day, till the mind is gradually reconciled to the omission.—JOHNSON.

Negligent, Remiss, Careless, Thoughtless, Heedless, Inattentive.

Negligence (*v. To disregard*) and Remissness respects the outward action: Careless, Heedless, Thoughtless, and Inattentive respect the state of the mind.

Negligence and remissness consist in not doing what ought to be done; carelessness and the other mental defects may show themselves in doing wrong, as well as in not doing at all; negligence and remissness are, therefore, to carelessness and the others, as the effect to the cause; for no one is so apt to be negligent and remiss as he who is careless, although at the same time negligence and remissness arise from other causes, and carelessness, thoughtlessness, &c., produce likewise other effects. Negligent is a stronger term than remiss; one is negligent in neglecting the thing that is expressly before one's eyes; one is remiss in forgetting that which was enjoined some time previously: the want of will renders a person negligent; the want of interest renders a person remiss; one is negligent in regard to business, and the performance of bodily labour; one is remiss in duty, or in such things as respect mental exertion. Servants are commonly negligent in what concerns their master's interest; teachers are remiss in not correcting the faults of their pupils. Negligence is therefore the fault of persons of all descriptions, but particularly those in low condition; remissness is a fault peculiar to those in a more elevated station: a clerk in an office is negligent in not making

proper memorandums; a magistrate or the head of an institution is remiss in the exercise of his authority to check irregularities.

Careless denotes the want of care (*v. Care*) in the manner of doing things: thoughtless denotes the want of thought or reflection about things; heedless denotes the want of heeding (*v. To attend*) or regarding things; inattentive denotes the want of attention to things (*v. To attend to*).

One is careless only in trivial matters of behaviour; one is thoughtless in matters of greater moment, in what respects the conduct. Carelessness leads children to make mistakes in their mechanical exercises, in whatever they commit to memory or to paper; thoughtlessness leads many who are not children into serious errors of conduct, when they do not think of or bear in mind the consequences of their actions. Carelessness is occasional, thoughtlessness is permanent; the former is inseparable from a state of childhood, the latter is a constitutional defect, and sometimes attends a man to his grave. Carelessness as well as thoughtlessness betrays itself not only in the thing that immediately employs the mind, but also in that which regards futurity. We may not only be careless in not doing the thing well that we are about, but we may be careless in neglecting to do it at all, or careless about the event, or careless about our future interest; it still differs, however, from thoughtless in this, that it bespeaks a want of interest or desire for the thing; but thoughtless bespeaks the want of thinking or reflecting upon it: the careless person abstains from using the means, because he does not care about the end; the thoughtless person cannot act; because he does not think: the careless person sees the thing, but does not try to obtain it: the thoughtless person has not the thought of it in his mind.

Careless is applied to such things as require permanent care; thoughtless to such as require permanent thought; heedless and inattentive are applied to passing objects that engage the senses or the thoughts of the moment. One is careless in business, thoughtless in conduct, heedless in walking or running, inattentive in listening: careless and thoughtless persons neglect the necessary use of their powers; the heedless and inattentive neglect the use of their senses. Careless people are unfit to be employed in the management of any concerns; thoughtless people are unfit to have the management of themselves; heedless children are unfit to go by themselves; inattentive children are unfit to be led by others. One is careless and inattentive in providing for his good; one is thoughtless and heedless in not guarding against evil: a careless person does not trouble himself about advancement; an inattentive person does not concern himself about improvement; a thoughtless person brings himself into distress; a heedless person exposes himself to accidents.

The two classes most apt to be negligent of this duty (religious retirement) are the men of pleasure, and the men of business.—BLAIR.

My generous brother is of gentle kind.
He seems remiss, but bears a valiant mind.—POPE.

If the parts of time were not variously coloured, we should never discern their departure and succession, but

should live *thoughtless* of the past, and *careless* of the future.—JOHNSON.

There in the ruin, *heedless* of the dead.

The shelter-seeking peasant builds his shed.

GOLDSMITH.

In the midst of his glory the Almighty is not *inattentive* to the meanest of his subjects.—BLAIR.

To Negotiate, Treat for or about, Transact.

The idea of conducting business with others is included in the signification of all these terms; but they differ in the mode of conducting it, and the nature of the business to be conducted. **Negotiate**, in the Latin *negotius*, participle of *negotor*, from *negotium*, is applied in the original mostly to merchandise or traffic, but it is more commonly employed in the complicated concerns of governments and nations. **Treat**, from the Latin *tracto*, frequentative of *traho* to draw, signifies to turn over and over or set forth in all ways: these two verbs, therefore, suppose deliberation: but **Transact**, from *transactus*, participle of *transago*, to carry forward or bring to an end, supposes more direct agency than consultation or deliberation; this latter is therefore adapted to the more ordinary and less entangled concerns of commerce. *Negotiations* are conducted by many parties, and involve questions of peace or war, dominions, territories, rights of nations, and the like: *treaties* are often a part of *negotiations*: they are seldom conducted by more than two parties, and involve only partial questions, as in *treaties* about peace, about commerce, about the boundaries of any particular state. A congress carries on *negotiations* for the establishment of good order among the ruling powers of Europe; individual states *treat* with each other, to settle their particular differences. To *negotiate* mostly respects political concerns, except in the case of *negotiating* bills: to *treat*, as well as *transact*, is said of domestic and private concerns: we *treat* with a person about the purchase of a house; and *transact* our business with him by making good the purchase and paying down the money.

As nouns, *negotiation* expresses rather the act of deliberating than the thing deliberated: *treaty* includes the ideas of the terms proposed, and the arrangement of those terms: *transaction* expresses the idea of something actually done and finished. *Negotiations* are sometimes very long pending before the preliminary terms are even proposed, or any basis is defined; *treaties* of commerce are entered into by all civilized countries, in order to obviate misunderstandings, and enable them to preserve an amicable intercourse; the *transactions* which daily pass in a great metropolis, like that of London, are of so multifarious a nature, and so infinitely numerous, that the bare contemplation of them fills the mind with astonishment. *Negotiations* are long or short; *treaties* are advantageous or the contrary; *transactions* are honourable or dishonourable.

I do not love to mingle speech with any about news or worldly *negotiations* in God's holy house.—HOWEL.

You have a great work in hand, for you write to me that you are upon a *treaty* of marriage.—HOWEL.

We are permitted to know nothing of what is *transacting* in the regions above us.—BLAIR.

Neighbourhood, Vicinity.

Neighbourhood, from *nigh*, signifies the place which is nigh, that is nigh to one's habitation.

Vicinity, from *vicus* a village, signifies the place which does not exceed in distance the extent of a village.

Neighbourhood, which is of Saxon origin, and first admitted into our language, is employed in reference to the inhabitants, or in regard to inhabited places; that is, it signifies either a community of neighbours, or the place they occupy: but *vicinity*, which in Latin bears the same acceptation as *neighbourhood*, is employed in English for the place in general, that is, near to the person speaking, whether inhabited or otherwise; hence the propriety of saying, a populous *neighbourhood*, a quiet *neighbourhood*, a respectable *neighbourhood*, and a pleasant *neighbourhood*, either as it respects the people or the country; to live in the *vicinity* of a manufactory, to be in the *vicinity* of the metropolis or of the sea.

Though the soul be not actually debauched, yet it is something to be in the *neighbourhood* of destruction.—SOUTH.

The Dutch, by the *vicinity* of their settlements to the coast of Caracas, gradually engrossed the greatest part of the cocoa trade.—ROBERTSON.

Nevertheless, *v. However*.

New, *v. Fresh*.

New, *v. Novel*.

News, Tidings.

News implies anything *new* that is related or circulated; but **Tidings**, from *tide*, signifies that which flows in periodically like the *tide*. *News* is unexpected; it serves to gratify idle curiosity: *tidings* are expected; they serve to allay anxiety. In time of war the public are eager after *news*; and they who have relatives in the army, are anxious to have *tidings* of them.

I wonder that in the present situation of affairs you can take pleasure in writing anything but *news*.—SPEO TATOR.

Too soon some demon to my father bore
The tidings that his heart with anguish tore.

FALCONER.

Nice, *v. Exact*.

Nice, *v. Fine*.

Niggardly, *v. Avaricious*.

Niggardly, *v. Economical*.

Nigh, *v. Close*.

Nightly, Nocturnal.

Nightly, immediately from the word *night*, and **Nocturnal**, from *nox* night, signify belonging to the night, or the night season; the former is therefore more familiar than the latter: we speak of *nightly* depredations to express what passes every night, or *nightly* disturbances; *nocturnal* dreams, *nocturnal* visits.

Yet not alone, while thou
Visit'st my slumbers *nightly*, or when morn
Purple the east,—MILTON.

Or gave the sun his labour, and that swift
Nocturnal and diurnal rumb suppos'd
Invisible else above all stars the wheel
Of day and night.—MILTON.

Nimble, v. Active.

Noble, Grand.

Noble, in Latin *nobilis*, from *nosco* to know, signifies knowable, or worth knowing.

Grand (*v. Grandeur*).

Noble is a term of general import; it simply implies the quality by which a thing is distinguished for excellence above other things: the **grand** is, properly speaking, one of those qualities by which an object acquires the name of **noble**; but there are many **noble** objects which are not denominated **grand**. A building may be denominated **noble** for its beauty as well as its size; but a **grand** building is rather so called for the expense which is displayed upon it: **nobleness** of acting or thinking comprehends all moral excellence that rises to a high pitch; but **grandeur** of mind is peculiarly applicable to such actions or traits as denote an elevation of character, rising above all that is common. A family may be either **noble** or **grand**; but it is **noble** by birth; it is **grand** by wealth, and an expensive style of living.

What then worlds

In a far thinner element sustain d.

And acting the same part with greater skill,

More rapid movement, and for nobler ends.

YOUNG.

More obvious ends to pass, are not these stars,
The seats majestic, proud imperial thrones,
On which angelic delegates of heav'n
Discharge high trusts of vengeance or of love,
To clothe in outward grandeur **grand** designs?

YOUNG.

Nocturnal, v. Nightly.

Noise, Cry, Outcry, Clamour.

Noise is any loud sound; **Cry**, **Outcry** and **Clamour**, are particular kinds of noises, differing either in the cause or the nature of the sounds. A **noise** proceeds either from animate or inanimate objects; the **cry** proceeds only from animate objects. The report of a cannon, or the loud sounds occasioned by a high wind, are **noises**, but not **cries**: **cries** issue from birds, beasts, and men. A **noise** is produced often by accident; a **cry** is always occasioned by some particular circumstance: when many horses and carriages are going together they make a great **noise**; hunger and pain causes **cries** to proceed both from animals and human beings.

Noise, when compared with **cry**, is sometimes only an audible sound; the **cry** is a very loud **noise**: whatever disturbs silence, as the falling of a pin in a perfectly still assembly, is denominated a **noise**; but a **cry** is that which may often drown other **noises**, as the **cries** of people selling things about the streets. A **cry** is in general a regular sound, but **outcry** and **clamour** are irregular sounds; the former may proceed from one or many, the latter from many in conjunction. A **cry** after a thief becomes an **outcry** when set up by many at a time; it becomes a **clamour**, if accompanied with shouting, bawling, and **noises** of a mixed and tumultuous nature.

These terms may all be taken in an improper as well as a proper sense. Whatever is obtruded upon the public notice, so as to become the universal subject of conversation and writing, is said to make a **noise**; in this manner a new and good performer at the theatre makes a **noise** on his first appearance: a **noise** may, however, be for or against; but a **cry**, **outcry**, and **clamour**, are always against the object, varying in the degree and manner in which they display themselves: **cry** implies less than **outcry**, and this is less than **clamour**. When the public voice is raised in an audible manner against any particular matter, it is a **cry**; if it be mingled with intemperate language it is an **outcry**; if it be vehement and exceedingly noisy, it is a **clamour**. partisans raise a **cry** in order to form a body in their favour; the discontented are ever ready to set up an **outcry** against men in power; a **clamour** for peace in the time of war is easily raised by those who wish to thwart the government.

Nor was his ear less peal'd

From **noises** loud and ruinous.—MILTON.

From either host, the mingled shouts and **cries**
Of Trojans and Rutilians rend the skies.

DRYDEN.

And now great deeds

Had been achiev'd, whereof all hell had rung,
Had not the snaky sorceress, that sat
Fast by hell gate, and kept the fatal key,
Ris'n, and with hideous **outcry** rush'd between.

MILTON.

Their darts with **clamour** at a distance drive,

And only keep the languish'd war alive.

DRYDEN.

Noisome, v. Hurtful.

Noisy, v. Loud.

Nomenclature, v. Dictionary.

To Nominate, Name.

Nominate comes immediately from the Latin *nominatus*, participle of *nominare*; **Name** comes from the Teutonic, &c., **name**, and both from the Latin *nomen*, &c. (*v. To name*).

To **nominate** and to **name** are both to mention by **name**; but the former is to mention for a specific purpose: the latter is to mention for general purpose: persons only are **named**, things as well as persons are **named**: one **nominate**s a person in order to propose him, or appoint him, to an office; but one **names** a person casually, in the course of conversation, or one **names** him in order to make some inquiry respecting him. To be **named** is a public act; to be **named** is generally private: one is **named** before an assembly; one is **named** in any place: to be **named** is always an honour; to be **named** is either honourable, or the contrary, according to the circumstances under which it is mentioned: a person is **named** as member of Parliament; he is **named** whenever he is spoken of.

Elizabeth **named** her commissioners to hear both parties.—ROBERTSON.

Then Calchas (by Ulysses first inspir'd)

Was urg'd to name whom th' angry gods requir'd.

DENHAM.

Note, v. Mark.

To Note, v. To mark.

Noted, v. Distinguished.

Noted, Notorious.

Noted (*v. Distinguished*) may be employed either in a good or a bad sense; **Notorious** is never used but in a bad sense: men may be *noted* for their talents, or their eccentricities; they are *notorious* only for their vices: *noted* characters excite many and diverse remarks from their friends and their enemies; *notorious* characters are universally shunned.

An engineer of *noted* skill.
Engag'd to stop the growing ill.—GAY.

What principles of ordinary prudence can warrant a man to trust a *notorious* cheat?—SOUTH.

Note, v. Remark.

To Notice, v. To attend to.

To Notice, v. To mark.

To Notice, v. To mention.

Notice, v. Information.

To Notice, Remark, Observe.

To Notice (*v. To attend to*) is either to take or to give *notice*: to **Remark**, compounded of *re* and *mark* (*v. Mark*), signifies to reflect or bring back any *mark* to our own mind, or communicate the same to another; to *mark* is to mark a thing once, but to *remark* is to mark it again.

Observe (*v. Looker-on*) signifies either to keep a thing present before one's own view, or to communicate our view to another.

In the first sense of these words, as the action respects ourselves, to *notice* and *remark* require simple attention, to *observe* requires examination. To *notice* is a more cursory action than to *remark*: we may *notice* a thing by a single glance, or on merely turning one's head; but to *remark* supposes a reaction of the mind on an object: we *notice* that a person passes our door on a certain day and at a certain hour; but we *remark* to others that he goes past every day at the same hour: we *notice* that the sun sets this evening under a cloud, and we *remark* that it has done so for several evenings successively: we *notice* the state of a person's health or his manners in company; we *remark* his habits and peculiarities in domestic life. What is *noticed* and *remarked* strikes on the senses, and awakens the mind; what is *observed* is looked after and sought for: the former are often involuntary acts; we see, hear, and think, because the objects obtrude themselves uncalled for; but the latter is intentional as well as voluntary; we see, hear, and think, on that which we have watched. We *remark* things as matters of fact; we *observe* them in order to judge of, or draw conclusions from, them: we *remark* that the wind lies for a long time in a certain quarter; we *observe* that whenever it lies in a certain quarter it brings rain with it. A general *notice* anything particular in the appearance of his army; he *remarks* that the men have not for a length of time worn contented faces; he consequently *observes* their actions, when they think they are not seen, in order to discover the cause of their dissatisfaction: people who have no curiosity are

sometimes attracted to *notice* the stars or planets, when they are particularly bright; those who look frequently will *remark* that the same star does not rise exactly in the same place for two successive nights; but the astronomer goes farther, and *observes* all the motions of the heavenly bodies, in order to discover the scheme of the universe.

In the latter sense of these verbs, as respects the communications to others of what passes in our own minds, to *notice* is to make known our sentiments by various ways; to *remark* and *observe* are to make them known only by means of words: to *notice* is a personal act towards an individual, in which we direct our attention to him, as may happen either by a bow, a nod, a word, or even a look; but to *remark* and *observe* are said only of the thoughts which pass in our own minds, and are expressed to others: friends *notice* each other when they meet; they *remark* to others the impression which passing objects make upon their minds: the *observations* which intelligent people make are always entitled to *notice* from young persons.

The depravity of mankind is so easy discoverable, that nothing but the desert or cell can exclude it from *notice*.—JOHNSON.

The glass that magnifies its objects contracts the sight to a point, and the mind must be fixed upon a single character, to *remark* its minute peculiarities.—JOHNSON.

The course of time is so visibly marked, that it is *observed* even by the birds of passage.—JOHNSON.

To Notify, v. To express.

Notion, v. Conception.

Notion, v. Opinion.

Notion, v. Perception.

Notorious, v. Noted.

Notwithstanding, v. However.

Novel, v. Fable.

Novel, New.

Novel and **New** both come immediately from the Latin *novus* (*v. News*), and the former is to the latter as the species to the genus: every thing *novel* is *new* but all that is *new* is not *novel*; what is *novel* is mostly strange and unexpected; but what is *new* is usual and expected: the freezing of the river Thames is a *novelty*; the frost in every winter is something *new* when it first comes; that is a *novel* sight which was either never seen before, or seen but seldom; that is a *new* sight which is seen for the first time: the entrance of the French king into the British capital was a sight as *novel* as it was interesting; the entrance of a king into the capital of France was a *new* sight, after the revolution which had so long existed.

We are naturally delighted with *novelty*.—JOHNSON.

'Tis on some evening, sunny, grateful, mild,
When nought but balm is beaming through the woods,
With yellow lustre bright, that the new triles
Visit the spacious heav'ns.—THOMSON.

To Nourish, Nurture, Cherish.

To Nourish and **Nurture** are but variations from the same verb *nutrio*.

Cherish, v. Foster.

Things *nourish*, persons *nurture* and *cherish*: to *nourish* is to afford bodily strength, to supply the physical necessities of the body; to *nurture* is to extend one's care to the supply of all its physical necessities, to preserve life, occasion growth, and increase vigour: the breast of the mother *nourishes*; the fostering care and attention of the mother *nurtures*. To *nurture* is a physical act; to *cherish* is a mental as well as a physical act: a mother *nurtures* her infant while it is entirely dependant upon her; she *cherishes* her child in her bosom, and protects it from every misfortune, or affords consolation in the midst of all its troubles, when it is no longer an infant.

Air, and ye elements, the eldest birth
Of nature's womb, that in quaternion run
Perpetual circle, multiform; and mix
And *nourish* all things.—MILTON.

Of thy superfluous brood, she'll *cherish* kind
The alien offspring.—SOMERVILLE.

Noxious, v. Hurtful.**Numb, Benumbed, Torpid.**

Numb and **Benumbed** come from the Hebrew *num* to sleep; the former denoting the quality, and the latter the state; there are but few things *numb* by nature; but there may be many things which may be *benumbed*. **Torpid**, in Latin *torpidus*, from *torpeo* to languish, is most commonly employed to ex-

press the permanent state of being *benumbed*, as in the case of some animals, which lie in a *torpid* state all the winter; or in the moral sense to depict the *benumbed* state of the thinking faculty; in this manner we speak of the *torpor* of persons who are *benumbed* by any strong affection, or by any strong external action.

The night, with its silence and darkness, shows the winter, in which all the powers of vegetation are *benumbed*.—JOHNSON.

There must be a grand spectacle to rouse the imagination, grown *torpid* with the lazy enjoyment of sixty years' security.—BURRE.

To Number, v. To reckon.**Numeral, Numerical.**

Numeral, or belonging to number, is applied to a class of words in grammar, as a *numeral* adjective, or a *numeral* noun: **Numerical**, or containing number, is applied to whatever other objects respect number; as a *numerical* difference, where the difference consists between any two numbers, or is expressed by numbers.

God has declared that he will, and therefore can, raise the same *numerical* body at the last day.—SOUTH.

Nuptials, v. Marriage.**To Nurture, v. To nourish.**

O.

Obdurate, v. Hard.**Obedient, v. Dutiful.****Obedient, Submissive, Obsequious.****Obedient, v. Dutiful.**

Submissive denotes the disposition to submit (*v. To yield*).

Obsequious, in Latin *obsequius*, from *obsequor*, or the intensive *ob* and *sequor* to follow, signifies following diligently, or with intensity of mind.

One is *obedient* to command, *submissive* to power or the will, *obsequious* to persons. *Obedience* is always taken in a good sense; one ought always to be *obedient* where *obedience* is due: *submission* is relatively good; it may, however, be indifferent or bad: one may be *submissive* from interested motives, or meanness of spirit, which is a base kind of *submission*; but to be *submissive* for conscience' sake is the bounden duty of a Christian: *obsequiousness* is never good; it is an excessive concern about the will of another which has always interest for its end.

Obedience is a course of conduct conformable either to some specific rule, or the express will of another; *submission* is often a personal

act, immediately directed to the individual. We show our *obedience* to the law by avoiding the breach of it; we show our *obedience* to the will of God, or of our parent, by making that will the rule of our life: on the other hand, we show *submission* to the person of the magistrate; we adopt a *submissive* deportment by a downcast look and a bent body. *Obedience* is founded upon principle, and cannot be feigned; *submission* is a partial bending to another, which is easily affected in our outward behaviour: the understanding and the heart produce *obedience*; but force, or the necessity of circumstances, give rise to *submission*.

Obedience and *submission* suppose a restraint on one's own will, in order to bring it into accordance with that of another; but *obsequiousness* is the consulting the will or pleasure of another: we are *obedient* from a sense of right; we are *submissive* from a sense of necessity; we are *obsequious* from a desire of gaining favour; a love of God is followed by *obedience* to His will; they are coincident sentiments that reciprocally act on each other, so as to serve the cause of virtue: a *submissive* conduct is at the worst an involuntary sacrifice of our independence to our fears or necessities, the evil of which is confined principally

to the individual who makes the sacrifice; but *obsequiousness* is a voluntary sacrifice of all that is noble in man to base gain, the evil of which extends far and wide: the *submissive* man, however mean he may be in himself, does not contribute to the vices of others; but the *obsequious* man has no scope for his paltry talent, but among the weak and wicked, whose weakness he profits by, and whose wickedness he encourages.

What gen'rous Greek, obedient to thy word,
Shall form an ambush, or shall lift the sword?—POPE.

The natives (of Britain) disarmed, despised, and *submissive*, had lost all desire, and even idea, of their former liberty.—HUME.

The charms of all, *obsequious*, courtly strike
On each he doats, on each attends alike.—FARNELL.

Obeisance, *v.* Homage.

Object, *v.* Aim.

Object, Subject.

Object, in Latin *objectus*, participle of *objicere* to lie in the way, signifies the thing that lies in one's way.

Subject, in Latin *subjectus*, participle of *subjicere* to lie under, signifies the thing forming the ground-work.

The *object* puts itself forward; the *subject* is in the back-ground; we notice the *object*; we observe or reflect on the *subject*: *objects* are sensible; the *subject* is altogether intellectual; the eye, the ear, and all the senses are occupied with the surrounding *objects*: the memory, the judgment, and the imagination are supplied with *subjects* suitable to the nature of the operations.

When *object* is taken for that which is intellectual, it retains a similar signification; it is the thing that presents itself to the mind; it is seen by the mind's eye: the *subject*, on the contrary, is that which must be sought for, and when found it engages the mental powers: hence we say an *object* of consideration, an *object* of delight, an *object* of concern: a *subject* of reflection, a *subject* of mature deliberation, the *subject* of a poem, the *subject* of grief, of lamentation, and the like. When the mind becomes distracted by too great a multiplicity of *objects*, it can fix itself on no one individual *object* with sufficient steadiness to take a survey of it: in like manner, if a child have too many *objects* set before it, for the exercise of its powers, it will acquire a familiarity with none: religion and politics are interesting, but delicate *subjects* of discussion.

He whose sublime pursuit is God and truth,
Burns like some absent and impatient youth,
To join the *object* of his warm desires.—JENYNS.

The hymns and odes (of the inspired writers) excel those delivered down to us by the Greeks and Romans, in the poetry as much as in the *subject*.—ADDISON.

To Object, Oppose.

To **Object** (*v.* *Object*) is to cast in the way, to **Oppose** is to place in the way; there is, therefore, very little original difference, except that casting is a more momentary and sudden proceeding, placing is a more preme-

ditated action; which distinction, at the same time, corresponds with the use of the terms in ordinary life: to *object* to a thing is to propose or start something against it; but to *oppose* it is to set one's self up steadily against it: one *objects* to ordinary matters that require no reflection; one *opposes* matters that call for deliberation, and afford serious reasons for and against: a parent *objects* to his child's learning the classics, or to his running about the streets; he *opposes* his marriage when he thinks the connection or the circumstances not desirable: we *object* to a thing from our own particular feelings; we *oppose* a thing because we judge it improper; capricious or selfish people will *object* to everything that comes across their own humour; those who *oppose* think it necessary to assign, at least, a reason for their *opposition*.

About this time, an Archbishop of York *objected* to clerks (recommended to benefices by the Pope) because they were ignorant of English.—TYRWHITT.

'Twas of no purpose to *oppose*,
She'd hear to no excuse in prose.—SWIFT.

Objection, *v.* Demur.

Objection, Difficulty, Exception.

Objection (*v.* *Demur*) is here a general term; it comprehends both the **Difficulty** and the **Exception**, which are but species of the *objection*: an *objection* and a *difficulty* are started; an *exception* is made: the *objection* to a thing is in general that which renders it less desirable; but the *difficulty* is that which renders it less practicable: there is an *objection* against every scheme which incurs a serious risk; the want of means to begin, or resources to carry on a scheme, are serious *difficulties*.

Objection and *exception* both respect the nature, the moral tendency, or moral consequences of a thing; but an *objection* may be frivolous or serious; an *exception* is something serious. the *objection* is positive; the *exception* is relatively considered, that is, the thing *excepted* from other things, as not good, and consequently *objected* to. *Objections* are made sometimes to proposals for the mere sake of getting rid of an engagement; those who do not wish to give themselves trouble find an easy method of disengaging themselves, by making *objections* to every proposition; lawyers make *exceptions* to charges which are not sufficiently substantiated. In all engagements entered into, it is necessary to make *exceptions* to the parties, whenever there is anything *exceptionable* in their characters: the present promiscuous diffusion of knowledge among the poorer orders is very *objectionable* on many grounds; the course of reading which they commonly pursue is without question highly *exceptionable*.

I would not desire what you have written to be omitted, unless I had the merit of removing your *objection*.—POPE.

In the examination of every great and comprehensive plan, such as that of Christianity, *difficulties* may occur.—BLAIR.

I am sorry you persist to take ill my not accepting your invitation, and to find your *exception* not unmix'd with some suspicion.—POPE.

Oblation, *v.* Offering.

Obligation, v. Duty.

To Oblige, v. To bind.

To Oblige, v. To compel.

Obliged, v. Indebted.

Obliging, v. Civil.

To Obliterate, v. To blot out.

Oblivion, v. Forgetfulness.

Oblong, Oval.

Oblong, in Latin *oblongus*. from the intensive syllable *ob*, signifies very long, longer than it is broad.

Oval, from the Latin *ovum*, an egg, signifies egg-shaped.

The *oval* is a species of the *oblong*: what is *oval* is *oblong*; but what is *oblong* is not always *oval*. *Oblong* is peculiarly applied to figures formed by rightlines, that is, all rectangular parallelograms, except squares, are *oblong*; but the *oval* is applied to curvilinear *oblong* figures, as ellipses, which are distinguished from the circle: tables are oftener *oblong* than *oval*; garden beds are as frequently *oval* as they are *oblong*.

Obloquy, v. Reproach.

Obnoxious, Offensive.

Obnoxious, from the intensive syllable *ob*, signifies exceedingly *noxious* and causing offence, or else liable to offence from others by reason of its *noxiousness*; **Offensive** signifies simply liable to give offence. *Obnoxious* is, therefore, a much more comprehensive term than *offensive*; for an *obnoxious* man both suffers from others and causes sufferings to others: an *obnoxious* man is one whom others seek to exclude; an *offensive* man may possibly be endured: gross vices, or particularly odious qualities, make a man *obnoxious*; but rude manners, and perverse tempers, make men *offensive*; a man is *obnoxious* to many, and *offensive* to individuals: a man of loose Jacobinical principles will be *obnoxious* to a society of loyalists; a child may make himself *offensive* to his friends.

I must have leave to be grateful to any one who serves me, let him be ever so *obnoxious* to any party.—**LOPE.**

The understanding is often drawn by the will and the affections from fixing its contemplation on an *offensive* truth.—**SOUTH.**

Obnoxious, v. Subject.

Obscure, v. Dark.

To Obscure, v. To Eclipse.

Obsequies, v. Funeral.

Obsequious, v. Obedient.

Observance, v. Form.

Observance, v. Observation.

Observant, v. Mindful.

Observation, Observance.

These terms derive their use from the different significations of the verb: **Observation** is the act of observing objects with the view to examine them (*v. To notice*); **Observance** is the act of observing in the sense of keeping or holding sacred (*v. To keep*). From a minute *observation* of the human body, anatomists have discovered the circulation of the blood, and the source of all the humours; by a strict *observance* of truth and justice, a man acquires the title of an upright man.

The pride which, under the check of public *observation*, would have been only vented among domestics, becomes, in a country baronet the torment of a province.—**JOHNSON.**

You must not fail to behave yourself towards my Lady Clare, your grandmother, with all duty and *observance*.—**EARL STAFFORD.**

Observations, v. Notes.

To Observe, v. To keep.

To Observe, v. To notice.

To Observe, Watch.

Observe, v. To notice.

Watch, v. To Watch.

These terms agree in expressing the act of looking at an object; but to *observe* is not to look after so strictly as is implied by to *watch*; a general *observes* the motions of an enemy when they are in no particular state of activity; he *watches* the motions of an enemy when they are in a state of commotion; we *observe* a thing in order to draw an inference from it; we *watch* anything in order to discover what may happen: we *observe* with coolness; we *watch* with eagerness: we *observe* carefully; we *watch* narrowly; the conduct of mankind in general is *observed*; the conduct of suspicious individuals is *watched*.

Nor must the ploughman less *observe* the skies.
—**DRYDEN.**

For thou know'st
What hath been warn'd us, what malicious foe
Watches, no doubt, with greedy hope to find,
His wish and best advantage, us assunder.
—**MILTON.**

To Observe, v. To see.

Observer, v. Looker on.

Obsolete, v. Old.

Obstacle, v. Difficulty.

Obstinate, Contumacious, Stubborn, Headstrong, Heady.

Obstinate, in Latin *obstinatus*, participle of *obstino*, from *ob* and *stino*, *sto* or *sisto*, signifies standing in the way of another.

Contumacious, v. Contumacy.

Stubborn, or *stoutborn*, signifies stiff or immovable by nature.

Headstrong signifies strong in the head or the mind; and **Heady**, full of one's own head.

Obstinacy is a habit of the mind; *contumacy* is either a particular state of feeling or a mode

of action: *obstinacy* consists in an attachment to one's own mode of acting; *contumacy* consists in a swelling contempt of others: the *obstinate* man adheres tenaciously to his own ways, and opposes reason to reason; the *contumacious* man disputes the right of another to control his actions, and opposes force to force. *Obstinacy* interferes with a man's private conduct, and makes him blind to right reason; *contumacy* is a crime against lawful authority; the *contumacious* man sets himself against his superiors; when young people are *obstinate* they are bad subjects of education; when grown people are *contumacious* they are troublesome subjects to the king.

The *stubborn* and the *headstrong* are species of the *obstinate*: the former lies altogether in the perversion of the will; the latter in the perversion of the judgement: the *stubborn* person wills what he wills; the *headstrong* person thinks what he thinks. *Stubbornness* is mostly inherent in a person's nature; a *headstrong* temper is commonly associated with violence and impetuosity of character. *Obstinacy* discovers itself in persons of all ages and stations; a *stubborn* and *headstrong* disposition betray themselves mostly in those who are unable to conform to the will of another.

The *obstinate* keep the opinions which they have once embraced in spite of all proof; but they are not hasty in forming their opinions, nor adopt them without a choice: the *headstrong* seize the first opinions that offer, and act upon them in spite of all remonstrance: the *stubborn* follow the ruling will or bent of their mind, without regard to any opinions; they are not to be turned by force or persuasion. If an *obstinate* child be treated with some degree of indulgence, there may be hopes of correcting his failing; but *stubborn* and *headstrong* children are troublesome subjects of education, and will baffle the utmost skill and patience: the former are insensible to all reason; the latter have blinded the little reason which they possess: the former are unconscious of everything, but the simple will and determination to do what they do; the latter are so preoccupied with their own favourite ideas as to set every other at nought; force serves mostly to confirm both in their perverse resolution of persistence.

But man we find the only creature,
Who, led by folly, combats nature;
Who, when she loudly cries for fear,
With obstinacy fixes there.—SWIFT.

When an offender is cited to appear in any ecclesiastical court, and he neglects to do it, he is pronounced *contumacious*.—BEVERIDGE.

From whence he brought them to these salvage parts,
And with science mollified their *stubborn* hearts.
SPENSER.

We, blindly by our *headstrong* passions led,
Are hot for action.—DRYDEN.

Hearty confidence promises victory without contest.—JOHNSON.

To Obstruct, *v.* To hinder.

To Obtain, *v.* To acquire.

To Obtain, *v.* To get.

To Obtrude, *v.* To intrude.

To Obviate, *v.* To prevent.

Obvious, *v.* Apparent.

To Occasion, *v.* To cause.

Occasion, Opportunity.

Occasion, in Latin *occasio*, from *obcasio*, or *ob* and *cado*, signifies that which falls in the way so as to produce some change.

Opportunity, in Latin *opportunitas*, from *opportunitus* fit, signifies the thing that happens fit for the purpose.

These terms are applied to the events of a life; but the *occasion* is that which determines our conduct, and leaves us no choice; it amounts to a degree of necessity: the *opportunity* is that which invites to action; it tempts us to embrace the moment for taking the step. We do things, therefore, as the *occasion* requires, or as the *opportunity* offers. There are many *occasions* on which a man is called upon to uphold his opinions. There are but few *opportunities* for men in general to distinguish themselves. The *occasion* obtrudes upon us; the *opportunity* is what we seek or desire. On particular *occasions* it is necessary for a commander to be severe; but a man of an humane disposition will profit by every *opportunity* to show his lenity to offenders.

Waller preserved and won his life from those who were most resolved to take it, and in an *occasion* in which he ought to have been ambitious to have lost it (to lose it).—CLARENDON.

Every man is obliged by the Supreme Maker of the universe to improve all the *opportunities* of good which are afforded him.—JOHNSON.

Occasion, Necessity.

Occasion (*v.* Occasion) includes. Necessity (*v.* Necessity) excludes, the idea of choice or alternative. We are regulated by the *occasion*, and can exercise our own discretion; we yield or submit to the *necessity*, without even the exercise of the will. On the death of a relative we have *occasion* to go into mourning if we will not offer an affront to the family; but there is no express *necessity*: in case of an attack on our persons, there is a *necessity* of self-defence for the preservation of life.

A merrier man
Within the limit of becoming mirth,
I never spent an hour's talk without,
His eye begets occasion for his wit.
SHAKESPEARE.

Where necessity ends curiosity begins.—JOHNSON.

Occasional, Casual.

These are both opposed to what is fixed or stated; but *Occasional* carries with it more the idea of unfrequency, and *Casual* that of unfixedness, or the absence of all design.

A minister is termed an *occasional* preacher, who preaches only on certain *occasions*; he's preaching at a particular place, or on a certain day may be *casual*. Our acts of charity may be *occasional*; but they ought not to be *casual*.

The beneficence of the Roman emperors and consuls was merely *occasional*.—JOHNSON.

What wonder if so near
Looks intervene, and smiles, or object now,
Casual discourse draws on.—MILTON.

Occult, *v.* Secret.

Occupancy, Occupation,

Are words which derive their meaning from the different acceptations of the primitive verb *occupy*: the former being used to express the state of holding or possessing any object; the latter to express the act of taking possession of, or keeping in possession. He who has the *occupancy* of land enjoys the fruits of it: the *occupation* of a country by force of arms is of little avail, unless one has an adequate force to maintain one's ground.

As *occupancy* gave the right to the temporary use of the soil; so it is agreed on all hands, that *occupancy* gave also the original right to the permanent property in the substance of the earth itself.—BLACKSTONE.

The unhappy consequences of this temperature is, that my attachment to any *occupation* seldom outlives its novelty.—COWPER.

Occupation, *v. Business.*

Occupation, *v. Occupancy.*

To Occupy, *v. To hold.*

Occurrence, *v. Event.*

Odd, *v. Particular.*

Odd, Uneven.

Odd, probably a variation from *add*, seems to be a mode of the *Uneven*; both are opposed to the even, but *odd* is only said of that which has no fellow; the *uneven* is said of that which does not square or come to an even point: of numbers we say that they are either *odd* or *uneven*; but of gloves, shoes, and everything which is made to correspond, we say that they are *odd*, when they are single; but that they are *uneven* when they are both different; in like manner a plank is *uneven* which has an unequal surface, or disproportionate dimensions; but a piece of wood is *odd* which will not match nor suit with any other piece.

Odious, *v. Hateful.*

Odour, *v. Smell.*

Economical, Saving, Sparing, Thrifty, Penurious, Niggardly.

The idea of not spending is common to all these terms: but *Economical* (*v. Economy*) signifies not spending unnecessarily or unwisely.

Saving is keeping and laying by with care; *Sparing* is keeping out of that which ought to be spent; *Thrifty* or *Thriving* is accumulating by means of *saving*; *Penurious* is suffering as from *penury* by means of *saving*; *Niggardly*, after the manner of a *niggard*, nigh or close person, is not spending or letting go, but in the smallest possible quantities. To be *economical* is a virtue in those who have but narrow means; all the other epithets however are employed in a sense more or less unfavourable; he who is *saving* when young, will be covetous when old; he who is *sparing* will generally be *sparing* out of the comforts of others; he who is *thrifty* commonly adds the desire of getting with that of *saving*; he who is *penurious*.

wants nothing to make him a complete miser: he who is *niggardly* in his dealings will be mostly avaricious in his character.

I may say of fame as Falstaff did of honour, "if it comes it comes unlook'd for, and there is an end on't." I am content with a bare *saving* game.—POPE.

Youth is not rich, in time it may be poor,
Part with it, as with money, *sparing*.—YOUNG.

Nothing is *penuriously* imparted of which a more liberal distribution would increase real felicity.—JOHNSON.

Who by resolves and vows engag'd does stand,
For days that yet belong to fate,
Does like an *unthrifty* mortgage his estate
Before it falls into his hands,—COWLEY.

No *niggard* nature; men are prodigals.—YOUNG.

Economy, Frugality, Parsimony.

Economy, from the Greek *οικονομία*, implies management. *Frugality*, from the Latin *fruges* fruits, implies temperance. *Parsimony* (*v. Avaricious*) implies simply forbearing to spend, which is in fact the common idea included in these terms; but the *economical* man spares expense according to circumstances; he adapts his expenditure to his means, and renders it by contrivance as effectual to his purpose as possible: the *frugal* man spares expense on himself or on his indulgences; he may however be liberal to others whilst he is *frugal* towards himself: the *parsimonious* man saves from himself as well as others; he has no other object than saving. By *economy*, a man may make a limited income turn to the best account for himself and his family; by *frugality* he may with a limited income be enabled to do much good to others; by *parsimony* he may be enabled to accumulate great sums out of a narrow income: hence it is that we recommend a plan for being *economical*; we recommend a diet for being *frugal*; we condemn a habit or a character for being *parsimonious*.

Your *economy* I suppose begins now to be settled; your expenses are adjusted to your revenue.—JOHNSON.

I accept of your invitation to supper, but I must make this agreement beforehand, that you dismiss me soon, and treat me *frugally*.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF PLINY.

War and *economy* are things not easily reconciled, and the attempt of leaning towards *parsimony* in such a state may be the worst *economy* in the world.—BURKE.

Economy, Management.

Economy (*v. Economy*) has a more comprehensive meaning than *management*; for it includes the system of science and of legislation as well as that of domestic arrangements; as the *economy* of agriculture: the internal *economy* of a government; political, civil, or religious *economy*; or the *economy* of one's household. *Management*, on the contrary, is an action that is very seldom abstracted from its agent, and is always taken in a partial sense, namely, as a part of *economy*. The internal *economy* of a family depends principally on the prudent *management* of the female: the *economy* of every well-regulated community requires that all the members should keep their station, and preserve a strict subordination; the *management* of particular

branches of this *economy* should belong to particular individuals.

Oh spare this waste of being half divine,
And vindicate th' *economy* of heav'n.—YOUNG.

What incident can show more *management* and address in the poet (Milton) than this of Samson's refusing the summons of the idolators, and obeying the visitation of God's spirit?—CUMBERLAND.

Of Course, v. Naturally.

Of Distinction, v. Of fashion.

Of Quality, v. Of fashion.

Offence, Trespass, Transgression, Misdemeanour, Misdeed, Affront.

Offence is here the general term, signifying merely the act that *offends* (v. *To displease*), or runs counter to something else.

Offence is properly indefinite; it merely implies an object without the least signification of the nature of the object; **Trespass** and **Transgression** have a positive reference to an object *trespassed upon* or *transgressed*; *trespass* is contracted from *trans* and *pass* that is a passing beyond; and *transgress* from *trans* and *gressus* a going beyond. The *offence*, therefore, which constitutes a *trespass* arises out of the laws of property; a passing over or treading upon the property of another is a *trespass*: the *offence* which constitutes a *transgression* flows out of the laws of society in general which fix the boundaries of right and wrong: whoever therefore goes beyond or breaks through these bounds is guilty of a *transgression*. The *trespass* is a species of *offence* which peculiarly applies to the land or premises of individuals; *transgression* is a species of moral as well as political evil. Hunters are apt to commit *trespasses* in the eagerness of their pursuit; the passions of men are perpetually misleading them and causing them to commit various *transgressions*; the term *trespass* is sometimes employed improperly as respects time and other objects; *transgression* is always used in one uniform sense as respects rule and law; we *trespass* upon the time or patience of another; we *transgress* the moral or civil law.

An *offence* is either public or private; a **Misdemeanour** is properly a private *offence*, although improperly applied for an *offence* against public law (v. *Crime*); for it signifies a wrong *demeanour* or an *offence* in one's *demeanour* against propriety; a **Misdeed** is always private, it signifies a wrong *deed*, or a *deed* which *offends* against one's duty. Riotous and disorderly behaviour in company are serious *misdemeanours*; every act of drunkenness, lying, fraud, or immorality of every kind, are *misdeeds*.

An *offence* is that which affects persons or principles, communities or individuals, and is committed either directly or indirectly against the person; an **Affront** is altogether personal, and is directly brought to bear against the front of some particular person; it is an *offence* against another to speak disrespectfully of him in his absence; it is an *affront* to push past him with violence and rudeness.

Offences are either against God or man; a *trespass* is always an *offence* against man; a *transgression* is against the will of God or the

laws of men; the *misdemeanour* is more particularly against the established order of society; a *misdeed* is an *offence* against the Divine Law; an *affront* is an *offence* against good manners.

Slight provocations and frivolous *offences* are the most frequent causes of disquiet.—BLAIR.

Forgive the barbarous *trespass* of my tongue.
OTWAY.

To whom with stern regard thus Gabriel spake:
Why hast thou, Satan, broke the bounds prescrib'd
To thy *transgressions*?—MILTON.

Smaller faults in violation of a public law are comprized under the name of *misdemeanour*.—BLACKSTONE.

Pierce famine is your lot, for this *misdeed*.
Reduc'd to grind the plates on which you feed.
DRYDEN.

God may some time or other think it the concern of his justice and providence too to revenge the *affronts* put upon the laws of man.—SOUTH.

To Offend, v. To displease.

Offender, Delinquent.

The Offender (v. *To displease*) is he who *offends* in anything, either by commission or omission; the **Delinquent**, from *delinquo* to *fall*, signifies properly he who fails by omission, but it is extended to signify failing by the violation of a law. Those who go into a wrong place are *offenders*; those who stay away when they ought to go are *delinquents*: there are many *offenders* against the Sabbath who commit violent and open breaches of decorum; there are still more *delinquents* who never attend a public place of worship.

When any *offender* is presented into any of the ecclesiastical courts he is cited to appear there.—BEVERIDGE.

The killing of a deer or bear, or even a hare, was punished with the loss of the *delinquent's* eyes.—HUME.

Offending, Offensive.

Offending signifies either actually *offending* or calculated to *offend* (v. *To displease*); **Offensive** signifies calculated to *offend* at all times; a person may be *offending* in his manners to a particular individual, or use an *offending* expression on a particular occasion without any imputation on his character; but if his manners are *offensive*, it reflects both on his temper and education.

And tho' th' *offending* part felt mortal pain,
Th' immortal part its knowledge did retain.
DENHAM.

Gentleness corrects whatever is *offensive* in our manners.
—BLAIR.

Offensive, v. Obnoxious.

Offensive, v. Offending.

To Offer, v. To give.

To Offer, Bid, Tender, Propose.

Offer, v. To give.

Bid, v. To ask.

Tender, like the word *tend*, from *tendo* to stretch, signifies to stretch forth by way of *offering*.

Propose, in Latin *proposui*, perfect of

propono to place or set before, likewise characterizes a mode of offering.

Offer is employed for that which is literally transferable, or for that which is indirectly communicable: *bid* and *tender* belong to *offer* in the first sense; *propose* belongs to *offer* in the latter sense. To *offer* is a voluntary and discretionary act; an *offer* may be accepted or rejected at pleasure; to *bid* and *tender* are specific modes of *offering* which depend on circumstances: one *bids* with the hope of its being accepted; one *tenders* from a prudential motive, and in order to serve specific purposes. We *offer* money to a poor person, it is an act of charity or good nature; we *bid* a price for the purchase of a house, it is a commercial dealing subject to the rules of commerce; we *tender* a sum of money by way of payment, it is a matter of prudence in order to fulfil an obligation. By the same rule one *offers* a person the use of one's horse; one *bids* a sum at an auction; one *tenders* one's services to the government.

To *offer* and *propose* are both employed in matters of practice or speculation; but the former is a less definite and decisive act than the latter; we *offer* an opinion by way of promoting a discussion we *propose* a plan for the deliberation of others. Sentiments which differ widely from the major part of those present ought to be offered with modesty and caution; we should not *propose* to another what we should be unwilling to do ourselves. We commonly *offer* by way of obliging; we commonly *propose* by way of arranging or accommodating. It is an act of puerility to *offer* to do more than one is enabled to perform; it does not evince a sincere disposition for peace to *propose* such terms as we know cannot be accepted.

Should all these *offers* for my friendship call,
'Tis he that *offers*, and I scorn them all.—POPE.

When the Earl of Oxford was told that Dr. Parnell waited among the crowd in the outer room, he went by the persuasion of Swift with his treasurer's staff to *bid* him welcome.—JOHNSON.

Aulus Gellius tells a story of one Lucius Neratius who made it his diversion to give a blow to whomever he pleased, and then *tender* them the legal forfeiture.—BLACKSTONE.

We *propose* measures for securing to the young the possession of pleasure (by connecting with it religion).—BLAIR.

Offering, Oblation.

Offering from *offer*, and **Oblation** from *oblatus* and *oblatus* or *oflatus*, come both from *offero* (*v. To offer*): the former is, however, a term of much more general and familiar use than the latter. *Offerings* are both moral and religious; *oblation* is religious only; the money which is put into the sacramental plate is an *offering*; the consecrated bread and wine at the sacrament is an *oblation*. The *offering* in a religious sense is whatever one *offers* as a gift by way of reverence to a superior; the *oblation* is the *offering* which is accompanied with some particular ceremony. The wise men made an *offering* to our Saviour, but not properly an *oblation*; the Jewish sacrifices, as in general all religious sacrifices, were in the proper sense *oblations*.

The winds to heav'n the curling vapours bore,
Ungrateful *off'ring* to th' immortal pow'rs,
Whose wrath hung heavy o'er the Trojan tow'rs.
POPE.

Ye mighty princes, your *oblations* bring,
And pay due honours to your awful king.—PITT.

Office, *v. Business*.

Office, Place, Charge, Function.

Office, in Latin *officium*, from *officio* or *efficio*, signifies either the duty performed or the situation in which the duty is performed. **Place** comprehends no idea of duty, for there may be sinecure *places* which are only nominal *offices*, and designate merely a relationship with the government: every *office* therefore of a public nature is in reality a *place*, yet every *place* is not an *office*. The *place* of secretary of state is likewise an *office*, but that of ranger of a park is a *place* only, and not always an *office*. An *office* is held: a *place* is filled: the *office* is given or entrusted to a person; the *place* is granted or conferred: the *office* reposes a confidence, and imposes a responsibility; the *place* gives credit and influence: the *office* is bestowed on a man from his qualification; the *place* is granted to him by favour or as a reward for past services: the *office* is more or less honourable; the *place* is more or less profitable.

In an extended application of the terms *office* and *place*, the latter has a much lower signification than that of the former, since the *office* is always connected with the State; but the *place* is a private concern; the *office* is a *place* of trust, but the *place* is a *place* for menial labour; the *offices* are multiplied in time of war; the *places* for domestic service are more numerous in a state of peace and prosperity. The *office* is frequently taken not with any reference to the *place* occupied, but simply to the thing done; this brings it nearer in signification to the term **Charge** (*v. Care*). An *office* imposes a task, or some performance: a *charge* imposes a responsibility; we have always something to do in an *office*, always something to look after in a *charge*: the *office* is either public or private, the *charge* is always of a private and personal nature: a person performs the *office* of a magistrate, or of a minister; he undertakes the *charge* of instructing youth, or of being a guardian, or of conveying a person's property from one *place* to another. The *office* is that which is assigned by another; **Function** is properly the act of discharging or completing an *office* or business, from *fungor*, *viz., finem* and *ago*, to put an end to or bring to a conclusion; it is extended in its acceptance to the *office* itself or the thing done. The *office*, therefore, in its strict sense is performed only by conscious or intelligent agents, who act according to their instructions; the *function*, on the other hand, is an operation of unconscious objects according to the laws of nature. The *office* of an herald is to proclaim public events or to communicate circumstances from one public body to another: the *function* of the tongue is to speak; that of the ear, to hear; that of the eye, to see. The word *office* is sometimes employed in the same application by the personification of nature, which assigns an *office* to the ear, to the

tongue, to the eye, and the like. When the frame becomes overpowered by a sudden shock, the tongue will frequently refuse to perform its office; when the animal functions are impeded for a length of time, the vital power ceases to exist.

'Tis all men's office to speak patience
To those that wring under the load of sorrow.
SHAKESPEARE.

When rogues like these (a sparrow cries)
To honours and employments rise,
I court no favour, ask no place.—GAY.

Denham was made governor of Farnham Castle for the king, but he soon resigned that charge and retreated to Oxford.—JOHNSON.

Nature within me seems,
In all her functions, weary of herself.—MILTON.

The two offices of memory are collection and distribution.—JOHNSON.

Officious, v. Active.

Offspring, Progeny, Issue.

Offspring is that which springs off or from; **Progeny** that which is brought forth or out of; **Issue** that which issues or proceeds from; and all in relation to the family or generation of the human species. *Offspring* is a familiar term applicable to one or many children; *progeny* is employed only as a collective noun for a number; *issue* is used in an indefinite manner without particular regard to number. When we speak of the children themselves, we denominate them the *offspring*; when we speak of the parents, we denominate the children their *progeny*. A child is said to be the only *offspring* of his parent; or he is said to be the *offspring* of low parents; a man is said to have a numerous or a healthy *progeny*, or to leave his *progeny* in circumstances of honour and prosperity. The *issue* is said only in regard to a man that is deceased: he dies with male or female *issue*; with or without *issue*; his property descends to his male *issue* in a direct line.

The same cause that has drawn the hatred of God and man upon the father of liars may justly entail it upon his *offspring* too.—SOUTH.

The base, degenerate from *offspring* ends,
A golden *progeny* from Heav'n descends.—DRYDEN.

Next him King Leyr, in happy place long reigned,
But had no *issue* male him to succeed.—SPENSER.

Often, Frequently.

Often, or its contracted form *oft*, comes in all probability through the medium of the northern languages, from the Greek *ai* again, and signifies properly repetition of action.

Frequently, from *frequent*, crowded, or numerous, respects a plurality or number of objects.

An ignorant man *often* uses a word without knowing what it means; ignorant people *frequently* mistake the meaning of the words they hear. A person goes out very *often* in the course of a week; he has *frequently* six or seven persons to visit him in the course of that time. *By doing a thing *often* it becomes habitual;

* Vide Truism: "Often, frequently."

we *frequently* meet the same persons in the route which we *often* take.

Often from the careless back
Of herds and flocks a thousand tugging hills
Pluck hair and wool.—THOMSON.

Here *frequent* at the visionary hour,
When musing midnight reigns or silent noon,
Angelic harps are in full concert heard.—THOMSON.

Old, v. Elderly.

Old, Ancient, Antique, Antiquated, Old-Fashioned, Obsolete.

Old, in German *alt*, low German, *old*, &c., comes from the Greek *εως* of yesterday.

Ancient, in French *ancien*, and **Antique**, **Antiquated**, all come from the Latin *antiquus*, and *antea* before, signifying in general before our time.

Old-Fashioned signifies after an *old* fashion.

Obsolete, in Latin *obsoletus*, participle of *obsoleo*, signifies literally out of use.

Old respects what has long existed and still exists; *ancient* what existed at a distant period, but does not necessarily exist at present; *antique*, that which has long been *ancient*, and of which there remain but faint traces: *antiquated*, *old-fashioned*, and *obsolete* that which has ceased to be any longer used or esteemed. A *fashion* is *old* when it has been long in use; a custom is *ancient* when its use has long been passed; a bust or statue is *antique* when the model of it only remains; a person is *antiquated* whose appearance is grown out of date; manners which are gone quite out of *fashion* are *old-fashioned*; a word or custom is *obsolete* which is grown out of use.

The *old* is opposed to the new: some things are the worse for being *old*; other things are the better. *Ancient* and *antique* are opposed to modern: all things are valued the more for being *ancient* or *antique*; hence we esteem the writings of the *ancients* even above those of the moderns. The *antiquated* is opposed to the customary and established; it is that which we cannot like, because we cannot esteem it: the *old-fashioned* is opposed to the fashionable: there is much in the *old-fashioned* to like and esteem; there is much that is ridiculous in the fashionable: the *obsolete* is opposed to the current; the *obsolete* may be good; the current may be vulgar and mean.

The Venetians are tenacious of *old* laws and customs to their great prejudice.—ADDISON.

But sev'n wise men the *ancient* world did know,
We scarce know sev'n who think themselves not so.
DENHAM.

Under an oak, whose *antique* root peeps out
Under the brook that brawls along this wood,
A poor sequester'd stag,
That from the hunters' aim had ta'en a hurt,
Did come to languish.—SHAKESPEARE.

The swords in the arsenal of Venice are *old-fashioned* and unwieldy.—ADDISON.

Whoever thinks it necessary to regulate his conversation by *antiquated* rules will be rather despised for his futility than caressed for his politeness.—JOHNSON.

Older, v. Senior.

Old-Fashioned, v. Old.

Old Times, v. Formerly.

Omen, Prognostic, Presage.

All these terms express some token or sign what is to come. *Omen*, in Latin *omen*, probably comes from the Greek *οικουα* to think, because it is what gives rise to much conjecture.

Prognostic, in Greek *προγνωστικον*, from *προγνωστω* to know before, signifies the sign by which one judges a thing beforehand, because a *prognostic* is rather a deduction by the use of the understanding.

Presage, *v. Augur*.

The *omen* and *prognostic* are both drawn from external objects; the *presage* is drawn from one's own feelings. The *omen* is drawn from objects that have no necessary connection with the thing they are made to represent; it is the fruit of the imagination, and rests on superstition: the *prognostic*, on the contrary, is a sign which partakes in some degree of the quality of the thing denoted. *Omens* were drawn by the heathens from the flight of birds, or the entrails of beasts; *prognostics* are discovered only by an acquaintance with the objects in which they exist, as the *prognostics* of a mortal disease are known to none so well as the physician; the *prognostics* of a storm or tempest are best known to the mariner. The *omen* and *presage* respect either good or bad events; *prognostic* respects mostly the bad. It is an *omen* of our success if we find those of whom we have to ask a favour in a good-humour; the spirit of discontent which pervades the countenances and discourse of a people is a *prognostic* of some popular commotion; the quickness of powers discoverable in a boy is sometimes a *presage* of his future greatness.

A signal *omen* stopp'd the passing host.—POPE.

Though your *prognostics* run too fast,
They must be verified at last.—SWIFT.

I know but one way of fortifying my soul against these gloomy *presages*, that is, by securing to myself the protection of that Being who disposes of events.—ADDISON.

To Omit, *v. To neglect*.

On One's Guard, *v. Aware*.

One, Single, Only.

Unity is the common idea of all these terms: and at the same time the whole signification of *One*, which is opposed to none: *Single*, in Latin *singulus*, each or one by itself, probably contracted from *sine angulo* without an angle, because what is entirely by itself cannot form an angle, signifies that *one* which is abstracted from others, and is particularly opposed to two, or a double which may form a pair; *Only*, contracted from *only*, signifying in the form of unity, is employed for that of which there is no more. A person has *one* child, is a positive expression that bespeaks its own meaning: a person has a *single* child, conveys the idea that there ought to be or might be more, that more was expected, or that once there were more: a person has an *only* child implies that he never had more.

For shame Rutilians, can you bear the sight,
Of *one* exposed for all, in *single* fight?—DRYDEN.

Homely but wholesome roots
My daily food, and water from the nearest spring
My *only* drink.—FILMER.

Only, *v. One*.

Only, *v. Solitary*.

Onset, *v. Attack*.

Onward, Forward, Progressive.

Onward is taken in the literal sense of going nearer to an object: *Forward* is taken in the sense of going from an object, or going farther in the line before one: *Progressive* has the sense of going gradually or step by step before one.

A person goes *onward* who does not stand still; he goes *forward* who does not recede; he goes *progressively* who goes *forward* at certain intervals.

Onward is taken only in the proper acceptance of travelling; the traveller who has lost his way feels it necessary to go *onward* with the hope of arriving at some point; *forward* is employed in the improper as well as the proper application; a traveller goes *forward* in order to reach his point of destination as quickly as possible; a learner uses his utmost endeavours in order to get *forward* in his learning; *progressively* is employed only in the improper application to what requires time and labour in order to bring it to a conclusion; every man goes on *progressively* in his art, until he arrives at the point of perfection attainable by him.

Remote, unfriended, melancholy, slow,
Or by the lazy Scheld, or wandering Po,
Or *onward* where the rude Carinthian boor,
Against the houseless stranger shuts the door,
Where'er I roam, whatever realms to see,
My heart untravell'd fondly turns to thee.
GOLDSMITH.

Harbood the chairman was much blamed for his rashness; he said the duty of the chair was always to set things *forward*.—BURNETT.

Reason *progressive*, instinct is complete.—YOUNG.

Opake, Dark.

Opake, in Latin *opacus*, comes from *ops* the earth, because the earth is the *darkest* of all bodies; the word *opake* is to *Dark* as the species to the genus, for it expresses that species of *darkness* which is inherent in solid bodies, in distinction from those which emit light from themselves, or admit of light into themselves; it is therefore employed scientifically for the more vulgar and familiar term *dark*. On this ground the earth is termed an *opake* body in distinction from the sun, moon, or other luminous bodies: any solid substances, as a tree or a stone, is an *opake* body, in distinction from glass, which is a clear or transparent body.

But all sunshine, as when his beams at noon,
Culminate from th' equator as they now
Shot upward still, whence no way round
Shadow from body *opake* can fall.—MILTON.

Open, *v. Candid*.

Open, *v. Frank*.

Opening, Aperture, Cavity.

Opening signifies in general any place left open without defining any circumstances ; the **Aperture** is generally a specific kind of opening which is considered scientifically : there are *openings* in a wood when the trees are partly cut away ; *openings* in streets by the removal of houses ; or *openings* in a fence that has been broken down ; but anatomists speak of *apertures* in the skull or in the heart, and the naturalist describes the *apertures* in the nests of bees, ants, beavers, and the like ; the *opening* or *aperture* is the commencement of an inclosure ; the **Cavity** is the whole inclosure : hence they are frequently as a part to the whole ; many animals make a *cavity* in the earth for their nest with only a small *aperture* for their regress and ingress.

The scented dew
Betrays her early labyrinth, and deep
In scattered sullen *openings*, far behind,
With every breeze she hears the coming storm.
THOMSON.

In less than a minute he had thrust his little person through the *aperture*, and again and again perches upon his neighbour's cage.—COWPER.

In the centre of every floor, from top to bottom is the chief room, of no great extent, round which there are narrow *cavities* or recesses.—JOHNSON.

Operation, *v. Action*.

Operation, *v. Work*.

Opiniated, or Opiniative, Conceited, Egoistical.

A fondness for one's opinion bespeaks the **Opiniated** man ; a fond conceit of one's self bespeaks the **Conceited** man : a fond attachment to himself bespeaks the **Egoistical** man : a liking for one's self or one's own is evidently the common idea that runs through these terms ; they differ in the mode and in the object.

An *opiniated* man is not only fond of his own *opinion*, but full of his own *opinion* ; he has an *opinion* on every thing, which is the best possible *opinion*, and is therefore delivered freely to every one, that they may profit in forming their own *opinions*. A *conceited* man has a *conceit* or an idle fond *opinion* of his own talent ; it is not only high in competition with others, but it is so high as to be set above others. The *conceited* man does not want to follow the ordinary means of acquiring knowledge : his *conceit* suggests to him that his talent will supply labour, application, reading and study, and every other contrivance which men have commonly employed for their improvement ; he sees by intuition what another learns by experience and observation ; he knows in a day what others want years to acquire ; he learns of himself what others are contented to get by means of instruction. The *egoistical* man makes himself the darling theme of his own contemplation ; he admires and loves himself to that degree that he can talk and think of nothing else ; his children, his house, his garden, his rooms, and the like, are the incessant theme of his conversation, and become invaluable from the mere circumstance of belonging to him.

An *opiniated* man is the most unfit for conversation, which only affords pleasure by an alternate and equable communication of sentiment. A *conceited* man is the most unfit for co-operation, where a junction of talent and effort is essential to bring things to a conclusion. An *egoistical* man is the most unfit to be a companion or friend, for he does not know how to value or like anything out of himself.

Down was he cast from all his greatness, as it is pity but all such politic *opiniators* should.—SOUTH.

No great measure at a very difficult crisis can be pursued which is not attended with some mischief ; none but *conceited* pretenders in public business hold any other language.—BURKE.

To show their particular aversion to speaking in the first person, the gentlemen of Port Royal branded this form of writing with the name of *egotism*.—ADDISON.

Opiniative, *v. Opiniated*.

Opinion, Sentiment, Notion.

Opinion, in Latin *opinio* from *opinor*, and the Greek *εἰναι* to think or judge, is the work of the head.

Sentiment, from *sentio* to feel, is the work of the heart.

Notion, in Latin *notio*, from *nosco* to know, is a simple operation of the thinking faculty.

We form *opinions* : we have *sentiments* : we get *notions*. *Opinions* are formed on speculative matter : they are the result of reading, experience, and reflection : *sentiments* are entertained on matters of practice, they are the consequence of habits and circumstances : *notions* are gathered upon sensible objects, and arise out of the casualties of hearing and seeing. We have *opinions* on religion, as respects its doctrines ; we have *sentiments* on religion as respects its practice and its precepts. The unity of the Godhead in the general sense and the doctrine of the Trinity in the particular sense, are *opinions* : honour and gratitude towards the Deity, the sense of our dependence upon him, and obligations to him are *sentiments*.

Opinions are more liable to error than *sentiments* ; the former depend upon knowledge, and must therefore be liable to inaccuracy ; the latter depend rather upon instinct, and a well organized frame of mind. *Notions* are still more liable to error than either ; they are the immature decisions of the uninformed mind on the appearances of things. The difference of *opinion* among men, on the most important questions of human life, is a sufficient evidence that the mind of man is very easily led astray in matters of *opinion* : whatever difference of *opinion* there may be among Christians, there is but one *sentiment* of love and good-will among those who follow the example of Christ, rather than their own passions : the *notions* of a Deity are so imperfect among savages in general, that they seem to amount to little more than an indistinct idea of some superior invisible agent.

No, cousin, (said Henry IV. when charged by the Duke of Bouillon with having changed his religion) I have changed no religion but an *opinion*.—HOWEL.

There are never great numbers in any nation who can raise a pleasing discourse from their own stock of *sentiments* and images.—JOHNSON.

This letter comes to your lordship, accompanied with a small writing, entitled a *notion*; for such alone can that piece be called which aspires no higher than to the forming a project.—SHAFTESBURY.

Opponent, v. Enemy.

Opportunity, v. Occasion.

To Oppose, v. To combat.

To Oppose, v. To contradict.

To Oppose v. To object.

To Oppose, Resist, Withstand, Thwart.

Oppose, v. To contradict.

Resist signifies literally to stand back, away from, or against.

With in **Withstand** has the force of *re* in *resist*.

Thwart, from the German *quer* cross, signifies to come across.

The action of setting one thing up against another is obviously expressed by all these terms, but they differ in the manner and the circumstances. **To oppose** is the most general and unqualified term. It simply denotes the relative position of two objects, and when applied to persons it does not necessarily imply any personal characteristic: we may *oppose* reason or force to force; or things may be *opposed* to each other which are in an *opposite* direction, as a house to a church. **Resist** is always an act of more or less force when applied to persons; it is mostly a culpable action, as when men *resist* lawful authority; *resistance* is in fact always bad, unless in case of actual self-defence. **Opposition** may be made in any form, as when we *oppose* a person's admittance into a house by our personal efforts: or *oppose* his admission into a society by a declaration of our opinions. **Resistance** is always a direct action, as when we *resist* an invading army by the sword, or *resist* the evidence of our senses by denying our assent; or, in relation to things, when wood or any hard substance *resists* the violent efforts of steel or iron to make an impression.

Withstand and **thwart** are modes of *resistance* applicable only to conscious agents. **To withstand** is negative; it implies not to yield to any foreign agency: thus, a person *withstands* the entreaties of another to comply with a request. **To thwart** is positive; it is actively to cross the will of another: thus humourous people are perpetually *thwarting* the wishes of those with whom they are in connection. **Habitual opposition**, whether in act or in spirit, is equally senseless; and none but conceited or turbulent people are guilty of it. **Oppositionists** to government are dangerous members of society, and are ever preaching up *resistance* to constituted authorities. It is a happy thing when a young man can *withstand* the allurements of pleasure. It is a part of a Christian's duty to bear with patience the untoward events of life that *thwart* his purposes.

So hot th' assault, so high the tumult rose,
While ours defend, and while the Greeks oppose.
DRYDEN.

Particular instances of second-sight have been given with such evidence, as neither Bacon nor Boyle have been able to *resist*.—JOHNSON.

For twice five days the good old seer *withstood*
Th' intended treason, and was dumb to blood.
DRYDEN.

The understanding and will never disagreed (before the fall); for the proposals of the one never *thwarted* the inclinations of the other.—SOUTH.

Opposite, v. Adverse.

Opprobrium, v. Infamy.

To Oppugn, v. To confute.

Option, Choice.

Option is immediately of Latin derivation, and is consequently a term of less frequent use than the word **Choice**, which has been shown (*v. To choose*) to be of Celtic origin. The former term, from the Greek *προποιαι* to see or consider, implies an uncontrolled act of the mind; the latter a simple leaning of the will. We speak of *option* only as regards one's freedom from external constraint in the act of *choosing*: one speaks of *choice* only as the simple act itself. The *option* or the power of *choosing* is given; the *choice* itself is made: hence we say a thing is at a person's *option*, or it is his own *option*, or the *option* is left to him, in order to designate his freedom of *choice* more strongly than is expressed by the word *choice* itself.

Whilst they talk we must make our *choice*, they or the Jacobins. We have no other *option*.—BURKE.

Opulence, v. Riches.

Oral, v. Verbal.

Oration, v. Address.

Oratory, v. Elocution.

Orb, v. Circle.

To Ordain, v. To appoint.

To Order, v. To appoint.

Order, v. Class.

Order, v. Command.

Order, v. Direction.

Order, Method, Rule.

Order, v. To dispose.

Method, in French *methode*, Latin *methodus*, Greek *μεθοδος* from *μετα* and *odos*, signifies the ready or right way to do a thing.

Rule comes from the Latin *regula* a rule, and *rego* to govern, direct, or make straight, the former expressing the act of making a thing straight or that by which it is made so; the latter the abstract quality of being so made.

Order is applied in general to everything that is disposed; *method* and *rule* are applied only to that which is done; the *order* lies in consulting the time, the place, and the object, so as to make them accord; the *method* consists in the right choice of means to an end; the *rule* consists in that which will keep us in the right way. Where there is a number of objects there must be *order* in the disposition of them: there must be *order* in a school as to the

arrangement both of the pupils and of the business: where there is work to carry on, or any object to obtain, or any art to follow, there must be *method* in the pursuit; a tradesman or merchant must have *method* in keeping his accounts; a teacher must have a *method* for the communication of instruction the *rule* is the part of the *method*; it is that on which the *method* rests; there cannot be *method* without *rule*, but there may be *rule* without *method*. the *method* varies with the thing that is to be done; the *rule* is that which is permanent and serves as a guide under all circumstances. We adopt the *method* and follow the *rule*. A painter adopts a certain *method* of preparing his colours according to the rules laid down by his art.

Order is said of every complicated machine, either of a physical or a moral kind: the *order* of the universe, by which every part is made to harmonize to the other part, and all individually to the whole collectively, is that which constitutes its principal beauty: as rational beings we aim at introducing the same *order* into the moral scheme of society: *order* is therefore that which is founded upon the nature of things, and seems in its extensive sense to comprehend all the rest. *Method* is the work of the understanding, mostly as it is employed in the mechanical process; sometimes, however, as respects intellectual objects. *Rule* is said either as it respects mechanical and physical actions or moral conduct.

The *order* of society is preserved by means of government, or authority: laws or *rules* are employed by authority as instruments in the preservation of *order*: no work should be performed, whether it be the building a house, or the writing a book, without *method*; this *method* will be more or less correct, as it is formed according to definite *rules*.

The term *rule* is, however, as before observed, employed distinctly from either *order* or *method*, for it applies to the moral conduct of the individual. The Christian religion contains *rules* for the guidance of our conduct in all the relations of human society.

As epithets, *orderly*, *methodical*, and *regular*, are applied to persons and even to things according to the above distinction of the nouns: an *orderly* man, or an *orderly* society, is one that adheres to the established *order* of things: the former in his domestic habits, the latter in their public capacity, their social meetings, and their social measures. A *methodical* man is one who adopts *method* in all he sets about; such a one may sometimes run into the extreme of formality, by being precise where precision is not necessary: we cannot speak of a *methodical* society, for *method* is altogether a personal quality. A man is *regular*, inasmuch as he follows a certain *rule* in his moral actions, and thereby preserves a uniformity of conduct: a *regular* society is one founded by a certain prescribed *rule*.

A *disorderly* person in a family discomposes its domestic œconomy: a man who is *disorderly* in his business throws everything into confusion. It is of peculiar importance for a person to be *methodical* who has the superintendence of other people's labour: much time is lost and much fruitless trouble occasioned by the want of *method*: *regularity*

of life is of as much more importance than *order* and *method*, as a man's durable happiness is to the happiness of the moment: the *orderly* and *methodical* respect only the transitory modes of things; but the *regular* concerns a man both for body and soul.

These terms are in like manner applied to that which is personal; we say, an *orderly* proceeding, or an *orderly* course, for what is done in due *order*: a *regular* proceeding, or a *regular* course, which goes on according to a prescribed *rule*; a *methodical* grammar, a *methodical* delineation, and the like, for what is done according to a given *method*.

The *order* and *method* of nature is generally very different from our measures and proportions.—BURKE.

Their story I revolv'd; and reverent own'd
Their polish'd arts of *rule*, their human virtues. MALLET.

To *Order*, v. To *place*.

Order, v. *Succession*.

Ordinary, v. *Common*.

Orifice, Perforation.

Orifice, in Latin *orificium* or *orificium*, from *os* and *factum*, signifies a made mouth, that is an opening made, as it were.

Perforation, in Latin *perforatio*, from *perforo*, signifies a piercing through.

These terms are both scientifically employed by medical men, to designate certain cavities in the human body; but the former respects that which is natural, the latter that which is artificial: all the vessels of the human body have their *orifices* which are so constructed as to open or close of themselves. Surgeons are frequently obliged to make *perforations* into the bones: sometimes *perforation* may describe what comes from a natural process, but it denotes a cavity made through a solid substance; but the *orifice* is particularly applicable to such openings as most resemble the mouth in form and use. In this manner the words may be extended in their application to other bodies besides animal substances, and in other sciences besides anatomy: hence we speak of the *orifice* of a tube; the *orifice* of any flower, and the like; or the *perforation* of a tree, by means of a cannon ball or an iron instrument.

Origin, Original, Beginning, Rise, Source.

The *Origin* and *Original* both come from the Latin *origo* to rise: the former designating the abstract property of *rising*: the latter the thing that is *risen*. *Origin* is said only of things that *rise*; *original* is said of those which give an *origin* to another; the *origin* serves to date the existence of a thing; the term *original* serves to show the author of a thing, and is opposed to the copy. The *origin* of the world is described in the first chapter of Genesis; Adam was the *original* from whom all the human race has sprung.

Origin has respect to the cause, *Beginning* to the period, of existence: everything owes its existence to the *origin*; it dates its existence from the *beginning*: there cannot be

an *origin* without a *beginning* : but there may be a *beginning* where we do not speak of an *origin*. We look to the *origin* of a thing in order to learn its nature : we look to the *beginning* in order to learn its duration. When we have discovered the *origin* of a quarrel we are in a fair way of becoming acquainted with the aggressors ; when we trace a quarrel to the *beginning*, we may easily ascertain how long it has lasted.

Origin and the *Rise* are both employed for the primary state of existence ; but the latter is a much more familiar term than the former : we speak of the *origin* of an empire, the *origin* of a family, the *origin* of a dispute, and the like ; but we say that a river takes its *rise* from a certain mountain, that certain disorders take their *rise* from particular circumstances which happen in early life : it is moreover observable that the term *origin* is confined solely to the first commencement of a thing's existence ; but *rise* comprehends its gradual progress in the first stages of its existence : the *origin* of the noblest families is in the first instance sometimes ignoble ; the largest rivers take their *rise* in small streams. We look to the *origin* as to the cause of existence : we look to the *rise* as to the situation in which the thing commences to exist, or the process by which it grows up into existence. It is in vain to attempt to search the *origin* of evil, unless as we find it explained in the word of God. Diseases take their *rise* in certain parts of the body, and after lying for some time dormant, break out in after life.

The *origin* and *rise* are said of only one object ; the *Source* is said of that which produces a succession of objects : the *origin* of evil in general has given *rise* to much speculation ; the love of pleasure is the *source* of incalculable mischiefs to individuals, as well as to society at large : the *origin* exists but once ; the *source* is lasting : the *origin* of every family is to be traced to our first parent, Adam ; we have a never-failing *source* of consolation in religion.

Christianity explains the *origin* of all the disorders which at present take place on earth.—BLAIR.

And had his better half, his bride,
Carv'd from th' *original*, his side.—BUTLER.

But wit and weaving had the same *beginning*,
Pallas first taught in poetry and spinning.—SWIFT.

The friendship which is to be practised or expected by *human* mortals must take its *rise* from mutual pleasure.—JOHNSON.

One *source* of the sublime is infinity.—BURKE.

Original, v. Origin.

Original, v. Primary.

Ostensible, v. Colourable.

Ostentation, v. Show.

Oval, v. Oblong.

Over, v. Above.

To Overbalance, Outweigh, Preponderate.

To *Overbalance* is to throw the balance over on one side.

To *Outweigh* is to exceed in weight.

To *Preponderate*, from *præ* before and *pondus* a weight, signifies also to exceed in weight.

Although these terms approach so near to each other in their original meaning, yet they have now a different application : in the proper sense, a person *overbalances* himself who loses his balance and goes on one side ; a heavy body *outweighs* one that is light, when they are put into the same pair of scales. *Overbalance* and *outweigh* are likewise used in the improper application ; *preponderate* is never used otherwise : things are said to *overbalance* which are supposed to turn the scale to one side or the other ; they are said to *outweigh* when they are to be weighed against each other ; they are said to *preponderate* when one weighs everything else down : the evils which arise from innovations in society commonly *overbalance* the good ; the will of a parent should *outweigh* every personal consideration in the mind ; which will always be the case where the power of religion *preponderates*.

Whatever any man may have written or done, his precepts or his valour will scarcely *overbalance* the unimportant uniformity which runs through his time.—JOHNSON.

If endless ages can *outweigh* an hour,
Let not the laurel but the palm inspire.—YOUNG.

Looks which do not correspond with the heart cannot be assumed without labour, nor continued without pain ; the motive to relinquish them must, therefore, soon *preponderate*.—HAWKESWORTH.

To Overbear, Bear Down, Overpower, Overwhelm, Subdue.

To *Overbear* is to *bear* one's self over another, that is, to make another *bear* one's weight ; to *Bear Down* is literally to bring down by *bearing* upon ; to *Overpower* is to get the *power* over an object ; to *Overwhelm*, from *whelm* or *wheel*, signifies to turn quite round as well as over ; to *Subdue* (v. *To conquer*) is literally to bring or put underfoot. A man *overbears* by carrying himself higher than others, and putting to silence those who might claim an equality with him ; an *overbearing* demeanor is most conspicuous in narrow circles ; where an individual, from certain casual advantages, affects a superiority over the members of the same community. To *bear down* is an act of greater violence : one *bears down* opposition ; it is properly the opposing force to force, until one side yields : there may be occasions in which *bearing down* is fully justifiable and laudable. Mr. Pitt was often compelled to *bear down* a factious party which threatened to overturn the government. *Overpower*, as the term implies, belongs to the exercise of power which may be either physical or moral : one may be *overpowered* by another, who in a struggle gets one into his power ; or one may be *overpowered* in an argument, when the argument of one's antagonist is such as to bring one to silence. One is *overborne* or *borne down* by the exertion of individuals ; *overpowered* by the active efforts of individual, or by the force of circumstances ; *overwhelmed* by circumstances or things only ; *overborne* by another of superior influence ; *borne down* by

the force of his attack; *overpowered* by numbers, by entreaties, by looks, and the like; and is *overwhelmed* by the torrent of words, or the impetuosity of the attack.

Overpower and *overwhelm* denote a partial superiority; *subdue* denotes that which is permanent and positive: we may *overpower* or *overwhelm* for a time, or to a certain degree; but to *subdue* is to get an entire and lasting superiority. *Overpower* and *overwhelm* are said of what passes between persons nearly on a level; but *subdue* is said of those who are, or may be, reduced to a low state of inferiority: individuals or armies are *overpowered* or *overwhelmed*; individuals or nations are *subdued*: we may be *overpowered* in one engagement, and *overpower* our opponent in another; we may be *overwhelmed* by the suddenness and impetuosity of an attack, yet we may recover ourselves so as to renew it; but when we are *subdued* all power of resistance is gone.

To *overpower*, *overwhelm*, and *subdue*, are likewise applied to the moral feelings, as well as to the external relations of things: but the two former are the effects of external circumstances; the latter follows from the exercise of the reasoning powers: the tender feelings are *overpowered*; the mind is *overwhelmed* with painful feelings; the unruly passions are *subdued* by the force of religious contemplation: a person may be so *overpowered*, on seeing a dying friend, as to be unable to speak; a person may be so *overwhelmed* with grief, upon the death of a near and dear relative, as to be unable to attend to his ordinary avocations; the passion of anger has been so completely *subdued* by the influence of religion on the heart, that instances have been known of the most irascible tempers being converted into the most mild and forbearing.

The duty of fear, like that of other passions, is not to *overbear* reason, but to assist it.—JOHNSON.

All colours that are more luminous (than green) *overpower* and dissipate the animal spirits which are employed in sight.—ADDISON.

Such implements of mischief as shall dash
To pieces, and *overwhelm* whatever stands
Adverse.—MILTON.

For what avails
Valour or strength, though matchless, quell'd with pain,
Which all *subdues*!—MILTON.

Overbearing, v. Imperious.

To Overcome, v. To conquer.

To Overflow, Inundate, Deluge.

What *Overflows* simply *flows over*: what *Inundates* (from *in* and *unda* a wave) *flows into*; what *Deluges* (from *diluo*) washes away.

The term *overflow* bespeaks abundance; whatever exceeds the measure of contents must *flow over*, because it is more than can be held: to *inundate* bespeaks not only abundance, but vehemence: when it *inundates* it *flows* in faster than is desired, it fills to an inconvenient height: to *deluge* bespeaks impetuosity; a *deluge* irresistibly carries away all before it. This explanation of these terms in their proper sense will illustrate their improper application: the heart is said to *overflow* with joy, with grief, with bitterness, and

the like, in order to denote the superabundance of the thing; a country is said to be *inundated* by swarms of inhabitants, when speaking of numbers who intrude themselves to the annoyance of the natives; the town is said to be *deluged* with publications of different kinds, when they appear in such profusion and in such quick succession as to supersede others of more value.

I am too full of you, not to *overflow* upon those I converse with.—POPE.

There was such an *inundation* of speakers, young speakers in every sense of the word, that neither my Lord Germaine, nor myself, could find room for a single word.—GIBBON.

To all those who did not wish to *deluge* their country in blood, the accepting of King William was an act of necessity.—BURKE.

To Overhear, v. To hear.

To Overpower, v. To beat.

To Overpower, v. To overbear.

To Overrule, Supersede.

To *Overrule* is literally to get the superiority of rule; and to *Supersede* is to get the upper or superior seat; but the former is employed only as the act of persons; the latter is applied to things as the agents: a man may be *overruled* in his domestic government, or he may be *overruled* in a public assembly, or he may be *overruled* in the cabinet; large works in general *supersede* the necessity of smaller ones, by containing that which is superior both in quantity and quality.

When fancy begins to be *overruled* by reason, and corrected by experience, the most artful tale raises but little curiosity.—JOHNSON.

Christoval received a commission empowering him to supersede Cortes.—ROBERTSON.

Overruling, v. Prevailing.

Overrun, v. To overspread.

Overspread, Overrun, Ravage.

To *Overspread* signifies simply to cover the whole surface of a body; but to *Overrun* is a mode of spreading, namely by running; things in general, therefore, are said to *overspread* which admit of extension; nothing can be said to *overrun* but what literally or figuratively runs: the face is *overspread* with spots; the ground is *overrun* with weeds. To *overrun* and to *Ravage* are both employed to imply the active and extended destruction of an enemy; but the former expresses more than the latter: a small body may *ravage* in particular parts; but immense numbers are said to *overrun*, as they run into every part: the Barbarians *overran* all Europe, and settled in different countries; detachments are sent out to *ravage* the country or neighbourhood.

The storm of hail and fire, with the darkness that *overspread* the land for three days, are described with great strength.—ADDISON.

Most despotic governments are naturally *overrun* with ignorance and barbarity.—ADDISON.

While Herod was absent, the thieves of Trachonites *ravaged* with their depredations all the parts of Judea and Celo-Syria that lay within their reach.—PRIDEAUX.

Oversight, *v. Inadvertency.*

Oversight, *v. Inspection.*

To Overthrow, *v. To beat.*

To Overthrow, *v. To overturn.*

To Overturn, Overthrow, Subvert,
Invert, Reverse.

To Overturn is simply to turn over, which may be more or less gradual: but to **Overthrow** is to throw over, which will be more or less violent. To **overturn** is to turn a thing either with its side or its bottom upward; but **to Subvert** is to turn that under which should be upward: to **Reverse** is to turn that before which should be behind; and to **Invert** is to place that on its head which should rest on its feet. These terms differ accordingly in their application and circumstances: things are *overturned* by contrivance and gradual means; infidels attempt to *overturn* Christianity by the arts of ridicule and falsehood: the French revolutionists *overthrew* their lawful government by every act of violence. To *overturn* is said of small matters; to *subvert* only of national or large concerns: domestic economy may be *overturned*; religious or political establishments may be *subverted*; that may be *overturned* which is simply set up; that is *subverted* which has been established: an assertion may be *overturned*; the best sanctioned principles may by artifice be *subverted*.

To *overturn, overthrow, and subvert*, generally involve the destruction of the thing so *overturned, overthrown, or subverted*, or at least renders it for the time useless, and are, therefore, mostly unallowed acts; but *reverse and invert*, which have a more particular application, have a less specific character of propriety: we may *reverse* a proposition by taking the negative instead of the affirmative; a decree may be *reversed* so as to render it nugatory; but both of these acts may be right or wrong, according to circumstances: likewise, the order of particular things may be *inverted* to suit the convenience of parties; but the order of society cannot be *inverted* without *subverting* all the principles on which civil society is built.

An age is rip'ning in revolving fate,
When Troy shall *overturn* the Grecian state.
DRYDEN.

Thus prudes, by characters *o'erthrown*,
Imagine that they raise their own.—GAY.

Others, from public spirit, laboured to prevent a civil war, which, whatever party should prevail, must shake, and perhaps *subvert*, the Spanish power.—ROBERTSON.

Our ancestors affected a certain pomp of style, and this affectation, I suspect, was the true cause of their so frequently *inverting* the natural order of their words, especially in poetry.—TYRREWHITT.

He who walks not uprightly has neither from the presumption of God's mercy *reverting* the decree of his justice, nor from his own purposes of a future repentance, any sure ground to set his foot upon.—SOUTH.

To Overwhelm, *v. To overbear.*

To Overwhelm, Crush.

To Overwhelm (*v. To overbear*) is to cover with a heavy body, so that one should sink

under it: to **Crush** is to destroy the consistency of a thing by violent pressure; a thing may be *crushed* by being *overwhelmed*, but it may be *overwhelmed* without being *crushed*; and it may be *crushed* without being *overwhelmed*: the girl Tarpeia, who betrayed the Capitoline hill to the Sabines, is said to have been *overwhelmed* with their arms, by which she was *crushed* to death: when many persons fall on one, he may be *overwhelmed* but not necessarily *crushed*: when a waggon goes over a body, it may be *crushed*, but not *overwhelmed*.

Let not the political metaphysics of Jacobins break prison, to burst like Levanter, to sweep the earth with their hurricane, and to break up the fountains of the great deep to *overwhelm* us.—BURKE.

Melt his cold heart, and wake dead nature in him.
Crush him in thy arms.—OTWAY.

Out-Cry, *v. Noise.*

To Out-Do, *v. To exceed.*

Outline, *v. Sketch.*

To Outlive, Survive.

To Outlive is literally to live out the life of another, to live longer: to **Survive**, in French *survivre*, is to live after; the former is employed to express the comparison between two lives; the latter to denote a protracted existence beyond any given term: one person is said properly to *outlive* another who enjoys a longer life; but we speak of *surviving* persons or things, in an indefinite or unqualified manner: it is not a peculiar blessing to *outlive* all our nearest relatives and friends; no man can be happy in *surviving* his honour.

A man never *outlives* his conscience, and that for this cause only he cannot *outlive* himself.—SOUTH.

Of so vast, so lasting, so *surviving* an extent is the malignity of a great guilt.—SOUTH.

Outrage, *v. Affront.*

Outside, *v. Show.*

Outward, External, Exterior.

Outward, or inclined to the *out*, after the manner of the *out*, indefinitely describes the situation; **External**, from the Latin *externus* and *extra*, is more definite in its sense, since it is employed only in regard to such objects as are conceived to be independent of man as a thinking being: hence, we may speak of the *outward* part of a building, of a board, of a table, a box, and the like; but of *external* objects acting on the mind, or of an *external* agency. **Exterior** is still more definite than either, as it expresses a higher degree of the *outward* or *external*; the former being in the comparative, and the two latter in the positive degree: when we speak of any thing which has two coats, it is usual to designate the outermost by the name of the *exterior*; when we speak simply of the surface, without reference to anything behind, it is denominated *external*; as the *exterior* coat of a walnut, or the *external* surface of things. In the moral application the *external* or *outward* is that which comes simply to the view; but the

exterior is that which is prominent, and which consequently may conceal something: a man may sometimes neglect the *outside*, who is altogether mindful of the *in*: a man with a pleasing *exterior* will sometimes gain more friends than he who has more solid merit.

And though my *outward* state misfortune hath
Depress'd thus low, it cannot reach my faith.
DENHAM.

The controversy about the reality of *external* evils is now at an end.—JOHNSON.

But when a monarch sins, it should be secret,
To keep *exterior* show of sanctity,
Maintain respect, and cover bad example.
DRYDEN.

To Outweigh, *v.* To Overbalance.

To Own, *v.* To acknowledge.

Owner, *v.* Possessor.

P.

Pace, Step.

Pace, in French *pas*, Latin *passus*, comes from the Hebrew *pashat* to pass, and signifies the act of passing, or the ground passed over.

Step, which comes through the medium of the northern languages, from the Greek *στέβω*, signifies the act of *stepping*, or the ground stepped over.

As respects the act, the *pace* expresses the general manner of passing on, or moving the body; the *step* implies the manner of treading with the foot: the *pace* is distinguished by being either a walk or a run; and in regard to horses a trot or a gallop: the *step* is distinguished by the right or left, the forward or the backward. The same *pace* may be modified so as to be more or less easy, more or less quick; the *step* may vary as it is light or heavy, graceful or ungraceful, long or short: we may go a slow *pace* with long *steps*, or we may go a quick *pace* with short *steps*: a slow *pace* is best suited to the solemnity of a funeral: a long *step* must be taken by soldiers in a slow march.

As respects the space passed or stepped over, the *pace* is a measured distance, formed by a long *step*; the *step*, on the other hand, is indefinitely employed for any space stepped over, but particularly that ordinary space which one *steps* over without an effort: a thousand *paces* was the Roman measurement for a mile; a *step* or two designates almost the shortest possible distance.

To-morrow, to-morrow, and to-morrow,
Creeps in a stealing *pace* from day to day.
SHAKESPEARE.

Grace was in all her *steps*, heaven in her eye,
In every gesture dignity and love.—MILTON.

To Pacify, *v.* To appease.

Pagan, *v.* Gentile.

Pain, Pang, Agony, Anguish.

Pain is to be traced, through the French and northern languages, to the Latin and Greek *ποινή* punishment, *πονος* labour, and *πενουσι* to be poor or in trouble. *Pang* is but a variation of *pain*, contracted from the Teutonic *peinigen* to torment.

Agony comes from the Greek *αγωνίζω* to struggle or contend, signifying the labour or *pain* of a struggle.

Anguish comes from the Latin *ango*, contracted from *ante* and *ago*, to act against, or in direct opposition to, and signifies the *pain* arising from severe pressure.

Pain, which expresses the feeling that is most repugnant to the nature of all sensible beings, is here the generic, and the rest specific terms; *pain* and *agony* are applied indiscriminately to what is physical and mental; *pang* and *anguish* mostly respect that which is mental: *pain* signifies either an individual feeling or a permanent state; *pang* is only a particular feeling: *agony* is sometimes employed for the individual feeling, but more commonly for the state; *anguish* is always employed for the state. *Pain* is indefinite with regard to the degree; it may rise to the highest, or sink to the lowest possible degree; the rest are positively high degrees of *pain*: the *pang* is a sharp *pain*; the *agony* is a severe and permanent *pain*; the *anguish* is an overwhelming *pain*.

The causes of *pain* are as various as the modes of *pain*, or as the circumstances of sensible beings: it attends disease and war, in an infinite variety of forms: the *pangs* of conscience frequently trouble the man who is not yet hardened in guilt: *agony* and *anguish* are produced by violent causes, and disease in its most terrible shape; wounds and torments naturally produce corporeal *agony*; a guilty conscience that is awakened to a sense of guilt will suffer mental *agony*: *anguish* arises altogether from moral causes; the miseries and distresses of others, particularly of those who are nearly related, are most calculated to excite *anguish*: a mother suffers *anguish* when she sees her child labouring under severe *pain*, or in danger of losing its life, without having the power to relieve it.

We should pass on from crime to crime heedless and remorseless, if misery did not stand in our way, and our own *pains* admonish us of our folly.—JOHNSON.

What *pangs* the tender breast of Dido tore.—DRYDEN.

Thou shalt behold him stretch'd in all the *agonies*
Of a tormenting and a shameful death.—OTWAY.

Are these the parting *pangs* which nature feels,
When *anguish* rends the heartstrings?—ROWE.

To Paint, Depict.

Paint and *Depict* both come from the Latin *pingo* to represent forms and figures; as a verb, to *paint* is employed either literally to

represent figures on paper, or to represent circumstances and events by means of words; to *depict* is used only in this latter sense, but the former word expresses a greater exercise of the imagination than the latter: it is the art of the poet to *paint* nature in lively colours; it is the art of the historian or narrator to *depict* a real scene of misery in strong colours. As nouns, *painting* rather describes the action or operation, and *picture* the result.

When we speak of a good *painting* we think particularly of its execution as to drapery, disposition of colours, and the like; but when we speak of a fine *picture*, we refer immediately to the object represented, and the impression which it is capable of producing on the beholder: *paintings* are confined either to oil-paintings or *paintings* in colours: but every drawing, whether in pencil, in crayons, or in Indian ink, may produce a *picture*; and we have likewise *pictures* in embroidery, *pictures* in tapestry, and *pictures* in Mosaic.

The *painting* is almost the natural man,
He is but outside.—SHAKSPEARE.

A *picture* is a poem without words.—ADDISON.

Painting is employed only in the proper sense; *picture* is often used figuratively: old *paintings* derive a value from the master by whom they were executed; a well-regulated family bound together by the ties of affection, presents the truest *picture* of human happiness.

I do not know of any *paintings*, bad or good, which produce the same effect as a poem.—BURKE.

Vision is performed by having a *picture*, formed by the rays of light, reflected from an object on the retina of the eye.—BURKE.

Pair, v. Couple.

Palate, Taste.

Palate, in Latin *palatum*, comes either from the Greek *πρω* to eat, or, which is more probable, from the Etruscan word *farlantum*, signifying the roof or arch of Heaven, or, by an extended application, the roof of the mouth.

Taste comes from the German *tasten* to touch lightly, because the sense of *taste* requires but the slightest touch to excite it.

Palate is, in an improper sense, employed for *taste*, because it is the seat of *taste*; but *taste* is never employed for *palate*: a person is said to have a nice *palate* when he is nice in what he eats or drinks; but his *taste* extends to all matters of sense, as well as those which are intellectual. A man of *taste*, or of a nice *taste*, conveys much more as a characteristic, than a man of a nice *palate*: the former is said only in a good sense; but the latter is particularly applicable to the epicure.

No fruit our *palate* courts, or flow'r our smell.
JENYNS.

In more exalted joys to fix our *taste*,
And wean us from delights that cannot last.
JENYNS.

Pale, Pallid, Wan.

Pale, in French *pale*, and **Pallid**, in Latin *pallidus*, both come from *paleo* to turn *pale*,

which probably comes from the Greek *παλλω* to make white, and that from *παλί* flour.

Wan is connected with *want* and *wane*, signifying in general a deficiency or a losing colour.

Pallid rises upon *pale*, and *wan* upon *pallid*: the absence of colour in any degree, where colour is a requisite quality, constitutes *pale-ness*; but *pallidness* is an excess of *pale-ness*, and *wan* is an unusual degree of *pallidness*: *pale-ness* in the countenance may be temporary; but *pallidness* and *wanness* are permanent; fear, or any sudden emotion, may produce *pale-ness*; but protracted sickness, hunger, and fatigue, bring on *pallidness*; and when these calamities are combined and heightened by every aggravation, they may produce that which is peculiarly termed *wanness*.

Pale is an ordinary term for an ordinary quality, applicable to many very different objects, to persons, colours, lights, and luminaries. *Pale-ness* may be either a natural, or an acquired deficiency: a person is said to be *pale*, a colour *pale*, a light *pale*, the sun *pale*: the deficiency may be desirable or otherwise; the *pale-ness* of the moon is agreeable, that of the complexion the contrary. *Pallid* is an ordinary term for an extraordinary quality: nothing is said to be *pallid* but the human face, and that not from the ordinary course of nature, but as the effect of disease; those who paint are most apt to look *pallid*. *Wan* is an extraordinary term for an ordinary property, it is applicable only to ghostly objects, or such as are rendered monstrous by unusually powerful causes: the effects of death on the human visage are fully expressed by the term *wan*, when applied to an individual who is reduced, by severe abstinence or sickness, to a state bordering on the grave.

Now morn, her lamp *pale* glimmering on the sight,
Scatter'd before her sun reluctant night.—FALCONER.

Her spirits faint,
Her cheeks assume a *pallid* tint.—ADDISON.

And with them comes a third with regal pomp,
But faded splendour *wan*.—MILTON.

To Palliate, v. To extenuate.

Palliate, v. Gloss.

Pallid, v. Pale.

To Palpitate, Flutter, Pant, Gasp.

Palpitate, in Latin *palpitatus*, from *pal-pito*, is a frequentative of the Greek *παλλω* to vibrate.

Flutter, is a frequentative of *fly*, signifying to fly backward and forward in an agitated manner.

Pant, probably derived from *pent*, and the Latin *pendo* to hang in a state of suspense, so as not to be able to move backward or forward, as is the case with the breath when one *pants*.

Gasp is a variation of *gape*, which is the ordinary accompaniment in the action of *gasp-ing*.

These terms agree in a particular manner, as they respect the irregular action of the heart or lungs: the two former are said of the heart; and the two latter of the lungs &

breath; to *palpitate* expresses that which is strong; it is a strong beating of the blood against the vessels of the heart: to *flutter* expresses that which is rapid; it is a violent and alternate motion of the blood backward and forward; fear and suspense produce commonly *palpitation*, but joy and hope produce a *fluttering*; *panting* is, with regard to the breath, what *palpitation* is with regard to the heart; *panting* is occasioned by the inflated state of the respiratory organs which renders this *palpitation* necessary: *gasping* differs from the former, inasmuch as it denotes a direct stoppage of the breath; a cessation of action in the respiratory organs.

No plays have oftener filled the eyes with tears, and the breast with *palpitation*, than those which are variegated with interludes of mirth.—JOHNSON.

She springs aloft, with elevated pride,
Above the tangle mass of low desires,
That bind the *fluttering* crowd.—THOMSON.

All nature fades extinct, and she alone,
Heard, felt, and seen, possesses every thought,
Fills every sense, and *pants* in every vein.
THOMSON.

Had not the soul this outlet to the skies,
In this vast vessel of the universe,
How should we *gasp*, as in an empty void!
YOUNG.

Panegyric, *v. Encomium.*

Pang, *v. Pain.*

To Pant, *v. To palpitate.*

Parable, Allegory,

Parable, in French *parabole*, Greek *παράβολη* from *παράβαλλον*, signifies what is thrown out or set before one, in lieu of something which it resembles.

Allegory, *v. Figure.*

* Both these terms imply a veiled mode of speech, which serves more or less to conceal the main object of the discourse by presenting it under the appearance of something else, which accords with it in most of the particulars: the *parable* is mostly employed for moral purposes; the *allegory* in describing historical events.

The *parable* substitutes some other subject or agent, who is represented under a character that is suitable to the one referred to. In the *allegory* are introduced strange and arbitrary persons in the place of the real personages, or imaginary characteristics, and circumstances are ascribed to real persons.

The *parable* is principally employed in the sacred writings; the *allegory* forms a grand feature in the productions of the eastern nations.

Parade, *v. Show.*

Parasite, *v. Flatterer.*

Pardon, *v. Excuse.*

To Pardon, *v. To forgive.*

Pardonable, *v. Venial.*

To Pare, *v. To peel.*

Parents, *v. Forefathers.*

Park, *v. Forest.*

Parliament, *v. Assembly.*

Parsimonious, *v. Avaricious.*

Parsimony, *v. Economy.*

Parson, *v. Clergyman.*

Part, Division, Portion, Share.

Part, in Latin *pars*, comes from the Hebrew *peresh* to divide.

Division, *v. To divide.*

Portion, in Latin *portio*, is supposed to be changed from *partio*, which comes from *partior* to distribute, and originally from *peresh*, as the word *part*.

Share, in Saxon *scyran* to divide, comes in all probability from the Hebrew *shar* to remain, that is, to remain after a *division*.

Part is a term not only of more general use, but of more comprehensive meaning than *division*; it is always employed for the thing *divided*, but *division* may be either employed for the act of *dividing*, or the thing that is *divided*: but in all cases the word *division* has always a reference to some action, and the agent by whom it has been performed; whereas *part*, which is perfectly abstract, has altogether lost this idea. We always speak of the *part* as opposed to the whole, but of the *division* as it has been made of the whole.

A *part* is formed of itself by accident, or made by design; a *division* is always the effect of design: a *part* is indefinite as to its quantity or nature, it may be large or small, round or square, of any dimension, of any form, of any size, or of any character; but a *division* is always regulated by some certain principles, it depends upon the circumstances of the *divisor* and thing to be *divided*. A page, a line, or a word, is the *part* of any book; but the books, chapters, sections, and paragraphs, are the *divisions* of the book. Stones, wood, water, air, and the like, are *parts* of the world; fire, air, earth, and water, are physical *divisions* of the globe; continents, seas, rivers, mountains, and the like, are geographical *divisions*, under which are likewise included its political *divisions* into countries, kingdoms, &c.

A *part* may be detached from the whole; a *division* is always conceived of in connection with the whole: *portion* and *share* are particular species of *divisions*, which are said of such matters as are assignable to individuals; *portion* respects individuals without any distinction; *share* respects individuals especially referred to. The *portion* of happiness which falls to every man's lot is more equal than is generally supposed; the *share* which partners have in the profits of any undertaking depends upon the sum which each has contributed towards its completion. The *portion* is that which simply comes to anyone; but the *share* is that which belongs to him by a certain right. According to the ancient customs of Normandy, the daughters could have no more than a third *part* of the property for their *share*, which was *divided* in equal *portions* between them.

Shall little haughty ignorance pronounce
His works unwise, of which the smallest *part*
Exceeds the narrow vision of her mind.

THOMSON.

* Vide Abbé Girard; "Parable, allegorie."

A *division* (in a discourse) should be natural and simple.
—BLAIR.

The jars of gen'rous wine, Aecetes' gift,
He set abroach, and for the feast prepar'd,
In equal *portions* with the ven'ous *shar'd*.

DRYDEN.

The monarch, on whom fertile Nile bestows
All which that grateful earth can bear,
Deceives himself, if he suppose
That more than this falls to his *share*.—COWLEY.

Part, Piece, Patch.

Part, v. Part.

Piece, in French *pièce*, in Hebrew *pas* to diminish; whence also comes **Patch**, signifying the thing in its diminished form, that which is less than a whole. The *part* in its strict sense is taken in connection with the whole; the *piece* is the part detached from the whole; the *patch* is that *piece* which is distinguished from others. Things may be divided into *parts* without any express separation; but when divided into *pieces* they are actually cut asunder. Hence we may speak of a loaf a divided into twelve *parts* when it is conceived only to be so; and divided into twelve *pieces*, when it is really so. On this ground, we talk of the *parts* of a country, but not of the *pieces*; and of a *piece* of land, not a *part* of land; so likewise letters are said to be the component *parts* of a word, but the half or the quarter of any given letter is called a *piece*. The chapters, the pages, the lines, &c., are the various *parts* of a book; certain passages or quantities drawn from the book are called *pieces*: the *parts* of matter may be infinitely decomposed; various bodies may be formed out of so ductile a *piece* of matter as clay. The *piece* is that which may sometimes serve as a whole; but the *patch* is that which is always broken and disjointed, a something imperfect; many things may be formed out of a *piece*: but the *patch* only serves to fill up a chasm.

To Partake, Participate, Share.

Partake and **Participate**, the one English, and the other Latin, signify literally to take a *part* in a thing. The former is employed in the proper or improper sense and the latter in the improper sense only: we may *partake* of a feast, or we may *partake* of pleasure, but we *participate* only in pleasure.

To *partake* is a selfish action; to *participate* is either a selfish or a benevolent action: we *partake* of that which pleases ourselves; we *participate* in that which pleases another: we *partake* of a meal with a friend; we *participate* in the gifts of Providence, or in the enjoyments which another feels.

To *partake* is the act of taking or getting a thing to one's-self; to **Share** is the act of having a title to a *share*, or being in the habits of receiving a *share*: we may, therefore, *partake* of a thing without *sharing* it, and *share* it without *partaking*. We *partake* of things mostly through the medium of the senses: whatever, therefore, we take a *part* in, whether gratuitously or casually, that we may be said to *partake* of; in this manner we *partake* of an entertainment without *sharing* it: on the other hand, we *share* things that

promise to be of advantage or profit, and what we *share* is what we claim; in this manner we *share* a sum of money which has been left to us in common with others.

All else of nature's common gift *partake*,
Unhappy Dido was alone awake.—DRYDEN.

Our God, when heav'n and earth he did create,
Form'd man, who should of both *participate*.
DENHAM,

Avoiding love, I had not found despair.
But *shar'd* with savage beasts the common air.
DRYDEN.

To Participate, v. To partake.

Particular, v. Circumstantial.

Particular, v. Exact.

Particular, Singular, Odd, Eccentric, Strange.

Particular, in French *particulier*, Latin *particularis* from *particula* a particle, signifies belonging to a particle or a very small part.

Singular, in French *singulier*, Latin *singularis* from *singulus* every one, which very probably comes from the Hebrew *sigel*, *peculium*, or private.

Odd, probably changed from *add*, signifying something arbitrarily added.

Eccentric, from *ex* and *centre*, signifies out of the centre or direct line.

Strange, in French *étrange*, Latin *extra*, and Greek *ek* out of, signifies out of some other part, or not belonging to this part.

All these terms are employed either as characteristics of persons or things. What is *particular* belongs to some small *particle* or point to which it is confined; what is *singular* is *single*, or the only one of its kind; what is *odd* is without an equal or anything with which it is fit to pair; what is *eccentric* is not to be brought within any rule or estimate, it deviates to the right and the left; what is *strange* is different from that which one is accustomed to see, it does not admit of comparison or assimilation. A person is *particular* as it respects himself; he is *singular* as it respects others; he is *particular* in his habits or modes of action; he is *singular* in that which is about him; we may be *particular* or *singular* in our dress; in the former case we study the minute points of our dress to please ourselves; in the latter case we adopt a mode of dress that distinguishes us from all others.

One is *odd*, *eccentric*, and *strange*, more as it respects established modes, forms, and rules, than individual circumstances; a person is *odd* when his actions or his words bear no resemblance to those of others; he is *eccentric* if he irregularly departs from the customary modes of proceeding; he is *strange* when that which he does makes him new or unknown to those who are about him. *Particularity* and *singularity* are not always taken in a bad sense; *oddness*, *eccentricity*, and *strangeness* are never taken in a good one. A person ought to be *particular* in the choice of his society, his amusements, his books, and the like; he ought to be *singular* in virtue, when vice is unfortunately prevalent: but *particularity* becomes

ridiculous when it respects trifles; and *singularity* becomes culpable when it is not warranted by the most imperious necessity. As *oddness*, *eccentricity*, and *strangeness*, consist in the violation of good order, of the decencies of human life, or the more important points of moral duty, they can never be justifiable, and are often unpardonable. An *odd* man, whom no one can associate with, and who likes to associate with no one, is an outcast by nature, and a burden to the society which is troubled with his presence. An *eccentric* character, who distinguishes himself by nothing but the breach of every established rule, is a being who deserves nothing but ridicule, or the more serious treatment of censure or rebuke. A *strange* person, who makes himself a *stranger* among those to whom he is bound by the closest ties, is a being as unfortunate as he is worthless. *Particularity*, in the bad sense, arises either from a naturally frivolous character, or the want of more serious objects to engage the mind; *singularity*, which is taken much oftener in the bad than in the good sense, arises from a preposterous pride which thirsts after distinction even in folly; *oddness* is mostly the effect of a distorted humour, attributable to an unhappy frame of mind; *eccentricity*, which is the excess of *singularity*, arises commonly from the undisciplined state of strong powers; *strangeness*, which is a degree of *oddness*, has its source in the perverted state of the heart.

When applied to characterize inanimate objects they are mostly used in an indifferent, but sometimes in a bad sense: the term *particular* serves to define or specify, it is opposed to the general or indefinite; a *particular* day or hour, a *particular* case, a *particular* person, are expressions which confine one's attention to one precise object in distinction from the rest; *singular*, like the word *particular*, marks but one object, and that which is clearly pointed out in distinction from the rest; but this term differs from the former, inasmuch as the *particular* is said only of that which one has arbitrarily made *particular*, but the *singular* is so from its own properties: thus a place is *particular* when we fix upon it, and mark it out in any manner so that it may be known from others; a place is *singular* if it have anything in itself which distinguishes it from others. *Odd*, in an indifferent sense, is opposed to even, and applied to objects in general; an *odd* number, an *odd* person, an *odd* book, and the like: but it is also employed in a bad sense, to mark objects which are totally dissimilar to others; thus an *odd* idea, an *odd* conceit, an *odd* whim, an *odd* way, an *odd* place. *Eccentric* is applied in its proper sense to mathematical lines or circles, which have not the same centre, and is never employed in an improper sense: *strange*, in its proper sense, marks that which is unknown or unusual, as a *strange* face, a *strange* figure, a *strange* place; but in the moral application it is like the word *odd*, and conveys the unfavourable idea of that which is uncommon and not worth knowing; a *strange* noise designates not only that which has not been heard before, but that which it is not desirable to hear; a *strange* place may signify not only that which we have been unaccustomed to see,

but that which has also much in it that is objectionable.

There is such a *particularity* for ever affected by great beauties, that they are encumbered with their charms in all they say or do.—HUGHES.

Singularity is only vicious, as it makes men act contrary to reason.—ADDISON.

History is the great looking-glass, through which we may behold with ancestral eyes, not only the various actions of past ages, and the *odd* accidents that attend time, but also discern the different humours of men.—HOWEL.

That acute, though *eccentric* observer, Rousseau, had perceived that to strike and interest the publick, the marvellous must be produced.—BURKE.

Is it not *strange* that a rational man should worship an ox?—SOUTH.

Particular, Individual.

Particular, v. Peculiar.

Individual, in French *individuel*, Latin *individuus*, signifies that which cannot be divided.

Both these terms are employed to express one object; but *particular* is much more specific than *individual*: the *particular* confines us to one object only of many; but *individual* may be said of any one object among many. A *particular* object cannot be misunderstood for any other, while it remains *particular*; but the *individual* object can never be known from other *individual* objects, while it remains only *individual*. *Particular* is a term used in regard to *individuals*, and is opposed to the general: *individual* is a term used in regard to collectives; and is opposed to the whole or that which is divisible into parts.

Those *particular* speeches which are commonly known by the name of rants, are blenishes in our English tragedy.—ADDISON.

To give thee being, I lent
Out of my side to thee, nearest my heart,
Substantial life, to have thee by my side,
Henceforth an *individual* solace dear.—MILTON.

Particular, v. Peculiar.

Particular, v. Special.

Particularly, v. Especially.

Partisan, v. Follower.

Partner, v. Colleague.

Partnership, v. Association.

Party, v. Faction.

Passage, v. Course.

Passionate, v. Angry.

Passive, Submissive.

Passive, in Latin *passivus* from *patio*, and the Greek *πασχω* to suffer, signifies disposed to suffer.

Submissive, v. Humble.

Passive is mostly taken in the bad sense for suffering indignity from another; *submissive* is mostly in a good sense for submitting to another, or suffering one's-self to be directed by another; to be *passive* therefore is to be *submissive* to an improper degree.

When men attempt unjustly to enforce obedience from a mere love of rule, it is none but those who are deficient in spirit who are *passive*, or who submit quietly to the imposition: when men lawfully enforce obedience, it is none but the unruly and self-willed who will not be *submissive*.

For high above the ground
Their march was; and the *passive* air upbore
Their nimble tread.—MILTON.

He in delight
Both of her beauty and *submissive* charms
Smil'd with superior love.—MILTON.

Passive, v. Patient.

Pastime, v. Amusement.

Patch, v. Part.

Pathetic, v. Moving.

Patience, Endurance, Resignation.

Patience applies to any troubles or pains whatever, small or great; **Resignation** is employed only for those of great moment, in which our dearest interests are concerned: *patience* when compared with *resignation* is somewhat negative; it consists in the abstaining from all complaint or indication of what one suffers: but *resignation* consists in a positive sentiment of conformity to the existing circumstances, be they what they may. There are perpetual occurrences which are apt to harass the temper, unless one regards them with *patience*; the misfortunes of some men are of so calamitous a nature that if they have not acquired the *resignation* of Christians they must inevitably sink under them.

Patience applies only to the evils that actually hang over us; but there is a *resignation* connected with a firm trust in Providence which extends its views to futurity, and prepares us for the worst that may happen.

As *patience* lies in the manner and temper of suffering, and **Endurance** in the act, we may have *endurance* and not *patience*: for we may have much to *endure* and consequently *endurance*: but if we do not *endure* it with an easy mind and without the disturbance of our looks and words, we have not *patience*: on the other hand we may have *patience* but not *endurance*: for our *patience* may be exercised by momentary trifles, which are not sufficiently great or lasting to constitute *endurance*.

Though the duty of *patience* and subjection, where men suffer wrongfully, might possibly be of some force in those times of darkness, yet modern Christianity teaches that then only men are bound to suffer when they are not able to resist.—SOUTH.

There was never yet philosopher
That could *endure* the tooth-ache patiently.
SHAKESPEARE.

My mother is in that dispirited state of *resignation* which is the effect of a long life, and the loss of what is dear to us.—POPE.

Patient, v. Invalid.

Patient, Passive.

Patient comes from *patiens*, the active participle of *patior* to suffer; **Passive** comes from the *passivus* participle of the same verb;

hence the difference between the words: *patient* signifies suffering from an active principle, a determination to suffer; *passive* signifies suffering or acted upon for want of power to prevent. The former, therefore, is always taken in a good sense; the latter in a bad sense. *Patience* is always a virtue, as it signifies the suffering quietly that which cannot be remedied; as there are many such evils incident to our condition, it has been made one of the first Christian duties: *passiveness* as a temper is a weakness, if not a vice, if it lead us needlessly to endure from others what we ought not to endure, but if it spring from a principle of submission, as opposed to resistance, it is then a Christian grace.

How poor are they that have not *patience*.
SHAKESPEARE.

I know that we are supposed (by the Revolutionists) a dull, sluggish race, rendered *passive* by finding our situation tolerable.—BURKE.

Pattern, v. Copy.

Pattern, v. Example.

Pauper, v. Poor.

To Pause, v. To demur.

Pay, v. Allowance.

Peace, Quiet, Calm, Tranquillity.

Peace, in Latin *pax*, may either come from *pactio* an agreement or compact which produces *peace*, or it may be connected with *pausa*, and the Greek *παύω* to cease

Quiet, v. Easy.

Calm, v. Calm.

Tranquillity, in Latin *tranquillitas*, from *tranquillus*, that is, *trans*, the intensive syllable, and *quillus* or *quietus*, signifying altogether or exceedingly *quiet*.

Peace is a term of more general application, and more comprehensive meaning than the others; it respects either communities or individuals; but *quiet* respects only individuals or small communities. Nations are said to have *peace*, but not *quiet*; persons or families may have both *peace* and *quiet*. *Peace* implies an exemption from public or private broils; *quiet* implies a freedom from noise or interruption. Every well-disposed family strives to be at *peace* with its neighbours, and every affectionate family will naturally act in such a manner as to promote *peace* among all its members: the *quiet* of a neighbourhood is one of its first recommendations as a place of residence.

Peace and *quiet*, in regard to individuals, have likewise a reference to the internal state of the mind; but the former expresses the permanent condition of the mind, the latter its transitory condition. Serious matters only can disturb our *peace*; trivial matters may disturb our *quiet*; a good man enjoys the *peace* of a good conscience; but he may have unavoidable cares and anxieties which disturb his *quiet*. There can be no *peace* where a man's passions are perpetually engaged in a conflict with each other; there can be no *quiet* where a man is embarrassed in his pecuniary affairs.

Calm is a species of *quiet*, which respects objects in the natural or the moral world; it indicates the absence of violent motion, as well as violent noise; it is that state which more immediately succeeds a state of agitation. As storms at sea are frequently preceded as well as succeeded by a dead *calm*, so political storms have likewise their *calms* which are their attendants, if not their precursors. *Peace*, *quiet*, and *calm* have all respect to the state contrary to their own; they are properly cessations either from strife, from disturbance, or from agitation and tumult. *Tranquillity*, on the other hand, is taken more absolutely: it expresses the situation as it exists in the present moment, independently of what goes before or after: it is sometimes applicable to society, sometimes to natural objects, and sometimes to the mind. The *tranquillity* of the state cannot be preserved unless the authority of the magistrates be upheld; the *tranquillity* of the air and of all the surrounding objects is one thing which gives the country its peculiar charms; the *tranquillity* of the mind in the season of devotion contributes essentially to produce a suitable degree of religious fervour.

As epithets, these terms bear the same relation to each other: people are *peaceable* as they are disposed to promote *peace* in society at large, or in their private relations; they are *quiet*, inasmuch as they abstain from every loud expression, or are exempt from any commotion in themselves; they are *calm* inasmuch as they are exempt from the commotion which at any given moment rages around them; they are *tranquil*, inasmuch as they enjoy an entire exemption from everything which can discompose. A town is *peaceable* as respects the disposition of the inhabitants; it is *quiet* as respects its external circumstances, or freedom from bustle and noise: an evening is *calm* when the air is lulled into a particular stillness, which is not interrupted by any loud sounds; a scene is *tranquil* which combines everything calculated to soothe the spirits to rest.

A false person ought to be looked upon as a public enemy, and a disturber of the *peace* of mankind.—SOUTH.

A paltry tale-bearer will discompose the *quiet* of a whole family.—SOUTH.

Cheerfulness banishes all anxious care and discontent, soothes and composes the passions, and keeps the soul in a perpetual *calm*.—ADDISON.

By a patient acquiescence under painful events for the present, we shall be sure to contract a *tranquillity* of temper.—CUMBERLAND.

Peaceable, Peaceful, Pacific.

Peaceable is used in the proper sense of the word *peace*, as it expresses an exemption from strife or contest (*v. Peace*); but *Peaceful* is used in its improper sense, as it expresses an exemption from agitation or commotion. Persons or things are *peaceable*; things, particularly in the higher style, are *peaceful*: a family is designated as *peaceable* in regard to its inhabitants; a house is designated as a *peaceful* abode, as it is remote from the bustle and hurry of a multitude. *Pacific* signifies either making *peace* or disposed to

make *peace*, and is applied mostly to what we do to others. We are *peaceable* when we do not engage in quarrels of our own; we are *pacific* if we wish to keep *peace*, or make *peace*, between others. Hence the term *peaceable* is mostly employed for individual or private concerns, and *pacific* most properly for national concerns; subjects ought to be *peaceable*, and monarchs *pacific*.

I know that my *peaceable* disposition already gives me a very ill figure here (at Ratisbon).—LADY W. MONTAGU.

Still as the *peaceful* walks of ancient night,
Silent as are the lamps that burn in tombs.
SHAKESPEARE.

The tragical and untimely death of the French monarch put an end to all *pacific* measures with regard to Scotland.—ROBERTSON.

Peaceful, v. Peaceable.

Peasant, v. Countryman.

Peculiar, Appropriate, Particular.

Peculiar, in Latin *peculiaris*, comes from *pecus* cattle, that is, the cattle which belonged to the slave or servant, in distinction from the master; and the epithet, therefore, designates in a strong manner private property, belonging exclusively to one's self.

Appropriate signifies *appropriated* (*v. To ascribe*).

Particular, v. Particular.

Peculiar is said of that which belongs to persons or things; *appropriate* is said of that which belongs to things only: the faculty of speech is *peculiar* to man, in distinction from all other animals; an address may be *appropriate* to the circumstances of the individual. *Peculiar* designates simple property; *appropriate* designates the right of propriety: there are advantages and disadvantages *peculiar* to every situation; the excellence of a discourse depends often on its being *appropriate* to the season. *Peculiar* and *particular* are both employed to distinguish objects; but the former distinguishes the object by showing its connexion with, or alliance to others; *particular* distinguishes it by a reference to some acknowledged circumstance; hence we may say that a person enjoys *peculiar* privileges or *particular* privileges: in this case *peculiar* signifies such as are confined to him, and enjoyed by none else; *particular* signifies such as are distinguished in degree and quality from others of the kind.

Great father Bacchus, to my song repair,
For clust'ring grapes are thy *peculiar* care.
DRYDEN.

Modesty and diffidence, gentleness and meekness, were looked upon as the *appropriate* virtues of the sex.—JOHNSON.

When we trust to the picture that objects draw of themselves on the mind, we deceive ourselves, without accurate and *particular* observation; it is but ill-drawn at first, the outlines are soon blurred, the colours every day grow fainter.—GRAY.

Peel, v. Skin.

To Peel, Pare.

Peel from the Latin *pellis* a skin, is the same as to skin or to take off the skin: to

Pare, from the Latin *paro* to trim or make in order, signifies to smooth. The former of these terms denotes a natural, the latter an artificial process: the former excludes the idea of a forcible separation; the latter includes the idea of separation by means of a knife or sharp instrument; potatoes and apples are *peeled* after they are boiled they are *pared* before they are boiled: an orange and a walnut are always *peeled* but not *pared*; a cucumber must be *pared* and not *peeled*: in like manner the skin may sometimes be *peeled* from the flesh, and the nails are *pared*.

Peevish, *v. Captious*.

Pellucid, Transparent.

Pellucid, in Latin *pellucidus* changed from *perlucidus*, signifies very shining.

Transparent, in Latin *transparens*, from *trans* through or beyond, and *pareo* to appear, signifies that which admits light through it.

Pellucid is said of that which is pervious to the light, or of that into which the eye can penetrate; *transparens* is said of that which is throughout bright: a stream is *pellucid*; it admits of the light so as to reflect objects, but it is not *transparent* for the eye.

Penalty, *v. Fine*.

To Penetrate, Pierce, Perforate, Bore.

Penetrate, *v. Discernment*.

Pierce, in French *percer*, Chaldee *pereh* to break or rend.

Perforate, from the Latin *per* through, and *foris* a door, signifies to make a door through,

Bore, in Saxon *borian*, is probably changed from *fore* or *foris* a door, signifying to make a door or passage.

To *penetrate* is simply to make an entrance into any substance; to *pierce* is to go still deeper: to *perforate* and to *bore* are to go through, or at all events to make a considerable hollow. To *penetrate* is a natural and gradual process in this manner rust *penetrates* iron, water *penetrates* wood; to *pierce* is a violent, and commonly artificial, process; thus an arrow or a bullet *pierces* through wood. The instrument by which the act of *penetration* is performed is in no case defined; but that of *piercing* commonly proceeds by some pointed instrument; we may *penetrate* the earth by means of a spade, a plough, a knife, or various other instruments: but one *pierces* the flesh by means of a needle, or one *pierces* the ground or a wall by means of a pick-axe.

To *perforate* and *bore* are modes of *piercing* that vary in the circumstances of the action, and the objects acted upon: to *pierce*, in its peculiar use, is a sudden action by which a hollow is produced in any substance; but to *perforate* and *bore* are commonly the effect of mechanical art. The body of an animal is *pierced* by a dart; but cannon is made by *perforating* or *boring* the iron: channels are formed under ground by *verforating* the earth;

holes are made in the ear by *perforation*; holes are made in leather or in wood by *boring*; these two last words do not differ in sense but in application; the latter being a term of vulgar use.

To *penetrate* and *pierce* are likewise employed in an improper sense; to *perforate* and *bore* are employed only in the proper sense. The two first bear the same relation to each other as in the former: *penetrate* is, however, only employed as the act of persons; *pierce* is used in regard to things. There is a power in the mind to *penetrate* the looks and actions, so as justly to interpret their meaning; the eye of the Almighty is said to *pierce* the thickest veil of darkness. Affairs are sometimes involved in such mystery that the most enlightened is unable to *penetrate* either the end or the beginning; the shrieks of distress are sometimes so loud as to seem to *pierce* the ear.

For if when dead we are but dust or clay,
Why think of what posterity shall say?
Their praise or censure cannot us concern,
Nor ever *penetrate* the silent urn.—JEYNS.

Subtle as lightning, bright, and quick and fierce,
Gold through doors and walls did *pierce*.—COWLEY.

Mountains were *perforated*, and bold arches thrown over the broadest and most rapid streams (by the Romans).—GIBBON.

But Cypys, and the graver sort, thought fit,
The Greeks' suspected present to commit
To seas or flames, at least to search or *bore*
The sides, and what that space contains 't' explore.
DENHAM.

Penetration, *v. Discernment*.

Penetration, Acuteness, Sagacity.

As characteristics of mind, these terms have much more in them in which they differ than in what they agree: **Penetration** is a necessary property of mind; it exists to a greater or less degree in every rational being that has the due exercise of its rational powers: **Acuteness** is an accidental property that belongs to the mind only under certain circumstances. As *penetration* (*v. Discernment*) denotes the process of entering into substances physically or morally, so *acuteness*, which is the same as sharpness, denotes the fitness of the thing that performs this process: and as the mind is in both cases the thing that is spoken of, the terms *penetration* and *acuteness* are in this particular closely allied. It is clear, however, that the mind may have *penetration* without having *acuteness*, although one cannot have *acuteness* without *penetration*. If by *penetration* we are commonly enabled to get at the truth which lies concealed, by *acuteness* we succeed in piercing the veil that hides it from our view; the former is, therefore, an ordinary, and the latter an extraordinary gift.

Sagacity, in Latin *sagacitas* from *sagis* to perceive quickly, comes in all probability from the Persian *sag* a dog, whence the term has been peculiarly applied to dogs, and from thence extended to all brutes which discover an intuitive wisdom, and also to children, or uneducated persons, in whom there is more *penetration* than may be expected from the narrow compass of their knowledge; hence, properly speaking, *sagacity* is natural or uncultivated *acuteness*.

Fairfax having neither talents himself for cabal, nor penetration to discover the cabals of others, had given his entire confidence to Cromwell.—HUME.

Chillingworth was an acute disputant against the papists.—HUME.

Activity to seize, not *sagacity* to discern, is the requisite which youth value.—BLAIR.

Penitence, *v.* Repentance.

Penman, *v.* Writer.

Penurious, *v.* Economical.

People, Nation.

People, in Latin *populus*, comes from the Greek λαός *laos* people, πᾶθος *pathos* a multitude, and πολὺς *polus* many. Hence the simple idea of numbers is expressed by the word *people*: but the term **Nation**, from *natus*, marks the connection of numbers by birth; *people* is, therefore, the generic, and *nation* the specific. A *nation* is a *people* connected by birth; there cannot, therefore, strictly speaking, be a *nation* without a *people*: but there may be a *people* where there is not a *nation*. * The Jews are distinguished as a *people* or a *nation* according to the different aspects under which they are viewed; when considered as an assemblage, under the special direction of the Almighty, they are termed the *people* of God; but when considered in regard to their common origin, they are denominated the Jewish *nation*. The Americans, when spoken of in relation to Britain, are a distinct *people*, because they have each a distinct government; but they are not a distinct *nation*, because they have a common descent. On this ground the Romans are not called the Roman *nation*, because their origin was so various, but the Roman *people*, that is an assemblage living under one form of government.

In a still closer application *people* is taken for a part of the state, namely, that part of a state which consists of a multitude, in distinction from its government: whence arises a distinction in the use of the terms; for we may speak of the British *people*, the French or the Dutch *people*, when we wish merely to talk of the mass, but we speak of the British *nation*, the French *nation*, and the Dutch *nation*, when public measures are in question, which emanate from the government, or the whole *people*. The English *people* have ever been remarkable for their attachment to liberty: the abolition of the slave trade is one of the most glorious acts of public justice which was ever performed by the British *nation*. The impetuosity and volatility of the French *people* render them peculiarly unfit to legislate for themselves; the military exploits of the French *nation* will render them a highly distinguished *people* in the annals of history. Upon the same ground republican states are distinguished by the name of *people*: but kingdoms are commonly spoken of in history as *nations*. Hence we say the Spartan *people*, the Athenian *people*, the *people* of Genoa, the *people* of Venice; but the *nations* of Europe, the African *nations*, the English, French, German, and Italian *nations*.

* Vide Roubaud; "Nation, people."

It is too flagrant a demonstration how much vice is the darling of any *people* when many amongst them are preferred for those practices for which in other places they can scarce be pardoned.—SOUTH.

When we read the history of *nations*, what do we read but the crimes and follies of men?—BLAIR.

People, Populace, Mob, Mobility.

People and **Populace** are evidently changes of the same word to express a number. The signification of these terms is that of a number gathered together. *People* is said of any body supposed to be assembled, as well as really assembled: *populace* is said of a body only when actually assembled. The voice of the *people* cannot always be disregarded; the *populace* in England are fond of dragging their favourites in carriages.

Mob and **Mobility** are from the Latin *mobilis*, signifying moveableness, which is the characteristic of the multitude: hence Virgil's *mobile vulgus*. These terms, therefore, designate not only what is low, but tumultuous. A *mob* is at all times an object of terror: the *mobility*, whether high or low, are a fluttering order that mostly run from bad to worse.

The *people* like a headlong torrent go,
And every dam they break or overflow.

SHAKSPERE.

The plant *populace*,
Those dupes of novelty, will bend before us.

MALLET.

By the senseless and insignificant clink of misapplied words, some restless demagogues had inflamed the mind of the sottish *mob* to a strange, unaccountable abhorrence of the best of men.—SOUTH.

People, Persons, Folks.

The term **People** has already been considered in two acceptations (*v.* *People, Nation; People, Populace*), under the general idea of an assembly; but in the present case it is employed to express a small number of individuals: the word *people*, however, is always considered as one undivided body, and the word **Person** may be distinctly used either in the singular or plural: as we cannot say one, two, three, or four *people*, but we may say one, two, three, or four *persons*, yet on the other hand, we may indifferently say, such *people* or *persons*, many *people* or *persons*, some *people* or *persons*, and the like.

With regard to the use of these terms, which is altogether colloquial, *people* is employed in general propositions; and *persons* in those which are specific or referring directly to some particular individuals: *people* are generally of that opinion; some *people* think so; some *people* attended: there were but few *persons* present at the entertainment; the whole company consisted of six *persons*.

As the term *people* is employed to designate the promiscuous multitude, it has acquired a certain meanness of acceptation which makes it less suitable than the word *persons*, when *people* of respectability are referred to: were I to say, of any individuals, I do not know who the *people* are, it would not be so respectful as to say, I do not know who those *persons* are: in like manner one says, from *people* of that stamp better is not to be expected; *persons* of their appearance do not frequent such places,

Folks, through the medium of the northern languages, comes from the Latin *vulgus*, the common people: it is not unusual to say good people, or good folks; and in speaking jocularly to one's friends the latter term is likewise admissible: but in the serious style it is never employed except in a disrespectful manner such folks (speaking of gamesters) are often put to sorry shifts.

Performance is ever the duller for
His act; and, but in the plainer and simple
Kind of the people, the deed is quite out of
Use.—SHAKESPEARE.

You may observe many honest, inoffensive persons
strangely run down by an ugly word.—SOUTH.

I paid some compliments to great folks, who like to
be complimented.—HEARING.

To Perceive, Discern, Distinguish.

Perceive, in Latin *percipio*, or *per* and *capio*, signifies to take hold of thoroughly.

Discern, *v. Discernment*.

Distinguish, *v. Difference*.

To *perceive* is a positive, to *discern* a relative, action: we *perceive* things by themselves; we *discern* them amidst many others: we *perceive* that which is obvious; we *discern* that which is remote, or which requires much attention to get an idea of it. We *perceive* by a person's looks and words what he intends; we *discern* the drift of his actions. We may *perceive* sensible or spiritual objects; we commonly *discern* only that which is spiritual: we *perceive* light, darkness, colours, or the truth or falsehood of anything; we *discern* characters, motives, the tendency and consequences of actions, &c. It is the act of a child to *perceive* according to the quickness of its senses; it is the act of a man to *discern* according to the measure of his knowledge and understanding.

To *discern* and *distinguish* approach the nearest in sense to each other; but the former signifies to see only one thing, the latter to see two or more in quick succession. We *discern* what lie in things; we *distinguish* things according to their outward marks; we *discern* things in order to understand their essences; we *distinguish* in order not to confound them together. Experienced and discreet people may *discern* the signs of the times; it is just to *distinguish* between an action done from inadvertence and that which is done from design. The conduct of people is sometimes so veiled by art that it is not easy to *discern* their object: it is necessary to *distinguish* between practice and profession.

And lastly, turning inwardly her eyes,
Perceives how all her own ideas rise.—JENYNS.

One who is actuated by party spirit is almost under
an incapacity of *discerning* either real blemishes or
beauties.—ADDISON.

Mr. Boyle observes, that though the mole be not totally
blind (as is generally thought), she has not sight enough
to *distinguish* objects.—ADDISON.

To Perceive, *v. To see*.

Perceptible, *v. Sensible*.

Perception, Idea, Conception, Notion.

Perception expresses either the act of *perceiving* (*v. To perceive*) or the impression produced by that act; in this latter sense it is analogous to an *Idea* (*v. Idea*). The impression of an object that is present to us is termed a *perception*; the revival of that impression, when the object is removed, is an *idea*. A combination of *ideas* by which any image is presented to the mind is a **Conception** (*v. To comprehend*); the association of two or more *ideas*, so as to constitute a decision, is a **Notion** (*v. Opinion*). *Perceptions* are clear or confused, according to the state of the sensible organs, and the *perceptive* faculty; *ideas* are faint or vivid, vague or distinct, according to the nature of the *perception*; *conceptions* are gross or refined according to the number and extent of one's *ideas*; *notions* are true or false, correct or incorrect, according to the extent of one's knowledge. The *perception* which we have of remote objects is sometimes so indistinct as to leave hardly any traces of the image on the mind; we have in that case a *perception*, but not an *idea*: if we read the description of any object, we may have an *idea* of it; but we need not have any immediate *perception*: the *idea* in this case being complex, and formed of many images of which we have already had a *perception*.

If we present objects to our minds, according to different images which have already been impressed, we are said to have a *conception* of them: in this case, however, it is not necessary for the objects really to exist; they may be the offspring of the mind's operation within itself: but with regard to *notions* it is different, for they are formed respecting objects that do really exist, although perhaps the properties or circumstances which we assign to them are not real. If I look at the moon, I have a *perception* of it; if it disappear from my sight, and the impression remains, I have an *idea* of it; if an object, differing in shape and colour from that or anything else which I may have seen, present itself to my mind, it is a *conception*; if of this moon I conceive that it is no bigger than what it appears to my eye, this is a *notion*, which in the present instance assigns an unreal property to a real object.

What can the fondest mother wish for more,
E'en for her darling son, than solid sense,
Perceptions clear, and flowing eloquence?—WYNNER.

Imagination selects *ideas* from the treasures of remembrance.—JOHNSON.

It is not a head that is filled with extravagant *conceptions* which is capable of furnishing the world with diversions of this nature (from humour).—ADDISON.

Those *notions* which are to be collected by reason, in opposition to the senses, will seldom stand forward in the mind, but be treasured in the remoter repositories of the memory.—JOHNSON.

Perception, *v. Sentiment*.

Peremptory, *v. Positive*.

Perfect, *v. Accomplished*.

Perfect, *v. Complete*.

Perfidious, *v. Faithless*.

To Perforate, *v.* To penetrate.

Perforation, *v.* Orifice.

To Perform, *v.* To effect.

To Perform, *v.* To execute.

Performance, *v.* Production.

Perfume, *v.* Smell.

Peril, *v.* Danger.

Period, *v.* Sentence.

Period, *v.* Time.

To Perish, Die, Decay.

Perish, in French *perir*, in Latin *perire*, compounded of *per* and *eo*, signifies to go thoroughly away.

Die, *v.* To die.

Decay, *v.* To decay.

To *perish* expresses more than to *die*, and is applicable to many objects; for the latter is properly applied only to express the extinction of animal life, and figuratively to express the extinction of life or spirit in vegetables or other bodies; but the former is applied to express the dissolution of substances, so that they lose their existence as aggregate bodies. What *perishes*, therefore, does not always *die*, although whatever *dies*, by that very act *perishes* to a certain extent. Hence we say that wood *perishes*, although it does not *die*: people are said either to *perish* or *die*: but as the term *perish* expresses even more than *dying*, it is possible for the same thing to *die* and not *perish*: thus a plant may be said to *die* when it loses its vegetative power; but it is said to *perish* if its substance crumbles into dust.

To *perish* expresses the end; to *decay*, the process by which this end is brought about; a thing may be long in *decaying*, but when it *perishes* it ceases at once to act or to exist: things, may, therefore, *perish* without *decaying*; they may likewise *decay* without *perishing*. Things which are altogether new, and have experienced no kind of *decay*, may *perish* by means of water, fire, lightning, and the like: on the other hand, wood, iron, and other substances may begin to *decay*, but may be saved from immediately *perishing* by the application of preventives.

Beauty and youth about to *perish* finds
Such noble pity in brave English minds.—WALLER.

The steer, who to the yoke was bred to bow
(Studious of tillage and the crooked plough),
Falls down and *dies*.—DRYDEN.

The soul's dark cottage, batter'd and *decay'd*,
Lets in new light through chinks that time has made.
WALLER.

To Perjure, *v.* To forswear.

Permanent, *v.* Durable.

Permission, *v.* Leave.

To Permit, *v.* To admit.

To Permit, *v.* To consent.

Pernicious, *v.* Destructive.

Pernicious, *v.* Hurtful.

To Perpetrate, Commit.

The idea of doing something wrong is common to these terms; but **Perpetrate**, from the Latin *perpetro*, compounded of *per* and *petro*, in Greek *παρρω*, signifying thoroughly to compass or bring about, is a much more determined proceeding than that of **Committing**. One may *commit* offences of various degree and magnitude; but one *perpetrates* crimes only, and those of the more heinous kind. A lawless banditti, who spend their lives in the *perpetration* of the most horrid crimes, are not to be restrained by the ordinary course of justice: he who *commits* any offence against the good order of society exposes himself to the censure of others, who may be his inferiors in certain respects.

Then shows the forest which, in after times,
Fierce Romulus, for *perpetrated* crimes,
A refuge made.—DRYDEN.

The miscarriages of the great designs of princes are of little use to the bulk of mankind, who seem very little interested in admonitions against errors which they cannot *commit*.—JOHNSON.

Perpetual, *v.* Continual.

To Perplex, *v.* To distress.

To Perplex, *v.* To embarrass.

To Persevere, *v.* To continue.

To Persist, *v.* To continue.

To Persist, *v.* To insist.

Persons, *v.* People.

Perspicuity, *v.* Clearness.

To Persuade, *v.* To exhort.

To Persuade, Entice, Prevail Upon.

Persuade (*v.* Conviction) and **Entice** (*v.* To allure) are employed to express different means to the same end; namely, that of drawing any one to a thing: one *persuades* a person by means of words; one *entices* him either by words or actions; one may *persuade* either to a good or bad thing; but one *entices* commonly to that which is bad; one uses arguments to *persuade*, and arts to *entice*.

Persuade and *entice* comprehend either the means or the end or both: **Prevail Upon** comprehends no more than the end: we may *persuade* without *prevailing upon*, and we may *prevail upon* without *persuading*. Many will turn a deaf ear to all our *persuasions*, and will not be *prevailed upon*, although *persuaded*: on the other hand, we may be *prevailed upon* by the force of remonstrance, authority, and the like; and in this case we are *prevailed upon* without being *persuaded*. We should never *persuade* another to do that which we are not willing to do ourselves; credulous or good-natured people are easily *prevailed upon* to do things which tend to their own injury.

I beseech you let me have so much credit with you as to *persuade* you to communicate any doubt or scruple which occur to you, before you suffer them to make too deep an impression upon you.—CLARENDON.

If gaming does an aged sire *entice*,
Then my young master swiftly learns the vice.
DRYDEN.

Herod hearing of Agrippa's arrival in Upper Asia, went thither to him and prevailed with him to accept an invitation.—PRIDEAUX.

Persuasion, v. Conviction.

Pertinacious, v. Tenacious.

To Peruse, To read.

Perverse, v. Awkward.

Pest, v. Bane.

Petition, v. Prayer.

Petty, v. Trifling.

Petulant, v. Captious.

Phantom, v. Vision.

Phrase, v. Diction.

Phrase, v. Sentence.

Phraseology, v. Diction.

Phrensy, v. Madness.

To Pick, v. To choose.

Picture, v. Likeness.

Picture, v. Painting.

Picture, Print, Engraving.

Picture (*v. Painting*) is any likeness taken by the hand of the artist: the **Print** is the copy of the *painting* in a *printed* state; and the **Engraving** is that which is produced by an *engraver*: every *engraving* is a *print*; but every *print* is not an *engraving*; for the *picture* may be *printed* off from something besides an *engraving*, as in the case of woodcuts. The term *picture* is sometimes used for any representation of a likeness without regard to the mode by which it is formed: in this case it is employed mostly for the representations of the common kind that are found in books; but *print* and *engraving* are said of the higher specimens of the art. On certain occasions the word *engraving* is most appropriate, as to take an *engraving* of a particular object; on other occasions the word *print*, as a handsome *print*, or a large *print*.

The *picture* plac'd for ornament and use,
The twelve good rules, the royal game of goose.
GOLDSMITH.

Tim, with surprise and pleasure staring,
Ran to the glass, and then comparing
His own sweet figure with the *print*.
Distinguish'd every feature in 't.—SWIFT.

Since the public has of late begun to express a relish for *engravings*, drawings, copyings, and for the original paintings of the chief Italian school, I doubt not that in a very few years we shall make an equal progress in this other science.—EARL OF SHAFTESBURY.

To Pierce, v. To penetrate.

To Pile, v. To heap.

Pillage, v. Rapine.

Pillar, Column.

Pillar, in French *pilier*, in all probability comes from *pile*, signifying anything piled up in an artificial manner. **Column**, in Latin *columna*, from *column* a prop or support. In their original meaning, therefore, it is obvious that these words differ essentially, although

in their present use they refer to the same object. The *pillar* mostly serves as a *column* or support, and the *column* is always a *pillar*; but sometimes a *pillar* does not serve as a prop, and then it is called by its own name; but when it supplies the place of a prop, then it is more properly denominated a *column*. Hence the monument is a *pillar*, and not a *column*: but the *pillars* on which the roofs of churches are made to rest may with more propriety be termed *columns*. *Pillar* is more frequently employed in a moral application than *column*, and in that case it always implies a prop. Government is the *pillar* on which all social order rests.

Withdraw religion, and you shake all the *pillars* of morality.—BLAIR.

Whate'er adorns
The princely dome, the *column*, and the arch,
The breathing marbles, and the sculptur'd gold,
Beyond the proud possessor's narrow claim,
His tuneful breast enjoys.—AKENSIDE.

To Pinch, v. To press.

To Pine, v. To flag.

Pious, v. Holy.

Pique, v. Malice.

Piteous, Doleful, Woeful, Rueful.

Piteous signifies moving *pity* (*v. Pity*).

Doleful, or full of *dole*, in Latin *dolor* pain, signifies indicative of much pain.

Woeful, or full of *woe*, signifies likewise indicative of *woe*, which from the German *weh* implies pain.

Rueful, or full of *rue*, from the German *reuen* to repent, signifies indicative of much sorrow.

The close alliance in sense of these words one to another is obvious from the above explanation; *piteous* is applicable to one's external expression of bodily or mental pain; a child makes *piteous* lamentations when it suffers from hunger, or has lost its way; *doleful* applies to those sounds which convey the idea of pain; there is something *doleful* in the tolling of a funeral bell, or in the sound of a muffled drum: *woeful* applies to the circumstances and situations of men; a scene is *woeful* in which we witness a large family of young children suffering under the complicated horrors of sickness and want; *rueful* applies to the outward indications of inward sorrow depicted in the looks or countenance. The term is commonly applied to the sorrows which spring from a gloomy or distorted imagination, and has therefore acquired a somewhat ludicrous acceptance; hence we find in Don Quixote the knight of the *rueful* countenance introduced.

Entreat, pray, beg, and raise a *doleful* cry.—DRYDEN.

A brutish temptation made Samson, from a judge of Israel, a *woeful* judgment upon it.—SOUTH.

With pondrous clubs
As weak against the mountain heaps they push
Their beating breast in vain and *piteous* bray,
He lays them quivering on th' ensanguin'd plain.
THOMSON.

Coccyus nam'd, of lamentation loud,
Heard on the *rueful* stream.—MILTON.

Piteous, v. Pitiabie.

Pitiable, Piteous, Pitiful.

These three epithets drawn from the same word have shades of difference in sense and application.

Pitiable signifies deserving of *pity*; **Piteous**, moving *pity*; **Pitiful**, full of that which awakens *pity*: a condition is *pitiable* which is so distressing as to call forth *pity*; a cry is *piteous* which indicates such distress as can excite *pity*; a conduct is *pitiful* which marks a character entitled to *pity*.

The first of these terms is taken in the best sense of the term *pity*; the last two in its unfavourable sense: what is *pitiable* in a person is independent of anything in himself; circumstances have rendered him *pitiable*; what is *piteous* and *pitiful* in a man arises from the helplessness and imbecility or worthlessness of his character; the former respects that which is weak; the latter that which is worthless in him; when a poor creature makes *piteous* moans, it indicates his incapacity to help himself as he ought to do out of his troubles; when a man of rank has recourse to *pitiful* shifts to gain his ends, he betrays the innate meanness of his soul.

Is it then impossible that a man may be found who without criminal, ill-intention, or *pitiable* absurdity, shall prefer a mixed government to either of the extremes? —BURKE.

I have in view, calling to mind with heed
Part of our sentence, that thy seed shall bruise
The serpent's head; *piteous* amends, unless
Be meant, whom I conjecture, our grand foe.—MILTON.

Bacon wrote a *pitiful* letter to King James I. not long before his death.—HOWELL.

Pitiful, v. Pitiable.

Pitiful, v. Mean.

Pity, Compassion.

Pity is in all probability contracted from *piety*.

Compassion, in Latin *compassio*, from *con* and *pator*, signifies to suffer in conjunction with another.

The pain which one feels at the distresses of another is the idea that is common to the signification of both these terms, but they differ in the object that causes the distress: the former is excited principally by the weakness or degraded condition of the subject; the latter by his uncontrollable and inevitable misfortunes. We *pity* a man of a weak understanding who exposes his weakness; we *compassionate* the man who is reduced to a state of beggary and want. *Pity* is kindly extended by those in higher condition to such as are humble in their outward circumstances; the poor are at all times deserving of *pity* when their poverty is not the positive fruit of vice: *compassion* is a sentiment which extends to persons in all conditions; the good Samaritan had *compassion* on the traveller who fell among thieves. *Pity*, though a tender sentiment, is so closely allied to contempt, that an ingenuous mind is always loath to be the subject of it, since it can never be awakened but by some circumstance of inferiority; it hurts the honest pride of a man to reflect that he can excite no

interest but by provoking a comparison to his own disadvantage; on the other hand, such is the general infirmity of our natures, and such our exposure to the casualties of human life, that *compassion* is a pure and delightful sentiment, that is reciprocally bestowed and acknowledged by all with equal satisfaction.

Others extended naked on the floor,
Exil'd from human *pity* here they lie,
And know no end of misery till they die.
POMFREY.

His fate *compassion* in the victor bred;
Stern as he was, he yet rever'd the dead.—POPE.

Pity, Mercy.

The feelings one indulges, and the conduct one adopts, towards others who suffer for their demerits is the common idea which renders these terms synonymous; but **Pity** lays hold of those circumstances which do not affect the moral character, or which diminish the culpability of the individual: **Mercy** lays hold of those external circumstances which may diminish punishment. *Pity* is often a sentiment unaccompanied with action; *mercy* is often a mode of action unaccompanied with sentiment: we have or take *pity* upon a person, but we show *mercy* to a person. *Pity* is bestowed by men in their domestic and private capacity; *mercy* is shown in the exercise of power: a master has *pity* upon his offending servant by passing over his offences, and affording him the opportunity of amendment; the magistrate shows *mercy* to a criminal by abridging his punishment. *Pity* lies in the breast of an individual, and may be bestowed at his discretion: *mercy* is restricted by the rules of civil society; it must not interfere with the administration of justice. Young offenders call for great *pity*, as their offences are often the fruit of inexperience and bad example, rather than of depravity: *mercy* is an imperative duty in those who have the power of inflicting punishment, particularly in cases where life and death are concerned.

Pity and *mercy* are likewise applied to the brute creation with a similar distinction: *pity* shows itself in relieving real misery, and in lightening burdens; *mercy* is displayed in the measure of pain which one inflicts. One takes *pity* on a poor ass to whom one gives fodder to relieve hunger; one shows it *mercy* by abstaining from laying heavy stripes upon its back.

These terms are moreover applicable to the Deity, in regard to his creatures, particularly man. God takes *pity* on us as entire dependants upon Him: He extends His *mercy* towards us as offenders against Him: He shows his *pity* by relieving our wants; He shows his *mercy* by forgiving our sins.

I pity from my soul unhappy men
Compell'd by want to prostitute their pen.
ROSCOMMON.

Cowards are cruel, but the brave
Love *mercy*, and delight to save.—GAY.

Place, v. Office.

Place, Situation, Station, Position, Post.

Place, in German *platz*, comes from *platt* even or open.

Situation, in Latin *situs*, comes from the Hebrew *sat* to put.

Station, *v.* **Condition**.

Position, in Latin *positio* or *positus*, comes from the same source as *situs*.

Place is the abstract or general term that comprehends the idea of any given space that may be occupied: *station* is the *place* where one stands or is fixed; *situation* and *position* respect the object as well as the *place*, that is, they signify how the object is put, as well as where it is put. A *place* or a *station* may be either vacant or otherwise; a *situation* and a *position* necessarily suppose some occupied *place*. A *place* is either assigned or not assigned, known or unknown, real or supposed: a *station* is a specifically assigned *place*. We choose a *place* according to our convenience, and we leave it again at pleasure; but we take up our *station*, and hold it for a given period. One inquires for a *place* which is known only by name; the *station* is appointed for us, and is therefore easily found out. Travellers wander from *place* to *place*; soldiers have always some *station*.

The term *place* is said of objects animate or inanimate; *station* only of animate objects; *situation* and *position* only of inanimate: a person chooses a *place*; a thing occupies a *place*, or has a *place* set apart for it: a *station* or *stated place* must always be assigned to each person who has to act in concert with others; a *situation* or *position* is chosen for a thing to suit the convenience of an individual: the former is said of things as they stand with regard to others; the latter of things as they stand with regard to themselves. The *situation* of a house comprehends the nature of the *place*, whether on high or low ground; and also its relation to other objects, that is, whether higher or lower, nearer or more distant: the *position* of a window in a house is considered as to whether it is straight or crooked; the *position* of a book is considered as to whether it stands leaning or upright, with its face or back forward. *Situation* is moreover said of things that come there of themselves; *position* only of those things which have been put there at will. The *situation* of some tree or rock, on some elevated *place*, is agreeable to be looked at, or to be looked from. The faulty *position* of a letter in writing sometimes spoils the whole performance.

Place, *situation*, and *station*, have an improper signification in respect to men in civil society, that is, either to their circumstances or actions; **Post** has no other sense when applied to persons. *Place* is as indefinite as before; it may be taken for that share which we personally have in society either generally, as when every one is said to fill a *place* in society; or particularly for a specific share of its business, so as to fill a *place* under government: *situation* is that kind of *place* which specifies either our share in its business, but with a higher import than the general term *place*, or a share in its gains and losses, as the prosperous or adverse *situation* of a man: a *station* is that kind of *place* which denotes a share in its relative consequence, power, and honour; in which sense every man holds a

certain *station*: the *post* is that kind of *place* in which he has a specific share in the duties of society: the *situation* comprehends many duties; but the *post* includes properly one duty only; the word being figuratively employed from the *post*, or particular spot which a soldier is said to occupy. A clerk in a counting-house fills a *place*: a clergyman holds a *situation* by virtue of his office; he is in the *station* of a gentleman by reason of his education, as well as his *situation*: a faithful minister will always consider that his *post* where good is to be done.

Surely the church is a *place* where one day's truce ought to be allowed to the dissensions and animosities of mankind.—BURKE.

A *situation* in which I am as unknown to all the world as I am ignorant of all that passes in it would exactly suit me.—COWPER.

It has been my fate to be engaged in business much and often, by the *stations* in which I have been placed.—ATTERBURY.

Every step in the progression of existence changes our *position* with respect to the things about us.—JOHNSON.

I will never, while I have health, be wanting to my duty in my *post*.—ATTERBURY.

To Place, Dispose, Order.

To **Place** is to assign a *place* (*v.* *Place*) to a thing; to **Dispose** is to *place* according to a certain rule; to **Order** is to *place* in a certain order.

Things are often *placed* from the necessity of being *placed* in some way or another: they are *disposed* so as to appear to the best advantage.

Books are *placed* on a shelf or in a cupboard to be out of the way; they are *disposed* on shelves according to their size: chairs are *placed* in different parts of a room; prints are tastefully *disposed* round a room.

Material objects only are *placed*: material or spiritual objects are *disposed*: spiritual objects only are *ordered*. Sticks are *placed* at certain distances for purposes of convenience; papers are *disposed* according to their contents.

To *dispose* in the improper sense is a more partial action than to *order*: one *disposes* for particular occasions; one *orders* for a permanency and in complicated matters: our thoughts may be *disposed* to seriousness in certain cases; our thoughts and wills ought to be *ordered* aright at all times. An author *disposes* his work agreeably to the nature of his subject; a tradesman *orders* his business so as to do everything in good time.

If I have a wish that is prominent above the rest, it is to see you *placed* to your satisfaction near me.—SHENSTONE.

And last the reliques by themselves *dispose*,
Which in a brazen urn the priests enclose.—DRYDEN.

Place, Spot, Site.

A particular or given space is the idea common to these terms; but the former is general and indefinite, the latter specific. **Place** is limited to no size nor quantity, it may be large; but **Spot** implies a very small *place*, such as by a figure of speech is supposed to be no larger than a *spot*: the term *place* is em-

played upon every occasion; the term *spot* is confined to very particular cases; we may often know the *place* in a general way where a thing is, but it is not easy after a course of years to find out the exact *spot* on which it has happened. The *place* where our Saviour was buried is to be seen and pointed out, but not the very *spot* where He lay.

The *Site* is the *spot* on which anything stands or is situated; it is more commonly applied to a building or any *place* marked out for a specific purpose; as the *site* on which a camp had been formed.

O how unlike the *place* from whence they fell!
MILTON.

My fortune leads to traverse realms alone,
And find no *spot* of all the world my own.
GOLDSMITH.

To *Place*, *v. To put*.

Placid, *v. Calm*.

Plain, *v. Apparent*.

Plain, *v. Even*.

Plain, *v. Frank*.

Plain, *v. Sincere*.

Plan, *v. Design*.

Plausible, *v. Colourable*.

Play, Game, Sport,

Play, from the French *plaire* to please, signifies in general what one does to please one's self.

Game, in Saxon *gaming*, very probably comes from the Greek *γᾶμος* to marry, which is the season for *games*: the word *γᾶμος*, itself, comes from *γᾶω* to be buoyant or boasting, whence comes our word *gay*.

Sport, in German *spass* or *posse*, comes fr m the Greek *παίζω* to jest.

Play and *game* both include exercise, corporeal or mental, or both; but *play* is an unsystematic, *game* a systematic, exercise: children *play* when they merely run after each other, but this is no *game*; on the other hand, when they exercise with the ball according to any rule, this is a *game*: every *game* therefore is a *play*, but every *play* is not a *game*: trundling a hoop is a *play*, but not a *game*: cricket is both a *play* and a *game*. One person may have his *play* by himself, but there must be more than one to have a *game*. *Play* is adapted to infants: *games* to those who are more advanced. *Play* is the necessary unbending of the mind to give a free exercise to the body: *game* is the direction of the mind to the lighter objects of intellectual pursuit. An intemperate love of *play*, though prejudicial to the improvement of young people, is not always the worst indications which they can give; it is often coupled with qualities of a better kind: when *games* are pursued with too much ardour, particularly for the purposes of gain, they are altogether prejudicial to the understanding, and ruinous to the morals.

Sport is a bodily exercise connected with the prosecution of some object; it is so far, therefore, distinct from either *play* or *game*: for *play* may be purely corporeal; *game*, prin-

cipally intellectual; but *sport* is a mixture of both. The term *game* comprehends the exercise of an art, and the perfection which is attained in that art is the end or source of pleasure; a *sport* is merely the prosecution of an object which may be, and mostly is, attainable by one's physical powers without any exercise of art: a *game*, therefore, is intellectual both in the end and the means; a *sport* only in the end. Draughts, backgammon, cards, and the like, are *games*: but hunting, shooting, racing, bowling, quoits, &c., are termed more properly *sports*: there are, however, many things which may be denominated either *game* or *sport* according as it has more or less of art in it. Wrestling, boxing, chariot-racing, and the like, were carried to such perfection by the ancients that they are always distinguished by the name of *games*; of which we have historical accounts under the different titles of the Olympic, the Pythian, the Nemean, and the Isthmian *games*. Similar exercises, when practised by the rustics in England, have been commonly denominated rural *sports*. Upon this ground *game* is used abstractedly for that part of the *game* in which the whole art lies; and *sport* is used for the end of the *sport* or the pleasure produced by the attainment of that end: thus we say that the *game* is won or lost; to be clever or inept at a *game*; to have much *sport*, to enjoy the *sport*, or to spoil the *sport*.

Play is not unlawful merely as a contest
HAWKESWORTH.

War! that mad *game* the world so loves to play.
SWIFT.

Why on that brow dwell sorrow and dismay,
Where loves were wont to *sport*, and smiles to play?
SWIFT.

Player, *v. Actor*.

To Plead, *v. To apologize*.

Pleader, *v. Defender*.

Pleasant, *v. Agreeable*.

Pleasant, *v. Facetious*.

Pleased, *v. Glad*.

Pleasing, *v. Agreeable*.

Pleasure, *v. Comfort*.

Pleasure, Joy, Delight, Charm.

Pleasure, from the Latin *placere* to please or give content, is the generic term, involving in itself the common idea of the other terms.

Joy, *v. Glad*.

Delight, in Latin *delicere*, comes from *delicio*, to allure, signifying what allures the mind.

Pleasure is a term of most extensive use; it embraces one grand class of our feelings or sensations, and is opposed to nothing but pain, which embraces the second class or division: *joy* and *delight* are but modes or modifications of *pleasure*, differing as to the degree, and as to the objects or sources. *Pleasure*, in its peculiar acceptation, is smaller in degree than either *joy* or *delight*, but in its universal acceptation it defines no degree: the term is indifferently employed for the highest as well as the lowest degree; whereas *joy* and *delight*

can be employed only to express a positively high degree. *Pleasure* is produced by any or every object; everything by which we are surrounded acts upon us more or less to produce it; we may have *pleasure* either from without or from within: *pleasure* from the gratification of our senses, from the exercise of our affections, or the exercise of our understandings; *pleasures* from our own selves, or *pleasures* from others: but *joy* is derived from the exercise of the affections: and *delight* either from the affections or the understanding. In this manner we distinguish the *pleasures* of the table, social *pleasures*, or intellectual *pleasures*; the *joy* of meeting an old friend; or the *delight* of pursuing a favourite object.

Pleasures are either transitory or otherwise; they may arise from momentary circumstances, or be attached to some permanent condition: all earthly *pleasure* is in its nature fleeting; and heavenly *pleasure*, on the contrary, lasting. *Joy* is in its nature commonly short of duration, it springs from particular events; it is *pleasure* at high tide, but it may come and go as suddenly as the events which caused it: one's *joy* may be awakened and damped in quick succession: earthly *joys* are peculiarly of this nature, and religious *joys* are not altogether divested of this characteristic; they are supposed to spring out of particular occurrences, when the spiritual and holy affections are peculiarly called into action. *Delight* is not so fleeting as *joy*, but it may be less so than simple *pleasure*; *delight* arises from a state of outward circumstances which is naturally more durable than that of *joy*; but it is a state seldom attainable and not so much at one's command as *pleasure*: this last is very seldom denied in some form or another to every human being, but those only are susceptible of *delight* who have acquired a certain degree of mental refinement; we must have a strong capacity for enjoyment before we can find *delight* in the pursuits of literature, or the cultivation of the arts. *Pleasures* are often calm and moderate; they do not depend upon a man's rank or condition; they are within the reach of all, more or less, and more or less at one's command: *joys* are buoyant; they dilate the heart for a time, but they must and will subside; they depend likewise on casualties which are under no one's control: *delights* are ardent and excessive; they are within the reach of a few only, but depend less on external circumstances than on the temper of the receiver.

Pleasure may be had either by reflection on the past or by anticipation of the future; *joy* and *delight* can be produced only by present objects: we have a *pleasure* in thinking on what we have once enjoyed, or what we may again enjoy; we experience *joy* on the receipt of particularly good news; one may experience *delight* from a musical entertainment. *Pleasure* and *delight* may be either individual or social; *joy* is rather of a social nature: we feel a *pleasure* in solitude when locked up only in our own contemplations; we experience *delight* in the prosecution of some great end; we feel *joy* in the presence of those whom we love, when we see them likewise happy. *Pleasures* are particularly divided into selfish or benevolent; *joys* and *delights* flow commonly from that

which immediately interests ourselves, but very frequently spring from the higher source of interest in the happiness of others: the *pleasure* of serving a friend, or relieving a distressed object, has always been esteemed by moralists as the purest of *pleasures*; we are told that in heaven there is more *joy* over one sinner that repenteth than over the ninety and nine that need no repentance; the *delight* which a parent feels at seeing the improvement of his child is one of those enviable sorts of *pleasures* which all may desire to experience, but which many must be contented to forego.

Pleasure, *joy*, and *delight* are likewise employed for the things which give *pleasure*, *joy*, or *delight*.

Charm (*v. Attraction*) is used only in the sense of what *charms*, or gives a high degree of *pleasure*; but not a degree equal to that of *joy* or *delight*, though greater than of ordinary *pleasure*; *pleasure* intoxicates; the *joys* of heaven are objects of a Christian's pursuit; the *delights* of matrimony are lasting to those who are susceptible of true affection; the *charms* of rural scenery never fail of their effect whenever they offer themselves to the eye.

That every day has its pains and sorrows is universally experienced; but if we look impartially about us, we shall find that every day has likewise its *pleasures* and its *joys*.—JOHNSON.

Whilst he who virtue's radiant course has run,
Descends like a serenely setting sun;
His thoughts triumphant heav'n alone employs,
And hope anticipates his future *joys*.—JENYNS.

Before the day of departure (from the country) a week is always appropriated for the payment and reception of ceremonial visits, at which nothing can be mentioned but the *delights* of London.—JOHNSON.

When thus creation's *charms* around combine,
Amidst the store should thankless pride repine?
GOLDSMITH.

Pledge, *v. Deposit*.

Pledge, *v. Earnest*.

Plenipotentiary, *v. Ambassador*.

Plentitude, *v. Fulness*.

Plenteous, *v. Plentiful*.

Plentiful, **Plenteous**, **Abundant**,
Copious, **Ample**.

Plentiful, and **Plenteous** signify the presence of *plenty*, *plentitude*, or *fulness*.

Abundant, in Latin *abundantia*, from *abundo* to overflow, compounded of the intensive *ab* and *unda* a wave, signifies literally overflowing.

Copious, in Latin *copiosus*, from *copia*, or *eon*, and *opes* wealth, signifies having a store.

Ample, *v. Ample*.

Plentiful and **plenteous** differ only in use: the former being most employed in the familiar; the latter in the grave style.

Plenty fills; **abundance** does more, it leaves a superfluity; as that, however, which fills suffices as much as that which flows over, the term **abundance** is often employed promiscuously with that of **plenty**; we can indifferently say a **plentiful** harvest, or an **abundant** harvest. **Plenty** is, however, more frequent in the literal sense for that which fills the body; **abundance**,

for that which fills the mind, or the desires of the mind : a *plenty* of provisions is even more common than an *abundance* ; a *plenty* of food ; a *plenty* of corn, wine, and oil : but an *abundance* of words ; an *abundance* of riches ; an *abundance* of wit or humour. In certain years fruit is *plentiful*, and at other times grain is *plentiful* ; in all cases we have *abundant* cause for gratitude to the Giver of all good things.

Copious and *ample* are modes either of *plenty* or *abundance* : the former is employed in regard to what is collected or brought into one point ; the term *ample* is employed only in regard to what may be narrowed or expanded ; a *copious* stream of blood, or a *copious* flow of words, equally designate the quantity which is collected together, as an *ample* provision, an *ample* store, an *ample* share, marks that which may at pleasure be increased or diminished.

The resty knaves are overrun with ease,
As *plenty* ever is the nurse of faction.—ROWE.

And God said, let the waters generate
Reptile with spawn *abundant*, living soul.—MILTON.

Smooth to the shelving brink a *copious* flood
Rolls fair and placid.—THOMSON.

Peaceful beneath primeval trees, that cast
Their *ample* shade o'er Niger's yellow stream,
Leans the huge elephant, wise-t of brutes.—THOMSON.

Pliable, v. Flexible.

Pliant, v. Flexible.

Plight, v. Situation.

Plot, v. Combination.

To Pluck, v. To draw.

Plunder, v. Rapine.

To Plunge, Dive.

Plunge is but a variation of *pluck*, *pull*, and the Latin *pello* to drive or force forward.

Dive is but a variation of *dip*, which is under various forms to be found in the northern languages.

One *plunges* sometimes in order to *dive* : but one may *plunge* without *diving*, and one may *dive* without *plunging* : to *plunge* is to dart headforemost into the water : to *dive* is to go to the bottom of the water, or towards it : it is a good practice for bathers to *plunge* into the water when they first go in, although it is not advisable for them to *dive* ; ducks frequently *dive* into the water without ever *plunging*. Thus far they differ in their natural sense ; but in the figurative application they differ more widely : to *plunge*, in this case, is an act of rashness ; to *dive* is an act of design : a young man hurried away by his passions will *plunge* into every extravagance when he comes into possession of his estate ; people of a prying temper seek to *dive* into the secrets of others.

The French *plunged* themselves into these calamities they suffer, to prevent themselves from settling into a British constitution.—BURKE.

How he did seem to *dive* into their hearts
With humble and familiar courtesy.—SHAKESPEARE.

To Point, v. To aim.

To Point Out, v. To show.

To Poise, Balance.

Poise, in French *peser*, probably comes from *pes* a foot, on which the body is as it were *poised*.

Balance, in French *balancer*, from the Latin *bilanz*, or *bis* and *lanx* a pair of scales.

The idea of bringing into an equilibrium is common to both terms ; but *poise* is a particular, and *balance* a more general term : a thing is *poised* as respects itself ; it is *balanced* as respects other things ; a person *poises* a plain stick in his hand when he wants it to lie even ; he *balances* the stick if it has a particular weight at each end : a person may *poise* himself, but he *balances* others : when not on firm ground, it is necessary to *poise* one's self ; when two persons are situated one at each end of a beam, they may *balance* one another.

Some evil, terrible and unforeseen,
Must sure ensue to *poise* the scale against
This vast profusion of exceeding pleasure.—ROWE.

This, O ! this very moment let me die,
While hopes and fears in equal *balance* lie.—DRYDEN.

Poison, Venom.

Poison, in French *poison*, comes from the Latin *potio* a potion or drink.

Venom, in French *venin*, Latin *venenum*, comes probably from *vena* the veins, because it circulates rapidly through the veins, and infects the blood in a deadly manner.

Poison is a general term ; in its original meaning it signifies any potion which acts destructively upon the system ; *venom* is a species of deadly or malignant *poison* : a *poison* may be either slow or quick ; a *venom* is always most active in its nature ; a *poison* must be administered inwardly to have its effect ; a *venom* will act by an external application : the juice of the hellebore is a *poison* ; the tongue of the adder and the tooth of the viper contain *venom* : many plants are unfit to be eaten on account of the *poisonous* quality which is in them ; the Indians are in the habit of dipping the tips of their arrows in a *venomous* juice, which renders the slightest wound mortal.

The moral application of these terms is clearly drawn from their proper acceptation : the *poison* must be infused or injected into the subject ; the *venom* acts upon him externally ; bad principles are justly compared to a *poison*, which some are so unhappy as to suck in with their mothers' milk ; the shafts of envy are peculiarly *venomous* when directed against those in elevated stations.

The devil can convey the *poison* of his suggestions quicker than the agitation of thought or the strictures of fancy.—SOUTH.

As the *venom* spread,
Frightful convulsions writh'd his tortur'd limbs.
FENTON.

Polite, v. Civil.

Polished, v. Polite.

Polite, Polished, Refined.

Polite (*v. Civil*) denotes a quality ; **Polished**, a state ; he who is *polite* is so according to the rules of *politeness* ; he who is

polished is *polished* by the force of art: a *polite* man is, in regard to his behaviour, a finished gentleman; but a rude person may be more or less *polished* or freed from rudeness. *Refined* rises in sense, both in regard to *polite* and *polished*: a man is indebted to nature, rather than to art, for his *refinement*; but his *politeness*, or his *polish*, are entirely the fruit of education. *Politeness* and *polish* do not extend to anything but externals; *refinement* applies as much to the mind as the body: rules of conduct, and good society, will make a man *polite*; lessons in dancing will serve to give a *polish*; *refined* manners or principles will naturally arise out of *refinement*.

As *polish* extends only to the exterior, it is less liable to excess than *refinement*: when the language, the walk, and deportment of a man is *polished*, he is divested of all that can make him offensive in social intercourse; but if his temper be *refined* beyond a certain boundary, he loses the nerve of character which is essential for maintaining his dignity against the rude shocks of human life.

A pedant among men of learning and sense is like an ignorant servant giving an account of *polite* conversation.—STEELE.

In rude nations the dependence of children on their parents is of shorter continuance than in *polished* societies.—ROBERTSON.

What is honour but the height and flower of morality, and the utmost *refinement* of conversation?

Polite, v. Gented.

Politic, v. Political.

Political, Politic.

Political has the proper meaning of the word *polity*, which, from the Greek *πολιτεία* and *πολις* a city, signifies the government either of a city or a country.

Politic, like the word *policy*, has the improper meaning of the word *polity*, namely, that of clever management, because the affairs of states are sometimes managed with considerable art and finesse; hence we speak of *political* government as opposed to that which is ecclesiastical; and of *politic* conduct as opposed to that which is unwise and without foresight: in *political* questions, it is not *politic* for individuals to set themselves up in opposition to those who are in power; the study of *politics*, as a science, may make a man a clever statesman; but it may not always enable him to discern true *policy* in his private concerns.

Machiavel laid down this for a master rule, in his *political* scheme, that the show of religion was helpful to the politician.—SOUTH.

A *politic* caution, a guarded circumspection, were among the ruling principles of our forefathers.—BURKE.

To Pollute, v. To contaminate.

Pomp, v. Magnificence.

To Ponder, v. To think.

Ponderous, v. Heavy.

Poor, Pauper.

Poor and **Pauper** are both derived from the Latin *pauper*, which comes from the Greek *πaupos* small. *Poor* is a term of general use; *pauper* is a term of particular use: a *pauper* is a poor man who lives upon alms or the relief of the parish: the former is, therefore, indefinite in its meaning; the latter conveys a reproachful idea. The word *poor* is used as a substantive only in the plural number; *pauper* is a substantive both in the singular and plural: the *poor* of the parish are, in general, a heavy burden upon the inhabitants; there are some persons who are not ashamed to live and die as *paupers*.

Populace, v. People.

Port, v. Harbour.

To Portend, v. To augur.

Portion, v. Deal.

Position, v. Place.

Position, Posture.

Position (*v. Place*) is here used as respects persons, and in this sense is allied to **Posture**, which is a species of *posture*, that is, an artificial or a set *posture*: if a person stands tip-toe, in order to see to a greater distance, he may be said to put himself into that *position*; but if a dancer do the same, as a part of his performance, it becomes a *posture*: so, likewise, when one leans against the wall it is a leaning *position*; but when one theatrically bends his body backward or forward, it is a *posture*: one may, in the same manner, sit in an erect *position*, or in a reclining *posture*.

Every step in the progression of existence changes our *position* with respect to the things about us.—JOHNSON.

Milton has represented this violent spirit (Moloch) as the first that rises in that assembly to give his opinion upon their present *posture* of affairs.—ADDISON.

Position, v. Tenet.

Positive, v. Actual.

Positive, v. Confident.

Positive, v. Definite.

Positive, Absolute, Peremptory.

Positive, in Latin *positivus*, from *pono* to put or place, signifies placed or fixed, that is, fixed or established in the mind.

Absolute (*v. Absolute*) signifies uncontrolled by any external circumstances.

Peremptory, in Latin *peremptorius*, from *perimo* to take away, signifies removing all further question.

Positive is said either of a man's convictions or temper of mind or of his proceedings; *absolute* is said of his mode of proceedings, or his relative circumstances; *peremptory* is said of his proceedings. *Positive*, as respects a man's conviction, has been spoken of under the article of *confident* (*v. Confident*); in the latter sense it bears the closest analogy to *absolute* or *peremptory*; a *positive* mode of speech depends upon a *positive* state of mind;

an *absolute* mode of speech depends upon the uncontrollable authority of the speaker: a *peremptory* mode of speech depends upon the disposition and relative circumstances of the speaker: a decision is *positive*: a command *absolute* or *peremptory*: what is *positive* excludes all question; what is *absolute* bars all resistance; what is *peremptory* removes all hesitation; a *positive* answer can be given only by one who has *positive* information; an *absolute* decree can issue only from one vested with *absolute* authority; a *peremptory* refusal can be given only by one who has the will and the power of deciding it without any controversy.

As adverbs, *positively*, *absolutely*, and *peremptorily* have an equally close connection: a thing is said not to be *positively* known, or *positively* determined upon, or *positively* agreed to; it is said not to be *absolutely* necessary, *absolutely* true or false, *absolutely* required; it is not to be *peremptorily* decided, *peremptorily* declared, *peremptorily* refused.

Positive and *absolute* are likewise applied to moral objects with the same distinction as before: the *positive* expresses what is fixed in distinction from the relative that may vary; the *absolute* is that which is independent of everything: thus, pleasures and pains are *positive*; names in logic are *absolute*; cases in grammar are *absolute*.

The diminution or ceasing of pain does not operate like *positive* pleasure.—BURKE.

Those parts of the moral world which have not an *absolute*, may yet have a relative beauty, in respect of some other parts concealed from us.—ADDISON.

The Highlander gives to every question an answer so prompt and *peremptory* that scepticism is dared into silence.—JOHNSON.

To Possess, *v. To have.*

To Possess, *v. To hold.*

Possessions, *v. Goods.*

Possessor, Proprietor, Owner, Master.

The **Possessor** has the full power, if not the right, of the present disposal over the object of possession; the **Proprietor** and **Owner** has the unlimited right of transfer, but not always the power of immediate disposal. The *proprietor* and the *owner* are the same in signification, though not in application: the first term being used principally in regard to matters of importance; the latter on familiar occasions: the *proprietor* of an estate is a more suitable expression than the *owner* of an estate: the *owner* of a book is more becoming than the *proprietor*. The *possessor* and the **Master** are commonly the same person, when those things are in question which are subject to *possession*; but the terms are otherwise so different in their original meaning, that they can scarcely admit of comparison; the *possessor* of a house is naturally the *master* of the house; and, in general, whatever a man *possesses*, that he has in his power, and is consequently *master* of; but we may have, legally, the right of *possessing* a thing, over which we have actually no power of control: in this case we are nominally *possessor* but virtually not *master*. A minor, or insane person, may

be both *possessor* and *proprietor* of that over which he has no control; a man is, therefore, on the other hand, appropriately denominated *master*, not *possessor*, of his actions.

I am convinced that a poetic talent is a blessing to its *possessor*.—SEWARD.

Death! great *proprietor* of all! 'Tis thine To tread out empire and to quench the stars.—YOUNG.

One cause of the insufficiency of riches (to produce happiness) is, that they very seldom make their *owner* rich.—JOHNSON.

Nought is seen
But the wild herds that own no *master's* stall.
THOMSON.

Possible, Practicable, Practical.

Possible, from the Latin *possum* to be able, signifies properly to be able to be done: **Practicable**, from *practice* (*v. To exercise*), signifies to be able to put in *practice*: hence the difference between *possible* and *practicable* is the same as between doing a thing at all, or doing it as a rule. There are many things *possible* which cannot be called *practicable*; but what is *practicable* must, in its nature, be *possible*. The *possible* depends solely on the power of the agent; the *practicable* depends on circumstances: a child cannot say how much it is *possible* for him to learn until he has tried; schemes have sometimes everything apparently to recommend them to notice but that which is of the first importance, namely, their *practicability*.

The *practicable* is that which may or can be *practised*; the **Practical** is that which is intended for *practise*: the former, therefore, applies to that which men devise to carry into *practise*: the latter to that which they have to *practise*; projectors ought to consider what is *practicable*; divines and moralists have to consider what is *practical*. The *practicable* is opposed to the *impracticable*; the *practical* to the theoretical or speculative.

How can we, without supposing ourselves under the constant care of a Supreme Being, give any *possible* account for that nice proportion which we find in every great city between the deaths and births of its inhabitants?—ADDISON.

He who would aim at *practicable* things should turn upon allaying our pain rather than removing our sorrow.—STEELE.

Practical cunning shows itself in political matters.—SOUTH.

Post, *v. Place.*

To Postpone, *v. To delay.*

Posture, *v. Action.*

Posture, *v. Position.*

Potent, *v. Powerful.*

Potentate, *v. Prince.*

Poverty, Indigence, Want, Need.

Poverty marks the condition of being poor.

Indigence, in Latin *indigentia*, comes from *indigeo* and the Greek *deômai* to want, signifying in the same manner as the word **Want**, the abstract condition of wanting.

Need, *v. Necessary.*

Poverty is a general state of fortune opposed to that of riches; in which one is abridged of the conveniences of life: *indigence* is a particular state of *poverty*, which rises above it in such a degree as to exclude the necessities as well as the conveniences of life; *want* and *need* are both partial states, that refer only to individual things which are *wanting* to any one. *Poverty* and *indigence* comprehend all a man's external circumstances; but *want*, when taken by itself, denotes the *want* of food or clothing, and is opposed to abundance; *need*, when taken by itself, implies the want of money, or any other useful article; but they are both more commonly taken in connection with the object which is *wanted*, and in this sense they are to the two former as the genus to the species. *Poverty* and *indigence* are permanent states; *want* and *need* are temporary: *poverty* and *indigence* are the order of Providence, they do not depend upon the individual, and are, therefore, not reckoned as his fault; *want* and *need* arise more commonly from circumstances of one's own creation, and tend frequently to one's discredit. What man has not caused, man cannot so easily obviate; *poverty* and *indigence* cannot, therefore, be removed at one's will: but *want* and *need* are frequently removed by the aid of others. *Poverty* is that which one should learn to bear, so as to lessen its pains; *indigence* is a calamity which the compassion of others may in some measure alleviate, if they cannot entirely obviate; *want*, when it results from intemperance or extravagance, is not altogether entitled to any relief; but *need*, when it arises from casualties that are independent of our demerits, will always find friends.

It is a wise distribution of Providence which has made the rich and poor to be mutually dependent upon each other, and both to be essential to the happiness of the whole. Among all descriptions of *indigent* persons, none are more entitled to charitable attention than those who in addition to their wants suffer under any bodily infirmity. The old proverb says, "That waste makes *want*," which is daily realized among men without making them wiser by experience. "A friend in *need*," according to another vulgar proverb, "is a friend indeed," which, like all proverbial sayings, contains a striking truth; for nothing can be more acceptable than the assistance which we receive from a friend when we stand in *need* of it.

That the *poverty* of the Highlanders is gradually diminished cannot be mentioned among the unpleasant consequences of subjection.—JOHNSON.

If we can but raise him above *indigence* a moderate share of good fortune and merit will be sufficient to open his way to whatever else we can wish him to obtain.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

Want is a bitter and a hateful good,
Because its virtues are not understood,
Yet many things, impossible to thought,
Have been by *need* to full perfection brought.

DRYDEN.

To Pound, *v. To break.*

To Pour, Spill, Shed.

Pour is probably connected with *pore*, and the Latin preposition *per* through, signifying to make to pass as it were through a channel.

Spill and *plash*, and the German *spülen* are probably onomatopœias.

Shed comes from the German *scheiden* to separate, signifying to cast from.

We *pour* with design; we *spill* by accident: we *pour* water over a plant or a bed; we *spill* it on the ground. To *pour* is an act of convenience; to *spill* and *shed* are acts more or less hurtful; the former is to cause to run in small quantities; the latter in large quantities: we *pour* wine out of a bottle into a glass; but the blood of a person is said to be *spilt* or *shed* when his life is violently taken away: what is *poured* is commonly no part of the body from whence it is *poured*; but what is *shed* is no other than a component part; hence trees are said to *shed* their leaves, animals their hair, or human beings to *shed* tears.

Poetry is of so subtle a spirit that in the *pouring* out of one language into another, it will evaporate.—DENHAM.

O reputation! dearer far than life,
Thou precious balm, lovely sweet of smell,
Whose cordial drops once *spile* by some rash hand,
Not all the owner's care, nor the repenting toil
Of the rude *spiller*, can collect.—SEWEL.

Herod acted the part of a great mourner for the deceased Aristobulus, *shedding* abundance of tears. FRIDEAUX.

Power, Strength, Authority,
Dominion.

Power, in French *pouvoir*, comes from the Latin *possum* to be able; *Strength* denotes the abstract quality of *strong*.

Authority, *v. Influence.*

Dominion, *v. Empire.*

Power is the generic and universal term, comprehending in it that simple principle of nature which exists in all subjects. *Power* is either physical or mental, public or private; in the former case it is synonymous with *strength*, in the latter with *authority*. *Power* in the physical sense respects whatever causes motion; *strength* respects that species of *power* that lies in the vital and muscular parts of the body. *Strength*, therefore, is internal, and depends upon the internal organization of the frame; *power*, on external circumstances. A man may have *strength* to move, but not the *power* if he be bound with cords. Our *strength* is proportioned to the health of the body, and the firmness of its make; our *power* may be increased by the help of instruments.

Civil *power* includes in it all that which enables us to have any influence or control over the actions, persons, property, &c., of others: *authority* is confined to that species of *power* which is derived from some legitimate source. *Power* exists independently of all right; *authority* is founded only on right. A king has often the *power* to be cruel, but he has never the *authority* to be so. Subjects have sometimes the *power* of overturning the government, but they can in no case have the *authority*. *Power* may be abused; *authority* may be exceeded. A minister abuses his *power* if he only exerts it to benefit his favourites and oppress the subject; an am-

bassador exceeds his *authority* who goes beyond the letter of his instructions.

Power may be seized either by fraud or force; *authority* is derived from some present law, or delegated by a higher *power*. A usurper has an assumed or usurped *power*; it is, therefore, exercised by no *authority*: the sovereign holds his *power* by the law of God; for God is the source of all *authority*, which is commensurate with his goodness, his *power*, and his wisdom: man, therefore, exercises the Supreme *authority* over man, as the minister of God's *authority*; he exceeds that *authority* if he do anything contrary to God's will. Subjects have a delegated *authority* which they receive from a superior; if they act for themselves without respect to the will of that superior, they exert a *power* without *authority*. In this manner a prime minister acts by the *authority* of the king to whom he is responsible. A minister of the gospel performs his functions by the *authority* of the gospel, as it is interpreted and administered by the Church; but when he acts by an individual or particular interpretation, it is a self-assumed *power*, but not *authority*. Social beings, in order to act in concert, must act by laws and the subordination of ranks, whether in religion or politics; and he who acts solely by his own will, in opposition to the general consent of competent judges, exerts a *power*, but is without *authority*. Hence those who officiate in England as ministers of the gospel, otherwise than according to the form and discipline of the Established Church, act by an assumed *power*, which, though not punishable by the laws of man, must, like other sins, be answered for at the bar of God.

It lies properly with the supreme *power* to grant privileges, or take them away; but the same may be done by one in whom the *authority* is invested. *Authority* in this sense is applied to the ordinary concerns of life, where the line of distinction is always drawn, between what we can and what we ought to do. There is *power* where we can or may act; there is *authority* only where we ought to act. In all our dealings with others, it is necessary to consider in everything, not what we have the *power* of doing, but what we have the *authority* to do. In matters of indifference, and in what concerns ourselves only, it is sufficient to have the *power* to act, but in all important matters we must have the *authority* of the divine law: a man may have the *power* to read or leave it alone; but he cannot dispose of his person without *authority*. In what concerns others, we must act by their *authority*, if we wish to act conscientiously; when the secrets of another are confided to us, we have the *power* to divulge them, but not the *authority*, unless it be given by him who entrusted them.

Instructors are invested by parents with *authority* over their children; and parents receive their *authority* from nature, that is, the law of God; this paternal *authority*, according to the Christian system, extends to the education, but not to the destruction of their offspring. The heathens, however, claimed and exerted a *power* over the lives of their children. By my superior strength I may be enabled to exert a *power* over a man so as to control his action; of his own accord he gives me *authority*

to dispose of his property; so in literature, men of established reputation, of classical merit, and known veracity, are quoted as *authorities* in support of any position.

Power is indefinite as to degree; one may have little or much *power*: *dominion* is a positive degree of *power*. A monarch's *power* may be limited by various circumstances; a despot exercises *dominion* over all his subjects, high and low. One is not said to get a *power* over any object, but to get an object into one's *power*: on the other hand, we get a *dominion* over an object; thus some men have a *dominion* over the consciences of others.

Hence thou shalt prove my might, and curse the hour
Thou stoodst a rival of imperial *power*.—POPE.

Power arising from strength is always in those who are governed, who are many; but *authority* arising from opinion is in those who govern, who are few.—TEMPLE.

And each of these must will, perceive, design,
And draw confusedly in a different line,
Which then can claim *dominion* o'er the rest,
Or stamp the ruling passion in the breast.—JENYNS.

Powerful, Potent, Mighty.

Powerful or full of *power*, is also the original meaning of *Potent*; but *Mighty* signifies having *might*. *Powerful* is applicable to strength as well as *power*: a *powerful* man is one who by his size and make can easily overpower another; and a *powerful* person is one who has much in his *power*; *potent* is used only in this latter sense, in which it expresses a larger extent of *power*: a *potent* monarch is much more than a *powerful* prince; *mighty* expresses a still higher degree of *power*; *might* is *power* unlimited by any consideration or circumstance; a giant is called *mighty* in the physical sense, and genius is said to be *mighty* which takes everything within its grasp; the Supreme Being is entitled either *Omnipotent* or *Almighty*; but the latter term seems to convey the idea of boundless extent more forcibly than the former.

It is certain that the senses are more *powerful* as the reason is weaker.—JOHNSON.

Now, flaming up the heavens, the *potent* sun
Melts into limpid air the high-raised clouds.
THOMSON.

He who lives by a *mighty* principle within, which the world about him neither sees nor understands, he only ought to pass for godly.—SOUTH.

Practicable, *v.* Possible.

Practical, *v.* Possible.

Practice, *v.* Custom.

To Practise, *v.* To exercise.

To Praise, Commend, Applaud, Extol.

Praise comes from the German *preisen* to value, and our own word *price*, signifying to give a value to a thing.

Commend, in Latin *commendo*, compounded of *com* and *mando*, signifies to commit to the good opinion of others.

Applaud, *v.* Applause.

Extol, in Latin *extollo*, signifies to lift up very high.

All these terms denote the act of expressing approbation. To *praise* is the most general and indefinite; it may rise to a high degree, but it generally implies a lower degree: we *praise* a person generally; we *commend* him particularly: we *praise* him for his diligence, sobriety, and the like; we *commend* him for his performances, or for any particular instance of prudence or good conduct. To *applaud* is an ardent mode of *praising*; we *applaud* a person for his nobleness of spirit: to *extol* is a reverential mode of *praising*; we *extol* a man for his heroic exploits. *Praise* is confined to no station, though with most propriety bestowed by superiors or equals: *commendation* is the part of a superior; a parent *commends* his child for an act of charity: *applause* is the act of many as well as of one; theatrical performances are the frequent subjects of public *applause*: to *extol* is the act of inferiors, who declare thus decidedly their sense of a person's superiority.

In the scale of signification *commend* stands the lowest, and *extol* the highest; we *praise* in stronger terms than we *commend*: to *applaud* is to *praise* in loud terms; to *extol* is to *praise* in strong terms. He who expects *praise* will not be contented with simple *commendation*: *praise*, when sincere, and bestowed by one whom we esteem, is truly gratifying; but it is a dangerous gift for the receiver; happy that man who has no occasion to repent the acceptance of it. *Commendation* is always sincere, and may be very beneficial by giving encouragement: *applause* is noisy: it is the sentiment of the multitude, who are continually changing.

How happy thou we find,
Who know by merit to engage mankind,
Prais'd by each tongue, by ev'ry heart below'd
For virtues practis'd, and for arts improv'd.—JENYNS.

When school-boys write verse, it may indeed suggest an expectation of something better hereafter, but deserves not to be *commended* for any real merit of their own.—COWPER.

While, from both benches, with redoubled sounds,
Th' *applause* of lords and commonersounds.
—DRYDEN.

The servile rout their careful Cæsar praise,
Him they *extol*; they worship him alone.—DRYDEN.

Praiseworthy, v. Laudable.

Prank, v. Frolic.

To Prate, v. To babble.

To Prattle, v. To babble.

Prayer, Petition, Request, Entreaty, Suit.

Prayer, from the Latin *preco*, and the Greek *ᾠαίνωμαι* to pray, is a general term, including the common idea of application to some person for any favour to be granted: **Petition**, from *peto* to seek; **Request** (*v. To ask*); **Entreaty** (*v. To beg*); **Suit** from *sue*, in French *suivre*, Latin *sequor*, to follow after; denote different modes of *prayer*, varying in the circumstances of the action and the object acted upon.

The *prayer* is made more commonly to the Supreme Being; the *petition* is made more generally to one's fellow-creatures; we may,

however, *pray* our fellow-creatures, and *petition* our Creator: the *prayer* is made for everything which is of the first importance to us as living beings; the *petition* is made for that which may satisfy our desires; hence our *prayers* to the Almighty respect all our circumstances as moral and responsible agents; our *petitions* respect the temporary circumstances of our present existence.

Petitions and *requests* are alike made to our fellow-creatures; but the former are a public act, in which many express their wishes to the Supreme Authority; the latter are an individual act between men in their private relations: the people *petition* the king or the parliament; a school of boys *petition* their master; a child makes a *request* to its parents; one friend makes a *request* to another. The *request* marks an equality, but the *entreaty* defines no condition; it differs, however, from the former in the nature of the object and the mode of preferring: the *request* is but a simple expression; the *entreaty* is urgent: the *request* may be made in trivial matters; the *entreaty* is made in matters that deeply interest the feelings: we *request* a friend to lend us a book; we use every *entreaty* in order to divert a person from those purposes which we think detrimental: one complies with a *request*; one yields to *entreaties*. It was the dying *request* of Socrates that they would sacrifice a cock to Æsculapius; Regulus was deaf to every *entreaty* of his friends, who wished him not to return to Carthage.

The *suit* is a higher kind of *prayer*, varying both in the nature of the subject, and the character of the agent. A gentleman pays his *suit* to a lady; a courtier makes his *suit* to the prince.

Torture him with thy softness,
Nor till thy *prayers* are granted, set him free.
—OTWAY.

She takes *petitions*, and dispenses laws,
Hears and determines every private cause.—DRYDEN.

Thus spoke Ilioneus; the Trojan crew,
With cries and clamours, his *request* renew.—DRYDEN.

Arguments, *entreaties*, and promises were employed in order to soothe them (the followers of Cortes).—ROBERTSON.

Seldom or never is there much spoke whenever any one comes to prefer a *suit* to another.—SOUTH.

Precarious, v. Doubtful.

Precedence, v. Priority.

Precedent, v. Example.

Preceding, v. Antecedent.

Precept, v. Command.

Precept, v. Doctrine.

Precept, v. Maxim.

Precincts, v. Border.

Precious, v. Valuable.

Precipitancy, v. Rashness.

Precise, v. Accurate.

Precision, v. Justness.

To Preclude, v. To prevent.

Precursor, v. Forerunner.

Predicament, v. Situation.

To Predict, *v. To foretell.*
 Predominant, *v. Prevailing.*
 Pre-eminence, *v. Priority.*
 Preface, *v. Prelude.*
 To Prefer, *v. To choose.*
 To Prefer, *v. To encourage.*
 Preferable, *v. Eligible.*
 Preference, *v. Priority.*
 Prejudice, *v. Bias.*
 Prejudice, *v. Disadvantage.*
 Preliminary, *v. Previous.*

Prelude, Preface.

Prelude, from the Latin *ludo* to play, signifies the game that precedes another; **Preface**, from the Latin *for* to speak, signifies the speech that precedes. The idea of a preparatory introduction is included in both these terms, but the former consists of actions, the latter of words; the throwing of stones and breaking of windows is the *prelude* on the part of a mob to a general riot; an apology for one's ill-behaviour is sometimes the *preface* to soliciting a remission of punishment. The *prelude* is mostly preparatory to that which is in itself actually bad: the *preface* is mostly preparatory to something supposed to be objectionable. Intemperance in liquor is the *prelude* to every other extravagance; when one wishes to ensure compliance with a request that may possibly be unreasonable, it is necessary to pave the way by some suitable *preface*.

At this time there was a general peace all over the world, which was a proper *prelude* for ushering in his coming who was the prince of peace.—PRIDEAUX.

As no delay
 Of *preface* brooking through his zeal of right.
 MILTON.

Premeditation, *v. Forethought.*

To Premise, Presume.

Premise, from *pre* and *mitto*, signifies set down beforehand; **Presume**, from *sumo* to take, signifies to take beforehand. Both these terms are employed in regard to our previous assertions or admissions of any circumstance; the former is used for what is theoretical or belongs to opinions: the latter is used for what is practical or belongs to facts: we *premise* that the existence of a Deity is unquestionable when we argue respecting his attributes; we *presume* that a person has a firm belief in divine revelation when we exhort him to follow the precepts of the Gospel. No argument can be pursued until we have *premised* those points upon which both parties are to agree: we must be careful not to *presume* upon more than what we are fully authorized to take for certain.

Here we must first *premise* what it is to enter into temptation.—SOUTH.

In the long Iambic metre, it does not appear that Chaucer ever composed at all; for I *presume* no one can imagine that he was the author of Gamelyn.—TYRWHITT.

To Prepare, *v. To fit.*
 Preparatory, *v. Previous.*
 To Preponderate, *v. To overbalance.*
 Prepossession, *v. Bent.*
 Prepossession, *v. Bias.*
 Preposterous, *v. Irrational.*
 Prerogative, *v. Privilege.*
 To Presage, *v. To augur.*
 Presage, *v. Omen.*
 To Prescribe, *v. To appoint.*
 To Prescribe, *v. To dictate.*
 Prescription, *v. Usage.*
 Present, *v. Gift.*
 To Present, *v. To give.*
 To Present, *v. To introduce.*
 To Preserve, *v. To keep.*
 To Preserve, *v. To save.*

To Press, Squeeze, Pinch, Gripe.

Press, in Latin *pressus*, participle of *premo*, which probably comes from the Greek *παρρημα*.

Squeeze, in Saxon *squizza*, Latin *quasso*, Hebrew *reshah* to press together.

Pinch is but a variation from *pincer*, *pin*, *spine*.

Gripe, from the German *greifen*, signifies to seize, like the word *grapple* or *grasp*, the Latin *rapio*, the Greek *γρῦναι* to fish or catch, and the Hebrew *geraph* to catch.

The forcible action of one body on another is included in all these terms. In the word *press* this is the only idea: the rest differ in the circumstances. We may *press* with the foot, the hand, the whole body, or any particular limb; one *squeezes* commonly with the hand; one *pinches* either with the fingers or an instrument constructed in a similar form; one *gripes* with teeth, claws, or any instrument that can gain a hold of the object. Inanimate as well as animate objects *press* or *pinch*: but to *squeeze* and *gripe* are more properly the actions of animate objects; the former is always said of persons, the latter of animals; stones *press* that on which they rest their weight; a door which shuts of itself may *pinch* the fingers; one *squeezes* the hand of a friend; lobsters and many other shell-fish *gripe* whatever comes within their claws.

In the figurative application they have a similar distinction; we *press* a person by importunity, or some coercive measure: an extortioner *squeezes* in order to get that which is given with reluctance or difficulty; a miser *pinches* himself if he contracts his subsistence; he *gripes* all that comes within his possession.

All these women (the thirty wives of Orodes) *pressed* hard upon the old king, each soliciting for a son of her own.—PRIDEAUX.

Ventidius receiving great sums from Herod to promote his interest, and at the same time greater to hinder it, *squeezed* each of them to the utmost, and served neither.—PRIDEAUX.

Better dispos'd to clothe the tatter'd wretch,
Who shrinks beneath the blast, to feed the poor
Pinch'd with afflictive want.—SOMERVILLE.

How can he be envid for his felicity who is conscious
that a very short time will give him up to the *gripe* of
poverty?—JOHNSON.

Pressing, Urgent, Importunate.

Pressing and **Urgent**, from *press* and *urge*, are applied as qualifying terms either to persons or things: **Importunate**, from the verb to *importune*, which probably signifies to wish to get into port, to land at some port, is applied only to persons. In regard to *pressing* it is said either of one's demands, one's requests, or one's exhortations; *urgent* is said of one's solicitations or entreaties; *importunate* is said of one's begging or applying for a thing. The *pressing* has more of violence in it; it is supported by force and authority; it is employed in matters of right; the *urgent* makes an appeal to one's feelings; it is more persuasive, and is employed in matters of favour: the *importunate* has some of the force, but none of the authority or obligation of the *pressing*; it is employed in matters of personal gratification. When applied to things, *pressing* is as much more forcible than *urgent* as in the former case; we speak of a *pressing* necessity, an *urgent* case. A creditor will be *pressing* for his money when he fears to lose it; one friend is *urgent* with another to intercede in his behalf; beggars are commonly *importunate* with the hope of teasing others out of their money.

Mr. Gay, whose zeal in your concern is worthy a friend,
writes to me in the most *pressing* terms about it.—
POPE.

The danger was *urgent*, and by losing a single moment
might become unavoidable.—ROBERTSON.

Sleep may be put off from time to time, yet the demand
of so *importunate* a nature as not to remain long un-
satisfied.—JOHNSON.

To Presume, *v.* To premise.

Presuming, *v.* Presumptive.

Presumption, *v.* Arrogance.

Presumptive, Presumptuous, Presuming.

Presumptive comes from *presume*, in the sense of supposing or taking for granted; **Presumptuous**, **Presuming** (*v.* *Arrogance*), come from the same verb in the sense of taking upon one's self or taking to one's self any importance; the former is therefore employed in an indifferent, the latter in a bad, acceptation: a *presumptive* heir is one *presumed* or expected to be heir; *presumptive* evidence is evidence founded on some *presumption* or supposition; so likewise *presumptive* reasoning; but a *presumptuous* man, a *presumptuous* thought, a *presumptuous* behaviour, all indicate an unauthorized *presumption* in one's own favour. *Presumptuous* is a stronger term than *presuming*, because it has a more definite use; the former designates the express quality of *presumption*, the latter the inclination: a man is *presumptuous* when his conduct partakes of the nature of *presumption*:

he is *presuming* inasmuch as he shows himself disposed to *presume*: hence we speak of *presumptuous* language, not *presuming* language; a *presuming* temper, not a *presumptuous* temper. In like manner when one says it is *presumptuous* in a man to do anything, this expresses the idea of *presumption* much more forcibly than to say it is *presuming* in him to do it. It would be *presumptuous* in a man to address a monarch in the language of familiarity and disrespect; it is *presuming* in a common person to address any one who is superior in station with familiarity and disrespect.

There is no qualification for government but virtue and wisdom, actual or *presumptive*.—BURKE.

See what is got by those *presumptuous* principles which have brought your leaders (of the revolution) to despise all their predecessors.—BURKE.

Presuming of his force with sparkling eyes,
Already he devours the promis'd prize.—DRYDEN.

Presumptuous, *v.* Presumptive.

Pretence, Pretension, Pretext, Excuse.

Pretence comes from *pretend* (*v.* *To feign*) in the sense of setting forth anything independent of ourselves. **Pretension** comes from the same verb in the sense of setting forth anything that depends upon ourselves. The *pretence* is commonly a misrepresentation; the *pretension* is frequently a miscalculation: the *pretence* is set forth to conceal what is bad in one's self; the *pretension* is set forth to display what is good: the former betrays one's falsehood, the latter one's conceit or self-importance; the former can never be employed in a good sense, the latter may sometimes be employed in an indifferent sense: a man of bad character may make a *pretence* of religion by adopting an outward profession; men of the least merit often make the highest *pretensions*.

The *pretence* and *Pretext* alike consist of what is unreal; but the former is not so great a violation of truth as the latter: the *pretence* may consist of truth and falsehood blended; the *pretext* consists altogether of falsehood: the *pretence* may sometimes serve only to conceal or palliate a fault; the *pretext* serves to hide something seriously culpable or wicked: a child may make indisposition a *pretence* for idleness; a thief makes his acquaintance with the servants a *pretext* for getting admittance into a house.

The *pretence* and *Excuse* are both set forth to justify one's conduct in the eyes of others; but the *pretence* always conceals something more or less culpable, and by a greater or less violation of truth; the *excuse* may sometimes justify that which is justifiable, and with strict regard to truth. To oblige one's self under the *pretence* of obliging another is a despicable trick; illness is an allowable *excuse* to justify any omission in business.

Ovid had warn'd her to beware
Of strolling gods, whose usual trade is,
Under *pretence* of taking air,
To pick up sublimary ladies.—SWIFT.

Each thinks his own the best *pretension*.—GAY.

Justifying perfidy and murder for publick benefit, publick benefit would soon become the *pretext*, and perfidy and murder the end.—BURKE.

The last refuge of a guilty person is to take shelter under an excuse.—SOUTH.

To Pretend, *v. To feign.*

To Pretend, *v. To affect.*

Pretension, *v. Pretence.*

Pretension, Claim.

Pretension (*v. Pretence*) and **Claim** (*v. To ask for*) both signify an assertion of rights, but they differ in the nature of the rights. The first refers only to the rights which are calculated as such by an individual; the latter to those which exist independent of his supposition: there cannot therefore be a *pretension* without some one to pretend, but there may be a *claim* without any immediate claimant: thus we say a person rests his *pretension* to the crown upon the ground of being descended from the former king; in hereditary monarchies there is no one who has any *claim* to the crown except the next heir in succession. A *pretension* is commonly built upon one's personal merits; a *claim* rests upon the laws of civil society: a person makes high *pretensions* who estimates his merits and consequent deserts at a high rate; he judges of his *claims* according as they are supported by the laws of his country or the circumstances of the case; the *pretension* when denied can never be proved; the *claim*, when proved, can be enforced. One is in general willing to dispute the *pretensions* of men who make themselves judges in their own cause; but one is not unwilling to listen to any *claims* which are modestly preferred. Those who make a *pretension* to the greatest learning are commonly men of shallow information; those who have the most substantial *claims* to the gratitude and respect of mankind are commonly found to be men of the fewest *pretensions*.

It is often charged upon writers, that with all their *pretensions* to genius and discoveries, they do little more than copy one another.—JOHNSON.

This night our minister we name,
Let every servant speak his claim.—GAY.

Pretext, *v. Pretence.*

Pretty, *v. Beautiful.*

Prevailing, Prevalent, Ruling, Overruling, Predominant.

Prevailing and **Prevalent** both come from the Latin *prevaleo* to be strong above others.

Ruling, Overruling, and Predominant (from *domino* to rule), signify *ruling* or bearing greater sway than others.

Prevailing expresses the actual state or quality of a particular object: *prevailing* marks the quality of *prevailing*, as it affects objects in general. The same distinction exists between *overruling* and *predominant*. A person has a *prevailing* sense of religion; religious feeling is *prevailing* in a country or in a community. The *prevailing* idea at present is in favour of the legitimate rights of the sovereign: a contrary principle has been very *prevailing* for many years. *Prevailing* and *prevailing* mark

simply the existing state of superiority: *ruling* and *predominant* express this state, in relation to some other which it has superseded or reduced to a state of inferiority. An opinion is said to be *prevailing* as respects the number of persons by whom it is maintained: a principle is said to be *ruling* as respects the superior influence which it has over the conduct of men more than any other. Particular disorders are *prevailing* at certain seasons of the year, when they affect the generality of persons: a particular taste or fashion is *predominant* which supersedes all other tastes or fashions. Excessive drinking is too *prevailing* a practice in England: virtue is certainly *predominant* over vice in this country, if it be in any country.

The evils naturally consequent upon a *prevailing* temptation are intolerable.—SOUTH.

Whate'er thou shalt ordain, thou *ruling* pow'r,
Unknown and sudden be the dreadful hour.—HOWE.

Nor can a man independently of the *overruling* influence of God's blessing and care call himself one penny richer.—SOUTH.

The doctrine of not owning a foreigner to be a king was held and taught by the Pharisees, a *predominant* sect of the Jews.—PRIDEAUX.

To Prevail Upon, *v. To persuade.*

Prevalent, *v. Prevailing.*

To Prevaricate, *v. To evade.*

To Prevent, *v. To hinder.*

To Prevent, Anticipate.

To Prevent is literally to come beforehand, and **Anticipate** to take beforehand: the former is employed for actual occurrences; the latter as much for calculations as for actions: to *prevent* is the act of one being towards another; to *anticipate* is the act of a being either towards himself or another. God is said to *prevent* us, if He interposes with his grace to divert our purposes towards that which is right; we *anticipate* the happiness which we are to enjoy in future; we *anticipate* what a person is going to say by saying the same thing before him. The term *prevent*, when taken in this its strict and literal sense, is employed only as the act of the Divine Being; *anticipate*, on the contrary, is taken only as the act of human beings towards each other. These words may, however, be farther allied to each other when under the term *prevention* in its vulgar acceptance is included the idea of hindering another in his proceedings; in which case to *anticipate* is a species of *prevention*; that is, to *prevent* another from doing a thing by doing it one's self.

But I do think it most cowardly and vile,
For fear of what might fall, so to *prevent*
The time of life.—SHAKESPEARE.

He that has *anticipated* the conversation of a wit will wonder to what prejudice he owes his reputation.—JOHNSON.

To Prevent, Obviate, Preclude.

To Prevent (*v. To hinder*) is here as in the former case the generic term, the others are specific. What one *prevents* does not happen at all: what one *Obviates* ceases to happen in future: we *prevent* those evils which we

know will come to pass if not *prevented*: we *obviate* those evils which we have already felt; that is, we *prevent* their repetition. Crimes and calamities are *prevented*; difficulties, objections, inconveniences, and troubles are *obviated*. When crowds collect in vast numbers in any small spot, it is not easy to *prevent* mischief; wise precautions may be adopted to *obviate* the inconvenience which necessarily attends a great crowd.

To *prevent* and *obviate* are the acts of either conscious or unconscious agents: to *Preclude* is the act of unconscious agents only; *one prevents* or *obviates* a thing by the use of means, or else the things themselves *prevent* and *obviate*, as when we say that a person prevents another from coming, or illness *prevents* him from coming: a person *obviates* a difficulty by a contrivance; a certain arrangement or change *obviates* every difficulty. We intentionally *prevent* a person from doing that which we disapprove of; his circumstances *preclude* him from enjoying certain privileges. *Prevent* respects that which is either good or bad; *obviate* respects that which is bad always; *preclude* respects that which is good or desirable: ill-health *prevents* a person from pursuing his business; employment *prevents* a young person from falling into bad practices; admonition often *obviates* the necessity of punishments; want of learning or of a regular education often *precludes* a man from many of the political advantages which he might otherwise enjoy.

Every disease of age we may *prevent*,
Like those of youth, by being diligent.—DENHAM.

The imputation of folly, if it is true, must be suffered without hope; but that of immorality may be *obviated* by removing the cause.—HAWKESWORTH.

Has not man an inheritance to which all may return who are not so foolish as to continue the pursuit after pleasure till every hope is *precluded*?—HAWKESWORTH.

Previous, v. Antecedent.

Previous, Preliminary, Preparatory, Introductory.

Previous, in Latin *prævi*, compounded of *præ* and *via*, signifies leading the way or going before.

Preliminary, from *præ* and *limen* a threshold, signifies belonging to the threshold or entrance.

Preparatory and **Introductory** signify belonging to a preparation or introduction.

Previous denotes simply the order of succession: the other terms, in addition to this, convey the idea of connection between the objects which succeed each other. *Previous* applies to actions and proceedings in general; as a *previous* question, a *previous* inquiry, a *previous* determination: *preliminary* is employed only for matters of contract; a *preliminary* article, a *preliminary* condition, are what precede the final settlement of any question; *preparatory* is employed for matters of arrangement; the disposing of men in battle is *preparatory* to an engagement; the making of marriage deeds and contracts is *preparatory* to the final solemnization of the marriage: *introductory* is employed for matters of science

or discussion; as remarks are *introductory* to the main subject in question; compendiums of grammar, geography, and the like, as *introductory* to larger works, are useful for young people. Prudent people are careful to make every *previous* inquiry before they seriously enter into engagements with strangers: it is impolitic to enter into details until all *preliminary* matters are fully adjusted: one ought never to undertake any important matter without first adopting every *preparatory* measure that can facilitate its prosecution: in complicated matters it is necessary to have something *introductory* by way of explanation.

One step by which a temptation approaches to its crisis is a *previous* growing familiarity of the mind with the sin which a man is tempted to.—SOUTH.

I have discussed the nuptial *preliminaries* so often that I can repeat the forms in which jointures are settled and pin-money secured.—JOHNSON.

Æschylus is in the practice of holding the spectator in suspense by a *preparatory* silence in his chief person.—CUMBERLAND.

Consider yourselves as acting now, under the eye of God, an *introductory* part to a more important scene.—BLAIR.

Prey, v. Booty.

Price, v. Cost.

Price, v. Value.

Pride, Vanity, Conceit.

Pride is in all probability connected with the word *parade*, and the German *pracht* show or splendour, as it signifies that high-flown temper in a man which makes him paint to himself everything in himself as beautiful or splendid.

Vanity, in Latin *vanitas*, from *vain* and *vanus*, is compounded of *ve* or *valde* and *inanis*, signifying exceeding emptiness.

Conceit, v. Conceit.

The valuing of one's self on the possession of any property is the idea common to these terms, but they differ either in regard to the object or the manner of the action. *Pride* is the term of most extensive import and application, and comprehends in its signification not only that of the other two terms, but likewise ideas peculiar to itself.

Pride is applicable to every object, good or bad, high or low, small or great; *vanity* is applicable only to small objects: *pride* is therefore good or bad; *vanity* is always bad, it is always emptiness or nothingness. A man is *proud* who values himself on the possession of his literary or scientific talent, on his wealth, on his rank, on his power, on his acquisitions, or his superiority over his competitors; he is *vain* of his person, his dress, his walk, or anything that is frivolous. *Pride* is the inherent quality in man; and while it rests on noble objects, it is his noblest characteristic; *vanity* is the distortion of one's nature flowing from a vicious constitution or education: *pride* shows itself variously according to the nature of the object on which it is fixed; a noble *pride* seeks to display itself in all that can command the respect or admiration of mankind: the *pride* of wealth, of power, or of other adventitious properties, commonly displays itself in an

unseemly deportment towards others; *vanity* shows itself only by its eagerness to catch the notice of others.

Pride (says Blair) makes us esteem ourselves: *vanity* makes us desire the esteem of others. But if *pride* is, as I have before observed, self-esteem, or, which is nearly the same thing, self-valuation, it cannot properly be said to make us esteem ourselves. Of *vanity* I have already said that it makes us anxious for the notice and applause of others; but I cannot with Dr. Blair say that it makes us want the esteem of others, because esteem is too substantial a quality to be sought for by the vain. Besides, that which Dr. Blair seems to assign as a leading and characteristic ground of distinction between *pride* and *vanity* is only an incidental property. A man is said to be vain of his clothes, if he gives indications that he values himself upon them as a ground of distinction; although he should not expressly seek to display himself to others.

Conceit is that species of self-valuation that respects one's talents only; it is so far therefore closely allied to *pride*; but a man is said to be *proud* of that which he really has, but to be *conceited* of that which he really has not: a man may be *proud* to an excess of merits which he actually possesses; but when he is *conceited* his merits are all in his own *conceit*; the latter is therefore obviously founded on falsehood altogether.

Vanity makes men ridiculous, *pride* odious, and ambition terrible.—STEELE.

'Tis an old maxim in the schools,
That *vanity's* the food of fools.—SWIFT.

The self-conceit of the young is the great source of those dangers to which they are exposed.—BLAIR.

Pride, Haughtiness, Loftiness, Dignity.

Pride is employed principally as respects the temper of the mind; the other terms are employed either as respects the sentiment of the mind or the external behaviour.

Pride is here as before (*v. Pride*) a generic term: *Haughtiness* (*v. Haughty*), *Loftiness* (*v. High*), *Dignity* (*v. Honour*), are but modes of *pride*. *Pride*, inasmuch as it consists purely of self-esteem, is a positive sentiment which one may entertain independently of other persons; it lies in the inmost recesses of the human heart, and wounds itself insensibly with our affections and passions; it is our companion by night and by day; in public or in private; it goes with a man wherever he goes, and stays with him where he stays; it is a never-failing source of satisfaction and self-complacency under every circumstance and in every situation of human life. *Haughtiness* is that mode of *pride* which springs out of one's comparison of one's self with others: the *haughty* man dwells on the inferiority of others; the *proud* man in the strict sense dwells on his own perfections. *Loftiness* is a mode of *pride* which raises the spirit above objects supposed to be inferior; it does not set man so much above others as above himself, or that which concerns himself. *Dignity* is a mode of *pride* which exalts the whole man, it is the entire consciousness of what is becoming himself and due to himself,

Pride assumes such a variety of shapes, and puts on such an infinity of disguises, that it is not easy always to recognize it at the first glance; but an insight into human nature will suffice to convince us that it is the spring of all human actions. Whether we see a man professing humility and self-abasement, or a singular degree of self-debasement, or any degree of self-exaltation, we may rest assured that his own *pride* or conscious self-importance is not wounded by any such measures; but that in all cases he is equally stimulated with the desire of giving himself in the eyes of others that degree of importance to which in his own eyes he is entitled. *Haughtiness* is an unbending species or mode of *pride* which does not stoop to any artifices to obtain gratification; but compels others to give it what it fancies to be its due. *Loftiness* and *dignity* are equally remote from any subtle pliance, but they are in no less degree exempt from the unamiable characteristic in *haughtiness* which makes a man bear with oppressive sway upon others. A *lofty* spirit and a *dignity* of character preserve a man from yielding to the contamination of outward objects, but leave his judgment and feeling entirely free and unbiassed with respect to others.

As respects the external behaviour, a *haughty* carriage is mostly unbecoming; a *lofty* tone is mostly justifiable, particularly as circumstances may require; and a *dignified* air is without qualification becoming the man who possesses real *dignity*.

Every demonstration of an implacable rancour and an untameable *pride* were the only encouragements we received (from the regicides) to the renewal of our supplications.—BURKE.

Provoked by Edward's *haughtiness*, even the passive Balliol began to mutiny.—ROBERTSON.

As soon as Almanzo knew his fate to be inevitable, he met it with the *dignity* and fortitude of a veteran.—ROBERTSON.

Waller describes Sacharissa as a predominating beauty of *lofty* charms and imperious influence.—JOHNSON.

Priest, *v. Clergyman*.

Primary, Primitive, Pristine, Original.

Primary, from *primus*, signifies belonging to or like the first. *Primitive*, from the same, signifies according to the first.

Pristine, in Latin *pristinus*, from *prius*, signifies in former times.

Original, signifies containing the *origin*.

The *primary* denotes simply the order of succession, and is therefore the generic term; *primitive*, *pristine*, and *original*, include also the idea of some other relation to the thing that succeeds, and are therefore modes of the *primary*. The *primary* has nothing to come before it; in this manner we speak of the *primary* cause as the cause which precedes secondary causes: the *primitive* is that after which other things are formed: in this manner a *primitive* word is that after which, or from which, the derivatives are formed: the *pristine* is that which follows the *primitive*, so as to become customary; there are but few specimens of the *pristine* purity of life among the professors of Christianity: the *original* is that which either gives birth to the thing or

belongs to that which gives birth to the thing: the *original* meaning of a word is that which was given to it by the makers of the word. The *primary* subject of consideration is that which should precede all others; the *primitive* state of society is that which was formed without a model, but might serve as a model; the *pristine* simplicity of manners may serve as a just pattern for the imitation of present times; the *original* state of things is that which is coeval with the things themselves.

Memory is the *primary* and fundamental power, without which there could be no other intellectual operation.—JOHNSON.

Meanwhile our *primitive* great sire to meet,
His godlike guest walks forth.—MILTON.

As to the share of power each individual ought to have in the state, that I must deny to be amongst the direct *original* rights of man.—BURKE.

While with her friendly clay he deign'd to dwell,
Shall she with safety reach her *pristine* seat.—PRIOR.

Primitive, v. Primary.

Prince, Monarch, Sovereign,
Potentate.

Prince, in French, *prince*, Latin *princeps* from *primus*, signifies the chief or the first person in the nation.

Monarch, from the Greek *monos* alone, and *arxh* government, signifies one having sole authority.

Sovereign is probably changed from *superregnum*.

Potentate, from *potens*, powerful, signifies one having supreme power.

Prince is the generic term, the rest are specific terms; every *monarch*, *sovereign*, and *potentate* is a *prince*, but not *vice versa*. The term *prince* is indefinite as to the degree of power: a *prince* may have a limited or despotic power; but in its restricted sense it denotes a smaller degree of power than any of the other terms: the term *monarch* does not define the extent of the power, but simply that it is undivided as opposed to that species of power which is lodged in the hands of many: *sovereign* and *potentate* indicate the highest degree of power; but the former is employed only as respects the nation that is governed, the latter respects other nations: a *sovereign* is supreme over his subjects; a *potentate* is powerful by means of his subjects. Every man having independent power is a *prince*, let his territory be ever so inconsiderable; Germany is divided into a number of small states which are governed by petty *princes*. Every one reigning by himself in a state of some considerable magnitude and having an independent authority over his subjects is a *monarch*: kings and emperors therefore are all *monarchs*. Every *monarch* is a *sovereign* whose extent of dominion and number of subjects rises above the ordinary level; he is a *potentate* if his influence either in the cabinet or the field extends very considerably over the affairs of other nations. Although we know that *princes* are but men, yet in estimating their characters we are apt to expect more of them than what is human. It is the great concern of every *monarch* who wishes for the welfare of his subjects to choose good counsellors: whoever

has approved himself a faithful subject may approach his *sovereign* with a steady confidence in having done his duty: the *potentates* of the earth may sometimes be intoxicated with their power and their triumphs, but in general they have too many mementos of their common infirmity to forget that they are but mortal men.

Of all the *princes* who had swayed the Mexican sceptre, Montezuma was the most haughty.—ROBERTSON.

The Mexican people were warlike and enterprising, the authority of the *monarch* unbounded.—ROBERTSON.

The Peruvians yielded a blind submission to their *sovereigns*.—ROBERTSON.

How mean must the most exalted *potentate* upon earth appear to that eye which takes in innumerable orders of spirits.—ADDISON.

Principal, v. Chief.

Principally, v. Especially.

Principle, v. Doctrine.

Principle, Motive.

The *Principle* (*v. Doctrine*) may sometimes be the *Motive*; but often there is a *principle* where there is no *motive*, and there is a *motive* where there is no *principle*. The *principle* lies in conscious and unconscious agents: the *motive* only in conscious agents: all nature is guided by certain *principles*; its movements go forward upon certain *principles*: man is put into action by certain *motives*; the *principle* is the prime moving cause of everything that is set in motion; the *motive* is the prime moving cause that sets the human machine into action. The *principle* in its restricted sense comes still nearer to the *motive*, when it refers to the opinions which we form: the *principle* in this case is that idea which we form of things, so as to regulate our conduct; the *motive* is that idea which simply impels to action; the former is therefore something permanent, and grounded upon the exercise of our reasoning powers; the latter is momentary, and arises simply from our capacity of thinking: bad *principles* lead a man into a bad course of life; but a man may be led by bad *motives* to do what is good as well as what is bad.

The best legislators have been satisfied with the establishment of some sure, solid, and ruling *principle* in government.—BURKE.

The danger of betraying our weakness to our servants, and the impossibility of concealing it from them, may be justly considered as one *motive* to a regular life.—JOHNSON.

Print, v. Mark.

Print, v. Picture.

Prior, v. Antecedent.

Priority, Precedence, Pre-eminence,
Preference.

Priority denotes the abstract quality of being before others; *Precedence*, from *pra* and *cedo*, signifies the state of going before: *Pre-eminence* signifies being more eminent or elevated than others: *Preference* signifies being put before others. *Priority* respects simply the order of succession, and is applied to objects either in a state of motion or rest; *precedence* signifies *priority* in going, and do-

pende upon a right or privilege; *pre-eminence* signifies *priority* in being, and depends upon merit; *preference* signifies *priority* in placing, and depends upon favour. The *priority* is applicable rather to the thing than the person; it is not that which is sought for, but that which is to be had: age frequently gives *priority* where every other claim is wanting. The immoderate desire for *precedence* is often nothing but a childish vanity; it is a distinction that flows out of rank and power: a nobleman claims a *precedence* on all occasions of ceremony. The love of *pre-eminence* is laudable, inasmuch as it requires a degree of moral worth which exceeds that of others: a general aims at *pre-eminence* in his profession. Those who are anxious to obtain the best for themselves are eager to have the *preference*: we seek for the *preference* in matters of choice.

A better place, a more commodious seat, *priority* in being helped at table, &c. what is it but sacrificing ourselves in such trifles to the convenience and pleasures of others?—EARL CHATHAM.

Ranks will thou (in the next world) be adjusted, and *precedency* set aright.—ADDISON.

It is the concern of mankind, that the destruction of order should not be a claim to rank; that crimes should not be the only title to *pre-eminence* and honour.—BURKE.

You will agree with me in giving the *preference* to a sincere and sensible friend.—GIBSON.

Pristine, v. Primary.

Privacy, Retirement, Seclusion.

Privacy literally denotes the abstract quality of *private*: but when taken by itself it signifies the state of being *private*: **Retirement** literally signifies the abstract act of *retiring*: and **Seclusion** that of *secluding* one's-self: but *retirement* by itself frequently denotes a state of being retired, or a place of *retirement*; *seclusion*, a state of being *secluded*: hence we say a person lives in *privacy*, in *retirement*, in *seclusion*: *privacy* is opposed to publicity; he who lives in *privacy*, therefore, is one who follows no public line, who lives so as to be little known: *retirement* is opposed to openness or freedom of access; he, therefore, who lives in *retirement* withdraws from the society of others, he lives by himself: *seclusion* is the excess of *retirement*: he who lives in *seclusion* bars all access to himself; he shuts himself from the world. *Privacy* is most suitable for such as are in circumstances of humiliation, whether from their misfortune or their fault: *retirement* is peculiarly agreeable to those who are of a reflective turn; but *seclusion* is chosen only by those who labour under some strong affection of the mind, whether of a religious or a physical nature.

Fly with me to some safe, some sacred *privacy*.
ROWE.

In our *retirements* everything disposes us to be serious.—ADDISON.

What can thy imagery of sorrow mean,
Secluded from the world, and all its care,
Hast thou to grieve or joy, to hope or fear

PRIOR.

Privilege, Prerogative, Exemption, Immunity.

Privilege, in Latin *privilegium*, compounded of *privus* and *lex*, signifies a law made for any individual or set of individuals.

Prerogative, in Latin *prærogativæ*, were so called from *præ* and *rogare* to ask, because they were first asked whom they would have to be consuls; hence applied in our language to the right of determining or choosing first in many particulars.

Exemption, from the verb to *exempt*, and **Immunity**, from the Latin *immunis* free, are both employed for the object from which one is *exempt* or free.

Privilege and *prerogative* consist of positive advantages; *exemption* and *immunity* of those which are negative: by the former we obtain an actual good, by the latter the removal of an evil.

Privilege, in its most extended sense, comprehends all the rest; for every *prerogative*, *exemption*, and *immunity* are *privileges*, inasmuch as they rest upon certain laws or customs, which are made for the benefit of certain individuals; but in the restricted sense *privilege* is used only for the subordinate parts of society, and *prerogative* for the superior orders: as they respect the public, *privileges* belong to or are granted to the subject; *prerogatives* belong to the crown. It is the *privilege* of a member of parliament to escape arrest for debt; it is the *prerogative* of the crown to be irresponsible for the conduct of its ministers: as respects private cases it is the *privilege* of females to have the best places assigned to them; it is the *prerogative* of the male to address the female.

Privileges are applied to every object which it is desirable to have: *prerogative* is confined to the case of making one's election, or exercising any special power; *exemption* is applicable to cases in which one is exempted from any tribute, or payment; *immunity*, from the Latin *munus* an office, is peculiarly applicable to cases in which one is freed from a service: all chartered towns or corporations have *privileges*, *exemptions*, and *immunities*: it is the *privilege* of the city of London to shut its gates against the king.

As the aged depart from the dignity, so they forfeit the *privileges*, of grey hairs.—BLAIR.

By the worst of usurpations, an usurpation on the *prerogatives* of nature, you attempt to force taylors and carpenters into the state.—BURKE.

Neither nobility nor clergy (in France) enjoyed any *exemption* from the duty on consumable commodities.—BURKE.

You claim an *immunity* from evil which belongs not to the lot of man.—BLAIR.

Privilege, v. Right.

Prize, v. Capture.

To Prize, v. To value.

Probability, v. Chance.

Probity, v. Honesty.

To Proceed, v. To advance.

To Proceed, v. To arise.

Proceeding, Process, Progress.

The manner of performing actions for the attainment of a given end is the common idea comprehended in these terms. **Proceeding** is the most general, as it simply expresses the general idea of the manner of going on: the

rest are specific terms, denoting some particularity in the action, object, or circumstance. *Proceeding* is said commonly of such things as happen in the ordinary way of doing business; *Process* is said of such things as are done by rule: the former is considered in a moral point of view; the latter in a scientific or technical point of view: the Freemasons gave bound themselves together by a law of secrecy not to reveal some part of their *proceedings*: the *process* by which paper is made has undergone considerable improvements since its first invention.

Proceeding and *Progress* both refer to the moral actions of men; but the *proceeding* simply denotes the act of going on, or doing something; the *progress* denotes an approximation to the end: the *proceeding* may be only a partial action, comprehending both the beginning and the end; but the *progress* is applied to that which requires time, and a regular succession of action, to bring it to a completion: that is a *proceeding* in which every man is tried in a court of law; that is a *progress* which one makes in learning, by the addition to one's knowledge: hence we do not talk of the *proceeding* of life, but of the *progress* of life.

Devotion bestows that enlargement of heart in the service of God which is the greatest principle both of perseverance and *progress* in virtue.—BLAIR.

Saturnian Juno now, with double care,

Attends the fatal *process* of the war.—DRYDEN.

What could be more fair than to lay open to an enemy all that you wished to obtain, and to desire him to imitate your ingenious *proceeding*!—BURKE.

Proceeding, Transaction.

Proceeding signifies literally the thing that *proceeds*; and *transaction* the thing *transacted*: the former is, therefore, of something that is going forward; the latter of something that is already done; we are witnesses to the whole *proceeding*; we inquire into the whole *transaction*. The term *proceeding* is said of every event or circumstance which goes forward through the agency of men; *transaction* comprehends only those matters which have been deliberately *transacted* or brought to a conclusion: in this sense we use the word *proceeding* in application to an affray in the street; and the word *transaction* to some commercial negotiation that has been carried on between certain persons. The term *proceeding* marks the manner of *proceeding*; as when we speak of the *proceedings* in a court of law; *transaction* marks the business *transacted*; as the *transactions* on the Exchange. A *proceeding* may be characterized as disgraceful; a *transaction* as iniquitous.

The *proceedings* of a council of old men in an American tribe, we are told, were no less formal and sagacious than those in a senate in more polished republics.—ROBERTSON.

It was Bothwell's interest to cover, if possible, the whole *transaction* under the veil of darkness and silence.—ROBERTSON.

Process, *v.* *Proceeding*.

Procession, Train, Retinue.

Procession, from the verb *proceed*, signifies the act of going forward or before, that is,

in the present instance, of going before others, or one before another.

Train in all probability comes from the Latin *traho* to draw, signifying the thing drawn after another, and in the present instance the persons who are led after, or follow, any object.

Retinue, from the verb to *retain*, signifies those who are retained as attendants.

All these terms are said of any number of persons who follow in a certain order; but this, which is the leading idea in the word *procession*, is but collateral in the terms *train* and *retinue*: on the other hand, the *procession* may consist of persons of all ranks and stations; but *train* and *retinue* apply only to such as follow some person or thing in a subordinate capacity: the former in regard to such as make up the concluding part of some *procession*; the latter only in regard to the servants or attendants on the great. At funerals there is frequently a long *train* of coaches belonging to the friends of the deceased which close the *procession*; princes and nobles never go out on state or public occasions without a numerous *retinue*: the beauty of every *procession* consists in the order with which every one keeps his place, and the regularity with which the whole goes forward; the length of a *train* is what renders it most worthy of notice; the number of a *retinue* in eastern nations is one criterion by which the wealth of the individual is estimated.

And now the priests, Potitius at their head,
In skins of beasts involv'd, the long *procession* led.
DRYDEN.

The moon, and all the starry *train*,
Hung the vast vault of heav'n.—GAY.

Him and his sleeping slaves, he slew; then spies
Where Remus with his rich *retinue* lies.—DRYDEN.

To Proclaim, *v.* To announce.

To Proclaim, *v.* To declare.

Proclamation, *v.* Decree.

To Procrastinate, *v.* To delay.

To Procure, *v.* To get.

To Procure, *v.* To provide.

Prodigal, *v.* Extravagant.

Prodigious, *v.* Enormous.

Prodigy, *v.* Wonder.

To Produce, *v.* To afford.

To Produce, *v.* To effect.

To Produce, *v.* To make.

Produce, *v.* Production.

Product, *v.* Production.

Production, Produce, Product.

The term *Production* expresses either the act of *producing* or the thing *produced*; *Product* and *Produce* express only the thing *produced*: the *production* of a tree from a seed is one of the wonders of nature: the *produce* will not be considerable.

In the sense of the thing *produced*, *production* is applied to every individual thing that

is *produced* by another: in this sense a tree is a *production*; *produce* and *product* are applied only to those *productions* which are to be turned to a purpose: the former in a collective sense, and in reference to some particular object; the latter in an abstract and general sense; the aggregate quantity of grain drawn from a field is termed the *produce* of the field; but corn, hay, vegetables, and fruits in general are termed *products* of the earth; the naturalist examines all the *productions* of nature; the husbandman looks to the *produce* of his land; the topographer and traveller inquire about the *products* of different countries.

There is the same distinction between these terms in their improper, as in their proper, acceptance: the *production* is whatever results from an effort, physical or mental, as a *production* of genius, a *production* of art, and the like; the *produce* is the amount or aggregate result from physical or mental labour: thus, whatever the husbandman reaps from the cultivation of his land is termed the *produce* of his labour; whatever results from any public subscription or collection is, in like manner, the *produce*: the *product* is employed only in regard to the mental operation of figures, as the *product* from multiplication.

Nature also, as if desirous that so bright a *production* of her skill should be set in the fairest light, had bestowed on King Alfred every bodily accomplishment.—HUME.

A storm of hail, I am informed, has destroyed all the *produce* of my estate in Tuscany.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

I cannot help thinking the Arabian tales the *product* of some woman's imagination.—ATTERBURY.

Production, Performance, Work.

When we speak of anything as resulting from any specified operation, we term it a *Production*; as the *production* of an author, signifying what he has *produced* by the effort of his mind: Homer's *Iliad* is esteemed as one of the finest *productions* of the imagination. When we speak of anything as executed or *performed* by some person we term it a *Performance*, as a drawing or a painting is denominated the *performance* of a particular artist. The term *production* cannot be employed without specifying or referring to the source from which it is *produced*, or the means by which it is *produced*; as the *production* of art, the *production* of the inventive faculty, the *production* of the mind, &c.: a *performance* cannot be spoken of without referring to the individual by whom it has been *performed*; hence we speak of this or that person's *performance*. When we wish to specify anything that results from *Work* or labour, it is termed a *work*: in this manner we either speak of the *work* of one's hands, or a *work* of the imagination, a *work* of time, a *work* of magnitude. The *production* results from a complicated operation; the *performance* consists of simple action; the *work* springs from active exertion: Shakspeare's plays are termed *productions*, as they respect the source from which they came, namely, his genius; they might be called his *performances*, as far as respected the *performance* or completion of some task or specific undertaking; they would

be called his *works*, as far as respected the labour which he bestowed upon them. The composition of a book is properly a *production*, when it is original matter; the sketching of a landscape, or drawing a plan, is a *performance*; the compilation of a history is a *work*.

Nature, in her *productions* slow, aspires
By just degrees to reach perfection's height.
SOMMERVILLE.

The *performances* of Pope were burnt by those whom he had, perhaps, selected as most likely to publish them.—JOHNSON.

Yet there are some *works* which the author must consign unpublished to posterity.—JOHNSON.

Profane, *v.* Irreligious.

To Profess, Declare.

Profess, in Latin *professus*, participle of *proficor*, compounded of *pro* and *fateor* to speak, signifies to set forth, or present to public view.

Declare, *v.* *To declare*.

An exposure of one's thoughts or opinions is the common idea in the signification of these terms; but they differ in the manner of the action, as well as the object: one *professes* by words or by actions: one *declares* by word's only: a man *professes* to believe that on which he acts; but he *declares* his belief of it either with his lips or in his writings. A *profession* may be general and partial, it may amount to little more than an intimation: a *declaration* is positive and explicit; it leaves no one in doubt: a *profession* may, therefore, sometimes be hypocritical; he who *professes* may wish to imply that which is not real: a *declaration* must be either directly true or false; he who *declares* expressly commits himself upon his veracity. One *professes* either as respects single actions or a regular course of conduct; one *declares* either passing thoughts or settled principles. A person *professes* to have walked to a certain distance; to have taken a certain route, and the like; a Christian *professes* to follow the doctrine and precepts of Christianity; a person *declares* that a thing is true or false, or he *declares* his firm belief in a thing.

To *profess* is employed only for what concerns one's self; to *declare* is likewise employed for what concerns others: one *professes* the motives and principles by which one is guided; one *declares* facts and circumstances with which one is acquainted: one *professes* nothing, but what one thinks may be creditable and fit to be known; but one *declares* whatever may have fallen under one's notice, or passed through one's mind, as the case requires; there is always a particular and private motive for *profession*; there are frequently public grounds for making a *declaration*. A general *profession* of Christianity, according to established forms, is the bounden duty of every one born in the Christian persuasion; but a particular *profession*, according to a singular and extraordinary form, is seldom adopted by any who do not deceive themselves, or wish to deceive others: no one should be ashamed of making a *declaration* of his opinions when the cause of truth is thereby supported; every one should be ready to declare what he knows when the purposes of justice are forwarded by the *declaration*.

Pretending first
Wise to fly pain, *professing* next the spy,
Argues no leader.—MILTON.

It is too common to find the aged at *declared* enmity with the whole system of present customs and manners.—BLAIR.

Profession, v. Business.

Proficiency, v. Progress.

Profit, v. Advantage.

Profit, v. Gain.

Profligate, Abandoned, Reprobate.

Profligate, in Latin *profligatus*, participle of *profligo*, compounded of the intensive *pro* and *fligo* to dash or beat, signifying completely ruined and lost to everything.

Abandoned, v. To abandon.

Reprobate (v. To reprove) signifies one thoroughly rejected.

These terms, in their proper acceptation, express the most wretched condition of fortune into which it is possible for any human being to be plunged, and consequently, in their improper application they denote that state of moral desertion and ruin which cannot be exceeded in wickedness or depravity. A *profligate* man has lost all by his vices, and consequently to his vices alone he looks for the regaining those goods of fortune which he has squandered; as he has nothing to lose, and everything to gain in his own estimation, by pursuing the career of his vices, he surpasses all others in his unprincipled conduct: an *abandoned* man is altogether *abandoned* to his passions, which having the entire sway over him, naturally impel him to every excess: the *reprobate* man is one who has been reprov'd until he becomes insensible to reproof, and is given up to the malignity of his own passions. The *profligate* man is the greatest enemy to society; the *abandoned* man is a still greater enemy to himself: the *profligate* man lives upon the public, whom he plunders or defrauds; the *abandoned* man lives for the indulgence of his own unbridled passions; the *reprobate* man is little better than an outcast both by God and man: unprincipled debtors, gamblers, sharpers, swindlers, and the like, are *profligate* characters; whore-masters, drunkards, spendthrifts, seducers, and debauchees of all descriptions are *abandoned* characters: although the *profligate* and *abandoned* are commonly the same persons, yet the young are in general *abandoned*, and those more hackney'd in vice are *profligate*; none can be *reprobate* but those who have been long tried.

Aged wisdom can check the most forward, and abash the most *profligate*.—BLAIR.

To be negligent of what any one thinks of you does not only show you arrogant but *abandoned*.—HUGHES.

And here let those who boast in mortal things
Learn how their greatest monuments of fame,
And strength, and art, are easily outdone
By reprobate spirits.—MILTON.

Profundity, v. Depth.

Profuse, v. Extravagant.

Profuseness, v. Profusion.

Profusion, Profuseness.

Profusion, from the Latin *profundo* to pour forth, is taken in relation to unconscious objects, which pour forth in great plenty; **Profuseness** is taken from the same, in relation to conscious agents, who likewise pour forth in great plenty: the term *profusion*, therefore, is put for plenty itself, and the term *profuseness* as a characteristic of persons in the sense of extravagance.

At the hospitable board of the rich, there will naturally be a *profusion* of everything which can gratify the appetite; when men see an unusual degree of *profusion*, they are apt to indulge themselves in *profuseness*.

Ye glittering towns with wealth and splendour crown'd,
Ye fields where summer spreads *profusion* round,
For me your tributary stores combine.—GOLDSMITH.

I was convinced that the liberality of my young companions was only *profuseness*.—JOHNSON.

Progenitors, v. Forefathers.

Progeny, v. Offspring.

Prognostic, v. Omen.

To Prognosticate, v. To foretell.

Progress, v. Proceeding.

Progress, Progression, Advance, Advancement.

A forward motion is designated by these terms: but **Progress** and **Progression** simply imply this sort of motion; **Advance** and **Advancement** also imply an approximation to some object: we may make a *progress* in that which has no specific termination, as a *progress* in learning, which may cease only with life; but the *advance* is only made to some limited point or object in view; as an *advance* in wealth or honour, which may find a termination within the life.

Progress and *advance* are said of that which has been passed over; but *progression* and *advancement* may be said of that which one is passing: the *progress* is made, or the person is in *advance*; he is in the act of *progression* or *advancement*: a child makes a *progress* in learning by daily attention; the *progression* from one stage of learning to another is not always perceptible; it is not always possible to overtake one who is in *advance*; sometimes a person's *advancement* is retarded by circumstances that are altogether contingent: the first step in any destructive course still prepares for the second, and the second for the third, after which there is no stop, but the *progress* is infinite.

I wish it were in my power to give a regular history of the *progress* which our ancestors have made in this species of *variation*.—TYRWHITT.

And better thence again, and better still,
In infinite *progression*.—THOMSON.

The most successful students make their *advancements* in knowledge by short flights.—JOHNSON.

I have lived to see the fierce *advancement*, the sudden turn, and the abrupt period, of three or four enormous friendships.—POPE.

Progress, Proficiency, Improvement.

Progress (v. Proceeding) is a generic term, the rest are specific; **Proficiency**, from the

Latin *proficio*, compounded of *pro* and *facio*, signifies a profited state, that is to say, a *progress* already made; and *Improvement*, from the verb *improved*, signifies an improved condition, that is, *progress* in that which *improves*. The *progress* here, as in the former paragraph, marks the step or motion onward, and the two others the point already reached; but the term *progress* is applied either in the proper or improper sense, that is, either to those travelling forward or to those going on step-wise in any work; *proficiency* is applied, in the improper sense, to the ground gained in an art, and *improvement* to what is gained in science or arts: when idle people set about any work, it is difficult to perceive that they make any *progress* in it from time to time; those who have a thorough taste for either music or drawing will make a *proficiency* in it which is astonishing to those who are unacquainted with the circumstances; the *improvement* of the mind can never be so effectually and easily obtained as in the period of childhood.

Solon, the sage, his *progress* never ceas'd,
But still his learning with his days increas'd.
DENHAM.

When the lad was about nineteen, his uncle desired to see him, that he might know what *proficiency* he had made.—HAWKESWORTH.

The metrical part of our poetry, in the time of Chaucer, was capable of more *improvement*.—TYRWHITT.

Progression, *v.* *Progress*.

Progressive, *v.* *Onward*.

To Prohibit, *v.* *To forbid*.

Project, *v.* *Design*.

Prolific, *v.* *Fertile*.

Prolix, *v.* *Diffuse*.

To Prolong, *v.* *To delay*.

Prominent, Conspicuous.

Prominent signifies hanging over; *Conspicuous* (*v.* *Distinguishes*) signifies easy to be beheld: the former is, therefore, to the latter, in some measure, as the species to the genus; what is *prominent* is, in general, on that very account *conspicuous*; but many things may be *conspicuous* besides those which are *prominent*. The terms *prominent* and *conspicuous* have, however, an application suited to their peculiar meaning: nothing is *prominent* but what projects beyond a certain line; everything is *conspicuous* which may be seen by many: the nose on a man's face is a *prominent* feature, owing to its projecting situation; and it is sometimes *conspicuous*, according to the position of the person: a figure in a painting is said to be *prominent*, if it appears to stand forward or before the others; but it is not properly *conspicuous*, unless there be something in it which attracts the general notice, and distinguishes it from all other things; on the contrary, it is *conspicuous*, but not expressly *prominent*, when the colours are vivid.

Lady Macbeth's walking in her sleep is an incident so full of tragic horror that it stands out as a *prominent* feature in the most sublime drama in the world.—CUMBERLAND.

That innocent mirth which had been so *conspicuous* in Sir Thomas More's life did not forsake him to the last.—ADDISON.

Promiscuous, Indiscriminate.

Promiscuous, in Latin *promiscuus*, from *promisco*, or *pro* and *misceo* to mingle, signifies thoroughly mingled.

Indiscriminate, from the Latin *in privative* and *discrimen* a difference, signifies without any difference.

Promiscuous is applied to any number of different objects mingled together; *indiscriminate* is only applied to the action in which one does not discriminate different objects: a multitude is termed *promiscuous*, as characterizing the thing; the use of different things for the same purpose, or of the same things for different purposes, is termed *indiscriminate*, as characterizing the person: things become *promiscuous* by the want of design in any one; they are *indiscriminate* by the fault of any one: plants of all descriptions are to be found *promiscuously* situated in the beds of a garden: it is folly to level any charge *indiscriminately* against all the members of any community or profession.

Victors and vanquish'd join *promiscuous* cries.
POPE.

From this *indiscriminate* distribution of misery, the moralists have always derived one of their strongest moral arguments for a future state.—JOHNSON.

Promise, Engagement, Word.

Promise, in Latin *promissus*, from *promitto*, compounded of *pro* before, and *mitto* to set or fix, that is, to fix beforehand.

Engagement, *v.* *Business*.

The *promise* is specific, and consequently more binding than the *engagement*; we *promise* a thing in a set form of words, that are clearly and strictly understood; we *engage* in general terms, that may admit of alteration: a *promise* is mostly unconditional; an *engagement* is frequently conditional. In *promises* the faith of an individual is admitted upon his *Word*, and built upon as if it were a deed; in *engagements* the intentions of an individual for the future are all that are either implied or understood: on the fulfilment of *promises* often depend the most important interests of individuals; an attention to *engagements* is a matter of mutual convenience in the ordinary concerns of life: a man makes a *promise* of payment, and upon his *promise* it may happen that many others depend for the fulfilment of their *promises*; when *engagements* are made to visit or meet others, an inattention to such *engagements* causes great trouble. As a *promise* and *engagement* can be made only by words, the word is often put for either, or for both, as the case requires: he who breaks his word in small matters cannot be trusted when he gives his word in matters of consequence.

An acre of performance is worth the whole world of *promise*.—HOWEL.

The *engagements* I had to Dr. Swift were such as the actual services he had done me, in relation to the subscription for Homer, obliged me to.—POPE.

Aeneas was our prince, a juster lord,
Or nobler warrior, never drew a sword;
Observant of the right, religious of his word.
DRYDEN.

To Promote, *v.* *To encourage*.

Prompt, *v. Diligent.*

Prompt, *v. Ready.*

To Promulgate, *v. To publish.*

Proneness, *v. Inclination.*

To Pronounce, *v. To utter.*

Proof, *v. Argument.*

Proof, *v. Evidence.*

Proof, *v. Experience.*

Prop, *v. Staff.*

To Propagate, *v. To spread.*

Propensity, *v. Inclination.*

Proper, *v. Right.*

Property, *v. Goods.*

Property, *v. Quality.*

Propitious, *v. Auspicious.*

Propitious, *v. Favourable.*

To Prophesy, *v. To foretell.*

Proportion, *v. Rate.*

Proportion, *v. Symmetry.*

Proportionate, Commensurate, Adequate.

Proportionate, from the Latin *proportio*, compounded of *pro* and *portio*, signifies having a portion suitable to, or in agreement with, some other object.

Commensurate, from the Latin *commensus* or *commensuratio*, signifies measuring in accordance with some other thing, being suitable in measure to something else.

Adequate, in Latin *adequatus*, participle of *adequo*, signifies made level with some other body.

Proportionate is here a term of general use; the others are particular terms, employed in a similar sense, in regard to particular objects; that is *proportionate* which rises as a thing rises, and falls as a thing falls; that is *commensurate* which is made to rise to the same measure or degree; that is *adequate* which is made to come up to the height of another thing. *Proportionate* is employed either in the proper or improper sense; in all recipes and prescriptions of every kind *proportionate* quantities must always be taken; when the task increases in difficulty and complication, a *proportionate* degree of labour and talent must be employed upon it. *Commensurate* and *adequate* are employed only in the moral sense; the former in regard to matters of distribution, the latter in regard to the equalizing of powers: a person's recompense should in some measure be *commensurate* with his labour and deserts: a person's resources should be *adequate* to the work he is engaged in.

All envy is *proportionate* to desire.—JOHNSON.

Where the matter is not *commensurate* to the words all speaking is but tautology.—SOUTH.

Outward actions are not *adequate* expressions of our virtues.—ADDISON.

Proposal, Proposition.

Proposal comes from *propose*, in the sense of offer: **Proposition** comes from *propose*, in the sense of setting down in a distinct form of words. We make a *proposai* to a person to enter into partnership with him; we make a *proposition* to one who is at variance with us to settle the difference by arbitration.

The *proposal* relates altogether to matters of personal and private interest; the *proposition* is sometimes of an abstract nature; *proposals* are made for the sale or purchase of particular articles, for the establishment of any mercantile concern, for the erection of any place or institution, and the like; *propositions* are advanced either for or against certain matters of opinion; the *proposal* is to be accepted; the *proposition* is to be admitted.

I have *proposed* a visit to her friend Lady Campbell, and my Anna seemed to receive the *proposal* with pleasure.—SIR WM. JONES.

The Protestants, averse from proceeding to any act of violence, listened with pleasure to the pacific *proposition* of the queen regent.—ROBERTSON.

To Propose, *v. To offer.*

To Propose, *v. To purpose.*

Proposition, *v. Proposal.*

Proposition, *v. Sentence.*

Proprietor, *v. Possessor.*

To Prorogue, Adjourn.

Prorogue, from the Latin *prorogo*, signifies to put off, and is used in the general sense of deferring for an indefinite period.

Adjourn, from *journée* the day, signifies only to put off for a day, or some short period: the former is applied to national assemblies only; the latter is applicable to any meeting.

A *prorogation* is the continuance of Parliament from one session to another.—BLACKSTONE.

An *adjournment* is no more than a continuance of the session from one day to another.—BLACKSTONE.

To Prosecute, *v. To continue.*

Proselyte, *v. Convert.*

Prospect, *v. View (Survey).*

Prospect, *v. View (Prospect).*

To Prosper, *v. To flourish.*

Prosperity, *v. Well-being.*

Prosperous, *v. Fortunate.*

To Protect, *v. To defend.*

To Protect, *v. To save.*

To Protest, *v. To affirm.*

To Protract, *v. To delay.*

To Prove, *v. To argue.*

To Prove, Demonstrate, Evince, Manifest.

Prove, in Latin *probo*, signifies to make good.

Demonstrate, from the Latin *demonstro*, signifies, by virtue of the intensive syllable *de*, to show in a specific manner.

Evince, v. *To argue.*

Manifest signifies to make *manifest* (*v. Apparent*).

Prove is here the general and indefinite term, the rest imply different modes of *proving*; to *demonstrate* is to prove specifically; we may *prove* anything by simple assertion but we must *demonstrate* by intellectual efforts; we may *prove* that we were in a certain place; but we *demonstrate* some point in science; we may *prove* by personal influence; but we can *demonstrate* only by the force of evidence; we *prove* our own merit by our actions; we *demonstrate* the existence of a Deity by all that surrounds us.

To *prove, evince, and manifest* are the acts either of persons or things; to *demonstrate*, that of persons only: in regard to persons, we *prove* either the facts which we know or the mental endowments which we possess: we *evince* and *manifest* a disposition or a state of mind: we *evince* our sincerity by our actions, it is a work of time; we *manifest* a friendly or a hostile disposition by a word, or a single action, it is the act of the moment. All these terms are applied to things, inasmuch as they may tend either to produce conviction or simply to make a thing known: to *prove* and *evince* are employed in the first case: to *manifest* in the latter case; the beauty and order in the Creation *prove* the wisdom of the Creator; a persistence in a particular course of conduct may either *evince* great virtue or great folly; the miracles wrought in Egypt *manifested* the Divine power.

Why on those shores are they with joy survey'd,
Admiring as heroes, and as gods obey'd,
Unless great acts superior merit prove.—POPE.

By the very setting apart and consecrating places for the service of God, we *demonstrate* our acknowledgment of his power and sovereignty over us.—BEVERIDGE.

We must *evince* the sincerity of our faith by good works.—BLAIR.

In the life of a man of sense, a short life is sufficient to *manifest* himself a man of honour and virtue.—STEELE.

Proverb, v. *Axiom.*

To Provide, Procure, Furnish,
Supply.

Provide, in Latin *providere*, signifies literally to see before, but figuratively to get in readiness for some future purpose.

Procure, v. *To get.*

Furnish, in French *fournir*.

Supply, in French *supplier*, Latin *suppleo* from *sub* and *pleo*, signifies to fill up a deficiency or make up what is wanting.

Provide and *procure* are both actions that have a special reference to the future; *furnish* and *supply* are employed for that which is of immediate concern: one *provides* a dinner in the contemplation that some persons are coming to partake of it; one *procures* help in the contemplation that it may be wanted; we *furnish* a room, as we find it necessary for the present purpose; one *supplies* a family with any article of domestic use. Calculation is necessary in *providing*; one does not wish to *provide* too much or too little: labour and management are requisite in *procuring*; when a thing is not always at hand, or not easily

come at, one must exercise one's strength or ingenuity to *procure* it: judgment is requisite in *furnishing*; what one *furnishes* ought to be selected with concern to the circumstances of the individual who *furnishes*: care and attention are wanted in *supplying* we must be careful to know what a person really wants, in order to *supply* him to his satisfaction. One *provides* against all contingencies; one *procures* all necessities; one *furnishes* all comforts; one *supplies* all deficiencies. *Provide* and *procure* are the acts of persons only; *furnish* and *supply* are the acts of unconscious agents: one's garden and orchard may be said to *furnish* him with delicacies; the earth *supplies* us with food. So in the improper application: the daily occurrences of a great city *furnish* materials for a newspaper: a newspaper to an Englishman *supplies* almost every other want.

A rude hand may build walls, form roofs, and lay floors, and *provide* all that warmth and security require.—JOHNSON.

Such dress as may enable the body to endure the different seasons, the most unenlightened nations have been able to *procure*.—JOHNSON.

Your ideas are new, and borrowed from a mountainous country, the only one that can *furnish* truly picturesque scenery.—GRAY.

And clouds, dissolv'd, the thirsty ground *supply*.
DRYDEN.

Providence, Prudence.

Providence and **Prudence** are both derived from the verb to *provide*; but the former expresses the particular act of providing; the latter the habit of providing. The former is applied both to animals and men; the latter is employed only as a characteristic of men. We may admire the *providence* of the ant in laying up a store for the winter; the *prudence* of a parent is displayed in his concern for the future settlement of his child. It is *provident* in a person to adopt measures of escape for himself in certain situations of peculiar danger; it is *prudent* to be always prepared for all contingencies.

In Albion's isle, when glorious Edgar reign'd,
He, wisely *provident*, from her white cliffs
Launch'd half her forests.—SOMERVILLE.

Prudence operates on life in the same manner as rules on composition; it produces vigilance rather than elevation.—JOHNSON.

Provident, v. *Careful.*

Provision, v. *Fare.*

To Provoke, v. *To aggravate.*

To Provoke, v. *To awaken.*

To Provoke, v. *To excite.*

Prudence, v. *Judgment.*

Prudence, v. *Providence.*

Prudence, v. *Wisdom.*

Prudent, Prudential.

Prudent (*v. Judgment*) characterizes the person or the thing; **Prudential** characterizes only the thing. **Prudent** signifies having *prudence*; **prudential**, according to rules of *prudence*, or as respects *prudence*. The *prudent* is opposed to the *imprudent* and incon-

siderate; the *prudential* is opposed to the voluntary: the counsel is *prudent* which accords with the principles of *prudence*: the reason or motive is *prudential* as flowing out of circumstances of *prudence* or necessity. Every one is called upon at certain times to adopt *prudent* measures; those who are obliged to consult their means in the management of their expenses must act upon *prudential* motives.

Ulysses first in public care she found,
For *prudent* counsel like the gods renowned.—POPE.

Those who possess elevated understandings are naturally apt to consider all *prudential* maxims as below their regard.—JOHNSON.

Prudential, v. Prudent.

To Pry, Scrutinize, Dive Into.

Pry is in all probability changed from prove, in the sense of try.

Scrutinize comes from the Latin *scrutor* to search thoroughly.

Dive, v. To plunge.

Pry is taken in the bad sense of looking more narrowly into things than one ought: *scrutinize* and *dive into* are employed in the good sense of searching things to the bottom.

A person who *prys* looks into that which does not belong to him; and too narrowly also into that which may belong to him; it is the consequence of a too eager curiosity or a busy meddling temper: a person who *scrutinizes* looks into that which is intentionally concealed from him; it is an act of duty flowing out of his office: a person who *dives* penetrates into that which lies hidden very deep; he is impelled to this action by the thirst of knowledge and a laudable curiosity.

A love of *prying* into the private affairs of families makes a person a troublesome neighbour: it is the business of the magistrate to *scrutinize* all matters which affect the good order of society: there are some minds so imbued with a love of science that they delight to *dive into* the secrets of nature

The peaceable man never officiously seeks to *pry* into the secrets of others.—BLAIR.

He who enters upon this *scrutiny* (into the depths of the mind) enters into a labyrinth.—SOUTH.

In man the more we *dive*, the more we see,
Heaven's signet stamping an immortal make.
YOUNG.

Prying, v. Curious.

Publicity, v. Notoriety.

To Publish, v. To advertise.

To Publish, v. To announce.

To Publish, v. To declare.

To Publish, Promulgate, Divulge, Reveal, Disclose.

Publish, v. To advertise.

Promulgate, in Latin *promulgatus*, participle of *promulgo* or *provolgo*, signifies to make vulgar.

Divulge, in Latin *divulgo*, that is, in *diversos vulgo*, signifies to make vulgar in different parts.

Reveal, in Latin *revelo*, from *velo* to veil, signifies to take off the veil or cover.

Disclose signifies to make the reverse of close.

To *publish* is the most general of these terms, conveying in its extended sense the idea of making known; but it is in many respects indefinite; we may make known to many or few; but to *promulgate* is always to make known to many. We may *publish* that which is a domestic or a national concern; we *promulgate* properly only that which is of general interest: the affairs of a family or of a nation are *published* in the newspapers; doctrines, principles, precepts, and the like are *promulgated*. We may *publish* things to be known, or things not to be known; we *divulge* things mostly not to be known: we may *publish* our own shame, or the shame of another, and we may *publish* that which is advantageous to another; but we commonly *divulge* the secrets or the crimes of another. To *publish* is said of that which was never before known, or never before existed; to *reveal* and *disclose* are said of that which has been only concealed or lay hidden: we *publish* the events of the day; we *reveal* the secret or the mystery of a transaction; we *disclose* the whole affair from beginning to end which has never been properly known or accounted for.

By the execution of several of his benefactors, Maximian *published* in characters of blood the indelible history of his baseness and ingratitude.—GIBBON.

An absurd theory on one side of a question forms no justification for alleging a false fact or *promulgating* mischievous maxims on the other.—BURKE.

Tremble thou wretch

That hast within thee undivulged crimes.

SHAKESPEARE.

In confession, the *revealing* is not for worldly use, but for the ease of a man's heart.—BACON.

Then earth and ocean various forms disclose.

DRYDEN.

To Pull, v. To draw.

Punctual, v. Exact.

Punishment, v. Correction.

To Purchase, v. To buy.

Pure, v. Clean.

To Purpose, v. To design.

To Purpose, Propose.

We **Purpose** (*v. To design*) that which is near at hand, or immediately to be set about; we **Propose** that which is more distant: the former requires the setting before one's mind, the latter requires deliberation and plan. We *purpose* many things which we never think worth while doing; but we ought not to *propose* anything to ourselves which is not of too much importance to be lightly adopted or rejected. We *purpose* to go to town on a certain day; we *propose* to spend our time in a particular study.

When listening Philomela deigns
To let them joy, and *purposes* in thought
Elate, to make her night excel their day.

THOMSON.

There are but two plans on which any man can *propose* to conduct himself through the dangers and distresses of human life.—BLAIR.

Purpose, v. Sake.

To Pursue, *v. To continue.*

To Pursue, *v. To follow.*

To Put, Place, Lay, Set.

Put is in all probability contracted from *positus*, participle of *pono* to place.

Place, *v. To place.*

Lay, in Saxon *legan*, German *legen*, Latin *loco*, and Greek *λεγομαι*, signifies to cause to lie; and Set, in German *setzen*, Latin *sisto*, from *sto* to stand, signifies to cause to stand. Put is the most general of all these terms; place, lay, and set are but modes of putting; one puts, but the way of putting it is not defined; we may put a thing into one's room, one's desk, one's pocket, and the like; but to place is to put in a specific manner, and for a specific purpose; one places a book on a shelf

as a fixed place for it, and in a position most suitable to it. To lay and set are still more specific than place; the former being applied only to such things as can be made to lie; and set only to such as can be made to stand: a book may be said to be laid on the table when placed in a downward position; and set on a shelf when placed on one end: we lay ourselves down on the ground; we set a trunk upon the ground.

The labourer cuts
Young slips, and in the soil securely puts. DRYDEN.

Then youths and virgins, twice as many, join
To place the dishes, and to serve the wine. DRYDEN.

Here some design a mole, while others there
Lay deep foundations for a theatre.—DRYDEN.

To Putrefy, *v. To rot.*

Q.

To Quake, *v. To shake.*

Qualification, Accomplishment.

The Qualification (*v. Competent*) serves the purpose of utility; the Accomplishment serves to adorn: by the first we are enabled to make ourselves useful; by the second we are enabled to make ourselves agreeable.

The qualifications of a man who has an office to perform must be considered: of a man who has only pleasure to pursue the accomplishments are to be considered. A readiness with one's pen, and a facility at accounts, are necessary qualifications either for a school or a counting-house; drawing is one of the most agreeable and suitable accomplishments that can be given to a young person.

The companion of an evening, and the companion for life, require very different qualifications.—JOHNSON.

Where nature bestows genius, education will give accomplishments.—CUMBERLAND.

Qualified, *v. Competent.*

To Qualify, *v. To fit.*

To Qualify, Temper, Humour.

Quality, *v. Competent.*

Temper, from *tempero*, is to regulate the temperament.

Humour, from *humor*, is to suit to the humour.

Things are qualified according to circumstances: what is too harsh must be qualified by something that is soft and lenitive; things are tempered by nature so that things perfectly discordant should not be combined; things are humoured by contrivance: what is subject to many changes requires to be humoured; a polite person will qualify a refusal by some expression of kindness; Providence has tem-

pered the seasons so as to mix something that is pleasant in them all. Nature itself is sometimes to be humoured when art is employed: but the tempers of men require still more to be humoured.

It is the excellency of friendship to rectify or at least to qualify the malignity of these surmises.—SOUTH.

God in his mercy has so framed and tempered his word, that we have for the most part a reserve of mercy wrapp'd up in a curse.—SOUTH.

Our British gardeners, instead of humouring nature, love to deviate from it as much as possible.—ADDISON.

Quality, *v. Distinction.*

Quality, Property, Attribute.

Quality, in Latin *qualitas* from *qualis* such, signifies such as a thing really is.

Property, which is changed from *propriety* and *proprius* proper or one's own, signifies belonging to a thing as an essential ingredient.

Attribute, in Latin *attributus*, participle of *attribuo* to bestow upon, signifies the things bestowed upon or assigned to another.

The quality is that which is inherent in the thing and co-existent; the property is that which belongs to it for the time being; the attribute is the quality which is assigned to any object. We cannot alter the quality of a thing without altering the whole thing; but we may give or take away properties from bodies at pleasure without entirely destroying their identity; and we may ascribe attributes at discretion.

Humility and patience, industry and temperance, are very often the good qualities of a poor man.—ADDISON.

No man can have sunk so far into stupidity as not to consider the properties of the ground on which he walks, of the plants on which he feeds, or of the animals that delight his ear.—JOHNSON.

Man o'er a wider field extends his views,
God through the wonder of his works pursues,
Exploring thence his attributes and laws,
Adores, loves, imitates th' Eternal Cause.

JENYNS.

Quantity, *v. Deal.*

Quarrel, *v. Difference.*

Quarrel, Broil, Feud.

Quarrel, *v. Difference.*

Broil probably comes from *brawl*, a noisy quarrel.

Feud, in German *fehde*, is connected with the word *fight*, including active hostility.

Quarrel is the general and ordinary term; *broil* and *feud* are particular terms.

The idea of a variance between two parties is common to these terms; but the former respects the complaints and charges which are reciprocally made; *broil* respects the confusion and entanglement which arises from a contention and collision of interests; *feud* respects the hostilities which arise out of the variance. There are *quarrels* where there are no *broils*, and there are both where there are no *feuds*; but there are no *broils* and *feuds* without *quarrels*: the *quarrel* is not always openly conducted between the parties; it may sometimes be secret, and sometimes manifest itself only in a coolness of behaviour: the *broil* is a noisy kind of *quarrel*, it always breaks out in loud, and mostly reproachful, language: *feud* is a deadly kind of *quarrel* which is heightened by mutual aggravations and insults. *Quarrels* are very lamentable when they take place between members of the same family; *broils* are very frequent among profligate and restless people who live together; *feuds* were very general in former times between different families of the nobility.

The dirk or broad dagger, I am afraid, was of more use in private *quarrels* than in battles.—JOHNSON.

Ev'n haughty Juno, who with endless *broils*,
Earth, seas, and heav'n, and Jove himself turmoils,
At length aton'd, her friendly pow'r shall join
To cherish and advance the Trojan line.—DRYDEN.

The poet describes (in the poem of Chevy-Chace) a battle occasioned by the mutual *feuds* which reigned in the families of an English and Scotch nobleman.—ADDISON.

Quarrel, Affray, or Fray.

Quarrel, *v. Difference.*

Affray or Fray, from *frico* to rub, signifies the collision of the passions.

A *quarrel* is indefinite, both as to the cause and the manner in which it is conducted; an *affray* is a particular kind of *quarrel*: a *quarrel* may subsist between two persons from a private difference; an *affray* always takes place between many upon some public occasion; a *quarrel* may be carried on merely by words; an *affray* is commonly conducted by acts of violence: many angry words pass in a *quarrel* between two happy people; many are wounded, if not killed in *affrays*, when opposite parties meet.

The *quarrel* between my friends did not run so high as I find your accounts have made it.—STEELE.

The provost of Edinburgh, his son, and several citizens of distinction, were killed in the *fray*.—ROBERTSON.

Quarter, *v. District.*

Query, *v. Question.*

To Question, *v. To ask.*

Question, *v. Doubt.*

Question, Query.

Question, *v. To ask.*

Query is but a variation of *quære*, from the verb *quæro* to seek or inquire.

Questions and queries are both put for the sake of obtaining an answer; but the former may be for a reasonable or unreasonable cause; a *query* is mostly a rational *question*: idlers may put *questions* from mere curiosity; learned men put *queries* for the sake of information.

Quickness, Swiftmess, Fleetness, Celerity, Rapidity, Velocity.

These terms are all applied to the motion of bodies, of which *Quickness*, from *quick*, denotes the general and simple idea which characterizes all the rest. *Quickness* is near akin to life, and is directly opposed to slowness. *Swiftmess*, in all probability from the German *schweifen* to roam; and *Fleetness*, from *fly*; express higher degrees of *quickness*. *Celerity*, probably from *celer* a horse; *Velocity*, from *volo* to fly; and *Rapidity*, from *rapio* to seize or hurry along, differ more in application than in degree. *Quick* and *swift* are applicable to any objects; men are *quick* in moving, *swift* in running: dogs hear *quickly*, and run *swiftly*; a mill goes *quickly* or *swiftly* round, according to the force of the wind: *fleetness* is the peculiar characteristic of winds or horses; a horse is *fleet* in the race, and is sometimes described to be as *fleet* as the winds: that which we wish to characterize as particularly *quick* in our ordinary operations, we say is done with *celerity*; in this manner our thoughts pass with *celerity* from one object to another: those things are said to move with *rapidity* which seem to hurry everything away with them; a river or stream moves with *rapidity*; time goes on with a *rapid* flight: *velocity* signifies the *swiftness* of flight, which is a motion that exceeds all others in *swiftness*: hence, we speak of the *velocity* of a ball shot from a cannon, or of a celestial body moving in its orbit; sometimes these words, *rapidity* and *velocity*, are applied in the improper sense by way of emphasis to the very *swift* movements of other bodies: in this manner the wheel of a carriage is said to move *rapidly*; and the flight of an animal or the progress of a vessel before the wind is compared to the flight of a bird in point of *velocity*.

Impatience of labour seizes those who are most distinguished for *quickness* of apprehension.—JOHNSON.

Above the bounding billows *swift* they flew,
Till now the Grecian camp appear'd in view.—POPE.

For fear, though *feeter* than the wind,
Believes 'tis always left behind.—BUTLER.

By moving the eye we gather up with great *celerity* the several parts of an object, so as to form one piece.—BURKE.

Meantime the radiant sun, to mortal sight
Descending *swift*, roll'd down the *rapid* light.—POPE.

Lightning is productive of grandeur which it chiefly owes to the *velocity* of its motion.—BURKE.

To Quiet, *v. To appease.*

Quiet, *v. Ease.*

Quiet, *v. Peace.*

To Quit, *v. To leave.*

To Quiver, *v. To shake.*

To Quote, *v. To cite.*

R.

Race, v. Course.

Race, Génération, Breed.

Race, v. Family.

Generation, in Latin *generatio* from *genero*, and the Greek *gennaw*, to engender or beget, signifies the thing begotten.

Breed signifies that which is *bred* (*v. To breed*). These terms are all employed in regard to a number of animate objects which have the same origin; the former is said only of human beings, the latter only of brutes: the term is employed in regard to the dead as well as the living; *generation* is employed only in regard to the living: hence we speak of the *race* of the Heracidae, the *race* of the Bourbons, the *race* of the Stuarts and the like; but the present *generation*, the whole *generation*, a worthless *generation*, and the like: *breed* is said of those animals who are brought forth, and brought up in the same manner. Hence, we denominate some domestic animals as of a good *breed*, where particular care is taken not only as to the animals from which they come, but also of those which are brought forth.

Where *racés* are thus numerous and thus combined, none but the chief of a clan is thus addressed by his name.—JOHNSON.

Like leaves on trees the *race* of man is found.

Now green in youth, now with'ring on the ground,

So *generations* in their course decay,

So flourish these when those are pass'd away.—POPE.

Nor last forget thy faithful dogs, but feed

With fatt'ning whey the mastiff's gen'rous *breed*.

DRYDEN.

To Rack, v. To break.

Radiance, Brilliancy.

Both these terms express the circumstance of a great light in a body; but **Radiance**, from *radius* a ray, denotes the emission of rays, and is, therefore, peculiarly applicable to bodies naturally luminous, like the heavenly bodies; and **Brilliancy** (*v. Bright*) denotes the whole body of light emitted, and may, therefore, be applied equally to natural and artificial light. The *radiancy* of the sun, moon, and stars constitutes a part of their beauty; the *brilliancy* of a diamond is frequently compared with that of a star.

To Radiate, v. To shine.

Rage, v. Anger.

Rage, v. Madness.

To Raise, v. To heighten.

To Raise, v. To lift.

To Rally, v. To deride.

To Ramble, v. To wander.

Rancour, v. Hatred.

Rancour, v. Malice.

To Range, v. To class.

To Range, v. To wander.

To Rank, v. To class.

To Ransom, v. To redeem.

Rapacious, Ravenous, Voracious.

Rapacious, in Latin *rapax*, from *rapio* to seize, signifies seizing or grasping anything with an eager desire to have.

Ravenous, from the Latin *rabies* fury, and *rapio* to seize, signifies the same as *rapacious*.

Voracious, from *voro* to devour, signifies an eagerness to devour.

The idea of greediness, which forms the leading feature in the signification of all these terms, is varied in the subject and the object: *rapacious* is the quality peculiar to beasts of prey; *ravenous* and *voracious* are common to all animals, when impelled by hunger. The beasts of the forest are *rapacious* at all times; all animals are more or less *ravenous* or *voracious*, as circumstances may make them: the term *rapacious* applies to the seizing of other animals as food; *ravenous* applies to the seizing of anything which one takes for one's food: a lion is *rapacious* when it seizes on its prey: it is *ravenous* in the act of consuming it. The word *ravenous* respects the haste with which one eats; the word *voracious* respects the quantity which one consumes: a *ravenous* person is loth to wait for the dressing of his food; he consumes it without any preparation: a *voracious* person not only eats in haste, but he consumes great quantities, and continues to do so for a long time. Abstinence from food, for an unusual length, will make any healthy creature *ravenous*; habitual intemperance in eating, or a diseased appetite, will produce *voracity*.

A display of our wealth before robbers is not the way to restrain their boldness, or to lessen their *rapacity*.—BURKE.

Again the holy fire on altars burn,

And once again the *rav'nous* birds return.—DRYDEN.

Ere you remark another's sin,

Bid thy own conscience look within;

Controul thy more voracious bill,

Nor for a breakfast nations kill.—GAY.

Rapidity, v. Quickness.

Rapine, Plunder, Pillage.

The idea of property taken from another contrary to his consent is included in all these terms: but the term **Rapine** includes most violence; **Plunder** includes removal or carrying away; **Pillage** search and scrutiny after a thing. A soldier who makes a sudden incursion into an enemy's country, and carries away whatever comes within his reach, is guilty of *rapine*: he goes into a house full of property and carries away much *plunder*; he enters with the rest of the army into a town, and stripping it of everything that was to be found, goes away loaded with *pillage*; mischief and bloodshed attend *rapine*; loss attends *plunder*; distress and ruin follow wherever there has been *pillage*.

Upon the banks
Of Tweed, slow winding thro' the vale, the seat
Of war and rapine once.—SOMERVILLE.

Ship-money was pitched upon as fit to be formed by
excise and taxes, and the burden of the subjects took off
by *plunderings* and sequestrations.—SOUTH.

Although the Eretrians for a time stood resolutely to
the defence of their city, it was given up by treachery
on the seventh day, and *pillaged* and destroyed in a
most barbarous manner by the Persians.—CUMBER-
LAND.

Rapture, *v. Ecstasy.*

Rare, Scarce, Singular.

Rare, in Latin *rarus*, comes from the Greek
αραιος rare.

Scarce, in Dutch *schaers* sparing, comes from
scheren to cut or clip, and signifies cut close.

Singular, *v. Particular.*

Rare and *scarce* both respect number or
quantity, which admit of expansion or dimi-
nution: *rare* is a thinned number, a dimin-
ished quantity; *scarce* is a short quantity.

Rare is applied to matters of convenience or
luxury; *scarce* to matters of utility or neces-
sity: that which is *rare* becomes valuable,
and fetches a high price; that which is *scarce*
becomes precious, and the loss of it is seriously
felt. The best of everything is in its nature
rare: there will never be a superfluity of such
things; there are, however, some things, as
particularly curious plants, or particular ani-
mals, which, owing to circumstances, are
always *rare*: that which is most in use will,
in certain cases, be *scarce*; when the supply
of an article fails, and the demand for it con-
tinues, it naturally becomes *scarce*. An aloe
in blossom is a *rarity*, for nature has pre-
scribed such limits to its growth as to give
but very few of such flowers: the paintings
of Raphael, and the former distinguished
painters, are daily becoming more *scarce* be-
cause time will diminish their quantity,
although not their value.

What is *rare* will often be *singular*, and
what is *singular* will often, on that account,
be *rare*; but these terms are not necessarily
applied to the same object: *fewness* is the
idea common to both; but *rare* is said of that
of which there might be more; while *singular*
is applied to that which is single, or nearly
single, in its kind. The *rare* is that which is
always sought for; the *singular* is not always
that which one esteems: a thing is *rare* which
is difficult to be obtained; a thing is *singular*
for its peculiar qualities, good or bad. Indian
plants are many of them *rare* in England,
because the climate will not agree with them;
the sensitive plant is *singular*, as its quality
of yielding to the touch distinguishes it from
all other plants.

Scarce is applied only in the proper sense to
physical objects; *rare* and *singular* are appli-
cable to moral objects. One speaks of a *rare*
instance of fidelity, of which many like
examples cannot be found; of a *singular* in-
stance of depravity, when a parallel case can
scarcely be found.

A perfect union of wit and judgement is one of the *rarest*
things in the world.—BUNKE.

When any particular piece of money grew very *scarce*,
it was often re-coined by a succeeding emperor.—ADDI-
SON.

We should learn, by reflecting on the misfortunes which
have attended others, that there is nothing *singular* in
those which befall ourselves.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF
CICERO.

Rash, *v. Foolhardy.*

Rashness, Temerity, Hastiness,
Precipitancy.

Rashness denotes the quality of *rash*,
which, like the German *rasch*, and our word
rush, comes from the Latin *ruc*, expressing
hurried and excessive motion.

Temerity, in Latin *temeritas*, from *temerè*,
possibly comes from the Greek *τημερον* at the
moment, denoting the quality of acting by
the impulse of the moment.

Hastiness, *v. Angry* and *Cursory.*

Precipitancy, from the Latin *pre* and
capio, signifies the quality or disposition of
taking things before they ought to be taken.

Rashness and *temerity* have a close alliance
with each other in sense; but they have a
slight difference which is entitled to notice:
rashness is a general and indefinite term,
in the signification of which an improper
celerity is the leading idea: this celerity may
arise either from a vehemence of character or
a temporary ardour of the mind: in the sig-
nification of *temerity*, the leading idea is want
of consideration, springing mostly from an
overweening confidence, or a presumption of
character. *Rashness* is, therefore, applied to
corporeal actions, as the jumping into a river,
without being able to swim, or the leaping
over a hedge, without being an expert horse-
man; *temerity* is applied to our moral actions,
particularly such as require deliberation, and
a calculation of consequences. *Hastiness* and
precipitancy are but modes or characteristics
of *rashness*, and consequently employed only
in particular cases, as *hastiness* in regard to
our movements, and *precipitancy* in regard
to our measures.

To distrust fair appearances, and to restrain *rash* desires
are instructions which the darkness of our present state
should strongly inculcate.—BLAIR.

All mankind have a sufficient plea for some degree of
restlessness, and the fault seems to be little more than too
much *temerity* of conclusion in favour of something not
experienced.—JOHNSON.

And hurry through the woods with *hasty* step,
Rustling and full of hope.—SOMERVILLE.

The night looks black and boding; darkness fell
Precipitate and heavy o'er the world,
At once extinguishing the sun.—MALLET.

To Rate, *v. To estimate.*

Rate, Proportion, Ratio.

Rate, *v. To estimate.*

Ratio has the same origin and original
meaning as *rate*.

Proportion, *v. Proportionate.*

Rate and *ratio* are in sense species of
proportion: that is, they are supposed or
estimated *proportions*, in distinction from *pro-
portions* that lie in the nature of things. The
first term, *rate*, is employed in ordinary con-
cerns; a person receives a certain sum weekly
at the *rate* of a certain sum yearly: *ratio* is
applied only to numbers and calculations; as

two is to four, so is four to eight, and eight to sixteen; the *ratio* in this case being double; *proportion* is employed in matters of science, and in all cases where the two more specific terms are not admissible; the beauty of an edifice depends upon observing the doctrine of *proportions*; in the disposing of soldiers a certain regard must be had to *proportion* in the height and size of the men.

At Ephesus and Athens, Anthony lived at his usual *rate* in all manner of luxury.—PRIDEAUX.

The rate of interest (to lenders) is generally in a compound *ratio* formed out of the inconvenience and the hazard.—BLACKSTONE.

Repentance cannot be effectual but as it bears some *proportion* to sin.—SOUTH.

Rate, v. Tax.

Rate, v. Value.

Ratio, v. Rate.

Rational, v. Reasonable.

Ravage, Desolation, Devastation.

Ravage comes from the Latin *rapio*, and the Greek *απρᾶω*, signifying a seizing or tearing away.

Desolation, from *solus* alone, signifies made solitary or reduced to solitude.

Devastation, in Latin *devastatio*, from *jevasto* to lay waste, signifies reducing to a waste or desert.

Ravage expresses less than either *desolation* or *devastation*: a breaking, tearing, or destroying is implied in the word *ravage*; but *desolation* signifies the entire unpeopling a land, and *devastation* the entire clearing away of every vestige of cultivation. Torrents, flames, and tempests *ravage*; war, plague, and famine *desolate*; armies of barbarians, who inundate a country, carry *devastation* with them wherever they go. *Nothing resists *ravages*, they are rapid and terrible; nothing arrests *desolation*, it is cruel and unpitiful; *devastation* spares nothing, it is ferocious and indefatigable. *Ravages* spread alarm and terror; *desolation*, grief and despair; *devastation*, dread and horror.

Ravage is employed likewise in the moral application; *desolation* and *devastation* only in the proper application to countries. Disease makes its *ravages* on beauty; death makes its *ravages* among men in a more terrible degree at one time than at another.

Beasts of prey retire, that all night long,

Urg'd by necessity, had rang'd the dark,

As if their conscious *ravage* shunn'd the light,

Asham'd.—THOMSON.

Amidst thy bow'rs the tyrant's hand is seen,

And *desolation* saddens all thy green.—GOLDSMITH.

How much the strength of the Roman republic is impaired, and what dreadful *devastation* has gone forth into all its provinces.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

To Ravage, v. To overspread.

Ravenous, v. Rapacious.

Ray, Beam.

Ray (*v. Gleam*) is indefinite in its meaning; it may be said either of a large or small quan-

tity of light: **Beam** (*v. Gleam*) is something positive; it can be said only of that which is considerable. We can speak of *rays* either of the sun, or the stars, or any other luminous body; but we speak of the *beams* of the sun or the moon. The *rays* of the sun break through the clouds; its *beams* are scorching at noon-day.

A room can scarcely be so shut up that a single *ray* of light shall not penetrate through the crevices; the sea, on a calm moonlight night, presents a beautiful spectacle, with the moon's *beams* playing on its waves.

The stars emit a shivered *ray*.—THOMSON.

The modest virtues mingle in her eyes,

Still on the ground dejected, darting all

Their humid *beams* into the blooming flowers.

THOMSON.

Ray, v. Gleam.

To Raze, v. To demolish.

To Reach, Stretch, Extend.

Reach, through the medium of the northern languages, as also the Latin *rego* in the word *porrigo*, and the Greek *ορεω*, comes from the Hebrew *rekang* to draw out, and *arek*, length.

Stretch is but an intensive of *reach*.

Extend, v. To extend.

The idea of drawing out in a line is common to these terms, but they differ in the mode and circumstances of the action. To *reach* and to *stretch* is employed only for drawing out in a straight line, that is, lengthwise; *extend* may be employed to express the drawing out in all directions. In this sense a wall is said to *reach* a certain number of yards; a neck of land is said to *stretch* into the sea; a wood *extends* many miles over a country. As the act of persons, in the proper sense, they differ still more widely; *reach* and *stretch* signify drawing to a given point, and for a given end; *extend* has no such collateral meaning. We *reach* in order to take hold of something; we *stretch* in order to surmount some object; a person *reaches* with his arm in order to get down a book; he *stretches* his neck in order to see over another person; in both cases we might be said simply to *extend* the arm or the neck, where the collateral circumstance is not to be expressed.

In the improper application, they have a similar distinction: to *reach* is applied to the movements which one makes to a certain end, and is equivalent to arriving at, or attaining. A traveller strives to *reach* his journey's end as quickly as possible; an ambitious man aims at *reaching* the summit of human power or honour. To *stretch* is applied to the direction which one gives to another object, so as to bring it to a certain point; a ruler stretches his power or authority to its utmost limits. To *extend* retains its original unqualified meaning; as when we speak of extending the meaning or application of a word, of *extending* one's bounty or charity, *extending* one's sphere of action, and the like.

The whole power of cunning is privative; to say nothing, and to do nothing, is the utmost of its *reach*.—JOHNSON.

* Vide Roubaud: "Ravager, demoler, devastar, sacager."

Pisins immense
Lie stretch'd below interminable meads.—THOMSON.
Our life is short, but to extend that span
To vast eternity is virtue's work.—SHAKESPEARE.

Ready, *v. Easy.*

Ready, Apt, Prompt.

Ready, *v. Easy.*

Apt, in Latin *aptus*, signifies literally fitness.

Prompt, *v. Expedition.*

Ready is in general applied to that which has been intentionally prepared for a given purpose; *promptness* and *aptness* are species of *readiness*, which lie in the personal endowments or disposition: hence we speak of things being *ready* for a journey; persons being *apt* to learn, or *prompt* to obey or to reply. *Ready*, when applied to persons, characterizes the talent; as a *ready wit*: *apt* characterizes their habits; as *apt* to judge by appearance, or *apt* to decide hastily: *prompt* characterizes more commonly the particular action, and denotes the willingness of the agent, and the quickness with which he performs the action; as *prompt* in executing a command, or *prompt* to listen to what is said.

The god himself with *ready* trident stands
And ope the deep, and spreads the moving sands.
DRYDEN.

Let not the fervent tongue,
Prompt to deceive, with adulation smooth,
Gain on your purpos'd will.—THOMSON.

Poverty is *apt* to betray a man into envy, riches into arrogance.—ADDISON.

Real, *v. Actual.*

Real, *v. Intrinsic.*

To Realize, *v. To fulfil.*

Realm, *v. State.*

Reason, *v. Argument.*

Reason, *v. Cause.*

Reason, *v. Consideration.*

Reason, *v. Sake.*

Reasonable, *v. Fair.*

Reasonable, Rational.

Are both derived from the same Latin word *ratio* reason, which, from *ratus* and *reor* to think, signifies the thinking faculty.

Reasonable signifies accordant with reason; *Rational* signifies having reason: the former is more commonly applied in the sense of right reason, propriety, or fairness; the latter is employed in the original sense of the word *reason*: hence we term a man *reasonable* who acts according to the principles of right reason; and a being *rational* who is possessed of the *rational* or *reasoning* faculty, in distinction from the brutes. It is to be lamented that there are much fewer *reasonable* than there are *rational* creatures.

Human nature is the same in all *reasonable* creatures.
—ADDISON.

The evidence which is afforded for a future state is sufficient for a *rational* ground of conduct.—BLAIR.

Rebellion, *v. Contumacy.*

Rebellion, *v. Insurrection.*

To Rebound, Reverberate, Recoil.

To **Rebound** is to bound or spring back: a ball *rebounds*. To **Reverberate** is to *verberate* or beat back: a sound *reverberates* when it echoes. To **Recoil** is to coil or whirl back: a snake *recoils*. The former two are rarely used in an improper application; but we may say of *recoil*, that a man's schemes will *recoil* on his own head.

Honour is but the reflection of a man's own actions shining bright in the face of all about him, and from thence *rebouncing* upon himself.—SOUTH.

You seemed to *reverberate* upon me with the beams of the sun.—HOWEL.

Who in deep mines for hidden knowledge toils,
Like guns o'ercharg'd, breaks, misses, or *recoils*.
DENHAM.

To Rebuff, *v. To refuse.*

To Rebuke, *v. To check.*

To Recall, *v. To abjure.*

To Recant, *v. To abjure.*

To Recapitulate, *v. To repeat.*

To Recede, Retreat, Retire,
Withdraw, Secede.

To **Recede** is to go back; to **Retreat** is to draw back; the former is a simple action, suited to one's convenience; the latter is a particular action, dictated by necessity: we *recede* by a direct backward movement; we *retreat* by an indirect backward movement: we *recede* a few steps in order to observe an object more distinctly; we *retreat* from the position we have taken in order to escape danger; whoever can advance can *recede*; but in general those only *retreat* whose advance is not free: *receding* is the act of every one; *retreating* is peculiarly the act of soldiers, or those who make hostile movements. To **Retire** and **Withdraw** originally signify the same as *retreat*, that is, to draw back or off; but they agree in application mostly with *recede*: to *recede* is to go back from a given spot; but to *retire* and *withdraw* have respect to the place or the presence of the persons: we may *recede* on an open plain; but we *retire* or *withdraw* from a room, or from some company. In this application *withdraw* is the more familiar term: *retire* may likewise be used for an army; but it denotes a much more leisurely action than *retreat*: a general *retreats*, by compulsion, from an enemy; but he may *retire* from an enemy's country when there is no enemy present.

Recede, *retire*, and *withdraw* are also used in a moral application; **Secede** is used only in this sense: a person *recedes* from his engagement, which is seldom justifiable; he *retires* from business, or *withdraws* from a society. To *secede* is a public act: men *secede* from a religious or political body; *withdraw* is a private act; they *withdraw* themselves as individual members from any society.

We were soon brought to the necessity of *receding* from our imagined equality with our cousins.—JOHNSON.

Retirement from the world's cares and pleasures has been often recommended as useful to repentance.—JOHNSON.

A temptation may *withdraw* for awhile and return again.—SOUTH.

How certain is our ruin, unless we sometimes *retreat* from this pestilential region (the world of pleasure).—BLAIR.

Pisistratus and his sons maintained their usurpations during a period of sixty-eight years, including those of Pisistratus's *secessions* from Athens.—CUMBERLAND.

Receipt, Reception.

Receipt comes from *receive*, in its application to inanimate objects, which are taken into possession.

Reception comes from the same verb, in the sense of treating persons at their first arrival: in the commercial intercourse of men, the *receipt* of goods or money must be acknowledged in writing; in the friendly intercourse of men, their *reception* of each other will be polite or cold, according to the sentiments entertained towards the individual.

If a man will keep but of even hand, his ordinary expenses ought to be but to half of his *receipts*.—BACON.

I thank you and Mrs. Pope for my kind *reception*.—ATTERBURY.

To Receive, Accept.

The idea of taking, from the Latin *capio*, is common to these words; but to **Receive** is to take back; to **Accept** is to take to one's self: the former is an act of right, we *receive* what is our own; the latter is an act of courtesy, we *accept* what is offered by another. To *receive* simply excludes the idea of refusal; to *accept* includes the idea of consent; we may *receive* with indifference or reluctance; but we must *accept* with willingness; the idea of *receiving* is included in that of *accepting*, but not *vice versa*: what we *receive* may either involve an obligation or not; what we *accept* always involves the return of like courtesy at least: he who *receives* a debt is under no obligation, but he who *receives* a favour is bound by gratitude; and he who *accepts* a present will feel himself called upon to make some return.

The sweetest cordial we *receive* at last
Is conscience of our virtuous actions past.—DENHAM.
Unransom'd here *receive* the spotless fair,
Accept the hecatomb the Greeks prepare.—POPE.

To **Receive**, *v.* To admit.

To **Receive**, *v.* To take.

Recent, *v.* Fresh.

Reception, *v.* Receipt.

Reciprocal, *v.* Mutual.

Reciprocity, *v.* Interchange.

Recital, *v.* Relation.

To **Recite**, *v.* To repeat.

To **Reckon**, *v.* To calculate.

To **Reckon**, **Count**, or **Account**,
Number.

Reckon, *v.* To calculate.

Count, or **Account**, *v.* To calculate.

Number signifies to put in the number.

The idea of estimating is here common to these terms, which differ less in meaning than in application: *reckon* is the most familiar; *account* and *number* are employed only in the grave style: we *reckon* it a happiness to enjoy the company of a particular friend; we ought to *account* it a privilege to be enabled to address our Maker by prayer; we must all expect to be one day *numbered* with the dead.

Reckoning themselves absolved by Mary's attachment to Bothwell, from the engagements which they had come under when she yielded herself a prisoner, they carried her, next evening, under a strong guard to the castle of Lochleven.—ROBERTSON.

There is no bishop of the Church of England but *accounts* it his interest, as well as his duty, to comply with this precept of the Apostle Paul to Titus, "These things teach and exhort."—SOUTH.

He whose mind never pauses from the remembrance of his own sufferings may justly be *numbered* among the most miserable of human beings.—JOHNSON.

Reckoning, *v.* Account.

To Reclaim, Reform.

Reclaim, from *clamo* to call, signifies to call back to its right place that which has gone astray.

Reform signifies to *form* anew that which has changed its *form*: they are allied only in their application to the moral character.

A man is *reclaimed* from his vicious courses by the force of advice or exhortation; he may be *reformed* by various means, external or internal.

A parent endeavours to *reclaim* a child, but too often in vain; the offender is in general not *reformed*.

Scotland had nothing to dread from a princess of Mary's character, who was wholly occupied in endeavouring to *reclaim* her heretical subjects.—ROBERTSON.

A monkey, to *reform* the times,
Resolv'd to visit foreign climes.—GAY.

To Recline, Repose.

To **Recline** is to lean back; to **Repose** is to place one's self back: he who *reclines* *reposes*; but we may *recline* without *reposing*: when we *recline* we put ourselves into a particular position; but when we *repose* we put ourselves into that position which will be most easy.

For consolation on his friend *reclin'd*.—FALCONER.

I first awak'd, and found myself *repos'd*
Under a shade, on flowers.—MILTON.

Recognize, Acknowledge.

Recognize, in Latin *recognoscere*, is to take knowledge of, or bring to one's own knowledge.

Acknowledge, *v.* To acknowledge.

To *recognize* is to take cognizance of that which comes again before our notice; to *acknowledge* is to admit to one's knowledge what ever comes fresh under our notice: we *recognize* a person whom we have known before; we *recognize* him either in his former character or in some newly assumed character; we *acknowledge* either former favours or those which have been just received: princes *recognize* certain principles which have been admitted

by previous consent; they *acknowledge* the justice of claims which are preferred before them.

When conscience threatens punishment to secret crimes, it manifestly *recognizes* a Supreme Governor from whom nothing is hidden.—BLAIR.

I call it *atheism* by establishment when any state, as such, shall not *acknowledge* the existence of God, as the moral governor of the world.—BURKE.

To Recoil, *v.* To rebound.

Recollection, *v.* Memory.

Recompense, *v.* Compensation.

Recompense, *v.* Gratuity.

To Reconcile, *v.* To conciliate.

To Record, *v.* To enrol.

Record, Register, Archive.

Record is taken for the thing *recorded*; **Register** either for the thing *registered* or the place in which it is *registered*; **Archive**, mostly for the place, and sometimes for the thing: *records* are either historical details, or short notices; *registers* are but short notices of particular and local circumstances; *archives* are always connected with the state: every place of antiquity has its *records* of the different circumstances which have been connected with its rise and progress, and the various changes which it has experienced; in public *registers* we find accounts of families, and of their various connections and fluctuations; in *archives* we find all legal deeds and instruments which involve the interests of the nation, both in its internal and external economy.

To Recount, *v.* To relate.

To Recover, Retrieve, Repair,
Recruit.

Recover is to get again under one's cover or protection.

Retrieve, from the French *trouver* to find, is to find again.

Repair, in French *reparer*, Latin *reparo*, from *parare* to get, signifies likewise to get again, or make a thing good as it was before.

Recruit, in French *recru*, from *cru* and the Latin *creco* to grow, signifies to grow again, or come fresh again.

Recover is the most general term, and applies to objects in general; *retrieve*, *repair*, and the others, are only partial applications: we *recover* things either by our own means or by casualties; we *retrieve* and *repair* by our own efforts only: we *recover* that which has been taken, or that which has been any way lost; we *retrieve* that which we have lost; we *repair* that which has been injured; we *recruit* that which has been diminished: we *recover* property from those who wish to deprive us of it; we *retrieve* our misfortunes, or our lost reputation; we *repair* the mischief which has been done to our property; we *recruit* the strength which has been exhausted; we do not seek after that which we think *irrecoverable*; we give that up which is *irretrievable*; we lament over that which is *irreparable*; our power of

recruiting depends upon circumstances; he who makes a moderate use of his resources, may in general easily *recruit* himself when they are gone.

The serious and impartial retrospect of our conduct is indisputably necessary to the confirmation or *recovery* of our virtue.—JOHNSON.

Why may not the soul receive
New organs, since ev'n art can these *retrieve*?
JENYNS.

Your men shall be receiv'd, your fleet *repair*'d,
DRYDEN.

With greens and flow'rs *recruit* their empty hives.
DRYDEN.

Recovery, Restoration.

Recovery is one's own act; **Restoration** is the act of another; we *recover* the thing we have lost when it comes again into our possession; but it is *restored* to us by another: a king *recovers* his crown by force of arms from the hands of an usurper; his crown is *restored* to him by the aid of his people: the *recovery* of property is good fortune; the *restoration* of property an act of justice.

Both are employed likewise in regard to one's health: but the former simply designates the regaining of the health; the latter refers to the instrument by which it is brought about: the *recovery* of his health is an object of the first importance to every man; the *restoration* of one's health seldom depends upon the efficacy of medicine than the benignant operations of nature.

Let us study to improve the assistance which this revelation affords for the *restoration* of our nature, and the *recovery* of our felicity.—BLAIR.

Recreation, *v.* Amusement.

To Recruit, *v.* To recover.

To Rectify, *v.* To amend.

To Rectify, *v.* To correct.

Rectitude, Uprightness.

Rectitude is properly rightness, which is expressed in a stronger manner by **Uprightness**: we speak of the *rectitude* of the judgment; but of the *uprightness* of the mind, or of the moral character, which must be something more than straight, for it must be elevated above everything mean or devious.

We are told by Cumberland that *rectitude* is merely metaphorical, and that as a right line describes the shortest passage from point to point, so a right action effects a good design by the fewest means.—JOHNSON.

Who to the fraudulent impostor foul,
In his *uprightness*, answer thus return'd.—MILTON

To Redeem, Ransom.

Redeem, in Latin *redimo*, is compounded of *re* and *emo* to buy off, or back to one's self.

Ransom is in all probability a variation of *redeem*.

Redeem is a term of general application; *ransom* is employed only on particular occasions: we *redeem* persons as well as things; we *ransom* persons only; we may *redeem* by labour, or anything which supplies an equivalent to money; we *ransom* property with money only: we *redeem* a watch, or what-

has been given in pawn; we *ransom* a captive; *redem* is employed in the improper application; *ransom* only in the proper sense: we may *redeem* our character, *redem* our life, or *redeem* our honour: and in this sense our Saviour *redeems* repentant sinners; but those who are *ransomed* only recover their bodily liberty.

Thus in her crime her confidence she plac'd
And with new treasons would *redem* the past.
DRYDEN.

A third tax was paid by vassals to the king, to *ransom* him if he should happen to be taken prisoner.—ROBERTSON.

Redress, Relief.

Redress, like **address** (*v. Accost*) in all probability comes from the Latin *dirigo*, signifying to direct or bring back to the former point.

Relief, *v. To help*.

Redress is said only with regard to matters of right and justice; *relief* to those of kindness and humanity: by power we obtain *redress*; by active interference we obtain a *relief*: an injured person looks for *redress* to the government: an unfortunate person looks for *relief* to the compassionate and kind; what we suffer through the oppression or wickedness of others can be *redressed* only by those who have the power of dispensing justice; whenever we suffer, in the order of Providence, we may meet with some *relief* from those who are more favoured. *Redress* applies to public as well as private grievances; *relief* applies only to private distresses: under a pretence of seeking *redress* of grievances, mobs are frequently assembled to the disturbance of the better disposed; under a pretence of soliciting charitable *relief*, thieves gain admittance into families.

Instead of *redressing* grievances, and improving the fabric of their state, the French were made to take a very different course.—BURKE.

This one
Relief the vanquish'd have, to hope for none.
DENHAM.

To Reduce, Lower.

Reduce is to bring down, and **Lower** to make *low* or *lower*, which proves the close connection of these words in their original meaning; it is, however, only in their improper application that they have any further connection. *Reduce* is used in the sense of lessen, when applied to number, quantity, price, &c.; *lower* is used in the same sense when applied to price, demands, terms, &c.; the former, however, occurs in cases where circumstances as well as persons are concerned; the latter only in cases where persons act: the price of corn is *reduced* by means of importation; a person *lowers* his price or his demand when he finds them too high. As a moral quality, the former is much stronger than the latter: a man is said to be *reduced* to an abject condition; but to be *lowered* in the estimation of others, to be *reduced* to a state of slavery, to be *lowered* in his own eyes.

The regular metres then in use may be *reduced*, I think to four.—TAYLOR.

It would be a matter of astonishment to me, that any *cattle* should be found proof against the beauties of

Agamemnon as to *lower* its author to a comparison with Sophocles or Euripides.—CUMBERLAND.

Redundancy, *v. Excess*.

To Reel, *v. To stagger*.

To Refer, *v. To allude*.

To Refer, Relate, Respect, Regard.

Refer, from the Latin *re* and *fero*, signifies literally to bring back; and **Relate**, from the participle *latus* of the same verb, signifies brought back: the former is, therefore, transitive, and the latter intransitive. One *refers* a person to a thing; one thing *refers*, that is, *refers* a person to another thing; one thing *relates*, that is, is *related*, to another. To *refer* is an arbitrary act, it depends upon the will of an individual; we may *refer* a person to any part of a volume, or to any work we please: to *relate* is a conditional act, it depends on the nature of things: nothing *relates* to another without some point of accordance between the two; orthography *relates* to grammar, that is, by being a part of the grammatical science. Hence it arises that *refer*, when employed for things, is commonly said of circumstances that carry the memory to events or circumstances; *relate* is said of things that have a natural connection; the religious festivals and ceremonies of the Roman Catholics have all a *reference* to some events that happened in the early periods of Christianity; the notes and observations at the end of a book *relate* to what has been inserted in the text.

Refer and *relate* carry us back to that which may be very distant; but **Respect** and **Regard** (*v. To esteem*) turn our views to that which is near. The object of the action *refer* and *relate* is indirectly acted upon, and consequently stands in the oblique case; we *refer* to an object; a thing *relates* to an object: but the object of the action *respect* and *regard* is directly acted upon, therefore it stands in the accusative or objective case; we *respect* or *regard* a thing, not to a thing. Whatever *respects* or *regards* a thing has a moral influence over it; but the former is more commonly employed than the latter: it is the duty of the magistrates to take into consideration whatever *respects* the good order of the community: what *relates* to a thing is often more intimately connected than what *respects*; and, on the contrary, what *respects* comprehends in it more than what *relates*. To *relate* is to *respect*; but to *respect* is not always to *relate*: the former includes every species of affinity or accordance; the latter only that which flows out of the properties and circumstances of things; when a number of objects are brought together, which fitly associate, and properly *relate* the one to the other, they form a grand whole, as in the case of any scientific work which is digested into a scheme; when all the incidental circumstances which *respect* either moral principles or moral conduct are properly weighed, they will enable one to form a just judgment.

Respect is said of objects in general; *regard* mostly of that which enters into the feeling: laws *respect* the general welfare of the community; the due administration of the laws *regards* the happiness of the individual.

Our Saviour's words (in his sermon on the mount) all refer to the Pharisees' way of speaking.—SOUTH.

Homer artfully interweaves, in the several succeeding parts of his poem, an account of everything material which relates to his princes.—ADDISON.

Religion is a pleasure to the mind, as respects practice.—SOUTH.

What I have said regards only the vain part of the sex.—ADDISON.

Refined, *v. Polite.*

Refinement, *v. Cultivation.*

To Reflect, *v. To consider.*

To Reflect, *v. To think.*

Reflection, *v. Insinuation.*

To Reform, *v. To amend.*

To Reform, *v. To correct.*

To Reform, *v. To reclaim.*

Reform, Reformation.

Reform has a general application; Reformation a particular application: whatever undergoes such a change as to give a new form to an object occasions a *reform*; when such a change is produced in the moral character, it is termed a *reformation*: the concerns of a state require occasional *reform*; those of an individual require *reformation*. When *reform* and *reformation* are applied to the moral character, the former has a more extensive signification than the latter; the term *reform* conveying the idea of a complete amendment; *reformation* implying only the process of amending or improving.

A *reform* in one's life and conversation will always be accompanied with a corresponding increase of happiness to the individual; when we observe any approaches to *reformation*, we may cease to despair of the individual who gives the happy indications.

He was anxious to keep the distemper of France from the least countenance in England, where he was sure some wicked persons had shown a strong disposition to recommend an imitation of the French spirit of *reform*.—BURKE.

Examples are pictures, and strike the senses, nay, raise the passions, and call in those (the strongest and most general of all motives) to the aid of *reformation*.—POPE.

Reformation, *v. Reform.*

Refractory, *v. Unruly.*

To Refrain, *v. To abstain.*

To Refresh, *v. To revive.*

Refuge, *v. Asylum.*

To Refuse, *v. To deny.*

Refuse, *v. Drags.*

To Refuse, Decline, Reject, Repel, Rebuff.

Refuse (*v. To deny*) signifies simply to pour back, that is, to send back, which is the common idea of all these terms.

Decline, in Latin *declino*, signifies literally to turn aside, Reject, from *jacio* to throw, to cast back; Repel, from *pello* to

drive, to drive back. Rebuff, from *buff* or *puff*, to puff one back, or send off with a puff.

Refuse is an unqualified action, it is accompanied with no expression of opinion; decline is a gentle and indirect mode of refusal; reject is a direct mode, and conveys a positive sentiment of disapprobation: we refuse what is asked of us, for want of inclination to comply; we decline what is proposed from motives of discretion; we reject what is offered to us, because it does not fall in with our views: we refuse to listen to the suggestions of our friends; we decline an offer of service: we reject the insinuations of the interested and evil-minded. To refuse is said only of that which passes between individuals; to reject is said of that which comes from any quarter: requests and petitions are refused by those who are solicited; opinions, propositions, and counsels are rejected by particular communities: the king refuses to give his assent to a bill; the parliament rejects a bill.

To repel is to reject with violence; to rebuff is to refuse with contempt. We refuse and reject that which is either offered or simply presents itself for acceptance: but we repel and rebuff that which forces itself into our presence, contrary to our inclination: we repel the attack of an enemy, or we repel the advances of one who is not agreeable; we rebuff those who put that in our way that is offensive. Importunate persons must necessarily expect to meet with rebuffs, and are in general less susceptible of them than others; delicate minds feel a refusal as a rebuff.

But all her arts are still employ'd in vain;
Again she comes, and is refus'd again.—DRYDEN.

Why should he then reject a suit so just?—DRYDEN.

Th' unwearied watch their listening leaders keep,
And, couching close, repel invading sleep.—POPE.

At length rebuff'd they leave their mangled prey.
—DRYDEN.

Melissa, though she could not boast the apathy of Cato, wanted not the more prudent virtue of Scipio, and gained the victory by declining the contest.—JOHNSON.

To Refute, *v. To confute.*

Regal, *v. Royal.*

To Regard, *v. To attend to.*

Regard, *v. Care.*

To Regard, *v. To esteem.*

To Regard, *v. To refer.*

Regardful, *v. Mindful.*

Regardless, *v. Indifferent.*

Regimen, *v. Food.*

Region, *v. District.*

To Register, *v. To enrol.*

Register, *v. List.*

Register, *v. Record.*

To Regret, *v. To complain.*

To Regulate, *v. To direct.*

To Regulate, *v. To govern.*

To Rehearse, *v. To repeat.*

Reign, *v. Empire.*

To Reject, *v.* To refuse.

Rejoinder, *v.* Answer.

To Relate, *v.* To refer.

To Relate, Recount, Describe.

Relate, in Latin *relatus*, participle of *refero*, signifies to bring that to the notice of others which has before been brought to our own notice.

Recount is properly to count again, or count over again.

Describe, from the Latin *scribo* to write, is literally to write down.

The idea of giving an account of events or circumstances is common to all these terms, which differ in the object and circumstances of the action. *Relate* is said generally of all events, both of those which concern others as well as ourselves; *recount* is said only of those which concern ourselves: those who *relate* all they hear often *relate* that which never happened; it is a gratification to an old soldier to *recount* all the transactions in which he bore a part during the military career of his early youth.

We *relate* events that have happened at any period of time immediate or remote; we *recount* mostly these things, which have been long passed: in *recounting*, the memory reverts to past scenes, and *count* over all that has deeply interested the mind. Travellers are pleased *relate* to their friends whatever they have seen remarkable in other countries; the *recounting* of our adventures in distant regions of the globe has a peculiar interest for all who hear them. We may *relate* either by writing or by word of mouth; we *recount* only by word of mouth: writers of travels sometimes give themselves a latitude in *relating* more than they have either heard or seen; he who *recounts* the exploits of heroism, which he has either witnessed or performed, will always meet with a delighted audience.

Relate and *recount* are said of that only which has passed: *describe* is said of that which exists: we *relate* the particulars of our journey; and we *describe* the country we pass through. Personal adventure is always the subject of a *relation*; the quality and condition of things are those of the *description*. We *relate* what happened on meeting a friend; we *describe* the dress of the parties, or the ceremonies which are usual on particular occasions.

O Muse! the causes and the crimes *relate*,
What goddess was provok'd, and whence he hate.
DRYDEN.

To *recount* Almighty works
What words or tongue of seraph can suffice?—MILTON.

In *describing* a rough torrent or deluge, the numbers
should run easy and flowing.—POPE.

Related, *v.* Connected.

Relation, Recital, Narration.

Relation, from the verb *relate*, denotes the act of *relating*.

Recital, from *recite*, denotes the act of *reciting*.

Narrative, from *narrate*, denotes the

thing *narrated*. *Relation* is here, as in the former paragraph (*v.* To *relate*), the general, and the others particular terms. *Relation* applies to every object which is related, whether of a public or private, a national or an individual nature; history is the *relation* of national events; biography is the *relation* of particular lives: *recital* is the *relation* or repetition of actual or existing circumstances: we listen to the *recital* of misfortunes, distresses, and the like. The *relation* may concern matters of indifference: the *recital* is always of something that affects the interests of some individual: the pages of the journal are filled with the *relation* of daily occurrences which simply amuse in the reading; but the *recital* of another's woes often draws tears from the audience to whom it is made.

Relation and *recital* are seldom employed but in connection with the object related or *recited*; *narrative* is mostly used by itself: hence we say the *relation* of any particular circumstance; the *recital* of any one's calamities; but an affecting *narrative* or a simple *narrative*.

Biography is of the various kinds of *narrative* writing, that which is most eagerly read.—JOHNSON.

Those *relations* are commonly of most value in which the writer tells his own story.—JOHNSON.

Old men fall easily into *recitals* of past transactions.—JOHNSON.

Relation, Relative, Kinsman, Kindred.

Relation is here taken to express the person *related*; it is, as in the former paragraph, the general term both in sense and application; **Relative** is employed only as respects the particular individual to whom one is *related*; **Kinsman** designates the particular kind of *relation*; and **Kindred** is a collective term to comprehend all one's *relations* or those who are akin to one. In abstract propositions we speak of *relations*; a man who is without *relations* feels himself an outcast in society: in designating one's close and intimate connection with persons we use the term *relative*; our near and dear *relatives* are the first objects of our regard; in designating one's *relationship* and connection with persons, *kinsman* is preferable; when a man has not any children he frequently adopts one of his *kinsmen* as his heir: when the ties of *relationship* are to be specified in the persons of any particular family, they are denominated *kindred*; a man cannot abstract himself from his *kindred* while he retains any spark of human feeling.

You are not to imagine that I think myself discharged from the duties of gratitude, only because my *relations* do not adjust their looks to my expectation.—JOHNSON.

Harod put all to death whom he found in Trechoritæ of the families and *kindred* of any of these at Repta.—PRIDEAUX.

Relative, *v.* *Relation*.

To Relax, Remit.

The general idea of lessening is that which allies these words to each other; but they differ very widely in their original meaning, and somewhat in their ordinary application; **Relax**, from the word *lax* or loose, signifies

to make loose, and in its moral use to lessen anything in its degree of tightness or rigour; to *Remit*, from *re* and *mitto* to send back, signifies to take off in part or entirely that which has been imposed; that is, to lessen in quantity. In regard to our attempts to act, we may speak of *relaxing* in our endeavours, and *remitting* our labours or exertions; in regard to our dealings with others, we may speak of *relaxing* in discipline, *relaxing* in the severity or strictness of our conduct, of *remitting* a punishment or *remitting* a sentence. The discretionary power of showing mercy when placed in the hands of the sovereign serves to *relax* the rigour of the law; when the punishment seems to be disproportioned to the magnitude of the offence, it is but equitable to *remit* it.

No more the smyth his dusky brow shall clear,
Relax his poudrous strength and lean to hear.
GOLDSMITH.

How often have I blessed the coming day,
When toil remitting lent its turn to play.
GOLDSMITH.

To Release, *v.* To deliver.

Relentless, *v.* Implacable.

Reliance, *v.* Dependence.

Relics, *v.* Remains.

Relief, *v.* Redress.

To Relieve, *v.* To alleviate.

Religious, *v.* Holy.

To Relinquish, *v.* To abandon.

To Relinquish, *v.* To leave.

Relish, *v.* Taste.

Reluctant, *v.* Averse.

To Remain, *v.* To continue.

Remainder, *v.* Rest.

Remains, *v.* Leavings.

Remains, Relics.

Remains signifies literally what *remains*: *Relics*, from the Latin *relinquo* to leave, signifies what is left. The former is a term of general and familiar application; the latter is specific. What *remains* after the use or consumption of anything is termed the *remains*; what is left of anything after a lapse of years is the *relic* or *relics*. There are *remains* of buildings mostly after a conflagration; there are *relics* of antiquity in most monasteries and old churches.

Remains are of value, or not, according to the circumstances of the case; *relics* always derive a value from the person to whom they were supposed originally to belong. The *remains* of a person, that is, what corporeally *remains* of a person, after the extinction of life, will be respected by his friend; a bit of a garment that belonged, or was supposed to belong, to some saint will be a precious *relic* in the eyes of a superstitious Roman Catholic. All nations have agreed to respect the *remains* of the dead; religion, under most forms, has given a sacredness to *relics* in the eyes of its most zealous votaries; the veneration of genius,

or the devotedness of friendship, has in like manner transferred itself from the individual himself to some object which has been his property or in his possession, and thus fabricated for itself *relics* equally precious.

Upon these friendly shores, and flow'ry plains,
Which hide Aachises and his blest remains.
DRYDEN.

All those arts, rarities, and inventions which the ingenious pursue, and all admire, are but the *reliques* of an intellect defaced with sin and time.—SOUTH.

Remark, Observation, Comment, Note, Annotation, Commentary.

Remark (*v.* To notice); and *Observation* (*v.* To notice); and *Comment*, in Latin *commentum*, from *commisissor* to call to mind; are either spoken or written; *Note*, *Annotation* (*v.* Note); *Commentary* a variation of *comment*; are always written. *Remark* and *observation*, admitting of the same distinction in both cases, have been sufficiently explained in the article referred to: *comment* is a species of *remark* which often loses in good-nature what it gains in seriousness; it is mostly applied to particular persons or cases, and more commonly employed as a vehicle of censure than of commendation; public speakers and public performers are exposed to all the *comments* which the vanity, the envy, and ill-nature of self-constituted critics can suggest; but when not employed in personal cases, it serves for explanation: the other terms are used in this sense only, but with certain modifications; the *note* is most general, and serves to call the attention to as well as illustrate particular passages in the text: *annotations* and *commentaries* are more minute; the former being that which is added by way of appendage; the latter being employed in a general form; as the *annotations* of the Greek scholiasts, and the *commentaries* on the sacred writings.

Spence in his *remarks* on Pope's *Odyssey*, produces what he thinks an unconquerable quotation from Dryden's preface to the *Æneid* in favour of translating an epic poem into blank verse.—JOHNSON.

If the critic has published nothing but rules and observations on criticism, I then consider whether there be a propriety and elegance in his thoughts and words.—ADDISON.

Sublime or low, unbended or intense,
The sound is still a *comment* to the sense.
ROSCOMMON.

The history of the *notes* (to Pope's *Homer*) has never been traced.—JOHNSON.

I love a critic who mixes the rules of life with *annotations* upon writers.—STEELE.

Memoirs or memorials are of two kinds, whereof the one may be termed *commentaries*, the other registers.—BACON.

Remarkable, *v.* Extraordinary.

To Remark, *v.* To notice.

To Remedy, *v.* To cure.

Remedy, *v.* Cure.

Remembrance, *v.* Memory.

Remembrancer, *v.* Monument.

Reminiscence, *v.* Memory.

Remiss, *v.* Negligent.

To Remit, *v.* To forgive.

• Remit, *v. To relax.*
 Remnant, *v. Rest.*
 Remorse, *v. Repentance.*
 Remote, *v. Distant.*
 Remuneration, *v. Compensation.*
 To Rend, *v. To break.*
 To Renew, *v. To revive.*
 To Renovate, *v. To revive.*
 To Renounce, *v. To abandon.*
 Renown, *v. Fame.*
 Renowned, *v. Famous.*
 To Repair, *v. To recover.*
 Reparation, *v. Restoration.*
 Repartee, *v. Retort.*
 To Repay, *v. To restore.*
 To Repeal, *v. To abolish.*

To Repeat, Recite, Rehearse, Recapitulate.

The idea of going over any words, or actions, is common to all these terms. **Repeat**, from the Latin *repeto* to seek, or go over again, is the general term, including only the common idea. **To Recite, Rehearse, and Recapitulate** are modes of *repetition*, conveying each some accessory idea. **To recite** is to repeat in a formal manner; **to rehearse** is to repeat or recite by way of preparation; **to recapitulate** is to repeat in a minute and specific manner. We repeat both actions and words; we recite only words; we repeat single words, or even sounds; we recite always a form of words: we repeat our own words, or the words of another; we recite only the words of another: we repeat a name; we recite an ode, or a set of verses: we repeat for purposes of general convenience; we recite for the convenience or amusement of others; we rehearse for some specific purpose, either for the amusement or instruction of others; we recapitulate for the instruction of others. We repeat that which we wish to be heard; we recite a piece of poetry before a company; we rehearse the piece in private which we are going to recite in public; we recapitulate the general heads of that which we have already spoken in detail. A master must always repeat to his scholars the instruction which he wishes them to remember; Homer is said to have recited his verses in different parts; players rehearse their different parts before they perform in public; ministers recapitulate the leading points in their discourse.

To repeat is commonly to use the same words: to recite, to rehearse, and to recapitulate do not necessarily require any verbal sameness. We repeat literally what we hear spoken by another; but we recite and rehearse events; and we recapitulate in a concise manner what has been uttered in a particular manner. An echo repeats with the greatest possible precision; Homer recites the names of all the Grecian and Trojan leaders, together with the names and account of their countries,

and the number of the forces which they commanded; Virgil makes *Aeneas* to rehearse before Dido and her courtiers the story of the capture of Troy, and his own adventures; a judge recapitulates evidence to a jury.

To repeat, recite, and recapitulate are employed in writing, as well as in speaking; rehearse is only a mode of speaking. It is sometimes a beauty in style to repeat particular words on certain occasions; an historian finds it necessary to recapitulate the principal events of any particular period.

I could not half those horrid crimes repeat,
 Nor half the punishments those crimes have met.
 DRYDEN.

Whenever the practice of recitation was disused, the works, whether poetical or historical, perished with the authors.—JOHNSON.

Now take your turns, ye muses, to rehearse
 His friend's complaints, and mighty magic verse.
 DRYDEN.

The parts of a judge are to direct the evidence to moderate length, repetition, or impertinency of speech; to recapitulate, select, and collate the material points of that which has been said.—BACON.

To Repel, *v. To refuse.*

Repentance, Penitence, Contrition, Compunction, Remorse.

Repentance, from *re* back, and *penitet* to be sorry, signifies thinking one's-self wrong for something past; **Penitence**, from the same source, signifies simply sorrow for what is amiss. **Contrition**, from *contero* to rub together, is to bruise as it were with sorrow; **Compunction**, from *compungo* to prick thoroughly; and **Remorse**, from *remordeo* to have a gnawing pain; all express modes of penitence differing in degree and circumstance. **Repentance** refers more to the change of one's mind with regard to an object, and is properly confined to the time when this change takes place; we therefore, strictly speaking, repent of a thing but once; we may, however, have penitence for the same thing all our lives. **Repentance** may be felt for trivial matters; we may repent of going or not going, speaking or not speaking; penitence refers only to serious matters; we are penitent only for our sins. Errors of judgment will always be attended with repentance in a mind that is striving to do right; there is no human being so perfect but that, in the sight of God, he will have occasion to be penitent for many acts of commission and omission.

Repentance may be felt for errors which concern only ourselves, or at most offences against our fellow-creatures; penitence, and the other terms, are applicable only to offences against the moral and Divine law, that law which is engraven on the heart of every man. We may repent of not having made a bargain that we afterwards find would have been advantageous, or we may repent of having done any injury to our neighbour; but our penitence is awakened when we reflect on our unworthiness or sinfulness in the sight of our Maker. This penitence is a general sentiment, which belongs to all men as offending creatures; but contrition, compunction, and remorse are awakened by reflecting on particular offences: contrition is a continued and severe sorrow, appropriate to one who has been in a continued state of

peculiar sinfulness: *compunction* is rather an occasional but sharp sorrow, provoked by a single offence, or a moment's reflection; *remorse* may be temporary, but it is a still sharper pain awakened by some particular offence of peculiar magnitude and atrocity. The prodigal son was a *contrite* sinner; the brethren of Joseph felt great *compunction* when they were carried back with their sacks to Egypt; David was struck with *remorse* for the murder of Uriah.

These four terms depend not so much on the measure of guilt as on the sensibility of the offender. Whoever reflects most deeply on the enormity of sin will be most sensible of *penitence* when he sees his own liability to offend. In those who have most offended, and are come to a sense of their own condition, *penitence* will rise to deep *contrition*. There is no man so hardened that he will not some time or other feel *compunction* for the crimes he has committed. He who has the liveliest sense of the Divine goodness will feel keen *remorse* whenever he reflects on anything that he has done by which he fears to have forfeited the favour of so good a Being.

This is the sinner's hard lot, that the same thing which makes him need *repentance* makes him also in danger of not obtaining it.—SOUTH.

Heaven may forgive a crime to *penitence*,
For heaven can judge if *penitence* be true.
DRYDEN.

Contrition, though it may melt, ought not to sink or overpower the heart of a Christian.—BLAIR.

All men, even the most depraved, are subject more or less to *compunctions* of conscience.—BLAIR.

The heart,
Pierc'd with a sharp *remorse* for guilt, disclaims
The costly poverty of hecatombs,
And offers the best sacrifice itself.—JEFFRY.

Repetition, Tautology.

Repetition is to *Tautology* as the genus to the species; the latter being as a species of vicious *repetition*. There may be frequent *repetitions* which are warranted by necessity or convenience; but *tautology* is that which nowise adds to either the sense or the sound. A *repetition* may, or may not, consist of literally the same words; but *tautology*, from the Greek *tautos* the same, and *logos* a word, supposes such a sameness in expression as renders the signification the same. In the liturgy of the Church of England there are some *repetitions* which add to the solemnity of the worship; in most extemporary prayers there is much *tautology* that destroys the religious effect of the whole.

That is truly and really *tautology* where the same thing is repeated, though under never so much variety of expression.—SOUTH.

To Repine, *v.* To complain.

To Reply, *v.* To answer.

Report, *v.* Fame.

Repose, *v.* Ease.

To Repose, *v.* To recline.

Reprehension, Reproof.

Personal blame or censure is implied by both these terms, but the former is much milder

than the latter. By *Reprehension* the personal independence is not so sensibly affected as in the case of *Reproof*: people of all ages and stations whose conduct is exposed to the investigation of others are liable to *reprehension*; but children only or such as are in a subordinate capacity are exposed to *reproof*. *Reprehension* amounts to little more than passing an unfavourable sentence upon the conduct of another: *reproof* adds to this an unfriendly address to the offender. The master of a school may be exposed to the *reprehension* of the parents for any supposed impropriety: his scholars are subject to his *reproof*.

When a man feels the *reprehension* of a friend, seconded by his own heart, he is easily heated into resentment.—JOHNSON.

There is an oblique way of *reproof* which takes off from the sharpness of it.—STEELE.

Representation, *v.* Show.

To Repress, Restrain, Suppress.

To *Repress* is to press back or down: to *Restrain* is to strain back or down: the former is the general, the latter the specific term: we always *repress* when we *restrain*, but not *vice versâ*. *Repress* is used mostly for pressing down, so as to keep that inward which wants to make its appearance: *restraint* is an habitual *repression* by which a thing is kept in a state of lowness: a person is said to *repress* his feelings when he does not give them vent either by his words or actions; he is said to *restrain* his feelings when he never lets them rise beyond a certain pitch: good morals as well as good manners call upon us to *repress* every unseemly expression of joy in the company of those who are not in a condition to partake of our joy; it is prudence as well as virtue to *restrain* our appetites by an habitual forbearance that they may not gain the ascendancy. One cannot too quickly *repress* a rising spirit of resistance in any community large or small; one cannot too early *restrain* the irregularities of childhood. The innocent vivacity of youth should not be *repressed*; but their wildness and intemperance ought to be *restrained*.

Philosophy has often attempted to *repress* insolence by asserting that all conditions are levelled by death.—JOHNSON.

He that would keep the power of sin from running out into act, must *restrain* it from conversing with the object.—SOUTH.

To *repress* is simply to keep down or to keep from rising within one's self. To *Suppress* is to keep under or to keep from appearing in public. A judicious parent *represses* every tumultuous passion in a child; a judicious commander *suppresses* a rebellion by a timely and resolute exercise of authority. Hence the term *repress* is used only for the feelings or the movements of the mind; but *suppress* may be employed for that which is external. We *repress* violence; *suppress* publications or information.

Her forwardness was *repressed* with a frown by her mother or aunt.—JOHNSON.

With him Palemon kept the watch at night,
In whose sad bosom many a sigh *suppress'd*
Some painful secret of the soul confest.

FALCONER.

Reprieve, Respite.

Reprieve comes in all probability from the French *reprie*, participle of *repandre*, and the Latin *reprehendo*, signifying to take back or take off that which has been laid on.

Respite in all probability is changed from *respiratus*, participle of *respiro*, signifying to breathe again.

The idea of a release from any pressure or burden is common to these terms; but the *reprieve* is that which is granted; the *respite* sometimes comes to us in the course of things: we gain a *reprieve* from any punishment or trouble which threatens us; we gain a *respite* from any labour or weight that presses upon us. A criminal gains a *reprieve* when the punishment of death is commuted for that of transportation; a debtor may be said to obtain a *reprieve* when, with a prison before his eyes, he gets such indulgence from his creditors as sets him free: there is frequently no *respite* for persons in a subordinate station when they fall into the hands of a hard task-master; Sisyphus is feigned by the poets to have been condemned to the toil of perpetually rolling a stone up a hill as fast as it rolled back, from which toil he had no *respite*.

All that I ask is but a short *reprieve*,
Till I forget to love and learn to grieve,
Some pause and *respite* only I require.
Till with my tears I shall have quench'd my fire.
DENHAM.

To Reprimand, *v.* To check.

Reprisal, *v.* Retaliation.

To Reproach, *v.* To blame.

Reproach, *v.* Discredit.

Reproach, Contumely, Obloquy.

Reproach, *v.* To blame.

Contumely, from *contumeo*, that is, *contra tumeo*, signifies to swell up against.

Obloquy, from *ob* and *loquor*, signifies speaking against or to the disparagement of any one.

The idea of contemptuous or angry treatment of others is common to all these terms; but *reproach* is the general, *contumely* and *obloquy* are the particular terms. *Reproach* is either deserved or undeserved; the name of Puritan is applied as a term of *reproach* to such as affect greater purity than others; the name of Christian is a name of *reproach* in Turkey. *Contumely* is always undeserved; it is the insolent swelling of a worthless person against merit in distress; our Saviour was exposed to the *contumely* of the Jews: *obloquy* is always supposed to be deserved; it is applicable to those whose conduct has rendered them objects of general censure, and whose name therefore has almost become a *reproach*. A man who uses his power only to oppress those who are connected with him will naturally and deservedly bring upon himself much *obloquy*.

Has foul *reproach* a privilege from heav'n?—POPE.

The royal captives followed in the train, amidst the horrid yells, and frantic dances, and infamous *contumelies* of the furies of hell.—BURKE.

How many men of honour are exposed from party spirit to public *obloquy* and *reproach*?—ADDISON.

Reproachful, Abusive, Scurrilous.

Reproachful or full of *reproach* (*v.* *Reproach*).

Abusive, or full of *abuse* (*v.* *Abuse*).

Scurrilous, in Latin *scurrilis*, from *scurra*, signifies like a buffoon or saucy jester.

Reproachful, when applied to persons, signifies full of *reproaches*; when to things deserving of *reproach* *abusive* is only applied to the person, signifying after the manner of *abuse*: *scurrilous* is employed as an epithet either for persons or things, signifying using *scurrility*, or after the manner of *scurrility*. The conduct of a person is *reproachful* inasmuch as it provokes or is entitled to the *reproaches* of others; the language of a person is *reproachful* when it abounds in *reproaches*, or partakes of the nature of a *reproach*: a person is *abusive* who indulges himself in *abuse* or *abusive* language: and he is *scurrilous* who adopts *scurrility* or *scurrilous* language.

When applied to the same object, whether to the person or to the thing, they rise in sense: the *reproachful* is less than the *abusive*, and this than the *scurrilous*: the *reproachful* is sometimes warranted by the provocation; but the *abusive* and *scurrilous* are always unwarrantable; *reproachful* language may be, and generally is, consistent with decency and propriety of speech; *abusive* and *scurrilous* language are outrages against the laws of good breeding, if not of morality. A parent may sometimes find it necessary to address an unruly son in *reproachful* terms; or one friend may adopt a *reproachful* tone to another; none, however, but the lowest orders of men, and those only when their angry passions are awakened, will descend to *abusive* or *scurrilous* language.

Honour teaches a man not to revenge a contumelious or *reproachful* word, but to be above it.—SOUTH.

Thus envy pleads a nat'ral claim
To persecute the Muses' fame,
Our poets in all times *abusive*,
From Homer down to Pope inclusive.—SWIFT.

Let your mirth be ever void of all *scurrility* and biting words to any man.—SIR HENRY SIDNEY.

To Reprobate, Condemn.

To Reprobate is much stronger than to **Condemn**: we always *condemn* when we *reprobate*, but not vice versa: to *reprobate* is to *condemn* in strong and *reproachful* language. We *reprobate* all measures which tend to sow discord in society, and to loosen the ties by which men are bound to each other; we *condemn* all disrespectful language towards superiors. We *reprobate* only the thing; we *condemn* the person also: any act of disobedience in a child cannot be too strongly *reprobated*; a person must expect to be *condemned* when he involves himself in embarrassments through his own imprudence.

Simulation (according to my Lord Chesterfield) is by no means to be *reprobated* as a disguise for chagrin or an engine of wit.—MACKENZIE.

I see the right, and I approve it too;

Condemn the wrong, and yet the wrong pursue.

TATE.

Reproof, *v.* Reprehension.

To Reprove, *v.* To blame.

To Reprove, *v. To check.*
 Repugnance, *v. Adversion.*
 Repugnant, *v. Adverse.*
 Reputation, *v. Character.*
 Reputation, *v. Fame.*
 Reputation, *v. Name.*
 Repute, *v. Name.*
 To Request, *v. To ask.*
 Request, *v. Prayer.*
 To Require, *v. To demand.*
 Requisite, *v. Necessary.*
 Requit, *v. Compensation.*
 Requit, *v. Retribution.*
 Resemblance, *v. Likeness.*
 Resentment, *v. Anger.*
 Reservation, *v. Reserve.*

Reserve, Reservation.

Reserve and Reservation from *servo* to keep, both signify a keeping back, but differ as to the object and circumstance of the action. *Reserve* is applied in a good sense, to anything natural or moral which is kept back to be employed for a better purpose on a future occasion; *reservation* is an artful keeping back for selfish purposes: there is a prudent *reserve* which every man ought to keep in his discourse with a stranger; equivocators deal altogether in mental *reservation*.

There is no maxim in politics more indisputable than that a nation should have many honours in *reserve* for those who do national services.—ADDISON.

There are three degrees of this hiding and veiling a man's self; first *reservation* and secrecy; second dissimulation in the negative; and the third simulation.—BACON.

To Reserve, Retain.

Reserve, from the Latin *servo* to keep, signifies to keep back.

Retain, from *teneo* to hold, signifies to hold back: they in some measure, therefore, have the same distinction as keep and hold.

To *reserve* is an act of more specific design; we *reserve* that which is the particular object of our choice: to *retain* is a simple exertion of our power; we *retain* that which is once come in our possession. To *reserve* is employed only for that which is allowable; we *reserve* a thing, that is, keep it back with care for some future purpose: to *retain* is often an unlawful act; a debtor frequently *retains* in his hands the money which he has borrowed.

To *reserve*, whether in the proper or improper application, is employed only as the act of a conscious agent; to *retain* is often the act of an unconscious agent: we *reserve* what we have to say on a subject until a more suitable opportunity offers; the mind *retains* the impressions of external objects, by its peculiar faculty, the memory; certain substances are said to *retain* the colour with which they have been dyed.

Augustus caused most of the prophetic books to be burnt, as spurious, *reserving* only those which bore the name of some of the sybils for their authors.—PRIDEAUX

The beauties of Homer are difficult to be lost, and these of Virgil to be retained.—JOHNSON.

To Reside, *v. To abide.*
 Residue, *v. Rest.*
 To Resign, *v. To abandon.*
 To Resign, *v. To give up.*
 Resignation, *v. Patience.*
 To Resist, *v. To oppose.*
 To Resolve, *v. To determine.*
 To Resolve, *v. To solve.*
 Resolute, *v. Decided.*
 Resolution, *v. Courage.*
 To Resort to, *v. To frequent.*
 Resource, *v. Expedient.*
 To Respect, *v. To esteem.*
 To Respect, *v. To honour.*
 To Respect, *v. To refer.*
 Respectful, *v. Dutiful.*
 Respite, *v. Interval.*
 Respite, *v. Reprieve.*
 Response, *v. Answer.*
 Responsible, *v. Answerable.*
 Rest, *v. Cessation.*
 To Rest, *v. To found.*
 Rest, *v. Ease.*

Rest, Remainder, Remnant, Residue.

Rest evidently comes from the Latin *resto*, in this case, though not in the former (*v. Ease*), signifying what stands or remains back.

Remainder literally signifies what remains after the first part is gone. **Remnant** is but a variation of *remainder*.

Residue, from *resido*, signifies likewise what remains back.

All these terms express that part which is separated from the other and left distinct: *rest* is the most general, both in sense and application; the others have a more specific meaning and use: the *rest* may be either that which is left behind by itself or that which is set apart as a distinct portion: the *remainder*, *remnant*, and *residue*, are the quantities which remain when the other parts are gone. The *rest* is said of any part, large or small; but the *remainder* commonly regards the smaller part which has been left after the greater part has been taken. A person may be said to sell some and give away the *rest*: when a number of hearty persons sit down to a meal, the *remainder* of the provisions, after all have been satisfied, will not be considerable. *Rest* is applied either to persons or things; *remainder* only to things: some were of that opinion, but the *rest* did not agree to it: the *remainder* of the paper was not worth preserving. *Remnant*, from *remanens* in Latin, is a species of *remainder*, applicable only to cloth or whatever remains

unsold out of whole pieces; as a remnant of cotton, linen, and the like. *Residue* is another species of *remainder*, employed in less familiar matters; the *remainder* is applied to that which remains after a consumption or removal has taken place; the term *residue* is applied to that which remains after a division has taken place; hence we speak of the *remainder* of the corn, the *remainder* of the books, and the like; but the *residue* of the property, the *residue* of the effects, and the like.

A last farewell!
For since a last must come, the *rest* are vain.
Like gasps in death which but prolong our pain.
DRYDEN.

Whatever you take from amusements or indolence will be repaid you an hundred-fold for all the *remainder* of your days.—EARL OF CHATHAM.

For this, far distant from the Latian coast,
She drove the *remnant* of the Trojan host.
DRYDEN.

The rising deluge is not stopp'd with dams,
But wisely managed, its divided strength
Is sluic'd in channels, and securely drain'd;
And while its force is spent, and unsupply'd,
The *residue* with mounds may be restrain'd.
SHAKESPEARE.

To Rest, *v.* To stand.

Restitution, *v.* Restoration.

Restoration, Restitution, Reparation,
Amends.

Restoration is employed in the ordinary application of the verb *restore*: **Restitution**, from the same verb, is employed simply in the sense of making good that which has been unjustly taken. *Restoration* of property may be made by any one, whether the person taking it or not: *restitution* is supposed to be made by him who has been guilty of the injustice. The dethronement of a king may be the work of one set of men, and his *restoration* that of another; but it is the bounden duty of every individual who has committed any sort of injustice to another to make *restitution* to the utmost of his power.

Restitution and **Reparation** are both employed in the sense of undoing that which has been done to the injury of another; but the former respects only injuries that affect the property, and *reparation* those which affect a person in various ways. He who is guilty of theft, or fraud, must make *restitution* by either *restoring* the stolen article or its full value; he who robs another of his good name, or does any injury to his person, has it not in his power so easily to make *reparation*.

Reparation and **Amends** (*v.* *Compensation*) are both employed in cases where some mischief or loss is sustained; but the term *reparation* comprehends the idea of the act of *repairing*, as well as the thing by which we *repair*; *amends* is employed only for the thing that will *amend* or make better; hence we speak of the *reparation* of an injury; but of the *amends* by itself. The term *reparation* comprehends all kinds of injuries, particularly those of a serious nature; the *amends* is applied only to matters of inferior importance.

It is impossible to make *reparation* for taking away the life of another. It is easy to make *amends* to any one for the loss of a day's pleasure.

All men (during the usurpation) longed for the *restoration* of the liberties and laws.—HUME.

The justices may, if they think it reasonable, direct *restitution* of a ratable share of the money given with an apprentice (upon his discharge).—BLACKSTONE.

Justice requires that all injuries should be *repaired*.—JOHNSON.

We went to the cabin of the French, who to make *amends* for their three weeks' silence, were talking and disputing with greater rapidity and confusion than I ever heard in an assembly even of that nation.—MANDÉVILLE.

Restore, Return, Repay.

Restore, in Latin *restauro*, from the Greek *stavpos* a pale, signifies properly to new pale, that is, to repair by a new paling, and, in an extended application, to make good what has been injured or lost.

Return signifies properly to turn again, or to send back; and **Repay** to pay back.

The common idea of all these terms is that of giving back. What we *restore* to another may or may not be the same as what we have taken; justice requires that it should be an equivalent in value, so as to prevent the individual from being in any degree a sufferer: what we *return* and *repay* must be precisely the same as we have received: the former in application to general objects, the latter in application only to pecuniary matters. We *restore* upon a principle of equity; we *return* upon a principle of justice and honour; we *repay* upon a principle of undeniable right. We cannot always claim that which ought to be *restored*; but we can not only claim but enforce the claim in regard to what is to be *returned* or *repaid*: an honest man will be scrupulous not to take anything from another without *restoring* to him its full value. Whatever we have borrowed we ought to *return*; and when it is money which we have obtained, we ought to *repay* it with punctuality. We *restore* to many as well as to one, to communities as well as to individuals: a king is restored to his crown; or one nation *restores* a territory to another: we *return* and *repay* not only individually, but personally and particularly: we *return* a book to its owner; we *repay* a sum of money to him from whom it was borrowed.

Restore and *return* may be employed in their improper application, as respects the moral state of persons and things; as a king *restores* a courtier to his favour, or a physician *restores* his patient to health: we *return* a favour; we *return* an answer or a compliment. *Repay* may be figuratively employed in regard to moral objects, as an ungrateful person *repays* kindnesses with reproaches.

When both the chiefs are sunder'd from the fight,
Then to the lawful king *restore* his right.—DRYDEN.

The swain
Receives his easy food from nature's hand,
And just *returns* of cultivated land.—DRYDEN.
Cæsar, whom fraught with eastern spoils,
Our heav'n the just reward of human toils,
Securely shall *repay* with rights divine.—DRYDEN.

To Restrain, *v.* To coerce.

To Restrain, *v.* To repress.

To Restrain, Restrict.

Restrain (*v.* *Coerce*) and **Restrict** are but variations from the same verb; but they

have acquired a distinct acceptation; the former applies to the desires, as well as the outward conduct; the latter only to the outward conduct. A person *restrains* his inordinate appetite; or he is *restrained* by others from doing mischief: he is *restricted* in the use of his money. To *restrain* is an act of power; but to *restrict* is an act of authority or law: the will or the actions of a child are *restrained* by the parent; but a patient is *restricted* in his diet by a physician, or any body of people may be restricted by laws.

Tully, whose powerful eloquence awhile
Restrain'd the rapid fate of rushing Rome.

THOMSON.

Though the Egyptians used flesh for food, yet they were under greater *restrictions* in this particular than most other nations.—JAMES.

Restraint, v. Constraint.

To Restrict, v. To restrain.

Result, v. Consequence.

To Retain, v. To hold.

To Retain, v. To reserve.

Retaliation, Reprisal.

Retaliation from *retaliare*, in Latin *retaliatio*, participle of *retalis*, compounded of *re* and *talis* such, signifies such again, or like for like. **Reprisal**, in French *reprisal* from *repris* and *reprandre*, in Latin *reprehendo* to take again, signifies to take in return for what has been taken. The idea of making another suffer in return for the suffering he has occasioned is common to these terms; but the former is employed in ordinary cases; the latter mostly in regard to a state of warfare, or to active hostilities. A trick practised upon another in return for a trick is a *retaliation*; but a *reprisal* always extends to the capture of something from another, in return for what has been taken. When neighbours fall out, the incivilities and spite of the one are too often *retaliated* by like acts of incivility and spite on the part of the other: when one nation commences hostilities against another by taking anything away violently, it produces *reprisals* on the part of the other. *Retaliation* is very frequently employed in the good sense for what passes innocently between friends: *reprisal* has always an unfavourable sense. Goldsmith's poem, entitled *Retaliation*, was written for the purpose of *retaliating* on his friends the humour they had practised upon him; when the quarrels of individuals break through the restraints of the law and lead to acts of violence on each other's property, *reprisals* are made alternately by both parties.

Therefore I pray let me enjoy your friendship in that fair proportion that I desire to return unto you by way of correspondence and *retaliation*.—HOWEL.

Go publish o'er the plain,
 How mighty a proselyte you gain!
 How noble a *reprisal* on the great!—SWIFT.

To Retard, v. To delay.

To Retard, Hinder.

Retard, from the Latin *tardus* slow, signifies to make slow.

Hinder, v. To hinder

To *retard* is applied to the movements of any object forward; to *hinder* is applied to the person moving or acting: we *retard* or make slow the progress of any scheme towards completion; we *hinder* or keep back the person who is completing the scheme: we *retard* a thing therefore often by *hindering* the person; but we frequently *hinder* a person without expressly *retarding*, and on the contrary the thing is *retarded* without the person being *hindered*. The publication of a work is sometimes *retarded* by the *hindrances* which an author meets with in bringing it to a conclusion; but a work may be *retarded* through the idleness of printers and a variety of other causes which are independent of any *hindrance*. So in like manner a person may be *hindered* in going to his place of destination; but we do not say that he is *retarded*, because it is only the execution of an object, and not the simple movements of the person which are *retarded*.

Nothing has tended more to *retard* the advancement of science than the disposition in vulgar minds to vilify what they cannot comprehend.—JOHNSON.

The very nearness of an object sometimes *hinders* the sight of it.—SOUTH.

For these, thou sayst, raise all the stormy strife
 Which *hinder* thy repose, and trouble life.—PRIOR.

Retinue, v. Procession.

To Retire, v. To recede.

Retirement, v. Privacy.

Retort, Repartee.

Retort, from *re* and *torqueo* to twist or turn back, to recoil, is an ill-natured reply: **Repartee**, from the word *part*, signifies a smart reply, a ready taking one's own part. The *retort* is always in answer to a censure for which one returns a like censure: the *repartee* is commonly in answer to the wit of another, where one returns a wit for wit. In the acrimony of disputes it is common to hear *retort* upon *retort* to an endless extent; the vivacity of discourse is sometimes greatly enhanced by the quick *repartee* of those who take a part in it. There is nothing wanting in order to make a *retort* but the disposition to aggravate one with whom we are offended; the talent for *repartee* is altogether a natural endowment, which does not depend in any degree upon the will of the individual.

Those who have so vehemently urged the dangers of an active life have made use of arguments that may be *retorted* upon themselves.—JOHNSON.

Henry IV. of France would never be transported beyond himself with choler but he would pass by anything with some *repartee*.—HOWEL.

To Retract, v. To abjure.

Retreat, v. Asylum.

To Retreat, v. To recede.

Retribution, Requital.

Retribution, from *tribuo* to bestow, signifies a bestowing back or giving in return.

Requital, v. Reward.

Retribution is a particular term; *requital* is general: the *retribution* comes from Provi-

dence; *requital* is the act of man: *retribution* is by way of punishment; *requital* is mostly by way of reward: *retribution* is not always dealt out to every man according to his deeds; it is a poor *requital* for one who has done a kindness to be abused.

Christ substituted his own body in our room, to receive the whole stroke of that dreadful *retribution* inflicted by the hand of an angry omnipotence.—SOUTH.

Leander was indeed a conquest to boast of, for he had long and obstinately defended his heart, and for a time made as many *requitals* upon the tender passions of her sex as she raised contributions upon his.—CUMBERLAND.

To Retrieve, *v. To recover.*

Retrospect, Review, Survey.

Retrospect is literally looking back, from *retro* behind, and *specio* to behold or cast an eye upon.

A **Review** is a view repeated; and a **Survey** is a looking over at once, from the French *sur* upon, and *voir* to see.

A *retrospect* is always taken of that which is past and distant; a *review* may be taken of that which is present and before us; every *retrospect* is a species of *review*, but every *review* is not a *retrospect*. We take a *retrospect* of our past life in order to draw salutary reflections from all that we have done and suffered; we take a *review* of any particular circumstance which is passing before us in order to regulate our present conduct. The *retrospect* goes further by virtue of the mind's power to reflect on itself, and to recall all past images to itself; the *review* may go forward by the exercise of the senses on external objects. The historian takes a *retrospect* of all the events which have happened within a given period; the journalist takes a *review* of all the events that are passing within the time in which he is living.

The *review* may be said of the past as well as the present; it is a *view* not only of what is, but what has been: the *survey* is entirely confined to the present; it is a *view* only of that which is.

We take a *review* of what we have already *viewed* in order to get a more correct insight into it: we take a *survey* of a thing in all its parts in order to get a comprehensive *view* of it, in order to examine it in all its bearings. A general occasionally takes a *review* of all his army; he takes a *survey* of the fortress which he is going to besiege or attack.

Believe me, my Lord, I look upon you as a spirit entered into another life, where you ought to despise all little views and mean *retrospects*.—POPE'S LETTERS TO ATTERBURY.

The *retrospect* of life is seldom wholly unattended by uneasiness and shame. It too much resembles the *review* which a traveller takes from some eminence of a barren country.—BLAIR.

Every man accustomed to take a *survey* of his own notions will, by a slight *retrospection*, be able to discover that his mind has undergone many revolutions.—JOHNSON.

To Return, *v. To restore.*

To Return, *v. To revert.*

To Reveal, *v. To publish.*

To Revenge, *v. To avenge.*

Revengeful, *v. Vindictive.*

To Reverberate, *v. To rebound.*

To Revere, *v. To adore.*

To Reverence, *v. To adore.*

To Reverence, *v. To awe.*

To Reverence, *v. To honour.*

Reverie, *v. Dream.*

To Reverse, *v. To overthrow.*

To Revert, Return.

Revert is the Latin and **Return** the English word; the former is used however only in few cases, and the latter in general cases: they are allied to each other in the moral application to matters of discussion; a speaker *reverts* to what has already passed on a preceding day; he *returns* after a digression to the thread of his discourse: we may always *revert* to something different, though more or less connected with that which we are discussing; we always *return* to that which we have left: we turn to something by *reverting*; we continue the same thing by *returning*.

Whatever lies or legendary tales
May taint my spotless deeds, the guilt, the shame,
Will back *revert* on the inventor's head.—SHIRLEY.
One day, the soul supine with ease and fulness
Revels secure, and fondly tells herself
The hour of evil can *return* no more.—ROWE.

Review, *v. Retrospect.*

Review, *v. Revisal.*

To Revile, Vilify.

Revile, from the Latin *vilis*, signifies to reflect upon a person, or retort upon him that which is vile: to **Vilify** signifies to make a thing vile, that is to set it forth as vile.

To *revile* is a personal act, it is addressed directly to the object of offence, and is addressed for the purpose of making the person vile in his own eyes: to *vilify* is an indirect attack which serves to make the object appear vile in the eyes of others. *Revile* is said only of persons, for persons only are *reviled*; but to *vilify* is said mostly of things, for things are often *vilified*. To *revile* is contrary to all Christian duty; it is commonly resorted to by the most worthless, and practised upon the most worthy: to *vilify* is seldom justifiable; for we cannot *vilify* without using improper language; it is seldom resorted to but for the gratification of ill-nature.

But chief he gloried with licentious stile
To lash the great, and monarchs to *revile*.—POPE.

There is nobody so weak of invention that cannot make some little stories to *vilify* his enemy.—ADDISON.

Revisal, Revision, Review.

Revisal, **Revision**, and **Review** all come from the Latin *video* to see, and signify looking back upon a thing or looking at it again: the terms *revisal* and *revision* are, however, mostly employed in regard to what is written; *review* is used for things in general. The *revisal* of a book is the work of the author, for the purposes of correction: the

review of a book is the work of the critic, for the purpose of estimating its value. *Revisal* and *revision* differ neither in sense nor application, unless that the former is more frequently employed abstractedly from the object *revised*, and *revision* mostly in conjunction: whoever wishes his work to be correct will not spare a *revisal*; the *revision* of classical books ought to be entrusted only to men of profound erudition.

There is in your persons a difference and a peculiarity of character preserved through the whole of your actions that I could never imagine but that this proceeded from a long and careful *revisal* of your work.—LOFTUS.

A common-place book accustoms the mind to discharge itself of its reading on paper, instead of relying on its natural power of retention aided by frequent *revisions* of its ideas.—EARL OF CHATHAM.

How enchanting must such a *review* (of their memorandum books) prove to those who make a figure in the polite world.—HAWKESWORTH.

Revision, v. Revisal.

To Revive, Refresh, Renovate, Renew.

Revive, from the Latin *vivo* to live, signifies to bring to life again; to **Refresh**, to make fresh again; to **Renew** and **Renovate**, to make new again. The restoration of things to their primitive state is the common idea included in these terms; the difference consists in their application. *Revive*, *refresh*, and *renovate* are applied to animal bodies; *revive* expressing the return of motion and spirits to one who was for the time lifeless; *refresh* expressing the return of vigour to one in whom it has been diminished; the air *revives* one who is faint; a cool breeze *refreshes* one who flags from the heat. *Revive* and *refresh* respect only the temporary state of the body; *renovate* respects its permanent state, that is, the health of the body: one is *revived* and *refreshed* after a partial exhaustion; one's health is *renovated* after having been considerably impaired.

Revive is applied likewise in the moral sense; *refresh* and *renovate* mostly in the proper sense; *renew* only in the moral sense. A discussion is said to be *revived*, or a report to be *revived*; a clamour is said to be *renewed*, or entreaties to be *renewed*; customs are *revived* which have lain long dormant, and as it were dead; practices are *renewed* that have ceased for a time.

Herod's rage being quenched by the blood of Mariamne, his love to her again *revived*.—PRIDEAUX.

Nor less thy world, Columbus! drinks, *refresh'd*,
The lavish moisture of the melting year.—THOMSON.

All nature feels the *renovating* force
Of winter.—THOMSON.

The last great age, foretold by sacred rhymes,
Renews its finished course.—THOMSON.

To Revoke, v. To abjure.

To Revoke, v. To abolish.

To Revolt, v. Insurrection.

Reward, v. Compensation.

Rhetoric, v. Eloquence.

Riches, Wealth, Opulence, Affluence.

Riches, in German *reichthum*, from *reiche* a kingdom, comes from the Latin *rego* to rule; because *riches* and power are intimately connected.

Wealth, from *well*, signifies well-being.

Opulence, from the Latin *opes* riches, denotes the state of having riches.

Affluence, from the Latin *ad* and *fluo*, denotes either the act of riches flowing in to a person, or the state of having things flowed in.

Riches is a general term denoting any considerable share of property, but without immediate reference to a possessor; *wealth* denotes the prosperous condition of the possessor; *opulence* characterizes the present possession of great *riches*; *affluence* denotes the increasing *wealth* of the individual. *Riches* is a condition opposed to poverty; the whole world is divided into *rich* and *poor*; *wealth* is that positive and substantial share in the goods of fortune which distinguish an individual from his neighbours, by putting him in possession of all that is commonly desired and sought after by man. *Opulence* is likewise a positively great share of *riches*, but refers rather to the external possessions than to the whole condition of the man. He who has much money has great *wealth*; but he who has much land, much cattle, many houses, and the like, is properly denominated *opulent*. *Affluence* is a term peculiarly applicable to the fluctuating condition of things which flow in quantities, or flow away in equally great quantities. Hence we do not say that a man is *opulent*, but that he is *affluent* in his circumstances. *Wealth* and *opulence* are applied to individuals, or communities; *affluence* is applicable only to an individual.

The *wealth* of a nation must be procured by the industry of the inhabitants; the *opulence* of a town may arise from some local circumstance in its favour, as its favourable situation for trade and the like; he who lives in *affluence* is apt to forget the uncertain tenure by which he holds his *riches*; we speak of *riches* as to their effects upon men's minds and manners; it is not every one who knows how to use them. We speak of *wealth* as it raises a man in the scale of society; the *wealthy* merchant is an important member of the community: we speak of *opulence* as it indicates the flourishing state of the individual; an *opulent* man shows unquestionable marks of his *opulence* around him: we speak of *affluence* to characterize the abundance of the individual; we show our *affluence* by the style of our living.

Riches are apt to betray a man into arrogance.
ADDISON.

His best companions innocence and health,
And his best *riches* ignorance of *wealth*.
GOLDSMITH.

Along the lawn where scatter'd hamlets rose,
Unwieldy *wealth* and cumbrous pomp repose,
GOLDSMITH.

Prosperity is often an equivocal word denoting merely *affluence* of possession.—BLAIR.

Our Saviour did not choose for himself an easy and *opulent* condition.—BLAIR.

To Ridicule, v. To laugh at.

To Ridicule, v. To deride.

Ridicule, Satire, Irony, Sarcasm.

Ridicule, *v.* *To deride.*

Satire, in Latin *satyr*, probably from *sat* and *ira* abounding in anger.

Irony, in Greek *εἰρωνία*, signifies dissimulation.

Sarcasm, from the Greek *σαρκασμος*, and *σαρκάζω*, from *σαρξ* flesh, signifies biting or nipping *satire*, so as it were to tear the flesh.

Ridicule has simple laughter in it, *satire* has a mixture of ill-nature or severity; the former is employed in matters of a shameless or trifling nature; but *satire* is employed either in personal or grave matters: *irony* is disguised *satire*; an *ironist* seems to praise that which he really means to condemn; *sarcasm* is bitter and personal *satire*; all the others may be successfully and properly employed to expose folly and vice; but *sarcasm*, which is the indulgence only of personal resentment, is never justifiable.

Nothing is a greater mark of a degenerate and vicious age than the common *ridicule* which passes on this state of life.—ADDISON.

A man resents with more bitterness a *satire* upon his abilities than his practice.—HAWKESWORTH.

The severity of this *sarcasm* stung me with intolerable rage.—HAWKESWORTH.

When Regan (in King Lear) counsels him to ask her sister forgiveness, he falls on his knees and asks her with a striking kind of *irony* how such supplicating language as this becometh him.—JOHNSON.

Ridiculous, *v.* *Laughable.*

Right, *v.* *Straight.*

Right, Just, Proper.

Right, in German *recht*, Latin *rectus*, signifies upright, not leaning to one side or the other, standing as it ought.

Just, in Latin *justus*, from *jus* law, signifies according to a rule of right.

Fit, *v.* *Fit.*

Proper, in Latin *proprius*, signifies belonging to a given rule.

Right is here the general term; the others express modes of *right*. The *right* and wrong are defined by the written will of God, or are written in our hearts according to the original constitutions of our nature; the *just* and *unjust* are determined by the written laws of men; the *fit* and *proper* are determined by the established principles of civil society.

Between the *right* and the wrong there are no gradations: a thing cannot be more *right* or more wrong; whatever is *right* is not wrong, and whatever is wrong is not *right*: the *just* and *unjust*, *proper* and *improper*, *fit* and *unfit*, on the contrary, have various shades and degrees that are not so easily definable by any forms of speech or written rules.

The *right* and wrong depend upon no circumstances; what is once *right* or wrong is always *right* or wrong, but the *just* or *unjust*, *proper* or *improper*, are relatively so according to the circumstances of the case: it is a *just* rule for every man to have that which is his own; but what is *just* to the individual may be *unjust* to society. It is *proper* for every man to take charge of his own concerns; but

it would be improper for a man in an unsound state of mind to undertake such a charge.

The *right* and the wrong are often beyond the reach of our faculties to discern; but the *just*, *fit*, and *proper* are always to be distinguished sufficiently to be observed. *Right* is applicable to all matters, important or otherwise; *just* is employed only in matters of essential interest; *proper* is rather applicable to the minor concerns of life. Everything that is done may be characterized as *right* or wrong: everything done to others may be measured by the rule of *just* or *unjust*: in our social intercourse, as well as in our private transactions, *fitness* and *propriety* must always be consulted. As Christians, we desire to do that which is *right* in the sight of God and man; as members of civil society we wish to be *just* in our dealings; as rational and intelligent beings, we wish to do what is *fit* and *proper* in every action, however trivial.

Hear then my argument—confess we must

A God there is supremely wise and just.

If so, however things affect our sight,

As sings our bard, whatever is is *right*.—JENYNS.

There is a great difference between good pleading and just composition.—MELMOSE'S LETTERS OF PLINY.

Visitors are no *proper* companions in the chamber of sickness.—JOHNSON.

Right, Claim, Privilege.

Right signifies in this sense what it is *right* for one to possess, which is in fact a word of large meaning: for since the *right* and the wrong depend upon indeterminate questions, the *right* of having is equally indeterminate in some cases with every other species of *right*. A **Claim** (*v.* *To ask for*) is a species of *right* to have that which is in the hands of another; the *right* to ask another for it. The **Privilege** (*v.* *Privilege*) is a species of *right* peculiar to particular individuals or bodies.

Right, in its full sense, is altogether an abstract thing which is independent of human laws and regulations; *claims* and *privileges* are altogether connected with the establishments of civil society.

Liberty, in the general sense, is an unalienable *right* which belongs to man as a rational and responsible agent; it is not a *claim*, for it is set above all question and all condition; nor is it a *privilege*, for it cannot be exclusively granted to one being, nor unconditionally be taken away from another.

Between *right* and power there is often as wide a distinction as between truth and falsehood; we have often a *right* to do that which we have no power to do, and the power to do that which we have no *right* to do; slaves have a *right* to the freedom which is enjoyed by creatures of the same species with themselves, but they have not the power to use this freedom as others do. In England men have the power of thinking for themselves as they please; but by the abuse which they make of this power we see that in many cases they have not the *right* unless we admit the contradiction that men have a *right* to do what is wrong; they have the power, therefore, of exercising this *right* only because no other person has the power of controlling them. We have often a *claim* to a thing which is not in our power.

to substantiate; and, on the other hand, *claims* are set up in cases which are totally unfounded on any right. *Privileges* are rights granted to individuals, depending either upon the will of the grantor or the circumstances of the receiver, or both; *privileges* are therefore partial rights transferrable at the discretion of persons individually or collectively.

In ev'ry street a city bard
Rules like an alderman his ward,
His undisputed rights extend
Through all the lane from end to end.—SWIFT.

Whence is this power, this fondness of all arts,
Serving, adorning life through all its parts;
Which names impos'd, by letters mark'd those names,
Adjusted property by legal claims?—JENYNS.

A thousand bards thy rights disown,
And with rebellious arm pretend
An equal privilege to descend.—SWIFT.

Righteous, v. Godly.

Rigid, v. Austere.

Rigorous, v. Austere.

Rim, v. Border.

Rind, v. Skin.

Ripe, Mature.

Ripe is the English, **Mature** the Latin word; the former has a universal application both proper and improper; the latter has mostly an improper application. The idea of completion in growth is simply designated by the former term; the idea of moral perfection as far at least as it is attainable, is marked by the latter: fruit is *ripe* when it requires no more sustenance from the parent stock; a judgment is *mature* which requires no more time and knowledge to render it perfect or fitted for exercise: in the same manner a project may be said to be *ripe* for execution, or a people *ripe* for revolt; and on the contrary reflection may be said to be *mature* to which sufficiency of time has been given, and age may be said to be *mature* which has attained the highest pitch of perfection. *Ripeness* is, however, not always a good quality; but *maturity* is always a perfection: the *ripeness* of some fruit diminishes the excellence of its flavour: there are some fruits which have no flavour until they come to *maturity*.

So to his crowne, she him restor'd againe,
In which he dyde, made ripe for death by aid.
SPENSER.

The Athenian age revolving in his mind
This weakness, blindness, madness of mankind,
Foretold that in *mature* days, though late,
When time should ripen the decrees of fate,
Some god would light us.—JENYNS.

To Rise, v. To arise.

Rise, v. Origin.

To Rise, Issue, Emerge.

To Rise, v. To arise.

Issue, v. To arise.

Emerge, v. Emergency.

To rise may either refer to open or enclosed spaces; *issue* and *emerge* have both a reference to some confined body: a thing may either *rise* in a body, without a body, or out of a body; but it *issues* and *emerges* out of a body. A thing may either rise in a plain or a wood;

it *issues* out of a wood: it may either *rise* in water or out of the water; it *emerges* from the water; that which *riseth* out of a thing comes into view by becoming higher: in this manner an air balloon might *rise* out of a wood; but that which *issues* comes out in a line with the object; horsemen *issue* from a wood; that which *issues* comes from the very depths of a thing, and comes as it were out as a part of it; but that which *emerges* proceeds from the thing in which it has been, as it were, concealed. Hence in the moral application, a person is said to *rise* in life without a reference to his former condition; but he *emerges* from obscurity: colour *riseth* in the face; but words *issue* from the mouth.

Ye mists and exhalations that now *rise*,
In honour to the world's great author *rise*.
MILTON.

Does not the earth quit scores with all the elements
In the noble fruits and productions that *issue* from it?—
SOUTH.

Let earth dissolve, yon ponderous orbs descend,
And grind us into dust, the soul is safe,
The man *emerges*.—YOUNG.

To Risk, v. To hazard.

Rite, v. Form.

Rivalry, v. Competition.

Road, v. Route.

To Roam, v. To wander.

Robbery, v. Depredation.

Robust, v. Strong.

Roll, v. List.

Romance, v. Fable.

Room, v. Space.

To Rot, Putrefy, Corrupt.

The dissolution of bodies by an internal process is implied by all these terms; but the first two are applied to natural bodies only; the last to all bodies natural and moral. **Rot** is the strongest of all these terms; it denotes the last stage in the progress of dissolution: **Putrefy** expresses the progress towards rottenness; and **Corruption** the commencement. After fruit has arrived at its maturity, or proper state of ripeness, it *rots*: meat which is kept too long *putrefies*: there is a tendency in all bodies to *corruption*; iron and wood *corrupt* with time; whatever is made, or done, or wished by men, is equally liable to be *corrupt*, or to grow *corrupt*.

Debate destroys dispatch, as *fruits* we see
Rot when they hang too long upon the tree.
DENHAM.

And draws the copious stream from swampy fens,
Where *putrefaction* into life ferments.—THOMSON.
After that they again returned beene,
That in that garden planted be agayne.
And grow a fresh, as they had never seene
Fleshy *corruption*, nor mortal payne.—SPENSER.

Rotundity, v. Roundness.

To Rove, v. To wander.

Rough, v. Abrupt.

Rough, v. Coarse.

Rough, v. Harsh.

Roundness, Rotundity.

Roundness and Rotundity both come from the Latin *rotundus* and *rota* a wheel, which is the most perfectly round body which is formed: the former term is, however, applied to all objects in general; the latter only to solid bodies which are round in all directions: one speaks of the *roundness* of a circle, the *roundness* of the moon, the *roundness* of a tree; but the *rotundity* of a man's body which projects in a round form in all directions, and the *rotundity* of a full cheek, or the *rotundity* of a turnip.

Bracelets of pearls gave *roundness* to her arms. PRIOR.

Angular bodies lose their points and asperities by frequent friction, and approach by degrees to uniform *rotundity*.—JOHNSON.

Round, v. Circuit.

To Rouse, v. To awaken.

To Rout, v. To beat.

Route, Road, Course.

Route comes in all probability from *rotundus* round, signifying the round which one goes.

Road comes no doubt from *ride*, signifying the place where one rides, as **Course**, from the Latin *cursus* (v. *Course*), signifies the place where one walks or runs.

Route is to *road* as the species to the genus: a *route* is a circular kind of *road*; it is chosen as the circuitous direction towards a certain point: the *road* may be either in a direct or indirect line; the *route* is always indirect; the *route* is chosen only by horsemen, or those who go to a considerable distance; the *road* may be chosen for the shortest distance: the *route* and *road* are pursued in their beaten track; the *course* is often chosen in the unbeaten track: an army or a company go a certain *route*: foot passengers are seen to take a certain *course* over fields.

Cortez (after his defeat at Mexico) was engaged in deep consultation with his officers, concerning the *route* which they ought to take in their retreat.—ROBERTSON.

At our first sally into the intellectual world, we all march together along one straight and open *road*.—JOHNSON.

Then to the stream when neither friends nor force,
Nor speed, nor art avail, he shapes his *course*. DENHAM.

Royal, Regal, Kingly.

Royal and Regal, from the Latin *rex* a king, though of foreign origin, have obtained more general application than the corresponding English term **Kingly**. *Royal* signifies, belonging to a king, in its most general sense; *regal*, in Latin *regalis*, signifies appertaining to a king, in its particular application; *kingly* signifies properly like a king. A *royal* carriage, a *royal* residence, a *royal* couple, a *royal* salute, *royal* authority, all designate the general and ordinary appurtenances to a king: *regal* government, *regal* state, *regal* power, *regal* dignity, denote the peculiar properties of a king: *kingly* always implies what is becoming a king, or after the manner of a king;

a *kingly* crown is such as a king ought to wear; a *kingly* mien, that which is after the manner of a king.

He died, and oh! may no reflection shed
Its poisonous venom on the *royal* dead.—PRIOR.

Jerusalem combin'd must see
My open fault and *regal* infamy.—PRIOR.

Scipio, you know how *Mæsanissa* bears
His *kingly* post, at more than ninety years. DENHAM.

To Rub, Chafe, Fret, Gall.

To Rub, through the medium of the northern languages, comes from the Hebrew *rup*; it is the generic term, expressing simply the act of moving bodies when in contact with each other; to **Chafe**, from the French *chauffer*, and the Latin *calfacere* to make hot, signifies to *rub* a thing until it is heated: to **Fret**, like the word *fritter*, comes from the Latin *frico* to *rub* or crumble, signifying to wear away by *rubbing*: to **Gall**, from the noun *gall*, signifies to make as bitter or painful as *gall*, that is, to wound by *rubbing*. Things are *rubbed* sometimes for purposes of convenience; but they are *chafed*, *fretted*, and *galled*, injuriously: the skin is liable to *chafe* from any violence; leather will *fret* from the motion of a carriage; when the skin is once broken, animals will become *galled* by a continuance of the friction. These terms are likewise used in the moral sense, to denote the actions of things on the mind, where the distinction is clearly kept up: we meet with *rubs* from the opposing sentiments of others; the angry humours are *chafed*; the mind is *fretted* and made sore by the frequent repetition of small troubles and vexations; pride is *galled* by humiliations and severe degradations.

A boy educated at home meets with continual *rubs* and disappointments (when he comes into the world).—BEATTIE.

Accoutred as we were, we both plung'd in
The troubled Tiber, *chafing* with the shores. SHAKESPEARE.

And full of indignation *frets*,
That women should be such coquettes.—SWIFT.

Thus every poet in his kind
Is bit by him that comes behind,
Who, tho' too little to be seen,
Can tease and *gall*, and give the spleen.—SWIFT.

Foul cank'ring rust the hidden treasure *frets*,
But gold that's put to use more gold begets. SHAKESPEARE.

Rude, v. Coarse.

Rude, v. Impertinent.

Rueful, v. Piteous.

Rugged, v. Abrupt.

Ruin, v. Bane.

Ruin, v. Destruction.

Ruin, v. Fall.

Rule, v. Guide.

To Rule, v. To govern.

Rule, v. Maxim.

Rule, v. Order.

Ruling, v. Prevailing.

Rumour, v. Fame.

Rupture, Fracture, Fraction.

Rupture, from *rumpo* to break or burst, and **Fracture** or **Fraction**, from *frango* to break, denote different kinds of breaking, according to the objects to which the action is applied. Soft substances may suffer a *rupture*; as the *rupture* of a blood-vessel: hard substances a *fracture*; as the *fracture* of a bone. *Rupture* and *fraction*, though not *fracture*, are used in an improper application; as the *rupture* of a treaty, or the *fraction* of a unit into parts.

To be an enemy, and once to have been a friend, does it not embitter the *rupture*?—SOUTH.

And o'er the high-pil'd hills of *fractur'd* earth
Wide dash'd the waves.—THOMSON.

Rural, Rustic.

Although both these terms, from the Latin *rus* country, signify belonging to the country,

yet the former is used in a good, and the latter in a bad or an indifferent sense. **Rural** applies to all country objects, except man; it is, therefore, always connected with the charms of nature: **Rustic** applies only to persons, or what is personal, in the country, and is, therefore, always associated with the want of culture. *Rural* scenery is always interesting; but the *rustic* manners of the peasants have frequently too much that is uncultivated and rude in them to be agreeable: a *rural* habitation may be fitted for persons in a higher station; but a *rustic* cottage is adapted only for the poorer inhabitants of the country.

E'en now, methinks, as pondering here I stand,

I see the *rural* virtues leave the land.—GOLDSMITH.

The freedom and laxity of a *rustic* life produces remarkable particularities of conduct.—JOHNSON.

Rustic, *v. Countryman*.

Rustic, *v. Rural*.

S.

Sacrament, *v. Lord's Supper*.

Sacred, *v. Holy*.

Sad, *v. Dull*.

Sad, *v. Mournful*.

Safe, Secure.

Safe, in Latin *salvus*, comes from the Hebrew *salah*, to be tranquil.

Secure, *v. Certain*.

Safety implies exemption from harm, or the danger of harm; *secure*, the exemption from danger: a person may be *safe* or saved in the midst of a fire, if he be untouched by the fire; but he is, in such a case, the reverse of *secure*. In the sense of exemption from danger, *safety* expresses much less than *security*: we may be *safe* without using any particular measures; but none can reckon on any degree of *security* without great precaution: a person may be very *safe* on the top of a coach in the daytime; but if he wish to *secure* himself, at night, from falling off, he must be fastened.

It cannot be *safe* for any man to walk upon a precipice, and to be always on the very border of destruction.—SOUTH.

No man can rationally account himself *secure* unless he could command all the chances of the world.—SOUTH.

Sagacity, *v. Penetration*.

Sage, Sagacious, Sapient.

Sage and **Sagacious** are variations from the Latin *sagax* and *sagto*, probably from the Persian *sag* a dog, sagacity being the peculiar property of a dog.

Sapient is in Latin *sapiens*, from *sapio*, which is either from the Greek *σᾶφος* wise, or, in the sense of tasting, from the Hebrew *sephak* the lip.

The first of these terms has a good sense, in application to men, to denote the faculty of discerning immediately, which is the fruit of experience, and very similar to that *sagacity* in brutes which instinctively perceives the truth of a thing without the deductions of reason; *sapient*, which has very different meanings in the original, is now employed only in regard to animals which are trained up to particular arts; its use is therefore mostly burlesque.

So strange they will appear, but so it happen'd
That these most *sage* Academicians safe
In solemn consultation—on a cabbage.

CUMBERLAND.

Sagacious all to trace the smallest game,
And bold to seize the greatest.—YOUNG.

Sailor, *v. Seaman*.

Sake, Account, Reason, Purpose, End.

These terms, all employed adverbially, modify or connect propositions: hence, one says, for his **Sake**, on his **Account**, for this **Reason**, for this **Purpose**, and to this **End**.

Sake, which comes from the word to seek, is mostly said of persons; what is done for a person's *sake* is the same as because of his seeking or at his desire; one may, however, say in regard to things, for the *sake* of good order, implying what good order requires: *account* is indifferently employed for persons or things; what is done on a person's *account* is done in his behalf, and for his interest; what is done on *account* of indisposition is done in consequence of it, the indisposition being the cause: *reason*, *purpose*, and *end* are applied to things only; we speak of the *reason* as the thing that justifies; we explain why we do a

thing when we say we do it for this or that reason: we speak of the *purpose* and the *end* by way of explaining the nature of the thing: the propriety of measures cannot be known unless we know the *purpose* for which they were done: nor will a prudent person be satisfied to follow any course unless he knows to what *end* it will lead.

Salubrious, v. Healthy.

Salutary, v. Healthy.

To Salute, v. To accost.

Salute, Salutation, Greeting.

Salute and Salutation, from the Latin *salus*, signifies literally wishing health to a person.

Greeting comes from the German *grüssen* to kiss or salute.

Salute respects the thing, and *salutation* the person giving the *salute*: a *salute* may consist either of a word or an action; *salutations* pass from one friend to another: the *salute* may be either direct or indirect; the *salutation* is always direct and personal: guns are fired by way of a *salute*; bows are given in the way of a *salutation*: *greeting* is a familiar kind of *salutation*, which may be given vocally or in writing.

Strabo tells us he saw the statue of Memnon, which, according to the poets, *saluted* the morning sun, every day, at its first rising, with a harmonious sound.—PRIDEAUX.

Josephus makes mention of a Manaken, who had the spirit of prophecy, and one time meeting with Herod among his schoolfellows, *greeted* him with this *salutation*, "Hail, King of the Jews."—PRIDEAUX.

Not only those I nam'd I there shall greet,
But my own gallant, virtuous Cato meet.

DENHAM.

To Sanction, v. To Countenance.

Sanctity, v. Holiness.

Sane, v. Sound.

Sanguinary, Bloody, Blood-Thirsty.

Sanguinary, from *sanguis*, is employed both in the sense of **Bloody** or having *blood*: **Blood-Thirsty**, or the thirsting after *blood*: *sanguinary*, in the first case, relates only to blood shed, as a *sanguinary* engagement, or a *sanguinary* conflict; *bloody* is used in the familiar application, to denote the simple presence of *blood*, as a *bloody* coat, or a *bloody* sword.

In the second case, *sanguinary* is employed to characterize the tempers of persons only; *blood-thirsty* to characterize the tempers of persons or animals: the French revolution has given us many specimens how *sanguinary* men may become who are abandoned to their own furious passions; tigers are by nature the most *blood-thirsty* of all creatures.

They have seen the French rebel against a mild and lawful monarch with more fury than ever any people has been known to rise against the most illegal usurper or the most *sanguinary* tyrant.—BURKE.

And from the wound,
Black *bloody* drops distill'd upon the ground.

DRYDEN.

The Peruvians fought not like the Mexicans, to glut *blood-thirsty* divinities with human sacrifices.—ROBERTSON.

Sap, Undermine.

Sap signifies the juice which springs from the root of a tree; hence to *sap* signifies to come at the root of anything by digging: to **Undermine** signifies to form a mine under the ground, or under whatever is upon the ground: we may *sap*, therefore, without *undermining*; and *undermine* without *sapping*: we may *sap* the foundation of a house without making any mine underneath; and in fortifications we may *undermine* either a mound, a ditch, or a wall, without striking immediately at the foundation: hence, in the moral application, to *sap* is a more direct and decisive mode of destruction; to *undermine* is a gradual, and may be a partial action. Infidelity *saps* the morals of a nation; courtiers *undermine* one another's interests at court.

With morning drams,
A filthy custom which he caught from thee,
Clean from his former practice, now he *saps*
His youthful vigour.—CUMBERLAND.

To be a man of business is, in other words, to be a plague and spy, a treacherous supplanter and *underminer* of the peace of families.—SOUTH.

Sarcasm, v. Ridicule.

To Satiare, v. To satisfy.

Satire, v. Ridicule.

Satire, v. Wit.

Satisfaction, v. Compensation.

Satisfaction, v. Contentment.

To Satisfy, Please, Gratify.

To Satisfy (*v. Contentment*) is rather to produce pleasure indirectly; to **Please** (*v. Agreeable*) is to produce it directly: the former is negative, the latter positive pleasure: as every desire is accompanied with more or less pain, *satisfaction*, which is the removal of desire, is itself to a certain extent pleasure; but what *satisfies* is not always calculated to *please*; nor is that which *pleases* that which will always *satisfy*: plain food *satisfies* a hungry person, but does not *please* him when he is not hungry; social enjoyments *please*, but they are very far from *satisfying* those who do not restrict their indulgences. To **Gratify** is to *please* in a high degree, to produce a vivid pleasure: we may be *pleased* with trifles: but we are commonly *gratified* with such things as act strongly either on the senses or the affections: an epicure is *gratified* with those delicacies which suit his taste; an amateur in music will be *gratified* with hearing a piece of Handel's composition finely performed.

He who has run over the whole circle of earthly *pleasures* will be forced to complain that either they were not *pleasures*, or that *pleasure* was not *satisfaction*.—SOUTH.

Did we consider that the mind of man is the man himself, we should think it the most unnatural sort of self-murder to sacrifice the sentiment of the soul to *gratify* the appetites of the body.—STEELE.

To Satisfy, Satiare, Glut, Cloy.

To Satisfy is to take enough: **Satiare** is a frequentative, formed from *satis* enough, signifying to have more than enough.

Glut, in Latin *glutio*, from *gula* the throat, signifies to take down the throat. *Satisfaction* brings pleasure: it is what nature demands; and nature, therefore, makes a suitable return: *satiety* is attended with disgust; it is what appetite demands; but appetite is the corruption of nature, and produces nothing but evil: *glutting* is an act of intemperance; it is what the inordinate appetite demands; it greatly exceeds the former in degree both of the cause and the consequence: **Cloying** is the consequence of *glutting*. Every healthy person *satisfies* himself with a regular portion of food; children, if unrestrained, seek to *satiare* their appetites, and *cloy* themselves by their excesses; brutes, or men debased into brutes, *glut* themselves with that which is agreeable to their appetites.

The first three terms are employed in a moral application; the last only in a natural or proper sense: we *satisfy* desires in general, or any particular desire; we *satiare* the appetite for pleasure; one *gluts* the eyes or the ears by anything that is horrid or painful.

The only thing that can give the mind any solid *satisfaction* is a certain complacency and repose in the good providence of God.—HERRING.

’Twas not enough
By subtle fraud to snatch a single life,
Puny impiety! whole kingdoms fell
To *save* the lust of power.—PORTEUS.

If the understanding be detained by occupations less pleasing, it returns again to study with greater alacrity than when it is *glutted* with ideal pleasures.—JOHNSON.

Religious pleasure is such a pleasure as can never *cloy* or overwork the mind.—SOUTH.

Saucy, *v. Impertinent.*

Savage, *v. Cruel.*

Savage, *v. Ferocious.*

To Save, *v. To deliver.*

To Save, *v. To keep.*

To Save, Spare, Preserve, Protect.

To Save is to make safe (*v. Safe*).

Spare, in German *sparen*, comes from the Latin *parco*, and the Hebrew *parek* to free.

Preserve, compounded of *præ* and *servo* to keep, signifies to keep off.

Protect, *v. To defend.*

The idea of keeping free from evil is the common idea of all these terms, and the peculiar signification of the term *save*; they differ either in the nature of the evil kept off or the circumstances of the agent: we may be *saved* from every kind of evil; but we are *spared* only from those which it is in the power of another to inflict: we may be *saved* from falling, or *saved* from an illness; a criminal is *spared* from punishment, or we may be *spared* by Divine Providence in the midst of some calamity: we may be *saved* and *spared* from any evils, great or small; we are *preserved* and *protected* only from evils of magnitude: we may be *saved* either from the inclemency of the weather or the fatal vicissitudes of life: we may be *spared* the pain of a disagreeable meeting, or we may be *spared* our lives; we are *preserved* from ruin or *protected* from oppression. *To save* and *spare* apply to evils that

are actual and temporary; *preserve* and *protect* to those which are possible or permanent: we may be *saved* from drowning, or we may *save* a thing instead of throwing it away; or a person may be *spared* from the sentence of the law; but we are *preserved* from the inclemency of the weather, or we *preserve* with care that which is liable to injury, or we are *protected* from the attacks of robbers.

To save may be the effect of accident or design; *to spare* is always the effect of some design or connection; *to preserve* and *protect* are the effect of a special exertion of power; the latter in a still higher degree than the former: we may be *preserved*, by ordinary means, from the evils of human life; but we are *protected* by the government, or by Divine Providence, from the active assaults of those who aim at doing us mischief.

Attilius sacrific'd himself to *save*
That faith which to his barb'rous foes he gave.
DENHAM.

Let Cesar spread his conquests far,
Less pleas'd to triumph than to *spare*.—JOHNSON.

Cortes was extremely solicitous to *preserve* the city of Mexico as much as possible from being destroyed.—ROBERTSON.

How poor a thing is man, whom death itself
Cannot *protect* from injuries.—RANDOLPH.

Saving, *v. Economical.*

To Saunter, *v. To linger.*

Savour, *v. Taste.*

To Say, *v. To speak.*

Saying, *v. Axiom.*

To Scale, *v. To arise.*

Scandal, *v. Discredit.*

Scandalous, *v. Infamous.*

Scanty, *v. Bare.*

Scarce, *v. Rare.*

Scarcely, *v. Hardly.*

Scarcity, Dearth.

Scarcity (*v. Rare*) is a generic term to denote the circumstance of a thing being *scarce*.

Dearth, which is the same as dearness, is a mode of *scarcity* applied in the literal sense to provisions mostly as provisions are mostly dear when they are *scarce*; the word *dearth* therefore denotes *scarcity* in a high degree: whatever men want, and find it difficult to procure, they complain of its *scarcity*: when a country has the misfortune to be visited by a famine, it experiences the frightfullest of all *dearths*.

To Scatter, *v. To spread.*

Scent, *v. Smell.*

Scheme, *v. Design.*

Scholar, Disciple.

Scholar and **Disciple** are both applied to such as learn from others: but the former is said only of those who learn the rudiments of knowledge: the latter of one who acquires any art or science from the instruction of

another: the *scholar* is opposed to the teacher; the *disciple* to the master: children are always *scholars*; adult persons may be *disciples*.

Scholars chiefly employ themselves in the study of words; *disciples*, as the *disciples* of our Saviour, in the study of things: we are the *scholars* of any one under whose care we are placed, or from whom we learn anything, good or bad; we are the *disciples* only of distinguished persons, or such as communicate useful knowledge: children are sometimes too apt *scholars* in learning evil from one another.

The Romans confessed themselves the *scholars* of the Greeks.—JOHNSON.

We are not the *disciples* of Voltaire.—DURKE.

School, Academy.

The Latin term *schola* signifies a loitering place, a place for desultory conversation or instruction, from the Greek σχολή leisure; hence it has been extended to any place where instruction is given, particularly that which is communicated to youth, which being an easy task to one who is familiar with this subject is considered as a relaxation rather than a labour.

Academy derives its name from the Greek ακαδημία the name of a public place in Athens, where the philosopher Plato first gave his lectures, which afterwards became a place of resort for learned men; hence societies of learned men have since been termed *academies*.

The leading idea in the word **School** is that of instruction given and doctrine received; in the word *academy* is that of association among those who have already learned: hence we speak in the literal sense of the *school* where young persons meet to be taught, or in the extended and moral sense of the old and new *school*, the Pythagorean *school*, the philosophical *school*, and the like; but the *academy* of arts or sciences, the French *academy*, being members of any *academy*, and the like.

The world is a great *school* where deceit, in all its forms, is one of the lessons that is first learned.—BLAIR.

As for other *academies*, such as those for painting, sculpture, or architecture, we have not so much as heard the proposal.—SHAFTESBURY.

Science, v. Knowledge.

To Scoff, Gibe, Jeer, Sneer.

Scoff comes from the Greek σκωπτω to deride.

Gibe and **Jeer** are connected with the word gabble and jabber, denoting an unseemly mode of speech.

Sneer is connected with sneeze and nose, the member by which sneering is performed.

Scoffing is a general term for expressing contempt; we may *scoff* either by *gibes*, *jeers*, or *sneers*; or we may *scoff* by opprobrious language and contemptuous looks with *gibing*, *jeering*, or *sneering*: to *gibe*, *jeer*, and *sneer* are personal acts; the *gibe* and *jeer* consist of words addressed to an individual: the former has most of ill-nature and reproach in it; the latter has more of ridicule or satire in it; they

are both, however, applied to the actions of vulgar people, who practise their coarse jokes on each other. *Scoff* and *sneer* are directed either to persons or things, as the object; *gibe* and *jeer* only towards persons: *scoff* is taken only in the proper sense; *sneer* derives its meaning from the literal act of sneering: the *scoffer* speaks lightly of that which deserves serious attention; the *sneerer* speaks either actually with a *sneer* or as it were by implication with a *sneer*: the *scoffers* at religion set at naught all thoughts of decorum, they openly avow the little estimation in which they hold it; the *sneerers* at religion are more sly, but not less malignant; they wish to treat religion with contempt, but not to bring themselves into the contempt they deserve.

The top, with learning at defiance,
Scoffs at the pedant and the science.—GAY.

Shrewd fellows and such arch wags! A tribe
That meet for nothing but to *gibe*.—SWIFT.

That *jeering* demeanour is a quality of great offence to others and danger towards a man's self.—LORD WENTWORTH.

There is one short passage still remaining (of *Alexes* the poet's) which conveys a *sneer* at Pythagoras.—CUMBERLAND.

Where town and country vicars flock in tribes,
Secur'd by numbers from the laymen's *gibes*.—SWIFT.

Midas, expos'd to all their *jeers*,
Had lost his art, and kept his ears.—SWIFT.
And *sneers* as learnedly as they,
Like females o'er their morning tea.—SWIFT.

Scope, v. Tendency.

To Scorn, v. To contemn.

Scornful, v. Contemptuous.

To Scream, v. To cry.

To Screen, v. To cover.

Scribe, v. Writer.

To Scruple, Hesitate, Waver.

Scruple, v. Conscientious.

Hesitate, v. To demur.

Waver, from the word *wave*, signifies to move backward and forward like a *wave*.

To *scruple* simply keeps us from deciding; the terms *hesitation* and *wavering* bespeak a fluctuating or variable state of the mind: we *scruple* simply from motives of doubt as to the propriety of a thing: we *hesitate* and *waver* from various motives, particularly such as affect our interests. Conscience produces *scruples*, fear produces *hesitation*, irresolution produces *wavering*: a person *scruples* to do an action which may hurt his neighbour or offend his Maker; he *hesitates* to do a thing which he fears may not prove advantageous to him; he *wavers* in his mind betwixt going or staying, according as his inclinations impel him to the one or the other: a man who does not *scruple* to say or do as he pleases will be an offensive companion if not a dangerous member of society: he who *hesitates* only when the doing of good is proposed evinces himself a worthless member of society; he who *wavers* between his duty and his inclination will seldom maintain a long or doubtful contest.

The Jacobins desire a change, and they will have it if they can; if they cannot have it by English cabal

they will make no sort of scruple to have it by the
catal of France.—BURKE.

The lords of the congregation did not *hesitate* a
moment whether they should employ their whole
strength in one generous effort to rescue their religion
and liberty from impending destruction.—ROBERTSON.

It is the greatest absurdity to be *swearing* and un-
settled without closing with that side which appears the
most safe and probable.—ADDISON.

Scrupulous, v. Conscientious.

To Scrutinize, v. To pry.

Scrutiny, v. Examination.

Scum, v. Dregs.

Scurrilous, v. Reproachful.

Seal, Stamp.

Seal is a specific; *Stamp*, a general term; there cannot be a *seal* without a *stamp*; but there may be many *stamps* where there is no *seal*. The *seal*, in Latin *sigillum*, signifies a signet or little sign, consisting of any one's coat of arms or any device; the *stamp* is, in general, any impression whatever which has been made by *stamping*, that is, any impression which is not easily to be effaced. In the improper sense, the *seal* is the authority; thus to set one's seal is the same as to authorise, and the *seal* of truth is any outward mark which characterizes it: but in the *stamp* is the impression by which we distinguish the thing; thus a thing is said to bear the *stamp* of truth, of sincerity, of veracity, and the like.

Therefore not long in force this charter stood,

Wanting that *seal*, it must be *seal'd* in blood.

DENHAM.

Wisdom for parts is madness for the whole,

This *stamps* the paradox, and gives us leave

To call the wisest weak.—YOUNG.

Seaman, Waterman, Sailor, Mariner.

All these words denote persons occupied in navigation; the *Seaman*, as the word implies, follows his business on the sea; the *Waterman* is one who gets his livelihood on fresh water; the *Sailor* and the *Mariner* are both specific terms to designate the *seaman*: every *sailor* and *mariner* is a *seaman*; although every *seaman* is not a *sailor* or *mariner*: the former is one who is employed about the laborious part of the vessel; the latter is one who traverses the ocean to and fro, who is attached to the water, and passes his life upon it.

Men of all ranks are denominated *seamen*, whether officers or men, whether in a merchantman or a king's ship: *sailor* is only used for the common men, or, in the sea phrase, for those before the mast, particularly in vessels of war: hence our *sailors* and soldiers are spoken of as the defenders of our country: a *mariner* is an independent kind of *seaman* who manages his own vessel, and goes on an expedition on his own account; fishermen, and those who trade along the coast, are in a particular manner distinguished by the name of *mariners*.

Thus the toss'd *seaman*, after boist'rous storms,
Lands on his country's breast.—LEE.

Many a lawyer who makes but an indifferent figure at
the bar might have made a very elegant *waterman*.—
SOUTH.

Through storms and tempests so the *sailor* drives.

SHIRLEY.

Welcome to me, as to a sinking *mariner*

The lucky plank that bears him to the shore.—LEE.

Search, v. Examination.

To Search, v. To examine.

Season, v. Time.

Seasonable, v. Timely.

To Secede, v. To recede.

Seclusion, v. Privacy.

To Second, Support.

To Second is to give the assistance of a second person; *to Support* is to bear up on one's own shoulders. *To second* does not express so much as *to support*: we second only by our presence, or our word; but we support by our influence, and all the means that are in our power: we second a motion by a simple declaration of our assent to it; we support a motion by the force of persuasion; so likewise we are said always to second a person's views when we give him openly our countenance by declaring our approbation of his measures; and we are said to support him when we give the assistance of our purse, our influence, or any other thing essential for the attainment of an end.

The blasting vollied thunder made all speed,

And seconded thy else not dreaded spear.

MILTON.

Impeachment's NO can best resist,

And AYE support the civil list.—GAY.

Second, Secondary, Inferior.

Second and *Secondary* both come from the Latin *secundus*, changed from *sequendus* and *sequor* to follow, signifying the order of succession: the former simply expresses this order: but the latter includes the accessory idea of comparative demerit: a person stands second in a list, or a letter is second which immediately succeeds the first; but a consideration is secondary, or of secondary importance, which is opposed to that which holds the first rank. *Secondary* and *Inferior* both designate some lower degree of a quality; but *secondary* is only applied to the importance or value of things; *inferior* is applied generally to all qualities: a man of business reckons everything as secondary which does not forward the object he has in view; men of inferior abilities are disqualified by nature for high and important stations, although they may be more fitted for lower stations than those of greater abilities.

Fond, foolish man! With fear of death surpris'd,

Which either should be wish'd for or despis'd;

This, if our souls with bodies death destroy,

That, if our souls a second life enjoy.—DENHAM.

Many instead of endeavouring to form their own opinions, content themselves with the secondary knowledge, which a convenient bench in a coffee-house can supply.—JOHNSON.

Who am alone

From all eternity; for none I know

Second to me, or like.—MILTON.

Hast thou not made me here thy substitute,

And these inferior far beneath me set?

MILTON.

Secondary, *v. Second.*

Secrecy, *v. Concealment.*

Secret, *v. Clandestine.*

Secret, Hidden, Latent, Occult, Mysterious.

Secret (*v. Clandestine*), signifies known to one's self only.

Hidden, *v. To conceal.*

Latent, in Latin *latens*, from *lateo* to lie hid, signifies the same as hidden.

Occult in Latin *occultus*, participle of *occulto*, compounded of *oc* or *ob* and *culto* or *colo* to cover over by tilling or ploughing, that is, to cover over with the earth.

Mysterious, *v. Dark.*

What is *secret* is known to some one; what is *hidden* may be known to no one: it rests in the breast of an individual to keep a thing *secret*; it depends on the course of things if anything remains *hidden*: every man has more or less of that which he wishes to keep *secret*: the talent of many lies *hidden* for want of opportunity to bring it into exercise; as many treasures lie *hidden* in the earth for want of being discovered and brought to light.

A *secret* concerns only the individual or individuals who hold it; but that which is *hidden* may concern all the world: sometimes the success of a transaction depends upon its being kept *secret*; the stores of knowledge which yet remain *hidden* may be much greater than those which have been laid open. The *latent* is the *secret* or concealed, in cases where it ought to be open: a *latent* motive is that which a person intentionally, though not justifiably, keeps to himself; the *latent* cause for any proceeding is that which is not revealed.

Occult and *mysterious* are species of the *hidden*: the former respects that which has a veil naturally thrown over it; the latter respects that mostly which is covered with a supernatural veil: an *occult* science is one that is *hidden* from the view of persons in general which is attainable but by few: *occult* causes or qualities are those which lie too remote to be discovered by the inquirer: the operations of Providence are said to be *mysterious*, as they are altogether past our finding out; many points of doctrine in our religion are equally *mysterious*, as connected with and dependent upon the attributes of the Deity.

Mysterious is sometimes applied to human transactions in the sense of throwing a veil intentionally over anything, in which sense it is nearly allied to the word *secret*, with this distinction, that what is *secret* is often not known to be *secret*; but that which is *mysterious* is so only in the eyes of others. Things are sometimes conducted with such *secrecy* that no one suspects what is passing until it is seen by its effects; an air of *mystery* is sometimes thrown over that which is in reality nothing when seen: hence *secrecy* is always taken in a good sense, since it is so great an essential in the transactions of men; but *mystery* is often employed in a bad sense; either for the affected concealment of that which is insignificant or the purposed con-

cealment of that which is bad: an expedition is said to be *secret*, but not *mysterious*; on the other hand, the disappearance of a person may be *mysterious*, but it is not said to be *secret*.

Ye boys, who pluck the flow'rs and spoil the spring,
Beware the *secret* snake that shoots a sting.
DRYDEN.

The blind laborious mole
In winding mazes works her *hidden* hole.—DRYDEN.

Some men have an *occult* power of stealing on the affections.—JOHNSON.

From his void embrace,
Mysterious heaven! That moment to the ground,
A blackened corse, was struck the beauteous maid.
THOMSON.

Mem'ry confus'd, and interrupted thought,
Death's harbingers lie *latent* in the draught.—PRIOR.

To Secrete, *v. To conceal.*

To Secrete One's Self, *v. To abscond.*

Secular, Temporal, Worldly.

Secular, in Latin *secularis*, from *seculum* an age or division of time, signifies belonging to time or this life.

Temporal, in Latin *temporalis*, from *tempus* time, signifies lasting only for a time.

Worldly signifies after the manner of the world.

Secular is opposed to ecclesiastical, *temporal* and *worldly* are opposed to spiritual or eternal.

The idea of the *world*, or the outward objects and pursuits of the *world*, in distinction from that which is set above the *world*, is implied in common by all the terms; but *secular* is an indifferent term, applicable to the allowed pursuits and concerns of men; *temporal* is used either in an indifferent or a bad sense; and *worldly* mostly in a bad sense, as contrasted with things of more value.

The office of a clergyman is ecclesiastical, but that of a schoolmaster is *secular*, which is frequently vested in the same hands; the upper house of parliament consists of lords spiritual and *temporal*; *worldly* interest has a more powerful sway upon the minds of the great bulk of mankind than their spiritual interests: whoever enters into the holy office of the ministry with merely *secular* views of preferment, chooses a very unfit source of emolument; a too eager pursuit after *temporal* advantages and *temporal* pleasures is apt to draw the mind away from its regard to those which are eternal; *worldly* applause will weigh very light when set in the balance against the reproaches of one's own conscience.

Some saw nothing in what has been done in France but a firm and temperate exertion of freedom, so consistent with morals and piety as to make it deserving not only of the *secular* applause of dashing Machiavellian politicians, but to make it a fit theme for all the devout effusions of sacred eloquence.—BURKE.

The ultimate purpose of government is *temporal*, and that of religion is eternal happiness.—JOHNSON.

Worldly things are of such quality as to lessen upon dividing.—GROVE.

Secure, *v. Certain.*

Secure, *v. Safe.*

Security, *v. Deposit.*

Security, *v. Fence.*

Sedate, *v. Composed.*

Sediment, *v. Dregs.*

Sedition, *v. Insurrection.*

Seditious, *v. Factious.*

Seditious, *Tumultuous.*

To Seduce, *v. To allure.*

Sedulous, Diligent, Assiduous.

Sedulous, from the Latin *sedulus* and *sedeo*, signifies sitting close to a thing.

Diligent, *v. Active, diligent.*

Assiduous, *v. Active, diligent.*

The idea of application is expressed by both these epithets, but *sedulous* is a particular, *diligent* is a general term: one is *sedulous* by habit; one is *diligent* either habitually or occasionally: a *sedulous* scholar pursues his studies with a regular and close application; a scholar may be *diligent* at a certain period, though not invariably so. *Sedulity* seems to mark the very essential property of application, that is, adhering closely to an object; but *diligence* expresses one's attachment to a thing, as evinced by an eager pursuit of it: the former, therefore, bespeaks the steadiness of the character: the latter merely the turn of one's inclination: one is *sedulous* from a conviction of the importance of the thing: one may be *diligent* by fits and starts, according to the humour of the moment.

Assiduous and *sedulous* both express the quality of sitting or sticking close to a thing, but the former may, like *diligent*, be employed on a partial occasion; the latter is always permanent: we may be *assiduous* in our attentions to a person; but we are *sedulous* in the important concerns of life. *Sedulous* peculiarly respects the quiet employments of life; a teacher may be entitled *sedulous*: *diligent* respects the active employments; one is *diligent* at work: *assiduity* holds a middle rank; it may be employed equally for that which requires active exertion, or otherwise: we may be *assiduous* in the pursuits of literature, or we may be *assiduous* in our attendance upon a person, or the performance of any office.

One thing I would offer is that he would constantly and *sedulously* read Tully, which will insensibly work him into a good Latin style.—LOCKE.

I would recommend a *diligent* attendance on the courts of justice (to a student for the bar).—DUNNING.

And thus the patient dam *assiduously* sits,
Not to be tempted from her tender task.
THOMSON.

To See *v. To look.*

To See, Perceive, Observe.

See, in the German *sehen*, Greek *θεαμαι*, Hebrew *sakah* or *soah*, is a general term: it may be either a voluntary or involuntary action; **Perceive**, from the Latin *percipio* or *per* and *capio* to take into the mind, is always a voluntary action; and **Observe** (*v. To notice*) is an intentional action. The eye sees when the mind is absent; the mind and the eye perceive in conjunction: hence we may say that a person sees, but does not perceive: we observe not merely by a simple act of the mind, but by its positive and fixed exertion.

We see a thing without knowing what it is; we perceive a thing, and know what it is, but the impression passes away; we observe a thing, and afterwards retrace the image of it in our mind. We see a star when the eye is directed towards it; we perceive it move if we look at it attentively; we observe its position in different parts of the heavens. The blind cannot see, the absent cannot perceive, the dull cannot observe.

Seeing, as a corporeal action, is the act only of the eye; *perceiving* and *observing* are actions in which all the senses are concerned. We see colours, we perceive the state of the atmosphere, and observe its changes. *Seeing* sometimes extends farther in its application to the mind's operations, in which it has an indefinite sense; but *perceive* and *observe* have both a definite sense: we may see a thing distinctly and clearly or otherwise; we perceive it always with a certain degree of distinctness; and observe it with a positive degree of minuteness, we see the truth of a remark; we perceive the force of an objection; we observe the reluctance of a person. It is farther to be observed, however, that when *see* expresses a mental operation, it expresses what is purely mental: *perceive* and *observe* are applied to such objects as are seen by the senses as well as the mind.

See is either employed as a corporeal or incorporeal action; *perceive* and *observe* are obviously a junction of the corporeal and incorporeal. We see the light with our eyes, or we see the truth of a proposition with our mind's eye; but we perceive the difference of climate, or we perceive the difference in the comfort of our situation: we observe the motions of the heavenly bodies.

There plant eyes, all mist from thence
Purge and disperse, that I may see and tell
Of things invisible to mortal sight.—MILTON.

Sated at length, ere long I might perceive
Strange alteration in me.—MILTON.

Every part of your last letter glowed with that warmth of friendship which, though it was by no means new to me, I could not but observe with peculiar satisfaction.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

To Seem, Appear.

The idea of coming to the view is expressed by both these terms; but the word **Seem** rises upon that of **Appear**. *Seem*, from the Latin *similis* like, signifies literally to appear like, and is therefore a species of appearance, which from the Latin *appareo* or *pareo*, and the Greek *παρεμει* to be present, signifies to be present, or before the eye. Every object may appear; but nothing seems, except that which the mind admits to appear in any given form. To seem requires some reflection and comparison of objects in the mind one with another; it is, therefore, peculiarly applicable to matters that may be different from what they appear, or of an indeterminate kind: that the sun seems to move, is a conclusion which we draw from the exercise of our senses, and comparing this case with others of a similar nature; it is only by a farther research into the operations of nature that we discover this to be no conclusive proof of its motion. To appear, on the contrary, is the express act of the things themselves on us; it is, therefore, peculiarly applicable to such objects as make an impres-

sion on us; to *appear* is the same as to present itself: the stars *appear* in the firmament, but we do not say that they *seem*; the sun *appears* dark through the clouds.

They are equally applicable to moral as well as natural objects with the above-mentioned distinction. *Seem* is said of that which is dubious, contingent, or future; *appear*, of that which is actual, positive, and past. A thing *seems* strange which we are led to conclude as strange from what we see of it; a thing *appears* clear when we have a clear conception of it: a plan *seems* practicable or impracticable; an author *appears* to understand his subject or the contrary. It *seems* as if all efforts to reform the bulk of mankind will be found inefficient: it *appears* from the long catalogue of vices which are still very prevalent, that little progress has hitherto been made in the work of reformation.

Lash'd into foam, the fierce conflicting brine
Seems o'er a thousand raging waves to burn.

THOMSON.

O heav'nly poet! Such thy verse *appears*,
So sweet, so charming to my ravish'd ears.

DRYDEN.

To Seize, *v.* To lay hold of.

Seizure, *v.* Capture.

To Select, *v.* To choose.

Self-Conceit, *v.* Self-will.

Self-sufficiency, *v.* Self-will.

Self-will, Self-Conceit, Self-Sufficiency.

Self-will signifies the *will* in one's-self: Self-Conceit, *conceit* of one's-self: Self-Sufficiency, *sufficiency* in one's-self. As characteristics they come very near to each other, but that depravity of the will which refuses to submit to every control either within or without is born with a person, and is among the earliest indications of character; in some it is less predominant than in others, but if not early checked, it is that defect in our natures which will always prevail; *self-conceit* is a vicious habit of the mind which is superinduced on the original character: it is that which determines in matters of judgement; a *self-willed* person thinks nothing of right or wrong; whatever the impulse of the moment suggests, is the motive to action: the *self-conceited* person is always much concerned about right and wrong, but it is only that which he conceives to be right and wrong; *self-sufficiency* is a species of *self-conceit* applied to action: as a *self-conceited* person thinks of no opinion but his own; a *self-sufficient* person refuses the assistance of everyone in whatever he is called upon to do.

To wilful men
The injuries that they themselves procur'd
Must be their schoolmasters.—SHAKESPEARE.

Nothing so haughty and assuming as ignorance, where
self-conceit bids it set up for infallible.—SOUTHWELL.

There safe in *self-sufficient* impudence
Without experience, honesty, or sense,
Unknowing in her interest, trade, or laws,
He vainly undertakes his country's cause.

JENYNS.

Senior, Elder, Older.

These are all comparatives expressive of the same quality, and differ therefore less in sense than in application.

Senior is employed not only in regard to the extent of age, but also to duration either in office or any given situation: *Elder* is employed only in regard to age: an officer in the army is a *senior* by virtue of having served longer than another; a boy is a *senior* in a school either by virtue of his age, his standing in the school, or his situation in the class; when therefore age alone is to be expressed, *elder* is more suitable than *senior*; the *elder* children or the *elder* branches of a family are clearly understood to include those who have priority of age.

Senior and *elder* are both employed as substantives; *Older* only as an adjective: hence we speak of the *seniors* in a school, or the *elders* in an assembly; but an *older* inhabitant, an *older* family.

Elder has only a partial use; *older* is employed in general cases: in speaking of children in the same family we may say, the *elder* son is heir to the estate; he is *older* than his brother by ten years.

Cratinus was *senior* in age to both his competitors Eupolis and Aristophanes.—CUMBERLAND.

The Spartans to their highest magistracy
The name of *elder* did appropriate.—DENHAM.

Since oft

Man must compute that age he cannot feel,
He scarce believes he's *older* for his years.

YOUNG.

Sensation, *v.* Feeling.

Sensation, *v.* Sentiment.

Sense, *v.* Feeling.

Sense, Judgement.

Sense (*v.* *Feeling*) signifies in general the faculty of feeling corporeally or perceiving mentally; in the latter case it is synonymous with *Judgement*, which is a special operation of the mind. *The *sense* is that primitive portion of the understanding which renders an account of things; and the *judgement* that portion of the reason which selects or rejects from this account. The *sense* is, so to speak, the reporter which collects the details, and exposes the facts; the *judgement* is the judge that passes sentence upon them. According to the strict import of the terms, the *judgement* depends upon the *sense*, and varies with it in degree. He who has no *sense* has no *judgement*; and he who loses *sense* loses *judgement*: since *sense* supplies the knowledge of things, and *judgement* pronounces upon them, it is evident that there must be *sense* before there can be *judgement*.

On the other hand, *sense* may be so distinguished from *judgement* that there may be *sense* without *judgement*, and *judgement* without *sense*: *sense* is the faculty of perceiving in general; it is applied to abstract science as well as general knowledge: *judgement* is the faculty of determining, that is of determining mostly in matters of practice. It is the lot of

* Vide Raubaud; "Sens, Jugement."

many, therefore, to have *sense* in matters of theory, who have no *judgement* in matters of practice : whilst others, on the contrary, who have nothing above common *sense* will have a soundness of *judgement* that is not be surpassed.

Nay, farther, it is possible for a man to have good *sense*, and yet not a solid *judgement* : as they are both natural faculties, men are gifted with them as variously as with every other faculty. By good *sense* a man is enabled to discern, as it were intuitively, that which requires another of less *sense* to ponder over and study ; by a solid *judgement* a man is enabled to avoid those errors in conduct which one of a weak *judgement* is always falling into. There is, however, this distinction between *sense* and *judgement*, that the deficiencies of the former may be supplied by diligence and attention ; but a defect in the latter is to be supplied by no efforts of one's own. A man may improve his *sense* in proportion as he has the means of information ; when the *judgement* has once been matured by age, it remains unimprovable by time or circumstance.

When employed as epithets, the terms *sensible* and *judicious* serve still more clearly to distinguish the two primitives. A writer or a speaker are said to be *sensible* : a friend, or an adviser, to be *judicious*. *Sense* displays itself in the conversation or the communication of one's ideas ; *judgement* in the propriety of one's actions. A *sensible* man may be an entertaining companion, but a *judicious* man in any post of command is an inestimable treasure. *Sensible* remarks are always calculated to please and interest *sensible* people ; *judicious* measures have a sterling value in themselves, that is, appreciated according to the importance of the object. Hence, it is obvious that to be *sensible* is a desirable thing, but to be *judicious* is an indispensable requisite.

The fox, in deeper cunning vers'd,
The beauties of her mind rehears'd,
And talk'd of knowledge, taste, and sense,
To which the fair have vast pretence. —MOORE.

Your observations are so *judicious*. I wish you had not been so sparing of them. —SIR W. JONES.

Sense, v. Signification.

Sensibility, v. Feeling.

Sensible, v. To feel.

Sensible, Sensitive, Sentient.

All these epithets, which are derived from the same source (*v. To feel*), have obviously a great sameness of meaning, though not of application. **Sensible** and **Sensitive** both denote the capacity of being moved to feeling ; **Sentient** implies the very act of feeling. *Sensible* expresses either a habit of the body and mind, or only a particular state referring to some particular object ; a person may be *sensible* of things in general, or *sensible* of cold, *sensible* of injuries, *sensible* of the kindnesses which he has received from an individual. *Sensitive* signifies always an habitual or permanent quality ; it is the characteristic of objects ; a *sensitive* creature implies one whose sense is by distinction quickly to be acted upon : a *sensitive* plant is a peculiar species of

plants, marked for the property of having sense or being *sensible* of the touch.

Sensible and *sensitive* have always a reference to external objects ; but *sentient* expresses simply the possession of feeling, or the power of feeling, and excludes the idea of the cause. Hence, the terms *sensible* and *sensitive* are applied only to persons or corporeal objects ; but *sentient* is likewise applicable to spirits ; *sentient* beings may include angels as well as men.

And with affection wondrous *sensible*,
He wrung Bassanio's hand, and so they parted.
SHAKESPEARE.

Those creatures live more alone whose food, and therefore prey, is upon other *sensitive* creatures. —TEMPLE.

Sensible, Perceptible.

These epithets are here applied not to the persons capable of being impressed, but to the objects capable of impressing : in this case **Sensible** (*v. To feel*) applies to that which acts on the senses merely ; **Perceptible** (*v. To see*), to that which acts on the senses in conjunction with the mind. All corporeal objects are naturally termed *sensible*, inasmuch as they are *sensible* to the eye, the ear, the nose, the touch, and the taste ; particular things are *perceptible*, inasmuch as they are to be perceived or recognized by the mind. Sometimes *sensible* signifies discernible by means of the senses, as when we speak of a *sensible* difference in the atmosphere, and in this case it comes nearer to the meaning of *perceptible* ; but the latter always refers more to the operation of the mind than the former ; the difference between colours is said to be scarcely *perceptible* when they approach very near to each other ; so likewise the growth of a body is said not to be *perceptible* when it cannot be marked from one time to another by the difference of state.

I have suffered a *sensible* loss, if that word is strong enough to express the misfortune which has deprived me of so excellent a man. —MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

What must have been the state into which the Assembly has brought your affairs, that the relief afforded by so vast a supply has been hardly *perceptible*. —BURKE.

Sensualist, Voluntary, Epicure.

The **Sensualist** lives for the indulgence of his senses : the **Voluntary** (from *voluptas* pleasure) is devoted to his pleasures, and as far as these pleasures are the pleasures of sense, the *voluntary* is a *sensualist* : the **Epicure** from *Epicurus* is one who makes the pleasures of sense his god, and in this sense he is a *sensualist* and a *voluntary*. In the application of these terms, however, the *sensualist* is one who is a slave to the grossest appetites ; the *voluntary* is one who studies his pleasures so as to make them the most valuable to himself ; the *epicure* is a species of *voluntary* who practises more than ordinary refinement in the choice of his pleasures.

Let the *sensualist* satisfy himself as he is able ; he will find that there is a certain living spark within which all the drink he can pour in will never be able to quench. —SOUTH.

To fill up the drawing of this personage he conceived a *voluntary*, who in his person should be bloated and blown up to the size of a Silenus ; lazy, luxurious, in

sensuality a satyr, in intemperance a bacchanalian.—CUMBERLAND.

What *epicure* can be always plying his palate?
SOUTH.

Sentence, Proposition, Period, Phrase.

Sentence, in Latin *sententia*, is but a variation of *sentiment* (*v. Opinion*).

Proposition, *v. Proposal*.

Period, in Latin *periodus*, Greek *περίοδος*, from *περί* about and *οδός* way, signifies the circuit or round of words, which renders the sense complete.

Phrase, from the Greek *φράσις* to speak, signifies the words uttered.

The *sentence* consists of any words which convey sentiment: the *proposition* consists of the thing set before the mind, that is, either our own minds or the minds of others; hence the term *sentence* has more special regard to the form of words, and the *proposition* to the matter contained: they are both used technically or otherwise: the former in grammar and rhetoric; the latter in logic. The *sentence* is simple and complex; the *proposition* is universal or particular. *Period* and *phrase*, like *sentence*, are forms of words, but they are solely so, whereas the *sentence* depends on the connection of ideas by which it is formed; we speak of *sentences* either as to their structure or their sentiment: hence the *sentence* is either grammatical or moral: but the *period* regards only the structure; it is either well or ill-turned: the term *phrase* denotes the character of the words; hence it is either vulgar or polite, idiomatic or general: the *sentence* must consist of at least two words to make sense; the *phrase* may be a single word or otherwise.

Some exact in letters pointed *sentences* and forcible *periods*.—JOHNSON.

In 1477, it required all the eloquence and authority of the famous Gerson to prevail upon the council of Constance to condemn this *proposition*, that there are some cases in which assassination is a virtue more meritorious in a knight than a squire.—ROBERTSON.

Disastrous words can best disaster show,
In angry *phrase* the angry passions glow.
ELPHINSTONE.

To Sentence, Doom, Condemn.

To Sentence, or pass *sentence*, is to give a final opinion or decision which is to influence the fate of an object.

Condemn, from *damnum* a loss, is to pass such a *sentence* as shall be to the hurt of an object.

Doom, which is a variation from *damnum*, has the same meaning.

Sentence is the generic, the two others specific terms. *Sentence* and *condemn* are used in the juridical as well as the moral sense; *doom* is employed in the moral sense only. In the juridical sense *sentence* is indefinite; *condemn* is definite: a criminal may be sentenced to a mild or severe punishment; he is always condemned to that which is severe; he is sentenced to imprisonment, or transportation, or death; he is condemned to the galleys, to transportation for life, or to death.

In the moral application they are in like

manner distinguished. To *sentence* is a softer term than to *condemn*, and this is less than to *doom*. *Sentence* applies to inanimate objects; *condemn* and *doom* only to persons or that which is personal. A person is *sentenced* to pass his time in town or in the country; a thing is *sentenced* to be thrown away which is esteemed as worthless; we may be *condemned* to hear the prating of a loquacious body; we may be *doomed* to spend our lives in penury and wretchedness. *Sentence*, particularly when employed as a noun, may even be favourable to the interests of a person; *condemn* is always prejudicial, either to his interest, his comfort, or his reputation; *doom* is always destructive of his happiness, it is that which always runs most counter to the wishes of an individual. It is of importance for an author that a critic should pronounce a favourable *sentence* on his works; immoral writers are justly *condemned* to oblivion or perpetual infamy; they are sometimes *doomed* to hear their own names pronounced with execration.

A *sentence* and *condemnation* is always the act of some person or conscious agent; *doom* is sometimes the fruit of circumstances. Tarkin the Proud was *sentenced* by the Roman people to be banished from Rome; Regulus was *condemned* to the most cruel death by the Carthaginians; many writers have been *doomed* to pass their lives in obscurity and want, whose works have acquired for them lasting honours after their death.

At the end of the tenth book, the poet joins this beautiful circumstance, that they offered up their penitential prayers on the very place where their judge appeared to them when he pronounced their *sentence*.—ADDISON.

Liberty (Thomson's "Liberty") called in vain upon her votaries to read her praises, her praises were *condemned* to harbour spiders and gather dust.—JOHNSON.

Even the abridger, compiler, and translator, though their labours cannot be ranked with those of the diurnal biographer, yet must not be rashly *doomed* to annihilation.—JOHNSON.

Sententious, Sentimental.

Sententious signifies having or abounding in *sentences* or judgements; **Sentimental**, having *sentiment* (*v. Opinion*). Books and authors are termed *sententious*; but travellers, society, intercourse, correspondence, and the like, are characterized as *sentimental*. Moralists, whose works and conversation abound in moral *sentences*, like Dr. Johnson's, are termed *sententious*; novelists and romance writers, like Mrs. Radcliffe, are properly *sentimental*. *Sententious* books always serve for improvement; *sentimental* works, unless they are of a superior order, are in general hurtful.

His (Mr. Ferguson's) love of Montesquieu and Tacitus has led him into a manner of writing too short-winded and *sententious*.—GRAY.

In books, whether moral or amusing, there are no passages more captivating than those delicate strokes of *sentimental* morality which refer our actions to the determination of feeling.—MACKENZIE.

Sentient, *v. Sensible*.

Sentiment, *v. Opinion*.

Sentiment, Sensation, Perception.

Sentiment and **Sensation** are obviously derived from the same source (*v. To feel*).

Perception, from *perceive* (v. *To see*), expresses the act of *perceiving*, or the impressions produced by *perceiving*.

The impressions which objects make upon the person are designated by all these terms; but the *sensation* has its seat in the heart, the *sensation* is confined to the senses; and the *perception* rests in the understanding. *Sentiments* are lively, *sensations* are grateful, *perceptions* are clear.

Gratitude is a *sensation* the most pleasing to the human mind; the *sensation* produced by the action of electricity on the frame is generally unpleasant; a nice *perception* of objects is one of the first requisites for perfection in any art. *The *sentiment* extends to manners, and renders us alive to the happiness or misery of others as well as our own; the *sensation* is purely physical; it makes us alive only to the effects of external objects on our physical organs: *perceptions* carry us into the district of science; they give us an interest in all the surrounding objects as intellectual observers. A man of spirit or courage receives marks of honour, or affronts, with very different *sentiments* from the poltroon; he who bounds his happiness by the present fleeting existence must be careful to remove every painful *sensation*: we judge of objects as complex or simple according to the number of *perceptions* which they produce in us.

I am framing every possible pretence to live hereafter according to my own taste and *sentiments*.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

When we describe our *sensations* of another's sorrows in condolence, the customs of the world scarcely admit of rigid veracity.—JOHNSON.

When first the trembling eye receives the day,
External forms on young *perception* play.
LANGHORNE.

Sentimental, v. *Sententious*.

Sentinel, v. *Guard*.

Sensitive, v. *Sensible*.

To Separate, v. *To abstract*.

Separate, v. *Different*.

To Separate, v. *To divide*.

To Separate, Sever, Disjoin, Detach.

Separate, v. *To abstract*.

Sever is but a variation of *separate*.

Disjoin, signifies to destroy a junction.

Detach, signifies to destroy a contact.

Whatever is united or joined in any way may be *separated*, be the junction natural or artificial; but to *sever* is a mode of *separating* natural bodies, or bodies naturally joined: we may *separate* in part or entirely: we *sever* entirely: we *separate* with or without violence; we *sever* with violence only: we may *separate* papers which have been pasted together, or fruits which have grown together; but the head is *severed* from the body, or a branch from the trunk. To *separate* may be said of things which are only remotely connected; *disjoin* is said of that which is intimately connected so as to be joined: we *separate* as convenience requires; we may *separate*

in a right or a wrong manner; we mostly *disjoin* things which ought to remain joined: we *separate* syllables in order to distinguish them; but they are sometimes *disjoined* in writing by an accidental erasure. To *detach* has an intermediate sense betwixt *separate* and *disjoin*, applying to bodies which are neither so loosely connected as the former, nor so closely as the latter: we *separate* things that directly meet in no point; we *disjoin* those which meet in every point; we *detach* those things which meet in one point only. To *separate* is either a corporeal or mental action; *disjoin* most commonly only a corporeal; and *detach* a mental action: we may *separate* ideas in the mind; we *disjoin* the material parts of bodies; we *detach* persons, that is, the minds of persons, from their party.

They (the French republicans) never have abandoned, and never will abandon, their old steady maxim of *separating* the people from their government.—BURKE.

To mention only that species of shell-fish that grow to the surface of several rocks, and immediately die upon their being *severed* from the place where they grow.—ADDISON.

In times and regions, so *disjoined* from each other that there can scarcely be imagined any communication of sentiments, has prevailed a general and uniform expectation of propitiating God by corporeal austerities.—JOHNSON.

As for the *detached* rhapsodies which Lycurgus in more early times brought with him out of Asia, they must have been exceedingly imperfect.—CUMBERLAND.

Sepulchre, v. *Grave*.

Sepulture, v. *Burial*.

Sequel, *Close*.

Sequel is a species of *Close*; it is that which follows by way of termination; but the *close* is simply that which *closes*, or puts an end to anything. There cannot be a *sequel* without a *close*, but there may be a *close* without a *sequel*. A story may have either a *sequel* or a *close*; when the end is detached from the beginning so as to follow, it is a *sequel*: if the beginning and end are uninterrupted, it is simply a *close*. When a work is published in distinct parts, those which follow at the end may be termed the *sequel*; if it appears all at once, the concluding pages are the *close*.

Serene, v. *Calm*.

Series, *Course*.

Series, which is also *series* in Latin, comes from *sero* or *necto* to bind, and signifies order and connection.

Course, in Latin *cursus*, from the verb *curro*, signifies the direction in which things run one after another.

There is always a *course* where there is a *series*, but not *vice versa*. Things must have some sort of connection with each other in order to form a *series*, but they need simply to follow in order to form a *course*; thus a *series* of events respects those which flow out of each other; a *course* of events, on the contrary, respects those which happen unconnectedly within a certain space: so in like manner, the numbers of a book, which serve to form a whole, are a *series*; and a number of lectures following each other at a given

* Abbé Girard; "Sentiment, sensation, perception."

time are a *course*; hence, likewise the technical phrase infinite *series* in algebra.

Series, *v. Succession*.

Serious, *v. Eager*.

Serious, *v. Grave*.

Servant, Domestic, Menial, Drudge.

In the term *Servant* is included the idea of the service performed: in the term *Domestic*, from *domus* a house, is included the idea of one belonging to the house or family: in the word *Menial*, from *manus* the hand, is included the idea of labour; and the term *Drudge*, that of *drudgery*. We hire a *servant* at a certain rate, and for a particular service; we are attached to our *domestics* according to their assiduity and attention to our wishes: we employ as a *menial* one who is unfit for a higher employment; and a *drudge* in any labour, however hard and disagreeable.

A *servant* dwells remote from all knowledge of his lord's purposes.—SOUTH.

Montezuma was attended by his own *domestics*, and served with his usual state.—ROBERTSON.

Some were his (King Charles') own *menial* servants, and ate bread at his table before they lifted up their heel against him.—SOUTH.

He who will be vastly rich must resolve to be a *drudge* all his days.—SOUTH.

Service, *v. Advantage*.

Service, *v. Avail*.

Service, *v. Benefit*.

Servitude, Slavery, Bondage.

Servitude expresses less than *Slavery*, and this less than *Bondage*.

Servitude, from *servio*, conveys simply the idea of performing a service, without specifying the principle upon which it is performed. Among the Romans *servus* signified a slave, because all who served were literally slaves, the power over the person being almost unlimited. The mild influence of Christianity has corrected men's notions with regard to their rights, as well as their duties, and established *servitude* on the just principle of a mutual compact, without any infraction on that most precious of all human gifts, personal liberty. *Slavery*, which marks a condition incompatible with the existence of this invaluable endowment, is a term odious to the Christian ear: it had its origin in the grossest state of society: the word being derived from the German *slave*, or *Scalavonians*, a fierce and intrepid people, who made a long stand against the Germans, and, being at last defeated, were made *slaves*. *Slavery*, therefore, includes not only *servitude*, but also the odious circumstance of the entire subjection of one individual to another; a condition which deprives him of every privilege belonging to a free agent, and a rational creature; and which forcibly bends the will and affections of the one to the humour of the other, and converts a thinking being into a mere senseless tool in the hands of its owner. *Slavery* unfortunately remains, though barbarism has ceased. Christianity has taught men their true end and destination; but it

has not yet been able to extinguish that inordinate love of dominion which is an innate propensity in the human breast. There are those who take the name of Christians, and yet cling to the practice of making their fellow creatures an article of commerce. Some delude themselves with the idea that they can ameliorate the condition of those over whom they have usurped this unlicensed power; but they forget that he who begins to be a *slave* ceases to be a man; that *slavery* is the extinction of our nobler part; and the abuse even of that part in us which we have in common with the brutes.

Bondage, from *bind*, denotes the state of being bound, that is, *slavery* in its most aggravated form, in which, to the loss of personal liberty, is added cruel treatment; the term is seldom applied in its proper sense to any persons but the Israelites in Egypt. In a figurative sense, we speak of being a *slave* to our passions, and under the *bondage* of sin, in which cases the terms preserve precisely the same distinction.

It is fit and necessary that some persons in the world should be in love with a splendid *servitude*.—SOUTH.

So different are the geniuses which are formed under Turkish *slavery* and Grecian liberty.—ADDISON.

Our cage

We make a choir, as doth the prison'd bird,
And sing our *bondage* freely.—SHAKESPEARE.

The same distinction exists between the epithets *Servile* and *Slavish*, which are employed only in the moral application. He who is *servile* has the mean character of a servant, but he is still a free agent; but he who is *slavish* is bound and fettered in every possible form.

That *servile* path thou nobly dost decline,
Of tracing word by word, and line by line,
Those are the labour'd births of *slavish* brains,
Not the effect of poetry but pain.—DENHAM.

To Set, *v. To put*.

To Set Free, *v. To free*.

To Settle, *v. To compose*.

To Settle, *v. To fix*.

To Settle, *v. To fix, determine*.

To Sever, *v. To separate*.

Several, *v. Different*.

Severe, *v. Austere*.

Severe, *v. Harsh*.

Severe, *v. Strict*.

Sex, *v. Gender*.

Shackle, *v. Chain*.

Shade, Shadow.

Shade and *Shadow*, in German *schatten*, are in all probability connected with the word *shine*, *show* (*v. To show*, &c.).

Both these terms express that darkness which is occasioned by the sun's rays being intercepted by anybody; but *shade* simply expresses the absence of the light, and *shadow* signifies also the figure of the body which thus intercepts the light. Trees naturally produce a *shade* by means of their branches

and leaves; and wherever the image of the tree is reflected on the earth that forms its *shadow*. It is agreeable in the heat of summer to sit in the *shade*; the constancy with which the *shadow* follows the man has been proverbially adopted as a simile for one who clings close to another. The distinction between these terms, in the moral sense, is precisely the same: a person is said to be in the *shade*, if he lives in obscurity or unnoticed; "the law (says St. Paul) is a *shadow* of things to come."

Welcome, ye *shades*! ye bowery thickets, hail!
THOMSON.

At every step,
Solemn and slow, the *shadows* blacker fall,
And all is awful listening gloom around.
THOMSON.

Shadow, v. Shade.

To Shake, Tremble, Shudder, Quiver, Quake.

Shake, Shudder, Quiver, and Quake, all come from the Latin *quatio* or *cutio* to shake, through the medium of the German *schütteln*, *schütten*, the Italian *scuocere*, and the like.

Tremble comes from the Latin *tremo*.

To *shake* is a generic term, the rest are but modes of *shaking*: to *tremble* is to *shake* from an inward cause, or what appears to be so: in this manner a person *trembles* from fear, from cold, or weakness; and a leaf which is imperceptibly agitated by the air is also said to *tremble*: to *shudder* is to *tremble* violently; *quiver* and to *quake* are both to *tremble* quickly; but the former denotes rather a vibratory motion, as the point of a spear when thrown against wood; the latter a quick motion of the whole body, as in the case of bodies that have not sufficient consistency in themselves to remain still.

The rapid radiance instantaneous strikes
Th' illumin'd mountain, through the forest streams,
Shakes on the floods.—THOMSON.

The trembling pilot, from his rudder torn,
Was headlong hurl'd.—DRYDEN.

He said, and hurl'd against the mountain side
His quivering spear.—DRYDEN.

Thereto as cold and dreary as a snake,
That seem'd to tremble evermore and quake.
SPENSER.

To Shake, Agitate, Toss.

Shake, v. To shake.

Agitate, in Latin *agito*, is a frequentative of *ago* to drive, that is, to drive different ways.

Toss is probably contracted from *torsi*, perfect of *torqueo* to whirl.

A motion more or less violent is signified by all these terms, which differ both in the manner and the cause of the motion. *Shake* is indefinite, it may differ in degree as to the violence; to *agitate* and *toss* rise in sense upon the word *shake*: a breeze *shakes* a leaf, a storm *agitates* the sea, and the waves *toss* a vessel to and fro: large and small bodies may be *shaken*; large bodies are *agitated*; a handkerchief may be *shaken*; the earth is *agitated* by an earthquake. What is *shaken* and *agitated* is not

removed from its place; but what is *tossed* is thrown from place to place. A house may frequently be *shaken*, while the foundation remains good; the waters are most *agitated* while they remain within their bounds; but a ball is *tossed* from hand to hand.

To *shake* and *toss* are the acts either of persons or things; to *agitate* is the act of things when taken in the active sense. A person *shakes* the hand of another, or the motion of a carriage *shakes* persons in general, and *agitates* those who are weak in frame; a child *tosses* his food about, or the violent motion of a vessel *tosses* everything about which is in it. To *shake* arises from external or internal causes; we may be *shaken* by others, or *shake* ourselves from cold: to *agitate* and *toss* arise always from some external action, direct or indirect; the body may be *agitated* by violent concussion from without or from the action of perturbed feelings; the body may be *tossed* by various circumstances, and the mind may be *tossed* to and fro by the violent action of the passions. Hence the propriety of using the terms in the moral application. The resolution is *shaken*, as the tree is by the wind; the mind is *agitated* like troubled waters; a person is *tossed* to and fro in the ocean of life, as the vessel is *tossed* by the waves.

An unwholesome blast of air, a cold, or a surfeit, may *shake* in pieces a man's hardy fabric.—SOUTH.

We all must have observed that a speaker *agitated* with passion, or an actor, who is indeed strictly an imitator, are perpetually changing the tone and pitch of their voice, as the sense of their words varies.—SIR WM. JONES.

Toss'd all the day in rapid circles round,
Breathless I fell.—POPE.

Shallow, v. Superficial.

Shame, v. Dishonour.

Shameless, v. Immodest.

To Shape, v. To form.

To Share, v. To divide.

Share, v. Part.

To Share, v. To partake.

Sharp, Acute, Keen.

Sharp, in German, &c., *scharp*, comes from *scheren* to cut.

Acute, v. Acute.

Keen, v. Acute.

The general property expressed by these epithets is that of *sharpness* or an ability to cut. The term *sharp* is generic and indefinite; the two others are modes of *sharpness* differing in the circumstance or the degree: the *acute* is not only more than *sharp* in the common sense, but signifies also *sharp-pointed*: a knife may be *sharp*; but a needle is properly *acute*. Things are *sharp* that have either a long or a pointed edge; but the *keen* is applicable only to the long edge; and that in the highest degree of *sharpness*: a common knife may be *sharp*; but a razor or a lancet are properly said to be *keen*. These terms preserve the same distinction in their figurative use. Every pain is *sharp* which may resemble that which is produced by cutting; it is *acute*

when it resembles that produced by piercing deep: words are said to be *sharp* which have any power in them to wound; they are *keen* when they cut deep and wide.

Be sure you avoid as much as you can to enquire after those that have been *sharp* in their judgements towards me.—EARL OF STRAFFORD.

Wisdom's eye
Acute for what? To spy men's miseries.—YOUNG.

To this great end *keen* instinct stings him on.
YOUNG.

To Shed, *v.* To pour.

Shelter, *v.* Asylum.

To Shelter, *v.* To cover.

Shelter, *v.* Harbour.

To Shine, Glitter, Glare, Sparkle,
Radiate.

Shine, in Saxon *schinean*, German *scheinen*, is in all probability connected with the words *show*, *see*, &c.

Glitter and Glare are variations from the German *gleissen*, *glänzen*, &c., which have a similar meaning.

To Sparkle signifies to produce sparks, and *spark* is in Saxon *spearce*, low German and Dutch *spark*.

To Radiate is to produce rays, from the Latin *radius* a ray.

The emission of light is the common idea conveyed by these terms. To *shine* expresses simply this general idea; *glitter* and the other verbs include some collateral ideas in their signification.

To *shine* is a steady emission of light; to *glitter* is an unsteady emission of light, occasioned by the reflection on transparent or bright bodies: the sun and moon *shine* whenever they make their appearance; but a set of diamonds *glitter* by the irregular reflection of the light on them; or the brazen spire of a steeple *glitters* when the sun in the morning *shines* upon it.

Shine specifies no degree of light, it may be barely sufficient to render itself visible, or it may be a very strong degree of light: *glare* on the contrary denotes the highest possible degree of light: the sun frequently *glares* when it *shines* only at intervals.

To *shine* is to emit light in a full stream; but to *sparkle* is to emit it in small portions; and to *radiate* is to emit it in long lines. The fire *sparkles* in the burning of wood; or the light of the sun *sparkles* when it strikes on knobs or small points; the sun *radiates* when it seems to emit its light in rays.

This glorious morning star was not the transitory light of a comet which *shines* and *glares* for a while, and then presently vanishes into nothing.—SOUTH.

Yet something *shines* more glorious in his word,
His mercy this.—WALLER.

The happiness of success *glittering* before him withdraws his attention from the atrociousness of the guilt.—JOHNSON.

Against the captiol I met a lion,
Who *glar'd* upon me, and went surly by
Without annoying me.—SHAKESPEARE.

His eyes so *sparkled* with a lively flame.—DRYDEN.

Now had the sun withdrawn his *radiant* light.
DRYDEN.

Shock, Concussion.

Shock denotes a violent *shake* or agitation; Concussion, a shaking together. The shock is often instantaneous, but does not necessarily extend beyond the act of the moment: the concussion is permanent in its consequences, it tends to derange the system. Hence the different application of the terms: the shock may affect either the body or the mind; the concussion affects properly only the body, or corporeal objects: a violent and sudden blow produces a shock at the moment it is given; but it does not always produce a concussion: the violence of a fall will, however, sometimes produce a concussion in the brain, which in future affects the intellect. Sudden news of an exceedingly painful nature will often produce a shock on the mind; but time mostly serves to wear away the effect which has been produced.

Shocking, *v.* Formidable.

To Shoot, Dart.

To Shoot and Dart, in the proper sense, are clearly distinguished from each other, as expressing different modes of sending bodies to a distance from a given point. From the circumstances of the actions arise their different application to other objects in the improper sense; as that which proceeds by shooting goes forth from a body unexpectedly, and with great rapidity; so, in the figurative sense, a plant shoots up that comes so unexpectedly as not to be seen; a star is said to shoot in the sky which seems to move in a shooting manner from one place to another: dart, on the other hand, or that which is darted, moves through the air visibly, and with less rapidity: hence the quick movements of persons or animals are described by the word *dart*; a soldier darts forward to meet his antagonist, a hare darts past anyone in order to make her escape.

Short, Brief, Concise, Succinct, Summary.

Short, in French *court*, German *kurz*, La in *curtus*, Greek *kurios*.

Brief, in Latin *brevis*, in Greek *βραχυς*.

Concise, in Latin *concisus*, signifies cut into a small body.

Succinct, in Latin *succinctus*, participle of *succingo*, to tuck up, signifies brought within a small compass.

Summary, *v.* Abridgement.

Short is the generic, the rest are specific terms: everything which admits of dimensions may be short, as opposed to the long, that is, either naturally or artificially; the rest are species of artificial shortness, or that which is the work of art: hence it is that material, as well as spiritual, objects may be termed short; but the brief, concise, succinct, and summary, are intellectual or spiritual only. We may term a stick, a letter, or a discourse short; but we speak of brevity only in regard to the mode of speech; conciseness and succinct-

ness as to the matter of speech; *summary* as to the mode either of speaking or action: the *brief* is opposed to the *prolix*; the *concise* and *succinct* to the *diffuse*; the *summary* to the *circumstantial* or *ceremonious*. It is a matter of comparatively little importance whether a man's life be long or *short*; but it deeply concerns him that every moment be well spent. *Brevity* of expression ought to be consulted by speakers, even more than by writers; *conciseness* is of peculiar advantage in the formation of rules for young persons; and *succinctness* is a requisite in every writer who has extensive materials to digest; a *summary* mode of proceeding may have the advantage of saving time, but it has the disadvantage of incorrectness, and often of injustice.

The widest excursions of the mind are made by *short* flights frequently repeated.—JOHNSON.

Premeditation of thought, and *brevity* of expression, are the great ingredients of that reverence that is required to a pious and acceptable prayer.—SOUTH.

Aristotle has a dry *conciseness* that makes one imagine one is perusing a table of contents.—GRAY.

Let all your precepts be *succinct* and clear.
That ready wits may comprehend them soon.
ROSCOMMON.

Not spend their time to show their reading,
She'd have a *summary* proceeding.—SWIFT.

Show, *v.* Magnificence.

To Show, Point Out, Mark, Indicate.

Show, in German *schauen*, &c., Greek *θεαομαι*, comes from the Hebrew *shuah* to look upon.

To Point Out is to fix a *point* upon a thing.

Mark, *v.* Mark, impression.

Indicate, *v.* Mark, sign.

Show is here the general term, and the others specific; the common idea included in the signification of them all is that of making a thing visible to another. To *show* is an indefinite term; one *shows* by simply setting a thing before the eyes of another: to *point out* is specific; it is to *show* some particular *point* by a direct and immediate application to it: we *show* a person a book, when we put it into his hands; but we *point out* the beauties of its contents by making a *point* upon them, or accompanying the action with some particular movement, which shall direct the attention of the observer in a specific manner. Many things, therefore, may be *shown* which cannot be *pointed out*: a person *shows* himself, but he does not *point* himself out: towns, houses, gardens, and the like are *shown*; but single things of any description are *pointed out*.

To *show* and *point out* are personal acts, which are addressed from one individual to another; but to *mark* is an indirect means of making a thing visible or observable: a person may *mark* something in the absence of others, by which he intends to distinguish it from all others: thus a tradesman *marks* the prices and names of the articles which he sets forth in his shop. We *show* by holding in one's hand; we *point out* with the finger; we *mark* with a pen or pencil. To *show* and *mark* are the acts either of a conscious or an unconscious agent; to *point out* is the act of a conscious agent

only; to *indicate*, that of an unconscious agent only: persons or things *show*, persons only *point out*, and things only *indicate*.

As applied to things, *show* is a more positive term than *mark* or *indicate*: that which *shows* serves as a proof; that which *marks* serves as a rule or guide for distinguishing. Nothing *shows* us the fallacy of forming schemes for the future more than the daily evidences which we have of the uncertainty of our existence; nothing *marks* the character of a man more strongly than the manner in which he bestows or receives favours. To *mark* is commonly applied to that which is habitual and permanent; to *indicate* to that which is temporary or partial. A single act or expression sometimes *marks* the ruling temper of the mind; a look may *indicate* what is passing in the mind at the time. A man's abstaining to give relief to great distress, when it is in his power, *marks* an unfeeling character; when a person gives another a cold reception, it *indicates* at least that there is no cordiality between them.

Then let us fall, but fall amidst our foes;
Despair of life the means of living shows.
DRYDEN

His faculties unfolded, *pointed out*
Where lavish nature the directing hand
Of art demanded.—THOMSON.

Amidst this wreck of human nature, traces still remain
which *indicate* its author.—BLAIR.

To Show, Exhibit, Display.

Show, *v.* To show.

Exhibit, *v.* To give.

Display, in French *deployer*, in all probability is changed from the Latin *plico*, signifying to unfold or set forth to view.

To *show* is here, as before, the generic term; to *exhibit* and *display* are specific: they may all designate the acts either of persons or things: the first, however, does this either in the proper or the improper sense: the two latter rather in the improper sense. To *show* is an indefinite action applied to every object: we may *show* that which belongs to others, as well as ourselves; we commonly *exhibit* that which belongs to ourselves; we *show* corporeal or mental objects; we *exhibit* that which is mental, or the work of the mind: one *shows* what is worth seeing in a house or grounds; one *exhibits* his skill on a stage. To *show* is an indifferent action: we may *show* accidentally or designedly, to please others, or to please ourselves; we *exhibit* and *display* with an express intention, and that mostly to please ourselves; we may *show* in a private or a public manner before one or many; we commonly *exhibit* and *display* in a public manner, or at least in such a manner as will enable us best to be seen. *Exhibit* and *display* have this farther distinction, that the former is mostly taken in a good or an indifferent sense, the latter in a bad sense: we may *exhibit* our powers from a laudable ambition to be esteemed; but we seldom make a *display* of any quality that is in itself praiseworthy, or from any motive but vanity: what we *exhibit* is, therefore, intrinsically good; what we *display* may often be only an imaginary or fictitious excellence. A musician *exhibits* his skill on any particular instrument; a fop *displays* his gold seals: or

an ostentatious man *displays* his plate, or his fine furniture.

When said of things, they differ principally in the manner or degree of clearness with which the thing appears to present itself to view : to *show* is, as before, altogether indefinite, and implies simply to bring to view ; *exhibit* implies to bring inherent properties to light, that is, apparently by a process : to *display* is to set forth so as to strike the eye : the windows on a frosty morning will *show* the state of the weather ; experiments with the air-pump *exhibit* the many wonderful and interesting properties of air ; the beauties of the creation are peculiarly *displayed* in the spring season.

The glow-worm *shows* the matin to be near,
And 'gins to pale his ineffectual fire.

SHAKESPEARE.

The world has ever been a great theatre, *exhibiting* the same repeated scene of the follies of men.—BLAIR.

Which interwoven Britons seem to raise,
And show the triumph that their shame *displays*.

DRYDEN.

Show, Exhibition, Representation, Sight, Spectacle.

Show signifies the thing shown (*v. To show*) ; **Exhibition** signifies the thing exhibited (*v. To show*) ; **Representation**, the thing represented ; **Sight**, the thing to be seen ; and **Spectacle**, from the Latin *specto*, stands for the thing to be beheld.

Show is here, as in the former article, the most general term. Everything set forth to view is *shown* ; and if set forth for the amusement of others, it is a *show*. This is the common idea included in the terms *exhibition* and *representation* : but *show* is a term of vulgar meaning and application ; the others have a higher use and signification. The *show* consists of that which merely pleases the eye ; it is not a matter either of taste or art, but merely of curiosity : an *exhibition*, on the contrary, presents some effort of talent or some work of genius ; and a *representation* sets forth the image or imitation of something by the power of art : hence we speak of a *show* of wild beasts ; an *exhibition* of paintings ; and a theatrical *representation*. The conjuror makes a *show* of his tricks at a fair to the wonder of the gazing multitude ; the artist makes an *exhibition* of his works ; *representations* of men and manners are given on the stage : *shows* are necessary to keep the populace in good humour ; *exhibitions* are necessary for the encouragement of genius ; *representations* are proper for the amusement of the cultivated, and the refinement of society. *Shows*, *exhibitions*, and *representations* are presented by some one to the view of others ; *sights* and *spectacles* present themselves to view. *Sight*, like *show*, is a vulgar term ; and *spectacle* the nobler term. Whatever is to be seen to excite notice is a *sight*, in which general sense it would comprehend every *show*, but in its particular sense it includes only that which casually offers itself to view : a *spectacle*, on the contrary, is that species of *sight* which has something in it to interest either the heart or the head of the observer : processions, reviews, sports, and the like are *sights*, but battles,

bull-fights, or public games of any description are *spectacles*, which interest, but shock the feelings.

Charm'd with the wonders of the *show*,
On every side, above, below,
She now of this or that inquires,
What least was understood admires.—GAY.

Copley's picture of Lord Chatham's death is an *exhibition* of itself.—BEATTIE.

There are many virtues which in their own nature are incapable of any outward *representation*.—ADDISON.

Their various arms afford a pleasing *sight*.

DRYDEN.

The weary Britons, whose warlike youth
Was by Maximilian lately led away,
Were to those pagans made an open prey,
And daily *spectacle* of sad decay.—SPENSER.

Show, Outside, Appearance, Semblance.

Where there is **Show** (*v. To show*) there must be **Outside** and **Appearance** ; but there may be the last without the former. The term *show* always denotes an action, and refers to some person as agent ; but the *outside* may be merely the passive quality of something. We speak, therefore, of a thing as mere *show* ; to signify that what is shown is all that exists : and in this sense it may be termed mere *outside*, as consisting only of what is on the *outside*. In describing a house, however, we speak of its *outside*, and not of its *show* ; as also of the *outside* of a book, and not of the *show*. *Appearance* denotes an action as well as *show* ; but the former is the act of an unconscious agent, the latter of one that is conscious and voluntary : the *appearance* presents itself to the view ; the *show* is purposely presented to view. A person makes a *show* so as to be seen by others ; his *appearance* is that which shows itself in him. To look only to *show*, or to be concerned for *show* only, signifies to be concerned for that only which will attract notice ; to look only to the *outside* signifies to be concerned only for that which may be seen in a thing, to the disregard of that which is not seen : to look only to *appearances* signifies the same as the former, except that *outside* is said in the proper sense of that which literally strikes the eye ; but *appearances* extend to a man's conduct, and whatever may affect his reputation.

Semblance or **Seeming** (*v. To seem*) always conveys the idea of an unreal *appearance*, or at least is contrasted with that which is real ; he who only wears the *semblance* of friendship would be ill deserving the confidence of a friend.

You'll find the friendship of the world is *show*,
Mere outward *show*.—SAVAGE.

The greater part of men behold nothing more than the rotation of human affairs. This is only the *outside* of things.—BLAIR.

Every accusation against persons of rank was heard with pleasure (by James of Scotland). Every *appearance* of guilt was examined with rigour.—ROBERTSON.

But man, the wildest beast of prey,
Wears friendship's *semblance* to betray.—MOORE.

Show, Parade, Ostentation.

These terms are synonymous when they imply abstract actions : **Show** is here, as in the preceding article, taken in the vulgar

sense; **Ostentation** and **Parade** include the idea of something particular: a man makes a *show* of his equipage, furniture, and the like, by which he strikes the eye of the vulgar, and seeks to impress them with an idea of his wealth and superior rank; this is often the paltry refuge of weak minds to conceal their nothingness: a man makes a *parade* with his wealth, his knowledge, his charities, and the like, by which he endeavours to give weight and dignity to himself, proportioned to the solemnity of his proceedings: *show* is, therefore, but a simple setting forth to view; but *parade* requires art, it is forced effort to attract notice by the number and extent of the ceremonies. The terms *show* and *parade* are confined to the act of *showing*; or the means which are employed to *show*, but *ostentation* necessarily includes the purpose for which the display is made: he who does a thing so as to be seen and applauded by others, does it from *ostentation*, particularly in application to acts of charity, or of public subscription, in which a man strives to impress others with the extent of his wealth by the liberality of his gift.

Great in themselves
They smile superior of eternal show.—SOMERVILLE.

It was not in the mere *parade* of royalty that the Mexican potentates exhibited their power.—ROBERTSON.

We are dazzled with the splendour of titles, the *ostentation* of learning, and the noise of victories.—SPECTATOR.

Showy, Gaudy, Gay.

Showy, having or being full of *show* (*v. Show, outside*), is mostly an epithet of dispraise; that which is *showy* has seldom anything to deserve notice beyond that which catches the eye; **Gaudy**, from the Latin *gaudeo* to rejoice, signifies literally full of joy; and is applied figuratively to the exterior of objects, but with the annexed bad idea of being striking to an excess: **Gay**, on the contrary, which is only a contraction of *gaudy*, is used in the same sense as an epithet of praise. Some things may be *showy*, and in their nature properly so; thus the tail of a peacock is *showy*: artificial objects may likewise be *showy*, but they will not be preferred by persons of taste: that which is *gaudy* is always artificial, and is always chosen by the vain, the vulgar, and the ignorant; a maid-servant will bedizen herself with *gaudy*-coloured ribbons. That which is *gay* is itself nature itself or nature imitated in the best manner: *spring* is a *gay* season, and flowers are its *gayest* accompaniments.

The *gaudy*, babbling, and remorseful day
Is crept into the bosom of the sea. SHAKESPEARE.

Jocund day
Upon the mountain tops sits *gaudy* dressed. SHAKESPEARE.

Shrewd, *v. Acute*.

To Shriek, *v. To cry*.

To Shrink, *v. To spring*.

To Shudder, *v. To shake*.

To Shun, *v. To avoid*.

To Shut, *v. To close*.

Sick, Sickly, Diseased, Morbid.

Sick denotes a partial state; **Sickly** a permanent state of the body, a proneness to be *sick*: he who is *sick* may be made well; but he who is *sickly* is seldom really well: all persons are liable to be *sick*, though few have the misfortune to be *sickly*: a person may be *sick* from the effect of cold, violent exercise, and the like; but he is *sickly* only from constitution.

Sickly expresses a permanent state of indisposition; but **Diseased** expresses a violent state of derangement without specifying its duration; it may be for a time only, or for a permanency: the person, or his constitution, is *sickly*: the person, or his frame, or particular parts, as his lungs, his inside, his brain, and the like, may be *diseased*. *Sick*, *sickly*, and *diseased* may all be used in a moral application; **Morbid** is used in no other. *Sick* denotes a partial state, as before, namely, a state of disgust, and is always associated with the object of the *sickness*; we are *sick* of turbulent enjoyments, and seek for tranquillity: *sickly* and *morbid* are applied to the habitual state of the feelings or character; a *sickly* sentimentality, a *morbid* sensibility: *diseased* is applied in general to individuals or communities, to persons or to things; a person's mind is in a *diseased* state when it is under the influence of corrupt passions or principles; society is in a *diseased* state when it is overgrown with wealth and luxury.

For aught I see they are as *sick* that surfeit with too much as they that starve with nothing.—SHAKESPEARE.

Both Homer and Virgil were of a very delicate and *sickly* constitution.—WALSH.

For a mind *diseased* with vain longings after unattainable advantages, no medicine can be prescribed.—JOHNSON.

Whilst the distempers of a relaxed fibre prognosticate all the *morbid* force of convulsion in the body of the state, the steadiness of the physician is overpowered by the very aspect of the *disease*.—BURKE.

Sickly, *v. Sick*.

Sickness, Illness, Indisposition.

Sickness denotes the state of being *sick* (*v. Sick*): **Illness** that of being *ill* (*v. Evil*): **Indisposition** that of being not well disposed. *Sickness* denotes the state generally or particularly; *illness* denotes it particularly: we speak of *sickness* as opposed to good health; in *sickness* or in health; but of the *illness* of a particular person: when *sickness* is said of the individual, it designates a protracted state; a person may be said to have much *sickness* in his family. *Illness* denotes only a particular or partial *sickness*: a person is said to have had an *illness* at this or that time, in this or that place, for this or that period. *Indisposition* is a slight *illness*, such an one as is capable of deranging him either in his enjoyments or in his business; colds are the ordinary causes of *indisposition*.

Sickness is a sort of earthly old age; it teaches us a diffidence in our earthly state.—POPE.

This is the first letter that I have ventured upon, which will be written, I fear, vacillansibus literis; as Tully says, Tully's Letters were after his recovery from an *illness*.—ATTERBURY.

It is not, as you conceive, an *indisposition* of body, but the mind's *disease*.—FORD.

Sight, *v. Show.*

Sign, *v. Mark.*

Sign, Signal.

Sign and Signal are both derived from the same source (*v. Mark, sign*), and the latter is but a species of the former.*

The *sign* enables us to recognize an object; it is therefore sometimes natural: *signal* serves to give warning; it is always arbitrary.

The movements which are visible in the countenance are commonly the *signs* of what passes in the heart; the beat of the drum is the *signal* for soldiers to repair to their post.

We converse with those who are present by *signs*; we make ourselves understood by those who are at a distance by means of *signals*.

The nod that ratifies the will divine,
The faithful fix'd irrevocable *sign*.
This seals thy suit.—POPE.

Then first the trembling earth the *signal* gave,
And flashing fires enlighten all the cave.—DRYDEN.

Signal, *v. Sign.*

Signal, Memorable.

Signal signifies serving as a sign.

Memorable signifies worthy to be remembered.

They both express the idea of extraordinary, or being distinguished from everything; whatever is *signal* deserves to be stamped on the mind, and to serve as a sign of some property or characteristic; whatever is *memorable* impresses upon the memory, and refuses to be forgotten: the former applies to the moral character; the latter to events and times: the Scriptures furnish us with many *signal* instances of God's vengeance against impenitent sinners, as also of his favour towards those who obey his will; the Reformation is a *memorable* event in the annals of ecclesiastical history.

We find, in the Acts of the Apostles, not only no opposition to Christianity from the Pharisees, but several *signal* occasions in which they assisted its first teachers.—WOTTON.

That such deliverances are actually afforded, those three *memorable* examples of Abimelech, Esau, and Balaam sufficiently demonstrate.—SOUTH.

To Signalize, Distinguish.

To Signalize, or make one's-self a sign of anything, is a much stronger term than simply to **Distinguish**; it is in the power of many to do the latter, but few only have the power of effecting the former: the English have always *signalized* themselves for their unconquerable valour in battle; there is no nation that has not *distinguished* itself at some period or another in war.

The knight of La Mancha gravely recounts to his companion the adventures by which he is to *signalize* himself.—JOHNSON.

The valued file
Distinguishes the swift, the slow, the subtle.
SHAKESPEARE.

Significant, Expressive.

The **Significant** is that which serves as a sign; the **Expressive** is that which speaks out or declares: the latter is therefore a stronger term than the former: a look is *significant* when it is made to *express* an idea that passes in the mind; but it is *expressive* when it is made to *express* a feeling of the heart: looks are but occasionally *significant*, but the countenance may be habitually *expressive*. *Significant* is applied in an indifferent sense, according to the nature of the thing signified; but *expressive* is always applied to that which is good: a *significant* look may convey a very bad idea; but an *expressive* countenance always *expresses* good feeling.

The distinction between these words is the same when applied to things as to persons: a word is *significant* of whatever it is made to signify; but a word is *expressive* according to the force with which it conveys an idea. The term *significant*, in this case, simply explains the nature; but the epithet *expressive* characterizes it as something good: technical terms are *significant* only of the precise ideas which belong to the art; most languages have some terms which are peculiarly *expressive*, and consequently adapted for poetry.

I could not help giving my friend the merchant a *significant* look upon this occasion.—CUMBERLAND

The English, madam, particularly what we call the plain English, is a very copious and *expressive* language.—RICHARDSON.

Signification, Meaning, Import, Sense.

The **Signification** (*v. To express*) is that of which the word is made the sign, the **Meaning** is that which the person attaches to it; the **Import** is that which is *imported* or carried into the understanding; the **Sense** is that which is comprehended by the sense or the understanding.

The *signification* of a word includes either the whole or the part of what is understood by it; the *meaning* is correct or incorrect according to the information of him who explains it: the *import* includes its whole force and value; the *sense* is applicable mostly to a part. The *signification* of a word is fixed by the standard of custom; it is not therefore to be changed by any individual: the *import* of a term is estimated by the various acceptations in which it is employed; a *sense* is sometimes arbitrarily attached to a word which is widely different from that in which it is commonly acknowledged.

It is necessary to get the true *signification* of every word, or the particular *meaning* attached to it, to weigh the *import* of every term, and to comprehend the exact *sense* in which it is taken. Every word expressing either a simple or a complex idea is said to have a *signification*, though not an *import*. Technical and moral terms have an *import* and different *senses*. A child learns the *significations* of simple terms as he hears them used; a writer must be acquainted with the full *import* of every term which he has occasion to make use of. The different *senses* which words admit

* Vide Girard: "Signe, signal."

of is a great source of ambiguity and confusion with illiterate people.

Signification and *import* are said mostly of single words only, *sense* is said of words either in connection with each other or as belonging to some class: thus we speak of the *signification* of the word *house*, of the *import* of the term *love*; but the *sense* of the sentence, the *sense* of the author; the employment of words is a technical, moral, or physical *sense*.

A *life* consists in this, that it is a false *signification* knowingly and voluntarily used.—SOUTH.

To draw near to God is an expression of awful and mysterious *import*.—BLAIR.

There are two *senses* in which we may be said to draw near, in such a degree as mortality admits, to God.—BLAIR.

When beyond her expectation I hit upon her *meaning*, I can perceive a sudden cloud of disappointment spread over her face.—JOHNSON.

To Signify, *v.* To denote.

To Signify, *v.* To express.

To Signify, *Imply*.

Signify, *v.* To express.

Imply, from the Latin *implico* to fold in, signifies to fold or involve an idea in any object.

These terms may be employed either as respects actions or words. In the first case *signify* is the act of the person making known by means of a *sign*, as we *signify* our approbation by a look; *imply* marks the value or force of the action; our assent is *implied* in our silence. When applied to words or marks, *signify* denotes the positive and established act of the thing; *imply* is its relative act; a word *signifies* whatever it is made literally to stand for; it *implies* that which it stands for figuratively or morally. The term *house* *signifies* that which is constructed for a dwelling; the term *residence* *implies* something superior to a house. A cross thus, +, *signifies* addition in arithmetic or algebra; a long stroke, thus, —, with a break in the text of a work, *implies* that the whole sentence is not completed. It frequently happens that words which *signify* nothing particular in themselves may be made to *imply* a great deal by the tone, the manner, and the connection.

Words *signify* not immediately and primarily things themselves, but the conceptions of the mind concerning things.—SOUTH.

Pleasure *implies* a proportion and agreement to the respective states and conditions of men.—SOUTH.

To Signify, Avail.

Signify (*v.* To *signify*) is here employed with regard to events of life, and their relative importance. *Avail* (*v.* To *avail*) is never used otherwise. That which a thing *signifies* is what it contains; if it *signifies* nothing, it contains nothing, and is worth nothing; if it *signifies* much, it contains much, or is worth much. That which *avails* produces; if it *avails* nothing it produces nothing, is of no use; if it *avails* much, it produces or is worth much.

We consider the end as to its *signification*, and the means as to their *avail*. Although it is of little or no *signification* to a man what

becomes of his remains, yet no one can be reconciled to the idea of leaving them to be exposed to contempt; words are but too often of little *avail* to curb the unruly wills of children.

As for wonders, what *signifieth* telling us of them?—CUMBERLAND.

What *avail* a parcel of statutes against gaming, when they all make them conspire together for the inraction of them!—CUMBERLAND.

Silence, Taciturnity.

• The Latins have the two verbs *sileo* and *taceo*: the former of which is interpreted by some to signify to cease to speak; and the latter not to begin to speak: others maintain the direct contrary. According to the present use of the words, *Silence* expresses less than *Taciturnity*: the *silent* man does not speak; the *taciturn* man will not speak at all. The Latins designated the most profound silence by the epithet of *taciturna silentia*.

Silence is either occasional or habitual; it may arise from circumstances or character: *taciturnity* is mostly habitual, and springs from disposition. A loquacious man may be *silent* if he has no one to speak to him, and a prudent man will always be *silent* where he finds that speaking would be dangerous: a *taciturn* man, on the other hand, may occasionally make an effort to speak, but he never speaks without an effort. When *silence* is habitual, it does not spring from an unamiable character; but *taciturnity* has always its source in a vicious temper of the mind. A *silent* man may frequently contract a habit of *silence* from thoughtfulness, modesty, or the fear of offending: a man is *taciturn* only from the sullenness and gloominess of his temper. Habits of retirement render men *silent*; savages seldom break their *silence*: company will not correct *taciturnity*, but rather increase it. The observer is necessarily *silent*: if he speaks, it is only in order to observe: the melancholy man is naturally *taciturn*; if he speaks it is with pain to himself. Seneca says, Talk little with others and much with yourself: the *silent* man observes this precept; the *taciturn* man exceeds it.

Silence is the perfectest herald of joy:

I were but little happy if I could say how much.

SHAKESPEARE.

Pythagoras enjoined his scholars an absolute *silence* for a long novitiate. I am far from approving such a *taciturnity*; but I highly approve the end and intent of Pythagoras' injunction.—CHATHAM.

Silent, Dumb, Mute, Speechless.

Not speaking is the common idea included in the signification of these terms, which differ either in the cause or the circumstance: *Silent* (*v.* *Silent*) is altogether an indefinite and general term, expressing little more than the common idea. We may be *silent* because we will not speak, or we may be *silent* because we cannot speak; but in distinction from the other terms it is always employed in the former case. *Dumb*, from the German *dumm* stupid or idiotic, denotes a physical incapacity to speak: hence persons are said to

• Vide Abbé Roubaud: "Silenceux, taciturne."

be born *dumb*; they may likewise be *dumb* from temporary physical causes, as from grief, shame, and the like, a person may be struck *dumb*. *Mute*, in Latin *mutus*, Greek *mutos* from *μωω* to shut, signifies a shut mouth, a temporary disability to speak from arbitrary and incidental causes: hence the office of *mutes*, or of persons who engage not to speak for a certain time; and, in like manner, persons are said to be *mute* who dare not give utterance to their thoughts. *Speechless*, or void of speech, denotes a physical incapacity to speak from incidental causes; as when a person falls down *speechless* in an apoplectic fit, or in consequence of a violent contusion.

And just before the confines of the wood,
The gliding Lethe leads her silent flood.

DRYDEN.

The truth of it is, half the great talkers in the nation would be struck *dumb* were this fountain of discourse (party lies) dried up.—ADDISON.

'Tis listening fear and *dumb* amazement all.

THOMSON.

Mute was his tongue, and upright stood his hair.

DRYDEN.

Long *mute* he stood, and leaning on his staff,
His wonder witness'd with an idiot laugh.

DRYDEN.

But who can paint the lover as he stood,
Pierc'd by s-vere amazement, hating life,
Speechless, and fix'd in all the death of woe?

THOMSON.

Silly, v. Simple.

Similarity, v. Likeness.

Simile, Similitude, Comparison.

Simile and **Similitude** are both drawn from the Latin *similis* like: the former signifying the thing that is like; the latter either the thing that is like or the quality of being like: in the former sense only it is to be compared with *simile*, when employed as a figure of speech or thought; everything is a *simile* which associates objects together on account of any real or supposed likeness between them; but a *similitude* signifies a prolonged or continued *simile*. The latter may be expressed in a few words as when we say the god-like Achilles; but the former enters into minute circumstances of **Comparison**, as when Homer compares any of his heroes fighting and defending themselves against multitudes to lions who are attacked by dogs and men. Every *simile* is more or less a *comparison*, but every comparison is not a *simile*: the latter compares things only as far as they are alike; but the former extends to those things which are different: in this manner there may be a *comparison* between large things and small, although there can be no good *simile*.

There are also several noble *similes* and allusions in the first book of *Paradise Lost*.—ADDISON.

Such as have a natural bent to solitude (to carry on the former *similitude*) are like waters which may be forced into fountains.—POPE.

Your image of worshipping once a year in a certain place, in imitation of the Jews, is but a *comparison* and *simile* non est idem.—JOHNSON.

Similitude, v. Likeness.

Similitude, v. *Simile*.

Simple, Single, Singular.

Simple, in Latin *simplex* or *sine plic* without a fold, is opposed to the complex which has many folds, or to the compound which has several parts involved or connected with each other. **Single** and **Singular** (v. *One*) are opposed, one to double, and the other to multifarious. We may speak of a *simple* circumstance as independent of anything; of a *single* instance or circumstance as unaccompanied by any other: and a *singular* instance as one that rarely has its like. In the moral application to the person, *simplicity*, as far as it is opposed to duplicity in the heart, can never be excessive; but when it lies in the head, so that it cannot penetrate the folds and doublings of other persons, it is a fault. *Singleness* of heart and intention is that species of *simplicity* which is altogether to be admired; *singularity* may be either good or bad according to circumstances; to be *singular* in virtue is to be truly good; but to be *singular* in manner is affectation which is at variance with genuine *simplicity*, if not directly opposed to it.

Nothing extraneous must cleave to the eye in the act of seeing: its bare object must be as naked as truth, as *simple* and unmix'd as sincerity.—SOUTH.

Mankind with other animals compare,

Single how weak, and impotent they are.

JENYNS.

From the union of the crowns to the Revolution in 1688, Scotland was placed in a political situation the most *singular* and most unhappy.—ROBERTSON.

Simple, Silly, Foolish.

Simple, v. Simple.

Silly is but a variation of *simple*.

Foolish signifies like a *fool* (v. *Fool*).

The *simple*, when applied to the understanding, implies such a contracted power as is incapable of combination; *silly* and *foolish* rise in sense upon the former, signifying either the perversion or the total deficiency of understanding; the behaviour of a person may be *silly* who from any excess of feeling loses his sense of propriety; the conduct of a person will be *foolish* who has not judgment to direct himself. Country people may be *simple* owing to their want of knowledge; children will be *silly* in company if they have too much liberty given to them; there are some persons who never acquire wisdom enough to prevent them from committing *foolish* errors.

And had the *simple* natives

Observ'd his sage advice,

Their wealth and fame some years ago

Had reach'd above the skies.—SWIFT.

Two gods a *silly* woman have undone.

DRYDEN.

Virgil justly thought it a *foolish* figure for a grave man to be overtaken by death while he was weighing the cadence of words and measuring verses.—WALSH.

Simulation, Dissimulation.

Simulation, from *similis*, is the making one's self like what one is not; and **Dissimulation**, from *dissimilis* unlike, is the making one's self appear unlike what one really is. The hypocrite puts on the semblance of virtue to recommend himself to the virtuous,

The dissembler conceals his vices when he wants to gain the simple or ignorant to his side.

Sin, *v. Crime.*

Sincere, *v. Candid.*

Sincere, *v. Hearty.*

Sincere, Honest, True, Plain.

Sincere (*v. Candid*) is here the most comprehensive term: **Honest** (*v. Honesty*), **True**, and **Plain** (*v. Even*) are but modes of *sincerity*.

Sincerity is a fundamental characteristic of the person; a man is *sincere* from the conviction of his mind; *honesty* is the expression of the feeling, it is the dictate of the heart; we look for a *sincere* friend and an *honest* companion: *truth* is a characteristic of *sincerity*, for a *sincere* friend is a *true* friend; but *sincerity* is a permanent quality in the character; and *true* may be an occasional one: we cannot be *sincere* without being *true*, but we may be *true* without being *sincere*.

In like manner a *sincere* man must be *plain*: since *plainness* consists in an unvarnished style; the *sincere* man will always adopt that mode of speech which expresses his sentiments most forcibly; but it is possible for a person to be occasionally *plain* who does not act from any principle of *sincerity*.

It is *plain*, therefore, that *sincerity* is the habitual principle of communicating our real sentiments; and that the *honest*, *true*, and *plain* are only the modes which it adopts in making the communication: *sincerity* is therefore altogether a personal quality, but the other terms are applied also to the acts, as an *honest* confession, a *true* acknowledgment, and a *plain* speech.

Rustic mirth goes round,
The simple joke that takes the shepherd's heart
Easily pleases, the long, loud laugh *sincere*.

THOMSON.

This book of the Sybils was afterwards interpolated by some Christian, who was more zealous than either *honest* or wise therein.—FRIDEAUX.

Poetical ornaments destroy that character of *truth* and *plainness* which ought to characterize history.—REV. NOLDS.

Fear not my *truth*: the moral of my wit
Is *plain* and *true*.—SHAKESPEARE.

Single, *v. One.*

Single, *v. Simple.*

Single, *v. Solitary.*

Singular, *v. Particular.*

Singular, *v. Rare.*

Singular, *v. Simple.*

To Sink, *v. To fall.*

Site, *v. Place.*

Situation, *v. Circumstance.*

Situation, *v. Place.*

Situation, Condition, State, Predicament, Plight, Case.

Situation, *v. Place.*

Condition, *v. Condition.*

State, in Latin *status*, from *sto* to stand, signifies the point stood upon.

Situation is said generally of objects as they respect others; *condition* as they respect themselves. Whatever affects our property, our honour, our liberty, and the like, constitutes our *situation*; whatever affects our person immediately is our *condition*: a person who is unable to pay a sum of money to save himself from a prison is in a bad *situation*; a traveller who is left in a ditch robbed and wounded is in a bad *condition*. *Situation* and *condition* are said of that which is contingent and changeable; *state*, of that which is comparatively stable or established. A tradesman is in a good *situation* who is in the way of carrying on a good trade; his affairs are in a good *state* if he is enabled to answer every demand and to keep up his credit. Hence it is that we speak of the *state* of health, and the *state* of the mind; not the *situation* or *condition*, because the body and mind are considered as to their general frame, and not as to any relative or particular circumstances; so likewise, a *state* of infancy, a *state* of guilt, a *state* of innocence, and the like; but not either a *situation* or a *condition*.

When speaking of bodies there is the same distinction in the terms as in regard to individuals. An army may be either in a *situation*, a *condition*, or a *state*. An army that is on service may be in a critical *situation*, with respect to the enemy and its own comparative weakness; it may be in a deplorable *condition* if it stand in need of provisions and necessities: an army that is at home will be in a good or bad *state*, according to the regulations of the commander-in-chief. Of a prince who is threatened with invasion from foreign enemies, and with a rebellion from his subjects, we should not say that his *condition*, but his *situation*, was critical. Of a prince, however, who like Alfred was obliged to fly, and to seek safety in disguise and poverty, we should speak of his hard *condition*: the *state* of a prince cannot be spoken of, but the *state* of his affairs and government, may; hence, likewise, *state* may with most propriety be said of a nation: but *situation* seldom, unless in respect to other nations, and *condition* never. On the other hand, when speaking of the poor, we seldom employ the term *situation*, because they are seldom considered as a body in relation to other bodies: we mostly speak of their *condition* as better or worse, according as they have more or less of the comforts of life; and of their *state* as regards their moral habits.

These terms may likewise be applied to inanimate objects; and upon the same grounds, a house is in a good *situation* as respects the surrounding objects; it is in a good or bad *condition* as respects the painting, and exterior altogether; it is in a bad *state* as respects the beams, plaster, roof, and interior structure altogether. The hand of a watch is in a different *situation* every hour; the watch itself may be in a bad *condition* if the wheels are clogged with dirt; but in a good *state* if the works are altogether sound and fit for service.

The man who has a character of his own is little changed by varying his *situation*.—MRS. MONTAGUE.

It is indeed not easy to prescribe a successful manner of approach to the distressed or necessitous, whose condition subjects every kind of behaviour equally to miscarriage.—JOHNSON.

Patience itself is one virtue by which we are prepared for that state in which evil shall be no more.—JOHNSON.

Situation and condition are either permanent or temporary. The *Predicament*, from the Latin *predico* to assert or declare, signifies the committing one's-self by an assertion; and when applied to circumstances, it expresses a temporary embarrassed situation occasioned by an act of one's own: hence we always speak of bringing ourselves into a *predicament*. *Plight*, contracted from the Latin *plicatus*, participle of *plico* to fold, signifies any circumstance in which one is disagreeably entangled; and *Case* (*v. Case*) signifies anything which may befall us, or into which we fall mostly, though not necessarily contrary to our inclination. Those two latter terms therefore denote a species of temporary condition: for they both express that which happens to the object itself without reference to any other. A person is in an unpleasant situation who is shut up in a stage coach with disagreeable company. He is in an awkward predicament when in attempting to please one friend he displeases another. He may be in a wretched plight if he is overturned in a stage at night, and at a distance from any habitation. He will be in evil case if he is compelled to put up with a spare and poor diet.

Satan beheld their plight,
And to his mates thus in derision call'd.

MILTON.

The offender's life lies in the mercy
Of the duke only, 'gainst all other voice,
In which predicament I say thou stand'st.

SHAKESPEARE.

Our case is like that of a traveller upon the Alps, who should fancy that the top of the next hill must end his journey, because it terminates his prospect.—ADDISON.

Size, Magnitude, Greatness, Bulk.

Size, from the Latin *cisus* and *credo* to cut, signifies that which is cut or framed according to a certain proportion.

Magnitude, from the Latin *magnitudo*, answers literally to the English word *Greatness*.

Bulk, *v. Bulky*.

Size is a general term including all manner of dimension or measurement; *magnitude* is employed in science or in an abstract sense to denote some specific measurement; *greatness* is an unscientific term applied in the same sense to objects in general: *size* is indefinite, it never characterizes anything either as large or small; but *magnitude* and *greatness* always suppose something great; and *bulk* denotes a considerable degree of *greatness*: things which are diminutive in *size* will often have an extraordinary degree of beauty, or some other adventitious perfection to compensate the deficiency; astronomers have classed the stars according to their different *magnitudes*: *greatness* is considered by Burke as one source of the sublime; *bulk* is that species of *greatness* which destroys the symmetry, and consequently the beauty, of objects.

Soon grows the pigmy to gigantic size.—DRYDEN.

Then forth'd the moon.

Globose, and every magnitude of stars.—MILTON.

Awe is the first sentiment that rises in the mind at the view of God's greatness.—BLAIR.

His huge bulk on seven high volumes roll'd.—DRYDEN.

To Sketch, *v. To Delineate*.

Sketch, Outlines.

A *Sketch* may form a whole; *Outlines* are but a part: the *sketch* may comprehend the *outlines*, and some of the particulars; *outlines*, as the term bespeaks, comprehend only that which is on the exterior surface: the *sketch*, in drawing, may serve as a land-cape, as it presents some of the features of a country; but the *outlines* serve only as bounding lines, within which the *sketch* may be formed. So in the moral application we speak of the *sketches* of countries, characters, manners, and the like, which serve as a description; but of the *outlines* of a plan, of a work, a project, and the like, which serve as a basis on which the subordinate parts are to be formed: barbarous nations present us with rude *sketches* of nature; an abridgment is little more than the *outlines* of a larger work.

In few, to close the whole,
The moral muse has shadow'd out a sketch
Of most our weakness needs believe or do.

YOUNG.

This is the outline of the fable (King Lear).

JOHNSON.

Skilful, *v. Clever*.

Skin, Hide, Peel, Rind.

Skin, which is in German *schin*, Swedish *skinn*, Danish *skind*, probably comes from the Greek *σκηνος*, a tent or covering.

Hide, in Saxon *hyd*, German *haut*, Low German *huth*, Latin *cutis*, comes from the Greek *κενθεν*, to hide, cover.

Peel, in German, *fell*, &c., Latin *pellis* a skin, in Greek *φελλος* or *φλοιος* bark, comes from *φλω* to burst or crack, because bark is easily broken.

Rind is in all probability changed from round, signifying that which goes round and envelops.

Skin is the term in most general use, it is applicable both to human creatures and to animals; *hide* is used only for the skins of large animals: we speak of the skins of birds or insects; but of the *hides* of oxen or horses and other animals, which are to be separated from the body and converted into leather. *Skin* is equally applied to the inanimate and the animate world; but *peel* and *rind* belong only to inanimate objects: the *skin* is generally said of that which is interior, in distinction from the exterior, which is the *peel*: an orange has both its *peel* and its thin *skin* underneath; an apple, a pear, and the like, has a *peel*. The *peel* is a soft substance on the outside; the *rind* is generally interior, and of a harder substance: in regard to a stick, we speak of its *peel* and its inner *skin*: in regard to a tree, we speak of its bark and its *rind*: hence, likewise, the term *rind* is applied to cheese, and other incrustated substances that envelop bodies.

Slack, Loose.

Slack, in Saxon *laec*, Low German *slack*, French *lache*, Latin *laxus*, and **Loose**, in Saxon *laes*, both come from the Hebrew *halatz* to make free or *loose*; they differ more in application than in sense: they are both opposed to that which is close bound; but *slack* is said only of that which is tied, or that with which anything is tied; while *loose* is said of any substances the parts of which do not adhere closely: a rope is *slack* in opposition to the tight rope, which is stretched to its full extent; and in general cords or strings are said to be *slack* which fail in the requisite degree of tightness; but they are said to be *loose* in an indefinite manner, without conveying any collateral idea: thus the string of an instrument is denominated *slack* rather than *loose*; on the other hand, *loose* is said of many bodies to which the word *slack* cannot be applied: a garment is *loose*, but not *slack*; the leg of a table is *loose*, but not *slack*. In the moral application that which admits of extension lengthways is denominated *slack*; and that which fails in consistency and close adherence is *loose*: trade is in general *slack*, or the sale of a particular article is *slack*; but an engagement is *loose*, and principles are *loose*.

From his *slack* hand the garland wreath'd for Eve
Down dropt.—MILTON.

Nor fear that he who sits so *loose* to life
Should too much shun its labours and its strife.
DENHAM.

To Slander, *v.* To asperse.

To Slant, Slope.

Slant is probably a variation of *leant*, and **Slope** of *slip*, expressive of a sideward movement or direction: they are the same in sense, but different in application: *slant* is said of small bodies only; *slope* is said indifferently of all bodies, large and small: a book may be made to *slant* by lying in part on another book, a desk, a table; but a piece of ground is said to *slope*.

As late the clouds,
Justling or push'd with winds, rude in their shock,
Fire the *slant* lightning.—MILTON.

Its uplands *sloping* deck the mountain's side.
GOLDSMITH.

Slavery, *v.* Servitude.

Slaughter, *v.* Carnage.

To Slaughter, *v.* To kill.

To Slay, *v.* To kill.

To Sleep, Slumber, Doze, Drowse, Nap.

Sleep, in Saxon *slæpan*, Low German *slap*, German *schlaf*, is supposed to come from the Low German *slap* or *slack* *slack*, because *sleep* denotes an entire relaxation of the physical frame.

Slumber, in Saxon *slumeran*, &c., is but an intensive verb of *schlummern*, which is a variation from the preceding *slæpan*, &c.

Doze, in Low German *dusen*, is in all probability a variation from the French *dors*, and the Latin *dormio* to *sleep*, which was anciently

dormio, and comes from the Greek *δερμα* a skin because people lay on skins when they *sleep*.

Drowse is a variation of *doze*.

Nap is in all probability a variation of *nob* and *nod*.

Sleep is the general term, which designates in an indefinite manner that state of the body to which all animated beings are subject at certain seasons in the course of nature; to *slumber* is to *sleep* lightly and softly; to *doze* is to incline to *sleep*, or to begin *sleeping*; to *nap* is to *sleep* for a time: every one who is not indisposed *sleeps* during the night; those who are accustomed to wake at a certain hour of the morning commonly *slumber* only after that time; there are many who, though they cannot *sleep* in a carriage, will yet be obliged to *doze* if they travel in the night; in hot climates the middle of the day is commonly chosen for a *nap*.

Sleepy, Drowsy, Lethargic.

Sleepy (*v.* To *sleep*) expresses either a temporary or a permanent state: **Drowsy**, which comes from the Low German *drusen*, and is a variation of *doze* (*v.* To *sleep*), expresses mostly a temporary state; **Lethargic**, from *lethargy*, in Latin *lethargia*, Greek *ληθαργια*, compounded of *ληθη* forgetfulness, and *αγρος* swift, signifying a proneness to forgetfulness or *sleep*, describes a permanent or habitual state.

Sleepy, as a temporary state, expresses also what is natural or seasonable; *drowsiness* expresses an inclination to *sleep* at unseasonable hours: it is natural to be *sleepy* at the hour when we are accustomed to retire to rest; it is common to be *drowsy* when sitting still after dinner. *Sleepiness*, as a permanent state, is an infirmity to which some persons are subject constitutionally; *lethargy* is a disease with which people, otherwise the most wakeful, may be occasionally attacked.

Slender, *v.* Thin.

To Slide, *v.* To slip.

Slight, *v.* Cursory.

Slight, *v.* Thin.

To Slight, *v.* To disregard.

Slim, *v.* Thin.

To Slip, Slide, Glide.

Slip is in Low German *slipan*, Latin *labor*, to *slip*, and *libo* to pour, which comes from the Greek *λειβουαι* to pour down as water does, and the Hebrew *salap* to turn aside.

Slide is a variation of *slip*, and **Glide** of *slide*.

To *slip* is an involuntary, and *slide* a voluntary motion: those who go on the ice in fear will *slip*; boys *slide* on the ice by way of amusement. To *slip* and *slide* are lateral movements of the feet; but to *glide* is the movement of the whole body, and just that easy motion which is made by *slipping*, *sliding*, *flying*, or *swimming*: a person *glides* along the surface of the ice when he *slides*; a vessel *glides* along through the water. In the moral

and figurative application, a person *slips* who commits unintentional errors; he *slides* into a course of life who wittingly, and yet without difficulty, falls into the practice and habits which are recommended; he *glides* through life if he pursues his course smoothly and without interruption.

Every one finds that many of the ideas which he desired to retain have irretrievably *slipped* away.—JOHNSON.

Thessander bold, and Sthenelus their guide,
And dire Ulysses down the cable *slide*.
DRYDEN.

And softly let the running waters *glide*.
DRYDEN.

Slippery, v. Glib.

To Slope, v. To slant.

Slothful, v. Inactive.

Slow, Dilatory, Tardy, Tedious.

Slow is doubtless connected with *sloth* and *slide*, which kind of motion when walking is the *slowest* and the *laziest*.

Dilatory, from the Latin *defero, dilatus*, to defer, signifies prone to defer.

Tardy, from the Latin *tardus*, signifies literally slow.

Tedious, from the Latin *tædium* weariness, signifies causing weariness.

Slow is a general and unqualified term applicable to the motion of any object or to the motions and actions of persons in particular, and to their dispositions also; *dilatory* relates to the disposition only of persons: we are *slow* in what we are about; we are *dilatory* in setting about a thing. **Slow** is applied to corporeal or mental actions; a person may be *slow* in walking, or *slow* in conceiving: *tardy* is applicable to mental actions; we are *tardy* in our proceedings or our progress; we are *tardy* in making up accounts or in concluding a treaty. We may be *slow* with propriety or not, to our own inconvenience or that of others; when we are *tedious* we are always so improperly: "To be *slow* and sure" is a vulgar proverb, but a great truth; by this we do ourselves good, and inconvenience no one; but he who is *tedious* is *slow* to the annoyance of others; a prolix writer must always be *tedious*, for he keeps the reader long in suspense before he comes to the conclusion of a period.

The powers above are *slow*
In punishing, and should not we resemble them?
DRYDEN.

A *dilatory* temper is unfit for a place of trust.
ADDISON.

The swains and *tardy* neat-herds came, and last
Menalcas; wet with beating winter mast.—DRYDEN.
Her sympathising lover takes his stand
High on th' opposite bank, and ceaseless sings
The *tedious* tune away.—THOMSON.

Sluggish, v. Inactive.

To Slumber, v. To sleep.

Sly, v. Cunning.

Small, v. Little.

To Smear, Daub.

To **Smear** is literally to do over with *smear*, in Saxon *smær*, German *schmeeren*, in Greek *μυρος*

a *salve*. To **Daub**, from *do* and *ub, über* over, signifies literally to do over with anything unseemly, or in an unsightly manner.

To *smear* in the literal sense is applied to such substances as may be rubbed like grease over a body; if said of grease itself it may be proper, as coachmen *smear* the coach wheels with tar or grease; but if said of anything else it is an improper action, and tends to disfigure, as children *smear* their hands with ink, or *smear* their clothes with dirt. To *smear* and *daub* are both actions which tend to disfigure; but we *smear* by means of rubbing over; we *daub* by rubbing, throwing, or in any way covering over: thus a child *smears* the window with his finger, or he *daubs* the wall with dirt. By a figurative application, *smear* is applied to bad writing, and *daub* to bad painting: indifferent writers who wish to excel are fond of re-touching their letters until they make their performance a sad *smear*; bad artists, who are injudicious in the use of their pencil, load their paintings with colour, and convert them into *daubs*.

Smell, Scent, Odour, Perfume, Fragrance.

Smell and *melt* are in all probability connected together, because *smells* arise from the evaporation of bodies.

Scent, changed from *sent*, comes from the Latin *sentio* to perceive or feel.

Odour, in Latin *odor*, comes from *oleo*, in Greek *ὄζω* to smell.

Perfume, compounded of *per* or *pro* and *fumo* or *fumus* a smoke or vapour, that is, the vapour that issues forth.

Fragrance, in Latin *fragrantia*, comes from *frago*, anciently *frago*, that is, to perfume or smell like the *fraga* or strawberry.

Smell and *scent* are said either of that which receives or that which gives the *smell*: the *odour*, the *perfume*, and *fragrance* of that which communicates the *smell*. In the first case, *smell* is said generally of all living things without distinction; *scent* is said only of such animals as have this peculiar faculty of tracing objects by their *smell*: some persons have a much quicker *smell* than others, and some have an acuter *smell* of particular objects than they have of things in general: dogs are remarkable for their quickness of *scent*, by which they can trace their masters and other objects at an immense distance; other animals are gifted with this faculty to a surprising degree, which serves them as a means of defence against their enemies.

In the second case *smell* is compared with *odour*, *perfume*, and *fragrance* either as respects the objects communicating the *smell* or the nature of the *smell* which is communicated. *Smell* is indefinite in its sense, and universal in its application; *odour*, *perfume*, and *fragrance* are species of *smell*; every object is said to *smell* which acts on the olfactory nerves; flowers, fruits, woods, earth, water, and the like have a *smell*; but the *odour* is said of that which is artificial; the *perfume* and *fragrance* of that which is natural: the burning of things produces an

odour; the *perfume* and *fragrance* arises from flowers or sweet-smelling herbs, spices, and the like. The terms *smell* and *odour* do not specify the exact nature of that which issues from bodies; they may both be either pleasant or unpleasant; but *smell*, if taken in certain connections, signifies a bad *smell*, and *odour* signifies that which is sweet: meat which is kept too long will have a *smell*, that is of course a bad *smell*; the *odours* from a sacrifice are acceptable, that is, the sweet *odours* ascend to heaven. *Perfume* is properly a wide-spreading *smell*, and when taken without any epithet signifies a pleasant *smell*; *fragrance* never signifies anything but what is good; it is the sweetest and most powerful *perfume*: the *perfume* from flowers and shrubs is as grateful to one sense as their colours and conformation are to the other; the *fragrance* from groves of myrtle and orange trees surpasses the beauty of their fruits or foliage.

Then curses his conspiring feet, whose scent
Betrays that safety which their swiftness lent.

DENHAM.

So flowers are gathered to adorn a grave,
To lose their freshness among bones and rottenness,
And have their *odours* stified in the dust.—ROWE.

At last a soft and solemn breathing sound
Rose like a steam of rich distilled *perfumes*.

MILTON.

Soft vernal *fragrance* clothe the flow'ring earth.

MASON.

Smooth, v. Even.

To Smother, v. To stifle.

To Smother, v. To suffocate.

To Snatch, v. To lay hold of.

To Sneer, v. To scoff.

To Soak, Drench, Steep.

Soak is a variation of *suck*.

Drench is a variation of *drink*.

Steep, in Saxon *steapan*, &c., from the Hebrew *satep*, signifies to overflow or overwhelm.

The idea of communicating or receiving a liquid is common to these terms. We *soak* things in water when we wish to soften them; animals are *drenched* with liquid as a medicinal operation. A person's clothes are *soaked* in rain when the water has penetrated every thread; he himself is *drenched* in the rain when it has penetrated as it were his very body; *drench* therefore in this case only expresses the idea of *soak* in a stronger manner. To *steep* is a species of *soaking* employed as an artificial process; to *soak* is however a permanent action by which hard things are rendered soft; to *steep* is a temporary action by which soft bodies become penetrated with a liquid: thus salt meat requires to be *soaked*; fruits are *steeped* in brandy.

Drill'd through the sandy stratum, every way
The waters with the sandy stratum rise,
And clear and sweeten as they *soak* along.

THOMSON.

And deck with fruitful trees the fields around,
And with refreshing waters *drench* the ground.

DRYDEN.

O sleep, O gentle sleep,
Nature's soft nurse! How have I frightened thee,
That thou no more wilt weigh my eyelids down,
And steep my senses in forgetfulness?

SHAKESPEARE.

Sober, v. Abstinent.

Sober, Grave.

Sober (*v. Abstinent*) expresses the absence of all exhilaration of spirits: **Grave** (*v. Grave*) expresses a weight in the intellectual operations which makes them proceed slowly. *Sobriety* is therefore a more natural and ordinary state for the human mind than *gravity*: it behoves every man to be *sober* in all situations; but those who fill the most important stations of life must be *grave*. Even in our pleasures we may observe *sobriety* which keeps us from every unseemly ebullition of mirth; but on particular occasions where the importance of the subject ought to weigh on the mind it becomes us to be *grave*. At a feast we have need of *sobriety*: at a funeral we have need of *gravity*: *sobriety* extends to many more objects than *gravity*; we must be *sober* in our thoughts and opinions, as well as in our outward conduct and behaviour; but we can be *grave* properly speaking only in our looks and our outward deportment.

Now came still ev'ning on, and twilight grey
Had in her *sober* liv'ry all things clad.—MILTON.

So spake the Cherub, and his *grave* rebuke,
Severe in youthful beauty, added grace
Invincible.—MILTON.

Sobriety, v. Modesty.

Sociable, v. Social.

Social, v. Convivial.

Social, Sociable.

Social, from *socius* a companion, signifies belonging or allied to a companion, having the disposition of a companion; **Sociable**, from the same, signifies able or fit to be a companion; the former is an active, the latter a passive quality: *social* people seek others; *sociable* people are sought for by others. It is possible for a man to be *social* and not *sociable*; to be *sociable* and not *social*: he who draws his pleasures from society without communicating his share to the common stock of entertainments is *social* but not *sociable*; men of a taciturn disposition are often in this case: they receive more than they give: he on the contrary who has talents to please company, but not the inclination to go into company, may be *sociable* but is seldom *social*; of this description are humourists who go into company to gratify their pride, and stay away to indulge their humour. *Social* and *sociable* are likewise applicable to things, with a similar distinction; *social* intercourse is that intercourse which men have together for the purposes of society; *social* pleasures are what they enjoy by associating together: a path or a carriage is denominated *sociable* which encourages the association of many.

Social friends

Attun'd to happy unison of soul.—THOMSON.

Sciences are of a *sociable* disposition, and flourish best in the neighbourhood of each other.—BLACKSTONE.

Society, *v.* Association.

Society, *v.* Community.

Society, *v.* Fellowship.

Society, Company.

Society (*v.* Association) and **Company** (*v.* Association) here express either the persons associating or the act of associating.

In either case *society* is a general, and *company* a particular term; as respects persons associating, *society* comprehends either all the associated part of mankind, as when we speak of the laws of *society*, the well-being of *society*; or it is said only of a particular number of individuals associated, in which latter case it comes nearest to *company* and differs from it only as to the purpose of the association. A *society* is always formed for some solid purpose as the Humane *Society*: and a *company* is always brought together for pleasure or profit, as has already been observed.

Good sense teaches us the necessity of conforming to the rules of the *society* to which we belong: good breeding prescribes to us to render ourselves agreeable to the *company* of which we form a part.

When expressing the abstract action of associating, the term *society* is even more general and indefinite than before; it expresses that which is common to mankind; and *company* that which is peculiar to individuals. The love of *society* is inherent in our nature; it is weakened or destroyed only by the vice of our constitution, or the derangement of our system; every one naturally likes the *company* of his own friends and connections in preference to that of strangers. *Society* is a permanent and habitual act; *company* is only a particular act suited to the occasion: it behoves us to shun the *society* of those from whom we can learn no good, although we may sometimes be obliged to be in their *company*. The *society* of intelligent men is desirable for those who are entering life; the *company* of facetious men is agreeable in travelling.

Unhappy he, who from the first of joys,

Society, cut off, is left alone

Amid this world of death.—THOMSON.

Company, though it may relieve a man from his melancholy, cannot secure him from his conscience.—SOUTH.

Soft, Mild, Gentle, Meek.

Soft, in Saxon *soft*, German *sanft*, comes most probably from the Saxon *sib*, Gothic *sef*, Hebrew *sabbath* rest.

Mild, in Saxon *milde*, German *milde*, &c., Latin *mollis*, Greek *μελακος*, comes from *μελισσω* to soothe with *soft* words, and *μελι* honey.

Gentle, *v.* Gentle.

Meek, like the Latin *mitis*, may in all probability come from the Greek *μεω* to make less, signifying to make one's self small, to be humble.

Soft and *mild* are employed both in the proper and the improper application; *meek* only in the moral application: *soft* is opposed to the hard; *mild* to the sharp or strong.

All bodies are said to be *soft* which yield easily to the touch or pressure, as a *soft* bed, the *soft* earth, *soft* fruit; some bodies are said to be *mild* which act weakly, but pleasantly, on the taste, as *mild* fruit, or a *mild* cheese; or on the feelings, as *mild* weather.

In the improper application, *soft*, *mild*, and *gentle* may be applied to that which acts weakly upon others, or is easily acted upon by others; *meek* is said of that only which is acted upon easily by others; in this sense they are all employed as epithets, to designate either the person or that which is personal.

In the sense of acting weakly, but pleasantly, on others, *soft*, *mild*, and *gentle* are applied to the same personal properties, but with a slight distinction in the sense: the voice of a person is either *soft* or *mild*; it is naturally *soft*, it is purposely made *mild*: a *soft* voice strikes agreeably upon the ear; a *mild* voice, when assumed by those who have authority, dispels all fears in the minds of inferiors. A person moves either *softly* or *gently*, but in the first case he moves with but little noise, in the second he moves with a slow pace. It is necessary to go *softly* in the chamber of the sick, that they may not be disturbed; it is necessary for a sick person to move *gently* when he first attempts to go abroad after his confinement.

To tread *softly* is an art which is acquired from the dancing-master; to go *gently* is a voluntary act: we may go a *gentle* or a quick pace at pleasure. Words are either *soft*, *mild*, or *gentle*: a *soft* word falls lightly upon the person to whom it is addressed; it does not excite any angry sentiment; the proverb says, "A *soft* answer turneth away wrath." A reproof is *mild* when it falls easily from the lips of one who has power to oppress and wound the feelings; a censure, an admonition, or a hint is *gentle* which bears indirectly on the offender, and does not expose the whole of his infirmity to view: a kind father always tries the efficacy of *mild* reproofs; a prudent friend will always try to correct our errors by *gentle* remonstrances.

In like manner we say that punishments are *mild* which inflict but a small portion of pain; they are opposed to those which are severe: those means of correction are *gentle* which are opposed to those that are violent. It requires discretion to know how to inflict punishment with the due proportion of *mildness* and severity; it will be fruitless to adopt *gentle* means of correction when there is not a power of resorting to those which are violent in case of necessity. Persons, or their manners, are termed *soft*, *mild*, and *gentle*, but still with similar distinctions; a *soft* address, a *soft* air, and the like, are becoming or not, according to the sex: in that which is denominated the *softer* sex, these qualities of *softness* are characteristic excellencies; but even in this sex they may degenerate, by their excess, into insipidity: and in the male sex they are compatible only in a small degree with manly firmness of carriage. *Mild* manners are peculiarly becoming in superiors, whereby they win the love and esteem of those who are in inferior stations; *gentle* manners are becoming in all persons who

take a part in social life : *gentleness* is, in fact, that due medium of *softness* which is alike suitable to both sexes, and which it is the object of polite education to produce.

In the sense of being acted on easily, the disposition is said to be not only *soft*, *mild*, and *gentle*, but also *meek* : *softness* of disposition and character is an infirmity both in the male and female, but particularly in the former ; it is altogether incompatible with that steadiness and uniformity of conduct which is requisite for every man who has an independent part to act in life. A man of a *soft* disposition often yields to the entreaties of others, and does that which his judgment condemns ; *mildness* of disposition unfits a man altogether for command, and is to be clearly distinguished from that *mildness* of conduct which is founded on principle ; *gentleness*, as a part of the character, is not so much to be recommended as *gentleness* from habit ; human life contains so much in itself that is rough, that the *gentle* disposition is unable to make that resistance which is requisite for the purposes of self-defence : *meekness* is a Christian virtue forcibly recommended to our practice by the example and precepts of our blessed Saviour ; it consists not only in an unresisting, but a forgiving temper, a temper that is unruffled by injuries and provocations ; it is, however, an infirmity if it springs from a want of spirit, or an unconsciousness of what is due to ourselves : *meekness*, therefore, as a natural temper, sinks into meanness and servility ; but when as an acquired temper, built upon principle, and moulded into a habit of the mind, it is the grand distinctive characteristic of the religion we profess.

Gentle and *meek* are likewise applied to animals ; the former to designate that easy flow of spirits which fits them for being guided in their movements, and the latter to mark that passive temper that submits to every kind of treatment, however harsh, without an indication even of displeasure. A horse is *gentle*, as opposed to one that is spirited ; the former is devoid of that impetus in himself to move which renders the other ungovernable : the lamb is a pattern of *meekness*, and yields to the knife of the butcher without a struggle or a groan.

Pray you tread *softly*, that the blind mole may not
Hear a foot fall.—SHAKESPEARE.

Soft stillness, and the night,
Become the touches of sweet harmony.
SHAKESPEARE.

As when the woods by *gentle* winds are stirr'd.
DRYDEN.

How *meek*, how patient, the *mild* creature lies,
What *softness* in its melancholy face,
What dumb-complaining innocence appears !
THOMSON.

Close at mine ear one call'd me forth to walk,
With *gentle* voice.—MILTON.

To Soil, *v.* To stain.

To Sojourn, *v.* To abide.

To Solace, *v.* To console.

Soldier-like, *v.* Martial.

Sole, *v.* Solitary.

Solemn, *v.* Grave.

To Solicit, *v.* To beg.

Solicitation, Importunity.

Solicitation is general ; **Importunity** is particular : it is importunate or troublesome *solicitation*. *Solicitation* is itself indeed that which gives trouble to a certain extent, but it is not always unreasonable : there may be cases in which we may yield to the *solicitations* of friends to do that which we have no objection to be obliged to do : but *importunity* is that *solicitation* which never ceases to apply for that which it is not agreeable to give. We may sometimes be urgent in our *solicitations* of a friend to accept some proffered honour ; the *solicitation* however, in this case, although it may even be troublesome, yet it is sweetened by the motive of the action : the *importunity* of beggars is often a politic means of extorting money from the passenger.

Although the devil cannot compel a man to sin, yet he can follow a man with continual *solicitations*.—SOUTH.

The torment of expectation is not easily to be borne when the heart has no rival engagements to withdraw it from the importunities of desire.—JOHNSON.

Solicitude, *v.* Care.

Solid, *v.* Firm.

Solid, *v.* Hard.

Solid, *v.* Substantial.

Solitary, *v.* Alone.

Solitary, Sole, Only, Single.

Solitary and **Sole** are both derived from *solus* alone or whole.

Only, that is *only*, signifies the quality of unity.

Single is an abbreviation of singular (*v.* *Simple*).

All these terms are more or less opposed to several or many. *Solitary* and *sole* signify one left by itself ; the former mostly in application to particular sensible objects, the latter in regard mostly to moral objects : a *solitary* shrub expresses not only one shrub, but one that has been left to itself : the *sole* cause or reason signifies that reason or cause which stands unsupported by anything else. *Only* does not include the idea of desertion or deprivation, but it comprehends that of want or deficiency : he who has *only* one shilling in his pocket means to imply that he wants more or ought to have more. *Single* signifies simply one or more detached from others, without conveying any other collateral idea : a *single* sheet of paper may be sometimes more convenient than a double one : a *single* shilling may be all that is necessary for the present purpose : there may be *single* ones, as well as a *single* one ; but the other terms exclude the idea of there being anything else. A *solitary* act of generosity is not sufficient to characterize a man as generous : with most criminals the *sole* ground of their defence rests upon their not having learnt to know and do better : harsh language and severe looks are not the *only* means of correcting the faults of others : *single* instances of extraordinary talents now and then present themselves in the course of an age.

In the adverbial form, *solely*, *only*, and *singly* are employed with a similar distinction. The disasters which attend an unsuccessful military enterprise is seldom to be attributed *solely* to the incapacity of the general: there are many circumstances both in the natural and moral world which are to be accounted for *only* by admitting a providence as presented to us in Divine revelation: there are many things which men could not effect *singly* that might be effected by them conjointly.

The cattle in the fields and meadows green,
Those rare and *solitary*, these in flocks.—MILTON.

All things are but insipid to a man in comparison of that one which is the *sole* minion of his fancy.—SOUTH.

Thy fear
Will save us trial, what the least can do
Single against the wicked.—MILTON.

Solitary, Desert, Desolate.

Solitary, v. Alone.

Desert is the same as *deserted*.

Desolate, in Latin *desolatus*, signifies *made solitary*.

All these epithets are applied to places, but with different modifications of the common idea of solitude which belongs to them. *Solitary* simply denotes the absence of all beings of the same kind; thus a place is *solitary* to a man where there is no human being but himself; and it is *solitary* to a brute when there are no brutes with which it can hold society. *Desert* conveys the idea of a place made *solitary* by being shunned, from its unfitness as a place of residence; all *deserts* are places of such wildness as seem to frighten away almost all inhabitants. *Desolate* conveys the idea of a place made *solitary*, or bare of inhabitants, and all traces of habitation, by violent means; every country may become *desolate* which is exposed to the inroads of a ravaging army.

The first time we beheld the hero (Ulysses), we find him disconsolately sitting on the *solitary* shore, sighing to return to Ithaca.—WHARTON.

A peopled city made a *desert* place.—DRYDEN.
Supporting and supported, polish'd friends
And dear relations mingle into bliss;
But this the rugged savage never felt,
E'en *desolate* in crowds.—THOMSON.

To Solve, Resolve.

Solve and **Resolve** both come from the Latin *solvo*, in Greek *λυω*, in Hebrew *sal* to loosen.

Between *solve* and *resolve* there is no considerable difference either in sense or application; the former seems merely to speak of unfolding in a general manner that which is wrapped up in obscurity: to *resolve* is rather to unfold it by the particular method of carrying one back to first principles; we *solve* a problem, and *resolve* a difficulty.

Something yet of doubt remains
Which only thy *solution* can *resolve*.—MILTON.

Some, Any.

Some, probably contracted from *so* a one or *such* a one, is altogether restrictive in its sense. **Any**, from a one, is altogether universal and indefinite. *Some* applies to one particular part in distinction from the rest: *any* to every in-

dividual part without distinction. Some think this, and others that: *any* person might believe if he would; *any* one can conquer his passions who calls in the aid of religion. In consequence of this distinction in sense, *some* can only be used in particular affirmative propositions; but *any*, which is equivalent to all, may be either in negative, interrogative, or hypothetical propositions: *some* say so: does *any* one believe it? He will not give to *any*.

Soon, Early, Betimes.

All these words are expressive of time; but **Soon** respects some future period in general; **Early**, or *ere*, before, and **Betimes**, or by the time, before a given time, respect some particular period at no great distance. A person may come *soon* or *early*; in the former case he may not be long in coming from the time that the words are spoken; in the latter case he comes before the time appointed. He who rises *soon* does nothing extraordinary; but he who rises *early* or *betimes* exceeds the usual hour considerably. *Soon* is said mostly of particular acts, and is always dated from the time of the person speaking, if not otherwise expressed; come *soon* signifies after the present moment: *early* and *betimes*, if not otherwise expressed, have always respect to some specific time appointed; come *early* will signify a visit, a meeting, and the like; do it *betimes* will signify before the thing to be done is wanted: in this manner both are employed for the actions of youth. An *early* attention to religious duties will render them habitual and pleasing; we must begin *betimes* to bring the stubborn will into subjection.

But *soon*, too *soon*! the lover turns his eyes;
Again she falls—again she dies—she dies.—POPE.

Pope, not being sent *early* to school, was taught to read by an aunt.—JOHNSON.

Happy is the man who *betimes* acquires a relish for holy solitude.—HORNE.

To Sooth, v. To allay.

Sordid, v. Mean.

Sorrow, v. Affliction.

Sorry, Grieved, Hurt.

Sorry and **Grieved** are epithets somewhat differing from their primitives *sorrow* and *grief* (*v. Affliction*), inasmuch as they are applied to ordinary subjects. We speak of being *sorry* for anything, however trivial, which concerns ourselves; but we are commonly *grieved* for that which concerns others. I am *sorry* that I was not at home when a person called upon me; I am *grieved* that it is not in my power to serve a friend who stands in need. Both these terms respect only that which we do ourselves: **Hurt** (*v. To displease* and *To injure*) respects that which is done to us, denoting painful feeling from *hurt* or wounded feelings; we are *hurt* at being treated with disrespect.

The ass, approaching next, confess'd
That in his heart he lov'd a jest
One fault he hath, is *sorry* for't,
His ears are half a foot too short.—SWIFT.

The mimic ape began to chatter,
How evil tongues his name bespatter;
He saw, and he was *grieved* to see't,
His zeal was sometimes indiscreet.—SWIFT.

No man is *hurt*, at least few are so, by hearing his
neighbour esteemed a worthy man.—BLAIR.

Sort, *v.* Kind.

Sovereign, *v.* Prince.

Soul, Mind.

These terms, or the equivalents to them, have been employed by all civilized nations to designate that part of human nature which is distinct from matter. The *Soul*, however, from the German *seele*, &c., and the Greek *ψα* to live, like the *anima* of the Latin, which comes from the Greek *ανειος* wind or breath, is represented to our minds by the subtlest or most ethereal of sensible objects, namely, breath or spirit, and denotes properly the quickening or vital principle. *Mind*, on the contrary, from the Greek *μενος*, which signifies strength, is that sort of power which is closely allied to, and in a great measure dependent upon, corporeal organization: the former is, therefore, the immortal, and the latter the mortal, part of us; the former connects us with angels, the latter with brutes: in the former we distinguish consciousness and will, which is possessed by no other created being that we know of; in the latter we distinguish nothing but the power of receiving impressions from external objects, which we call ideas, and which we have in common with the brutes. There are minute philosophers who, from their extreme anxiety after truth, deny that we possess anything more than what this poor composition of flesh and blood can give us; and yet, methinks, sound philosophy would teach us that we ought to prove the truth of one position before we assert the falsehood of its opposite; and consequently that if we deny that we have anything but what is material in us, we ought first to prove that the material is sufficient to produce the reasoning faculty of man. Now it is upon this very impossibility of finding anything in matter as an adequate cause for the production of the *soul* that it is conceived to be an entirely distinct principle. If we had only the mind, that is, an aggregate of ideas or sensible images, such as is possessed by the brutes, it would be no difficulty to conceive of this as purely material, since the act of receiving images is but a passive act, suited to the inactive property of matter: but when the *soul* turns in upon itself, and creates for itself by abstraction, combination, and deduction, a world of new objects, it proves itself to be the most active of all principles in the universe; it then positively acts upon matter instead of being acted upon by it. But not to lose sight of the distinction drawn between the words *soul* and *mind*, I simply wish to show that the vulgar and the philosophical use of these terms altogether accord, and are both founded on the true nature of things; namely, that the word *soul* is taken for the active and living principle, and *mind* is considered as the storehouse or receiver: so likewise when we say that a person is the *soul* of the society in which he

acts; or that we treasure anything in the *mind*, it makes an impression on the *mind*.

Man's *soul* in a perpetual motion flows,
And to no outward cause that motion owes.
DENHAM.

In bashful coyness, or in maiden pride,
The soft return conceal'd, save when it stole
In side-long glances from her downcast eyes,
Or from her swelling *soul* in stifled sighs.
THOMSON.

'E'en from the body's purity, the *mind*
Receives a secret sympathetic aid.—THOMSON.

Sound, Sane, Healthy.

Sound and Sane, in Latin *sanus*, comes probably from *sanguis* the blood, because in that lies the seat of health or sickness.

Healthy, *v.* *Healthy*.

Sound is extended in its application to all things that are in the state in which they ought to be, so as to preserve their vitality; thus, animals and vegetables are said to be *sound* when in the former there is nothing amiss in their breath, and in the latter in their root. By a figurative application, wood and other things may be said to be *sound* when they are entirely free from any symptom of decay: *sane* is applicable to human beings, in the same sense, but with reference to the mind; a *sane* person is opposed to one that is insane: *healthy* expresses more than either *sound* or *sane*; we are *healthy* in every part, but we are *sound* in that which is essential for life; he who is *sound* may live, but he who is *healthy* enjoys life.

But Cypri, and the rest of *sounder* mind,
The fatal present to the flames design'd.—DRYDEN.

But the course of succession (to the crown) is the *healthy* habit of the British constitution.—BURKE.

Sound, Tone.

Sound, in Latin *sonus*, and **Tone** in Latin *tonus*, may probably both come from the Greek *τενω*, from *τενω* to stretch or exert, signifying simply an exertion of the voice; but I should rather derive *sound* from the Hebrew *shaon* a noise.

Sound is that which issues from any body, so as to become audible; *tone* is a species of *sound* which is produced from particular bodies: a *sound* may be accidental; we may hear the *sounds* of waters or leaves, of animals or men: *tones* are those particular *sounds* which are made either to express a particular feeling or to produce harmony; a sheep will cry for its lost young in a *tone* of distress; an organ is so formed as to send forth the most solemn *tones*.

The *sounds* of the voice, according to the various touches which raise them, form themselves into an acute or grave, quick or slow, loud or soft, *tone*.—HUGHES.

Source, *v.* *Origin*.

Source, *v.* *Spring*.

Space, Room.

Space, in Latin *spatium*, Greek *σπασιον*, *Eol.* *σπασιον* a race-ground.

Room, in Saxon *rum*, &c. Hebrew *ramah* a wide place.

These are both abstract terms, expressive of that portion of the universe which is supposed not to be occupied by any solid body: *space* is a general term, which includes within itself that which infinitely surpasses our comprehension; *room* is a limited term, which comprehends those portions of *space* which are artificially formed: *space* is either extended or bounded; *room* is always a bounded *space*: the *space* between two objects is either natural, incidental, or designedly formed; the *room* is that which is the fruit of design, to suit the convenience of persons: there is a sufficient *space* between the heavenly bodies to admit of their moving without confusion; the value of a house essentially depends upon the quantity of *room* which it affords; in a row of trees there must always be vacant *spaces* between each tree; in a coach there will be only *room* for a given number of persons.

Space is only taken in the natural sense; *room* is also employed in the moral application: in every person there is ample *room* for amendment or improvement.

The man of wealth and pride
Takes up a *space* that many poor supplied.
GOLDSMITH.

For the whole world, without a native home,
Is nothing but a prison of a larger *room*.—COWLEY.

Spacious, *v. Ample.*

To Spare, *v. To afford.*

To Spare, *v. To save.*

Sparing, *v. Oeconomical.*

Spark, *v. Gallant.*

To Sparkle, *v. To shine.*

To Speak, Say, Tell.

Speak, in Saxon *specan*, is probably changed from the German *sprechen*, and connected with *brechen* to break, the Latin *precor* to pray, and the Hebrew *barek* to bless.

Say, in Saxon *seegan*, German *sagen*, Latin *seco* or *sequor*, changed into *dico*, and Hebrew *shoch* to speak or say.

Tell, in Saxon *taellan*, Low German *tellan*, &c., is probably an onomatopoeia in language.

To *speak* may simply consist in uttering an articulate sound; but to *say* is to communicate some idea by means of words: a child begins to *speak* the moment it opens its lips to utter any acknowledged sound; but it will be some time before it can *say* anything: a person is said to *speak* high or low, distinctly or indistinctly; but he *says* that which is true or false, right or wrong: a dumb man cannot *speak*; a fool cannot *say* anything that is worth hearing: we *speaking* languages, we *speaking* sense or nonsense, we *speaking* intelligibly or unintelligibly: but we *say* what we think at the time. In an extended sense, *speaking* may refer as much to sense as to sound; but then it applies only to general cases, and *say* to particular and passing circumstances of life: it is a great abuse of the gift of speech not to *speaking* the truth; it is very culpable in a person to *say* that he will do a thing and not to do it.

To *say* and *tell* are both the ordinary actions of men in their daily intercourse; but *say* is very partial, it may comprehend single un-

connected sentences, or even single words: we may *say* yes or no; but we *tell* that which is connected, and which forms more or less of a narrative. To *say* is to communicate that which passes in our own minds, to express our ideas and feelings as they rise; to *tell* is to communicate events or circumstances respecting ourselves or others: it is not good to let children *say* foolish things for the sake of talking; it is still worse for them to be encouraged in *telling* everything they hear: when every one is allowed to *say* what he likes and what he thinks, there will commonly be more *speakers* than hearers; those who accustom themselves to *tell* long stories impose a tax upon others which is not repaid by the pleasure of their company.

Men's reputations depend upon what others *say* of them; reports are spread by means of one man *telling* another.

He that questioneth much shall learn much, and content much, for he shall give occasion to those whom he asketh to please themselves in *speaking*.—BACON.

Say, Yorke (for sure, if any, thou canst *tell*).
What virtue is, who practise it so well.—JENYNS.

To Speak, Talk, Converse, Discourse.

Speak, *v. To speak.*

Talk is but a variation of *tell* (*v. To speak*).

Converse, *v. Conversation.*

Discourse, in Latin *discursus*, expresses properly an examining or deliberating upon.

The idea of communicating with, or communicating to, another, by means of signs, is common in the signification of all these terms: to *speaking* is an indefinite term, specifying no circumstance of the action; we may *speaking* only one word or many; but we *talk* for a continuance: we *speaking* from various motives; we *talk* for pleasure; we *converse* for improvement, or intellectual gratification: we *speaking* with or to a person: we *talk* commonly to others; we *converse* with others. *Speaking* a language is quite distinct from writing; public *speaking* has at all times been cultivated with great care, but particularly under popular governments: *talk* is mostly the pastime of the idle and the empty; those who think least *talk* most: *conversation* is the rational employment of social beings, who seek by an interchange of sentiments to purify the affections, and improve the understanding.

Conversation is the act of many together: *talk* and *discourse* may be the act of one addressing himself to others: *conversation* loses its value when it ceases to be general; *talk* has seldom any value but what the *talker* attaches to it; a *discourse* derives its value from the nature of the subject, as well as the character of the *speaker*: *conversation* is adapted for mixed companies; children *talk* to their parents, or to their companions; parents and teachers *discourse* with young people on moral duties.

Falsehood is a *speaking* against our thoughts.—SOUTH.

Talkers are commonly vain and credulous withal; for he that *talks* what he knoweth will also *talk* what he knoweth not.—BACON.

Go, therefore, half this day, as friend with friend,
Converse with Adam.—MILTON.

Let thy discourses be such, that thou mayst give Profit to others, or from them receive.—DENHAM.

To Speak, *v.* To utter.

Special, Specific, Particular.

Special, in Latin *specialis*, signifies belonging to the species; **Particular**, belonging to a particle or small part; **Specific**, in Latin *specificus*, from *species* a species, and *facio* to make, signifies making a species. The *special* is that which comes under the general; the *particular* is that which comes under the *special*: hence we speak of a *special* rule; but a *particular* case. *Particular* and *specific* are both applied to the properties of individuals; but *particular* is said of the contingent circumstances of things, *specific* of their inherent properties; every plant has something *particular* in itself different from others, it is either longer or shorter, weaker or stronger: but its *specific* property is that which it has in common with its species: *particular* is, therefore, the term adapted to loose discourse: *specific* is a scientific term which describes things minutely.

The same may be said of *particularize* and *specify*: we *particularize* for the sake of information; we *specify* for the sake of instruction; in describing a man's person and dress we *particularize* if we mention everything singly which can be said upon it; in delineating a plan it is necessary to *specify* time, place, distance, materials, and everything else which may be connected with the carrying it into execution.

God claims it as a *special* part of his prerogative to have the entire disposal of riches.—SOUTH.

Every state has a *particular* principle of happiness, and this principle may in each be carried to a mischievous excess.—GOLDSMITH.

The imputation of being a fool is a thing which mankind, of all others, is the most impatient of, it being a blot upon the prime and *specific* perfection of human nature.—SOUTH.

Species, *v.* Kind.

Specific, *v.* Special.

Specimen, *v.* Copy.

Specious, *v.* Colourable.

Speck, *v.* Blemish.

Spectacle, *v.* Show.

Spectator, *v.* Looker-on.

Spectre, *v.* Vision.

Speculation, *v.* Theory.

Speech, *v.* Address.

Speech, *v.* Language.

Speechless, *v.* Silent.

To Speed, *v.* To hasten.

To Spend, Exhaust, Drain.

Spend, contracted from *expend*, in Latin *expendo* to pay away, signifies to give from one's-self.

Exhaust, from the Latin *exhaustio* to draw out, signifies to draw out all that there is.

Drain, a variation of draw, signifies to draw dry.

The idea of taking from the substance of anything is common to these terms; but to *spend* is to deprive it in a less degree than to *exhaust*, and that in a less degree than to *drain*: every one who exerts himself, in that degree *spends* his strength; if the exertions are violent he *exhausts* himself; a country which is *drained* of men is supposed to have no more left. To *spend* may be applied to that which is either external or inherent in a body; *exhaust* to that which is inherent; *drain* to that which is external of the body in which it is contained: we may speak of *spending* our wealth, our resources, our time, and the like; but of *exhausting* our strength, our vigour, our voice, and the like; of *draining*, in the proper application, a vessel of its liquid, or, in the improper application, *draining* a treasury of its contents: hence arises this farther distinction, that to *spend* and to *exhaust* may tend, more or less, to the injury of a body; but to *drain* may be to its advantage. Inasmuch as what is *spent* or *exhausted* may be more or less essential to the soundness of a body, it cannot be parted with without diminishing its value, or even destroying its existence; as when a fortune is *spent* it is gone, or when a person's strength is *exhausted* he is no longer able to move: on the other hand, to *drain*, though a more complete evacuation, is not always injurious, but sometimes even useful to a body; as when the land is *drained* of a superabundance of water.

Your tears for such a death in vain you *spend*, Which straight in immortality shall end.—DENHAM.

Many of our provisions for ease or happiness are *exhausted* by the present day.—JOHNSON.

Teaching is not a flow of words nor the *draining* of an hour-glass.—SOUTH.

To Spend or Expend, Waste, Dissipate, Squander.

Spend and **Expend** are variations from the Latin *expendo*; but *spend* implies simply to turn to some purpose, or make use of; to *expend* carries with it likewise the idea of exhausting; and **Waste**, moreover, comprehends the idea of exhausting to no good purpose: we *spend* money when we purchase anything with it; we *expend* it when we lay it out in large quantities, so as essentially to diminish its quantity: individuals *spend* what they have: government *expends* vast sums in conducting the affairs of a nation; all persons *waste* their property who have not sufficient discretion to use it well: we *spend* our time, or our lives, in any employment; we *expend* our strength and faculties upon some arduous undertaking; we *waste* our time and talents in trifles.

Dissipate, in Latin *dissipatus*, from *dissipo*, that is, *dis* and *cipo*, in Greek *cipo* to scatter, signifies to scatter different ways, that is, to *waste* by throwing away in all directions: **Squander**, which is a variation of *wander*, signifies to make to run wide apart. Both these terms, therefore, denote modes of *wasting*; but the former seems peculiarly applicable to that which is *wasted* in detail upon

different objects, and by a distraction of the mind; the latter respects rather the act of *wasting* in the gross, in large quantities, by planless profusion; young men are apt to *dissipate* their property in pleasures; the open, generous, and thoughtless are apt to *squander* their property.

Then having spent the last remains of light,
They give their bodies due repose at night.—DRYDEN.
What numbers, guiltless of their own disease,
Are snatch'd by sudden death, or waste by slow degrees?
JENYNS.

He pitied man, and much he pitied those
Whom falsely smiling fate has curs'd with means
To *dissipate* their days in quest of joy.—ARMSTRONG.
To how many temptations are all, but especially the young and gay, exposed to *squander* their whole time amidst the circles of levity.—BLAIR.

Sphere, *v.* Circle.

To Spill, *v.* To pour.

Spirit, *v.* Animation.

Spirited, *v.* Spirituous.

Spiritual, *v.* Incorporal.

Spiritual, *v.* Spirituous.

Spirituous, Spirited, Spiritual,
Ghostly.

Spirituous signifies having *spirit* as a physical property, after the manner of *spirituous* liquors: **Spirited** is applicable to the animal *spirits* of either men or brutes; a person or a horse may be *spirited*: **Spiritual** and **Ghostly** signify belonging generally to the *spirit* or *ghost*, in distinction from what is corporeal. *Spiritual* applies either to beings or to objects which engage the attention; angels are *spiritual* agents; death, immortality, and all religious subjects, are denominated *spiritual*; *ghostly* is seldom used but in a religious sense for a *spiritual* agent; the devil is called our *ghostly* enemy.

Spite, *v.* Malice.

Splendour, *v.* Brightness.

Splendour, *v.* Magnificence.

Splenetic, *v.* Gloomy.

To Split, *v.* To break.

Spoil, *v.* Booty.

Spontaneously, *v.* Willingly.

Sport, *v.* Amusement.

To Sport, *v.* To jest.

Sport, *v.* Play.

Sportive, *v.* Lively.

Spot, *v.* Blemish.

To Spout, *v.* To spurt.

Sprain, *v.* Strain.

Spread, Scatter, Disperse.

Spread, *v.* To spread.

Scatter, like *shatter*, is a frequentative of *shake* (*v.* To shake).

Disperse, *v.* To dispel.

Spread applies equally to divisible or indivisible bodies; we *spread* our money on the table, or we may *spread* a cloth on the table; but *scatter* is applicable to divisible bodies only; we *scatter* corn on the ground. To *spread* may be an act of design or otherwise, but mostly the former; as when we *spread* books or papers before us: *scatter* is mostly an act without design; a child *scatters* the papers on the floor. When taken, however, as an act of design, it is done without order; but *spread* is an act done in order: thus hay is *spread* out to dry, but corn is *scattered* over the land. Things may *spread* in one direction, or at least without separation; but they *disperse* in many directions, so as to destroy the continuity of bodies: a leaf *spreads* as it opens in all its parts, and a tree also *spreads* as its branches increase; but a multitude *disperses*, an army *disperses*. Between *scatter* and *disperse* there is no other difference than that one is immethodical and involuntary, the other systematic and intentional: flowers are *scattered* along a path which accidentally fall from the hand; a mob is *dispersed* by an act of authority: sheep are *scattered* along the hills; religious tracts are *dispersed* among the poor: the disciples were *scattered* as sheep without a shepherd, after the delivery of our Saviour into the hands of the Jews; they *dispersed* themselves, after His ascension, over every part of the world.

All in a row
Advancing broad, or wheeling round the field,
They *spread* their breathing harvest to the sun.

THOMSON.

Each leader now his *scatter'd* force conjoins.—POPE.

Straight to the tents the troops *dispersing* bend.—POPE.

To Spread, Expand, Diffuse.

Spread, in Saxon *spredan*, Low German *spredan*, High German *spreiten*, is an intensive of *breit* broad, signifying to stretch wide.

Expand, in Latin *expando*, compounded of *ex* and *pando* to open, and the Greek *φαωω* to show or make appear, signifies to open out wide.

Diffuse, *v.* Diffuse.

To *spread* is the general, the other two are particular terms. To *spread* may be said of anything which occupies more space than it has done, whether by a direct separation of its parts or by an accession to the substance; but to *expand* is to *spread* by means of separating or unfolding the parts: a mist *spreads* over the earth; a flower *expands* its leaves: a tree *spreads* by the growth of its branches; the opening bud *expands* when it feels the genial warmth of the sun.

Spread and *expand* are used likewise in a moral application; *diffuse* is seldom used in any other application: *spread* is here, as before, equally indefinite as to the mode of the action; everything *spreads*, and it *spreads* in any way; but *expansion* is that gradual process by which an object opens or unfolds itself after the manner of a flower: *diffusion* is that process of *spreading* which consists literally in pouring out in different ways.

Evils *spread*, and reports *spread*; the mind *expands*, and prospects *expand*; knowledge

diffuses itself, or cheerfulness is *diffused* throughout a company.

See where the winding vale its lavish'd stores
Irriguous *spreads*.—THOMSON.

As from the face of heaven the shatter'd clouds
Tumultuous rove, th' interminable sky
Sublimar swells, and o'er the world *expands*
A purer azure.—THOMSON.

Th' unceasing floods *diffus'd*
In glassy breadth, seem, through delusive lapse,
Forgetful of their course.—THOMSON.

To Spread, Circulate, Propagate, Disseminate.

To *Spread* (v. *To spread, expand*) is said of any object material or spiritual; the rest are mostly employed in the moral application. To *spread* is to extend to an indefinite width; to *Circulate* is to *spread* within a circle; thus news *spreads* through a country; but a story *circulates* in a village, or from house to house, or a report is *circulated* in a neighbourhood. *Spread* and *circulate* are the acts of persons or things; *Propagate* and *Disseminate* are the acts of persons only. The thing *spreads* and *circulates*, or it is *spread* and *circulated* by some one; it is always *propagated* and *disseminated* by some one. *Propagate*, from the Latin *propago* a breed, and *disseminate*, from *semen* a seed, are here figuratively employed as modes of *spreading*, according to the natural operations of increasing the quantity of anything which is implied in the first two terms. What is *propagated* is supposed to generate new subjects; as when doctrines, either good or bad, are *propagated* among the people so as to make them converts: what is *disseminated* is supposed to be sown in different parts; thus principles are *disseminated* among youth.

Love would betwixt the rich and needy stand,
And *spread* heaven's bounty with an equal hand.
WALLER.

Our God, when heaven and earth He did create,
Form'd man, who should of both partake;
If our lives' motions theirs must imitate,
Our knowledge, like our blood, must *circulate*.
DENHAM.

He shall extend his *propagated* sway
Beyond the solar year, without the *starry* way.
DRYDEN.

Nature seems to have taken care to *disseminate* her blessings among the different regions of the world.—ADDISON.

Sprightly, v. Cheerful.

Sprightly, v. Lively.

To Spring, v. To arise.

Spring, Fountain, Source.

Spring denotes that which *springs*; the word, therefore, carries us back to the point from which the water issues. *Fountain*, in Latin *fons* from *fundo* to pour out, signifies the *spring* which is visible on the earth: and *Source* (v. *Origin*) is said of that which is not only visible, but runs along the earth. *Springs* are to be found by digging a sufficient depth in all parts of the earth: in mountainous countries, and also in the East, we read of *fountains* which form themselves, and supply the surrounding parts with refreshing streams: the *sources* of rivers are always to be traced to some mountain.

These terms are all used in a figurative sense: in the Bible the gospel is depictedured as a *spring* of living waters; the eye as a *fountain* of tears. In the general acceptation the term *source* is used for the channel through which any event comes to pass, the primary cause of its happening: war is the *source* of many evils to a country; an imprudent step in the outset of life is oftentimes the *source* of ruin to a young person.

The heart of the citizen is a perennial *spring* of energy to the state.—BURKE.

Eternal king! the author of all being,
Fountain of light, thyself invisible.—MILTON.

These are thy blessings, industry! rough power!
Yet the kind *source* of every gentle art.—THOMSON.

To Spring, Start, Startle, Shrink.

Spring, v. To spring.

Start is in all probability an intensive of *stir*.

Startle is a frequentative of *start*.

Shrink is probably an intensive of *sink*, signifying to sink in to itself.

The idea of a sudden motion is expressed by all these terms, but the circumstances and mode differ in all; *spring* is indefinite in these respects, and is therefore the most general term. To *spring* and *start* may be either voluntary or involuntary movements, but the former is mostly voluntary, and the latter involuntary; a person *springs* out of bed, or one animal *springs* upon another; a person or animal *starts* from a certain point to begin running, or *starts* with fright from one side to the other. To *startle* is always an involuntary action; a horse *starts* by suddenly flying from the point on which he stands; but if he *startles* he seems to fly back on himself and stops his course; to *spring* and *start* therefore always carry a person farther from a given point; but *startle* and *shrink* are movements within one's self; *startling* is a sudden convulsion of the frame which makes a person to stand in hesitation whether to proceed or not; *shrinking* is a contraction of the frame within itself; any sudden and unexpected sound makes a person *startle*; the approach of any frightful object makes him *shrink* back: *spring* and *start* are employed only in the proper sense of corporeal movements: *startle* and *shrink* are employed in regard to the movements of the mind as well as the body.

Death wounds to cure; we fall, we rise, we reign,
Spring from our fetters, and fasten in the skies.
YOUNG.

A shape within the wat'ry gleam appear'd,
Bending to look on me. I *started* back,
It *started* back.—MILTON.

'Tis listening fear and dumb amazement,
When to the *startled* eye the sudden glance
Appears far south, eruptive through the cloud.
THOMSON.

There is a horror in the scene of a ravaged country which makes nature *shrink* back at the reflection.—HERRING.

To Sprinkle, Bedew.

To *Sprinkle* is a frequentative of *spring*, and denotes either an act of nature or design: to *Bedew* is to cover with *dew*, which is an operation of nature. By *sprinkling*, a liquid falls in sensible drops upon the earth; by

bedewing, it covers by imperceptible drops; rain *besprinkles* the earth; dew *bedews* it. So likewise, figuratively, things are *sprinkled* with flour; the cheeks are *bedewed* with tears.

To Sprout, Bud.

Sprout, in Saxon *sprylan*, Low German *sproylen*, is doubtless connected with the German *spritzen* to *sput*, *spreiten* to spread, and the like.

To **Bud** is to put forth *buds*; the noun *bud* is a variation from button, which it resembles in form. To *sprout* is to come forth from the stem; to *bud*, to put forth in *buds*.

Spruce, *v. Finical*.

Spurious, Suppositious, Counterfeit.

Spurious, in Latin *spurius*, or Greek *σπουδαῖος*, that is, one conceived by a woman, because the ancients called the female *spurius*; hence, one who is of uncertain origin on the father's side is termed *spurious*.

Suppositious, from *suppose*, signifies to be supposed or conjectured, in distinction from being positively known.

Counterfeit, *v. To imitate*.

All these terms are modes of the false; the two former indirectly, the latter directly: whatever is uncertain that might be certain, and whatever is conjectural that might be conclusive, are by implication false; that which is made in imitation of another thing, so as to pass for it as the true one, is positively false. Hence, the distinction between these terms, and the ground of their applications. An illegitimate offspring is said to be *spurious* in the literal sense of the word, the father in this case being always uncertain; and any offspring which is termed *spurious* falls necessarily under the imputation of not being the offspring of the person whose name they bear. In the same manner an edition of a work is termed *spurious* which comes out under a false name, or a name different from that in the title-page: *suppositious* expresses more or less of falsehood, according to the nature of the thing. A *suppositious* parent implies little less than a directly false parent; but in speaking of the origin of any person in remote periods of antiquity, it may be merely *suppositious* or conjectural from the want of information. *Counterfeit* respects rather works of art which are exposed to imitation: coin is *counterfeit* which bears a false stamp, and every invention which comes out under the sanction of the inventor's name is likewise a *counterfeit* if not made by himself or by his consent.

Being to take leave of England, I thought it very handsome to take my leave also of you, and my dearly honoured Mother, Oxford; otherwise both of you may have just grounds to cry me up, you for a forgetful friend, she for an ungrateful son, if not some *spurious* issue.—HOWEL.

The fabulous tales of early British history, *suppositious* treaties, and charters are the proofs on which Edward founded his title to the sovereignty of Scotland.—ROBERTSON.

Words may be *counterfeit*,
False coin'd, and current only from the tongue,
Without the mind.—SOUTHERN.

To Spurt, Spout.

To **Spurt** and **Spout** are, like the German *spritzen*, variations of *spreiten* to spread (*v. To spread*), and *springen* to spring (*v. To arise*); they both express the idea of sending forth liquid in small quantities from a cavity; the former, however, does not always include the idea of the cavity, but simply that of springing up; the latter is however confined to the circumstance of issuing forth from some place; dirt may be *spurred* in the face by means of kicking it up; or blood may be *spurred* out of a vein when it is opened, water out of the mouth, and the like; but a liquid *spouts* out from a pipe. To *spurt* is a sudden action arising from a momentary impetus given to a liquid either intentionally or incidentally; the beer will *spurt* from a barrel when the vent-peg is removed; to *spout* is a continued action produced by a perpetual impetus which the liquid receives equally from design or accident; the water *spouts* out from a pipe which is denominated a *spout*, or it will *spurt* out from any cavity in the earth, or in a rock which may resemble a *spout*; a person may likewise *spout* water in a stream from his mouth. Hence the figurative application of these terms; any sudden conceit which compels a person to an eccentric action is a *spurt*, particularly if it springs from ill-humour or caprice; a female will sometimes take a *spurt* and treat her intimate friends very coldly, either from a fancied offence or a fancied superiority; to *spout*, on the other hand, is to send forth a stream of words in imitation of the stream of liquid, and is applied to those who affect to turn-speakers in whom there is commonly more sound than sense.

Far from the parent stream it boils again
Fresh into day, and all the glittering hill
Is bright with spouting rills.—THOMSON.

Spy, *v. Emissary*.

To **Squander**, *v. To spend*.

Squeamish, *v. Fastidious*.

To **Squeeze**, *v. To break*.

To **Squeeze**, *v. To press*.

Stability, *v. Constancy*.

Stable, *v. Firm*.

Staff, Stay, Prop, Support.

From **Staff** in the literal sense (*v. Staff*) comes *staff* in the figurative application; anything may be denominated a *staff* which holds up after the manner of a *staff* particularly as it respects persons; bread is said to be the *staff* of life; one person may serve as a *staff* to another. The *staff* serves in a state of motion; the **Stay** and **Prop** are employed for objects in a state of rest; the *stay* makes a thing *stay* for the time being, it keeps it from falling; it is equally applied to persons and things; we may be a *stay* to a person who is falling by letting his body rest against us; in the same manner buttresses against a wall, and shores against a building serve the purpose of *stays* while they are repairing. For the same reason that part of a female's dress which serves as a

stay to the body is denominated *stays*; the *prop* keeps a thing up for a permanency; every pillar on which a building rests is a *prop*; whatever therefore requires to be raised from the ground and kept in that state may be set upon *props*; between the *stay* and the *prop* there is this obvious distinction, that as the *stay* does not receive the whole weight, it is put so as to receive it indirectly by leaning against the object; but the *prop*, for a contrary reason, is put upright underneath the object so as to receive the weight directly: the derivation of this word *prop*, from the Dutch *proppe* a plug, and the German *pfropfen* a cork, does not seem to account very clearly for its present use in English.

Stay and *prop* may be figuratively extended in their application with the same distinction in their sense; a crust of bread may serve as a *stay* to the stomach; a person's money may serve as a *prop* for the credit of another. *Support* is altogether taken in the moral and abstract sense: whatever *supports*, that is, bears the weight of an object, is a *support*, whether in a state of motion like a *staff* or in a state of rest like a *stay*; whether to bear the weight in part like a *stay*, or altogether like a *prop*, it is still a *support*; but the term is likewise employed on all occasions in which the other terms are not admissible. Whatever *supports* existence, whether directly or indirectly, is a *support*: food is the *support* of the animal body; labour, or any particular employment, is likewise one's *support*, or the indirect means of gaining the *support*; hope is the *support* of the mind under the most trying circumstances; religion, as the foundation of all our hopes, is the best and surest *support* under affliction.

Let shame and confusion then cover me if I do not abhor the intolerable anxiety I well understand to wait inseparably upon that *staff* of going about beguilefully to support any man.—LORD WENTWORTH.

Whatever thy many fingers can entwine,
Proves thy *support* and all its strength is thine,
Tho' nature gave not legs, it gave the hands
By which thy *prop* thy prouder cedar stands.
DENHAM.

If hope precarious, and of things when gain'd
Of little moment and as little *stay*,
Can sweeten toils and dangers into joys,
What then that hope which nothing can defeat?
YOUNG.

Staff, Stick, Crutch.

Staff, in Low German *staff*, &c., in Latin *stipes*, in Greek *στυπη*, comes from *στυψω* *stipo* to fix.

Stick signifies that which can be stuck in the ground.

Crutch, as changed from *cross*, is a *staff* or *stick* which has a cross-bar at the top.

The ruling idea in a *staff* is that of firmness and fixedness, it is employed for leaning upon: the ruling idea in a *stick* is that of sharpness with which it can penetrate, it is used for walking and ordinary purposes; the ruling idea in the *crutch* is its form, which serves the specific purpose of support in case of lameness; a *staff* can never be small, but a *stick* may be large; a *crutch* is in size more of a *staff* than a common *stick*.

To Stagger, Reel, Totter.

Stagger is in all probability a frequentative from the German *steigen*, and the Greek *στοιχειν* to go, signifying to go backward and forward.

To *Reel* signifies to go like a *reel* in a winding manner.

Totter most probably comes from the German *zittern* to tremble, because to *totter* is a tremulous action.

All these terms designate an involuntary and an unsteady motion; they vary both in the cause and the mode of the action; *staggering* and *reeling* are occasioned either by drunkenness or sickness; *tottering* is purely the effect of weakness, particularly the weakness of old age; a drunken man always *staggers* as he walks: one who is giddy *reels* from one part to another: to *stagger* is a much less degree of unsteadiness than to *reel*; for he who *staggers* is only thrown a little out of the straight path, but he who *reels* altogether loses his equilibrium; *reeling* is commonly succeeded by falling. To *stagger* and *reel* are said as to the carriage of the whole body; but *totter* has particular reference to the limbs; the knees and the legs *totter*, and consequently the footsteps become *tottering*. In an extended application, the mountains may be said to *stagger* and to *reel* in an earthquake: the houses may *totter* from their very bases. In a figurative application, the faith or the resolution of a person *staggers* when its hold on the mind is shaken, and begins to give way: a nation or a government will *totter* when it is torn by intestine convulsions.

Nathless it bore his foe not from his sell,
But made him *stagger* as he were not well.
SPENSER.

The clouds, commixt
With stars swift gliding sweep along the sky;
All nature *reels*.—THOMSON.

Troy nods from high, and *totters* to her fall.—DRYDEN.

To *Stagnate*, v. To *stand*.

Stain, v. *Blemish*.

To *Stain*, v. To *colour*.

To Stain, Soil, Sully, Tarnish.

Stain, v. *Blemish*.

Soil and *Sully*, from the French *souiller*, signifies to smear with dirt.

Tarnish, in French *ternir*, probably from the Latin *terere* to bruise.

All these terms imply the act of diminishing the brightness of an object; but the term *stain* denotes something grosser than the other terms, and is applied to inferior objects: things which are not remarkable for purity or brightness may be *stained*, as hands when *stained* with blood, or a wall *stained* with chalk; nothing is *sullied* or *tarnished* but what has some intrinsic value; a fine picture or piece of writing may be easily *soiled* by a touch of the finger; the finest glass is the soonest *tarnished*: hence in the moral application, a man's life may be *stained* by the commission of some gross immorality: his honour may be *sullied*, or his glory *tarnished*.

Thou, rather than thy justice should be stained,
Didst stain the cross.—YOUNG.

I cannot endure to be mistaken or suffer my purer affections to be soiled with the odious attributes of covetousness and ambitious falsehood.—LORD WENTWORTH.

Oaths would debase the dignity of virtue,
Else I could swear by him, the power who clothed
The sun with light, and gave you starry host
Their chaste unsullied lustre.—FRANCIS.

I am not now what I once was; for since I parted from thee, fate has tarnish'd my glories.—TRAPP.

To Stammer, v. To hesitate.

To Stamp, v. Seal.

Stamp, v. Mark.

To Stand, Stop, Rest, Stagnate.

To Stand, in German *stehen*, &c., Latin *sto*, Greek *στημι* to stand, Hebrew *sut* to settle.

Stop, in Saxon *stoppan*, &c., conveys the ideas of pressing, thickening, like the Latin *stipa*, and the Greek *στεφειν*; whence it has been made in English to express immovability.

Rest, v. Ease.

Stagnated, in Latin *stagnatus*, participle of *stagnare*, comes from *stagnum* a pool, and that either from *sto* to stand, because waters stand perpetually in a pool, or from the Greek *στέγνυμι* an inclosure, because a pool is an inclosure for waters.

The absence of motion is expressed by all these terms; *stand* is the most general of all the terms; to stand is simply not to move; to stop is to cease to move: we stand either for want of inclination or power to move; but we stop from a disinclination to go on: to rest is to stop from an express dislike to motion; we may stop for purposes of convenience, or because we have no farther to go, but we rest from fatigue; to stagnate is only a species of standing as respects liquids; water may both stand and stagnate; but the former is a temporary, the latter a permanent stand: water stands in a puddle, but it stagnates in a pond or in any confined space.

All these terms admit of an extended application; business stands still, or there is a stand to business; a mercantile house stops, or stops payment; an affair rests undecided, or rests in the hands of a person; trade stagnates. Stand, stop, and rest are likewise employed transitively, but with a wide distinction in the sense; to stand in this case is to set one's self up to resist; as to stand the trial, to stand the test; to stop has the sense of hinder; as to stop a person who is going on, that is, to make him stop: to rest is to make a thing rest or lean; a person rests his argument upon the supposed innocence of another.

Whither can we run,
Where make a stand?—DRYDEN.

I am afraid should I put a stop now to this design, now that it is so near being completed, I shall find it difficult to resume it.—MELMOTH'S PLINY.

Who rests of immortality assur'd
Is safe, whatever ills are here endur'd.—JENYNS.

This inundation of strangers, which used to be confined to the summer, will stagnate all the winter.—GIBBON.

Standard, v. Criterion.

To Stare, v. To gaze.

To Start, v. To spring.

To Startle, v. To spring.

Stately, v. Magisterial.

State, v. Situation.

State, Realm, Commonwealth.

The **State** is that consolidated part of a nation in which lies its power and greatness.

The **Realm**, from *royaume* a kingdom, is any state whose government is monarchical.

The **Commonwealth** is the grand body of a nation, consisting both of the government and people, which forms the *commonwealth*, *welfare*, or *wealth*.

The ruling idea in the sense and application of the word *state* is that of government in its most abstract sense; affairs of *state* may either respect the internal regulations of a country or it may respect the arrangements of different states with each other. The term *realm* is employed for the nation at large, but confined to such nations as are monarchical and aristocratical; peers of the realm sit in the English parliament by their own right. The term *commonwealth* refers rather to the aggregate body of men, and their possessions, than to the government of a country: it is the business of the minister to consult the interests of the *commonwealth*.

The term *state* is indefinitely applied to all communities, large or small, living under any form of government: a petty principality in Germany, and the whole German or Russian empire, are alike termed *states*. *Realm* is a term of dignity in regard to a nation; France, Germany, England, Russia, are, therefore, with most propriety termed *realms*, when spoken of either in regard to themselves or in general connections. *Commonwealth*, although not appropriately applied to any nation, is most fitted for republics, which have hardly fixedness enough in themselves to deserve the name of *state*.

No man that understands the *state* of Poland, and the United Provinces, will be able to range them under any particular names of government that have been invented.—TEMPLE.

Then Saturn came, who fled the power of Jove,
Robb'd of his realms, and banish'd from above.
—DRYDEN.

Civil dissension is a viperous worm,
That gnaws the bowels of the commonwealth.
—SHAKESPEARE

Station, v. Condition.

Station, v. Place.

Stay, v. Staff.

To Stay, v. To continue.

Steadiness, v. Constancy.

To Steal Away, v. To abscond.

To Steep, v. To soak.

Step, v. Pace.

Stern, v. Austere.

To Stick, Cleave, Adhere.

Stick, in Saxon *stican*, Low German *steken*, Latin *stigo*, Greek *στυγω* to prick, Hebrew *stock* to press.

Cleave, in Saxon *cleofen*, Low German *kliven*, Danish *klæve*, is connected with our words glue and lime, in Latin *gluten*, Greek *κόλλα* lime.

Adhere, *v. To attach.*

To *stick* expresses more than to *cleave*, and *cleave* than *adhere*: things are made to *stick* either by incision into the substance or through the intervention of some glutinous matter; they are made to *cleave* and *adhere* by the intervention of some foreign body: what *sticks*, therefore, becomes so fast joined as to render the bodies inseparable; what *cleaves* and *adheres* is less tightly bound, and more easily separable.

Two pieces of clay will *stick* together by the incorporation of the substance in the two parts; paper is made to *stick* to paper by means of glue: the tongue in a certain state will *cleave* to the roof of the mouth: paste, or even occasional moisture, will make soft substances *adhere* to each other, or to hard bodies. Animals *stick* to bodies by means of their claws; persons in the moral sense *cleave* to each other by never parting company; and they *adhere* to each other by uniting their interests.

Stick is seldom employed in the moral sense, but in the familiar and inelegant style; *cleave* and *adhere* are peculiarly proper in the moral acceptance.

Adieu then, O my soul's far better part,
Thy image *sticks* so close
That the blood follows from my rending heart.
DRYDEN.

Gold and his gains no more employ his mind,
But, driving o'er the billows with the wind,
Cleaves to one faithful plank, and leaves the rest
behind.—ROWE.

That there's a God from nature's voice is clear;
And yet, what errors to this truth *adhere*!—JENYNS.

Stick, *v. Staff.*

To Stick, *v. To fix.*

To Stifle, Suppress, Smother.

Stifle is a frequentative of *stuff*, in Latin *stipo*, and Greek *στυφω* to make tight or close.

Suppress, *v. To repress.*

Smother, as a frequentative of *smut* or *smoke*, signifies to cover with smut or smoke.

Stifle and *smother* in their literal sense will be more properly considered under the article of *Suffocate*, &c. (*v. To suffocate*); they are here taken in a moral application.

The leading idea in all these terms is that of keeping out of view: *stifle* is applicable to the feelings only; *suppress* to the feelings or to outward circumstances; *smother* to outward circumstances only: we *stifle* resentment; we *suppress* anger: the former is an act of some continuance; the latter is the act of the moment: we *stifle* our resentment by abstaining to take any measures of retaliation; we *suppress* the rising emotion of anger, so as not to give it utterance or even the expression of a look. It requires time and powerful motives to *stifle*, but only a single effort to *suppress*; nothing but a long course of vice can enable a man to *stifle* the admonitions and reproaches of conscience; a sense of prudence may some-

times lead a man to *suppress* the joy which an occurrence produces in his mind.

In regard to outward circumstances, we say that a book is *suppressed* by the authority of government; that vice is *suppressed* by the exertions of those who have power: an affair is *smothered* so that it shall not become generally known, or that the fire is *smothered* under the embers.

Art, brainless art! our furlous charioteer
(For nature's voice *unstifed* would recall)
Drives headlong to the precipice of death.—YOUNG.

They foresaw the violence with which this indignation would burst out after being so long *suppressed*.—ROBERTSON.

Great and generous principles not being kept up and cherished, but *smothered* in sensual delights, God snuffers them to sink into low and inglorious satisfaction.—SOUTH.

To Stifle, *v. To suffocate.*

Stigma, *v. Mark.*

To Stimulate, *v. To encourage.*

To Still, *v. To appease.*

Stipend, *v. Allowance.*

To Stir, Move.

Stir, in German *stören*, old German *stiren* or *steren*, Latin *turbo*, Greek *στυβη* or *θορυβη* trouble or tumult.

Move, *v. Motion.*

Stir is here a specific, *move* a generic term; to *stir* is to *move* so as to disturb the rest and composure either of the body or mind; hence the term *stir* is employed to designate an improper or unauthorized motion; children are not allowed to *stir* from their seats in school rooms; a soldier must not *stir* from the post which he has to defend; atrocious criminal, or persons raving mad are bound hand and foot, that they may not *stir*.

At first the groves are scarcely seen to *stir*.—THOMSON.

I've read that things inanimate have *mov'd*,
And as with living souls have been inform'd,
By magic numbers and persuasive sounds.
CONGREVE.

To Stir Up, *v. To awaken.*

Stock, Store.

Stock, from *stick*, *stoke*, *stow*, and *stuff*, signifies any quantity laid up.

Store, in Welsh *stor*, comes from the Hebrew *satar* to hide.

The ideas of wealth and stability being naturally allied, it is not surprising that *stock*, which expresses the latter idea, should also be put for the former, particularly as the abundance here referred to serves as a foundation in the same manner as *stock* in the literal sense does to a tree.

Store likewise implies a quantity; but agreeable to the derivation of the word, it implies an accumulated quantity. Any quantity of materials which is in hand may serve as a *stock* for a given purpose; thus a few shillings with some persons may be their *stock-in-trade*: any quantity of materials brought together for a given purpose may serve as a *store*; thus the industrious ant collects a *store* of grain for the winter: we judge of a man's substantial

property by the *stock* of goods which he has on hand; we judge of a man's disposable property by the *store* which he has. The *stock* is that which must increase of itself; it is the source and foundation of industry: the *store* is that which we must add to occasionally; it is that from which we draw in time of need. By a *stock* we gain riches; by a *store* we guard against want: a *stock* requires skill and judgment to make the proper application: a *store* requires foresight and management to make it against the proper season. It is necessary for one who has a large trade to have a large *stock*, and for him who has no prospect of supply to have a large *store*.

The same distinction subsists between these words in their moral application; he who wishes to speak a foreign language must have a *stock* of familiar words; *stores* of learning are frequently lost to the world for want of means and opportunity to bring them forth to public view.

As verbs, to *stock* and to *store* both signify to provide; but the former is a provision for the present use, and the latter for some future purpose: a tradesman *stocks* himself with such articles as are most saleable; a fortress or a ship is *stored*, a person *stocks* himself with patience, or *stores* his memory with knowledge.

It will not suffice to rally all one's little utmost into one discourse which can constitute a divine. Any man would then quickly be drained: and his short *stock* would serve but for one meeting in ordinary converse; therefore there must be *store*, plenty, and a treasure, lest he turn broker in divinity.—SOUTH.

Stop, v. Cessation.

To Stop, v. To check.

To Stop, v. To hinder.

To Stop, v. To stand.

Store, v. Stock.

Storm, v. Breeze.

Story, v. Anecdote.

Story, Tale.

Story, v. Anecdote.

Tale, v. Fable.

The *story* is either an actual fact or something feigned; the *tale* is always feigned: *stories* are circulated respecting the accidents and occurrences which happen to persons in the same place; *tales* of distress are told by many merely to excite compassion. When both are taken for that which is fictitious, the *story* is either an untruth, or falsifying of some fact, or it is altogether an invention; the *tale* is always an invention. As an untruth, the *story* is commonly told by children; and as a fiction, the *story* is commonly made for children: the *tale* is of deeper invention, formed by men of mature understanding, and adapted for persons of mature years.

Meantime the village rouses up the fire,
While well attested, and as well believed,
Heard solemn, goes the goblin *story* round.

THOMSON.

He makes that pow'r to trembling nations known,
But rarely this, not for each vulgar end,
As superstitious idle *tales* pretend.—JENYNS.

Stout, v. Corpulent.

Strain, Sprain, Stress, Force.

Strain and Sprain are without doubt variations of the same word, namely, the Latin *stringo* to pull tight, or to stretch; they have now, however, a distinct application: to *strain* is to extend beyond its ordinary length by some extraordinary effort; to *sprain* is to *strain* so as to put out of its place, or extend to an injurious length: the ankle and the wrist are liable to be *sprained* by a contusion; the back and other parts of the body may be *strained* by over-exertion.

Strain and *Stress* are kindred terms, as being both variations of stretch and *stringo*; but they differ now very considerably in their application: figuratively we speak of *straining* a nerve, or *straining* a point, to express making great exertions, even beyond our ordinary powers; and morally we speak of laying a *stress* upon any particular measure or mode of action, signifying to give a thing importance: the *strain* (v. *Stress*) may be put for the course of sentiment which we express, and the manner of expressing it; the *stress* (v. *Stress*) may be put for the efforts of the voice in uttering a word or syllable: a writer may proceed in a *strain* of panegyric or invective; a speaker or a reader lays a *stress* on certain words by way of distinguishing them from others. To *strain* is properly a species of **Forcing**; we may *force* in a variety of ways, that is, by the exercise of *forcing* upon different bodies, and in different directions; but to *strain* is to exercise *force* by stretching or prolonging bodies; thus to *strain* a cord is to pull it to its full extent; but we may speak of *forcing* any hard substance in, or *forcing* it out, or *forcing* it through, or *forcing* it from a body: a door or a lock may be *forced* by violently breaking them: but a door or a lock may be *strained* by putting the hinges or the spring out of its place. So likewise, a person may be said to *force* himself to speak, when by a violent exertion he gives utterance to his words; but he *strains* his throat or his voice when he exercises the *force* on the throat or lungs so as to extend them. *Force* and *stress* as nouns are in like manner comparable when they are applied to the mode of utterance: we must use a certain *force* in the pronunciation of every word; this therefore is indefinite and general; but the *stress* is that particular and strong degree of *force* which is exerted in the pronunciation of certain words.

There was then (before the fall) no pining, no struggling with memory, no *straining* for invention.—SOUTH.

Was ever any one observed to come out of a tavern fit for his study, or indeed for anything requiring *stress*?—SOUTH.

Oppose not rage while rage is in its *force*.

SHAKESPEARE.

Strain, v. Stress.

Straight, Right, Direct.

Straight, from the Latin *strictus*, participle of *stringo* to tighten or bind, signifies confined, that is, turning neither to the right nor left. *Straight* is applied, therefore, in its proper sense to corporeal objects; a path which is *straight* is kept within a shorter space than if it were curved. **Right** and

Direct, from the Latin *rectus*, regulated or made as it ought, are said of that which is made by the force of the understanding, or by an actual effort, what one wishes it to be : hence, the mathematician speaks of a *right* line, as the line which lies most justly between two points, and has been made the basis of mathematical figures ; and the moralist speaks of the *right* opinion as that which has been formed by the best rule of the understanding ; and, on the same ground, we speak of a *direct* answer, as that which has been framed so as to bring soonest and easiest to the point desired.

Truth is the shortest and nearest way to our end, carrying us thither in a *straight* line.—TILLOTSON.

Then from pole to pole
He views in breadth, and without longer pause,
Down *right* into the world's first region throws
His flight precipitant.—MILTON.

Hence around the head
Of wandering swain the white-wind'd plover wheels
Her sounding flight, and then directly on
In long excursion skims the level lawn.—THOMSON.

Strait, Narrow.

Strait, in Latin *strictus*, participle of *stringo* to bind close, signifies bound tight, that is, brought into a small compass : **Narrow**, which is a variation of near, expresses a mode of nearness or closeness. *Strait* is a particular term ; *narrow* is general : *straitness* is an artificial mode of narrowness ; a coat is *strait* which is made to compress a body within a small compass : *narrow* is either the artificial or the natural property of a body ; as a *narrow* ribbon, or a *narrow* leaf.

That which is *strait* is so by the means of other bodies ; that which is so of itself, as a piece of water confined close on each side by land, is called a *strait* : whatever is bounded by sides that are near each other is *narrow* ; thus a piece of land whose prolonged sides are at a small distance from each other is *narrow*.

The same distinction applies to these terms in their moral use : a person in *straitened* circumstances is kept, by means of his circumstances, from incurring even expenses ; a person who is in *narrow* circumstances is represented as having but a small extent of property.

A faithless heart, how despicably small,
Too *strait* aught great or generous to receive.
YOUNG.

No *narrow* trith
He had to pass.—MILTON.

Strange, *v. Particular*.

Stranger, Foreigner, Alien.

Stranger, in French *étranger*, Latin *extraneus* or *extra*, in Greek *εξ*, signifies out of, that is, out of another country : **Foreigner**, from *foris* abroad, and **Alien**, from *alienus* another's, have obviously the same original meaning : they have, however, deviated in their acceptations. *Stranger* is a general term, and applies to one not known, or not an inhabitant, whether of the same or another country ; *foreigner* is applied only to *strangers* of another country ; and *alien* is a technical term applied to *foreigners* as subjects or residents, in distinction from natural born sub-

jects. Ulysses, after his return from the Trojan war, was a *stranger* in his own house ; the French are *foreigners* in England, and the English in France ; neither can enjoy, as *aliens*, the same privileges in a *foreign* country as they do in their own : the laws of hospitality require us to treat *strangers* with more ceremony than we do members of the same family, or very intimate friends : the lower orders of the English are apt to treat *foreigners* with an undeserved contempt ; every *alien* is obliged, in time of war, to have a license for residing in England.

From *stranger* and *alien* come the verbs to *estrangle* and *alienate*, which are extended in their meaning and application ; the former signifying to make the understanding or mind of a person *strange* to an object, and the latter to make the heart or affections of one person *strange* to another : thus we may say that the mind becomes *alienated* from one object, when it has fixed its affections on another ; or a person *estranges* himself from his family.

Worldly and corrupt men *estrangle* themselves from all that is divine.—BLAIR.

All the distinctions of this little life
Are quite cutaneous, quite *foreign* to the man.
YOUNG.

Like you an *alien* in a land unknown,
I learn to pity woes so like my own.—DRYDEN.

Stratagem, *v. Artifice*.

To Stray, *v. To deviate*.

Stream, Current, Tide.

A fluid body in a progressive motion is the object described in common by these terms : **Stream** is the most general, the other two are but modes of the *stream* : *stream*, in Saxon *stream*, in German *strom*, is an onomatopoeia which describes the prolongation of any body in a narrow line along the surface ; a **Current**, from *curro* to run, is a running *stream* ; and a **Tide**, from *tide*, in German *zeit* time, is a periodical *stream* or *current*. All rivers are *streams* which are more or less gentle, according to the nature of the ground through which they pass ; the force of the *current* is very much increased by the confinement of any water between rocks, or by means of artificial impediments : the *tide* is high or low, strong or weak, at different hours of the day ; when the *tide* is high the *current* is strongest.

From knowing the proper application of these terms, their figurative use becomes obvious : a *stream* of air, or a *stream* of light, is a prolonged body of air or light : a *current* of air is a continued *stream* that has rapid motion : streets and passages, which are open at each extremity, are the channels of such *currents* : in the moral sense the *tide* is the ruling fashion or propensity of the day ; it is in vain to stem the *tide* of folly, it is wiser to get out of its reach.

When now the rapid *stream* of eloquence
Bears all before it, passion, reason, sense,
Can its dread thunder, or its lightning's force,
Derive their essence from a mortal source ?
JENYNS.

With secret course, which no loud storms annoy,
Glides the smooth *current* of domestic joy.
GOLDSMITH.

There is a *tide* in the affairs of men
Which taken at the flood leads on to fortune.
SHAKESPEARE.

To Stream, *v. To flow.*

Strength, *v. Power.*

To Strengthen, Fortify, Invigorate.

Strengthen, from *strength*, and **Fortify**, from *fortis* and *facio*, signify to make strong: **Invigorate** signifies to put in vigour (*v. Energy*).

Whatever adds to the *strength*, be it in ever so small a degree, *strengthens*; exercise *strengthens* either body or mind: whatever gives *strength* for a particular emergence *fortifies*; religion *fortifies* the mind against adversity: whatever adds to the *strength* so as to give a positive degree of *strength*, *invigorates*; morning exercise in fine weather *invigorates*.

There is a certain bias towards knowledge, in every mind, which may be *strengthened* and improved.—BUDGE.

This relation will not be wholly without its use, if those who languish under any part of its sufferings shall be enabled to *fortify* their patience by reflecting that they feel only those afflictions from which the abilities of Savage could not exempt him.—JOHNSON.

For much the pack
(Rous'd from their dark alcoves) delight to stretch
And bask in his *invigorating* ray.—SOMERVILLE.

Strenuous, Bold.

Strenuous, in Latin *strenuus*, from the Greek *σπηνης* undaunted, untamed, that is, *σπηνιος* to be without all rein or control.

Bold, *v. Bold*.

Strenuous expresses much more than *bold*; *boldness* is a prominent idea, but it is only one idea which enters into the signification of *strenuousness*; it combines likewise fearlessness, activity, and ardour. An advocate in a cause may be *strenuous*, or merely *bold*: in the former case he omits nothing that can be either said or done in favour of the cause, he is always on the alert, he heeds no difficulties or danger; but in the latter case he only displays his spirit in the undisguised declaration of his sentiments. *Strenuous* supporters of any opinion are always strongly convinced of the truth of that which they support, and warmly impressed with a sense of its importance; but the *bold* supporter of an opinion may be impelled rather with the desire of showing his *boldness* than maintaining his point.

While the good weather continued, I strolled about the country, and made many *strenuous* attempts to run away from this odious giddiness.—BEATTIE.

Fortune befriends the *bold*.—DRYDEN.

Stress, *v. Strain*.

Stress, Strain, Emphasis, Accent.

Stress, *v. Strain*.

Strain, *v. Strain*.

Emphasis, from the Greek *ἐμψυω* to appear, signifies making to appear.

Accent, in Latin *accentus*, from *canto* to sing, signifies to suit the tune or tone of the voice.

Stress and *strain* are general both in sense and application: the former still more than the latter: *emphasis* and *accent* are modes of

the *stress*. *Stress* is applicable to all bodies, the powers of which may be tried by exertion; as the *stress* upon a rope, upon the shaft of a carriage, a wheel or spring in a machine; the *strain* is an excessive *stress*, by which a thing is thrown out of its course: there may be a *strain* in most cases where there is a *stress*: but *stress* and *strain* are to be compared with *emphasis* and *accent*, particularly in the exertion of the voice, in which case the *stress* is a strong and special exertion of the voice, on one word, or one part of a word, so as to distinguish it from another; but the *strain* is the undue exertion of the voice beyond its usual pitch, in the utterance of one or more words: we lay a *stress* for the convenience of others; but when we *strain* the voice it is as much to the annoyance of others as it is hurtful to ourselves. The *stress* may consist in an elevation of voice, or a prolonged utterance; the *emphasis* is that species of *stress* which is employed to distinguish one word or syllable from another: the *stress* may be accidental; but the *emphasis* is an intentional *stress*: ignorant people and children are often led to lay the *stress* on little and unimportant words in a sentence; speakers sometimes find it convenient to mark particular words, to which they attach a value, by the *emphasis* with which they utter them. The *stress* may be casual or regular, on words or syllables; the *accent* is that kind of regulated *stress* which is laid on one syllable to distinguish it from another: there are many words in our own language, such as subject, object, present, and the like, where to distinguish the verb from the noun, the *accent* falls on the last syllable for the former, and on the first syllable for the latter.

Singing differs from vociferation in this, that it consists in a certain harmony; nor is it performed with so much *straining* of the voice.—JAMES.

Those English syllables which I call long ones receive a peculiar *stress* of voice from their acute or circumflex *accent*, as in quickly, dōwry.—FOSTER.

The correctness and harmony of English verse depends entirely upon its being composed of a certain number of syllables, and its having the *accents* of those syllables properly placed.—TYRWHITT.

In reference to the use of words, these terms may admit of a farther distinction; for we may lay a *stress* or *emphasis* on a particular point of our reasoning, in the first case, by enlarging upon it longer than on other points; or, in the second case, by the use of stronger expressions or epithets. The *strain* or *accent* may be employed to designate the tone or manner in which we express ourselves, that is, the spirit of our discourse: in familiar language, we talk of a person's proceeding in a *strain* of panegyric, or of censure; but, in poetry, persons are said to pour forth their complaints in tender *accents*.

After such a mighty *stress*, so irrationally laid upon two slight, empty words ("self-consciousness" and "mutual consciousness") have they made anything but the author himself (Sherlock on the Trinity) better understood?—SOUTH.

The idle, who are neither wise for this world nor the next, are *emphatically* called, by Doctor Tillotson, "Fools at large."—SPECTATOR.

An assured hope of future glory raises him to a pursuit of a more than ordinary *strain* of duty and perfection.—SOUTH.

For thee my tuneless accents will I raise.—DRYDEN.

To Stretch, *v. To reach*.

Strict, Severe.

Strict, from *strictus* bound or confined, characterizes the thing which binds or keeps in control: **Severe** (*v. Austere*) characterizes in the proper sense the disposition of the person to inflict pain, and in an extended application the thing which inflicts pain. The term *strict* is, therefore, taken always in the good sense; *severe* is good or bad, according to circumstances: he who has authority over others must be *strict* in enforcing obedience, in keeping good order, and a proper attention to their duties; but it is possible to be very *severe* in punishing those who are under us, and yet very lax in all matters that our duty demands of us.

Lycurgus then, who bow'd beneath the force
Of strictest discipline, severely wise,
All human passions.—THOMSON.

Strife, *v. Contention*.

Strife, *v. Discord*.

To Strike, *v. To beat*.

To Strip, *v. To bereave*.

To Strive, *v. To contend*.

Stroke, *v. Blow*.

To Strôll, *v. To wander*.

Stricture, *v. Animadversion*.

Strong, *v. Cogent*.

Strong, Firm, Robust, Sturdy.

Strong is in all probability a variation of *strict*, which is in German *streng*, because strength is altogether derived from the close texture of bodies.

Robust, in Latin *robustus*, from *robur*, signifies literally having the strength of oak.

Sturdy, like the word stout, steady (*v. Firm*), comes in all probability from *stehen* to stand, signifying capable of standing.

Strong is here the generic term; the others are specific, or specify strength under different circumstances; *robust* is a positive and high degree of strength, arising from a peculiar bodily make; *sturdy* indicates not only strength of body but also of mind: a man may be *strong* from the strength of his constitution, from the power which is inherent in his frame; but a *robust* man has strength both from the size and texture of his body, he has a bone and nerve which is endowed with great power. A little man may be *strong*, although not *robust*; a tall, stout man, in full health, may be termed *robust*.

A man may be *strong* in one part of his body and not in another: he may be *stronger* at one time, from particular circumstances, than he is at another; but a *robust* man is *strong* in his whole body: and as he is *robust* by nature, he will cease to be so only from disease.

Sturdiness lies both in the make of the body and the temper of the mind: a *sturdy* man is capable of making resistance and ready to make it; he must be naturally *strong*, and not of slender make, but he need not be *robust*: a *sturdy* peasant presents us with a man who,

both by nature and habit, is formed for withstanding the inroads of an enemy.

Every object is termed *strong* which is the reverse of weak; persons only are termed *robust* who have every bodily requisite to make them more than ordinarily *strong*; persons only are *sturdy* whose habits of life qualify them both for action and for endurance.

If thou hast strength, 'twas heaven that strength
bestow'd.—POPE.

The huntsman ever gay, robust, and bold,
Defies the noxious vapour.—SOMERVILLE.

Beneath their sturdy strokes the billows roar.
DRYDEN.

Structure, *v. Edifice*.

Stubborn, *v. Obstinate*.

Study, *v. Attention*.

Stupid, Dull.

Stupid, in Latin *stupidus*, from *stupeo* to be amazed or bewildered, expresses an amazement which is equivalent to a deprivation of understanding: **Dull**, through the medium of the German *toll* and Swedish *stöttig*, comes from the Latin *stultus* simple or foolish, and denotes a simple deficiency. *Stupidity* in its proper sense is natural to a man, although a particular circumstance may have a similar effect upon the understanding; he who is questioned in the presence of others may appear very *stupid* in that which is otherwise very familiar to him. *Dull* is an incidental quality, arising principally from the state of the animal spirits: a writer may sometimes be *dull* who is otherwise vivacious and pointed; a person may be *dull* in a large circle while he is very lively in private intercourse.

A stupid butt is only fit for the conversation of ordinary people.—ADDISON.

It is the great advantage of a trading nation that there are very few in it so *dull* and heavy who may not be placed in stations of life which may give them an opportunity of making their fortunes.—ADDISON.

Sturdy, *v. Strong*.

To Stutter, *v. To hesitate*.

Style, *v. Diction*.

Suavity, Urbanity.

Suavity is literally sweetness; and **Urbanity** the refinement of the city, in distinction from the country: inasmuch, therefore, as a polite education tends to soften the mind and the manners, it produces *suavity*; but *suavity* may sometimes arise from natural temper, and exist, therefore, without *urbanity*; although there cannot be *urbanity* without *suavity*. By the *suavity* of our manners we gain the love of those around us; by the *urbanity* of our manners we render ourselves agreeable companions; hence also arises another distinction that the term *suavity* may be applied to other things, as the voice, or the style; but *urbanity* to manners only.

The *suavity* of Menander's style might be more to Plutarch's taste than the irregular sublimity of Aristophanes.—CUMBERLAND.

The virtue called *urbanity* by the moralists, or a courtly behaviour, consists in a desire to please the company.—POPE.

To Subdue, *v.* To conquer.

To Subdue, *v.* To overbear.

To Subdue, *v.* To subject.

Subject, *v.* Matter.

Subject, *v.* Object.

Subject, Liable, Exposed, Obnoxious.

Subject, in Latin *subjectus*, participle of *subjicio* to cast under, signifies thrown underneath.

Liable, compounded of *lie* and *able*, signifies ready to lie near or lie under.

Exposed, in Latin *expositus*, participle of *expono*, compounded of *ex* and *pono*, signifies set out, set within the view or reach.

Obnoxious, in Latin *obnoxius*, compounded of *ob* and *noxiam* mischief, signifies in the way of mischief.

All these terms are applied to those circumstances in human life by which we are affected independently of our own choice. Direct necessity is included in the term *subject*; whatever we are obliged to suffer, that we are *subject* to; we may apply remedies to remove the evil, but often in vain: *liable* conveys more the idea of casualties; we may suffer that which we are *liable* to, but we may also escape the evil if we are careful: *exposed* conveys the idea of a passive state into which we may be brought either through our own means or through the instrumentality of others: we are *exposed* to that which we are not in a condition to keep off from ourselves; it is frequently not in our power to guard against the evil; *obnoxious* conveys the idea of a state into which we have altogether brought ourselves; we may avoid bringing ourselves into the state, but we cannot avoid the consequences which will ensue from being thus involved. We are *subject* to disease, or *subject* to death; this is the irrevocable law of our nature; tender people are *liable* to catch cold; all persons are *liable* to make mistakes: a person is *exposed* to insults who provokes the anger of a low-bred man; a minister sometimes renders himself *obnoxious* to the people, that is, puts himself in the way of their animosity.

To *subject* and *expose*, as verbs, are taken in the same sense: a person *subjects* himself to impertinent freedoms by descending to indecent familiarities with his inferiors: he *exposes* himself to the derision of his equals by an affectation of superiority.

The devout man aspires after some principles of more perfect felicity which shall not be *subject* to change or decay.—BLAIR.

The sinner is not only *liable* to that disappointment of success which so often frustrates all the designs of men, but *liable* to a disappointment still more cruel, of being successful and miserable at once.—BLAIR.

On the bare earth *expos'd* he lies,
With not a friend to close his eyes.—DRYDEN.

And much he blames the softness of his mind,
Obnoxious to the charms of woman kind.

DRYDEN.

Subject, Subordinate, Inferior, Subservient.

Subject, *v.* Subject.

Subordinate, compounded of *sub* and *order*, signifies to be in an order that is under others.

Inferior, in Latin *inferior*, comparative of *inferus* low, which probably comes from *infero* to cast into, because we are cast into places that are low.

Subservient, compounded of *sub* and *servio*, signifies serving under something else.

These terms may either express the relation between persons to persons or things to things. *Subject* in the first case respects the exercise of power; *subordinate* is said of the station and office; *inferior*, either of a man's outward circumstances or of his merits and qualifications; *subservient*, of one's relative services to another, but always in a bad sense. According to the law of nature, a child should be subject to his parents, according to the law of God and man he must be *subject* to his prince: the good order of society cannot be rightly maintained unless there be some to act in a *subordinate* capacity; men of *inferior* talent have a part to act which, in the aggregate, is of no less importance than that which is sustained by men of the highest endowments: men of no principle or character will be most *subservient* to the base purposes of those who pay them best. It is the part of the prince to protect the *subject*, and of the *subject* to love and honour the prince; it is the part of the exalted to treat the *subordinate* with indulgence; and of the latter to show respect to those under whom they are placed; it is the part of the superior to instruct, assist, and encourage the *inferior*; it is the part of the latter to be willing to learn, ready to obey, and prompt to execute. It is not necessary for any one to act the degrading part of being *subservient* to another.

In the second instance *subject* has the same sense as in the preceding article (*v.* *Subject*), where it is taken to express the relation of persons to things; *subordinate* designates the degree of relative importance between things: *inferior* designates every circumstance which can render things comparatively higher or lower; *subservient* designates the relative utility of things under certain circumstances, but not always in the bad sense. All things in this world are *subject* to change; matters of *subordinate* consideration ought to be entirely set out of the question when any grand object is to be obtained: things of *inferior* value must necessarily sell for an *inferior* price: there is nothing so insignificant but it may be made *subservient* to some purpose.

Contemplate the world as *subject* to the Divine dominion.—BLAIR.

The idea of pain in its highest degree is much stronger than the highest degree of pleasure, and preserves the same superiority through all the *subordinate* gradations.—BURKE.

I can myself remember the time when in respect of music our reigning taste was in many degrees *inferior* to the French.—SHAFTESBURY.

Though a writer may be wrong himself, he may chance to make his errors *subservient* to the cause of truth.—BURKE.

To Subject, Subjugate, Subdue.

Subject signifies to make subject.

Subjugate, from *jugum* a yoke, signifies to bring under the yoke.

Subdue, v. To conquer.

Subject is here the generic; the two others specific terms: we may *subject* either individuals or nations; but we *subjugate* only nations. We *subject* ourselves to reproof, to inconvenience, or to the influence of our passions: one nation *subjugates* another; *subjugate* and *subdue* are both employed with regard to nations that are compelled to submit to the conqueror: but *subjugate* expresses even more than *subdue*, for it implies to bring into a state of permanent submission: whereas to *subdue* may be only a nominal and temporary subjection: Cæsar *subjugated* the Gauls, for he made them subjects to the Roman empire; but Alexander *subdued* the Indian nations, who revolted after his departure.

Where there is no awe, there will be no *subjection*.

SOUTH.

O fav'rite virgin, that hast warm'd the breast
Whose sov'reign dictates *subjugate* the east.—PRIOR.

Thy son (nor is th' appointed season far)
In Italy shall wage successful war,
Till, after every foe *subdu'd*, the sun
Thrice through the signs his annual race shall run.
DRYDEN.

To Subjoin, v. To affix.**To Subjugate, v. To subject.****Sublime, v. Great.****Submissive, v. To comply.****Submissive, v. Humble.****Submissive, v. Obedient.****Submissive, v. Passive.****To Submit, v. To comply.****Subordinate, v. Subject.****To Suborn, v. To foment.****Subservient, v. Subject.****To Subside, Abate, Intermit.**

Subside, from the Latin *sub* and *sedeo*, signifies to settle to the bottom.

Abate, v. Abate.

Intermit, from the Latin *inter* and *mitto*, signifies to leave a space or interval between.

A settlement after agitation is the peculiar meaning of *subside*. That which has been put into commotion *subsides*; heavy particles *subside* in a fluid that is at rest, and tumults are said to *subside*: a diminution of strength characterizes the meaning of *abate*; that which has been high in action may *abate*; the rain *abates* after it has been heavy; and a man's anger *abates*: alternate action and rest is implied in the word *intermit*; whatever is in action may sometimes cease from action; labour without *intermission* is out of the power of man.

It was not long before this joy *subsided* in the remembrance of that dignity from which I had fallen.—HAWKESWORTH.

But first to heav'n thy due devotions pay,
And annual gifts on Ceres' altar lay,
When winter's rage *abates*.—DRYDEN.

Whether the time of *intermission* be spent in company or in solitude, the understanding is abstracted from the object of inquiry.—JOHNSON.

To Subsist, v. To be.**Subsistence, v. Livelihood.****Substantial, Solid.**

Substantial signifies having a substance: **Solid** signifies having a firm substance. The *substantial* is opposed to that which is thin and has no consistency; the *solid* is opposed to the liquid, or that which is of loose consistency. All objects which admit of being handled are in their nature *substantial*; those which are of so hard a texture as to require to be cut are *solid*. *Substantial* food is that which has a consistency in itself, and is capable of giving fulness to the empty stomach; *solid* food is meat in distinction from drink.

In the moral application an argument is said to be *substantial* which has weight in itself; a reason is *solid* which has a high degree of *substantiality*.

Trusting in its own native and *substantial* worth
Scorns all meretricious ornaments.—MILTON.

As the swollen column of ascending smoke,
So *solid* swells thy grandeur, pigmy man.—YOUNG.

To Substitute, v. To change.**Subterfuge, v. Evasion.****Subtle, v. Cunning.****To Subtract, v. To deduct.****To Subvert, v. To overturn.****To Succeed, v. To follow.****Successful, v. Fortunate.****Succession, Series, Order.**

Succession signifies the act or state of *succeeding* (v. *To follow*).

Series, v. Series.**Order, v. To place.**

Succession is a matter of necessity or casualty: things *succeed* each other, or they are taken in *succession* either arbitrarily or by design: the *series* is a connected *succession*; the *order*, the *ordered* or arranged *succession*. We observe the *succession* of events as a matter of curiosity; we trace the *series* of events as a matter of intelligence; we follow the *order* which the historian has pursued as a matter of judgment: the *succession* may be slow or quick; the *series* may be long or short; the *order* may be correct or incorrect. The present age has afforded a quick *succession* of events, and presented us with a *series* of atrocious attempts to disturb the peace of society under the name of liberty. The historian of these times needs only pursue the *order* which the events themselves point out.

We can conceive of time only by the *succession* of ideas one to another.—HAWKESWORTH.

A number of distinct fables may contain all the topics of moral instruction; yet each must be remembered by a distinct effort of the mind, and will not recur in a *series*, because they have no connection with each other.—HAWKESWORTH.

In all versæ, however familiar and easy, the words are necessarily thrown out of the *order* in which they are commonly used.—HAWKESWORTH.

Successive, Alternate.

What is **Successive** follows directly; what is **Alternate** follows indirectly. A minister preaches *successively* who preaches every Sunday uninterruptedly at the same hour; but he preaches *alternately* if he preaches on one Sunday in the morning, and the other Sunday in the afternoon at the same place. The *successive* may be accidental or intentional; the *alternate* is always intentional: it may rain for three successive days, or a fair may be held for three successive days: trees are placed sometimes in *alternate* order, when every other tree is of the same size and kind.

Think of a hundred solitary streams peacefully gliding between amazing cliffs on one side and rich meadows on the other, gradually swelling into noble rivers, *successively* losing themselves in each other, and all at length terminating in the harbour of Plymouth.—GIBBON.

Suffer me to point out one great essential towards acquiring facility in composition: viz., the writing *alternately* in different measures.—SEWARD.

Succinct, v. Short.

To Succour, v. To help.

To Suffer, v. To admit.

To Suffer, v. To let.

To Suffer, Bear, Endure, Support.

Suffer, in Latin *suffero*, compounded of *sub* and *fero*, signifies bearing up or firm underneath.

Bear, v. To bear.

Endure, in Latin *induro*, signifies to harden or be hardened.

Support, from the Latin *sub* and *porto*, signifies to carry up or to carry from underneath ourselves, or to receive the weight.

To *suffer* is a passive and involuntary act; it denotes simply the being a receiver of evil; it is therefore the condition of our being: to *bear* is positive and voluntary; it denotes the manner in which we receive the evil. "Man," says the Psalmist, "is born to *suffering* as the sparks fly upwards;" hence the necessity for us to learn to *bear* all the numerous and diversified evils to which we are obnoxious.

To *bear* is a single act of the resolution, and relates only to common ills; we *bear* disappointments and crosses: to *endure* is a continued and powerful act of the mind: we *endure* severe and lasting pains both of body and mind; we *endure* hunger and cold; we *endure* provocations and aggravations; it is a making ourselves by our own act invulnerable to external evils. The first object of education should be to accustom children to *bear* contradictions and crosses, that they may afterwards be enabled to *endure* every trial and misery.

To *bear* and *endure* signify to receive becomingly the weight of what befalls ourselves: to *support* signifies to *bear* either our own or another's evils; for we may either *support* ourselves, or be supported by others: but in this latter case we *bear*, from the capacity which is within ourselves; but we *support* ourselves by foreign aid, that is, by the consolations of religion, the participation and condolence of friends, and the like. As the

body may be early and gradually trained to *bear* cold, hunger, and pain, until it is enabled to *endure* even excruciating agonies, so may the mind be brought, from *bearing* the roughnesses of others' tempers with equanimity, or the unpleasantnesses which daily occur, with patience, to *endure* the utmost scorn and provocation which human malice can invent: but whatever a person may *bear* or *endure* of personal inconvenience, there are *sufferings* arising from the wounded affections of the heart which by no efforts of our own we shall be enabled to *support*: in such moments we feel the unspeakable value of religion, which puts us in possession of the means of *supporting* every sublimary pain.

The words *suffer* and *endure* are said only of persons and personal matters; to *bear* and *support* are said also of things, signifying to receive a weight: in this case they differ principally in the degree of weight received. To *bear* is said of any weight, large or small, and either of the whole or any part of the weight; *support* is said of a great weight and the whole weight. The beams or the foundation *bear* the weight of a house; but the pillars upon which it is raised, or against which it leans, *support* the weight.

Let a man be brought into some such severe and trying situation as fixes the attention of the public on his behaviour. The first question which we put concerning him is not, what does he *suffer*? but, how does he *bear* it? If we judge him to be composed and firm, resigned to Providence, and supported by conscious integrity, his character rises, and his miseries lessen in our view.—BLAIR.

How miserable his state who is condemned to *endure* at once the pangs of guilt and the vexations of calamity.—BLAIR.

Sufficient, v. Enough.

To Suffocate, Stifle, Smother, Choak.

Suffocate, in Latin *suffocatus*, participle of *suffoco*, compounded of *sub* and *faxo*, signifies to constrain or tighten the throat.

Stifle is a frequentative of *stuff*, that is, to stuff excessively.

Smother is a frequentative of *smoke*.

Choak is probably a variation of *cheek*, in Saxon *ceac*, because strangulation is effected by a compression of the throat under the cheek-bone.

These terms express the act of stopping the breath, but under various circumstances and by various means; *suffocation* is produced by every kind of means, external or internal, and is therefore the most general of these terms; *stifling* proceeds by internal means, that is, by the admission of foreign bodies into the passages which lead to the respiratory organs: we may be *suffocated* by excluding the air externally, as by gagging, confining closely, or pressing violently: we may be *suffocated* or *stified* by means of vapours, close air, or smoke. To *smother* is to *suffocate* by the exclusion of air externally, as by covering a person entirely with bed-clothes: to *choak* is a mode of *stifling* by means of large bodies, as a piece of food lodging in the throat or the larynx.

A *suffocating* wind the pilgrim smites
With instant death.—THOMSON.

When my heart was ready with a sigh to cleave,
I have, with mighty anguish of my soul,
Just at the birth stifled this still-born sigh.

SHAKESPEARE.

The love of jealous men breaks out furiously (when the object of their loves is taken from them) and throws off all mixtures of suspicion which choked and smothered it before.—ADDISON.

Suffrage, v. Vote.

To Suggest, v. To allude.

To Suggest, v. To hint.

Suggestion, v. Dictate.

To Suit, v. To agree.

To Suit, v. To fit.

Suit, v. Prayer.

Suitable, v. Becoming.

Suitable, v. Conformable.

Suitable, v. Convenient.

Suitable, v. Correspondent.

Suitor, v. Lover.

Sullen, v. Gloomy.

To Sully, v. To stain.

Summary, v. Abridgement.

Summary, v. Short.

To Summons, v. To call.

To Summon, v. To cite.

Sundry, v. Different.

Superficial, Shallow, Flimsy.

The **Superficial** is that which lies only at the surface; it is therefore by implication the same as the **Shallow**, which has nothing underneath: *shallow* being a variation of hollow or empty. Hence a person may be called either *superficial* or *shallow*, to indicate that he has not a profundity of knowledge, but otherwise, *superficiality* is applied to the exercise of the thinking faculty, and *shallow ness* to its extent. Men of free sentiments are *superficial* thinkers, although they may not have understandings more *shallow* than others. *Superficial* and *shallow* are applicable to things as well as persons: **Flimsy** is applicable to things only. *Flimsy* most probably comes from flame, that is, flamy, showy, easily seen through. In the proper sense we may speak of giving a *superficial* covering of paint or colour to a body; of a river or piece of water being *shallow*; of cotton or cloth being *flimsy*. In the improper sense, a survey or a glance may be *superficial* which does not extend beyond the *superficies* of things; a conversation or a discourse may be *shallow* which does not contain a body of sentiment; and a work or performance may be *flimsy* which has nothing solid in it to engage the attention.

By much labour we acquire a *superficial* acquaintance with a few sensible objects.—BLAIR.

I know thee to thy bottom; from within
Thy *shallow* centre to the utmost skin.—DRYDEN.

Superficies, v. Surface.

Superfluity, v. Excess.

Superintendency, v. Inspection.

Superiority, v. Excellence.

To Supersede, v. To overrule.

Supine, v. Indolent.

Supple, v. Flexible.

To Supplicate, v. To beg.

To Supply, v. To provide.

To Support, v. To countenance.

To Support, v. To hold.

Support, v. Livelihood.

Support, v. Staff.

To Support, v. To suffer.

To Support, v. To second.

To Support, v. To sustain.

To Suppose, v. To conceive.

To Suppose, v. To think.

Supposition, v. Conjecture.

Suppositious, v. Spurious.

To Suppress, v. To repress.

To Suppress, v. To stifle.

Sure, v. Certain.¹

Surface, Superficies.

Surface, compounded of *sur* for *super* and *face*, is a variation of the Latin term **Superficies**; and yet they have acquired this distinction, that the former is the vulgar and the latter the scientific term; of course the former has a more indefinite and general application than the latter. A *surface* is either even or uneven, smooth or rough; but the mathematician always conceives of a *plane superficies* on which he founds his operations.

Nor to the *surface* of enlivened earth,
Graceful with hills and dales and leafy woods,
Her liberal tresses, is thy force confined.

THOMSON.

Those who have undertaken the task of reconciling mankind to their present state frequently remind us that we view only the *superficies* of life.—JOHNSON.

Surge, v. Wave.

Surmise, v. Conjecture.

To Surmount, v. To conquer.

To Surpass, v. To exceed.

To Surprise, v. To wonder.

To Surrender, v. To give up.

To Surround, Encompass, Environ, Encircle.

Surround, in old French *surround*, signifies, by means of the intensive syllable *sur* over, to go all round.

Encompass, compounded of *en* or *in* and *compass*, signifies to bring within a certain compass formed by a circle: so likewise **Environ**, from the Latin *gyrus*, and the Greek *γυρος* a circle, and also **Encircle**, signify to bring within a circle.

Surround is the most literal and general of all these terms, which signify to inclose any object either directly or indirectly. We may *surround* an object by standing at certain distances all round it: in this manner a town, a house, or a person may be *surrounded* by other persons, or an object may be *surrounded* by inclosing it in every direction, and at every point; in this manner a garden is *surrounded* by a wall. To *encompass* is to *surround* in the latter sense, and applies to objects of a great or indefinite extent; the earth is *encompassed* by the air, which we term the atmosphere: towns are *encompassed* by walls. To *surround* is to go round an object of any form, whether square or circular, long or short; but to *environ* and to *encircle* carry with them the idea of forming a circle round an object; thus a town or a valley may be *enviored* by hills, a basin of water may be *encircled* by trees, or the head may be *encircled* by a wreath of flowers.

In an extended or moral sense we are said to be *surrounded* by objects which are in great numbers, and in different directions about us: thus a person living in a particular spot where he has many friends may say he is *surrounded* by his friends; so likewise a particular person may say that he is *surrounded* by dangers and difficulties: but in speaking of man in a general sense, we should rather say he is *encompassed* by dangers, which expresses in a much stronger manner our peculiarly exposed condition.

But not to me returns
Day, or the sweet approach of ev'n or morn,
But cloud instead, and ever-during dark
Surrounds me.—MILTON.

Where Orpheus on his lyre laments his love,
With beasts *encompass'd*, and a dancing grove.
—DRYDEN.

Of fighting elements, on all sides round
Environ'd.—MILTON.

As in the hollow breast of Appenine,
Beneath the shelter of *encircling* hills,
A myrtle rises, far from human eye;
So flourish'd, blooming, and unseen by all,
The sweet Lavinia.—THOMSON.

Survey, v. Retrospect.

Survey, v. View.

To Survive, v. To outlive.

Susceptibility, v. Feeling.

Suspense, v. Doubt.

To Sustain, Support, Maintain.

Sustain, compounded of *sus* or *sub* and *teneo* to hold, signifies to hold or keep up.

Support, v. To countenance.

Maintain, v. To assert.

The idea of exerting one's-self to keep an object from sinking is common to all these terms, which vary either in the mode or the object of the action. To *sustain* and *support* are passive, and imply that we bear the weight of something pressing upon us; *maintain* is active, and implies that we exert ourselves so as to keep it from pressing upon us. We *sustain* a load; we *support* a burden; we *maintain* a contest. The principal difficulty in an engagement is often to *sustain* the first shock of the attack; a soldier has not merely

to *support* the weight of his arms, but to *maintain* his post. What is *sustained* is often temporary; what is *supported* is mostly permanent: a loss or an injury is *sustained*; pain, distress, and misfortunes are *supported*; *maintain*, on the other hand, is mostly something of importance or advantage; credit must always be *maintained*.

We must *sustain* a loss with tranquillity; we must *support* an affliction with equanimity; we must *maintain* our own honour, and that of the community to which we belong, by the rectitude of our conduct.

With labour spent, no longer can be wield
The heavy falchion, or *sustain* the shield,
O'erwhelm'd with darts.—DRYDEN.

Let this *support* and comfort you, that you are the father of ten children, among whom there is one to be but one soul of love and obedience.—LYTTLETON.

As compass'd with a wood of spears around,
The lordly lion still *maintains* his ground,
So Turnus fares.—DRYDEN.

Sustenance, v. Livelihood.

To Swallow Up, v. To absorb.

Sway, v. Influence.

To Swell, v. To heave.

Swiftness, v. Quickness.

Sycophant, v. Flatterer.

Symmetry, Proportion.

Symmetry, in Latin *symmetria*, Greek *συμμετρία* from *συν* and *μετρον*, signifies a measure that accords.

Proportion, in Latin *proportio*, compounded of *pro* and *portio*, signifies every portion or part according with the other, or with the whole.

The signification of these terms is obviously the same, namely, a due admeasurement of the parts to each other and to the whole; but *symmetry* has now acquired but a partial application to the human body; and *proportion* is applied to everything which admits of dimensions and an adaptation of the parts: hence we speak of *symmetry* of feature; but *proportion* of limbs, the *proportion* of the head to the body.

Sensual delights in enlarged minds give way to the sublimer pleasures of reason, which discover the causes and designs; the frame, connection, and *symmetry* of things.—BERKELEY.

The inventors of stuffed hips had a better eye for due *proportion* than to add to a redundancy, because in some cases it was convenient to fill up a vacuum.—CUMBERLAND.

Sympathy, Compassion, Commiseration, Condolence.

Sympathy, from the Greek *συμ* or *συν* with, and *παθος* feeling, has the literal meaning of fellow-feeling, that is, a kindred or like feeling, or feeling in company with another. **Compassion** (v. *Pity*); **Commiseration**, from the Latin *com* and *miseria* misery; **Condolence**, from the Latin *con* and *doleo* to grieve, signify a like suffering, or a suffering in company. Hence it is obvious that according to the derivation of the words, the *sympathy* may either be said of pleasure or pain, the rest only of that which is painful. *Sym-*

pathy preserves its original meaning in its application, for we laugh or cry by *sympathy*; this may, however, be only a merely physical operation; but *compassion* is altogether a moral feeling, which makes us enter into the distresses of others: we may, therefore, *sympathize* with others without essentially serving them; but if we feel *compassion*, we naturally turn our thoughts towards relieving them.

Compassion is awakened by those sufferings which are attributable to our misfortunes; *commiseration* is awakened by sufferings arising from our faults; *condolence* is awakened by the troubles of life. Poverty and want excite our *compassion*; we endeavour to relieve them: a poor criminal suffering the penalty of the law excites our *commiseration*; we endeavour, if possible, to mitigate his punishment: the loss which a friend sustains produces *condolence*; we take the best means of testifying it to him. *Compassion* is the sentiment of one mortal towards another; *commiseration* is represented as the feeling which our wretchedness excites in the Supreme Being. *Compassion* may be awakened by persons in very unequal conditions of life: *condolence* supposes an entire equality; it excludes everything but what flows out of the courtesy and goodwill of one friend to another.

That mind and body often *sympathize*
Is plain; such is this union nature ties.—JENYNS.
Then must we those who groan beneath the weight
Of age, disease, or want, *commiserate*?
'Mongst those whom honest lives can recommend,
Our justice more *compassion* should extend.
DENHAM.

Rather than all must suffer, some must die,
Yet nature must *condole* their misery.—DENHAM.

Symptom, *v. Mark.*

Synod, *v. Assembly.*

System, Method.

System, in Latin *systema*, Greek *συστημα* from *συστημι* or *συν* and *ιστημι* to stand together, signifies that which is put together so as to form a whole.

Method, in Latin *methodus* from the Greek *μετα* and *οδος* a way by which anything is effected.

System expresses more than *method*, which is but a part of *system*: *system* is an arrangement of many single or individual objects according to some given rule, so as to make them coalesce. *Method* is the manner of this arrangement, or the principle upon which this arrangement takes place. The term *system*, however, applies to a complexity of objects; but arrangement, and consequently *method*, may be applied to everything that is to be put into execution. All sciences must be reduced to *system*; and without *system* there is no science: all business requires *method*; and without *method* little can be done to any good purpose.

If a better *system's* thine,
Impart it frankly, or make use of mine.—FRANCIS.

The great defect of the Seasons is the want of *method*, but for this I know not that there was any remedy.—JOHNSON.

T.

Taciturnity, *v. Silence.*

To Take, Receive.

To Take, which in all probability comes from the Latin *tactum*, participle of *tango* to touch, is a general term; **Receive** (*v. To receive*) is specific.

To take signifies to make one's own by coming in exclusive contact with it; **to receive** is to take under peculiar circumstances. We **take** either from things or persons; we **receive** from persons only: we **take** a book from the table; we **receive** a parcel which is sent us; we **take** either with or without the consent of the person; we **receive** it with his consent, or according to his wishes: a robber **takes** money when he can find it; a friend **receives** the gift of a friend.

Each *takes* his seat, and each *receives* his share.
POPE.
Till seiz'd with shame, they wheel about and face,
Receive their foes, and raise a throat'ning cry.
The Tuscans *take* their turn to fear and fly.
DEYDEN.

To Take Heed, *v. To guard against.*

To Take Hold of, *v. To lay hold of.*

To Take Leave, *v. To leave.*

To Take Pains, *v. To labour.*

Tale, *v. Fable*

Tale, *v. Story*

Talent, *v. Faculty.*

Talent, *v. Gift.*

Talent, *v. Intellect.*

To Talk, *v. To speak.*

Talkative, Loquacious, Garrulous.

Talkative implies ready or prone to *talk* (*v. To speak*).

Loquacious, from *loquor* to speak or talk, has the same original meaning.

Garrulous, in Latin *garrulus*, from *garris* to blab, signifies prone to tell or make known. These reproachful epithets differ principally in the degree. **To talk** is allowable, and consequently it is not altogether so unbecoming to be occasionally *talkative*: but *loquacity*, which implies always an immoderate propensity to *talk*, is always bad, whether springing from affection or an idle temper: and *garrulity*, which arises from the excessive desire of communicating, is a failing that is painful.

able only in the aged, who have generally much to tell.

Every absurdity has a champion to defend it; for error is always *talkative*.—GOLDSMITH.

Therites only clamour'd in the throng.

Loquacious, loud, and turbulent of tongue.

POPE.

Pleas'd with that social sweet garrulity.

The poor disband'd vet'ran's sole delight.

SOMERVILLE.

Tall, *v. High*.

Tame, *v. Gentle*.

To Tantalize, *v. To aggravate*.

To Tantalize, *v. To tease*.

Tardy, *v. Slow*.

To Tarnish, *v. To stain*.

To Tarry, *v. To linger*.

Tartness, *v. Acrimony*.

Taste, *v. Palate*.

Taste, Flavour, Relish, Savour.

Taste comes from the Teutonic *tasten* to touch lightly, and signifies either the organ which is easily affected, or the act of discriminating by a light touch of the organ, or the quality of the object which affects the organ; in this latter sense it is closely allied to the other terms.

Flavour most probably comes from the Latin *flavere* to breathe, signifying the rarefied essence of bodies which affect the organ of taste.

Relish is derived by Minshew from *relecher* to lick again, signifying that which pleases the palate so as to tempt to a renewal of the act of *tasting*.

Savour, in Latin *sapor* and *sapio* to smell, taste, or be sensible, most probably comes from the Hebrew *sapah* the mouth or palate, which is the organ of taste.

Taste is the most general and indefinite of all these; it is applicable to every object that can be applied to the organ of *taste*, and to every degree and manner in which the organ can be affected: some things are *tasteless*, other things have a strong *taste*, and others a mixed *taste*. The *flavour* is the predominating *taste*, and consequently is applied to such objects as may have a different kind or degree of *taste*; an apple may not only have the general *taste* of apple, but also a *flavour* peculiar to itself: the *flavour* is commonly said of that which is good, as a fine *flavour*, a delicious *flavour*; but it may designate that which is not always agreeable, as the *flavour* of fish, which is unpleasant in things that do not admit of such a *taste*. The *relish* is also a particular *taste*; but it is that which is artificial, in distinction from the *flavour*, which may be the natural property. We find the *flavour* such as it is; we give the *relish* such as it should be, or we wish it to be: milk and butter receive a *flavour* from the nature of the food with which the cow is supplied; sauces are used in order to give a *relish* to the food that is dressed with them.

Savour is a term in less frequent use than the others, but, agreeable to the Latin deriva-

tion, it is employed to designate that which smells as well as *tastes*, a sweet-smelling savour; so likewise, in the moral application, a man's actions or expressions may be said to savour of vanity. *Taste* and *relish* may be moreover compared as the act of persons: we *taste* whatever affects our *taste*; but we *relish* that only which pleases our *taste*: we *taste* fruits in order to determine whether they are good or bad; we *relish* fruits as a dessert, or at certain seasons of the day. So likewise, in the moral application, we have a *relish* for books, for learning, for society, and the like.

Ten thousand thousand precious gifts

My daily thanks employ;

Nor is the least a cheerful heart

That *tastes* those gifts with joy.—ADDISON.

The Philippine Islands give a *flavour* to our European bowls.—ADDISON.

I love the people.

But do not like to stage me to their eyes,

Though it do well, I do not *relish* well

Their loud applause.—SHAKESPEARE.

The pleasant savoury smell

So quicken'd appetite that I methought

Could not but *taste*.—MILTON.

Taste, Genius.

Taste, in all probability from the Latin *tactum* and *tango* to touch, seems to designate the capacity to derive pleasure from an object: Genius designates the power we have for accomplishing any object. He who derives particular pleasure from music may be said to have a *taste* for music; he who makes very great proficiency in the theory and practice of music may be said to have a *genius* for it. It is obvious, therefore, that we may have a *taste* without having *genius*; but it would not be possible to have *genius* for a thing without having a *taste* for it: for nothing can so effectually give a *taste* for any accomplishment as the capacity to learn it, and the susceptibility of all its beauties, which circumstances are inseparable from *genius*.

The cause of a wrong *taste* is a defect of judgment.—BURKE.

Taste consists in the power of judging, *genius* in the power of executing.—BLAIR.

To Taunt, *v. To tease*.

Tautology, *v. Repetition*.

Tax, Duty, Custom, Toll, Impost, Tribute, Contribution.

The idea of something given by the people to the government is expressed by all these terms.

Tax, in French *taxe*, Latin *taxo*, from the Greek *τασσω*, *ταξω*, to dispose or put in order, signifies what is disposed in order for each to pay.

Custom signifies that which is given under certain circumstances, according to *custom*.

Duty signifies that which is given as a due or debt.

Toll, in Saxon *toll*, &c., Latin *telonium*, from the Greek *τελος* a custom, signifies a particular kind of *custom* or *due*.

Tax is the most general of these terms, and

applies to or implies whatever is paid by the people to the government, according to a certain estimate; the *customs* are a species of *tax* which are less specific than other *taxes*, being regulated by *custom* rather than any definite law; the *customs* apply particularly to what was *customarily* given by merchants for the goods which they imported from abroad: the *duty* is a species of *tax* more positive and binding than the *custom*, being a specific estimate of what is *due* upon goods, according to their value; hence it is not only applied to goods that are imported, but also to many other articles inland: *toll* is that species of *tax* which serves for the repair of roads and havens.

The preceding terms refer to that which is levied by authority on the people; but they do not directly express the idea of levying or paying: **Impost**, on the contrary, signifies literally that which is imposed; and **Tribute** that which is paid or yielded: the former, therefore, exclude that idea of coercion which is included in the latter. The *tax* is levied by the consent of many; the *impost* is imposed by the will of one; and the *tribute* is paid at the demand of one or a few: the *tax* serves for the support of the nation; the *impost* and the *tribute* serve to enrich a government. Conquerors lay heavy *imposts* upon the conquered countries; distant provinces pay a *tribute* to the princes to whom they owe allegiance. **Contribution** signifies the *tribute* of many in unison, or for the same end; in this general sense it includes all the other terms; for *taxes* and *imposts* are alike paid by many for the same purpose; but as the predominant idea in *contribution* is that of common consent, it supposes a degree of freedom in the agent which is incompatible with the exercise of authority expressed by the other terms: hence the term is with more propriety applied to those cases in which men voluntarily unite in giving towards any particular object; as charitable *contributions*, or *contributions* in support of a war; but it may be taken in the general sense of a forced payment, as in speaking of military *contribution*.

Tax, Rate, Assessment.

Tax, agreeably to the above explanation (*v. Tax*), and **Rate**, from the Latin *ratius* and *reor* to think or estimate, both derive their principal meaning from the valuation or proportion according to which any sum is demanded from the people; but the *tax* is imposed directly by the government for public purposes, as the land *tax*, the window *tax*, and the like; and the *rate* is imposed indirectly for the local purpose of each parish, as the church *rates*, the poor *rates*, and the like. The *tax* and *rate* is a general rule or ratio, by which a certain sum is raised upon a given number of persons; the **Assessment** is the application of that rule to the individual.

The house-duty is a *tax* upon houses, according to their real or supposed value; the poor's *rate* is a *rate* laid on the individual likewise, according to the value of his house, or the supposed rent which he pays; the *assessment*, in both these, is the valuation of

the house, which determines the sum to be paid by each individual: it is the business of the minister to make the *tax*; of the parish officers to make the *rate*; of the commissioners or assessors to make the *assessment*; the former has the public to consider; the latter the individual. An equitable *tax* must not bear harder upon one class of the community than another: an equitable *assessment* must not bear harder upon one inhabitant than another.

To Teach, *v. To inform.*

To Tear, *v. To break.*

To Tease, Vex, Taunt, Tantalize, Torment.

Tease is most probably a frequentative of *tear*.

Vex, *v. To displease.*

Taunt is probably contracted from *tantalize*.

Tantalize, *v. To aggravate.*

Torment, from the Latin *tormentum* and *torqueo* to twist, signifies to give pain by twisting, or griping. The idea of acting upon others so as to produce a painful sentiment is common to all these terms; they differ in the mode of the action, and in the degree of the effect.

All these actions rise in importance: to *tease* consists in that which is most trifling; to *torment* in that which is most serious. We are *teased* by a fly that buzzes in our ears; we are *vexed* by the carelessness and stupidity of our servants; we are *taunted* by the sarcasms of others; we are *tantalized* by the fair prospects which only present themselves to disappear again; we are *tormented* by the importunities of troublesome beggars. It is the repetition of unpleasant trifles which *teases*; it is the crossness and perversity of things which *vex*; it is the contemptuous and provoking behaviour which *taunts*; it is the disappointment of awakened expectations which *tantalizes*; it is the repetition of grievous troubles which *torments*. We may be *teased* and *tormented* by that which produces bodily or mental pain; we are *vexed*, *taunted*, and *tantalized* only in the mind. Irritable and nervous people are most easily *teased*; capitious and fretful people are most easily *vexed* or *taunted*: sanguine and eager people are most easily *tantalized*: in all these cases the imagination or the bodily state of the individual serves to increase the pain: but persons are *tormented* by such things as inflict positive pain.

Louisa began to take a little mischievous pleasure in teasing.—CUMBERLAND.

And sharpen'd shares shall vex the fruitful ground.
DRYDEN.

Sharp was his voice, which in the shrillest tone
Thus with injurious taunts attack the throne.
POPE.

When the maid (in Sparta) was once sped, she was not suffered to *tantalize* the male part of the commonwealth.
ADDISON.

Truth exerting itself in the searching precepts of self-denial and mortification is *tormenting* to vicious minds.
—SOUTH.

Tedious, *v. Wearisome.*

Tegument, Covering.

Tegument, in Latin *tegumentum*, from *tego* to cover, is properly but another word to express the sense of **Covering**, yet it is now employed in cases where the term *covering* is inadmissible. *Covering* signifies mostly that which is artificial; but *tegument* is employed for that which is natural: clothing is the *covering* for the body; the skin of vegetable substances, as seeds, is called the *tegument*. The *covering* is said of that which covers the outer surface: the *tegument* is said of that which covers the inner surface; the pods of some seeds are lined with a soft *tegument*.

To Tell, *v.* To speak.

Temerity, *v.* Rashness.

Temper, *v.* Disposition.

Temper, *v.* Frame.

Temper, *v.* Humour.

To Temper, *v.* To qualify.

Temperament, *v.* Frame.

Temperament, Temperature.

Temperament and Temperature are both used to express that state which arises from the tempering of opposite or varying qualities; the *temperament* is said of animal bodies, and the *temperature* of the atmosphere. Men of a sanguine *temperament* ought to be cautious in their diet; all bodies are strongly affected by the *temperature* of the air.

Without a proper *temperament* for the particular art which he studies, his utmost pains will be to no purpose. —BUDGELL.

O happy England, where there is such a rare *temperature* of heat and cold. —HOWEL.

Temperance, *v.* Modesty.

Temperate, *v.* Abstinent.

Temperature, *v.* Temperament.

Tempest, *v.* Breeze.

Temple, Church.

* These words designate an edifice destined for the exercise of religion; but **Temple** is adapted to the lofty style, and **Church** to the familiar style, at least as far as regards the Christian revealed religion; for, in regard to Paganism, the term which originated with heathens is the ordinary term in the place of *church*. *Temple* conveys the idea of that which is august; it marks in the proper sense that edifice which is consecrated to the Deity: *church* seems to indicate something more common; it serves particularly for the assembly of the faithful. Nothing profane ought to enter the *temple* of the Lord: nothing ought to be permitted in our *churches* which does not contribute to the edification of Christians.

The mind and heart of man are the *temple* of the living God; it is there He wishes to be adored: the *church* is that place where, as a social being, he offers his vows to his Maker.

Temporal, *v.* Secular.

* Vide Girard: "Temple, église."

Temporary, Transient, Transitory, Fleeting.

Temporary, from *tempus* time, characterizes that which is intended to last only for a time, in distinction from that which is permanent; offices depending upon a state of war are *temporary*, in distinction from those which are connected with internal policy. **Transient**, that is, passing, or in the act of passing, characterizes what in its nature exists only for the moment: a glance is *transient*. **Transitory**, that is, apt to pass away, characterizes everything in the world which is formed only to exist for a time, and then to pass away; thus our pleasures, and our pains, and our very being, are denominated *transitory*. **Fleeting**, which is derived from the verb to fly and flight, is but a stronger term to express the same idea as *transitory*.

By the force of superior principles the *temporary* prevalence of passions may be restrained. —JOHNSON.

Any sudden diversion of the spirits, or the jostling in of a *transient* thought, is able to deface the little images of things (in the memory). —SOUTH.

Man is a *transitory* being. —JOHNSON.

Thus when my *fleeting* days at last,

Unheeded, silently are past,

Calmly I shall resign my breath,

In life unknown, forgot in death. —SPECTATOR.

To Tempt, *v.* To allure.

To Tempt, *v.* To try.

Tenacious, Pertinacious.

To be **Tenacious** is to hold a thing close, to let it go with reluctance: to be **Pertinacious** is to hold it out in spite of what can be advanced against it, the prepositive syllable *per* having an intensive force. A man of a *tenacious* temper insists on trifles that are supposed to affect his importance; a *pertinacious* temper insists on everything which is apt to affect his opinions. *Tenacity* and *pertinacity* are both foibles, but the former is sometimes more excusable than the latter.

We may be *tenacious* of that which is good, as when a man is *tenacious* of whatever may affect his honour; but we cannot be *pertinacious* in anything but our opinions, and that too in cases when they are least defensible. It commonly happens that people are most *tenacious* of being thought to possess that in which they are most deficient, and most *pertinacious* in maintaining that which is most absurd. A liar is *tenacious* of his reputation for truth: sophists, freethinkers, and sceptics, are the most *pertinacious* objectors to whatever is established.

So *tenacious* are we of the old ecclesiastical modes, that very little alteration has been made in them since the fourteenth or fifteenth century; adhering to our old settled maxims, never entirely, nor at once, to depart from antiquity. —BURKE.

The most *pertinacious* and vehement demonstrator may be wearied in time by continual negation. —JOHNSON.

Tendency, Drift, Scope, Aim.

Tendency, from to *tend*, denotes the property of tending towards a certain point, which is the characteristic of all these words, but this is applied only to things; and **Drift**, from the verb to *drive*; **Scope**, from the Greek

σκοπεῖν to look; and *Aim*, from the verb to *aim* (v. *Aim*); all characterize the thoughts of a person looking forward into futurity, and directing his actions to a certain point. Hence we speak of the *tendency* of certain principles or practices as being pernicious; the drift of a person's discourse; the *scope* which he gives himself either in treating of a subject or in laying down a plan; or a person's *aim* to excel, or *aim* to supplant another, and the like. The *tendency* of most writings for the last five-and-twenty years has been to unhinge the minds of men: where a person wants the services of another, whom he dares not openly solicit, he will discover his wishes by the *drift* of his discourse: a man of a comprehensive mind will allow himself full *scope* in digesting his plans for every alteration which circumstances may require when they come to be developed: our desires will naturally give a cast to all our *aims*; and so long as they are but innocent, they are necessary to give a proper stimulus to exertion.

It is no wonder if a great deal of knowledge, which is not capable of making a man wise, has a natural *tendency* to make him vain and arrogant.—ADDISON.

This said, the whole audience soon found out his *drift*, The convention was summoned in favour of Swift. SWIFT.

Merit in every rank has the freest *scope* (in England).—BLAKE.

Each nobler *aim*, repress by long controul,
Now sinks at last, or feebly mans the soul.
GOLDSMITH.

To Tender, v. To offer.

Tenderness, v. Benevolence.

Tenet, v. Doctrine.

Tenet, Position.

The *Tenet* is the opinion which we hold in our own minds; the *Position* is that which we lay down for others. Our *tenets* may be hurtful, our *positions* false. He who gives up his *tenets* readily evinces an unstable mind; he who argues on a false *position* shows more tenacity and subtlety than good sense. The *tenets* of the different denominations of Christians are scarcely to be known or distinguished; they often rest upon such trivial points: the *positions* which an author lays down must be very definite and clear when he wishes to build upon them any theory or system.

The occasion of Luther's being first disgusted with the *tenets* of the Romish church is known to every one, the least conversant with history.—ROBERTSON.

To the *position* of Tully, that if virtue could be seen, she must be loved, may be added, that if truth could be heard, she must be obeyed.—JOHNSON.

Term, v. Article.

Term, Limit, Boundary.

* *Term*, in Latin *terminus*, from the Greek *τεμα* an end, is the point that ends, and that to which we direct our steps: *Limit*, from the Latin *limes* a landmark, is the line which we must not pass: *Boundary*, from *bound*, is the obstacle which interrupts our progress, and prevents us from passing.

We are either carried towards or away from

* Vide Girard: "Termes, limites, bornes."

the *term*; we either keep within *limits* or we overstep them; we contract or extend a *boundary*.

The *term* and the *limit* belong to the thing; by them it is ended: the *boundary* is extraneous of it; they include it in the space which it occupies, or contain it within its sphere. The Straits of Gibraltar was the *term* of Hercules' voyages: it was said, with more eloquence than truth, that the *limits* of the Roman empire were those of the world: the sea, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, are the natural *boundaries* of France. We mostly reach the *term* of our prosperity when we attempt to pass the *limits* which Providence has assigned to human efforts: human ambition often finds a *boundary* set to its gratification by circumstances which were the most unlooked for, and apparently the least adapted to bring about such important results.

We see the *term* of our evils only in the *term* of our life: our desires have no *limits*; their gratification only serves to extend our prospects indefinitely: those only are happy whose fortune is the *boundary* of their desires.

No *term* of time this union shall divide.—DRYDEN.

Providence has fix'd the *limits* of human enjoyment by immoveable *boundaries*.—JOHNSON.

The wall of Antoninus was fixed as the *limit* of the Roman empire.—GIBBON.

Term, v. Word.

To Terminate, v. To complete.

To Terminate, v. To end.

Terrible, v. Fearful.

Terrible, v. Formidable.

Terrific, v. Fearful.

Territory, Dominion.

Both these terms respect a portion of country under a particular government; but the word *Territory* brings to our minds the land which is included; *Dominion* conveys to our minds the power which is exercised: the *territory* speaks of that which is in its nature bounded; *dominion* may be said of that which is boundless. A petty prince has his *territory*; the monarch of a great empire has *dominions*.

It is the object of every ruler to guard his *territory* against the irruptions of an enemy; ambitious monarchs are always aiming to extend their *dominions*.

The conquered *territory* was divided among the Spanish invaders, according to rules which custom had introduced.—ROBERTSON.

And while the heroic Pyrrhus shines in arms,
Our wide *dominions* shall the world o'er-run.
TRAPP.

Terror, v. Alarm.

Testament, v. Will.

To Testify, v. To express.

Testimony, v. Evidence.

Thankfulness, Gratitude.

Thankfulness, or a *fulness* of thanks, is the outward expression of a grateful feeling.

Gratitude, from the Latin *gratitudo*, is the feeling itself. Our *thankfulness* is measured

by the number of our words; our *gratitude* is measured by the nature of our actions. A person appears very *thankful* at the time who afterwards proves very *ungrateful*. *Thankfulness* is the beginning of *gratitude*: *gratitude* is the completion of *thankfulness*.

Theologian, v. Ecclesiastic.

Theory, Speculation.

Theory, from the Greek *theoria* to behold, and **Speculation**, from the Latin *specto* to behold, are both employed to express what is seen with the mind's eye. *Theory* is the fruit of reflection, it serves the purposes of science; practice will be incomplete when the *theory* is false: *speculation* belongs more to the imagination; it has therefore less to do with realities; it is that which cannot be reduced to practice, and can therefore never be brought to the test of experience. Hence it arises that *theory* is contrasted sometimes with the practice to designate its insufficiency to render a man complete; and *speculation* is put for that which is fanciful and unreal: a general who is so only in *theory* will acquit himself miserably in the field; a religionist who is so only in *speculation* will make a wretched Christian.

True piety without cessation lost
By theories, the practice past is lost.—DENHAM.
You were the prime object of my speculation.
HOWEL.

Therefore, Consequently, Accordingly.

Therefore, that is, for this reason, marks a deduction: **Consequently**, that is, in consequence, marks a consequence: **Accordingly**, that is, according to some thing, implies an agreement or adaptation. *Therefore* is employed particularly in abstract reasoning; *consequently* is employed either in reasoning or in the narrative style; *accordingly* is used principally in the narrative style. Young persons are perpetually liable to fall into error through inexperience; they ought therefore the more willingly to submit themselves to the guidance of those who can direct them: the French nation is reduced to a state of moral anarchy; *consequently* nothing but time and good government can bring the people back to the use of their sober senses: every preparation was made, and every precaution was taken; *accordingly* at the fixed hour they proceeded to the place of destination.

If you cut off the top branches of a tree, it will not therefore cease to grow.—HUGHES.

Reputation is power; *consequently* to despise is to weaken.—SOUTH.

The pathetic, as Longinus observes, may animate the sublime; but is not essential to it. *Accordingly*, as he further remarks, we very often find that those who excel most in stirring up the passions very often want the talent of writing in the sublime manner.—ADDISON.

Thick, Dense.

Between **Thick** and **Dense** there is little other difference than that the latter is employed to express that species of *thickness* which is philosophically considered as the property of the atmosphere in a certain condition; hence we speak of *thick* in regard to

hard or soft bodies, as a *thick* board or *thick* cotton; solid or liquid, as a *thick* cheese or *thick* milk: but the term *dense* only in regard to the air in its various forms, as a *dense* air, a *dense* vapour, a *dense* cloud.

I have discovered, by a long series of observations, that invention and elocution suffer great impediments from *dense* and impure vapours.—JOHNSON.

Thin, Slender, Slight, Slim.

Thin, in Saxon *thinne*, German *dünn*, Latin *tener*, from *tendo*, in Greek *tenno* to extend or draw out, and the Hebrew *taken* to grind or reduce to powder.

Slender, **Slight**, and **Slim**, are all variations from the German *schlank*, which are connected with the words *slime* and *sling*, as also with the German *schlingen* to wind or wreath, and *schlange* a serpent, designating the property of length and smallness which is adapted for bending or twisting. *Thin* is the generic term, the rest are specific: *thin* may be said of that which is small and short, as well as small and long; *slender* is always said of that which is small and long at the same time: a board is *thin* which wants solidity or substance; a poplar is *slender* because its tallness is disproportioned to its magnitude or the dimensions of its circumference. *Thinness* is sometimes a natural property; *slight* and *slim* are applied to that which is artificial: the leaves of trees are of a *thin* texture; a board may be made *slight* by continually planing; a paper box is very *slim*. *Thinness* is a good property sometimes; *thin* paper is frequently preferred to that which is thick: *slightness* and *slimness*, which is a greater degree of *slightness*, are always defects; that which is made *slight* is unfit to bear the stress that will be put upon it, that which is *slim* is altogether unfit for the purpose proposed; a carriage that is made *slight* is quickly broken, and always out of repair; paper is altogether too *slim* to serve the purpose of wood.

I have found dulness to quicken into sentiment in a *thin* ether.—JOHNSON.

Very *slender* differences will sometimes part those whom beneficence has united.—JOHNSON.

Friendship is often destroyed by a thousand secret and *slight* competitions.—JOHNSON.

To Think, Reflect, Ponder, Muse.

Think, in Saxon *thincan*, German *denken*, &c., comes from the Hebrew *dan* to direct, rule, or judge.

Reflect, in Latin *reflecto*, signifies literally to bend back, that is, to bend the mind back on itself.

Ponder, from *pondus* a weight, signifies to weigh.

Muse, from *musa* a song, signifies to dwell upon with the imagination.

To *think* is a general and indefinite term; to *reflect* is a particular mode of *thinking*; to *ponder* and *muse* are different modes of *reflecting*, the former on grave matters, the latter on matters that interest either the affections or the imagination: we *think* whenever we receive or recall an idea to the mind; but we

reflect only by recalling, not one only, but many ideas: we *think* if we only suffer the ideas to revolve in succession in the mind; but in *reflecting* we compare, combine, and judge of those ideas which thus pass in the mind: we *think*, therefore, of things past, as they are pleasurable or otherwise; we *reflect* upon them as they are applicable to our present condition: we may *think* on things past, present, or to come; we *reflect*, *ponder*, and *muse* mostly on that which is past or present. The man *thinks* on the days of his childhood, and wishes them back; the child *thinks* on the time when he shall be a man, and is impatient until it is come: the man *reflects* on his past follies, and tries to profit by experience; he *ponders* on any serious concern that affects his destiny, and *muses* on the happy events of his childhood.

No man was ever weary of *thinking*, much less of *thinking* that he had done well or virtuously.—SOUTH.

Let men but *reflect* upon their own observation, and consider impartially with themselves how few in the world they have known made better by age.—SOUTH.

Stood on the brink of hell, and look'd awhile
Pond'ring his voyage.—MILTON.

I was sitting on a sofa one evening, after I had been teased by Amurath, and my imagination kindled as I *mused*.—HAWKSWORTH.

To Think, Suppose, Imagine, Believe, Deem.

To *Think* is here, as in the preceding article, the generic term. It expresses, in common with the other terms, the act of having a particular idea in the mind; but it is indefinite as to the mode and the object of the action. To *think* may be the act of the understanding, or merely of the *imagination*: to *Suppose* and *Imagine* are rather the acts of the *imagination* than of the understanding. To *think*, that is, to have any thought or opinion upon a subject, requires reflection; it is the work of time: to *suppose* and *imagine* may be the acts of the moment. We *think* a thing right or wrong; we *suppose* it to be true or false; we *imagine* it to be real or unreal. To *think* is employed promiscuously in regard to all objects, whether actually existing or not: to *suppose* applies to those which are uncertain or precarious; *imagine*, to those which are unreal. *Think* and *imagine* are said of that which affects the senses immediately; *suppose* is only said of that which occupies the mind. We *think* that we hear a noise as soon as the sound catches our attention; in certain states of the body or mind we *imagine* we hear noises which were never made: we *think* that a person will come to-day, because he has informed us that he intends to do so; we *suppose* that he will come to-day at a certain hour because he came at the same hour yesterday.

When applied to the events and circumstances of life, to *think* may be applied to any time, past, present, or to come, or where no time is expressed; to *suppose* is more aptly applied to a future time; and *imagine* to a past or present time. We *think* that a person has done a thing, is doing it, or will do it; we *suppose* that he will do it; we *imagine* that he has done it, or is doing it. A person *thinks* that he will die; *imagines* that he is in a dangerous way; we *think* that the weather

will be fine to-day; we *suppose* that the affair will be decided.

In regard to moral points, in which case the word *Deem* may be compared with the others, to *think* is a conclusion drawn from certain premises. I *think* that a man has acted wrong: to *suppose* is to take up an idea arbitrarily or at pleasure; we argue upon a *supposed* case, merely for the sake of argument: to *imagine* is to take up an idea by accident, or without any connection with the truth or reality; we *imagine* that a person is offended with us, without being able to assign a single reason for the idea; *imaginary* evils are even more numerous than those which are real: to *deem* is to form a conclusion; things are *deemed* hurtful or otherwise in consequence of observation.

To *think* and *believe* are both opposite to knowing or perceiving; but *think* is a more partial action than *believe*: we *think* as the thing strikes us at the time; we *believe* from a settled deduction: hence it expresses much less to say that I *think* a person speaks the truth than that I *believe* that he speaks the truth.

I *think* from what I can recollect that such and such were the words, is a vague mode of speech, not admissible in a court of law as positive evidence: the natural question which follows upon this is, do you firmly *believe* it? to which whoever can answer in the affirmative, with the appearance of sincerity, must be admitted as a testimony. Hence it arises that the word can only be employed in matters that require but little thought in order to come to a conclusion; and *believe* is applicable to things that must be admitted only on substantial evidence. We are at liberty to say that I *think*, or I *believe* that the account is made out right; but we must say that I *believe*, not *think*, that the Bible is the word of God.

If to conceive how anything can be
From shape extracted, and locality,
Is hard, what *think* you of the Deity?—JENYNS.

It is absurd to *suppose* that while the relations, in which we stand to our fellow-creatures, naturally call forth certain sentiments and affections, there should be none to correspond to the first and greatest of all beings.—BLAIR.

How ridiculous must it be to *imagine* that the clergy of England favour popery, when they cannot be clergymen without renouncing it.—BEVERIDGE.

For they can conquer who *believe* they can.—DRYDEN.

An empty house is by the players *deemed* the most dreadful sign of popular disapprobation.—HAWKSWORTH.

Thought, v. Idea.

Thoughtful, Considerate, Deliberate.

Thoughtful, or full of *thinking* (v. To *think*, *reflect*); *Considerate*, or ready to *consider* (v. To *consider*, *reflect*); and *Deliberate*, ready to *deliberate* (v. To *consult*); rise upon each other in their signification: he who is *thoughtful* does not forget his duty; he who is *considerate* pauses, and *considers* properly what is his duty; he who *deliberates* *considers* *deliberately*. It is a recommendation to a subordinate person to be *thoughtful* in doing what is wished of him: it is the recommendation of a confidential person to be *considerate*.

as he has often to judge according to his own discretion; it is the recommendation of a person who is acting for himself in critical matters to be *deliberate*. There is this farther distinction in the word *deliberate*, that it may be used in the bad sense to mark a settled intention to do evil; young people may sometimes plead in extenuation of their guilt that their misdeeds do not arise from *deliberate* malice.

Men's minds are in general inclined to levity, much more than to *thoughtful* melancholy.—BLAIR.

Some things will not bear much zeal: and the more earnest we are about them, the less we recommend ourselves to the approbation of sober and *considerate* men.—TILLOTSON.

There is a vast difference between sins of infirmity and those of presumption, as vast as between inadvertency and *deliberation*.—SOUTH.

Thoughtless, *v.* *Negligent*.

Threat, Menace.

Threat is of Saxon origin; **Menace** is of Latin extraction. They do not differ in signification; but, as is frequently the case, the Saxon is the familiar term, and the Latin word is employed only in the higher style. We may be *threatened* with either small or great evils; but we are *menaced* only with great evils. One individual threatens to strike another: a general *menaces* the enemy with an attack. We are *threatened* by things as well as persons: we are *menaced* by persons only: a person is *threatened* with a look; he is *menaced* with a prosecution by his adversary.

By turns put on the suppliant and the lord;
Threaten'd this moment, and the next implor'd.
PRIOR.

Of the sharp axe
Regardless, that o'er his devoted head
Hangs menacing.—SOMERVILLE.

Threatening, *v.* Imminent.

Thrifty, *v.* Economical.

To Thrive, *v.* To flourish.

Throng, *v.* Multitude.

To Throw, *v.* To cast.

To Thwart, *v.* To resist.

Tide, *v.* Stream.

Tidings, *v.* News.

To Tie, *v.* To bind.

Tillage, *v.* Cultivation.

Time, *v.* Duration.

Time, Season.

Time is here the generic term; it is taken either for the whole or the part: **Season** is any given portion of *time*. We speak of *time* when the simple idea of *time* only is to be expressed, as the *time* of the day, or the *time* of the year; the *season* is spoken in reference to some circumstances; the year is divided into four parts, called the *seasons*, according to the nature of the weather: hence, in general, that *time* is called the *season* which is suitable for any particular purpose; youth is the *season* for improvement. It is a matter of necessity to choose the *time*; it is an affair of wisdom to choose the *season*.

You will often want religion in *times* of most danger.—CHATHAM.

Piso's behaviour towards us in this *season* of affliction has endeared him to us.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

Time, Period, Age, Date, *Æra*, Epocha.

Time (*v.* *Time*) is, as before, taken either from *time* in general or *time* in particular; all the other terms are taken for particular portions of *time*. *Time* included within any given points is termed a **Period**, from the Greek *περίοδος*, signifying a course, round, or any revolution: thus, the *period* of day, or of night, is the space of *time* comprehended between the rising and setting, or setting and rising of the sun; the *period* of a year comprehends the space which the earth requires for its annual revolution. So, in an extended and moral application, we have stated *periods* in our life for particular things: during the *period* of infancy a child is in a state of total dependence on its parents; a *period* of apprenticeship has been appointed for youth to learn different trades. The **Age** is a species of *period* comprehending the life of a man, and consequently referring to what is done by men living within that *period*: hence we speak of the different *ages* that have existed since the commencement of the world, and characterise this or that *age* by the particular degrees of vice or virtue, genius, and the like, for which it is distinguished. The **Date** is that *period* of *time* which is reckoned from the *date* or commencement of a thing to the *time* that it is spoken of: hence we speak of a thing as being of a long or a short *date*. **Æra**, in Latin *æra*, probably from *æs* brass, signifying coin with which one computes: and **Epocha**, from the Greek *ἐποχή*, from *ἐμῆω* to stop, signifying a resting place; both refer to points of *time* rendered remarkable by events: but the former is more commonly employed in the literal sense for points of computation in chronology, as the Christian *æra*; the latter is indefinitely employed for any *period* distinguished by remarkable events: the grand rebellion is an *epocha* in the history of England.

There is a *time* when we should not only number our days, but our hours.—YOUNG.

But the last *period*, and the fatal hour,
Of Troy is come.—DENHAM.

The story of Haman only shows us what human nature has too generally appeared to be in every *age*.—BLAIR.

Plantations have one advantage in them which is not to be found in most other works, as they give a pleasure of a more lasting *date*.—ADDISON.

That *period* of the Athenian history which is included within the *æra* of Pisistratus, and the death of Menander the comic poet, may justly be styled the literary *age* of Greece.—CUMBERLAND.

The institution of this library (by Pisistratus) forms a signal *epocha* in the annals of literature.—CUMBERLAND.

Timely, Seasonable.

The same distinction exists between the epithets **Timely** and **Seasonable**. The former signifies within the *time*, that is, before the *time* is past; the latter according to the *season* or what the *season* requires. A *timely* notice prevents that which would otherwise happen; a *seasonable* hint seldom fails of its

effect because it is *seasonable*. We must not expect to have a *timely* notice of death, but must be prepared for it at any time; an admonition to one who is on a sick-bed is *very seasonable*, when given by a minister or a friend. The opposites of these terms are *untimely* or *ill-timed* and *unseasonable*: *untimely* is directly opposed to *timely*, signifying before the time appointed; as an *untimely* death: but *ill-timed* is indirectly opposed, signifying in the *wrong time*; as an *ill-timed* remark.

It imports all men, especially bad men, to think on the judgement, that by a *timely* repentance they may prevent the woeful effects of it.—SOUTH.

What you call a bold is not only the kindest, but the most *seasonable* proposal you could have made.—LOCKE.

Times Past, *v. Formerly*.

Timeserving, Temporizing.

Timeserving and **Temporizing** are both applied to the conduct of one who adapts himself servilely to the time and season; but a *timeserver* is rather active, and a *temporizer* passive. A *timeserver* avows those opinions which will serve his purpose: the *temporizer* forbears to avow those which are likely for the time being to hurt him. The former acts from a desire of gain, the latter from a fear of loss. *Timeservers* are of all parties, as they come in the way: *temporizers* are of no party, as occasion requires. Sycophant courtiers must always be *timeservers*: ministers of state are frequently *temporizers*.

Ward had complied during the late times, and held in by taking the covenant; so he was hated by the high men as a *timeserver*.—BURNETT.

Feeble and *temporizing* measures will always be the result when men assemble to deliberate in a situation where they ought to act.—ROBERTSON.

Timid, *v. Afraid*.

Timorous, *v. Afraid*.

Tinge, *v. Colour*.

Tint, *v. Colour*.

To Tire, *v. To weary*.

Tiresome, *v. Wearisome*.

Title, *v. Name*.

Toil, *v. Work*.

Token, *v. Mark*.

To Tolerate, *v. To admit*.

Toll, *v. Tax*.

Tomb, *v. Grave*.

Tone, *v. Sound*.

Tongue, *v. Language*.

Tool, *v. Instrument*.

To Torment, *v. To tease*.

Torment, Torture.

Torment (*v. To tease*) and **Torture** both come from *torqueo* to twist, and express the agony which arises from a violent twisting or griping of any part; but the latter, which is more immediately derived from the verb, expresses much greater violence and consequent

pain than the former. *Torture* is an excess of *torment*. We may be *tormented* by a variety of indirect means; but we are *tortured* only by the direct means of the rack, or similar instrument. *Torment* may be permanent; *torture* is only for a time, or on certain occasions. It is related in history that a person was once *tormented* to death by a violent and incessant beating of drums in his prison: the Indians practise every species of *torture* upon their prisoners. A guilty conscience may *torment* a man all his life: the horrors of an awakened conscience are a *torture* to one who is on his death-bed.

Yet in his empire o'er thy abject breast
His flames and *torments* only are exprest.—PRIOR.

To a wild sonnet or a wanton air,
Offence and *torture* to a sober ear.—PRIOR.

Torpid, *v. Numb*.

Torture, *v. Torment*.

To Toss, *v. To shake*.

Total, *v. Gross*.

Total, *v. Whole*.

To Totter, *v. To stagger*.

Touch, *v. Contact*.

Tour, *v. Circuit*.

Tour, *v. Excursion*.

To Trace, *v. To derive*.

Trace, *v. Mark*.

Track, *v. Mark*.

Tract, *v. Essay*.

Tractable, *v. Docile*.

Trade, *v. Business*.

Trade, Commerce, Traffic, Dealing.

Trade, in Italian *tratto*, Latin *tracto* to treat, signifies the transaction of business.

Commerce, *v. Intercourse*.

Traffic, in French *traffique*, Italian *traffico*, compounded of *tra* or *trans* and *facio*, signifies to make over from one to another.

Dealing, from the verb to *deal*, in German *theilen* to divide, signifies to get together in parts according to a certain ratio, or at a given price.

The leading idea in *trade* is that of carrying on business for purposes of gain; the rest are but modes of *trade*: *commerce* is a mode of *trade* by exchange: *traffic* is a sort of personal *trade*, a sending from hand to hand; *dealing* is a bargaining or calculating kind of *trade*. *Trade* is either on a large or small scale; *commerce* is always on a large scale; we may *trade* retail or wholesale; we always carry on *commerce* by wholesale; *trade* is either within or without the country; *commerce* is always between different countries: there may be a *trade* between two towns; but there is a *commerce* between England and America, between France and Germany: hence it arises that the general term *trade* is of inferior import when compared with *commerce*. The *commerce* of a country, in the abstract and general sense, conveys more to our mind, and

is a more noble expression, than the *trade* of the country, as the merchant ranks higher than the *tradesman*, and a *commercial* house than a *trading* concern. *Trade* may be altogether domestic, and betwixt neighbours; the *traffic* is that which goes forward betwixt persons at a distance; in this manner there may be a great *traffic* betwixt two towns or cities, as betwixt London and the capitals of the different counties. *Trade* may consist simply in buying and selling according to a stated valuation; *dealings* are carried on in matters that admit of a variation: hence we speak of *dealers* in wood, in corn, seeds, and the like, who buy up portions of these goods, more or less, according to the state of the market.

These terms will also admit of an extended application: hence we speak of the risk of *trade*, the narrowness of a *trading* spirit; the *commerce* of the world, a legal, or illicit, *commerce*; to make a *traffic* of honours, of principles, of places, and the like; *plain-dealing* or *underhand-dealing*.

Trade, without enlarging the British territories, has given us a kind of additional empire.—ADDISON.

Nature abhors
And drives thee out from the society
And commerce of mankind for breach of faith.
SOUTHERN.
The line of Ninus this poor comfort brings,
We sell their dust, and *traffic* for their kings.
DRYDEN.

Traffic, v. Trade.

Train, v. Procession.

Traitorous, v. Treacherous.

Tranquillity, v. Peace.

To Transact, v. To negotiate.

Transaction, v. Proceeding.

To Transcend, v. To exceed.

To Transcribe, v. To copy.

**To Transfigure, Transform,
Metamorphose.**

Transfigure is to make to pass over into another figure; **Transform** and **Metamorphose** is to put into another form: the former being said only of spiritual beings, and particularly in reference to our Saviour: the other two terms being applied to that which has a corporeal form.

Transformation is commonly applied to that which changes its outward form; in this manner a harlequin *transforms* himself into all kinds of shapes and likenesses. *Metamorphosis* is applied to the form internal as well as external, that is, to the whole nature; in this manner Ovid describes, among others, the *metamorphoses* of Narcissus into a flower, and Daphne into a laurel: with the same idea we may speak of a rustic being *metamorphosed*, by the force of art, into a fine gentleman.

We have of this gentleman a piece of the *transfiguration*, which I think is held a work second to none in the world.—STEELE.

A lady's shift may be *metamorphosed* into billets-doux, and come into her possession a second time.—ADDISON.

Can a good intention, or rather a very wicked one so miscalled, *transform* perjury and hypocrisy into merit and perfection?—SOUTH.

To Transform, v. To transfigure.

To Transgress, v. To infringe.

Transgression, v. Offence.

Transient, v. Temporary.

Transitory, v. Temporary.

Transparent, v. Pellucid.

To Transport, v. To bear.

Transport, v. Ecstasy.

Travel, v. Journey.

Treacherous, v. Faithless.

Treacherous, v. Insidious.

**Treacherous, Traitorous,
Treasonable.**

These epithets are all applied to one who betrays his trust; but **Treacherous** (*v. Faithless*) respects a man's private relations; **Traitorous** his public relation to his prince and his country: he is a *treacherous* friend, and a *traitorous* subject. We may be *treacherous* to our enemies as well as our friends, for nothing can lessen the obligation to preserve the fidelity of promise; we may be *traitorous* to our country by abstaining to lend that aid which is in our power, for nothing but death can do away the obligation which we owe to it by the law of nature. **Traitorous** and **Treasonable** are both applicable to subjects: but the former is extended to all public acts; the latter only to those which affect the supreme power: a soldier is *traitorous* who goes over to the side of the enemy against his country; a man is guilty of *treasonable* practices who meditates the life of the king, or aims at subverting his government: a man may be a *traitor* under all forms of government; but he can be guilty of *treason* only in a monarchical state.

This very charge of folly should make men cautious how they listen to the *treacherous* proposals which come from his own bosom.—SOUTH.

All the evils of war must unavoidably be endured, as the necessary means to give success to the *traitorous* designs of the rebel.—SOUTH.

Herod trumped up a sham plot against Hyrcanus, as if he held correspondence with Malchus King of Arabia, for accomplishing *treasonable* designs against him.—PRIDEAUX.

Treasonable, v. Treacherous.

To Treasure, Hoard.

The idea of laying up carefully is common to these verbs; but to **Treasure** is to lay up for the sake of preserving; to **Hoard**, to lay up for the sake of accumulating; we *treasure* up the gifts of a friend; the miser *hoards* up his money: we attach a real value to that which we *treasure*; a fictitious value to that which is *hoarded*. To *treasure* is used either in the proper or improper sense; to *hoard* only in the proper sense: we *treasure* a book on which we set particular value, or we *treasure* the words or actions of another in our recollection; the miser *hoards* in his coffers whatever he can scrape together.

Fancy can combine the ideas which memory has *treasured*.—HAWKSWORTH.

Boards ev'n beyond the miser's wish abound.—GOLD-SMITH.

Treat, v. Feast.

To Treat For or About, v. To negotiate.

Treatise, v. Essay.

Treatment, Usage.

Treatment implies the act of treating, and **Usage** that of using; *treatment* may be partial or temporary; but *usage* is properly employed for that which is permanent or continued: a passer-by may meet with ill-treatment; but children and domestics are liable to meet with ill-usage. All persons may meet with treatment from others with whom they casually come in connection; but *usage* is applied more properly to those who are more or less in the power of others: children may receive good or ill-usage from those who have the charge of them, servants from their masters, or wives from their husbands.

By promises of more indulgent treatment, if they would unite with him (Cortes) against their oppressors, he prevailed on the people to supply the Spanish camp with provisions.—ROBERTSON.

If we look further into the world, we shall find this usage (of our Saviour from his own) not so very strange; for kindred is not friendship.—SOUTH.

Trembling, Tremor, Trepidation.

All these terms are derived from the very same source (v. *Agitation*), and designate a general state of agitation: **Trembling** is not only the most familiar but also the most indefinite term of the three; **Trepidation** and **Tremor** are species of *trembling*. *Trembling* expresses any degree of involuntary shaking of the frame, from the affection either of the body or the mind; cold, nervous affections, fear, and the like, are the ordinary causes of *trembling*: *tremor* is a slight degree of *trembling* which arises only from a mental affection; when the spirits are agitated, the mind is thrown into a *tremor* by any trifling incident: *trepidation* is more violent than either of the two, and springs from the defective state of the mind, it shows itself in the action, or the different movements of the body, rather than in the body; those who have not the requisite composure of mind to command themselves on all occasions are apt to do what is required of them with *trepidation*. *Trembling* is either an occasional or an habitual infirmity; there is no one who may not be sometimes seized with a *trembling*, and there are those who, from a lasting disease or from old age, are never rid of it: *tremor* is but occasional, and consequently depends rather on the nature of the occasion: no one who has a proper degree of modesty can make his first appearance in public without feeling a *tremor*: *trepidation* may be either occasional or habitual, but oftener the latter, since it arises rather from the weakness of the mind than the strength of the cause.

And with unmanly trembling shook the car.—POPE.

The ferocious insolence of Cromwell, the ragged brutality of Harrison, and the general *trepidation* of fear and wickedness (in the rebel parliament), would make a picture of unexampled variety.—JOHNSON.

Laughter is a vent of any sudden joy that strikes upon the mind, which, being too volatile and strong, breaks out in this *tremor* of the voice.—STEELE.

Trembling and *tremulous* are applied as epithets either to persons or things: a *trembling* voice evinces *trepidation* of mind; a *tremulous* voice evinces a *tremor* of mind: notes in music are sometimes *trembling*: the motion of the leaves of trees is *tremulous*.

And rend the *trembling* unresisting prey.—POPE.

As thus th' effulgence *tremulous* I drank,
With cherish'd gaze.—THOMSON.

Tremendous, v. Fearful.

Tremor, v. Agitation.

Tremor, v. Trembling.

Trepidation, v. Agitation.

Trepidation, v. Trembling.

Trespass, v. Offence.

Trial, v. Attempt.

Trial, v. Experience.

Tribute, v. Tax.

Trick, v. Artifice.

To Trick, v. To cheat.

Trifling, Trivial, Petty, Frivolous, Futile.

Trifling, **Trivial**, both come from *trivium*, a common place of resort where three roads meet, and signify common.

Petty is in French *petit* little, in Latin *putus* a boy or minion, and the Hebrew *pethi* foolish.

Frivolous, in Latin *frivolus*, comes in all probability from *frio* to crumble into dust, signifying reduced to nothing.

Futile, in Latin *futiles*, from *futio* to pour out, signifies cast away as worthless.

All these epithets characterize an object as of little or no value; *trifling* and *trivial* differ only in degree; the latter denoting a still lower degree of value than the former. What is *trifling* or *trivial* is that which does not require any consideration and may be easily passed over as forgotten: trifling objections can never weigh against solid reason; *trivial* remarks only expose the shallowness of the remarker: what is *petty* is beneath our consideration, it ought to be disregarded and held cheap; it would be a *petty* consideration for a minister of state to look to the small savings of a private family: what is *frivolous* and *futile* is disgraceful for any one to consider; the former in relation to all the objects of our pursuit or attachment, the latter only in regard to matters of reasoning; dress is a *frivolous* occupation when it forms the chief business of a rational being; the objections of free-thinkers against revealed religion are as *futile* as they are mischievous.

We exceed the ancients in doggerel humour, burlesque, and all the *trivial* arts of ridicule.—ADDISON.

There is scarcely any man without some favourite trifle which he values above greater attainments; some desire of *petty* praise which he cannot patiently suffer to be frustrated.—JOHNSON.

It is an endless and *frivolous* pursuit to act by any other rule than the care of satisfying our own minds.—STEELE.

Out of a multiplicity of criticisms by various hands many are sure to be *futile*.—COWPER.

Trivial, v. Trifling.

Troop, Company.

In a military sense a **Troop** is among the horse what a **Company** is among the foot; but this is only a partial acceptance of the term. *Troop*, in French *troupe*, Spanish *tropa*, Latin *turba*, signifies an indiscriminate multitude; *company* (v. *To accompany*) is any number joined together, and bearing each other *company*; hence we speak of a *troop* of hunters, a *company* of players; a *troop* of horsemen, a *company* of travellers.

To Trouble, v. To afflict.

To Trouble, Disturb, Molest.

Whatever uneasiness or painful sentiment is produced in the mind by outward circumstances is effected either by **Trouble** (v. *Affliction*), by **Disturbance** (v. *Commotion*), or by **Molestation** (v. *To inconvenience*). *Trouble* is the most general in its application; we may be *troubled* by the want of a thing, or *troubled* by that which is unsuitable; we are *disturbed* and *molested* only by that which actively *troubles*. Pecuniary wants are the greatest *troubles* in life; the perverseness of servants, the indisposition or ill behaviour of children, are domestic *troubles*: but the noise of children is a disturbance, and the prospect of want *disturbs* the mind. *Trouble* may be permanent; *disturbance* and *molestation* are temporary, and both refer to the peace which is destroyed: a *disturbance* ruffles or throws out of a tranquil state; a *molestation* burdens or bears hard either on the body or the mind: noise is always a *disturbance* to one who wishes to think or to remain in quiet; talking, or any noise, is a *molestation* to one who is in an irritable frame of body or mind.

Ulysses was exceedingly *troubled* at the sight of his mother (in the Elysian fields).—ADDISON.

No buzzing sounds *disturb* their golden sleep.
DRYDEN.

All use those arms which nature has bestow'd,
Produce their tender progeny, and feed
With care parental, whilst that care they need
In these lov'd offices completely blest,
No hopes beyond them, nor vain fears molest.
JENYNS.

Troubles, v. Difficulties.

Troublesome, Irksome, Vexatious.

These epithets are applied to the objects which create *trouble* or *vexation*.

Irksome is compounded of *irk* and *some*, from the German *arger* vexation, which probably comes from the Greek *apros*.

Troublesome (v. *To afflict*) is here, as before, the generic term; *irksome* and **Vexatious** are species of the *troublesome*: what is *troublesome* creates either bodily or mental pain; what is *irksome* creates a mixture of bodily and mental pain; and what is *vexatious* creates

purely mental pain. What requires great exertion, or a too long continued exertion or exertions, coupled with difficulties, is *troublesome*; in this sense the laying in stores for the winter is a *troublesome* work for the ants, and compiling a dictionary is a *troublesome* labour to some writers: what requires any exertion which we are unwilling to make, or interrupts the peace which we particularly long for, is *irksome*; in this sense giving and receiving of visits is *irksome* to some persons; travelling is *irksome* to others; what comes across our particular wishes, or disappoints us in a particular manner, is *vexatious*; in this sense the loss of a prize which we had hoped to gain may be *vexatious*.

The incursions of *troublesome* thoughts are often violent and importunate.—JOHNSON.

For not to *irksome* toil, but to delight he made us.
MILTON.

The pensive goddess has already taught
How vain is hope, and how *vexatious* thought.—PRIOR.

To Truck, v. To exchange.

True, v. Sincere.

Trust, v. Belief.

To Trust, v. To confide.

Trust, v. Hope.

Trusty, v. Faithful.

Truth, Veracity.

Truth belongs to the thing; **Veracity** to the person: the *truth* of the story is admitted upon the *veracity* of the narrator.

I shall think myself obliged for the future to speak always in *truth* and sincerity of heart.—ADDISON.

Many relations of travellers have been slighted as fabulous till more frequent voyages have confirmed their *veracity*.—JOHNSON.

Try, Tempt.

Try, v. To attempt.

Tempt, v. To attempt.

To *try* is to call forth one's ordinary powers: to *tempt* is a particular species of trial: we *try* either ourselves or others; we *tempt* others: we *try* a person only in the path of his duty; but we may *tempt* him to depart from his duty: it is necessary to *try* the fidelity of a servant before you place confidence in him; it is wicked to *tempt* any one to do that which we should think wrong to do ourselves: our strength is *tried* by frequent experiments; we are *tempted* by the weakness of our principles, to give way to the violence of our passions.

League all your forces then, ye pow'rs above,
Join all, and *try* the omnipotence of Jove.—POPE.
Still the old sting remain'd, and men began
To *tempt* the serpent, as he *tempted* man.—DENHAM.

To Tumble, v. To fall.

Tumid, v. Turgid.

Tumult, v. Bustle.

Tumultuary, v. Tumultuous.

Tumultuous, Tumultuary.

Tumultuous signifies having tumult; **Tumultuary**, disposed for tumult: the

former is applied to objects in general; the latter to persons only: in *tumultuous* meetings the voice of reason is the last thing that is heard; it is the natural tendency of large and promiscuous assemblies to become *tumultuary*.

But, O! beyond description happiest he

Who ne'er must roll on life's *tumultuous* sea.—PRIOR.

With *tumultuary* but irresistible violence the Scotch insurgents fell upon the churches in that city (Perth).—ROBERTSON.

Tumultuous, Turbulent, Seditious, Mutinous.

Tumultuous (*v. Bustle*) describes the disposition to make a noise; those who attend the playhouses, particularly the lower orders, are frequently *tumultuous*: **Turbulent** marks a hostile spirit of resistance to authority; when prisoners are dissatisfied they are frequently *turbulent*: **Seditious** marks a spirit of resistance to government; during the French revolution the people were often disposed to be *seditious*: **Mutinous** marks a spirit of resistance against officers either in the army or navy; a general will not fail to quell the first risings of a *mutinous* spirit. Electioneering mobs are always *tumultuous*; the young and the ignorant are so averse to control that they are easily led by the example of an individual to be *turbulent*; among the Romans the people were in the habit of holding *seditious* meetings, and sometimes the soldiery would be *mutinous*.

Turbulent, *v. Tumultuous*.

Turgid, Tumid, Bombastic.

Turgid and **Tumid** both signify swollen, but they differ in their application: *turgid* belongs to diction, as a *turgid* style; *tumid* is applicable to the water and other objects, as the *tumid* waves. **Bombastic** from *bombastic* a kind of cotton, signifies puffed up like cotton, and is, like *turgid*, applicable to words: but the *bombastic* includes the sentiments expressed: *turgidity* is confined mostly to the mode of expression. A writer is *turgid* who expresses a simple thought in lofty language: a person is *bombastic* who deals in large words and introduces high sentiments in common discourse.

To Turn, Bend, Twist, Distort, Wring, Wrest, Wrench.

Turn, in French *tourner*, comes from the Greek *ropev* to turn, and *ropeos* a turner's wheel.

Bend, *v. Bend*.

Twist, in Saxon *getwisan*, German *zweyen* to double, comes from *zwey* two.

Distort, in Latin *distortus*, participle of *distorqueo*, compounded of *dis* and *torqueo*, signifies to turn violently aside.

To *turn* signifies in general to put a thing out of its place in an uneven line; to *bend*, and the rest, are species of *turning*: we *turn* a thing by moving it from one point to another; thus we *turn* the earth over: to *bend* is simply to change its direction; thus a *stick* is *bent*:

to *twist* is to *bend* many times, to make many *turns*: to *distort* is to *turn* or *bend* out of the right course; thus the face is *distorted* in convulsions. To **Wring** is to *twist* with violence; thus linen which has been wetted is *wrung*: to **Wrest** or **Wrench** is to separate from a body by means of *twisting*; thus a stick may be *wrested* out of the hand, or a hinge *wrenched* off the door.

The same distinction holds good in the moral application: we *turn* a person from his design; we *bend* the will of a person; we *twist* the meaning of words to suit our purposes: we *distort* them so as to give them an entirely false meaning; we *wring* a confession from one; or *wrest* the meaning of a person's words.

Yet still they find a future task remain,

To *turn* the soil, and break the clods again.

DRYDEN.

Strong passion dwells on that object which has seized and taken possession of the soul; it is too much occupied and filled by it to *turn* its view aside.—BLAIR.

Some to the house,

The fold and dairy, hungry *bent* their flight.

THOMSON.

But let not on thy hook the tortur'd worm,

Convulsive, *twist* in agonizing folds.—THOMSON.

We saw their stern, *distorted* looks from far.—DRYDEN.

Our bodies are unhappily made the weapons of sin; therefore we must, by an austere course of duty, first *wring* these weapons out of its hands.—SOUTH.

Wresting the text to the old giant's sense,

That heav'n once more must suffer violence.—DENHAM.

She *wrench'd* the jav'lin with her dying hands.

DRYDEN.

Turn, Bent.

These words are only compared here in the figurative application, as respects the state of a person's inclination: the **Turn** is therefore, as before, indefinite as to the degree; it is the first rising inclination: **Bent** is a positively strong *turn*, a confirmed inclination; a child may early discover a *turn* for music or drawing; but the real *bent* of his genius is not known until he has made a proficiency in his education, and has had an opportunity of trying different things: it may be very well to indulge the *turn* of mind; it is of great importance to follow the *bent* of the mind as far as respects arts and sciences.

I need not tell you how a man of Mr. Rowe's *turn* entertained me.—POPE.

I know the *bent* of your present attention is directed towards the eloquence of the bar.—MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF PLINY.

To Turn, Wind, Whirl, Twirl, Writhe.

To **Turn** (*v. To turn*) is, as before, the generic term; the rest are but modes of *turning*; that is, **Wind**, to *turn* a thing round in a regular manner; **Whirl**, to *turn* it round in a violent manner; to **Twirl**, to *turn* it round in an irregular and unmeaning way; **Writhe**, to *turn* round in convulsion within itself. A worm seldom moves in a straight line; it is, therefore, always *turning*: sometimes it lies, and sometimes it *writhes* in agony: a wheel is *whirled* round by the force of gunpowder: a top is *twirled* by a child in play.

How has this poison lost its wonted ways?
It should have burnt its passage, not have linger'd
In the blind labyrinths and crooked *turnings*
Of human composition.—DRYDEN.

The tracks of Providence like rivers *wind*,
Here run before us, there retreat behind.—HIGGINS.

He was no civil ruffian; none of those
Wholly with *twisted* locks, betray with shrugs.
THOMSON.

Man is but man, inconstant still, and various;
There's no to-morrow in him like to-day;
Perhaps the atoms, *whirling* in his brain,
Make him think honestly this present hour:
The next, a swarm of base, ungrateful thoughts
May mount aloft.—DRYDEN.

I had used my eye to such a quick succession of objects
that, in the most precipitate *twirl*, I could catch a sentence
out of each author.—STEELE.

Dying, he bellow'd out his dread remorse,
And *writ'h'd* with seeming anguish of the soul.
SHIRLEY.

To Twirl, *v. To turn.*

To Twist, *v. To turn.*

Type, *v. Figure.*

Tyrannical, *v. Absolute.*

U.

Umpire, *v. Judge.*

Unbelief, *v. Disbelief.*

Unbelief, Infidelity, Incredulity.

Unbelief (*v. Belief*) respects matters in general; Infidelity (*v. Faithful*) is *unbelief* as respects Divine revelation; Incredulity is *unbelief* in ordinary matters. *Unbelief* is taken in an indefinite and negative sense; it is the want of *belief* in any particular thing that may or may not be *believed*: *infidelity* is a more active state of mind; it supposes a violent and total rejection of that which ought to be *believed*: *incredulity* is also an active state of mind, in which we oppose a *belief* to matters that may be rejected. *Unbelief* does not of itself convey any reproachful meaning; it depends upon the thing disbelieved: *infidelity* is taken in the worst sense for a blind and senseless perversity in refusing belief: *incredulity* is often a mark of wisdom. The Jews are *unbelievers* in the mission of our Saviour; the Turks are *infidels*, inasmuch as they do not believe in the Bible; Deists and Atheists are likewise *infidels*, inasmuch as they set themselves up against Divine revelation; well-informed people are always *incredulous* of stories respecting ghosts and apparitions.

One gets by heart a catalogue of title-pages and editions; and immediately, to become conspicuous, declares that he is an *unbeliever*.—ADDISON.

Belief and profession will speak a Christian but very faintly when thy conversation proclaims thee an *infidel*.—SOUTH.

The youth hears all the predictions of the aged with obstinate *incredulity*.—JOHNSON.

Unblemished, *v. Blameless.*

Unbodied, *v. Incorporeal.*

Unbounded, *v. Boundless.*

Unceasingly, *v. Incessantly.*

Uncertain, *v. Doubtful.*

Unconcerned, *v. Indifferent.*

Unconquerable, *v. Invincible.*

To Uncover, Discover.

To Uncover, like Discover, implies to take off the covering; but the former refers

mostly to an artificial, material, and occasional covering; the latter to a natural, moral, and habitual covering: plants are *uncovered* that they may receive the benefit of the air; they are *discovered* to gratify the researches of the botanist.

Uncovered, *v. Bare.*

Undaunted, *v. Bold.*

Undeniable, *v. Indubitable.*

Under, Below, Beneath.

Under, like hind in behind, and the German *unter*, *hinter*, &c., are all connected with the preposition *in* in implying the relation of enclosure.

Below denotes the state of being low; and Beneath from the German *nieder*, and the Greek *υεπε* or *ενεπε* downwards, has the same original signification. It is evident, therefore, from the above, that the preposition *under* denotes any situation of retirement or concealment; *below*, any situation of inferiority or lowness; and *beneath*, the same, only in a still greater degree. We are covered or sheltered by that which we stand *under*; we excel or rise above that which is *below* us; we look down upon that which is *beneath* us: we live *under* the protection of government; the sun disappears when it is *below* the horizon; we are apt to tread upon that which is altogether *beneath* us.

The Jewish writers in their chronological computations often shoot *under* or over the truth at their pleasure.—PRIDEAUX.

All sublunary comforts imitate the changeableness, as well as feel the influence, of the planet they are *under*.—SOUTH.

Our minds are here and there, *below*, above;
Nothing that's mortal can so quickly move.
DENHAM.

How can anything better be expected than rust and canker when men will rather dig their treasure from *beneath* than fetch it from above.—SOUTH.

To Understand, *v. To conceive.*

Understanding, Intellect, Intelligence.

Understanding (*v. To conceive*), being the Saxon word, is employed to describe a

familiar and easy operation of the mind in forming distinct ideas of things. *Intellect* (*v. Intellect*) is employed to mark the same operation in regard to higher and more abstruse objects. The *understanding* applies to the first exercise of the rational powers: it is therefore aptly said of children and savages that they employ their *understandings* on the simple objects of perception; a child uses his *understanding* to distinguish the dimensions of objects, or to apply the right names to the things that come before his notice.

Intellect, being a matured state of the *understanding*, is most properly applied to the efforts of those who have their powers in full vigour: we speak of *understanding* as the characteristic distinction between man and brute; but human beings are distinguished from each other by the measure of their *intellect*. We may expect the youngest children to employ an *understanding* according to the opportunities which they have of using their senses; we are gratified when we see great *intellect* in the youth whom we are instructing.

Intellect and *Intelligence* are derived from the same word; but *intellect* describes the power itself, and *intelligence* the exercise of that power: the *intellect* may be hidden, but the *intelligence* brings it to light; hence we speak of *intelligence* as displayed in the countenance of a child whose looks evince that he has exerted his *intellect*, and thereby proved that it exists. Hence it arises that the word *intelligence* has been employed in the sense of knowledge or information, because these are the express fruits of *intelligence*: we must know by means of *intelligence*: but we may be ignorant with a great share of *intellect*.

The light within us is (since the fall) become darkness: and the *understanding*, that should be eyes to the blind faculty of the will, is blind itself.—SOUTH.

All those arts and inventions which vulgar minds gaze at, the ingenious pursue, and all admire, are but the reliques of an *intellect* defaced with sin and time.—SOUTH.

Silent as the ecstatic bliss
Of souls, that by *intelligence* converse.—OTWAY.

Undertaking, v. Attempt.

Undetermined, Unsettled, Unsteady, Wavering.

Undetermined (*v. To determine*) is a temporary state of the mind; *Unsettled* is commonly more lasting: we are *undetermined* in the ordinary concerns of life; we are *unsettled* in matters of opinion; we may be *undetermined* whether we shall go or stay; we are *unsettled* in our faith or religious profession.

Undetermined and *unsettled* are applied to particular objects; *Unsteady* and *Wavering* are habits of the mind: to be *unsteady* is in fact to be habitually *unsettled* in regard to all objects. An *unsettled* character is one that has no settled principles; an *unsteady* character has an unfitness in himself to settle. *Undetermined* describes one uniform state of mind, namely, the want of determination: *wavering* describes a changeable state, namely, the state of determining variously at different times. *Undetermined* is always taken in an indifferent,

wavering mostly in a bad sense: we may frequently be *undetermined* from the nature of the case, which does not present motives for determining; but a person is mostly *wavering* from a defect in his character, in cases where he might determine. A parent may with reason be *undetermined* as to the line of life which he shall choose for his son: men of soft and timid characters are always *wavering* in the most trivial as well as the most important concerns of life.

We suffer the last part of life to steal from us in weak hopes of some fortuitous occurrence or drowsy equilibrations of *undetermined* counsel.—JOHNSON.

Uncertain and *unsettled* as Cicero was, he seems fired with the contemplation of immortality.—FEARCE.

You will find soberness and truth in the proper teachers of religion, and much *unwisdom* and vanity in others —EARL WENTWORTH.

Yet such, we find, they are as can control
The servile actions of our *wav'ring* soul.—PRIOR.

Uneven, v. Odd.

Unfaithful, v. Faithless.

Unfeeling, v. Hard.

To Unfold, Unravel, Develop.

To *Unfold* is to open that which has been folded; to *Unravel* is to open that which has been unravelled or tangled; to *Develop* is to open that which has been wrapt in an *envelope*. The application of these terms therefore to moral objects is obvious: what has been *folded* and kept secret is *unfolded*; in this manner a hidden transaction is *unfolded* by being related circumstantially; what has been entangled in any mystery or confusion is *unravelled*: in this manner a mysterious transaction is *unravelled* if any circumstance is fully accounted for: what has been wrapped up so as to be entirely shut out from view is *developed*; in this manner the plot of a play or novel or the talent of a person is *developed*.

And to the sage-instructing eye *unfold*
The various twine of light.—THOMSON.

You must be sure to *unravel* all your designs to a jealous man.—ADDISON.

The character of Tiberius is extremely difficult to *develop*.—CUMBERLAND.

Ungovernable, v. Unruly.

Unhappy, Miserable, Wretched.

Unhappy is literally not to be happy; this is the negative condition of many who might be happy if they pleased. *Miserable*, from *misereor* to pity, is to deserve pity; that is to be positively and extremely *unhappy*: this is the lot only of a comparatively few. *Wretched*, from our word *wreck*, the Saxon *wrecca* an exile, and the like, signifies cast away or abandoned; that is, particularly *miserable*, which is the lot of still fewer. As happiness lies properly in the mind, *unhappy* is taken in the proper sense, with regard to the state of the feelings; but is figuratively extended to the outward circumstances which occasion the painful feelings; we lead an *unhappy* life, or are in an *unhappy* condition: as that which excites the compassion of others must be external, and the state of abandonment must of itself be an outward state,

miserable and *wretched* are properly applied to the outward circumstances which cause the pain, and improperly to the pain which is occasioned. We can measure the force of these words, that is to say, the degree of *unhappiness* which they express, only by the circumstance which causes the *unhappiness*. An *unhappy* man is indefinite; as we may be *unhappy* from slight circumstances, or from those which are important; a child may be said to be *unhappy* at the loss of a plaything; a man is *unhappy* who leads a vicious life; *miserable* and *wretched* are more limited in their application; a child cannot be either *miserable* or *wretched*; and he who is so has some serious cause either in his own mind or in his circumstances to make him so: a man is *miserable* who is tormented by his conscience; a mother will be *wretched* who sees her child violently torn from her.

The same distinction holds good when taken to designate the outward circumstances themselves; he is an *unhappy* man whom nobody likes, and who likes nobody; every criminal suffering the punishment of his offence is an *unhappy* man. The condition of the poor is particularly *miserable* in countries which are not blessed with the abundance that England enjoys. Philoctetes, abandoned by the Greeks in the island of Lemnos, a prey to the most poignant grief and the horrors of indigence and solitude, was a *wretched* man.

Unhappy is only applicable to that which respects the happiness of man; but *miserable* and *wretched* may be said of that which is mean and worthless in its nature: a writer may be either *miserable* or *wretched* according to the lowness of the measure at which he is rated; so likewise any performance may be *miserable* or *wretched*; a house may be *miserable* or *wretched*, and the like.

Such is the fate *unhappy* women find,
And such the curse intall'd upon our kind.—ROWE.

These *miseries* are more than may be borne.
SHAKESPEARE.

'Tis murmur, discontent, distrust,
That makes you *wretched*.—GAY.

Uniform, v. Equal.

Unimportant, Insignificant, Immaterial, Inconsiderable.

The want of *importance*, of *consideration*, of *signification*, and of matter or substance, is expressed by these terms. They differ therefore principally according to the meaning of the primitives; but they are so closely allied that they may be employed sometimes indifferently. **Unimportant** regards the consequences of our actions: it is *unimportant* whether we use this or that word in certain cases; **Inconsiderable** and **Insignificant** respect those things which may attract notice; the former is more adapted to the grave style, to designate the comparative low value of things; the latter is a familiar term which seems to convey a contemptuous meaning; in a description we may say that the number, the size, the quantity, &c. is *inconsiderable*; in speaking of persons we may say they are *insignificant* in stature, look, talent, station, and the like; or, speaking of things, an *insignificant*

production, or an *insignificant* word: **Immaterial** is a species of the *unimportant*, which is applied only to familiar subjects; it is *immaterial* whether we go to-day or to-morrow; it is *immaterial* whether we have a few or many.

Nigro and Guerra made no discoveries of any *importance*.—ROBERTSON.

That the soul cannot be proved mortal by any principle of natural reason is, I think, no *inconsiderable* point gained.—SOUTH.

As I am *insignificant* to the company in public places, I gratify the vanity of all who pretend to make an appearance.—ADDISON.

If in the judgment of impartial persons, the arguments be strong enough to convince an unbiassed mind, it is not *material* whether every wrangling atheist will sit down contented with them.—STILLINGFLEET.

Uninterruptedly, v. Incessantly.

To Unite, v. To add.

To Unite, v. To connect.

Universal, v. General.

Unjust, v. Wicked.

Unlearned, v. Ignorant.

Unless, Except.

Unless, which is equivalent to *if less*, if not, or if one fail, is employed only for the particular case; but **Except** has always a reference to some general rule, of which an *exception* is hereby signified: I shall not do it *unless* he ask me; no one can enter *except* those who are provided with tickets.

Unless money can be borrowed, trade cannot be carried on.—BLACKSTONE.

If a wife continues in the use of her jewels till her husband's death, she shall afterwards retain them against his executors and administrators, and all other persons except creditors.—BLACKSTONE.

Unlettered, v. Ignorant.

Unlike, v. Different.

Unlimited, v. Boundless.

Unmerciful, v. Hard-hearted.

Unoffending, Inoffensive, Harmless.

Unoffending denotes the act of not *offending*: **Inoffensive** the property of not being disposed or apt to offend: **Harmless**, the property of being void of harm. **Unoffending** expresses therefore only a partial state; *inoffensive* and *harmless* mark the disposition and character. A child is *unoffending* as long as he does nothing to offend others; but he may be *offensive* if he discover an unamiable temper, or has unpleasant manners; a creature is *inoffensive* that has nothing in itself that can offend; but that is *harmless* which has neither the will nor the power to harm. Domestic animals are frequently very *inoffensive*; it is a great recommendation of a quack medicine to say that it is *harmless*.

The *unoffending* royal little ones (of France) were not only condemned to languish in solitude and darkness, but their bodies left to perish with disease.—SEWARD.

She crushes *inoffensive* must.—MILTON.

When the disciple is questioned about the studies of his master, he makes report of some minute and frivolous

researches which are introduced only for the purpose of raising a harmless laugh.—CUMBERLAND.

Unquestionable, v. Indubitable.

Unrelenting, v. Implacable.

Unruly, Ungovernable, Refractory.

Unruly marks the want of disposition to be ruled: **Ungovernable**, an absolute incapacity to be governed: the former is a temporary or partial error, the latter is an habitual defect in the temper: a volatile child will be occasionally *unruly*; any child of strong passions will become *ungovernable* by excessive indulgence; we say that our wills are *unruly*, and our tempers are *ungovernable*. The *unruly* respects that which is to be ruled or turned at the instant, and is applicable therefore to the management of children: *ungovernable* respects that which is to be put into a regular course, and is applicable therefore either to the management of children or the direction of those who are above the state of childhood; a child is *unruly* in his actions, and *ungovernable* in his conduct. Hence **Refractory**, from the Latin *refringo* to break open, marks the disposition to break everything down before it: it is the excess of the *unruly* with regard to children; the *unruly* is, however, negative but the *refractory* is positive: an *unruly* child objects to be ruled; a *refractory* child sets up a positive resistance to all rule: an *unruly* child may be altogether silent and passive; a *refractory* child always commits himself by some act of intemperance in word or deed: he is *unruly* if in any degree he gives trouble in the ruling; he is *refractory* if he refuses altogether to be ruled.

How hardly is the restive *unruly* will of man first tamed and broke to duty.—SOUTH.

I conceive (replied Nicholas) I stand here before you, my most equitable judges, for no worse a crime than cudgelling my *refractory* mule.—CUMBERLAND.

Heav'n's, how unlike their Belgic sires of old!
Rough, poor, content, *ungovernably* bold.
GOLDSMITH.

Unsearchable, Inscrutable.

These terms are both applied to the Almighty, but not altogether indifferently; for that which is **Unsearchable** is not set at so great a distance from us as that which is **Inscrutable**: for that which is *searched* is in common concerns easier to be found than that which requires a *scrutiny*. The ways of God are all to us finite creatures more or less *unsearchable*; but the mysterious plans of Providence as frequently evinced in the affairs of men are altogether *inscrutable*.

Things else by me *unsearchable*, now heard
With wonder.—MILTON.

To expect that the intricacies of science will be pierced by a careless glance, is to expect a particular privilege; but to suppose that the maze is *inscrutable* to diligence, is to enchain the mind in voluntary shackles.—JOHNSON.

Unsettled, v. Undetermined.

Unspeakable, Ineffable, Unutterable, Inexpressible.

Unspeakable and Ineffable, from the Latin *for* to speak, have precisely the same

meaning; but the *unspeakable* is said of objects in general, particularly of that which is above human conception, and surpasses the power of language to describe; as the *unspeakable* goodness of God: **Ineffable** is said of such objects as cannot be painted in words with adequate force; as the *ineffable* sweetness of a person's look: **Unutterable** and **Inexpressible** are extended in their signification to that which is incommunicable by signs from one being to another; thus grief is *unutterable* which it is not in the power of the sufferer by any sounds to bring home to the feelings of another; grief is *inexpressible* which is not to be expressed by looks, or words, or any signs. *Unutterable* is, therefore, applied only to the individual who wishes to give utterance: *inexpressible* may be said of that which is to be expressed concerning others; our own pains are *unutterable*; the sweetness of a person's countenance is *inexpressible*.

The vast difference of God's nature from ours makes the difference between them so *unspeakably* great.—SOUTH.

The influences of the Divine nature enliven the mind with *ineffable* joys.—SOUTH.

Nature breeds,
" Perverse, all monstrous, all prodigious things,
Abominable, *unutterable*.—MILTON.

The evil which lies lurking under a temptation is intolerable and *inexpressible*.—SOUTH.

Unspotted, v. Blameless.

Unsteady, v. Undetermined.

Untoward, v. Awkward.

Untruth, Falsehood, Falsity, Lie.

Untruth is an *untrue* saying; **Falsehood** and **Lie** are *false* sayings: *untruth* of itself reflects no disgrace on the agent; it may be unintentional or not: a *falsehood* and a *lie* are intentional *false* sayings, differing only in degree as the guilt of the offender: a *falsehood* is not always spoken for the express intention of deceiving, but a *lie* is uttered only for the worst of purposes. Some persons have a habit of telling *falsehoods* from the mere love of talking: those who are guilty of bad actions endeavour to conceal them by *lies*. Children are apt to speak *untruths* for want of understanding the value of words: travellers from a love of exaggeration are apt to introduce *falsehoods* into their narrations: it is the nature of a *lie* to increase itself to a tenfold degree; one *lie* must be backed by many more.

Falsehood is also used in the abstract sense for what is *false*. *Falsity* is never used but in the abstract sense, for the property of the *false*. The former is general, the latter particular in the application: the truth or *falsehood* of an assertion is not always to be distinctly proved; the *falsity* of any particular person's assertion may be proved by the evidence of others.

Above all things tell no *untruth*, no, not even in trifles.—SIR HENRY SYDNEY.

Many temptations to *falsehood* will occur in the disguise of passions, too specious to fear much resistance.—JOHNSON.

The nature of a *lie* consists in this, that it is a *false* signification knowingly and voluntarily used.—SOUTH.

Unutterable, v. Unspeakable.

Unwilling, *v. Averse.*

Unwilling, *v. Willingly.*

Unworthy, Worthless.

Unworthy is a term of less reproach than **Worthless**; for the former signifies not to be worthy of praise or honour; the latter signifies to be without all worth, and consequently in the fullest sense bad. It may be a mark of modesty or humility to say that I am an *unworthy* partaker of your kindness; but it would be fully and extravagance to say that I am a *worthless* partaker of your kindness. There are many *unworthy* members in every religious community; but every society that is conducted upon proper principles will take care to exclude *worthless* members. In regard to one another we are often *unworthy* of the distinctions or privileges we enjoy; in regard to our Maker we are all *unworthy* of his goodness: for we are all *worthless* in his eyes.

Since in dark sorrow I my days did spend,
Till now disdaining his *unworthy* end.—DENHAM.

The school of Socrates was at one time deserted by everybody, except *Aschines* the parasite of the tyrant *Dionysius*, and the most *worthless* man living.—CUMBERLAND.

To Upbraid, *v. To blame.*

Upon, *v. Above.*

Uprightness, *v. Honesty.*

Uprightness, *v. Rectitude.*

Uproar, *v. Bustle.*

Urbanity, *v. Suavity.*

To Urge, *v. To encourage.*

Urgent, *v. Pressing.*

Usage, Custom, Prescription.

The **Usage** is what one has been long used to do; **Custom** (*v. Custom*) is what one generally does; **Prescription** is what one is prescribed to do. The *usage* acquires force and sanction by dint of time; the *custom* acquires sanction by the frequency of its being done or the numbers doing it; the *prescription* acquires force by the authority which *prescribes* it, namely, the universal consent of mankind. Hence it arises that *customs* vary in every age, but that *usage* and *prescription* supply the place of written law.

With the national assembly of France, possession is nothing, law and *usage* are nothing.—BURKE.

For since the time of Saturn's holy reign,
His hospitable *customs* we retain.—DRYDEN.

If in any case the shackles of *prescription* could be wholly shaken off, on what occasion should it be expected but in the selection of lawful pleasure?—JOHNSON.

Usage, *v. Treatment.*

Use, *v. Avail.*

To Use, *v. To employ.*

To Use, *v. To labour, endeavour.*

Usually, *v. Commonly.*

To Usurp, *v. To appropriate.*

Utility, *v. Advantage.*

To Utter, *v. To express.*

To Utter, Speak, Articulate, Pronounce.

Utter, from *out*, signifies to put out; that is, to send forth a sound; this therefore is a more general term than **Speak**, which is to utter an intelligible sound. We may *utter* a groan; we *speak* words only, or that which is intended to serve as words. To *speak* therefore is only a species of *utterance*; a dumb man has *utterance* but not *speech*.

Articulate and **Pronounce** are modes of *speaking*; to *articulate*, from *arviculum* a joint, is to *pronounce* distinctly the letters or syllables of words; which is the first effort of a child beginning to *speak*. It is of great importance to make a child *articulate* every letter when he first begins to *speak* or read. To *pronounce*, from the Latin *pronuncio* to speak out loud, is a formal mode of *speaking*.

A child must first *articulate* the letters and the syllables, then he *pronounces* or sets forth the whole word; this is necessary before he can *speak* to be understood.

At each word that my destruction *utter'd*
My heart recoiled.—OTWAY.

Waller had a graceful way of *speaking*.—CLARENDON.

The torments of disease can sometimes only be signified by groans or sobs, or *inarticulate* ejaculations.—JOHNSON.

Speak the speech I pray you, as I *pronounced* it to you.
—SHAKSPEARE.

V.

Vacancy, Vacuity, Inanity.

Vacancy and **Vacuity** both denote the space unoccupied, or the abstract quality of being unoccupied. **Inanity**, from the Latin *inanis*, denotes the abstract quality of emptiness, or of not containing anything: hence the former terms *vacancy* and *vacuity* are used in an indifferent sense; *inanity* always in a bad sense: there may be a *vacancy* in the mind, or a *vacancy* in life, which we may or may not fill up as we please; but *inanity* of character

denotes the want of the essentials that constitute a character.

There are *vacuities* in the happiest life, which it is not in the power of the world to fill.—BLAIR.

When I look up and behold the heavens, it makes me scorn the world and the pleasures thereof, considering the vanity of these and the *inanity* of the other.—HOWEL.

Vacant, *v. Empty.*

Vacant, *v. Idle.*

Vacuity, *v. Vacancy.*

Vague, *v. Loose.*

Vain, *v. Idle.*

Vain, Ineffectual, Fruitless.

Vain, *v. Idle.*

Ineffectual, that is, not *effectual* (*v. Effective*).

Fruitless, that is, without *fruit*, signifies not producing the desired fruit of one's labour.

These epithets are all applied to our endeavours; but the term *vain* is the most general and indefinite; the other terms are particular and definite. What we aim at, as well as what we strive for, may be *vain*; but *ineffectual* and *fruitless* refer only to the end of our labours. When the object aimed at is general in its import, it is common to term the endeavour *vain* when it cannot attain this object; it is *vain* to attempt to reform a person's character until he is convinced that he stands in need of reformation; when the means employed are inadequate for the attainment of the particular end, it is usual to call the endeavour *ineffectual*: cool arguments will be *ineffectual* in convincing any one inflamed with a particular passion; when labour is specifically employed for the attainment of a particular object it is usual to term it *fruitless* if it fail: peace-makers will often find themselves in this condition, that their labours will be rendered *fruitless* by the violent passions of angry opponents.

Nature aloud calls out for balmy rest,
But all in vain.—GENTLEMAN.

After many *fruitless* overtures, the Inca, despairing of any cordial union with a Spaniard, attacked him by surprise with a numerous body.—ROBERTSON.

Thou thyself with scorn
And anger wouldst resent the offer'd wrong,
Though *ineffectual* found.—MILTON.

Valour, *v. Bravery.*

Valuable, Precious, Costly.

Valuable signifies fit to be *valued*; **Precious**, having a high *price*; **Costly**, *costing* much money. *Valuable* expresses directly the idea of *value*; *precious* and *costly* express the same idea indirectly: on the other hand, that which is *valuable* is only said to be fit or deserving of *value*; but *precious* and *costly* denote that which is highly *valuable*, according to the ordinary measure of *valuing* objects, that is, by the *price* they bear; hence, the two latter express the idea much more strongly than the former. A book is *valuable* according to its contents, or according to the estimate which men set upon it, either individually or collectively. The Bible is the only *precious* book in the world that has intrinsic *value*, that is, set above all *price*. There are many *costly* things, which are only *valuable* to the individuals who are disposed to expend money upon them.

What an absurd thing it is to pass over all the *valuable* parts of a man, and fix our attention on his infirmities.—ADDISON.

It is no improper comparison that a *thankful* heart is like a box of *precious* ointment.—HOWEL.

Christ is sometimes pleased to make the profession of himself *costly*.—SOUTH.

Value, Worth, Rate, Price.

Value, from the Latin *valere* to be strong, respects those essential qualities which constitute its strength.

Worth, in German *worth*, from *würhen* to perceive, signifies that good which is experienced or felt to exist in a thing.

Rate, *v. Proportion.*

Price, in Latin, *pretium*, from the Greek *πρᾶσσω* to sell, signifies what a thing is sold for.

Value is a general and indefinite term applied to whatever is really good or conceived as such in a thing: the *worth* is that good only which is conceived or known as such. The *value* therefore of a thing is as variable as the humours and circumstances of men; it may be nothing or something very great in the same object at the same time in the eyes of different men. The *worth* is, however, that *value* which is acknowledged: it is therefore something more fixed and permanent; we speak of the *value* of external objects which are determined by taste; but the *worth* of things as determined by rule. The *value* of a book that is out of print is fluctuating and uncertain; but its real *worth* may not be more than what it would fetch for waste paper. The *rate* and *price* are the measures of that *value* or *worth*; the former in a general, the latter in a particular application to mercantile transactions. Whatever we give in exchange for another thing, whether according to a definite or an indefinite estimation, that is said to be done at a certain *rate*; thus we purchase pleasure at a dear *rate*, when it is at the expense of our health: *price* is the *rate* of exchange estimated by coin or any other medium; hence *price* is a fixed *rate*, and may be figuratively applied in that sense to moral objects; as when health is expressly sacrificed to pleasure, it may be termed the *price* of pleasure.

Life has no *value* as an end, but means.
An end deplorable! A means divine.—YOUNG.

Pay
No moment, but in purchase of its *worth*;
And what its *worth* ask death-beds.—YOUNG.

If you will take my humour as it runs, you shall have hearty thanks into the bargain, for taking it off at such a *rate*.—EARL OF SHAFTESBURY.

The soul's high *price*
Is writ in all the conduct of the skies.—YOUNG.

To Value, Prize, Esteem.

To **Value** is in the literal sense to fix the real *value* of a thing. **Prize**, signifying to fix a *price*, and **Esteem** (*v. Esteem*), are both modes of *valuing*. In the extended sense, to *value* may mean to ascertain the relative or supposititious *value* of a thing: in this sense men *value* gold above silver, or an appraiser *values* goods. To *value* may either be applied to material or spiritual subjects, to corporeal or mental actions: *price* and *esteem* are taken only as mental actions; the former in reference to sensible or moral objects, the latter only to moral objects: we may *value* books according to their market *price*, or we may *value* them according to their contents; we *prize* books only for their contents, in which sense *prize* is a much stronger term than *value*;

we also prize men for their usefulness to society ; we esteem their moral characters.

The prize, the beauteous prize, I will resign
So dearly valu'd, and so justly mine.—POPE.

Nothing makes women esteemed by the opposite sex more than chastity ; whether it be that we always prize those most who are hardest to come at, or that nothing besides chastity, with its collateral attendants, fidelity and constancy, gives a man a property in the person he loves.—ADDISON.

Vanity, v. Pride.

To Vanquish, v. To conquer.

Variable, v. Changeable.

Variation, v. Change.

Variation, Variety.

Variation denotes the act of *varying* (v. *To change*) ; **Variety** denotes the quality of *varying*, or the thing *varied*. The astronomer observes the *variations* in the heavens ; the philosopher observes the *variations* in the climate from year to year. *Variety* is pleasing to all persons, but to none so much as the young and the fickle : there is an infinite *variety* in every species of objects animate or inanimate.

The idea of *variation* (as a constituent in beauty), without attending so accurately to the manner of *variation*, has led Mr. Hogarth to consider angular figures as beautiful.—BURKE.

As to the colours usually found in beautiful bodies, it may be difficult to ascertain them, because in the several parts of nature there is an infinite *variety*.—BURKE.

Variety, v. Difference.

Variety, v. Variation.

Various, v. Different.

To Varnish, v. To gloss

To Vary, v. To change.

To Vary, v. To differ.

Vast, v. Enormous.

Vehement, v. Violent.

Veil, v. Cloak.

Velocity, v. Quickness.

Venal, Mercenary.

Venal, from the Latin *venalis*, signifies saleable or ready to be sold, which, applied as it commonly is to persons, is a much stronger term than **Mercenary** (v. *Mercenary*). A *venal* man gives up all principle for interest ; a *mercenary* man seeks his interest without regard to principle : *venal* writers are such as write in favour of the cause that can promote them to riches or honours ; a servant is commonly a *mercenary* who gives his services according as he is paid : those who are loudest in their professions of political purity are the best subjects for a minister to make *venal* ; a *mercenary* spirit is engendered in the minds of those who devote themselves exclusively to trade.

The minister, well pleas'd at small expense,
To silence so much rude impertinence,
With squeeze and whisper yields to his demands,
And on the *venal* list enroll'd he stands.—JENYNS.

For their assistance they repair to the northern steel, and bring in an unnatural, *mercenary* crew.—SOUTH.

To Venerate, v. To adore.

Venial, Pardonable.

Venial, from the Latin *venia* pardon or indulgence, is applied to what may be tolerated without express disparagement to the individual, or direct censure ; but the **Pardonable** is that which may only escape severe censure, but cannot be allowed : garrulity is a *venial* offence in old age ; levity in youth is *pardonable* in single instances.

Whilst the clergy are employed in extirpating mortal sins, I should beglad to rally the world out of indecencies and *venial* transgressions.—CUMBERLAND.

The weaknesses of Elizabeth were not confined to that period of life when they are more *pardonable*.—ROBERTSON.

Venom, v. Poison.

Venture, v. Hazard.

Veracity, v. Truth.

Verbal, Vocal, Oral.

Verbal, from *verbum* a word, signifies after the manner of a spoken word ; **Oral**, from *os* a mouth, signifies by word of mouth ; and **Vocal**, from *vox* the voice, signifies by the voice : the two former of these words are used to distinguish the speaking from writing ; the latter to distinguish the sounds of the voice from any other sounds, particularly in singing : a *verbal* message is distinguished from one written on a paper, or in a note ; *oral* tradition is distinguished from that which is handed down to posterity by means of books ; *vocal* music is distinguished from instrumental ; *vocal* sounds are more harmonious than those which proceed from any other bodies.

Among all the northern nations, shaking of hands was held necessary to bind the bargain, a custom which we still retain in many *verbal* contracts.—BLACKSTONE.

Forth came the human pair,
And join'd their vocal worship to the quire
Of creatures wanting voice.—MILTON.

In the first ages of the world instruction was commonly *oral*.—JOHNSON.

Verge, v. Border.

Versatile, v. Changeable.

Vestige, v. Mark.

To Vex v. To displease.

To Vex, v. To tease.

Vexation, Mortification, Chagrin.

Vexation, v. To displease.

Mortification, v. To humble.

Chagrin, in French *chagrin*, from *aigrir*, and the Latin *acer*, sharp, signifies a sharp point.

Vexation springs from a variety of causes, acting unpleasantly on the inclinations or passions of men ; *mortification* is a strong degree of *vexation*, which arises from particular circumstances acting on particular passions :

the loss of a day's pleasure is a *vezation* to one who is eager for pleasure; the loss of a prize, or the circumstance of coming into disgrace where we expected honour, is a *mortification* to an ambitious person. *Vezation* arises principally from our wishes and views being crossed: *mortification*, from our pride and self-importance being hurt; *chagrin*, from a mixture of the two; disappointments are always attended with more or less of *vezation*, according to the circumstances which give pain and trouble; an exposure of our poverty may be more or less of a *mortification*, according to the value which we set on wealth and grandeur; a refusal of a request will produce more or less of *chagrin* as it is accompanied with circumstances more or less *mortifying* to our pride.

Poverty is an evil complicated with so many circumstances of uneasiness and *vezation* that every man is studious to avoid it.—JOHNSON.

I am *mortified* by those compliments which were designed to encourage me.—POPE.

It was your purpose to balance my *chagrin* at the inconsiderable effect of that essay, by representing that it obtained some notice.—HILL.

Vexatious, v. Troublesome.

Vice, v. Crime.

Vice, v. Imperfection.

Vicinity, v. Neighbourhood.

Vicissitude, v. Change.

Victor, v. Conqueror.

To Vie, v. To contend.

To View, v. To look.

View, Survey, Prospect.

View (v. *To look*), and **Survey**, compounded of *vey* or *view* and *sur* over, mark the act of the person, namely, the looking at a thing with more or less attention: **Prospect**, from the Latin *prospectus* and *prospicio* to see before, designates the thing seen. We take a *view* or *survey*, the *prospect* presents itself: the *view* is of an indefinite extent; the *survey* is always comprehensive in its nature. Ignorant people take but narrow *views* of things; men take more or less enlarged *views*, according to their cultivation: the capacious mind of a genius takes a *survey* of all nature. The *view* depends altogether on the train of a person's thoughts; the *prospect* is set before him, it depends upon the nature of the thing: our *views* of advancement are sometimes very fallacious; our *prospects* are very delusive; both occasion disappointment: the former is the keener, as we have to charge the miscalculation upon ourselves. Sometimes our *prospects* depend upon our *views*, at least in matters of religion; he who forms erroneous *views* of a future state has but a wretched *prospect* beyond the grave.

Fools *view* by part, and not the whole *survey*.
So crowd existence all into a day.—JENYNS.

No land so rude but looks beyond the tomb
For future *prospects* in a world to come.—JENYNS.

View, Prospect, Landscape.

View and Prospect (v. *View, prospect*), though applied here to external objects of

sense, have a similar distinction as in the preceding article. The *view* is not only that which may be seen, but that which is actually seen; the *prospect* is that which may be seen; that ceases, therefore, to be a *view*, which has not an immediate agent to *view*; although a *prospect* exists continually, whether seen or not: hence we speak of our *view* being intercepted, but not our *prospect* intercepted; a confined or bounded *view*, but a lively or dreary *prospect*. *View* is an indefinite term; it may be said either of a number of objects or of a single object, of a whole or of a part: *prospect* is said only of an aggregate number of objects: we may have a *view* of a town, of a number of scattered houses, of a single house, or of the spire of a steeple; but the *prospect* comprehends that which comes within the range of the eye. *View* may be said of that which is seen directly or indirectly; *prospect* only of that which directly presents itself to the eye: hence a drawing of an object may be termed a *view*, although not a *prospect*. *View* is confined to no particular objects; *prospect* mostly respects rural objects; and **Landscape** respects no others. *Landscape, landskip, or landshape*, denote any portion of country which is in a particular form: hence the *landscape* is a species of *prospect*. A *prospect* may be wide, and comprehend an assemblage of objects both of nature and art; but a *landscape* is narrow, and lies within the compass of the naked eye: hence it is also that *landscape* may be taken also for the drawing of a *landscape*, and consequently for a species of *view*: the taking of *views* or *landscapes* is the last exercise of the learner in drawing.

Thus was this place
A happy rural seat of various *views*.—MILTON.

Now skies and seas their *prospect* only bound.
DRYDEN.

So lovely seemed
That *landscape*, and of pure now purer air
Meets his approach.—MILTON.

Vigilant, v. Wakeful.

Vigour, v. Energy.

Vile, v. Base.

To Vilify, v. To revile.

To Vindicate, v. To assert.

To Vindicate, v. To avenge.

To Vindicate, v. To defend.

To Violate, v. To infringe.

Violence, v. Force.

**Violent, Furious, Boisterous,
Vehement, Impetuous.**

Violent signifies having force (v. *Force*).

Furious signifies having fury (v. *Anger*).

Boisterous in all probability comes from *bestir*, signifying ready to *bestir* or come into motion.

Vehement, in Latin *vehemens*, compounded of *veho* and *mens*, signifies carried away by the mind or the force of passion.

Impetuous signifies having an *impetus*.

Violent is here the most general, including

the idea of force or violence, which is common to them all; it is as general in its application as in its meaning. When *violent* and *furious* are applied to the same objects, the latter expresses a higher degree of the former: thus a *furious* temper is *violent* to an excessive degree; a *furious* whirlwind is *violent* beyond measure. *Violent* and *boisterous* are likewise applied to the same objects; but the *boisterous* refers only to the *violence* of the motion or noise: hence we say that a wind is *violent*, inasmuch as it acts with great force upon all bodies; it is *boisterous*, inasmuch as it causes the great motion of bodies: a *violent* person deals in *violence* of every kind; a *boisterous* person is full of *violent* action.

Violent, *vehement*, and *impetuous* are all applied to persons, or that which is personal: a man is *violent* in his opinions, *violent* in his measures, *violent* in his resentments; he is *vehement* in his affections or passions, *vehement* in love, *vehement* in zeal, *vehement* in pursuing an object, *vehement* in expression: *violence* transfers itself to some external object on which it acts with force; but *vehemence* respects that species of *violence* which is confined to the person himself: we may dread *violence*, because it is always liable to do mischief; we ought to suppress our *vehemence*, because it is injurious to ourselves: a *violent* partisan renders himself obnoxious to others; a man who is *vehement* in any cause puts it out of his own power to be of use. *Impetuosity* is rather the extreme of *violence* or *vehemence*: an *impetuous* attack is an excessively *violent* attack; an *impetuous* character is an excessively *vehement* character.

This gentleman (Mr. Steele) among a thousand others, is a great instance of the fate of all who are carried away by party spirit of any side; I wish all *violence* may succeed as ill.—POPE.

The *furious* pard,
Cowl'd and subdu'd, flies from the face of man.
SOMERVILLE.

Ye too, ye winds! that now begin to blow
With *boisterous* sweep, I raise my voice to you.
THOMSON.

If there be any use of gesticulation, it must be applied to the ignorant and rude, who will be more affected by *vehemence* than delighted by propriety.—JOHNSON.

The central waters round *impetuous* rush'd.
THOMSON.

Visage, v. Face.

Visible, v. Apparent.

**Vision, Apparition, Phantom,
Spectre, Ghost.**

Vision, from the Latin *visus* seeing or seen, signifies either the act of seeing or thing seen; **Apparition**, from *appear*, signifies the thing that appears. As the thing seen is only the improper signification, the term *vision* is never employed but in regard to some agent: the *vision* depends upon the state of the *visual* organ; the *vision* of a person whose sight is defective will frequently be fallacious; he will see some things double which are single, long which are short, and the like. In like manner, if the sight be miraculously impressed, his *vision* will enable him to see that which is supernatural: hence it is that *vision* is either true or false, according to the circumstances of the individual; and a *vision* signifying a

thing seen is taken for a supernatural exertion of the *vision*; *apparition*, on the contrary, refers us to the object seen; this may be true or false according to the manner in which it presents itself.

Joseph was warned by a *vision* to fly into Egypt with his family; * Mary Magdalen was informed of the resurrection of our Saviour by an *apparition*: feverish people often think they see *visions*; timid and credulous people sometimes take trees and posts for *apparitions*.

Phantom, from the Greek *phantō* to appear, is used for a false *apparition*, or the appearance of a thing otherwise than what it is; thus the *ignis fatuus*, vulgarly called Jack-o'-Lantern, is a *phantom*.

Spectre, from *specio* to behold, and **Ghost** from *geist* a spirit, are the *apparitions* of immaterial substances. The *spectre* is taken for any spiritual being that appears; but *ghost* is taken only for the spirits of departed men who appear to their fellow-creatures; a *spectre* is sometimes made to appear on the stage; *ghosts* exist mostly in the imagination of the young and the ignorant.

Visions and inspirations some expect
Their course here to direct.—COWLEY.

Full fast he flies, and dares not look behind him,
Till out of breath he overtakes his fellows,
Who gather round and wonder at the tale
Of horrid *apparition*.—BLAIR.

The *phantoms* which haunt a desert are want, and misery, and danger.—JOHNSON.

Rous'd from their slumbers,
In grim array the grisly *spectres* rise.—BLAIR.

The lonely tower
Is also shunn'd, whose mournful chambers hold,
So night-struck fancy dreams, the yelling *ghost*.
THOMSON.

Visionary, v. Enthusiast.

Visitant, v. Guest.

Visitor, v. Guest.

Vivacious, v. Lively.

Vivacity, v. Animation.

Vivid, v. Clear.

Vocabulary, v. Dictionary.

Vocal, v. Verbal.

Voice, v. Vote.

Void, v. Empty.

Volatility, v. Lightness.

Voluntarily, v. Willingly.

Voluptuary, v. Sensualist.

Voracious, v. Ravenous.

Vote, Suffrage, Voice.

Vote, in Latin *votum* from *voveo* to vow, is very probably from *vox* a voice, signifying the voice that is raised in supplication to heaven.

Suffrage, in Latin *suffragium*, is in all probability compounded of *sub* and *frango* to break out or declare for a thing.

Voice is here figuratively taken for the voice that is raised in favour of a thing.

* Vide Trusler: "Vision, apparition."

The *vote* is the wish itself, whether expressed or not; a person has a *vote*, that is, the power of wishing; but the *suffrage* and the *voice* are the wish that is expressed; a person gives his *suffrage* or his *voice*.

The *vote* is the settled and fixed wish, it is that by which the most important concerns in life are determined; the *suffrage* is a *vote* given only in particular cases; the *voice* is a partial or occasional wish, expressed only in matters of minor importance.

The *vote* and *voice* are given either for or against a person or thing; the *suffrage* is commonly given in favour of a person: in all public assemblies the majority of *votes* decide the question; members of Parliament are

chosen by the *suffrages* of the people; in the execution of a will every executor has a *voice* in all that is transacted.

The popular vote
Inclines here to continue.—MILTON.

Reputation is commonly lost because it never was deserved; and was conferred at first, not by the *suffrage* of criticism, but by the fondness of friendship.—JOHNSON.

That something's ours when we from life depart,

This all conceive, all feel it at the heart;

The wise of learned antiquity proclaim

This truth; the public voice declares the same.

JENYNS.

To Vouch, *v.* To affirm.

Voyage, *v.* Journey.

Vulgar, *v.* Common.

W.

Wages, *v.* Allowance.

To Wait For, *v.* To wait.

To wait On, *v.* To attend.

Wakeful, Watchful, Vigilant.

We may be **Wakeful** without being **Watchful**; but we cannot be *watchful* without being *wakeful*.

Wakefulness is an affair of the body, and depends upon the temperament; *watchfulness* is an affair of the will, and depends upon the determination: some persons are more *wakeful* than they wish to be; few are as *watchful* as they ought to be.

Vigilance, from the Latin *vigil*, and the Greek *αγᾶλλος*, *αγᾶλλω* to be on the alert, expresses a high degree of *watchfulness*: a sentinel is *watchful* who on ordinary occasions keeps good *watch*; but it is necessary for him, on extraordinary occasions, to be *vigilant* in order to detect whatever may pass.

We are *watchful* only in the proper sense of *watching*; but we may be *vigilant* in detecting moral as well as natural evils.

Music shall wake her that hath power to charm
Pale sickness, and avert the stings of pain;
Can raise or quell our passions, and becalm
In sweet oblivion the too *wakeful* sense.—FENTON.

He who remembers what has fallen out will be *watchful* against what may happen.—SOUTH.

Let a man strictly observe the first hints and whispers of good and evil that pass in his heart; this will keep conscience quick and *vigilant*.—SOUTH.

Walk, *v.* Carriage.

Wan, *v.* Pale.

To Wander, *v.* To deviate.

To Wander, To Stroll, Ramble,
Kove, Roam, Range.

Wander, in German *wandern*, is a frequentative of *wenden* to turn, signifying to turn frequently.

To **Stroll** is probably an intensive of to *roll*, that is, to go in a planless manner.

Ramble, from the Latin *re* and *ambulo*, is to walk backward and forward; and **Rove** is probably a contraction of *ramble*.

Roam is connected with our word *room*, space, signifying to go in a wide space, and the Hebrew *rom* to be violently moved backward and forward.

Range, from the noun *range*, a rank, row, or extended space, signifies to go over a great space. The idea of going in an irregular and free manner is common to all these terms.

To *wander* is to go in no fixed path; to *stroll* is to wander out of a path that we had taken. To *wander* may be an involuntary action; a person may *wander* to a great distance, or for an indefinite length of time; in this manner a person *wanders* who has lost himself in a wood: to *stroll* is a voluntary action, limited at our discretion; thus when a person takes a walk, he sometimes *strolls* from one path into another as he pleases; to *ramble* is to *wander* without any object, and consequently with more than ordinary irregularity; in this manner he who sets out to take a walk, without knowing or thinking where he shall go, *rambles* as chance directs: to *rove* is to *wander* in the same planless manner, but to a wider extent; a fugitive who does not know his road *roves* about the country in quest of some retreat: to *roam* is to *wander* from the impulse of a disordered mind; in this manner a lunatic who has broken loose may *roam* about the country; so likewise a person who travels about, because he cannot rest in quiet at home, may also be said to *roam* in quest of peace: to *range* is the contrary of to *roam*; as the former indicates a disordered state of mind, the latter indicates composure and fixedness; we *range* within certain limits, as the hunter *ranges* the forest, the shepherd *ranges* the mountains.

But far about they *wander* from the grave
Of him whom his ungente fortune urged
Against his own sad breast to lift the hand
Of impious violence.—THOMSON.

I found by the voice of my friend who walked by me, that we had insensibly *strolled* into the grove sacred to the widow.—ADDISON.

I thus rambled from pocket to pocket until the beginning of the civil wars.—ADDISON.

Where is that knowledge now, that regal thought,
With just advice and timely counsel fraught?
Where now, O Judge of Israel, does it rove?

PRIOR.

She looks abroad, and prunes herself for flight,
Like an unwilling inmate long to roam
From this dull earth, and seek her native home.

JENYNS.

The stag too singled from the herd, where long
He rung'd the branching monarch of the shades,
Before the tempest drives.—THOMSON.

Want, v. Poverty.

To Want, Need, Lack.

To be without is the common idea expressed by these terms; but to **Want** is to be without that which contributes to our comfort, or is an object of our desire; to **Need** is to be without that which is essential for our existence or our purposes; to **Lack**, which is probably a variation from *leak*, and a term not in frequent use, expresses little more than the general idea of being without, unaccompanied by any collateral idea. From the close connection which subsists between desiring and *want*, it is usual to consider what we *want* as artificial, and what we *need* as natural and indispensable: what one man *wants* is a superfluity to another: but that which is *needed* by one is in like circumstances *needed* by all: tender people *want* a fire when others would be glad not to have it; all persons *need* warm clothing and a warm house in the winter.

To *want* and *need* may extend indefinitely to many or all objects: to *lack*, or be deficient, is properly said of a single object; we may *want* or *need* everything: we lack one thing, we *lack* this or that; a rich man may *lack* understanding, virtue, or religion; he who *wants* nothing is a happy man: he who *needs* nothing may be happy if he *wants* no more than he has; for then he *lacks* that which alone can make him happy, which is contentment.

To be rich is to have more than is desired, and more than is *wanted*.—JOHNSON.

The old from such affairs are only freed,
Which vigorous youth and strength of body *need*.

DENHAM.

See the mind of beastly man!
That hath so soon forgot the excellence
Of his creation, when he life began.
That now he chooseth with vile difference
To be a beast and *lack* intelligence.—SPENSER.

Ware, v. Commodity.

Warlike, v. Martial.

Warmth, v. Fire.

Warning, v. Admonition.

To Warrant, v. To guarantee.

Wary, v. Cautious.

To Waste, v. To spend.

To Watch, v. To guard.

To Watch, v. To observe.

Watchful, v. Wakeful.

Waterman, v. Seaman.

Waterman, Boatman, Ferryman.

These three terms are employed for persons who are engaged with boats; but the term

Waterman is specifically applied to such whose business it is to let out their boats and themselves for a given time; the **Boatman** may use a boat only occasionally for the transfer of goods; a **Ferryman** uses a boat only for the conveyance of persons or goods across a particular river or piece of water.

Wave, Billow, Surge, Breaker.

Wave, from the Saxon *waegan*, and German *wiegen* to weigh or rock, is applied to water in an undulating state; it is, therefore, the generic term, and the rest are specific terms: those *waves* which swell more than ordinarily are termed **Billows**, which is derived from *bulge* or *bilge*, and German *balg*, the paunch or belly: those *waves* which rise higher than usual are termed **Surges**, from the Latin *surgo* to rise: those *waves* which dash against the shore, or against vessels, with more than ordinary force, are termed **Breakers**.

The wave behind impels the wave before.—POPE.

I saw him beat the billows under him,
And ride upon their backs.—SHAKESPEARE.

He flies aloft, and with impetuous roar
Pursues the foaming surges to the shore.

DRYDEN.

Now on the mountain wave on high they ride,
Then downward plunge beneath th' involving tide,
Till one who seems in agony to strive,
The whirling breakers heave on shore alive.

FALCONER.

To Waver, v. To fluctuate.

Wavering, v. Undetermined.

Way, Manner, Method, Mode, Course, Means.

All these words denote the steps which are pursued from the beginning to the completion of any work. The **Way** is both general and indefinite; it is either taken by accident or chosen by design: the **Manner** and **Method** are species of the *way* chosen by design; the former in regard to orders. Whoever attempts to do that which is strange to him will at first do it in an awkward *way*: the *manner* of conferring a favour is often more than the favour itself; experience supplies men in the end with a suitable *method* of carrying on their business. The *method* is said of that which requires contrivance; the **Mode**, of that which requires practice and habitual attention; the former being applied to matters of art, and the latter to mechanical actions: the master has a good *method* of teaching to write; the scholar has a good or bad *mode* of holding his pen. The **Course** and the **Means** are the *way* which we pursue in our moral conduct: the *course* is the *course* of measures which are adopted to produce a certain result; the *means* collectively for the *course* which lead to a certain end: in order to obtain legal redress, we must pursue a certain *course* in law; law is one *means* of gaining redress, but we do wisely, if we can, to adopt the safer and pleasanter *means* of persuasion and cool remonstrance.

The ways of heaven are dark and intricate.—ADDISON.

My mind is taken up in a more melancholy manner.—ATTERTON.

Men are willing to try all *methods* of reconciling guilt and quiet.—JOHNSON.

Modes of speech, which owe their prevalence to modish folly, die away with their inventors.—JOHNSON.

All your sophisters cannot produce anything better adapted to preserve a rational and manly freedom than the course that we have pursued.—BURKE.

The most wonderful things are brought about in many instances by means the most absurd and ridiculous.—BURKE.

Weak, Feeble, Infirm.

Weak, in Saxon *wacc*, Dutch *wack*, German *schwach*, is in all probability an intensive of *weich* soft, which comes from *weichen* to yield, and this from *bewegen* to move.

Feeble, probably contracted from *failable*.

Infirm, *v. Debility*.

The Saxon term *weak* is here, as it usually is, the familiar and universal term; *feeble* is suited to a more polished style; *infirm* is only a species of the *weak*: we may be *weak* in body or mind; but we are commonly *feeble* and *infirm* only in the body: we may be *weak* from disease, or *weak* by nature, it equally conveys the gross idea of a defect: but the term *feeble* and *infirm* are qualified expressions for *weakness*: a child is *feeble* from its infancy; an old man is *feeble* from age; the latter may likewise be *infirm* in consequence of sickness. We pity the *weak*, but their *weakness* often gives us pain; we assist the *feeble* when they attempt to walk; we support the *infirm* when they are unable to stand. The same distinction exists between *weak* and *feeble* in the moral use of the words: a *weak* attempt to excuse a person conveys a reproachful meaning; but the *feeble* efforts which we make to defend another may be praiseworthy, although *feeble*.

You, gallant Vernon I saw
The miserable scene: you pitying saw;
To infant *weakness* sunk the warrior's arm.
THOMSON.

Command th' assistance of a friend,
But *feeble* are the succours I can send.—DRYDEN.

At my age, and under my *infirmities*, I can have no relief but those with which religion furnishes me.—ATTERBURY.

To Weaken, Enfeeble, Debilitate, Enervate, Invalidate.

To **Weaken** is to make *weak* (*v. Weak*), and is, as before, the generic term: to **Enfeeble** is to make *feeble* (*v. Weak*): to **Debilitate** is to cause *debility* (*v. Debility*): to **Enervate** is to *unnerve*; and to **Invalidate** is to make not valid or strong: all of which are but modes of *weakening* applicable to different objects. To *weaken* may be either a temporary or permanent act when applied to persons; *enfeeble* is permanent either as to the body or the mind: we may be *weakened* suddenly by severe pain; we are *enfeebled* in a gradual manner, either by the slow effects of disease or age. To *weaken* is either a particular or a complete act; to *enfeeble*, to *debilitate*, and *enervate* are properly partial acts: what *enfeebles* deprives of vital or essential power; what *debilitates* may lessen power in one particular, though not in another; the severe exercise of any power, such as the memory or the attention, will tend to *debilitate* that faculty: what *enervates* acts particularly on the nervous system; it relaxes the frame, and unfits the person for action either of body or mind. To

weaken is said of things as well as persons; to *invalidate* is said of things only: we *weaken* the force of an argument by an injudicious application; we *invalidate* the claim of another by proving its informality in law.

No article of faith can be true which *weakens* the practical part of religion.—ADDISON.

So much hath hell debas'd, and pain
Enfeebled me, to what I was in heav'n.—MILTON.

Sometimes the body in full strength we find,
Whilst various ails *debilitate* the mind.—JENYNS.

Elevated by success, and *enervated* by luxury, the military, in the time of the emperors, soon became incapable of fatigue.—GIBBON.

Do they (the Jacobins) mean to *invalidate* that great body of our statute law which passed under those whom they treat as usurpers?—BURKE.

Weakness, *v. Imperfection*.

Wealth, *v. Riches*.

Weapon, *v. Arms*.

Weariness, *v. Fatigue*.

Wearisome, Tiresome, Tedious.

Wearisome (*v. To weary*) is the general and indefinite term; **Tiresome** (*v. To weary*); and **Tedious**, causing *tedium*, a specific form of *wearisomeness*: common things may cause *weariness*; that which acts painfully is either *tiresome* or *tedious*, but in different degrees; the repetition of the same sounds will grow *tiresome*; long waiting in anxious suspense is *tedious*: there is more of that which is physical in the *tiresome*, and mental in the *tedious*.

All weariness presupposes weakness, and consequently every long, importune, *wearisome* petition is truly and properly a force upon him that is pursued with it.—SOUTH.

Far happier were the meanest peasant's lot
Than to be plac'd on high, in anxious pride,
The purple drudge and slave of *tiresome* state.
WEST.

Happy the mortal man who now, at last,
Has through this doleful vale of misery past,
Who to his destin'd stage has carried on
The *tedious* load, and laid his burden down.
PRIOR.

To Weary, Tire, Jade, Harass.

To **Weary** is a frequentative of *wear*, that is, to *wear* out the strength.

To **Tire**, from the French *tirer* and the Latin *traho* to draw, signifies to *draw* out the strength.

To **Jade** is the same as to *goad*.

Harass, *v. Distress*.

Long exertion *wearies*; a little exertion will *tire* a child or a weak man; forced exertions *jade* painful exertions, or exertions coupled with painful circumstances, *harass*: the horse is *jaded* who is forced on beyond his strength; the soldier is *harassed* who marches in perpetual fear of an attack from the enemy. We are *wearyed* with thinking when it gives us pain to think any longer; we are *tired* of our employment when it ceases to give us pleasure; we are *jaded* by incessant attention to business; we are *harassed* by perpetual complaints which we cannot redress.

All pleasures that affect the body must needs *weary*.—SOUTH.

Every morsel to a satisfied hunger is only a new labour to a tired digestion.—SOUTH.

I recall the time (and am glad it is over) when about this hour (six in the morning) I used to be going to bed surfeited with pleasure, or jaded with business.—BOLINGBROKE.

Bankrupt nobility, a factious, giddy, and Divided Senate, a *harass'd* commonalty, Is all the strength of Venice.—OTWAY.

Wedding, v. Marriage.

Wedlock, v. Marriage.

To Weep, v. To cry.

Weight, v. Importance.

Weight, Heaviness, Gravity.

Weight, from *to weigh*, is that which a thing weighs.

Heaviness, from *heavy* and *heave*, signifies the abstract quality of the *heavy*, or difficult to heave.

Gravity, from the Latin *gravis*, likewise denotes the same abstract quality.

Weight is indefinite; whatever may be weighed has a *weight*, whether large or small: *heaviness* and *gravity* are the property of bodies having a great *weight*. **Weight** is only opposed to that which has or is supposed to have no *weight*, that is, what is incorporeal or immaterial; for we may speak of the *weight* of the lightest conceivable bodies, as the *weight* of a feather: *heaviness* is opposed to lightness; the *heaviness* of lead is opposed to the lightness of a feather.

Weight lies absolutely in the thing; *heaviness* is relatively considered with respect to the person: we estimate the *weight* of things according to a certain measure; we estimate the *heaviness* of things by our feelings.

Gravity is that species of *weight* which is scientifically considered as inherent in certain bodies; the term is therefore properly scientific.

Weight, Burden, Load.

Weight, v. Weight.

Burden, from *bear*, signifies the thing borne.

Load, in German *laden*, is supposed by Adelung to admit of a derivation from different sources; but he does not suppose that which appears to me the most natural, namely, from *lay*, which becomes in our preterite *laid*, particularly since in Low German and Dutch *laden*, to *load*, is contracted into *laeyen*, and the literal meaning of *load* is to lay on or in anything.

The term *weight* is here considered in common with the other terms, in the sense of a positive *weight*, as respects the persons or things by which it is allied to the word *burden*: the *weight* is said either of persons or things: the *burden* more commonly respects persons; the *load* may be said of either: a person may sink under the *weight* that rests upon him; a platform may break down from the *weight* upon it; a person sinks under his *burden* or *load*; a cart breaks down from the *load*. The *weight* is abstractedly taken for what is without reference to the cause of its being there; *burden* and *load* have respect to the person or

thing by which they are produced; accident produces the *weight*; a person takes a *burden* upon himself, or has it imposed upon him; the *load* is always laid on: it is not proper to carry any *weight* that exceeds our strength; those who bear the *burden* expect to reap the fruit of their labour; he who carries *loads* must be contented to take such as are given him.

In the moral application, these terms mark the pain which is produced by a pressure; but the *weight* and *load* rather describe the positive severity of the pressure; the *burden* respects the temper and inclinations of the sufferer; the *load* is in this case a very great *weight*: a minister of state has a *weight* on his mind at all times, from the heavy responsibility which attaches to his station; one who labours under strong apprehensions or dread of an evil has a *load* on his mind; any sort of employment is a *burden* to one who wishes to be idle; and time unemployed is a *burden* to him who wishes to be always in action.

With what oppressive *weight* will sickness, disappointment, or old age fall upon the spirits of that man who is a stranger to God?—BLAIR.

Understood not that a grateful mind
By owing owes not, but still pays at once;
Indebted and discharg'd: what burden then?

MILTON.

His barns are stor'd,
And groaning saddles bend beneath their load.
SOMERVILLE.

Weighty, v. Heavy.

Well-Being, Welfare, Prosperity, Happiness.

Well-Being may be said of one or many, but more of a body; the *well-being* of society depends upon a due subordination of the different ranks of which it is composed. **Welfare**, or *faring well*, from the German *fahren* to go, respects the good condition of an individual: a parent is naturally anxious for the *welfare* of his child.

Well-being and *welfare* consist of such things as more immediately affect our existence: **Prosperity**, which comprehends both *well-being* and *welfare*, includes likewise all that can add to the enjoyments of man. The *prosperity* of a state, or of an individual, therefore, consists in the increase of wealth, power, honours, and the like; as outward circumstances more or less affect the **Happiness** of man: *happiness* is, therefore, often substituted for *prosperity*; but it must never be forgotten that *happiness* properly lies only in the mind, and that consequently *prosperity* may exist without *happiness*; but *happiness*, at least as far as respects a body of men, cannot exist without some portion of *prosperity*.

Have free-thinkers been authors of any inventions that conduce to the *well-being* of mankind?—BERKELEY.

For his own sake no duty he can ask.

The common *welfare* is our only task.—JENYNS.

Religion affords to good men peculiar security in the enjoyment of their *prosperity*.—BLAIR.

Welcome, v. Acceptable.

Welfare, v. Well-being.

To Wheedle, v. To coax.

Whimsical, v. Fanciful.

To Whirl, v. To turn.

Whole, v. All.

Whole, Entire, Complete, Total, Integral.

* **Whole** excludes subtraction; **Entire** excludes division; **Complete** excludes deficiency: a *whole* orange has had nothing taken from it; an *entire* orange is not yet cut; and a *complete* orange is grown to its full size: it is possible, therefore, for a thing to be *whole* and not *entire*; and to be both, and yet not *complete*: an orange cut into parts is *whole* while all the parts remain together, but it is not *entire*; hence we speak of a *whole* house, an *entire* set, and a *complete* book. The *wholeness* or integrity of a thing is destroyed at one's pleasure; its *completeness* depends upon circumstances.

Total denotes the aggregate of the parts; *whole* the junction of all the parts: the former is, therefore, employed more in the moral sense to convey the idea of extent, and the latter mostly in the proper sense: hence we speak of the *total* destruction of the *whole* city, or of some particular houses: the *total* amount of expenses; the *whole* expense of the war. *Whole* and *total* may in this manner be employed to denote things as well as qualities: in regard to material substances a *whole* is always opposed to the parts of which it is composed; the *total* is the collective sum of the parts; and the *Integral* is the same as the *integral* number.

The first four may likewise be employed as adverbs; but *wholly* is a more familiar term than *totally* in expressing the idea of extent; *entirely* is the same as undividely; *completely* is the same as perfectly, without anything wanting: we are *wholly* or *totally* ignorant of the affair; we are *entirely* at the disposal or service of another; we are *completely* at variance in our accounts.

And all so forming an harmonious *whole*.—THOMSON.

The *entire* conquest of the passions is so difficult a work, that they who despair of it should think of a less difficult task, and only attempt to regulate them.—STEELE.

And oft, when unobserv'd,
Steal from the barn a straw, till soft and warm,
Clean and complete, their habitation grows.

THOMSON.

Nothing under a *total* thorough change in the convert will suffice.—SOUTH.

Wholesome, v. Healthy.

Wicked, v. Bad.

Wicked, Unjust, Iniquitous.

Wicked (v. *Bad*) is here the generic term; **Iniquitous**, from *iniquus* unjust, signifies that species of *wickedness* which consists in violating the law of right betwixt man and man; **Nefarious**, from the Latin *nefas* wicked or abominable, is that species of *wickedness* which consists in violating the most sacred obligations. The term *wicked*, being indefinite, is commonly applied in a milder sense than *iniquitous*; and *iniquitous* than *nefarious*: it

is *wicked* to deprive another of his property unlawfully, under any circumstances; but it is *iniquitous* if it be done by fraud and circumvention; and *nefarious* if it involves any breach of trust: any undue influence over another, in the making of his will, to the detriment of the rightful heir, is *iniquitous*; any underhand dealing of a servant to defraud his master is *nefarious*.

In the corrupted currents of this world,
Offence's gilded hand may shove by justice;
And oft 'tis seen, the *wicked* prize itself
Buys out the law.—SHAKESPEARE.

Lucullus found that the province of Pontus had fallen under great disorders and oppressions from the *iniquity* of usurers and publicans.—FRIEBAUX.

Wide, v. Large.

To Will, Wish.

The **Will** is that faculty of the soul which is the most prompt and decisive; it immediately impels to action: the **Wish** is but a gentle motion of the soul towards a thing. We can *will* nothing but what we can effect; we may *wish* for many things which lie above our reach. The *will* must be under the entire control of reason, or it will lead a person into every mischief: *wishes* ought to be under the direction of reason, or otherwise they may greatly disturb our happiness.

A good inclination is but the first rude draught of virtue; but the finishing strokes are from the *will*.—SOUTH.

The *wishing* of a thing is not properly the *will*ing of it; it imports no more than an idle, unoperative, complacency in, and desire of, the object.—SOUTH.

Willingly, Voluntarily, Spontaneously.

To do a thing **Willingly** is to do it with a good will; to do a thing **Voluntarily** is to do it of one's own accord: the former respects one's *willingness* to comply with the wishes of another; we do what is asked of us, it is a mark of good-nature: the latter respects our freedom from foreign influence; we do that which we like to do; it is a mark of our sincerity. It is pleasant to see a child do his task *willingly*; it is pleasant to see a man *voluntarily* engage in any service of public good. **Spontaneously** is but a mode of the *voluntary*, applied, however, more commonly to inanimate objects than to the will of persons: the ground produces *spontaneously* when it produces without culture; and words flow *spontaneously* which require no effort on the part of the speaker to produce them. If, however, applied to the will, it bespeaks in a stronger degree the totally unbiassed state of the agent's mind: the *spontaneous* effusions of the heart are more than the *voluntary* services of benevolence. The *willing* is opposed to the *unwilling*, the *voluntary* to the *mechanical* or *involuntary*, the *spontaneous* to the *reluctant* or the *artificial*.

Food not of angels, yet accepted so,
As that more *willingly* thou couldst not seem
At heav'n's high feasts t' have fed.—MILTON.

Thoughts are only criminal when they are first chosen, and then *voluntarily* continued.—JOHNSON.

Of these none uncontrol'd and lawless rove,
But to some destin'd end *spontaneous* move.

JENYNS.

* Vide Girard: "Entier, complet."

Wily, *v. Cunning.*

To Win, *v. To acquire.*

To Wind, *v. To turn.*

Wisdom, Prudence.

Wisdom (*v. Wit*) consists in speculative knowledge; **Prudence** (*v. Prudent*) in that which is practical: the former knows what is past; the latter by foresight knows what is to come: many wise men are remarkable for their want of *prudence*; and those who are remarkable for *prudence* have frequently no other knowledge of which they can boast.

Two things speak much the *wisdom* of a nation: good laws, and a *prudent* management of them.—STILLING-FLEET.

To Wish, *v. To desire.*

To Wish, *v. To will.*

Wit, *v. Ingenuity.*

Wit, Humour, Satire, Irony, Burlesque.

Wit, like wisdom, according to its original, from *weissen* to know, signifies knowledge, but it has so extended its meaning as to signify that faculty of the mind by which knowledge or truth is perceived. The first property of *wit*, as an exertion of the intellectual faculty, is that it be spontaneous, and as it were instinctive: laboured or forced *wit* is no *wit*. Reflection and experience supply us with wisdom; study and labour supply us with learning; but *wit* seizes with an eagle eye that which escapes the notice of the deep thinker, and elicits truths which are in vain sought for with any severe effort. **Humour** is a species of *wit* which flows out of the *humour* of a person. *Wit*, as distinguished from *humour*, may consist of a single brilliant thought; but *humour* runs in a vein; it is hot & striking, but an equable and pleasing, flow of *wit*. Of this description of *wit* Mr. Addison has given us the most admirable specimens in his writings, who knew best how to explain what *wit* and *humour* was, and to illustrate it by his practice. **Satire**, from *satyr*, probably from *sal* and *ira* abounding in anger, and **Irony**, from the Greek *epovvia* simulation and dissimulation, are personal and censorious sorts of *wit*; the first of which openly points at the object, and the second in a covert manner takes its aim. **Burlesque** is rather a species of *humour* than direct *wit*, which consists in an assemblage of ideas extravagantly discordant. The *satire* and *irony* are the most ill-natured kinds of *wit*; *burlesque* stands in the lowest rank.

Wit lies most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety.—ADDISON.

In a true piece of *wit* all things must be,
Yet all things there agree.—COWLEY.

For sure by *wit* is chiefly meant
Applying well what we invent:
What *humour* is, not all the tribe
Of logic-mongers can describe;
Here nature only acts her part,
Unhelp'd by practice, books, or art.—SWIFT.

There is a kind of nature, a certain regularity of thought, which must discover the writer (of *humour*) to be a man of sense at the same time that he appears altogether given up to caprice.—ADDISON.

The ordinary subjects of *satire* are such as excite the greatest indignation in the best temper.—ADDISON.

In writings of *humour*, figures are sometimes used of so delicate a nature that it shall often happen that some people will see things in a direct contrary sense to what the author and the majority of the readers understand them; to such the most innocent *irony* may appear *irre-*

ligion.—CAMBRIDGE.

One kind of *burlesque* represents many persons in the accoutrements of heroes.—ADDISON.

Witness, *v. Deponent.*

To Withdraw, *v. To recede.*

To Withstand, *v. To oppose.*

Without, *v. Unless.*

Without Intermission, *v. Incessantly.*

Woeful, *v. Piteous.*

Wonder, Admire, Surprise, Astonish, Amaze.

Wonder, in German *wundern*, &c., is in all probability a variation of *wander*; because *wonder* throws the mind off its bias.

Admire, from the Latin *miror*, and the Hebrew *marah* to look at, signifies looking at attentively.

Surprise, compounded of *sur* and *prize*, or the Latin *prehendo*, signifies to take on a sudden.

Astonish, from the Latin *attonitus*, and *tonitru* thunder, signifies to strike as it were with the overpowering noise of thunder.

Amaze signifies to be in a *maze*, so as not to be able to collect one's-self.

That particular feeling which any thing unusual produces on our minds is expressed by all these terms, but under various modifications. *Wonder* is the most indefinite in its signification or application, but it is still the least vivid sentiment of all: it amounts to little more than a pausing of the mind, a suspension of the thinking faculty, an incapacity to fix on a discernable point in an object that rouses our curiosity: it is that state which all must experience at times, but none so much as those who are ignorant; they *wonder* at everything because they know nothing. *Admiration* is *wonder* mixed with esteem or veneration: the *admirer* suspends his thoughts, not from the vacancy but the fulness of his mind: he is rivetted to an object which for a time absorbs his faculties: nothing but what is great and good excites *admiration*, and none but cultivated minds are susceptible of it: an ignorant person cannot *admire*, because he cannot appreciate the value of anything. *Surprise* and *astonishment* both arise from that which happens unexpectedly; they are species of *wonder* differing in degree, and produced only by the events of life: the *surprise*, as its derivation implies, takes us unawares; we are *surprised* if that does not happen which we calculate upon, as the absence of a friend whom we looked for; or we are *surprised* if that happens which we did not calculate upon; thus we are *surprised* to see a friend returned whom we supposed was on his journey: *astonishment* may be awakened by similar events which are more unexpected and more unaccountable: thus we are *aston-*

ished to find a friend at our house whom we had every reason to suppose was many hundred miles off: or we are *astonished* to hear that a person has got safely through a road which we conceived to be absolutely impassable.

Surprise may for a moment startle; *astonishment* may stupefy and cause an entire suspension of the faculties; but *amazement* has also a mixture of perturbation. We may be *surprised* and *astonished* at things in which we have no particular interest: we are mostly *amazed* at that which immediately concerns us. We may be *surprised* agreeably or otherwise; we may be *astonished* at that which is agreeable, although *astonishment* is not itself a pleasure; but we are *amazed* at that which happens contrary to our inclination. We are agreeably *surprised* to see our friends: we are *astonished* how we ever got through the difficulty: we are *amazed* at the sudden and unexpected events which have come upon us to our ruin. A man of experience will not have much to *wonder* at, for his observation will supply him with corresponding examples of whatever passes: a wise man will have but momentary *surprises*; as he has estimated the uncertainty of human life, few things of importance will happen contrary to his expectations: a generous mind will be *astonished* at gross instances of perfidy in others: there is no mind that may not sometimes be thrown into *amazement* at the awful dispensations of Providence.

The reader of the "Seasons" wonders that he never saw before what Thomson shows him.—JOHNSON.

With eyes insatiate and tumultuous joy,
Beholds the presents, and admires the boy.
—DRYDEN.

So little do we accustom ourselves to consider the effects of time, that things necessary and certain often *surprise* us like unexpected contingencies.—JOHNSON.

I have often been *astonished*, considering that the mutual intercourse between the two countries (France and England) has lately been very great, to find how little you seem to know of us.—BURKE.

Amazement seizes all; the gen'ral cry
Proclaims Laocoon justly doom'd to die.—DRYDEN.

Wonder, Miracle, Marvel, Prodigy, Monster.

Wonder is that which causes *wonder* (*v. Wonder*).

Miracle, in Latin *miraculum*, and *miror* to *wonder*, comes from the Hebrew *mevakh* seen, signifying that which strikes the sense. **Marvel** is a variation of *miracle*.

Prodigy, in Latin *prodigium*, from *pro-diyo*, or *procul* and *ago* to launch forth, signifies the thing launching forth.

Monster, in Latin *monstrum*, comes from *monere* to advise or give notice; because among the Romans any unaccountable appearance was considered as an indication of some future event.

Wonders are natural: *miracles* are supernatural. The whole Creation is full of *wonders*; the Bible contains an account of the *miracles* which happened in those days. *Wonders* are real; *marvels* are often fictitious; *prodigies* are extravagant and imaginary. Natural history is full of *wonders*; travels abound in *marvels* or in *marvellous* stories,

which are the inventions either of the artful or the ignorant and credulous: ancient history contains numberless accounts of *prodigies*. *Wonders* are agreeable to the laws of nature; they are *wonderful* only as respects ourselves: *monsters* are violations of the laws of nature. The production of a tree from a grain of seed is a *wonder*; but the production of a calf with two heads is a *monster*.

His wisdom such as once it did appear,
Three kingdoms' wonder, and three kingdoms' fear.
—DENHAM.

Murder, though it have no tongue, will speak
With most miraculous organ.—SHAKESPEARE.
Ill omens may the guilty tremble at,
Make every accident a prodigy,
And monsters frame where nature never err'd.—LEE.

Wooer, *v. Lover*.

Word, *v. Promise*.

Word, Term, Expression.

* **Word** is here the generic term; the other two are specific. Every **Term** and **Expression** is a *word*; but every *word* is not denominated a *term* or *expression*. Language consists of *words*; they are the connected sounds which serve for the communication of thought. *Term*, from *terminus* a boundary, signifies any *word* that has a specific or limited meaning; *expression* (*v. To express*) signifies any *word* which conveys a forcible meaning. Usage determines *words*; science fixes *terms*; sentiment provides *expressions*. The purity of a style depends on the choice of *words*; the precision of a writer depends upon the choice of his *terms*; the force of a writer depends upon the aptitude of his *expressions*.

The grammarian treats on the nature of *words*; the philosopher weighs the value of scientific *terms*; the rhetorician estimates the force of *expressions*. The French have coined many new *words* since the revolution: *terms* of art admit of no change after the signification is fully defined: *expressions* vary according to the connection in which they are introduced.

As all words in few letters live,
Thou to few words all sense dost give.—COWLEY.

The use of the *word minister* is brought down to the literal signification of it, a servant; for now to serve and to minister, serve and ministerial, are *terms* equivalent.—SOUTH.

A maxim, or moral saying, naturally receives this form of the antithesis, because it is designed to be engraven on the memory, which recalls it more easily by the help of such contrasted *expressions*.—BLAIR.

Work, Labour, Toil, Drudgery.

Work, in Saxon *weorc*, Greek *epyon*, Hebrew *areg*.

Labour, *v. To Labour*.

Toil, probably connected with *til*.

Drudgery, *v. Servant*.

Work is the general term, as including that which calls for the exertion of our strength; *labour* differs from it in the degree of exertion required; it is hard *work*: *toil* expresses a still higher degree of painful exertion: *drudgery* implies a mean and degrading *work*.

* Girard: "Term, expression."

Every member of society must *work* for his support, if he is not in independent circumstances: the poor are obliged to *labour* for their daily subsistence; some are compelled to *toil* incessantly for the pittance which they earn: *drudgery* falls to the lot of those who are the lowest in society. A man wishes to complete his *work*; he is desirous of resting from his *labour*; he seeks for a respite from his *toil*; he submits to *drudgery*.

The hiring thus
With *labour* drudges out the painful day.—*ROWE*.

Work. *Production.*

Work, Operation.

Work (*v. Work*) is simple exertion: **Operation** is a combined exertion.

Work may be purely mechanical: the *operation* has mostly a method: the day-labourer performs his *work* by the use of his hands only; a medical man performs an *operation* by the exercise of his skill.

Some deadly draught, some enemy to life,
Boils in my bowels, and *works* out my soul.
DRYDEN.

Sometimes a passion seems to *operate*,
Almost in contradiction to itself.—*SHIRLEY*.

Workman, v. Artificer.

Worldly, v. Secular.

To Worship, v. To adore.

Worth, v. To deserve.

Worth, v. Value.

Worthless, v. Unworthy.

To Wrangle, v. To jangle.

Wrath, v. Anger.

To Wrench, v. To turn.

To Wrest, v. To turn.

Wretched, v. Unhappy.

To Wring, v. To turn.

Writer, Penman, Scribe.

Writer is an indefinite term; every one who *writes* is called a *writer*; but none are **Penmen** but such as are expert at their pen. Many who profess to teach *writing* are themselves but sorry *writers*: the best *penmen* are not always the best teachers of *writing*. The **Scribe** is one who *writes* for the purpose of copying; he is therefore an official *writer*.

Writer, Author.

Writer refers us to the act of *writing*. **Author** to the act of inventing. There are therefore many *writers* who are not *authors*; but there is no *author* of books who may not be termed a *writer*: compilers and contributors to periodical works are *writers*, but not *authors*. Poets and historians are properly termed *authors*, but not *writers*.

To Writhe, v. To turn.

Wrong, v. Injury.

Y.

Yet, v. However.

To Yield, v. To afford.

To Yield, v. To bear.

To Yield, v. To comply.

Yielding, v. Complaint.

To Yield, v. To give up.

Youthful, Juvenile, Puerile.

Youthful signifies full of *youth*, or in the complete state of *youth*: **Juvenile**, from the Latin *juvenis*, signifies the same; but **Puerile** from *puer* a boy, signifies literally *boyish*. Hence the first two terms are taken in an indifferent sense; but the latter in a bad sense, or at least always in the sense of what

is suitable to a boy only: thus we speak of *youthful* vigour, *youthful* employments, *juvenile* performances, *juvenile* years, and the like: but *puerile* objections, *puerile* conduct, and the like. Sometimes *juvenile* is taken in the bad sense when speaking of *youth* in contrast with men, as *juvenile* tricks; but *puerile* is a much stronger term of reproach, and marks the absence of manhood in those who ought to be men. We expect nothing from a *youth* but what is *juvenile*; we are surprised and dissatisfied to see what is *puerile* in a man.

Chorcbus, then with *youthful* hopes begun'd,
Swain with success, and of a daring mind,
This new invention fatally design'd.—*DRYDEN*.

Raw *juvenile* writers imagine that, by pouring forth figures often, they render their compositions warm and animated.—*BLAIR*.

After the common course of *puerile* studies, he was put an apprentice to a brewer.—*JOHNSON*.

THE END.

